Plus Builders, Inc. V. Atty.

Anastacio Revilla, Jr (2006)

Facts:

-this is a case for disbarment filed by Plus Builders Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.

-petitioner charged respondent with committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court;
misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with
nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law.

-Atty. Anastacio Revilla represented Tenants/Farmers in a case against petitioner.

-The Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a consolidated Decision in favor of

petitioner/complainant [Plus Builders, Inc.], and against [tenants/farmers.

-Respondent knowing that there was a monetary judgment by way of Disturbance Compensation
granted to Tenants/Farmers ation granted to Tenants/Farmers, x x x filed a 'Motion for Leave of Court to
Allow Correction of Caption and Amendment of Judgment.

-"After realizing that his motion failed to give him beneficial monetary gain from the PARAD judgment,
for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order was filed by the
respondent before the DARAB. The DARAB then issued temporary restraining order.

-Petitioners then sought redress to the CA and the CA granted their petition declaring the DARAB orders
to null and void. This incident was elevated to Supreme Court and was affirmed with finality.

-Enraged by defeat, respondent filed an Action to Quiet Title before the RTC Cavite to stop the
enforcement of the decisions of CA and SC arguing that respondents possession of the litigated land had
already ripened into ownership and he merely wanted to protect his rights and interests of his clients.

-When the IBP-CBD investigated, they found respondent guilty of violating the attorney's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly, respondent had "maliciously concealed the defeat of his
clients in the case before the PARAD of Cavite and the higher courts in order to secure a temporary
restraining order from the RTC of Imus, Cavite. As a result, he was able to delay the execution of the
provincial adjudicator's Decision

ISSUE: WON respondent should be suspended for unlawful practice of law

RULING:

-Yes

-Lawyers are officers of the court and are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially
with the courts.

-While lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their client, they must never abuse their right of recourse to
the courts by arguing a case that has repeatedly been rejected.

-In the case at bar, respondent’s purpose in pursuing the cause of his client s is merely to delay unduly
the execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision.
-Respondent also as a law partner of the "KDC Legal Services, Law Offices and Associates," was
rendering legal services together with persons not licensed to practice law. His silence on this accusation
is deemed an admission, especially because he had every chance to deny it.

-Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide thus: "Canon 9 - A lawyer shall
not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

-'Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.'

-Therefore, respondent is hereby suspended for two years.

Plus Builders, Inc. V. Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr (2009

Facts:

- Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 13, 2006, finding
respondent guilty of gross misconduct for committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the
court, misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment and collaborating
with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.

-Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration appealing to the court that his penalty be reduced to
mere reprimand or admonition for the sake of his family and the poor clients he was defending.

- He merely exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled under the
law, he was only being protective of the interest of his clients as a good father would be protective of his
own family, and that the two years he does not deserve the penalty of two years' suspension.

- he has been a member of the bar for more than 20 years, served as former president of the IBP
Marinduque Chapter, handling detention prisoners and pro bono cases, and the sole breadwinner in the
family with a wife who is jobless, four (4) children who are in school, a mother who is bedridden and a
sick sister to support. The family's only source of income is his private practice of law, a work he has
been engaged in for more than twenty-five (25) years up to the present.

Issue: WON motion for reconsideration shall be granted

RULING:

-Yes

- In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense
within the authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth
and justice.

- Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of
a judgment or by misusing court processes.
- the Court also knows how to show compassion and will not hesitate to refrain from imposing the
appropriate penalties in the presence of mitigating factors

- We find the suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law sufficient in this case.

In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Facts:

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law
books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles
and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent
has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal
proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts,
including the Supreme Court.

Case 1: Cases involving Traders Royal Bank (TRB).

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB).
On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate
mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned,
respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16,
1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as
security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT
No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney
executed by their respective owners.

Case 2: Cases involving United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).

Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage was
constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name.
This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for
P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor).
The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.

Case 3: Cases involving Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC).

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the
Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate
sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment
thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00
on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB,
Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City
RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.

Issue: Whether the respondent-accused is liable for constructive contempt?

Ruling: Yes

-He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to
the many rulings rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become
final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his own individual
version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the
Constitution and the law

-he has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries,
needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court
employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and
motions.

-he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-same theory in various proceedings, causing much loss
of time, annoyance and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.

-is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the
procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have
been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed.

