Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 78813-14 November 8, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FARHAD HATANI y ABOLHASSAN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Nestor I. Madlansacay, counsel de parte for accused-appellant.

Nasser A. Marohomsalic, collaborating counsel for accused-appellant.

QUIASON, J.:

This is an appeal from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, convicting
appellant in Criminal Cases No. Q-11867 and No. Q-11868.

The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Farhad Hatani y
Abolhassan, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal practice of medicine in violation of
R.A. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 (Secs. 8, 10) penalized by Section 28
thereof with "a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, or by imprisonment of not less than one
year nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court; and considering the circumstances of the case and the ignominy caused by him to his
two teen-aged, female, then unmarried victims, this Court exercising its discretion granted
under said Section 28 of the law, hereby SENTENCES said accused FARHAD HATANI Y
ABOLHASSAN to pay a fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency AND to suffer imprisonment of five (5) years; and to pay
the costs.

This Court further recommends that after service of his sentence the accused be deported as
undesirable alien (Rollo, p. 35).

The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11868 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, FARHAD HATANI y
ABOLHASSAN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby SENTENCES said accused to suffer life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the complainant, Precila Borja, in the
sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and to pay costs (Rollo, p. 41).

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 charged appellant with illegal practice of medicine, in
violation of R.A. No. 2382, otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines the above named
accused, knowing fully well that he has not satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board
Examination, neither is he a holder of a valid Certificate of Registration duly issued by the
Board of Medical Examiners, as in fact he does not even appear to have taken or completed
the course leading to a medical degree, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously for compensation, fee and salary, paid to him directly, physically examined
Priscila (sic) Borja Y Loquero and Wilma Borja Y Loquero, diagnosed, treated and administer
injections on the persons of Prescila (sic) Borja Y Loquero and Wilma Borja Y Loquero, in
Violation of Section 10, in relation to Section 28, Republic Act No. 2382 (Records, Vol. I, p.
1).

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11868, charged appellant with Rape, committed as follows:
 That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, and while she was deprived of reason or unconscious after
having been drugged or administered medicine, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned PRECILA BORJA Y LOQUERO
without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as
may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code (Records, Vol. II, p. 1).

It appears that in the morning of July 6, 1979, Agustina Borja visited her comadre, Maura Fontreras, and
requested malunggay leaves as medication for her 16-year old daughter, Precila, who had high fever and
loose bowel movement. Upon learning that Precila was sick, Marita, Maura's daughter, introduced Agustina
to her husband, appellant herein, whom she said was a medical doctor. Marita suggested that her husband
treat Precila and Agustina agreed.

Appellant and Marita went to the Borja residence, where he examined Precila. He gave her tablets to take
and administered two injections (to her), one in the morning and the second at noon. After each injection,
Precila would feel dizzy and fall asleep.

It was appellant's diagnosis that Precila was a drug addict and required further observation and treatment.
Appellant offered to attend to Precila at his house and again, Agustina agreed in the belief that her daughter
was a drug addict.

In the evening of the same day, Precila was fetched by appellant and Marita and was brought to appellant's
house. Again, Precila was given an injection which caused her to sleep. When she awoke, she realized that
she was naked and her entire body was in pain. Appellant was seated on the bed and was fondling her
private parts. Shocked, Precila called for her mother and tried to get up. Appellant, however, punched her on
the chest and forced her to lie down. He pressed a pillow on her face and injected her again, causing her to
fall asleep.

When Precila awoke the second time, she found appellant in bed with her. He was naked and fondling her
private parts. The pain all over her body lingered. When Precila touched her private parts, she saw blood
stains on her hand. She tried to stand up but she was too weak. Appellant gave her another injection
rendering her unconscious.

The following morning, Agustina went to fetch Precila. Upon reaching the Fontreras' residence, she went
straight to the bedroom, where, to her great dismay, she found Precila and appellant both asleep and naked.
She hurriedly dressed up Precila and brought her home.

When Precila woke up, she noticed she was already home and her mother was crying. Precila remained
dizzy, with throbbing pains all over her body. When talked to, she was incoherent.

That evening, Precila's oldest sister, Josefina, a nurse by profession, came home and saw Precila looking
very weak. Her mother, who was crying narrated what she had witnessed that morning. She also told
Josefina that appellant was in the other bedroom, treating another sister, Wilma whom he also diagnosed as
a drug addict. Josefina immediately proceeded to the bedroom and saw appellant about to inject Wilma.

Josefina saw the open bag of appellant, which contained empty capsules of dalmane and empty vials of
valium. She inquired on the need of the injection and appellant replied that a second shot of plain distilled
water was required to cure Wilma of her drug addiction. Josefina told appellant to stop but he persisted.
Only upon threat that she would call the police did appellant stop. Appellant and his wife then left the Borja
residence.

The following day, Agustina and Josefina brought Precila and Wilma to the Philippine Constabulary
Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where Josefina and Wilma gave their statements (Exhs. "D"
and "F"). Precila was physically examined by a doctor, whose medical report stated that Precila's hymen and
"deep, healing lacerations" and that "subject is in non-virgin state physically" (Exh. A). Several needle
puncture marks were also found on Precila's arms and buttocks.

A physical examination was likewise done on Wilma, which showed that she too had a needle puncture, as
shown in the Medico-Legal Report (Exh. "L").

Acting on the complaint filed before the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), a surveillance of
appellant's residence was conducted. Subsequently, a search warrant was secured from Judge Jose P.
Castro of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. Armed with the warrant, CANU agents raided
appellant's residence on July 15, 1979.

Assorted drugs, such as dalmane, valium and mogadon, as well as prescription pads in the name of Dr.
Jesus Yap (Exhs. "H" "H-4") and other medical instruments, such as a "thermometer, a "hygomonometer
(sic), stethoscope, syringes and needles, were seized.
The Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") on the prescription slips showed that these were written by
the appellant himself. The report on the chemistry examination of the seized tablets and capsules (Exhs. "J"
"J-1") confirmed the presence of mogadon, dalmane and valium.

After the preliminary investigation, separate informations for rape and violation of R.A. No. 2382 were filed.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to both crimes.

The defense's version is that in the evening of July 6, 1976, Agustina and Precila Borja visited the mother-in-
law of the appellant, Maura Fontreras. In the course of the conversation, Agustina asked Marita if she could
help Precila. Marita obliged and agreed to take care of Precila for the night and allow her to sleep in her
bedroom.

Precila and Marita chatted the whole night. Accordingly, Precila confessed that she was not really sick. She
merely related her personal problems, involving her parents. She also admitted her vice, such as drinking,
smoking and taking drugs.

Their talk lasted until the wee hours of the morning and during their conversation, appellant would
occasionally enter the room but he never joined their discussion.

Precila and Marita shared the same bed. Appellant; who was wearing only his pajama pants, slept on the
floor at the opposite end of the room.

The following morning Agustina arrived and Marita related some of Precila's problems. Nothing untoward
happened that day and Agustina headed for home while Precila and Marita followed later.

At past midnight of July 15, 1979, a raid was conducted by CANU agents in the house of the appellant under
the supervision of C1C Agustin Timbol, Jr. The raid was made upon Josefina's complaint for illegal
possession of drugs.

Appellant and his wife were driven out of their bedroom, while three-men remained. Later, appellant was
called to join them in the bedroom and he was shocked to see assorted drugs scattered around. Appellant
denied owning them. Photographs were taken of him with the drugs. A barangay official was called to attest
to the list of the confiscated drugs. Appellant, however, refused to sign the said list.

C1C Timbol offered to fur the case in exchange of money. Instead of acceding, appellant demanded to see
the search warrant. C1C Timbol failed to show a warrant on the pretext that they were military men without
need of any identification or search warrant. Appellant, his wife and brother-in-law were forced to join C1C
Timbol for questioning in Camp Crame. Upon boarding the van, appellant saw Josefina aboard kissing C1C
Timbol and both exchanged victory signs.

The trial court rendered two separate decisions and convicted the appellant of both crimes. In finding
appellant guilty of illegal purchase of medicine, considerable weight was given to the prosecution's exhibits.

The Professional Regulation Commission certified that appellant is not among the list of registered
physicians nor among those with special permit to practice medicine in a limited scope (Exh. "K").

Appellant failed to refute the Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") released by the PC Crime
Laboratory showing that the signature of Dr. Jesus D. Yap (Exhs. "H" — "H-4") prescribing medicine
belonged to him. The pictures also taken during the raid (Exhs. "G" - "G-8'" undeniably reveal several
medical equipment used by practicing physicians.

Notwithstanding the trial court's finding that there was no direct evidence of rape, it concluded that
circumstantial evidence indicate that rape was consummated by appellant considering the following:

1. The medico-legal examination of victim Precila, taken on July 8, 1979 at 10:25 in the
morning or less than 48 hours from the evening of July 6, 1979 found "hymen with deep,
healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position"; thus indicating that the lacerations were
recent as they are in the process of healing; (Exh. "A-1")

2. The above undeniable findings of the expert confirms the statement of the victim, a young
girl of 16 or 17 years of age, that when she held private parts which were painful then, she
noticed blood. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5).

The fresh laceration of the hymen further confirms the carnal assault. (People vs. Ocampo, L-47335, Aug.
13, 1986)

3. In the two short waking moments of the victim she noticed she was naked and beside her
on the same bed was the accused, also naked. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 3-5)
 4. The accused, then 21 years of age was in the prime of youth, and the unconscious girl
beside him was just 16 or 17 years of age, thus in the full bloom of womanhood. The sexual
excitement on the part of the accused was therefore exceedingly great.

5. When the mother, Agustina, came into the room of the accused that early morning of July
7, 1979 she saw her daughter and the accused on the same bed and both naked. (tsn.,
Rogato, Jan. 27, 1981, p. 9)

6. The medico-legal found several needle puncture marks on the arms and buttocks of
Precila (Exh. "A"); thus confirming Precila's testimony that she had been injected by the
accused, rendering her unconscious (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5; tsn., Nenita, May 21,
1984, pp. 3-6; also pp. 29-30).

7. The medico-legal found the victim "in non-virgin state physically." (Exh; "A-i")

8. At the time of the medico-legal examination, i.e. morning of July 8, 1979, the victim was
found to be "incoherent." (Exh. A) — after effect of the injections or drugs.

9. At the time of the incident (July 6, 1979) the Borjas and Frontreras (sic) were "comadres"
and neighbors. There is no enmity between and among them.

10. Between accused and Marita on one hand, and the victim, her mother, and sisters, on
the other hand, there was no misunderstanding before the incident. There is absolutely
absence of any ulterior motive for the teen-aged victim or her family to file the serious charge
of rape which would expose her to embarrassment of examination of her private parts and
public trial (Rollo, pp. 38-39).

In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Appellant faults complainant for recounting her ordeal only after four years when she took the witness stand.
This argument is misleading. The record shows that the day after the rape, Josefina and Wilma Borja,
accompanied by their mother, Agustina, issued their statements at Camp Crame. Agustina gave her
statement twice on separate days. Precila did not give any statement due to her weak condition but it cannot
be denied that she was instead physically examined. Suffice it to say, the Medico Legal Report (Exh. "A")
indicates swellings and lacerations and concludes that Precila was no longer a virgin. Although the records
fail to show any sworn statement by Precila, such is not fatal where the sworn affidavits of her mother, her
two sisters and the medico-legal report are sufficient to show probable cause of rape (People v. Yambao,
193 SGRA 571 [1991]).

Precila was either dizzy or unconscious at the time she was sexually abused. We find her testimony
consistent and credible. While her testimony is limited to the times when she would gain her consciousness,
it is not unlikely that such traumatic incidents would still be engraved on her mind even four years after.

Appellant's assertion that Precila failed to inform her family of his misdeeds is explainable. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, Precila was still dizzy and incoherent as a consequence of the
injections administered by appellant. In fact, when Precila was physically examined by the doctor the day
after, she was still sleepy and groggy (TSN, March 31, 1980, pp. 7-8).

Appellant also finds it strange that considering the acts allegedly committed by him against Precila, the
medico-legal report fails to specify any injuries on the body of Precila. Appellant need not inflict heavy blows
on Precila for the simple reason that she was under sedation. The absence of the injuries does not negate
the commission of rape (People v. Torrevillas, 203 SCRA 576 [1991]; People v. Arenas, 198 172 [1991]) for
rape may be committed after rendering a woman unconscious (Art. 335, Revised Penal Code; People v.
Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 [1991]).

Appellant alleges that Precila was no longer a virgin on that fateful day and that her bleeding was actually
the start of her menstrual cycle. It is settled jurisprudence that virginity is not an essential element of rape
(People v. Corro, 197 SCRA 121 [1991]; People v. Banayo, 195 SCRA 543 [1991]). To claim that Precila's
menstrual cycle began on that day is highly speculative.

Appellant claims that the sworn statements of the Borjas (Exhs. "D", "E" and "F") were antedated and were
prepared after the illegal search was conducted in his residence. He also cites some inconsistencies in said
statements. We find the claim to be devoid of merit. It is only now on appeal that appellant disputes the
execution of these affidavits. When they were presented and offered as evidence, appellant failed to raise
such objections and to refute them.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses merely refer to minor details,
which cannot destroy their credibility (People v. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632 [1991]). This is also true where
statements made while on the witness stand are claimed to be inconsistent with the affidavit, which are
generally incomplete (People v. Lagota, 194 SCRA 92 [1991]; People v. Avanzado, 158 SCRA 427 [1988]).

With regard to the second assignment of error, appellant insists that his conviction arose from insufficient
evidence and his failure to prove his innocence.

Indeed, the circumstantial evidence established at the trial are more than sufficient to prove the guilt of
appellant. The Medico-Legal Report on Precila, taken within 48 hours from the commission of rape
confirmed that her hymen had "deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position" and Precila was "in
non-virgin state physically" (Exh. "A"). Furthermore, the report confirms that Precila had at least six needle
puncture marks and swellings, which confirm that appellant had injected her several times.

On the two occasions that Precila woke up, she positively stated that appellant was with her on the bed and
that they were both naked. She also tried to free herself on both attempts from accused, but, he made her
unconscious through injections (TSN, February 9, 1984, pp. 3-5). This is corroborated by the testimony of
Agustina, who saw her daughter and accused together naked on bed (TSN, January 27, 1981, p. 9). These
unbroken chain of events leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused actually raped Precila.

