LACONSAY V. FIDEL BEROG Y CARAOS his body under the Toyota but to no avail.
his body under the Toyota but to no avail. His right leg was ran over for the second
Employer-Employee Relationship | December 3, 2014
SUMMARY: Petitioner Laconsay is the authorized representative of his wife as regards
the control and use of a Harabas vehicle. One day, he sent Ontuca to drive the vehicle to
the chapel and help out in the clean-up activities there. An enraged Bautista suddenly
demanded the keys for the vehicle and subsequently sped away from the premises. A
vehicular collision occurred between the Harabas and two Toyota cars; respondent Fidel
was pinned against the Toyota car and his right leg was ran over, ultimately leading to
its amputation. Fidel’s parents filed for damages. Fidel testified that it was Ontuca who
was driving the Harabas when it ran over his right leg for the second time. The Court
ruled in favor of respondents, holding Laconsay liable as the employer of Ontuca.
DOCTRINE: Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees.
To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must
overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.
 Act/omission: Act of employee  Ontuca was driving the Harabas when it ran over
Fidel’s right leg.
 Negligence: Negligence of employee  Ontuca was the authorized driver of the
Harabas and as such should have been diligent in its use. Negligence of employer
 Laconsay was negligent in the selection and supervision of Ontuca.
 Injury: Amputation of Fidel’s right leg
 Causation: Negligent driving  right leg was ran over  right leg was amputated
FACTS:
 Petitioner Laconsay visited to a chapel in Brgy. Don Bosco, Better Living Subdivision,
and Paranaque City to check on the status of its construction. He promised the
engineer that he will being his Harabas vehicle (a type of station wagon) in order to
help clean the area. (Note that the Harabas was left in his custody by his wife Felisa
who was already residing abroad).
 On the date of the clean-up, however, petitioner Laconsay sent Ontuca to drive the
Harabas instead because he had an out-of-town commitment. Ontuca has always
been Laconsay’s designated driver in several previous occasions.
 Ontuca arrived at the chapel and parked the Harabas on the premises. While cleaning
the chapel with the help of another person, an enraged Bautista barged in the chapel
brandishing a 15-inch bolo. Bautista angrily demanded the keys for Harabas; Ontuca
immediately complied out of fear for his life. Bautista sped away in the Harabas;
Ontuca gave chase and even tried to ride the vehicle through the passenger seat.
 Respondent minor Fidel Berog was fixing his bike while seated between two Toyota
cars that were parked along the street. His companion suddenly shouted to warn him
that a vehicle was fast approaching his way. In no time, the Harabas collided against
one of the Toyota cars; unable to react immediately, Fidel was pinned severely
against the other Toyota car.
 Fidel testified that as the Harabas pulled away, he saw its driver (Bautista) flee with
a bloody face and that another man (Ontuca) took over the steering wheel. Again he
saw the Harabas being driven again towards where he was. He hurriedly tried to hide
time. He was rushed to the hospital where his right leg was amputated.
 Fidel, represented by his parents, filed a complaint for damages against Laconsay,
Ontuca, Bautista, and Felisa. Felisa and Bautista were declared in default.
 In their Answer with Counterclaim, Laconsay and Ontuca denied liability and raised
the following defenses, among other things:
o that Bautista has never been the driver or employee of Laconsay,
o that only Bautista should be held liable for damages,
o that the complaint only impleaded Laconsay because the claimants could
not claim from anyone else, and
o that the preliminary investigation of the case resulted in the exculpation of
Laconsay and Ontuca from any liability.
 The RTC ruled in favor Fidel; it accorded full weight and credence to his testimony
which categorically identified Ontuca as the driver of the Harabas when it ran over
his right leg. CA affirmed the RTC, with the modification of adjusting the
hospitalization expense to the actual amounts as evidenced by receipts and the moral
damages is increased to P1.5 million from P1 million.
 Hence, this appeal by Laconsay.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. W/n Laconsay should be held liable for the injury sustained by Fidel – YES
 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
XXX
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
 Art. 2180 and Art. 2194 categorically provide that the responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. In other words, the liability of joint
tortfeasors is solidary. Under Art. 2180, an employer may be held solidarily
liable for the negligent act of his employee.
 Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly
arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees. To avoid liability for
a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption
by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
 Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact which the Court cannot pass
upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as the Court's jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing errors of law.
 In this case, the Supreme Court found no reason to reverse the factual findings of the
lower courts. There is ample evidence establishing the fact that Ontuca was driving
the vehicle when it ran over the right leg of Fidel for the second time. The CA, as
emphasized by the Court, found that: “Ontuca worsened the victim's fate by running
 over his right leg twice. Clearly, the liability of Ontuca for negligence emanated from
his being the authorized driver of the Harabas vehicle and from his voluntary act of
carelessly operating the vehicle when it ran over and crushed the right leg of Fidel.”

As regards the employer-employee relationship:

 Laconsay cannot deny being Ontuca’s employer. It is clearly evident in the records
that Laconsay authorized Ontuca to driver the Harabas. As employer, Laconsay share
a vicarious liability for the negligent act of Ontuca; he failed in exercising the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Ontuca.
 Laconsay also cannot avoid liability on the basis of the registration of Felisa’s
ownership over the Harabas. It has been established by evidence that he has control
of its use; one of the pieces of evidence presented was a barangay complaint filed by
Laconsay which contains his signature as Felisa’s “authorized representative.”
 The CA emphasized that the operator of record continues to be the operator
of the vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and third
person, and is responsible for the consequences incident to the vehicle’s
operation, and who should be held out as the employer of the driver. To
give effect to this policy, the actual operator and employer shall be
considered as the agent of the operator of record.

RULING: Wherefore, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Decision dated

October 6, 2008 and Resolution dated June 23, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 81698 are AFFIRMED."