-The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that
judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch,
department, or official of Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must rest

-Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly committed
over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his
serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority, he is
hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to
pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of
which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges or court
employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENEZA,
Petitioners, v. BINALBANGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS &
QUINTIN MUNING, Respondents.

(May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services rendered?)

Facts:

-The petitioners in this case are complainants in a case. After the court of Industrial relations rendered a
decision in favor of them, their counsel (Atty. Cipriano Cid and Associates) on record filed a notice of
attorney’s lien. Quintin Muning, counsel for respondent, also filed a petition for award of services
rendered but was opposed by Cipriano Cid and Associates on the ground that he is not a lawyer.

-The court of industrial relations awarded the 25% compensation for professional services as follows:

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates 10%

Quintin Muning 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis 5%

Issue: WON may a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services rendered

Ruling:

-No

-For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, provides that

"Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney’s agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, . . ." cralaw virtua

-This rule imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition h the recovery of
attorney’s fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client’s representative in court be a lawyer.

-In the case at bar, Muning is not a lawyer hence he can’t establish an attorney-client relationship.

-Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers’ Association, Et. Al.
v. Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, 4 that an agreement providing for the
division of attorney’s fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with
lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified.

THE REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES

-Section 2. Scope. - These Rules shall govern the procedure in actions before the Metropolitan Trial
Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) for payment of money where the value of the claim does not exceed Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.

-Section 3. Objectives. - (a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of persons to a speedy
disposition of their cases; (b) To provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the disposition of
small claims cases; and, (c) To introduce innovations and best practices for the benefit of the
underprivileged.

-Section 5. Applicability. - The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all actions that are purely civil in nature
where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of
money

-The claim or demand may be: (a) For money owed under any of the following: 1. Contract of Lease; 2.
Contract of Loan; 3. Contract of Services; 4. Contract of Sale; or 5. Contract of Mortgage; (b) For
liquidated damages arising from contracts; (c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an
arbitration award involving a money claim covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec. 417 of Republic Act
7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991.

Section 7. Venue. - The regular rules on venue shall apply. However, if the plaintiff is engaged in the
business of lending, banking and similar activities, and has a branch within the municipality or city where
the defendant resides, the Statement of Claim/s shall be filed where that branch is located.
-Section 11. Dismissal of the Claim. - After the court determines that the case falls under these Rules, it
may, from an examination of the allegations of the Statement of Claim/s and such evidence attached
thereto, by itself, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of the case. The order
of dismissal shall state if it is with or without prejudice.

However, if the case does not fall under this Rule, but falls under summary or regular procedure, the
case shall not be dismissed. Instead, the case shall be re-docketed under the appropriate procedure, and
returned to the court where it was assigned, subject to payment of any deficiency in the applicable
regular rate of filing fees. If a case is filed under the regular or summary procedure, but actually falls
under this Rule, the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for appropriate assignment.

-Section 19. Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed. - No attorney shall appear in behalf of or represent a
party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant. If the court determines that a
party cannot properly present his/her claim or defense and needs assistance, the court may, in its
discretion, allow another individual who is not an attorney to assist that party upon the latter's consent.

-Section 20. Non-appearance of Parties. - Failure of the plaintiff to appear shall be cause for the
dismissal of the Statement of Claim/s without prejudice. The defendant who appears in the absence of
the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on a permissive counterclaim.

Katarungang Pambarangay Law

-The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R. A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991,

-I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law [formerly P. D. 1508, repealed and now replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and
Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991], and prior
recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government offices, except
in the following disputes:

[1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;

[3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and municipalities, unless the
parties thereto agree to submit their difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;

[4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only individuals
shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents [Sec. 1, Rule
VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules];

[5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
[6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one [1] year or
a fine of over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

[7] Offenses where there is no private offended party;

[8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further
continued

[9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice;

[10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) [Secs. 46 & 47, R. A.
6657];

[11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations [Montoya vs. Escayo, et
al., 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction
over conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain offices of the Department
of Labor and Employment];

[12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in court [See Sanchez vs.
Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459].