As held in People v. Yambao, supra, credence is given to the findings of the trial court where the rape
victim's testimony is buttressed by the corroborative testimony of the mother and the medico-legal report, as
well as the report of the police investigator.

It must also be borne in mind that at the time of the commission of the crime, Precila was just sixteen years
old. No young lady at the prime of her youth would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of
her intimate parts and later bare herself to the disgrace brought to her honor in a public trial unless she was
motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit apprehended and brought to justice (People v. Patilan, 197
SCRA 354 [1991]; People v. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571 [1991]).

Appellant claims that his right to be presumed innocent was violated. He cites the trial court's decision
holding that it. —

. . . finds that with these circumstantial evidences (sic) pieced together the prosecution has
proved the crime of rape, and the burden shifted on the defense to show the contrary (Rollo,
p. 40).

Appellant was afforded a fair trial and in fact he availed of surrebuttal evidence. The statement of the trial
court, as correctly argued by the Solicitor General, implies that the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
support appellant's conviction unless the defense is able to provide evidence to the contrary.

With respect to his conviction of illegal practice of medicine, appellant presented inconsistent claims. On one
hand, he claims that the drugs and other paraphernalia were planted by the raiding team; while on the other
hand, he claims that these were seized without any warrant.

If indeed the evidence were all planted, how can appellant explain his handwriting on the prescription pads
in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap? A perusal of the photographs showing accused during the raid, fails to
indicate any protestation by him. In fact, the other photographs (Exhs. "G-l", "G-2", "G-4" — "G-8") do not
bear any sign of disorder, in contrast to appellant's testimony that his room was made into a mess during the
raid.

The records fail to disclose a copy of a search warrant. However, the prosecution was able to present its
return (Exh. "ZZ") and we are satisfied that indeed a lawful search warrant was obtained. Besides, the judge
who granted the search warrant was the same judge who initially heard both criminal cases. It can therefore
be presumed, that the search was made with a search warrant and absent of any showing that it was
procured maliciously, the items seized are admissible in evidence (People v. Umali, 193 SCRA 493 [1991]).

The evidence is overwhelming that appellant actually treated and diagnosed Precila and Wilma Borja. The
positive testimony of Agustina, Precila, Wilma and Josefina Borja; the medico-legal reports (Exhs. "A", "A-7",
"C", "L" and "L-1") which attest to the needle marks; the Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. I); the
photographs (Exhs. "G-l — "G-8") showing assorted drugs and medical equipment in appellant's room; and
the chemistry reports (Exhs. "J" — "J-1") prove that appellant was engaged in the practice of medicine. And
as to his allegation that there was no proof of payment, the law specifically punishes said act whether or not
done for a fee.

Appellant claims that Precila admitted in her cross-examination that she was in school the whole day of July
6, 1979 and it was therefore impossible for him to have treated and diagnosed her on that date. An accurate
reading of the transcript, however, will show that Precila's testimony was in response to a question regarding
her school schedule for that day.
Finally, appellant claims that the ponente of both decisions was not the trial judge, ergo said judge was thus
deprived of the opportunity to assess the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Admittedly, the ponente's participation was limited to the resolution of the cases. The fact that the judge who
heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment, and for that reason the latter did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the records of the
case, does not render the judgment erroneous (People v. Ramos, Jr., 203 SCRA 237 [1991]; People v.
Villamayor, 199 SCRA 472 [1991]), especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its
conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the judgments appealed from are AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 186387 August 31, 2011

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JUAN MENDOZA y VICENTE, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal assailing the June 5, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. HC-No.
02734 which affirmed with modification the February 6, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Baguio
City, Branch 61 (RTC). The RTC found accused Juan Mendoza y Vicente guilty of having violated Section 5
and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Version of the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution shows that Senior Police Officer 4 Edelfonso Sison (SPO4 Sison) received
information from a long-serving unidentified informant of the Baguio City Police Office’s (BCPO) Drug
Enforcement Section (DES) that the accused contacted him and offered to sell shabu worth ₱1,000.00 to
any interested buyer. The accused then suggested that they meet at the stairs of the Cresencia Barangay
Hall along Bokawkan Road.

After interviewing the informant, Police Senior Inspector Myles Pascual (PSI Pascual) decided to conduct a
buy-bust operation to entrap the accused. PSI Pascual made arrangements for the informant, the accused,
and the poseur buyer officer to meet on April 14, 2005 around 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon at the stairs
below the Cresencia Barangay Hall along Bokawkan Road. He planned for an entrapment operation and put
together a team, with SPO4 Sison, as team leader; Police Officer 3 Ricky Calamiong (PO3 Calamiong) and
PO3 Roy Mateo (PO3 Mateo), as back-up officers; and Police Officer 2 Edgar Antolin (PO2 Antolin), as the
poseur buyer.

In coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the entrapment team proceeded to
the area at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, half an hour before the scheduled time. The team parked their
vehicle 20 to 30 meters away from the designated transaction area. PO2 Antolin and the informant alighted
and proceeded to the stairway to wait for the accused.

Twenty minutes later, the accused arrived and approached the informant. The latter introduced PO2 Antolin
as the buyer. After the accused asked if the buyer had the money, PO2 Antolin handed over ₱1,000.00. The
accused then gave him two (2) sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Antolin raised his right
hand, the pre-arranged signal, signifying to the other team members that the transaction had been
consummated. The team rushed to assist PO2 Antolin, who arrested the accused and recovered the buy-
bust-money. PO2 Antolin frisked the accused and recovered five (5) more small transparent sachets with
white crystalline substance from the pants pocket of the accused. He turned over the same to the team
leader, SPO4 Sison.
SPO4 Sison informed the accused in Tagalog the reason why he was being arrested and apprised him of
his constitutional rights. The accused merely nodded but otherwise kept silent.3 The buy-bust team then took
the accused to the BCPO, where PO2 Antolin identified him as Juan Mendoza, alias "Ampi."

In a preliminary test, the white crystalline substance recovered from the accused tested positive for the
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.4 The case records state that
after the conduct of such preliminary test, the items confiscated from the accused were turned over to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for
further analysis and disposition.5

A confirmatory test conducted on the same day by Police Inspector and Forensic Chemical Officer Cecile
Akiangan Bullong yielded the same result.6

Version of the Accused

The accused alleges that in the afternoon of April 14, 2005, he was walking down Sepic Road, Baguio City,
on his way home from his brother’s house in Guisad, where he had just finished washing diapers and
clothes. A vehicle stopped beside him and SPO4 Sison alighted. The accused knew SPO4 Sison because
the latter arrested him for a drug offense way back in 1997, for which he was convicted and incarcerated in
Camp Sampaguita for five years.

SPO4 Sison showed him a photograph and demanded information about the person in the photo. When he
insisted that he did not know who it was, SPO4 Sison invited him to the BCPO-DES. As he could not
decline, he went along with him.

At the DES, the police again asked him if he knew the person in the photo and a certain Gary Chua, but he
replied in the negative. He was also questioned whether he knew someone who was selling drugs, and he
again replied in the negative. He told the police that since his release from prison, he no longer dabbled in
the drug trade, as he already had a family. When he told SPO4 Sison that he did not know anyone who was
selling drugs, SPO4 Sison got angry.

After an hour, he was informed that he would be subjected to a drug test. Again, unable to refuse, he was
subjected to a drug test at the BCPO Station 7 laboratory, in front of the DES. He was then brought to the
Baguio General Hospital (BGH) for a medical examination, and later back to the police station.

During the interrogation at the police office, he did not have a counsel present.7 SPO4 Sison did not inform
him that he was being arrested for the possession of the 5 heat-sealed plastic sachets containing shabu.8

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated February 6, 2007, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both
Criminal Case No. 24384-R and Criminal Case No. 24385-R. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 24384-R, judgment is rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond
any reasonable doubt and he is hereby sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱500,000.00 and in Criminal Case No. 24385-R, judgment is rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond
any reasonable doubt and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of Twelve (12) Years
and One (1) Day to Fourteen (14) Years, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.9

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision10 dated June 5, 2008, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 06
February 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61 finding the accused-appellant JUAN
MENDOZA Y VICENTE guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 in Criminal Case Nos. 24384-R and 24385-R and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,00[0].00, and the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, respectively, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that said
accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 24385-R.

SO ORDERED.11

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
 In his Supplemental Brief for the Accused-Appellant,12 the accused submits that the court a quo erred:

In not finding that the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with, rendering the evidence compromised.

In convicting the accused-appellant notwithstanding the fact that his guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt.13

Ruling of the Court

The Court finds the arguments of the accused bereft of merit.

In crimes involving the sale of illegal drugs, two essential elements must be satisfied: (1) identities of the
buyer, the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for
it.14

In the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the other hand, it must be shown that: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.15 In this case, all these elements were satisfactorily proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt through testimonial, documentary and object evidence presented during the trial. PO2 Antolin, the
designated poseur-buyer, testified as to the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of the accused,
and the seizure and marking of the illegal drugs recovered from the accused. 16 Then, SPO4 Sison
corroborated PO2 Antolin’s testimony and confirmed that all the confiscated items recovered from the
accused were turned over to him as team leader.17

The accused also argues that the procedure in the custody and disposition of the dangerous drugs was not
observed. The Court finds, however, that the compliance with the chain of custody rule was sufficiently
established in this case.

In the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, the following links must be established: first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second,
the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.18

Regarding the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination, the parties admitted the following facts during pre-trial:

1. The fact that the forensic chemist examined the drugs and prepared the report thereon but
qualified that it did not come from the accused;

2. Medico-legal Report;

3. The witnesses to the inventory witnessed the inventory taking, signed the inventory but
they have no knowledge that the drugs came from the accused.

4. Order of detention, booking sheet and preliminary test;

5. Existence of the pre-operation report and the request for drug test.19 [Emphases supplied]

The prosecution also presented several documents that traced how the evidence changed hands.

The Inventory in the Presence of Witnesses20 (Exhibit "D") listed six small transparent heat-sealed plastic
sachets, each weighing approximately 0.3g and containing white crystalline substance suspected to be
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, previously marked as "ECA" 04/14/0521 , and showed the
corresponding photos taken during the inventory (Exhibit "N").22

The Certificate of Preliminary Test23 (Exhibit "F") prepared under the signature of Marites Vizcara Tamio of
the BCPO DES and addressed to the Baguio City Prosecutor, certified that on April 14, 2005, at 3:00 o’clock
in the afternoon, she conducted a preliminary test on the same marked items24 by using Simons reagent on
the white crystalline substance contained in the individually heat-sealed plastic sachets. All the items yielded
a "dark blue color," indicating the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The
same certificate stated that the alleged confiscated pieces of evidence were turned over the to the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for chemistry analysis and
disposition.
Finally, Chemistry Report No. D-044-200525 (Exhibit "G")26 issued by the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory
Office at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet stated that following a qualitative examination
conducted on the same marked items,27 it was found that the specimens produced a positive result for the
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

The illegal drugs subject of the buy-bust transaction and those recovered from the person of the accused
were positively identified by PO2 Antolin, marked and presented as evidence during trial:

Q x x x I am showing you two sachets marked as Exhibit "A" ECA. 04/14/05 BB and a signature. Now tell us
the relation of these sachets which the accused gave to you in exchange of the ₱1,000.00?

WITNESS:

A These are the buy bust item, sir.

PROS. CATRAL:

Q Now what does ECA stands (sic) for again?

A Edgar Cortes Antolin, sir.

Q And that will be you

A Yes, sir.

Q And 04/14/05 would be the date of the transaction?

A Yes, sir.

Q And BB. What would those letters mean?

A buy bust, sir.

Q How about this signature, whose signature would that be?

A My signature, sir.

xxx

Q I am presenting to you five sachets which your office marked as Exhibit CDEF and G with the marking
ECA, 04/14/05 signature and a letter R. Are these the same items which you referred a while back?

A Yes, sir.

Q And for the record, what does ECA stands (sic) for?

WITNESS:

A Edgar Cortes Antolin, sir.

PROS. CATRAL:

Q And what does 04/14/05 means (sic)?

A The date, sir.

Q The date of what?

A The date of the transaction, sir.

Q And what does "R" in the five sachets represents (sic)?

A Recovered, sir.

PROS. CATRAL:
For purposes of identification, may we have the two sachets marked as BB be marked as Exhibit M-1 and
M-2 which are the subject for sale and the other five other sachets with marking R be marked as M-3, 4, 5,
6, and 7 to constitute the charge for possession.

COURT:

Mark it. 28

From the foregoing circumstances, it is unmistakable that there is no break in the chain of custody of the
seized dangerous drugs from the time that it came to the possession of PO2 Antolin to the point when such
items were presented and identified during trial. Clearly, there is no doubt that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized dangerous drug were properly preserved, in compliance with what the law requires.

WHEREFORE, the June 5, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-No. 02734 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 194721 August 15, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA a.k.a. JAO MAPA, Accused-Appellant.

VILLARAMA, JR.*

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Once again, on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, we uphold the state's compliance with the chain
of custody rule and sustain the conviction1 of accused-appellant of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of shabu.

The Facts

Accused-appellant identified himself as "John Brian Amarillo, 25 years old, a resident of Laperal Compound,
Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, single, a washing boy."2 The records do not indicate when, how and upon
whose liking the a.k.a. "Jao Mapa" came to be associated with the accused.

"Jao Mapa," the "washing boy" who was acquitted for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal Case Nos.
03-2044-45,3 in 2004, and whose name appeared in the drugs Watchlist of Barangay Guadalupe Viejo,
Makati City,4 was again charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu this time allegedly
committed in 2006.

