INTRAMUROS TENNIS CLUB, INC.

(ITC), PHILIPPINE TENNIS

ASSOCIATION (PHILTA) and ITC TENNIS PLAYERS, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (PTA), CLUB INTRAMUROS,
and COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, respondents.

G.R. No. 135630

September 26, 2000

PONENTE: GONZAGA-REYES, J.

FACTS:

Private respondent Philippine Tourism Authority (Tourism Authority) owns the

Victoria Tennis Courts in Intramuros, Manila by virtue of PD 1763. In a
Memorandum of Agreement executed in 1987, Tourism Authority transferred the
management, operation, administration and development of the Victoria Tennis
Courts to petitioner Philippine Tennis Association (Tennis Association) for a
period of 10 years. Petitioner Intramuros Tennis Club (ITC) is an affiliate of
Tennis Association and has for its members tennis players and enthusiasts who
regularly use the facilities of the Victoria Tennis Courts. During the effectivity
of the MOA, the Tourism Authority wrote to the Tennis Association alleging
violations by the Tennis Association of the terms and conditions of the MOA.
The former demanded the surrender of the possession of Victoria Tennis
Courts. The Tourism Authority wrote a second letter demanding the Tennis
Association to vacate the premises and to give way to the Tourism Authority’s
golf course expansion program with private respondent Club Intramuros.

Petitioners Tennis Association instituted a case for preliminary injunction, damages

and prayer for TRO with the RTC. Among others, it alleged that by complying
with the demand to vacate, petitioner ITC stands to sustain liability because
it had prior commitments to use the Victoria Tennis Courts for two activities. The
TRO was granted as well as the preliminary injunction. Tourism Authority filed
a motion to dismiss stating that in view of the expiration of the MOA,
petitioner’s cause of action was moot and academic. Motion to Dismiss was
granted.

Petitioners Tennis Association appealed. While the appeal was pending,

respondents Tourism Authority filed a motion for execution of judgment
pending appeal. It alleged that there was an urgent necessity on the part of
respondents to immediately take possession of the Victoria Tennis Courts by
reason of its being heavily deteriorated and un-sanitized because of petitioner’s
failure to maintain its good condition. Court granted the motion for execution.
In their MR, petitioners argue that under Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the ROC,
respondent Court should have conducted hearings to ascertain whether there
were good reasons to issue the writ of execution pending appeal. Such was
denied. Hence, the present civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC’s order granting the Motion to Dismiss was a “final order”?

COURT’S RULING:

Yes. The respondent court may order execution pending appeal when the ff.
conditions are present: 1) there must be a judgment or final order; 2) the trial
court must have lost jurisdiction over the case; 3) there must be “good reasons”
to allow execution; 4) such good reasons must be stated in a special order after
due order. The RTC order which granted the Tourism Authority’s motion to
dismiss was a final order within the contemplation of Sec. 2, Rule 39 of ROC.
There is a difference between a “final” judgment or order and one which has
“become final” or one that has become “final and executory.” A “final” judgment
or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court
to do in respect thereto-such as an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis
of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights
and obligations of the parties and which party is in the right, or a judgment or
order that dismisses an action on the ground of res judicata or prescription, for
instance. A “final” judgment or order in the sense just described becomes “final
and executory” upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom where no
appeal has been duly perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the
judgment of the appellate court in turn becomes final. It is called “final and
executory” judgment because execution at such point issues as a matter of right.
By its provisional nature, the remedy of execution pending appeal requires
only a “final” judgment or order and a “final and executory” judgment or order.
The RTC order granting the Motion to Dismiss, lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction and held private respondents entitled to possess the Victoria Tennis
Courts is a final order within the contemplation of Rule 39 of ROC, inasmuch
as it makes an adjudication on the merits of the case and dismisses petitioners’
action. Furthermore, at the time the motion for execution pending appeal was filed,
the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the case as petitioners’ appeal had
already been perfected and the records of the case transmitted to respondent court.
We uphold CA’s position in granting the motion for execution pending appeal
without a full-blown or trial-type hearing as long as there was opportunity to
be heard. The only issue remaining is whether or not there was GADLEJ in granting
the motion. Execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the
general rule that only a final judgment may be executed. Thus, the existence
of good reasons is essential. In this case, the Court said that good reasons to
grant the motion exist. The trial court was deteriorating thus respondent has to
take possession to save it from its condition.

The instant petition is DISMISSED. The validity of the writ of execution issued
and implemented pursuant to the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July
9, 1998 and September 23, 1998 is SUSTAINED. No costs.