-III. All complaints and/or informations filed or raffled to your sala/branch of the Regional Trial Court
shall be carefully read and scrutinized to determine if there has been compliance with prior Barangay
conciliation procedure under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations as a pre-condition to judicial action, particularly whether the certification to file action
attached to the records of the case comply with the requirements hereinabove enumerated in Par. II;

-IV. A case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation which is a pre-condition for
formal adjudication (Sec. 412 [a] of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law) may be dismissed upon
motion of defendant/s, not for lack of jurisdiction of the court but for failure to state a cause of action or
prematurity (Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470; Gonzales vs. CA, 151 SCRA 289), or the court may suspend
proceedings upon petition of any party under Sec. 1, Rule 21 of the Rules of Court; and refer the case
motu proprio to the appropriate Barangay authority applying by analogy Sec. 408 [g], 2nd par., of the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law which reads as follows:

"The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the Lupon under this Code are
filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer case to the Lupon concerned for amicable
settlement.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 9406

AN ACT REORGANIZING AND STRENGTHENING THE PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (PAO), AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE "ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987", AS AMENDED, GRANTING SPECIAL ALLOWANCE TO PAO
OFFICIALS AND LAWYERS, AND PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR
-SEC. 2. Section 14, Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 14. Public Attorney's Office (PAO). - The Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) is renamed Public
Attorney's Office (PAO). It shall exercise the powers and functions as are now provided by law for the
Citizen's Legal Assistance Office or may hereafter be provided by law.

"The PAO shall be an independent and autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice in
accordance with Sec. 38(3), Chapter 7 of Book IV of this Code for the purposes of policy and program
coordination. "The PA0 shall be the principal law office of the government in extending free legal
assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases."

-SEC. 3. A new Section 14-A, is hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987", to read as follows:

"SEC. 14-A Powers and Functions. - The PAO shall independently discharge its mandate to render, free of
charge, legal representation, assistance, and counselling to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. In the exigency of the service, the PAO may be called upon
by proper government authorities to render such service to other persons, subject to existing laws, rules
and regulations."

"SEC. 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit. - The clients of the PAO shall exempt from
payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial
bodies, as an original proceeding or on appeal. "The costs of the suit, attorney's fees and contingent fees
imposed upon the adversary of the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be deposited in the
National Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special allowances of authorized officials and
lawyers of the PAO.

-"SEC. 16-F. Franking Privilege. - The PAO may transmit through ordinary mail and/or registered mail
with return card, free of charge, all official communications and papers directly connected with the
conduct of its duties, function and/or its exercise of administrative supervision over its personnel.

Presidential Decree No. 1275, s. 1978, REORGANIZING THE PROSECUTION STAFF OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE AND THE OFFICES OF THE PROVINCIAL AND CITY FISCALS, REGIONALIZING THE
PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND CREATING THE NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE

-Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of
Justice. There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision
and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the
Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City
Fiscal’s Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.

The power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice includes the authority to act
directly on any matter within the jurisdiction of the Prosecution Staff, the Regional State Prosecution
Office or the Office of the Provincial or City Fiscal and to review, modify or revoke any decision or action
of the Chief of said staff or office.
-Section 11. Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals; Duties and Functions. The provincial fiscal or the city fiscal
shall:

(a) Be the law officer of the province or city, as the case may be. He shall have charge of the prosecution
of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts of such province
or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal prosecutions.

(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all
penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his
assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by
subpoena for the purpose.

(c) Investigate commissions of criminal acts and take an active part in the gathering of relevant
evidence. For this purpose, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Philippine Constabulary and other
offices and agencies of the government shall extend to him the necessary assistance.

(e) Assist the Solicitor General, when so deputized in the public interest, in the performance of any
function or in the discharge of any duty incumbent upon the latter, within the territorial jurisdiction of
the former, in which cases, he shall be under the control and supervision of the Solicitor General with
regard to the conduct of the proceedings assigned to him and render reports thereon.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10071 AN ACT STRENGTHENING AND RATIONALIZED THE NATIONAL PROSECUTION
SERVICE

-Section 3. Creation of the National Prosecution Service. - There is hereby created and established a
National Prosecution Service to be composed of the prosecution staff in the Office of the Secretary of
Justice and such number of regional prosecution offices, offices of the provincial prosecutor and offices
of the prosecutor as are hereinafter Provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the preliminary
investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws under the supervision of the
Secretary of Justice, subject to the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 7 hereof.

-Section 6. Regional Prosecution Office. - There shall be at each administrative region, except the
National Capital Region (NCR), a Regional Prosecution Office to be headed by a Regional Prosecutor who
shall be assisted by one (1) Deputy Regional Prosecutor, one (1) Senior Assistant Regional Prosecutor,
three (3) Assistant Regional Prosecutors, and one (1) Prosecution Attorney.

-Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor. - The provincial
prosecutor shall:

(a) Be the law officer of the province or city, as the case may be:

(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of
penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations
he or any of his/her assistants shall receive the statements under oath or take oral evidence of
witnesses, and for this purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath
before him/her, and the attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant witness may be enforced by
application to any trial court;

(c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal
ordinances in the courts at the province or city and therein discharge all the duties incident to the
institution of criminal actions, subject to the provisions of second paragraph of Section 5 hereof

Felipe Abella V. Atty. Asteria Cruzabra

Facts:

-Abella filed a complaint for violation of Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees against Atty. Asteria Cruzabra

-complainant charged respondent with engaging in private practice while employed in the government
service.

-Complainant alleged that respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar and was appointed as Deputy
Register of Deeds of General Santos City.

-Complainant asserted that as Deputy Register of Deeds, respondent filed a petition for commission as a
notary public and was commissioned on 29 February 1988 without obtaining prior authority from the
Secretary of the Department of Justice.

-Complainant claimed that respondent has notarized some 3,000 documents. Complainant pointed out
that respondent only stopped notarizing documents when she was reprimanded by the Chief of the
Investigation Division of the Land Registration Authority

-In her Comment, respondent admitted that she was a notary public. Respondent stated that she was
authorized by her superior, the Register of Deeds, to act as a notary public. Respondent pointed out that
the Register of Deeds, Atty. Pelagio T. Tolosa, also subscribed petitions and documents that were
required to be registered.

-When the IBP investigated, they recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent for
lack of merit. The fact that she applied for commission as Notary Public without securing the approval of
the proper authority although she was allowed to do so by her superior officer, was not her own
undoing for having relied on the ample authority of her superior officer, respondent being a neophyte in
the law profession for having newly passed the bar a year after at that time.

Issue: WON respondent should is guilty of the said charge

Ruling:

-Yes

-Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, provides that, No officer or employee shall
engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department
-It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public, she did not obtain
a written permission from the Secretary of the DOJ. Respondent's superior, the Register of Deeds,
cannot issue any authorization because he is not the head of the Department. And even assuming that
the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to present any proof of that written permission.

-Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, engaging in the private practice of
profession, when unauthorized, is classified as a light offense punishable by reprimand

-Therefore, respondent is declared guilty of engaging in notarial practice without the written authority
from the Secretary of the Department of Justice, and accordingly we REPRIMAND her.

Office of the Court Administrator V. Atty. Misael Ladaga

Facts:

-respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
requested the court administrator Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono
counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case for Falsification of Public Document
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City

- While respondent's letter-request was pending action, respondent appeared as counsel for the
accused in the said criminal case

-Respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case because of the factual circumstances
surrounding the criminal case.

Issue: WON respondent should be held liable for appearing in court without prior authorization from
the court

Ruling:

-Yes

-under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession.

-under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging
in the private practice of their profession. The said section reads: SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to
practice. – No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.

-However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession in
this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates
a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a
lawyer.

-In the case at bar, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono
counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law
profession contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with
a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.

Erwin Javellana V. DILD

Facts:

-Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Council or of Bago City, Negros Occidental

-City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case against Javellana for: (1) violation of
Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in
relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act
No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority

-Divinagracia’s complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the city Council or Sanggunian
Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law
without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local
Government,

-Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice of law for the reasons stated in his
letter-request.

-On the same date, Secretary Santos replied as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "1st Indorsement
September 10, 1990 "Respectfully returned to Councilor Erwin B. Javellana, Bago City, his within letter
dated September 10, 1990, requesting for a permit to continue his practice of law for reasons therein
stated, with the information that, as represented and consistent with law, we interpose no objection
thereto, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions.

-On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth
guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective officials

-On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the
ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circular Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the
Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.

-Javellana’s motion to dismiss was denied by the public respondents. His motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied

Issue:WON administrative case against Javellana shall be dismissed

Ruling:

-we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the administrative charge against him
-The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in
effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner
Javellana is a councilman

-The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in
effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner
Javellana is a councilman

Francisco Lorenzana V. Atty. Cesar Fajardo

Facts:

-Francisco Lorenzana, complainant, charges respondent Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo with violation of the Civil
Service Law and Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and seeks his disbarment from the
practice of the law profession.