The accusatory portions of the separate Informations both dated 10 April 2006 filed and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati read:

[Criminal Case No. 06-750

That on or about the 8th day of April 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA alias "Jao Mapa/Jao"], without the corresponding
license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and
deliver zero point zero three (0.03) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a
dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

[Criminal Case No. 06-751

That on or about the 8th day of April 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA alias "Jao Mapa/Jao"], not being lawfully authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession direct custody and control
the following items with markings, to wit:

"JAO 1" - 0.03 gram

"JAO 2" - 0.02 gram

"JAO 3" - 0.02 gram

"JAO 4" - 0.02 gram

"JAO 5" - 0.02 gram

"JAO 6" - 0.02 gram

"JAO 7" - 0.02 gram

"JAO 8" - 0.01 gram

"JAO 9" - 0.02 gram

"JAO 10" - 0.03 gram

"JAO 11" - 0.02 gram

"JAO 12" - 0.02 gram

"JAO 13" - 0.03 gram

"JAO 14" - 0.02 gram

with a total weight of zero point three three (0.33) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which
is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

On 8 May 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During pretrial, the forensic chemist and PO2 Rafael
Castillo, the police investigator assigned to the case, appeared in court. The parties stipulated on the
following: "qualification of the forensic chemist as an expert witness; existence of the documents relative to
the examination conducted by the forensic chemist; substance, subject matter of [the] case; existence of the
Final Investigation [R]eport; and Acknowledgement Receipt,"7 after which, the court ordered that the
testimony of the forensic chemist and the police investigator be dispensed with.8

On trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO1 Percival Mendoza9 (PO1 Mendoza) and
PO3 Julius Lique10 (PO3 Lique), both of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force of the
Makati Central Police Station; and Barangay Captain Angelito Gatchalian11 (Barangay Captain Gatchalian)
of Barangay Guadalupe Viejo. The defense, on the other hand, presented the accused as its lone witness.12

The Court of Appeals summarized the version of the prosecution in the following manner:

xxxx

On April 8, 2006, PO1 Mendoza x x x received a telephone call from an informant that a certain Jao Mapa
(later identified as the Accused- Appellant) was selling prohibited narcotics at Laperal Compound,
Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City. Immediately, a briefing for a buy-bust operation was conducted. The buy-bust
team prepared Three Hundred Pesos (Ph₱ 300.00) worth of marked money and designated PO1 Mendoza
as the poseur-buyer. The other members of the team were PO2 Lique, PO1 Randy Santos, and PO1
Voltaire Esquerra. The team coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency before proceeding to
the target area.

At around 9:15 o’clock in the evening of the same day, the team proceeded to the basketball court inside
Laperal Compound where the Accused-Appellant was sighted. Once inside, PO1 Mendoza and the
informant, with the help of sufficient lights coming from the nearby shanties and sari-sari stores, saw a man
wearing a camouflage short pants and a dark t-shirt casually standing beside one of the basketball court’s
post while talking to two (2) men. The informant called the attention of the Accused-Appellant and introduced
PO1 Mendoza to the latter as a buyer intending to purchase Three Hundred Pesos (Ph₱ 300.00) worth
of shabu. PO1 Mendoza then handed the marked money to the Accused-Appellant who, in turn, took from
his right pocket a small plastic sachet allegedly containing shabu and gave it to the former. Upon receipt,
PO1 Mendoza examined the contents thereof and asked the Accused-Appellant, "Panalo to ha?" The
Accused-Appellant replied with "Ako pa! Amin ang pinakamagandang bato dito."

When PO1 Mendoza was certain that the plastic sachet contained shabu, he lit a cigarette, a pre-arranged
signal, and motioned to his team members to arrest the Accused-Appellant. PO1 Mendoza subsequently
introduced himself as a police officer and arrested the latter. A few seconds later, his other team members
arrived. A procedural body search was conducted resulting in the discovery of a small Mercury Drug plastic
bag containing seventeen (17) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with suspected shabu, the
marked money, and several Peso bills of different denominations. The confiscated items were immediately
marked, photographed, and inventoried at the place of arrest and in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Gatchalian.
The photographs of the seized items were taken by PO3 Lique. Thereafter, the Accused-Appellant was
brought to the Makati Police Station for further investigation. Subsequently, the seized plastic sachets were
brought to the Crime Laboratory to determine the presence of shabu. The results thereof showed that the
substances therein were positive for Methylamphetamine,Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.13

The version of the defense, on the other hand, consisted of the sole testimony of the accused, to wit:

The Accused-Appellant testified that, on April 8, 2006, at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, he was
watching a game at the basketball court in Laperal Compound, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, when several
men arrived and asked him if he knew the whereabouts of a certain Alvin. When he could not give any
information, they brought him to the Makati Police Station. It was only after he was detained that he learned
that charges were being filed against him for the sale and possession of dangerous drugs.14

After trial, the court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.15 The dispositive
portion of the Decision dated 28 July 2008 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 06-750, finding the accused JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charge for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (₱ 500,000.00);

2. In Criminal Case No. 06-751, finding the same accused JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charge for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) days as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum and to pay a fine of three hundred thousand pesos (₱ 300,000.00).16

On appeal, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED17 the decision of the trial court. Hence, this automatic review of
the accused’ conviction.

Our Ruling

We sustain the conviction of appellant.

To prove illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be present: "(a) the identities of the buyer and
the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for the thing.18 And, to secure conviction, it is material to establish that the transaction or sale
actually took place, and to bring to the court the corpus delicti as evidence.19

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant, not being
authorized by law, sold a sachet of shabu to PO1 Mendoza in a buy-bust operation. PO1 Mendoza testified
that, during the buy-bust operation, the informant introduced him to accusedappellant; that informant asked
accused-appellant if he could help PO1 Mendoza buy shabu; that accused-appellant agreed to sell him
Three Hundred Peso-worth of shabu; that PO1 Mendoza, counted the pre-marked bills in front of accused-
appellant and gave them to him; and that accused-appellant, in turn, handed him a small transparent plastic
sachet, which he took from the pocket of his short pants, and which tested for shabu based on the result of
the laboratory examination. PO1 Lique corroborated the testimony of PO1 Mendoza by stating that he saw
accused-appellant hand something to the poseur-buyer. Further, the seized items, together with the result of
the laboratory examination and the marked money were all presented in court.

As to the crime of illegal possession of shabu, the prosecution clearly proved the presence of the following
essential elements of the crime: "(a) the accused [was] in possession of an item or object that is identified to
be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession [was] not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the drug."20 After the arrest of the accused-appellant, seventeen (17) heat-
sealed sachets of white substance were found in his possession. The chemistry report showed that the
white substance in the plastic sachets tested for shabu. And, there was no showing that such possession
was authorized by law.
We find no merit in the arguments of the defense that the arresting officers did not testify that the marking of
the seized items were done in the presence of the persons mentioned by the law and its implementing rules;
and that testimonies on how the confiscated items were turned over to the investigator for examination were
lacking.

The Joint Affidavit of Arrest21 executed by PO1 Mendoza and PO1 Randy C. Santos, the allegations of which
PO1 Mendoza affirmed and confirmed during his direct testimony, is clear on two points: (1) that the seized
items were marked and inventoried at the place where accused-appellant was arrested; and (2) that the
integrity of the seized items was preserved. Thus:

4. That immediately thereafter, together with the confiscated pieces of evidence marked and inventoried at
the place of suspect’s apprehension, the confiscated pieces of evidence, together with suspect AMARILLO,
were immediately brought at SAID SOTF office, for formal dispositions and proper investigations.

5. That, before the SAID SOTF office, the investigator on case acknowledge the complaint, and in
preparation for the formal filing of formal charges against herein suspects, same was subjected to the
procedural Drug Test at SOCO/SPD and mandatory MEDICO LEGAL examinations at OSMAK Malugay as
assisted by the same arresting officers, xxx. The confiscated pieces of evidence, only in so far with the
suspected illegal drugs and the small white plastic Mercury Drug were referred at SOCO SPD for laboratory
examinations and safe keeping.22

The Joint Affidavit of Arrest is consistent with the following testimony of PO1 Mendoza on direct
examination:

Q: Mr. Witness, after the inventory what did you do next, if there’s any?

A: We proceeded to our office, SAID SOFT office, sir.

Q: And what did you do when you reached your office?

A: We made the necessary documents for filing the case, sir.

Q: What did you do with the items you recovered from the accused?

A: We turned it over to the investigator together with the subject person to SOCO crime
laboratory for drug test examination and for laboratory examination, sir.23 (Emphasis supplied.)

The testimony, in turn, is well-supported by a copy of the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exhibit "A")
showing that it was PO1 Mendoza himself who brought the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Stamped
on the face of the receiving copy of the request were the following:

PNP CRIME LABORATORY

SOUTHERN POLICE DISTRICT OFFICE

F. ZOBEL, MAKATI CITY

CONTROL NO. 1204-06

T/D RECEIVED: 11:55 PM 8 APRIL 06

RECEIVED BY: NVP DE RANIA

DELIVERED BY: PO1 PERCIVAL MENDOZA

CASE NO. D-284-0624 (Emphasis supplied)

As to the required "presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice,
and any elected public official," Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
R.A. 9165 specifically provides:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – x x x:

1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

This has been substantially complied with after the prosecution was able to show that the accused, the
arresting officers and a public official were all present during the inventory of the seized items as evidenced
by the testimonies of the witnesses, the photographs, and the Acknowledgement Receipt of the items
seized.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that all of these were defective for one reason or another, the
defense failed to consider the following well-settled principle:

The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and
photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not automatically
render accused-appellant’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. xxx25

The Court has long settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe
the requirements provided under Sec. 21 of RA 9165, for as long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken.26

As to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, we hold, as we have done time and again, that
"the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is
accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect"27 and that "findings of the trial
courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors;
gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings."28

Also, after a thorough examination of the records, we find the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution credible. For instance, after the cross examination of Barangay Captain Gatchalian, the
presiding judge asked him a number of clarificatory questions, which he readily answered in a
straightforward manner. Thus:

Q: May we know xxx if you knew all along before the buy bust operation where to be conducted by the said
anti-narcotics team?

A: Yes, sir, because I am the Cluster head, every time we have an operation beforehand they tell me the
operation.

Q: So you knew all along that you will be called to act as the witness when the inventory would be prepared?

A: Yes, [Y]our Honor.

Q: When you reached the place where the incident happened, was the inventory sheet already
accomplished wherein the items allegedly seized from the accused were listed?

A: Not yet, when I arrived, that’s the time they prepared the inventory sheet, so, when I arrived, then they
started to write the items.29 (Emphasis supplied)

PO3 Lique corroborated material facts in the testimony of PO1 Mendoza, to the effect that the sale
of shabu between accused-appellant and PO1 Mendoza was consummated, and that Barangay Captain
Gatchalian was present during the inventory of the seized items.

The doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is likewise applicable in the
instant case there being no showing of any ill motive on the part of the arresting officers to falsely accuse
accused-appellant of the crimes charged. In fact, he himself testified that "he did not know any of the
persons who arrested him and that he did not also have any misunderstanding with any one of them."30 The
Court elucidated:

xxx. And in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a
serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, . . ., must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been
framed.31

Finally, we find the penalties imposed by the trial court in order.

Under Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, a person found guilty of unauthorized sale of shabu shall suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱ 500,000.00)
to Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00).32

On the other hand, under Section 11, Article II of the same Act, the crime of illegal possession
of shabu weighing less than five (5) grams is punishable by imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years, and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00).33

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the determination of the appropriate penalty,34 the trial court
correctly imposed the following penalties: (1) in Criminal Case No. 06-750 for the crime of illegal sale
of shabu, life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500.000.00) considering that
these arc within the period and range of the fine prescribed by law35 and (2) in Criminal Case No. 06-751 for
the crime of illegal possession of 0.33 gram of shabu, imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum, and a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00), which is within the range of the amount imposable therefor. 36

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 31 May 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03579
is AFFIRMED, and, thereby the 28 July 20C'8 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 06-
750-751 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 132135 May 21, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
DOMINGO SABARDAN, appellant.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69, in
Criminal Case No. 1590-B convicting appellant Domingo Sabardan of serious illegal detention with rape,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering the appellant to indemnify the
private complainant, Richelle Banluta, the sum of ₱50,000.00.

The Information2 against the appellant reads:

That about and during the period beginning the 15th day of September 1991, to the 30th day of
September 1991, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and by force and intimidation, detain and keep lock one Richelle Banluta, a girl twelve (12) years of
age in his rented apartment at No. 5 Linaluz St., SCH-Subdivision-Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal,
from September 15 to September 30, 1991, or a period of fifteen (15) days, under restraint and
against the will of said Richelle Banluta, and said accused during said period of detention did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have a carnal knowledge of the complainant Richelle
Banluta while she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious by reason of a drug which he
administered to her, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.

When arraigned on June 9, 1992, the appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

The Case for the Prosecution

Richelle Banluta was born on August 10, 1979. When she was about four (4) years old, Nimfa Banluta, a
beach resort owner, allowed Richelle to stay in their house and considered her as a natural daughter. Nimfa
had Richelle enrolled in the elementary school using her surname, "Banluta."

Sometime in 1990, the Banluta family transferred their residence to No. 5, Linaluz Street, San Carlos
Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. Opposite their house was that of Elizabeth de Luna. Another
neighbor of the Banluta family was the appellant, then fifty-year-old Domingo Sabardan, a cathecist who
resided in a two-storey apartment about fifteen meters away from the Banluta residence. The appellant
came to meet Richelle as he frequented the Banluta house and befriended Rico Banluta, Nimfa’s twenty-
one-year-old son.

At about 10:00 p.m. on September 15, 1991, Nimfa berated Richelle for playing with the diaper of her niece.
Richelle, who was then a little more than twelve years old, placed some underwear, shorts, long pants, and
four shirts in her school bag and surreptitiously left the house. She passed by the appellant’s apartment
while the latter was on his way out to throw garbage. The appellant inquired where she was going, and
Richelle replied that she was earlier berated by her mother and was leaving the house. The appellant invited
Richelle to his apartment, and to spend the night therein. Richelle agreed. She felt happy, thinking that she
was in good hands.3 Besides, she had nowhere to go.4

The appellant led Richelle to a room on the second floor of the apartment, where she slept without removing
her pants and underwear. The following morning, the appellant served breakfast to Richelle in her room. He
told Richelle that Ella, who stayed in the house, had left earlier at 5:00 a.m. The room where Richelle slept
had three padlocked windows with jalousies.5

Later that day, the appellant served lunch and dinner to Richelle in her room. That night, the appellant
entered the room completely naked. Surprised, Richelle asked what he was doing in the room, but the
appellant did not respond. Richelle kicked him and pulled his hair, and told him to get out. The appellant left
the room.

The next morning, Richelle told the appellant that she wanted to go home already. The appellant dissuaded
her from leaving and told Richelle that her mother might get angry if she found out that she had slept in his
apartment.

The appellant later left the house. When Richelle tried to open the door, she found out that it was locked
from the outside.6

In the evening of the fourth day of her detention, or on September 18, 1991, Richelle was seated on a coach
in the sala on the ground floor of the apartment.7 The appellant forced her to drink a glass of ice cold beer.
When she refused, the appellant threatened to kill her. Afraid for her life, she drank the beer from a glass.
The appellant then embraced her, kissed her and touched her breasts. Richelle resisted. Momentarily, she
felt dizzy and fell unconscious.

Early the next morning, Richelle woke up and found herself lying in bed completely naked. She felt severe
pains in her vagina. She saw the appellant beside her, also completely naked.8 She noticed that her vagina
was bleeding profusely. She asked Sabardan what he did to her and he told her nothing.9 Richelle washed
her vagina with water.10

In the evening of the fifth day of her detention, or on September 19, 1991, while Richelle was sitting on the
sofa on the ground floor, the appellant again forced her to drink beer. She resisted but the appellant
threatened to kill her anew. She drank the beer, but consumed only about one-half of the contents of the
glass. She felt dizzy and lost consciousness. When she woke up in the morning, she again felt severe pains
in her vagina and saw blood in it.11

The appellant forced Richelle to drink either beer or juice on four other occasions. Richelle felt dizzy
afterwards, and would wake up completely naked, feeling pains in her vagina.

On September 30, 1991, the appellant left the house, but closed the door outside with three padlocks. At
about 5:00 a.m. on that same day, Elizabeth de Luna, a housewife who lived about thirty meters away from
the appellant, heard someone hysterically shouting, "Mang Domeng!"12 Elizabeth sensed that the voice was
that of Richelle’s. She looked out of the window of her house and saw the appellant in the upper floor of his
apartment, walking to and fro.13

Elizabeth waited for daybreak, and at 6:00 a.m. reported the incident to Val Banluta, Richelle’s brother.
Elizabeth and Val went to the appellant’s house and knocked on the door. No one responded. The two left
and kept the incident to themselves.14 At about 11:00 a.m., Elizabeth sensed that someone in the appellant’s
house was watching television. She related the incident to Richelle’s other brother, Rico Banluta, who
climbed the wall of the appellant’s house which abutted a vacant lot, and through the window saw Richelle
inside the apartment. Rico informed Val of his discovery. They proceeded to the police station where they
reported the incident. Three policemen arrived, and along with Rico and Val, they proceeded to the
appellant’s apartment. They saw that it was locked from the outside with three padlocks. Instead of
destroying the padlocks, the policemen asked Rico and the latter’s friends to climb over the wall. Toto and
Binoy, who were friends of Rico, climbed the wall, and managed to extricate Richelle from the second floor
of the apartment through the window, after removing the jalousies.15 The appellant was not in the house at
that time.

Richelle was, thereafter, brought to the police station for investigation. There, she executed a written sworn
statement dated October 2, 1991. She also signed a criminal complaint charging the appellant of serious
illegal detention with rape.16

Dr. Jesusa O. Nieves, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, conducted a physical
and medical examination on the private complainant on October 3, 1991. She prepared a Medico-Legal
Report,17 with the following findings:

General and Extragenital:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are hemi-spherical
with light brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen
is flat and soft.

Genital:

There is lanugo-type growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and slightly gaping
with the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating, the same is
disclosed an elastic, fleshly-type hymen with deep, healed laceration at 7 o’clock. External
vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction of examining index finger and
the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix
is normal in size, color and consistency.

CONCLUSION:

Subject is in non-virgin state physically.

There are no external signs of recent application of any form of violence.

REMARKS:

Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci and for
spermatozoa.

The Defense of the Appellant

The appellant denied having raped Richelle. He testified that he was single, 56 years of age, and was
residing at No. 11 Luz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal.18 He alleged
that he taught catechism in front of the Central School of Angono and the school in Barangay Pag-asa.19 He
was a person of good moral character and could not have perpetrated the crime charged.

According to the appellant, he never saw Richelle during the period of September 15, 1991 to September
30, 1991, nor did he invite her to stay in his apartment.20 He further asserted that he had nothing to do with
the offense charged and that Richelle was merely trying to exact money from him.21

Prosperidad Sabardan Soriano, the appellant’s sister, testified that she customarily paid a visit to her
brother’s apartment. During the period of September 15, 1991 up to September 30, 1991, she visited her
brother on four different occasions. The first was on September 17, 1991, which was the appellant’s
birthday; the second was on September 25, 1991, the witness’ natal day. The third was on September 29,
1991; and finally, on September 30, 1991. She never saw Richelle in her brother’s apartment.22

After due trial, the court rendered judgment on October 25, 1997, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Serious
Illegal Detention with Rape, and therefore sentence (sic) him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to indemnify the private complainant the sum of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the cost.

SO ORDERED.23
The appellant now appeals the decision, contending that:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED SINCE THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED DID NOT CONFORM TO THE CRIME CHARGED.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD SUFFERED
DETENTION OR THAT SHE HAD BEEN RAPED.

III. THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.24

The Court’s Ruling

Anent the first and second assigned errors, the appellant contends that he was deprived of his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him because he was charged of detaining and
raping the private complainant in his apartment at No. 5 Linaluz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision,
Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. However, the prosecution’s evidence shows that she was detained and raped
at No. 11-C Luz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. Furthermore, the
appellant asserts that under the allegations of the Information, the private complainant was raped when she
was "deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious by reason of a drug" which the appellant supposedly
administered to her. The prosecution, however, failed to adduce evidence that he administered any drug to
the private complainant before she was raped.25 If this were true, Richelle could not have known that she
was raped by the appellant since she testified that she felt dizzy and lost consciousness after drinking beer
and juice.

The appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that Richelle was illegally detained by the
appellant in his apartment, and that he forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. The evidence on
record, the appellant insists, shows that Richelle agreed to stay with him in his apartment after leaving their
house and consented to having sexual intercourse with him. From the time Richelle arrived at his apartment
in the evening of September 15, 1991 up to September 30, 1991, she never tried to escape, nor shouted for
help, despite the proximity of the appellant’s apartment to their house and that of Elizabeth de Luna.

The contention of the appellant does not persuade.

The verisimilitude and probative weight of the testimony of Richelle, that the appellant detained her against
her will and raped her in his apartment, were not debilitated by her mistake in declaring that the apartment of
the appellant was at No. 5-C Linaluz Street, when, in fact, it was at No. 11-C Luz Street, San Carlos Heights
Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. It must be stressed that the situs criminis is not an essential
element in rape. The gravamen of the felony is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private
complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Richelle’s mistake was only minor and collateral to the gravamen of the crime charged. She
consistently testified that the appellant detained and raped her in his apartment, only about thirty meters
away from their house in San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. The appellant
admitted that he resided in the said apartment, and that Richelle and her family were his neighbors.
In People vs. Monieva,26 we stressed that where the inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime,
such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified to. It has been
held that inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony, referring to minor details and not upon the
basic aspect of the crime, do not diminish the witnesses’ credibility.

The case for the prosecution was not enfeebled by its failure to adduce in evidence the substance or drug
which the appellant forced Richelle to drink and which made her dizzy and unconscious, or its failure to
present an expert witness to testify on the presence of any sedative in the beer and juice which Richelle was
made to drink.

First. The drug or substance in question is only corroborative to Richelle’s testimony that she became dizzy
and unconscious when the appellant forced her to drink beer and juice. There can be no other conclusion
than that the appellant mixed a sedative in the beverage which he forced Richelle to drink. It must be
stressed that Richelle was then barely twelve years old. The alcoholic content of the beer must have caused
her to feel dizzy and lose consciousness. She was rendered to such stupor, weakness of body and mind as
to prevent effectual resistance and preclude the possibility of consent.

Second. In People vs. Del Rosario,27 we held that a test to determine the presence of any sedative or drug in
the drinks given to a victim is not an indispensable element in the prosecution for rape:

True, there was no test conducted to determine the presence of any sedative or drug in the drinks given to
the victims which caused them to lose momentary control of their faculties. But this is of little consequence
as the same is not an indispensable element in the prosecution for rape. Under the circumstances, it suffices
that the victim was found to have been unconscious at the time the offender had carnal knowledge of her.28
Richelle testified that during the fourth and fifth days of her captivity, before she was rescued on September
30, 1991, the appellant forced her to drink beer or juice, threatening to kill her if she refused. Despite her
resistance, the appellant succeeded in forcing her to drink the beverage. Richelle felt dizzy and unconscious
as a consequence, and when she came to, found herself completely naked with the appellant beside her
who was also completely nude.29

Richelle testified, thus:

Q Question No. 22, Madam Witness, Bukod sa ginawa niyang paghahalik at paghimas niya sa iyong
dede na una mong binanggit, mayroon pa ba siyang ginawa sa iyo?

Sagot: Noon pong ikatlong araw, meaning on the 17th, sa bahay ni Mang Domeng pagdating niya
galing sa pagtuturo ng religion ay pilit niya akong pinainom ng beer at matapos kong mainom ang
halos kalahati ng isang boteng beer sa kapipilit niya ay nawalan na ako ng malay at nang magising
ako ng madaling araw ay naramdaman ko na masakit ang aking katawan pati na ang aking kike at
katabi ko na si Mang Domeng na hubot hubad kung kaya tinanong ko siya kung ano ang nangyari at
bakit ko siya katabi at sinabi sa akin na wala at umalis na siya sa aking kwarto, at halos hindi na siya
umaalis ng bahay at kung umalis man ay sandali lang at bumabalik agad ito at kung ilang gabi niya
akong pilit na pinaiinom ng beer o kaya ay juice at tuwing nakakainom ako ng mga ito ay nawawalan
ako ng malay tao at tuwing magigising ako ay katabi ko na si Mang Domeng na palaging hubot
hubad at wala ang aking panty. Do you confirm this?

A Yes, sir.

Q How many times did the accused ask you to drink juice?

A Seven (7) times, sir.

Q The equal number of times you were asked to drink beer, is it not?

A Yes, sir. Sometimes beer, sometimes juice, but I was asked to drink for seven (7) times.

COURT:

Q So that, it is a fact that you were made to drink beer for seven (7) times?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q How about juice, how many times did he made (sic) you [to] drink juice?

A Sometimes he asked me to drink juice and sometimes beer for seven (7) times, Your Honor.

Q So that, what you want to tell us on those seven (7) occasions that you were made to drink it was
either beer or juice?

A Yes, Your Honor.

ATTY. MENDOZA:

Q Do you recall how many times you were asked to drink beer?

A I don’t know, sir. I just know juice and beer.

Q Do you recall how many times you were asked to drink juice?

A No, sir.

Q Was there any instance that the accused asked you to drink beer and juice at the same time?

A None, sir.

Q When you were asked by the accused to drink juice, is it not a fact that you were asked to drink
juice while you were in the sofa or downstairs?

A Sometimes in the sofa, sometimes in the room, sir.30

Understandably, Richelle could not have seen the appellant insert his penis into her vagina since she lost
consciousness after drinking the beer and juice. However, in rape cases, carnal knowledge of the victim by
the accused may be proven not only by direct evidence but also by circumstantial evidence, provided that
there is more than one circumstance; the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.31

In the case at bar, the evidence on record shows that, on the fourth and fifth day of Richelle’s captivity, and
while seated on the sofa in the sala of the ground floor of the appellant’s apartment, the appellant forced her
to drink beer. She felt dizzy and lost consciousness, and when she came to, found herself in the room on the
second floor of the apartment, completely naked, with the appellant beside her. Richelle felt severe pains in
her vagina and was petrified when she saw plenty of blood on it. She washed her bloodied vagina with
water. To quote the testimony of Richelle:

Q Madam witness, let’s go back to the 4th day that you were inside the room and that the following
day you wake (sic) up early in the morning nude where the accused was nowhere in that place,
when you wake (sic) up in that morning, what did you feel in your body?

A My vagina is (sic) painful, sir.

Q That is (sic) all that you felt, your vagina is (sic) painful, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q As a matter of fact, there was no blood in your vagina, is it not?

A There was, sir.

Q Small quantity or big quantity?

A Big quantity, sir.

Q What did you do with your vagina with full of blood as you testified?

A I was afraid, sir.32

Q On the 5th day when you wake (sic) up in the sofa was your vagina bleeding?

A Yes, sir.

Q On the 4th, on the 5th day that your vagina was bleeding, Madame witness, is it not a fact that you
washed your vagina?

A I washed it, sir.

Q What did you use in washing your vagina?

A Water, sir.

Q With a soap?

A No, sir.33

The testimony of Richelle, that the appellant succeeded in raping her, is corroborated by Dr. Jesusa Nieves’
medical findings that Richelle was no longer in a virgin state physically and that her hymen had a deep
laceration at seven o’clock when she was examined on October 3, 1991.

Q Can you please tell us your findings with regard to the genital of the victim?

A Upon the examination of the genie layer, the sex organ of the victim, the only pertinent findings
I’ve got was the laceration, a deep healed laceration at the hymen, sir.

Q What does that signifies (sic)?

A That a hard blunt object was forcefully inserted to the genie layer of the victim, sir.
 Q I notice in this findings (sic) of yours there is a laceration at 7:00 o’clock, can you please clarify
this?

A The laceration at the 7 o’clock only means that since the hymen is circular in appearance, it is
being correlated to the face of the watch so when we say that the laceration is located at 7 o’clock
then it only means the same that the laceration or the tear is located in the same position as the
number 7 of the clock, sir.

Q Now, you claimed that upon your examination, one of your findings that [there]is a laceration of
(sic) 7 o’clock, what could have cause (sic) the laceration of (sic) 7 o’clock?

Atty. Mendoza:

Already answered, Your Honor, the forceful insertion by blunt instrument.

Fiscal Tacla:

Q Would you consider the penis or a male organ as the blunt instrument which to have put (sic) into
her organ?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was the state of the virginity of the lady when you conducted an examination upon her
person?

A She is no longer a virgin, sir.

Q What made you conclude that thing?