-complainant alleged that respondent, while employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement Office
in Manila, until his retirement on May 15, 2002, was a member of the People's Law Enforcement Board
(PLEB)

-He was also a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches Proper. Complainant also
alleged that respondent was engaged in the private practice of law.

-When the IBP investigated, respondent should still be held liable for violation of Civil Service Rules and
Regulations since he failed to show that he was permitted by his Office to appear as counsel for his
clients.

Issue: WON respondent should be held liable for practicing without permission

Ruling:

-Yes

-Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.7 Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists
in frequent or customary action a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of law by attorneys
employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statutes has been interpreted as
customarily habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services

-In the case at bar, respondent's appearance as counsel is not merely isolated. Evidence presented by
complainant shows that he had an extensive practice of law.

-While employed as a Legal Officer in the Urban Resettlement Office of Manila, he maintained a law
office.

-Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules that "(n)o officer or employee shall engage
directly in any private business, vocation or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department.
REY J. VARGAS AND EDUARDO A. PANES, JR., COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. MICHAEL A. IGNES, ATTY.
LEONARD BUENTIPO MANN, ATTY. RODOLFO U. VIAJAR, JR., AND ATTY. JOHN RANGAL D. NADUA,
RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

-complainants filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Ignes, Atty. Mann, Atty. Rodolfu Viajar and
Atty. Nadua before the IBP

-Complainants alleged that respondents appeared as counsels of Koronadal Water District without legal
authority and that Atty. Ignes continued representing KWD after the OGCC had confirmed the
expiration of Atty. Ignes’s contract.

-Respondent defended that they can validly represent KWD since Atty. Ignes was not notified of his
contract’s pre-termination.

Issue: WON respondents should be held administratively

Ruling:

-Yes

-Under the Administrative Code of 1987, GOCCs should refrain from hiring private lawyers or law firms
to handle their cases and legal matters. But the same Section 3 provides that in exceptional cases, the
written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as
the case may be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before the hiring or
employment of a private lawyer or law firm

-In the instant case, there is no proof that the OGCC and COA approved Atty. Nadua's engagement as
legal counsel or collaborating counsel. Insofar as Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann are concerned, their
appointment as collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009 has no approval from the
OGCC and COA.

-In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of KWD without authority, after his authority as
its counsel had expired.

-for respondents' willful appearance as counsels of KWD without authority to do so, there is a valid
ground to impose disciplinary action against them.

-Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.

-Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo Mann, Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr., and John Rangal D.
Nadua are found GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do
so and FINED P5,000 each, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution. They
are STERNLY WARNED that a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PAMINTUAN DEVELOPMENT CO.

Facts:

-Attys. Engilberto F. Montarde and Felix F. Mesa, filed a Notice of Entry of Appearance in behalf of
petitioner

-Respondent filed an Opposition contending that the notice of appeal and notice of entry of appearance
should be denied due course because Attys. Montarde and Mesa failed to show that their appearance
was authorized by petitioner.

-on the other hand, respondents asserted that they were duly authorized, attaching to their Comment
the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Gilda E. Pico, Executive Vice President of petitioner,
authorizing Loreto B. Corotan to represent, [8] and designating [9] Attys. Montarde and Mesa as
counsels for LANDBANK

-DARAB issued an order holding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa are without authority to represent
petitioner because the latter failed to effect a valid substitution of their former counsel of record

-The CA sustained the DARAB Ruling.

Issue: WON petitioner’s respondents be granted with their petition for entry of appearance

Ruling:

-Yes

-We find that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion in holding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa lacked
the authority to file a notice of appeal in behalf of petitioner

-Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. ' An
attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding
judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any
attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he
appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him,
and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in court for a
person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.

-A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client.

-The DARAB's assertion that Attys. Montarde and Mesa cannot validly represent petitioner because
there was no proper substitution of counsels, lacks merit. Petitioner never intended to replace its
counsel of record, the law firm Piczon, Beramo & Associates. Though not specified in the notice, Attys.
Montarde and Mesa entered their appearance as collaborating counsels.

-In law it is assumed prima facie that every attorney who appears in court does so with sufficient
authority. The fact that a second attorney enters an appearance on behalf of a litigant does not
authorize a presumption that the authority of the first attorney has been withdrawn.
-WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED and the April 15, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85843, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is DIRECTED to give due course to petitioner's Notice of Entry of
Appearance and the Notice of Appeal.