A That is based on my findings at the hymen, sir.34

We reject the appellant’s submission that he could not have raped Richelle during the period of September
17, 1991 to September 30, 1991 because when she was examined by Dr. Nieves on October 3, 1991, the
lacerations in her hymen had already healed. The appellant’s reliance on the testimony of Dr. Nieves, that
the healing period of the lacerations on the hymen was seven (7) days from the infliction of such lacerations,
is misplaced. The doctor did not testify that the laceration in the hymen of Richelle could not have been
healed in less than seven days. Indeed, the healing of wounds is dependent on several factors: (a)
vascularity; (b) age of the person; (c) degree of rest or immobilization; and (d) nature of injury.35

In fine, although the lacerations were already healed by the time Richelle was examined by Dr. Nieves on
October 3, 1991, it is not impossible that Richelle was raped by the appellant for the first time on the fourth
day of her captivity. It is well settled that healed lacerations do not necessarily negate rape.36

The appellant asserted that Richelle consented to having sex with him, because she shouted, "Mang
Domeng, tama na, ayaw ko na!," when he kissed and embraced her, and mashed her breasts. The appellant
asserts that, in saying, "ayaw ko na," twelve-year-old Richelle was consenting to his prior sexual assaults.
Richelle’s testimony reads:

Q Throughout these days that the accused embraced you, kissed you and got hold of your breast,
you did not shout?

A I shouted everyday, sir.

Q Will you tell this Court what words you used when you shouted?

A I shouted, "Mang Domeng, tama na, ayaw ko na."

Q Why, Madame witness, when you said "ayaw ko na," was there any instance that you agreed to
Mang Domeng?

FISCAL TACLA:

What is that agreement all about, Your Honor?

ATTY. MENDOZA:
 Well, "ayaw ko na" Your Honor, she presumed that ayaw na niya iyong nagaganap sa kanya. My
question is on what was happening to her that she is now testifying, was there any occasion that she
agreed.

COURT:

Answer.

Witness:

A Ayaw ko na po iyong ginagawa niya sa akin. Gusto ko nang umuwi sa amin.

ATTY. MENDOZA:

Q In all that occasions you did not box nor kick the accused, is it not?

A I tried to fight back and I even pulled his hair, sir.37

The appellant’s contention deserves scant consideration. As gleaned from Richelle’s testimony, she had
been shouting and pleading to the appellant everyday to stop the lascivious acts and the sexual advances
on her. She resolutely fought back and even pulled the appellant’s hair. In fine, when the appellant subjected
Richelle to his bestial desires, Richelle resisted, to no avail. If, as claimed by the appellant, Richelle had
consented to having sexual intercourse with him from September 16, 1991 to September 30, 1991, there
would no longer have been a need for him to force her to drink beer and juice to render her dizzy and
unconscious.

The testimony of Richelle should not be considered in its truncated parts but in its entirety. The meaning of
the words in a portion of the testimony of a witness should be considered, taking into account the entirety of
the latter’s testimony. Besides, bearing in mind the chastity and bashfulness of a typical Filipina, especially
one in her tender years, it is highly inconceivable for Richelle, a young girl, to consent to sexual acts with the
appellant. Richelle was barely in her teens when the harrowing experience took place. We find it deviant for
a twelve-year-old naïve and unsophisticated grade school student to be consenting to sexual intercourse
with the appellant. Richelle’s unwaivering sincerity and candor while testifying in court convinces us that she
was constrained by her desire to seek justice for the bestial act committed upon her person.38 In fact,
Richelle cried while recalling the sexual assaults on her.

The appellant harped on his being a catechist of good moral character to escape conviction. This hardly
justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Indeed, religiosity is not always a badge of
good conduct and faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion. In the case of People vs.
Diopita,39 this Court pronounced that an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because he is of good
moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on
the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of
the appellant’s good moral character cannot prevail.

The appellant contends that Richelle consented to stay in his apartment; hence, he cannot be convicted of
serious illegal detention. We agree with the appellant’s assertion that he is not guilty of serious illegal
detention, but we do not agree that Richelle consented to stay in his apartment from September 17, 1991
until she was rescued on September 30, 1991. Understandably, Richelle did not leave the appellant’s
apartment on September 30, 1991. She had just surreptitiously left their house in a rebellious mood and had
nowhere to go. She believed, at that time, that she was safe with the appellant, who was their neighbor and
her brother’s friend. However, when the appellant sat on her bed in the evening of the same day, completely
naked, Richelle decided to leave the next day. She balked at leaving only when the appellant warned her
that her mother, Nimfa, would berate her for sleeping at his apartment. Obviously, in warning Richelle of
what to expect from her mother, the appellant wanted to instill fear in her mind to force her to remain in his
apartment. Richelle should have left the apartment and returned home that day, and contend with her
mother’s anger for leaving their house and sleeping in the appellant’s apartment. However, Richelle, then
barely twelve years old and a mere grade six pupil, cannot be expected to react and decide like an adult
would. She could not have foreseen the appellant’s evil intent of raping her. Moreover, even if she wanted to
leave the appellant’s apartment, she could not do so because the appellant did not allow her to leave.
Frustrated in his first attempt, the appellant was determined to deflower Richelle. And the appellant
succeeded, because on the fourth day of Richelle’s stay in the appellant’s apartment, the appellant forced
her to drink beer which caused her to feel dizzy and rendered her unconscious. The appellant forthwith
raped her.

In light of the evidence on record, the original and primordial intention of the appellant in keeping Richelle in
his apartment was to rape her and not to deprive her of her liberty. Hence, the appellant is guilty only of rape
under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and not of the complex crime of serious illegal
detention with rape under Article 267, in relation to Articles 335 and 48 of the Code.40 Hence, the trial court
correctly sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua.

Richelle could not have escaped from the appellant’s apartment during her stay therein from September 17,
1991 until September 30, 1991, because the appellant locked the door from the outside whenever he would
go out. Richelle could move around the house, but the windows on the ground and second floors had grills
with smoked glass.41 Richelle tried to open the windows, but she could not.

We, likewise, find it incredible for Richelle to contrive a story of rape which would expose herself to a lifetime
of shame, allow an examination of her private parts and face public trial.42 A rape victim who testifies in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness.
The bare denial of the appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Richelle. Well-settled is the
rule that testimonies of young victims of rape deserve full credence and should not be so easily dismissed
as a mere fabrication.43 In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of the victim to be trustworthy
and convincing. It has been held in a long line of cases that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are afforded great respect, since it is the trial judge who observes and
monitors the behavior and demeanor of the witnesses.

Finally, the assertion of the appellant that the charge against him was motivated by Richelle’s desire to
extort money from him is preposterous. The appellant’s testimony to prove his claim is hearsay because he
was merely told by his counsel of Richelle’s desire for money. The appellant failed to present his counsel to
prove his claim. Besides, the appellant was merely a catechist and had no apparent sustainable means of
livelihood, and only survived through the support given to him by his siblings. We agree with the findings of
the trial court, viz:

The accused tried to insinuate ulterior or improper motive on the part of the complainant by alleging
that complainant Richelle charge[d] him with this offense because they are asking money as told [to]
him by Atty. Mendoza.

This allegation is patently unmeritorious and cannot be given any value by the court, as it was
hearsay, and Atty. Mendoza was not presented to pursue or give light on this allegation. At any rate,
the mother of the offended party, Nimfa Banluta, testified that she got the insinuation that the sister
of the accused was willing to settle the case through her friend living near the street of the accused.44

It is rudimentary that where there is no showing that the private complainant was impelled by any improper
motive in making the accusation against the appellant, her complaint is entitled to full faith and credit.
Hence, when the appellant could not present any sensible justification as to why the private complainant had
accused him, such fact logically proves that no improper motive propelled the latter to charge the former of
such a serious offense as rape.45

The trial court correctly awarded Richelle civil indemnity of ₱50,000. This is in the nature of actual and
compensatory damages, and is obligatory upon conviction for rape.46 In addition, she is entitled to moral
damages in the amount of ₱50,000. Moral damages are automatically awarded to rape victims without the
necessity of proof, for it is assumed that she suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. Such award
is separate and distinct from civil indemnity.47

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal,
Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. 1590-B, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of serious illegal detention with rape is MODIFIED. Appellant DOMINGO SABARDAN is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the victim, Richelle Banluta, ₱50,000 as
civil indemnity and ₱50,000 as moral damages. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 205227 April 7, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MARCO P. ALEJANDRO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated November 11, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03483 which affirmed the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204
convicting appellant of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) under Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). In its Resolution3 dated
March 14, 2012, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by appellant.

The Facts

Marco P. Alejandro (appellant), along with Imelda G. Solema and Jenny V. del Rosario, were charged with
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9 l 65 under the following Information:

That on or about the 12th day of July, 2006, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, not being authorized by law did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, trade deliver and give away to another, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug
weighing 98.51 grams contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, in violation of the above-
cited law.

Contrary to law.4

When arraigned, all three accused pleaded not guilty. Upon demurrer to evidence filed by accused Jenny
del Rosario, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting her of the crime charged considering that her mere
presence in the car used by appellant is not indicative of conspiracy in the sale of illegal drugs.5

At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following:

1. The identity of the accused as the persons charged;

2. The jurisdiction of this Court over the persons of the accused;

3. Police Inspector Ruben Mamaril Apostol Jr. is a member of a PNP Crime Laboratory Office as of
July 12, 2006 and he is an expert in Forensic Chemistry;

4. That a request for laboratory examination was made for the specimens allegedly confiscated from
the accused;

5. The existence and authenticity of the request for examination of the seized items and Request for
a drug test on the persons of the accused;

6. That pursuant to the requests for the drug test and examination of the specimens, the
corresponding Regional Crime Laboratory Office, Calabarzon issued two (2) chemistry reports, D-
267-06 and CRIM[D]T-286-06 that subject specimens submitted are positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride; and

7. That only a representative sample of the specimens submitted were examined by the Forensic
Chemist which consist of one (1) transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance in black
and red markings.6

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented the following factual milieu based on the testimonies of SPO1 Jaime A. Cariaso
(poseur-buyer), SPO1 Norman Jesus P. Platon and Police Inspector Ruben M. Apostol, Jr. (Forensic
Chemical Officer):

In the morning of July 11, 2006, a Confidential Informant (CI) went to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) Regional Office 4-A (CALABARZON) at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba City, Laguna. The
CI informed Regional Director P/Supt. Raul L. Bargamento that he was able to set up a deal with a certain
"Aida" who directed him to look for a buyer of 100 grams of shabu for the price of ₱360,000.00.7

Immediately, P/Supt. Bargamento instructed Police Chief Inspector Julius Ceasar V. Ablang to form a team
who will conduct a buy-bust operation. PCI Ablang organized the team composed of eleven police officers
and made the proper coordination with PDEA. Since the target area is situated in Barangay Bayanan,
Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, the team likewise obtained the requisite "Authority to Operate Outside
AOR".8 During the briefing, SPO1 Cariaso was designated as poseur-buyer while SPO1 Platon will be his
back-up arresting officer. Four pieces of five hundred peso (₱500) bills were then prepared and marked by
SPO1 Cariaso. The said bills stacked on the boodle money were placed inside SPO1 Cariaso’s belt bag. On
the same day, SPO1 Cariaso and SPO1 Platon, along with the CI, conducted a surveillance of the house of
"Aida" and vicinity. Prior to these preparations, the CI had contacted "Aida" through her cellphone and
arranged the 2:00 p.m. meeting/sale transaction the following day.9

The next day, July 12, 2006, at around 12:00 noon, the team accompanied by the CI boarded two service
vehicles and proceeded to the target area. They arrived at Barangay Bayanan at 1:45 p.m. SPO1 Cariaso
and the CI parked the Toyota Revo infront of the house of "Aida" while SPO1 Platon and the rest of the
team, who rode on another vehicle (Isuzu Crosswind), waited at a distance. As agreed during the briefing,
SPO1 Platon positioned himself in a spot where he could see SPO1 Cariaso. The other police officers
posted themselves where they could see SPO1 Platon as the latter will wait for a "missed call" from SPO1
Cariaso.10

SPO1 Cariaso and the CI alighted from the Revo and went to the gate of the house of "Aida". They called
the attention of a woman whom the CI identified as "Aida". The woman came out of the house and the CI
introduced SPO1 Cariaso to her as the buyer of shabu. After the introduction, the CI left. The woman asked
SPO1 Cariaso where the money is and he opened his belt bag to show her the money. SPO1 Cariaso in
turn asked her where the shabu is and she replied that he should wait for Marco (appellant). SPO1 Cariaso
and the woman then went inside the Revo and waited for appellant. After about five minutes, a Toyota Vios
arrived and parked infront of the Revo. The woman told SPO1 Cariaso that the driver of the Vios was
appellant.11

Appellant alighted from the Vios and went inside the Revo. The woman introduced appellant to SPO1
Cariaso as the buyer. After appellant ascertained that SPO1 Cariaso had the money with him, he went down
and got something from the Vios. When appellant returned, he was carrying an item wrapped in newspaper.
Inside the Revo, appellant uncovered the item and SPO1 Cariaso saw a transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance which appellant handed to him. Appellant then demanded for the
money. SPO1 Cariaso gave appellant the belt bag containing the marked bills and boodle money and
quickly pressed the call key of his cellphone, the pre-arranged signal for the team that the sale had been
consummated.12

Within fifteen seconds, SPO1 Platon rushed towards the Revo and the rest of the team followed. The team
introduced themselves as PDEA agents. SPO1 Cariaso arrested appellant and the woman ("Aida") who was
later identified as Imelda G. Solema. Meanwhile, SPO1 Platon arrested the woman passenger in the Vios
who was later identified as Jenny del Rosario.

The seized plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was marked by SPO1 Cariaso with his
initials "EXH. A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" and signed it at the bottom. SPO1 Cariaso also recovered the marked
₱500 bills and boodle money from appellant. The three accused and the confiscated items were brought to
the PDEA Regional Office in Camp Vicente Lim.13

At the PDEA regional office, appellant and his co-accused were booked and the confiscated items were
inventoried by the investigator in the presence of SPO1 Cariaso, a media representative and a barangay
councilor. A request for laboratory examination of the seized transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance, weighing 98.51 grams, was prepared and signed by P/Supt. Bargamento. There were
also requests made for the physical examination and drug test of the arrested persons. The request for
laboratory examination and the specimen marked "EXH. A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" were brought by SPO1
Cariaso to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory Office 4A. Result of the chemical
analysis performed by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. showed that the said specimen is positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Appellant and his co-accused likewise were found positive for
methamphetamine based on screening and confirmatory test done on their urine samples.14

The prosecution presented and offered the following evidence: (1) Pre-Operation Report dated July 12, 2006
submitted by PCI Ablang (Team Leader) and noted by P/Supt. Bargamento; (2) Authority to Operate Outside
AOR dated July 12, 2006 granted by PDEA Police Chief Inspector Emmanuel Salvador L. Enriquez; (3)
Certificate of Coordination dated July 12, 2006 from PDEA; (4) Request for Laboratory Examination dated
July 12, 2006 of specimen marked "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" with signature of poseur-buyer; (5) Request
for Drug Test of arrested persons dated July 12, 2006 signed by P/Supt. Bargamento; (6) Request for
Physical/Medical Examination of arrested persons signed by P/Supt. Bargamento; (7) Chemistry Report No.
D-267-06 dated July 13, 2006 submitted by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. showing positive findings on specimen
marked "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006"; (8) Chemistry Report No. CRIMDT-268-06 to 270-06 submitted by
Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. showing positive findings on the urine samples taken from appellant and his co-
accused; (9) Certification dated July 12, 2006 issued by Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Roy A. Camarillo of the
PNP Regional Crime Laboratory 4A stating that "there are no external signs of recent application of any form
of trauma noted during the time of examination" on the persons of appellant and his co-accused; (10)
Certificate of Inventory prepared by PCI Ablang and signed/witnessed by a media representative (Lyka
Manalo) and Barangay Councilor (Jerusalem Jordan); (11) One transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance with markings "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" and signed by poseur-buyer SPO1
Cariaso; (12) Affidavit of Poseur-Buyer dated July 13, 2006 executed by SPO1 Cariaso; (13) Affidavit of
Back-Up/Arresting Officer dated July 13, 2006 executed by SPO1 Platon; (14) Booking Sheet and Arrest
Reports of appellant and his co-accused containing their fingerprints, but which only Imelda Solema signed
while appellant and Jenny del Rosario refused to sign; and (15) four pieces ₱500 bills marked money with
serial numbers CM180235, YA867249, ZS853938 and ZW337843.15

Version of the Defense

Appellant’s defense is anchored on the claim that no buy-bust took place. He testified that on July 12, 2006,
at around 1:30 p.m., he went to the house of his co-accused Imelda Solema whom he knows is called "Im".
The purpose of his visit to Im was to rent her apartment because his girlfriend is arriving from Japan. Along
the way, he saw Jenny del Rosario with her baby and let them rode on his car (Vios) as they were going the
same way. Upon reaching Im’s house at 1:45 p.m., he parked his vehicle infront of said house but a
barangay tanod told him not to park there as it was a towing area. And so he parked his Vios inside the
garage of Im’s house which has a steel gate and knocked at its door. Meanwhile, Jenny del Rosario was left
inside the Vios.16

Upon entering the house of Im, appellant claimed he was immediately grabbed by a man who made him lie
down. He would later learn at PDEA that the man’s name is "Toto" and his female companion is Ma’am
Carla. These PDEA agents took his belt bag containing cash (₱48,000) and his jewelry. He was also
handcuffed and brought inside his car where Toto, Ablang and a driver also boarded. He saw SPO1 Cariaso
for the first time at the PDEA office. He likewise does not know SPO1 Platon. At the PDEA office, appellant
and his co-accused were photographed after they were made to change clothes. Appellant further claimed
that PCI Ablang demanded money (₱1 million) from him in exchange for his release. When he was unable to
give such amount, they just detained him and his co-accused. Their urine samples were taken and
submitted for drug testing.17

As to the shabu allegedly seized from him in a buy-bust operation, appellant vehemently denied having such
drug in his possession at the time. They have already been detained for two days when they were
photographed with the said item. The taking of photographs was done in the presence of PDEA personnel,
barangay officials from Canlubang and the media.18

On cross-examination, appellant explained that he had talked to his lawyer regarding the filing of a case
against the PDEA officers who tried to extort money from him but his lawyer suggested they should first do
something about this case. He added that he does not know of any reason why SPO1 Cariaso is accusing
him of selling an illegal drug.19

Imelda G. Solema testified that on July 12, 2006 between 1:00 to 2:00 in the afternoon, she was inside her
house watching TV together with her seven-year-old son when some persons carrying long firearms arrived
asking if she is "Aida". She shouted to them that she is not "Aida" but "Im." These armed persons searched
her house for shabu and when she shouted she was pushed into a chair. After ten minutes of searching,
nothing was found in her house. When somebody knocked on the door, one of the armed men opened it and
they saw appellant. They pulled appellant inside, poked a gun at him, made him lie down and handcuffed
him. She and appellant were brought outside the house and boarded into the Revo. They waited for the
other car for the armed men to board appellant there. Thereafter, they were brought to the PDEA office in
Canlubang where they were detained.20

On cross-examination, Imelda Solema admitted that appellant was her friend even prior to their arrest
because he was the "kumpare" of her sister. Appellant went to her house at the time as they had an
agreement that he will rent one of the units of her apartment.21

The defense presented another witness, Rowena S. Gutierrez, a siomai/sago vendor who allegedly saw
what transpired at the house of Imelda Solema from a distance of 6-8 meters. She testified that on July 12,
2006 at past 2:00 p.m., a red car immediately parked infront of the house of Imelda Solema, whom they call
"Im." A man and a woman (whom she later learned were police officers) alighted from said car and entered
the house of Im. Not too long after, a silver car also arrived which was supposed to park in the area but
there were barangay tanods and so it parked instead in the garage of the mother of Im. She later learned
that the driver of the silver car was appellant. Appellant went out of his car and proceeded to Im’s house.
When appellant was already inside Im’s house, two vehicles (Revo and Crosswind) suddenly arrived and
there were armed men who alighted from said vehicles and entered Im’s house. Thereafter, she heard Im
crying as she was being held by a woman and a man. The armed men forced Im and appellant into the
Revo. The persons left were a female and a child who eventually drove the silver car.22

On cross-examination, the witness admitted that the relatives of her friend Im asked her to testify because
the others who also saw the incident were afraid to do so.23

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC found that the police officers complied with all the requirements in conducting a buy-bust
operation, and that their testimonies were spontaneous, straightforward and consistent on all material points.
On the other hand, the RTC observed that the testimonies of defense witnesses do not jibe or are
inconsistent with each other. It held that appellant’s denial of the crime charged is a negative self-serving
evidence and cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution who, being police officers, are presumed to have performed their duties in accordance with law,
and who have no reason to fabricate the charges against the accused.

Convinced that appellant and his co-accused Imelda Solema had conspired in selling shabu, the RTC noted
that it was the latter who called up the former about the offer of the poseur-buyer SPO1 Cariaso to buy
shabu. Appellant thus brought the pack of shabu to be sold to SPO1 Cariaso, unaware of the entrapment
plan of the police officers. As to their warrantless arrest, the RTC held that such arrest was legal since the
accused were caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, a dangerous drug, to a poseur-buyer who turned out
to be a police officer, in a legitimate buy-bust operation.

Accordingly, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused MARCO ALEJANDRO y PINEDA and
IMELDA SOLEMA y GUTIERREZ GUILTY of violating Sec. 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002 beyond reasonable doubt, they are sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to suffer all the
accessory penalties provided by law and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00) each
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The Acting Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit the subject "shabu" contained in a transparent
plastic sachet which was marked as Exhibit "J" to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper
disposition.

Accused MARCO ALEJANDRO y PINEDA is ordered committed to the National Bilibid Prisons and accused
IMELDA SOLEMA y GUTIERREZ is ordered committed to the Philippine Correctional for Women until
further orders.

The preventive imprisonment undergone by the accused shall be credited in their favor.

SO ORDERED.24

Ruling of the CA

By Decision dated November 11, 2011, the CA affirmed appellant’s conviction. The CA rejected appellant’s
argument that there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that a sale transaction of illegal drugs took place
as there appeared to be no prior meeting or conversation between him and appellant, and hence they could
not have agreed on a price certain for a specified weight of drugs to be sold. It stressed that from the
prosecution’s narration of facts, the basis of the meeting between the poseur-buyer and "Aida" was the
arrangement made by the CI for the sale of shabu; hence there was already an agreement for the sale of
100 grams of shabu for the amount of ₱360,000.00.

The CA was likewise convinced that the corpus delicti of the crime has been established. It held that the
failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily
render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible.

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

Firmly established in our jurisprudence is the rule that in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
the following essential elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. Implicit
in all these is the need for proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the confiscated prohibited or regulated drug as evidence.25

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the
concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.26

The above elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution. Poseur-buyer SPO1 Cariaso
identified appellant as the seller of shabu. While the police officers were initially unaware of the identity of
appellant, as their CI had only informed them about appellant’s co-accused, "Aida" (Imelda Solema) with
whom the CI had set up a drug deal for 100 grams of shabu for the price of ₱360,000.00, appellant’s
presence at the buy-bust scene, and his act of delivering the shabu directly to SPO1 Cariaso clearly
identified him as the seller who himself demanded and received the payment from SPO1 Cariaso after
giving the shabu to the latter.

Appellant’s arrival at the house of Imelda Solema at the appointed time of the sale transaction arranged the
previous day by the CI, and with Imelda Solema informing SPO1 Cariaso that they should wait for appellant
after SPO1 Cariaso asked for the shabu, were clear indications that they acted in coordination and
conspiracy to effect the sale of shabu to a buyer brought by the CI and who turned out to be a police officer
detailed with the PDEA. SPO1 Cariaso placed his initials and date of buy-bust on the plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance sold to him by appellant. After Forensic Chemical Officer Pol. Insp.
Apostol, Jr. conducted a chemical analysis of the said specimen, the result yielded positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. The same specimen was presented in court
as evidence after it was properly identified by SPO1 Cariaso and Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. to be the same
substance handed by appellant to SPO1 Cariaso and examined by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr.

SPO1 Platon corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Cariaso that they conducted a buy-bust operation as he
positioned himself across the street 15 meters from the house of Imelda Solema. From his vantage, SPO1
Platon saw the following transpired: SPOI Cariaso accompanied by the CI in front of the house of Imelda
Solema; SPO1 Cariaso conversing with Imelda Solema; the subsequent arrival of appellant on board the
Vios; appellant going inside the Revo where SPO1 Cariaso and Imelda Solema waited for him; appellant
getting something from the Vios and returning to the Revo carrying the said item. Upon hearing the call from
SPO1 Cariaso’s cellphone, SPO1 Platon immediately proceeded to the scene and arrested Jenny del
Rosario who was still inside the Vios. At that moment, SPO1 Cariaso had already arrested appellant and
Imelda Solema, confiscated the transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and
recovered the marked money from appellant.

Clearly, all the elements of the crime were established by both the oral and object evidence presented in
court. It is settled that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they enjoy the presumption of having performed their
duties in a regular manner, unless, of course, there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on their
part or deviation from the regular performance of their duties.27 Since no proof of such ill-motive on the part
of the PDEA buy-bust team was adduced by appellant, the RTC and CA did not err in giving full faith and
credence to the prosecution’s account of the buy-bust operation. This Court has repeatedly stressed that a
buy-bust operation (which is a form of entrapment) is a valid means of arresting violators of R.A. No. 9165.28

Appellant assails the CA in not correctly interpreting the requirements set forth in Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations. He harps on the failure to immediately mark the
seized shabu at the scene of the incident and photograph the same, and the inventory of the confiscated
items which was not shown to have been done in the presence of the accused. As to the absence of
testimony by the investigator and the receiving employee of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory, appellant
argues this is fatal to the case of the prosecution. He thus contends that the chain of custody was broken in
this case.

We sustain the CA’s ruling on the chain of custody issue.

Under Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No.
9165, "chain of custody" is defined as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of
the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 laid down the procedure for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs.

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA
Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
 (3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by
the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the
subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing
within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating
therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination
on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;

xxxx

On the other hand, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 reads:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, while SPO1 Cariaso testified that he immediately marked the transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance sold to him by appellant, there was no statement as to whether such
marking was made at the place of arrest. From the records it is clear that such marking was done upon
reaching the PDEA office before its turnover to the investigator on duty. What is important is that the seized
specimen never left the custody of SPO1 Cariaso as he was present throughout the physical inventory being
conducted by the said investigator.

This Court has already ruled in several cases that the failure of the prosecution to show that the police
officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to
the guidelines, is not fatal. It does not automatically render accused-appellant’s arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of
the accused.29

Records reveal that only the marked money was photographed at the PDEA office. The Certificate of
Inventory, though not signed by the accused, was duly signed by team leader PCI Ablang, a representative
from the media and a barangay councilor. We thus find substantial compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and IRR.

Time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that substantial compliance with the procedural aspect
of the chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible.30 In the instant
case, although the police officers did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, their noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from appellant as the
chain of custody of the evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case.

In the case of People v. Kamad,31 the Court enumerated the links that the prosecution must establish in the
chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer
of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission
of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.32

The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the transparent plastic sachet containing shabu
during the buy-bust operation. Records show that from the time appellant handed to SPO1 Cariaso the said
item, only SPO1 Cariaso was in possession of the same until it was brought to the PDEA office. SPO1
Cariaso himself marked the said sachet of shabu with his initials and date of buy-bust: "EXH A J.A.C. July
12, 2006." While the marking was not immediately made at the crime scene, it does not automatically impair
the integrity of the chain of custody as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have
been preserved.33

The second link is the turnover of the shabu at the PDEA office. SPO1 Cariaso testified that he turned over
the seized plastic sachet containing shabu with his markings "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" to the
investigator who proceeded with the inventory thereof, along with the marked money also confiscated from
appellant. He was present next to the investigator while the latter was conducting the inventory.
The third link constitutes the delivery of the request for laboratory examination and the specimen to the PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory. It was likewise SPO1 Cariaso who brought the said request and the specimen
to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory on the same day. He personally turned over the specimen marked
"EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" to the receiving clerk as evidenced by the stamp receipt on the said request
bearing the time and date received as "10:25 PM July 12, 2006."34

The fourth link seeks to establish that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination is the one
presented in court. Forensic Chemical Officer Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. testified that the transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance which was marked "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006", was given to
him by the receiving clerk. Within twenty-four hours, he conducted the chemical analysis by taking a
representative sample from the specimen, even explaining in detail the process of testing the specimen for
shabu. He identified the specimen with markings "EXH. A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" presented as evidence in
court (Exhibit "J") as the same specimen he examined and which he found positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. 1âwphi 1

The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as the investigator and the receiving clerk of the
PNP Regional Crime Laboratory is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of
witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to
present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.35 Further, there is
nothing in R.A. No. 9165 or in its implementing rules, which requires each and every one who came into
contact with the seized drugs to testify in court. "As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was
clearly established to have not been broken and the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs
seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs should
take the witness stand."36

With the unbroken chain of custody duly established by the prosecution evidence, the CA did not err in
giving the same full credence in contrast to the denial by appellant who failed to substantiate his allegation
of frame-up and extortion. Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by the Court because it is
easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. It is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.37 To substantiate such defense, the evidence must be clear and
convincing and should show that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive
or were not properly performing their duty. Otherwise, the police officers' testimonies on the operation
deserve full faith and credit.38 No such evidence was presented by appellant in this case. The CA even
quoted in part the decision of the RTC which highlighted the irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies
of defense witnesses on what transpired during the buy-bust operation.

Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and fine, ranging from
₱500,000.00 to ₱10,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved.
Hence, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱1,000,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated November 11, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 03483 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202709 July 3, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE,

vs.
ROMEO ONIZA Y ONG AND MERCY ONIZA Y CABARLE, APPELLANTS.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:
This case is about the need to absolve the accused of the charges against them because of the police
officers’ outright failure without any justification to abide by the law governing the conduct of seizure
operations involving dangerous drugs.

The Facts and the Case

On June 21, 2004 the Public Prosecutors Office of Rizal filed separate charges of possession of dangerous
drugs1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rizal, Branch 2, against the accused spouses Romeo in
Criminal Case 7598 and Mercy Oniza in Criminal Case 7599. The prosecution further charged the spouses
with selling dangerous drugs in Criminal Case 7600, all allegedly in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The prosecution’s version is that at about 9:30 p.m. on June 16, 2004, PO1 Reynaldo M. Albarico, PO1
Fortunato P. Jiro III, and PO1 Jose Gordon Antonio of the Rodriguez Police Station in Rizal received
information from a police asset that accused Mercy Oniza was selling dangerous drugs at Phase 1-D
Kasiglahan Village, Barangay San Jose.2 They immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation.
After coordinating its action with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the police team proceeded to
Kasiglahan Village on board an owner-type jeep. They brought with them two pieces of pre-marked ₱100
bills.3

On arrival at the place, the team members positioned themselves at about 15 to 20 meters from where they
spotted Mercy Oniza and a male companion, later identified as her accused husband Romeo Oniza. The
police informant approached Mercy and initiated the purchase. 4 He handed the two marked ₱100 bills to her
which she in turn gave to Romeo.5 After pocketing the money, the latter took out a plastic sachet of white
crystalline substance from his pocket and gave it to the informant. The latter then scratched his head as a
signal for the police officers to make an arrest.6

The police officers came out of concealment to arrest Mercy and Romeo.7 On seeing the police officers,
however, the two quickly ran into their house, joined by Valentino Cabarle (separately charged) who had
earlier stood nearby, and locked the door behind them. The officers rammed the door open to get in. They
apprehended Mercy, Romeo, and Valentino.8 Officer Jiro recovered four heat-sealed plastic sachets
believed to contain shabu from Mercy. Officer Albarico retrieved two marked ₱100 bills and a similar plastic
sachet from Romeo. Officer Antonio seized an identical sachet from Valentino.9

The police officers brought their three captives to the police station for investigation and booking. Officer Jiro
marked all the items the police seized and had these brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for examination.10 After forensic chemical analysis, the contents of the sachets proved to be
shabu.11

The prosecution and the defense stipulated that the specimens that PO1 Annalee R. Forro, a PNP forensic
chemical officer, examined were methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). They further stipulated, however,
that Officer Forro "could not testify on the source and origin of the subject specimens that she had
examined."12 As a result, PO1 Forro did not testify and only her report was adduced by the prosecution as
evidence.

The evidence for the accused shows, on the other hand, that at around 9:30 p.m. on June 16, 2004, the
spouses Mercy and Romeo were asleep at their home when Mercy was suddenly awakened by the voice of
Belen Morales calling on her from outside the house. As Mercy peeped through the window, Belen told her
that the police had arrested and mauled Mercy’s brother, Valentino. Mercy hurriedly ran out of the house to
find out what had happened to her brother.13

When Mercy got to where Valentino was, she saw some police officers forcibly getting him into an owner-
type jeep while Zenaida Cabarle, Mercy and Valentino’s mother, kept pulling him out of the owner-type jeep.
When Mercy approached Valentino, the police officers told her to accompany him to the police station. This
prompted her to shout for her husband’s help.14

Meanwhile, when Romeo had awakened, he came out of the house, and saw two police officers in black
jackets, Albarico and Antonio, who approached him. They seized and shoved him into the owner-type jeep
to join Mercy and Valentino. Romeo noticed that Valentino was grimacing in pain, having been beaten up by
the police.15

At the police station, the police officers asked their three captives to produce ₱30,000.00 in exchange for
their release.16 Officer Antonio took out something from his pocket, showed it to them, and told them that he
would use it to press charges against them. Afterwards, PO1 Antonio took Mercy to the kitchen room and hit
her head with two pieces of pot covers ("pinompyang").17

Nearly after five years of trial or on April 2, 2009 the RTC rendered a decision18 that found Romeo and
Mercy guilty of possession of dangerous drugs in Criminal Cases 7598 and 7599, respectively, and imposed
on them both the penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years and a fine of ₱300,000.00.
Further, the trial court found them guilty of selling dangerous drugs in Criminal Case 7600 and imposed on
them both the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00. The trial court, however, acquitted
Valentino of the separate charge of possession of dangerous drugs filed against him in Criminal Case 7597.

On appeal in CA-G.R. CR-HC 04301, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgments of conviction
against Romeo and Mercy, hence, the present appeal to this Court.

Issue Presented

The issue presented in this case is whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
Romeo and Mercy were in possession of and were selling dangerous drugs when the team of police officers
arrested them on June 16, 2004.

Ruling of the Court

The law prescribes certain procedures in keeping custody and disposition of seized dangerous drugs like the
shabu that the police supposedly confiscated from Romeo and Mercy on June 16, 2004. Section 21 of
Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 reads:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Compliance with the above, especially the required physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs in
the presence of the accused, the media, and responsible government functionaries, would be clear evidence
that the police had carried out a legitimate buy-bust operation. Here, the prosecution was unable to adduce
such evidence, indicating that the police officers did not at all comply with prescribed procedures. Worse,
they offered no excuse or explanation at the hearing of the case for their blatant omission of what the law
required of them.

Apart from the above, the prosecution carried the burden of establishing the chain of custody of the
dangerous drugs that the police allegedly seized from the accused on the night of June 16, 2004. It should
establish the following links in that chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover
of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.19

Still, jurisprudence has established a rare exception with respect to the first required link—immediate seizure
and marking of the seized items in the presence of the accused and others20—namely, that (a) there must be
justifiable grounds for non-compliance with the procedures; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved.

Here, the prosecution’s own evidence as recited by the CA and the RTC is that the police officers did not
make a physical inventory of the seized drugs nor did they take a picture of the same in the presence of the
accused, someone in the media, a Department of Justice (DOJ) representative, and any elected public
official.

All that Officer Albarico could say is that his companion, Officer Jiro, marked the plastic sachets with the
initials of the accused already at the police station and then turned over the same to the desk officer who
prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination.21 Thus:

Pros. Gonzales : And after that, what, if any, did you do next?

PO1 Albarico : After arresting them, we brought them to our police station, sir.

Pros. Gonzales : And at the station, Mr. Witness, what happened to the items that you said was [sic]
recovered from the possession of accused Romeo?

PO1 Albarico : We have the pieces of evidence blottered, sir.

Pros. Gonzales : And thereafter, what happened to the evidence gathered, Mr. Witness?

PO1 Albarico : PO1 Jiro marked the evidence, sir.

xxxx

Pros. Gonzales : Mr. Witness, those substance[s] that were marked by PO1 Jiro, what happened to them
after the markings?

PO1 Albarico : After marking the pieces of evidence, he turned them over to the Desk Officer and prepared
a request for examination and those were brought to Camp Crame for examination, sir.

xxxx

Pros. Gonzales : If you know, what was the result of the request for examination?

PO1 Albarico : As far as we know, it is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, sir.

Yet, the police officers did not bother to offer any sort of reason or justification for their failure to make an
inventory and take pictures of the drugs immediately after their seizure in the presence of the accused and
the other persons designated by the law. Both the RTC and the CA misapprehended the significance of
such omission. It is imperative for the prosecution to establish a justifiable cause for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements set by law.22 The procedures outlined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 are not merely
empty formalities—these are safeguards against abuse,23 the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for
extortion.24

And what is the prosecution’s evidence that the substances, which the police chemist examined and found
to be shabu, were the same substances that the police officers allegedly seized from Romeo and Mercy? No
such evidence exists. As pointed out above, the prosecution stipulated with the accused that the police
chemist "could not testify on the source and origin of the subject specimens that she had examined." No
police officer testified out of personal knowledge that the substances given to the police chemist and
examined by her were the very same substances seized from the accused. 1âwphi1

In regard to the required presence of representatives from the DOJ and the media and an elective official,
the prosecution also did not bother to offer any justification, even a hollow one, for failing to comply with
such requirement. What is more, the police officers could have easily coordinated with any elected barangay
official in the conduct of the police operation in the locality.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the February 23, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 04301, which affirmed the April 2, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Criminal Cases 7598, 7599, and 7600 and, accordingly, ACQUITS the accused-appellants Romeo Oniza y
Ong and Mercy Oniza y Cabarle of the charges against them in those cases on the ground of reasonable
doubt.

The National Police Commission is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE PO1 Reynaldo M. Albarico, PO1
Fortunato P. Jiro III and PO1 Jose Gordon Antonio for the possible filing of appropriate charges, if
warranted.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE both the above accused-
appellants from custody unless they are detained for some other lawful cause.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECONO DIVISION

G.R. No. 195528 July 24, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOSE CLARA y BUHAIN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal filed by herein accused Joel Clara y Buhain (Joel) from the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.2

The factual rendition of the prosecution follows:

Prosecution witness P03 Leonardo R. Ramos (P03 Ramos) narrated that he acted as a poseur-buyer in a
buy-bust operation conducted by their office, the District Anti-Illegal Drug Special Task Group (DAID-SOTG)
of Quezon City on 12 September 2005.3 He recalled that on or about 4:00 o’clock in afternoon of the said
date, a male informant came to their office with the information that a person named "Ningning" was selling
drugs at 22-C Salvador Drive, Balonbato, Quezon City.4 Police team leader SPO2 Dante D. Nagera (SPO2
Nagera) endorsed the matter to their Chief of Office Col. Gerardo B. Ratuita (Col. Ratuita) for the conduct of
a buy-bust operation.5 A buy-bust group was created consisting of SPO2 Nagera, PO1 Peggy Lynne V.
Vargas (PO1 Vargas), PO1 Teresita B. Reyes (PO1 Reyes), PO1 Alexander A. Jimenez (PO1 Jimenez) and
PO3 Ramos who was designated as the poseur-buyer.6 During the briefing, it was agreed upon that
₱200.00-worth of shabu would be bought from "Ningning" by PO3 Ramos. Before leaving for their target,
PO1 Reyes prepared a Pre-Operation Report and forwarded it to the Tactical Operation Communication of
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for coordination.7 At 8:00 o’clock in the evening, the team
proceeded to the area on board three vehicles: Nissan Sentra, Toyota Corolla and owner-type jeep.8 Upon
their arrival at 9:35 o’clock in the evening, PO3 Ramos and the informant knocked on the door of the house
while the rest of the team positioned themselves ten meters away.9 The informant identified "Gigi" as the
accused Joel, Ningning’s uncle.10 Initiating a conversation, the informant introduced to Joel PO3 Ramos as a
buyer of ₱200.00-peso worth of illegal drug. When PO3 Ramos asked for Ningning, Joel answered that she
was upstairs. Joel asked for payment and PO3 Ramos handed the ₱200 marked money.11 Joel went
upstairs and called Ningning. Ningning opened the door and handed Joel a small plastic sachet of shabu
which in turn was handed to PO3 Ramos.12

Thereafter, PO3 Ramos touched his head as a pre-arranged signal to prompt the back-up police officers of
the consummation of the illegal sale. Immediately, the rest of the team rushed to the place to arrest
Joel.13 Joel tried to close the door to prevent the police officers from entering the house but PO3 Ramos was
able to grab him. SPO2 Nagera quickly went upstairs to arrest Ningning but the latter was able to escape
apprehension.14 PO3 Ramos immediately frisked Joel inside the house but failed to recover anything from
him; the marked money was given to Ningning when Joel went upstairs to get the plastic sachet.15

Joel was brought to the police station and was informed by PO1 Jimenez of his constitutional rights as a
consequence of his arrest.16 Afterwards, the small plastic sachet recovered was marked by PO1 Jimenez
inside the station and an inventory receipt was prepared.17 PO3 Ramos clarified that the plastic sachet was
in the possession of PO1 Jimenez from the place of arrest until arrival at the police station. PO3 Ramos
added that PO1 Jimenez was present at the time of arrest which explained his possession of the plastic
sachet containing shabu.18

Inside the courtroom, PO3 Ramos identified Joel as the one involved in the illegal transaction.19 He also
identified the small plastic sachet of shabu as the subject of the illegal transaction through the marking
"LRR" he placed on it.20 He testified that he brought the plastic sachet containing the specimen to the crime
laboratory for examination21 where it was tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, as certified by
the examining Forensic Chemist Engr. Leonard M. Jabonillo (Forensic Chemist Jabonillo) of Central Police
District Crime Laboratory in his Chemistry Report.22

SPO2 Nagera was also called to the witness stand to present his version of the events. However, some
inconsistencies surfaced during his examination at the witness stand.

When asked about the gender of the informant who came to their office, he answered that the informant was
a female, contradicting the statement of PO3 Ramos.23 He also differed from the statement of PO3 Ramos
when he testified that only two modes of transportation, instead of three, were used by the buy-bust team in
proceeding to the target area, one Nissan Maxima and one owner-type jeep.24 He also had difficulty in
identifying the accused inside the court room when he was asked upon by the prosecutor to do so.25

Further contradiction was made when SPO2 Nagera narrated that PO3 Ramos was the one holding the
plastic sachet before it was turned over to PO1 Jimenez for investigation.26 He also admitted in his cross
examination that he never saw Ningning during the entire buy-bust operation.27 Finally, when asked about on
who placed the initial "LRR" on the plastic sachet, he positively identified that it was the investigator who put
the same.28

PO1 Jimenez was also presented in court as a prosecution witness to give details of the buy-bust operation.
His version, however, also differed from the versions presented by PO3 Ramos and SPO2 Nagera. He
testified that the plastic sachet confiscated was already marked by the apprehending officers when it was
turned over to him for investigation, a contradiction of the statements of both PO3 Ramos and SPO2 Nagera
that it was him who marked the plastic sachet with the initial "LRR."29 He positively identified that he saw the
item being marked by the apprehending officers in their office.30

The defense interposed denial.

Accused Joel denied any involvement in the buy-bust operation. He recalled that he was inside his house
sleeping between 9:00 to 10:00 o’clock in the evening of 12 September 2005 when five uniformed police
officers entered his house.31 They got hold of his arm and frisked him but failed to recover anything.32 The
police officers did not inform him of the reason for his arrest; neither did they recite his constitutional rights.
Afterwards, he was made to ride an owner type vehicle and was taken to the police station where he was
only asked for his name.33 He denied having sold drugs and having seen the marked money and plastic
sachet containing shabu.34

On cross examination, Joel was also inconsistent in portions of his testimony. He testified that all of his
siblings were in the province and his only companions in the house at the time of the arrest were his nephew
and niece.35 However, when asked why the door was still open at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, he
replied that he was waiting for his sister.36 He also contradicted his earlier statement that he was sleeping
with his nephew and niece downstairs when in his cross examination he said that his niece was staying on
the second floor of the house at the time of the arrival of the police officers.37

Joel was eventually charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs punishable under Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 before the Prosecutor’s Office of Quezon City. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:

Criminal Case No. 05-136719

That on or about the 12th day of September, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there
willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction,
ZERO POINT ZERO SEVEN (0.07) gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.38

When arraigned, Joel pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.39

During pre-trial, it was agreed upon by both parties that Forensic Chemist Jabonillo had no personal
knowledge as to how the plastic sachet containing specimen positive for illegal drug came to of police
officers’ possession. The forensic chemist merely examined the specimen and found it to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. As a consequence of these stipulations, his testimony was dispensed with
by the court.40

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court on 21 March 2007 found the accused guilty of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of
the decision41 reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered finding the accused JOEL CLARA Y BUHAIN GUILTY beyond
reasonable of the crime in violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165 as charged (for drug pushing) and he is
sentenced to suffer the prescribed jail term of Life Imprisonment and pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.

The shabu weighing 0.07 gram involved in this case is ordered transmitted to the PDEA thru DDB for
disposal in accordance with R.A. 9165.42

The trial court ruled that Joel directly dealt with the poseur buyer and participated in all the stages of the
illegal sale. It found conspiracy between Joel and Ningning. It pointed out that Ningning was able to escape
the police dragnet while Joel was being arrested because of her familiarity as a drug operator with police
operations.

The police operation and its coordination with the operatives of the PDEA would be recognized by the
appellate court as legally performed.43 On the contrary the prosecution’s scenario that the police officers
entered Joel’s residence and hauled him out with no reason at all was found to be improbable.44

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the ruling of the trial court, the appellate court ruled that all the elements of an illegal sale of
dangerous drugs were present.45 First, Joel, as the seller of illegal drug, was positively identified by the
poseur buyer and the police officers; Second, the confiscated white crystalline substance which was found
by the PNP crime laboratory as positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride which is a dangerous drug was
presented during trial; and Lastly, the illegal sale was for a consideration of ₱200.00 given by PO3 Ramos
as poseur buyer. The appellate court further held that the non-presentation of the marked money was not
fatal since the prosecution witnesses were able to establish that the ₱200.00 bill used to purchase the illegal
drug was in the possession of Ningning who was able to evade arrest.46

Our Ruling

After a careful review of the evidence, we resolve to reverse the ruling of conviction and render a judgment
of acquittal in favor of the accused.

In his Brief, the accused-appellant contested his conviction due to the inconsistencies in the prosecution’s
presentation of a supposed buy-bust operation, coupled with its failure to establish with certainty the chain of
custody of evidence. He also argued against the presumption of regularity of performance of duties. Finally,
to substantiate his innocence, he pointed out that he was not even the target person in the PDEA
Coordination Report and denied any conspiracy and involvement with such target person named
"Ningning."47

Inspite of the imperfect narration of events by the accused Joel, we are constrained to render a judgment of
acquittal due to the lapses of the prosecution that led to its failure to discharge the burden of proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.

In order to successfully prosecute an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following
elements must first be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration
of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

It is basic in criminal prosecutions that an accused is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the burden to overcome such
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.48 It must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even
present evidence on its own behalf, in which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should
necessarily be acquitted.49

In this case, the prosecution failed to overcome such presumption when it presented inconsistent versions of
an illegal sale.

PO3 Ramos identified Joel as the seller who sold to him a small plastic sachet containing shabu in
exchange of two hundred pesos. We quote the relevant portions:

FISCAL (to witness)

Q: What happened there?

A: When we reached the house sir, we knocked at the door and alias Gigi open (sic) it.

xxxx

Q: What was the conversation with you during that time?

A: The informant first introduced me to Gigi that I will be the one to buy shabu.

Q: What was the answer of Gigi at that time?

A: He asked how much.

Q: What was your answer?

A: I said ‘dos’.

Q: After informing him that you intend to buy dos of illegal drug, what happened?

A: I first asked where is Ningning.

Q: What was the answer of Gigi?

A: He said that she was upstairs.

Q: What happened after that?

A: He asked for my money, sir.

Q: Did you give the ₱200.00.

A: Yes sir, I gave the money.

Q: After giving that money to Gigi, what happened after that?

A: He called Ningning from up stair (sic).

Q: Did Ningning go to the place where you were talking with Gigi at that time?

A: No sir, she just open (sic) the door and handed the sachet of shabu.

xxxx

Q: When he received that from Ningning at that time, what did you do?

A: After Gigi got it he gave it to me, sir.

Q: Can you describe that item you received from Gigi that came from Ningning at that time?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Can you describe?

A: Yes sir, just a small plastic sachet.50

PO3 Ramos initially testified that he placed his marking on the small plastic sachet he was able to buy from
Joel:

Q: If that small plastic sachet is shown to you can you indentify the specimen?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why?

A: Because I placed my marking.

Q: What marking did you place?

A: LRR.

Q: Showing to you this transparent plastic sachet containing illegal drug, what can you say about that, what
is the relation of that transparent plastic sachet to the plastic sachet you have just mentioned?

A: That is the sachet I was able to buy, sir.

Q: Where is the marking?

A: It was on top of the plastic sachet.51 (Emphasis supplied)

However, he would later present a new version on who marked the plastic sachet:

Q: Now, going [back] to the police station, other than searching, what other matters were taken during the
arrest?

A: The evidence that I was able to get from Ningning and it was the investigator who marked it.

Q: Other than putting the initial on the transparent plastic sachet immediately after the arrest Mr. Witness,
what was the SOP in a buy-bust operation, after taking or receiving the item from the accused during the
arrest?

A: We made the inventory receipt, sir.52 (Emphasis supplied)

 xxxx

Q: x x x. You said that it was the investigator who made the marking in the transparent plastic sachet, where
were you when the marking was placed on it?

A: I was in front of the investigator.

Q: What was the marking placed?

A: LRR.53 (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

Q: You said that the investigator placed the marking in the transparent plastic sachet and likewise he was
the one who made the inventory receipt. In what particular place that he prepared this particular document?

A: At the area, sir.

Q: What do you mean by area?

A: In front of the house of the accused, sir.

Q: What is the name of that investigator again?

A: Alexander Jimenez, sir.54 (Emphasis supplied)

The testimony of PO3 Ramos, which apparently was given as proof of all the elements that constitute an
illegal sale of drug is however, inconsistent on material points from the recollection of events of PO3 Ramos,
SPO2 Nagera and PO1 Jimenez regarding the marking, handling and turnover of the plastic sachet
containing the dangerous drug of shabu.

SPO2 Nagera narrated that it was PO1 Jimenez who marked the plastic sachet after it was handed by PO3
Ramos:

Q: What did the investigator do to shabu, Mr. Witness?

A: They placed their initial and prepared request for examination address to the Crime Laboratory
sir.55 (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

Q: Where was PO3 Ramos when that plastic sachet, when the police investigator put the initial, Mr.
Witness?

A: We were there sir.56 (Emphasis supplied)

However, PO1 Jimenez later testified that it was PO3 Ramos who marked the plastic sachet in their office.

Q: Being the investigator you saw the item confiscated?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was it already marked when it was received by you?

A: It was already marked by the apprehending officers.

Q: Did you see it marked by the apprehending officer?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?

A: In our office.57 (Emphasis supplied)

Contradictory statements were further made as to who between PO3 Ramos and PO1 Jimenez held the
shabu from the time of the arrest until arrival at the police station. PO3 Ramos pointed to PO1 Jimenez in
his direct examination:
Q: You said immediately after arresting and searching the accused in this case you said that you brought the
accused to the police station, who was in possession of the transparent plastic sachet from where you
received that transparent plastic sachet in exchange to ₱200.00 going to the police station Mr. Witness?

A: The investigator, sir.

Q: You mean to say that investigator was present when the accused was arrested in this case?

A: Yes sir, he was with us.58 (Emphasis supplied)

However, SPO2 Nagera pointed to PO3 Ramos as the one in possession:

Q: What about the shabu, who was holding it in going to the police station, Mr. Witness?

A: Ramos, sir.

Q: What happened next, Mr. Witness?

A: It was turn (sic) over to the police investigator, sir.59 (Emphasis supplied)

The clear inconsistency in the presentation of facts is fatal. It creates doubts whether the transaction really
occurred or not. Though Joel’s denial as a defense is weak, such cannot relieve the prosecution the burden
of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an illegal transaction actually took place.60

Inconsistencies of the prosecution witnesses referring to the events that transpired in the buy-bust operation
can overturn the judgment of conviction. As held in Zaragga v. People,61 material inconsistencies with regard
to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs
created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. Prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the
identity of the shabu led to the acquittal of the accused in that case.62

Inconsistencies and discrepancies referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do
not diminish the witnesses’ credibility. If the cited inconsistency has nothing to do with the elements of a
crime, it does not stand as a ground to reverse a conviction.63 However, in this case, the material
inconsistencies are furthered by inconsistencies of the police officers on minor details. Referring back to the
narration of circumstances of the buy-bust operation, SPO2 Nagera was asked about the gender of the
informant who went to their office to report about the illegal activities committed by Ningning. He readily
1âwphi1

answered that the informant was a female.64 PO3 Ramos in turn, when asked to describe what happened in
the afternoon before the buy-bust operation, testified that a male informant came to their office to report
about a person selling illegal drugs.65

These conflicting statements of the prosecution effectively broke the chain of custody of evidence of the sale
of dangerous drug.

Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 provides for the procedure
to be observed in preserving the integrity of chain of custody:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,

Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given copy thereof. Provided, that the physical inventory
and the photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at least the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team/officer, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

"Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court and
finally for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.66

To establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, the prosecution must establish the following links,
namely: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the
forensic chemist to the court.67.

The "objective test" in determining the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust
operation provides that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust
operation—from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the
promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal
subject of sale.68 The manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the
payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by
courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.69

In view of these guiding principles, we rule that the prosecution failed to present a clear picture on how the
police officers seized and marked the illegal drug recovered by the apprehending officer and how the
specimen was turned over by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer.

As to the first link of marking, the three police officers failed to agree on who among them marked the plastic
sachet, which is highly improbable if they really had a clear grasp on what really transpired on the day of
operation.

PO3 Ramos testified that he placed his marking on the small plastic sachet but recanted his previous
statement at the latter part of the examination and pointed out that it was the investigator PO1 Jimenez who
put the marking in front of him at the area of arrest.70 SPO2 Nagera in his testimony confirmed that it was
PO1 Jimenez who put marking on the plastic sachet.71 However, PO1 Jimenez in his testimony clarified that
the item confiscated were already marked by the apprehending officers when it was turned over to him in
their office.72

Likewise, they cannot seem to agree on the second link on who among them held the item confiscated from
the time of arrest and confiscation until it was turned over to the investigator and the place where it was
turned over.

PO3 Ramos positively pointed that it was PO1 Jimenez who took possession of the item from the time of the
arrest until arrival at the police station.73 However, when SPO2 Nagera was asked, he pointed out that it was
PO3 Ramos who held the item from the time of the arrest until they reached the police where it was turned
over to Jimenez for investigation.74

In Malillin v. People,75 it was explained that the chain of custody rule includes testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.76

The inconsistent statements of the police officers generated doubt on whether the identity of the evidence
seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to marking and inventory then given to the
Jimenez for investigation and eventually submitted by PO3 Ramos for examination by the forensic chemist.

The prosecution cannot rely on the saving clause provided under Section 21(a) of the IRR that non-
compliance with the legal requirements shall not render void and invalid seizures of and custody over said
items. This saving clause is applicable only if prosecution was able to prove the twin conditions of (a)
existence of justifiable grounds and (b) preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
items.77 The procedural lapses in this case put to doubt the integrity of the items presented in court.

The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is adamant in its argument that there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by police officers conducting buy-bust operation.

We agree but with qualification.

In numerous cases, we were inclined to uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of
public officers.78 However, this is not a hard-and-fast rule. It does not mean that we straight away and
without a blink of the eye rule on the regularity of their performance of duties. We at all times harmonize the
interest of the accused alongside the interest of the State.
Inconsistencies committed by the police officers amounting to procedural lapses in observing the chain of
custody of evidence requirement effectively negated this presumption. Their inaccurate recall of events
amounted to irregularities that affected the presumption and tilted the evidence in favor of the accused. The
absence of improper motive tends to sustain inexistence but does not absolutely rule out false charges.

In case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of police officers and the presumption of innocence
of the accused, we rule that the latter must prevail as the law imposes upon the prosecution the highest
degree of proof of evidence to sustain conviction.79

Due to foregoing flagrant inconsistencies in the testimonies of police officers which directly constitute the
recollection of events of buy-bust together and failure of observance of chain of custody of evidence which
effectively broke the links to sustain conviction, we rule for the acquittal of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 4 August 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02714 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 21 March 2007 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 103 of Quezon City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant JOSE CLARA y
BUHAIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention unless his continued
confinement is warranted for some other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice