Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws
are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him
who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No.
42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its
decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed
to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept
on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between
them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle,
his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio
City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair
located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22,
1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
 The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of
her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for
her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment
was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis.
She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing
cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire
or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal
man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he
loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically
capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two
of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities,
there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant,
was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he
forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she
did not like it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and
these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and,
(2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is
still a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio
Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of
impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection
and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the
defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a
soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that
with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the
plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy
of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of
proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-
coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in
their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that
in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is
annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings.
When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the
trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony.
After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that
since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides
that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule
19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only
shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
 The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts.
The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital
obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner
and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points
out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity
and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological
disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or
other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to
March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that
there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be
filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the
other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the
reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her
what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her.
He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not
psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to
prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the
same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil
Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that
defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's
inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would
expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
 We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and
who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the
basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is
useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is
to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared
feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy
but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each
other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor
gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire
of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29,
1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Thirteenth Division: Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente, Eduardo G. Montenegro and

Antonio P. Solano, JJ., concurring.

2 Rollo, pp. 20-24.

3 Ibid.

4 Rollo, p. 34.

5 Exhs. "2", "2-B" and "2-C".

6 Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family Code of the Philippines
Annotated, Pineda, 1989 ed., p. 51.

7 Decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 30-31.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.

Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious
endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.

Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.

Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .

PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before
the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees;
and the costs.

On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new
trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and
their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of
arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the
opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion
to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court
granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but
that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.

Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and
their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances
of settling the case amicably were nil.

On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this
Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set
aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.

A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly
supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.)
Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid
defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to
fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions
or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand
Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage,
because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before
the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule
33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for
he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law.
The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to
marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs.
Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would
have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower
girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received
(Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left
a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home
city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to
the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of
merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and]
oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with
costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused
himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon
which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to
the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the
evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following
statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal
Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho.
"Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in
August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a
narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the
house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room
was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small
hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door,
opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was
suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice,
"Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open
by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the
porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his
feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by
the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant
thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be
a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by
the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his
pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to
his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up
Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one
of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was
because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms
prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door
and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk
with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the
nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and
Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party
separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting
on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the
impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite
defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that
the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by
forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe
that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died
from the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted
that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-
defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete
exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the
door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one,
under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the
thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat
that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the
night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an
assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first
blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor
his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal
blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he
was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or
his property or the property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible
who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if
the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if
the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think
there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided
always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in
those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a
crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different
from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law,
sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596;
Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is
whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and
assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given
of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that
the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the
actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor
to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the
express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the
general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the
Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient
of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal
intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express
provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or
imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act
committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these
exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a
wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again,
"There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of
them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in
the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less
in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the
same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth.
Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to
be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall
appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the
wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article,
say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention
(intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and
includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of
1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was
redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence
of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this
article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have
shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is
no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there
is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal
Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of
May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from
the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil
effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church,
there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes
every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the
commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact
submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various
crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article
568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a
grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision
correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence
shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being
subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or
less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one
thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
(criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word
"willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while
the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently
understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies
an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in
contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful."
And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose;
in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious,"
"maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or
willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require
general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification.
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be
committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes
generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be
found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an
act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present
this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes
important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence
of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or
mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind
was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of
an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself
does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an
act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal
jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or
exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the
result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the
dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its
jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the
innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure,
he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another
to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And
whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from
its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself
spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with
the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are
only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior
to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be
punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract
justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law
excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the
same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of
cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer.
Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held
that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12,
p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real
departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil
purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids."
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in
fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the
maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense,
a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387;
P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb.,
625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to
say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is
to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and
the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming
the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts
which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is
founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide;
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other
words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the
doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as
they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself
correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are
in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a
man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken
belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are
in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer
believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal
liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be
guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the
facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary
ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the
presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design
against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was
no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according
to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in
Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms
and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached
near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the
instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder
only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more
criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine
must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the
pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And
when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the
reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's
Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here
set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of
his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was
attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one
or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and
took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a
blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the
unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to
 whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in
consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had
always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness,
demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility,
as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal
Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without
sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force
used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the
supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have
been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was
nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they
might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room,
and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might
endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant
was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was
attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally
necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his
assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration
which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish
whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might
accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed
rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal
Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the
city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8
paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money,
he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had
before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance,
finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined,"
realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend
was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the
author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but
only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness
of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and
one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this
sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the
identity of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness,
etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17,
1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone
thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted,
and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of
which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same
spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense
with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to
exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed,
and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon
appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the
malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was
acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p.
128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman
struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his
sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and
of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented
themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief
that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he
can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake
as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
oficio. So ordered.

Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the merits of
the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code,
was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without
malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased
could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the
person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a
knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be
sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties
provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both
instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig
City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a
lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second
prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline
L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out
the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the
MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005,
invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded
with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven
days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No.
2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner
for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of
S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved
unavailing.6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego
participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of
jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC
was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence,
petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No.
82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that
the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to
maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence
holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate
the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to
the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by
counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A.
2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him
of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding
petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond
are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit
to review judgments of convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question
on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis
under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of
its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review
to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped
bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory
review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment
of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable
on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the
defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or
acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that
mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled
proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the
suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A.
No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the
MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the
filing of this petition.

Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense"13protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior
verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge.
Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve
the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of
the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to
three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light
felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person
shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending
to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who
fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached
to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for
either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties
(paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8).
Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the
intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass
of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately
defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last
century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of
Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x
x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes);
(2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the
mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in
itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to
deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence:
murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is
treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty
therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed
willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent
variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to
the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in
damage, either to person or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to
Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an
intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v.
Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has
long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court
decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes
under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found
expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an
indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of
quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense
alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but
arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v.
Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of
a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for
"reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed
earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior
conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the
Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.),
People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of
Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of
Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy
Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a
subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges
grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence,
the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does
not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not
be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the
reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by
more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November
1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of
a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz
chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in
1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to property
for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had
relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs.
Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29,
1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence,
the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does
not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not
be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto,
Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second
accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes
with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page
82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and
submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner
guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that
"if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same
consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-
and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated
with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the
mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored
to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a
vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of
the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court
initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case.
In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny
People v. Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v.
Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between
the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been
dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace
court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim.
Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple
physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the
accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were
acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash
the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured
passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he
had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon
he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through
reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to
the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against
Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant
Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of
dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police
constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the
municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having
driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had
pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some
time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same
accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be
₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed
the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law
prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless
imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not
the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove
the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to
support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

xxxx

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that
the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge
for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out
of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior
court.43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose
of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double
jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless
Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar,
fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was
anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for
the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition
on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield
no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or
clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views
expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30,
1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from
persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in
criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes,
both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple
felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving
multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x
x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or
more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution
multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365
governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human
interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models – that of a single criminal
negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties
corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should
such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense
with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried
separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences
of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double
jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one
consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting
acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the
other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly,
this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under
Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty
under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under
Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single
prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized
as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is
not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized
as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-
crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence
separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge
alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to
three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall
be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The
information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x
x.53 (Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one
framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting
acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present
framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the
penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes,
require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize
each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article
365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases. 1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws
constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under
our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually
impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies;
or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we
rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined
with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the
accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for
the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence
of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges
are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,
irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible
second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to
proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of
charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by
the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to
quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a
single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still
keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article
365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366
against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the
ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 22 September 2010.

1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006.

3 In a Resolution dated 4 October 2004.

4 In an Order dated 17 May 2005 (Records, p. 142).

5 In a Resolution dated 24 May 2005.

6 Denied in an Order dated 2 May 2006.

7 Rollo, pp. 30-33.

8 The provision states: "Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. – x x x x

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal
if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal."

9 329 Phil. 339 (1996).

10 Id. at 350.

11 The provision states: "Forfeiture of bail. – When the presence of the accused is required by the court
or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time.
If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the
bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show why no judgment
should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and

(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and
severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability
of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted."

12 Rollo, p. 40.

13 Section 21, Article III, 1987 Constitution.

14Section 7, Rule 117 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The right has, of course, broader scope to
cover not only prior guilty pleas but also acquittals and unconsented dismissals to bar prosecutions for
the same, lesser or graver offenses covered in the initial proceedings (id.)

15 Rollo, p. 97.

16 Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga, 97 Phil. 342, 345 (1955) (emphasis in the original).

17 Id.

18 Id. at 345-346.

19We observed in Quizon: "Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive
phrases as ‘homicide through reckless imprudence,’ and the like; when the strict technical offense is,
more accurately, ‘reckless imprudence resulting in homicide’; or ‘simple imprudence causing damages to
property.’’’ (Id. at 345; emphasis supplied)

20
In People v. Buan, 131 Phil. 498, 500-502 (1968), which applied Quizon’s logic, the Court canvassed
relevant jurisprudence, local and Spanish:

[T]he quasi-offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions. This has been the constant
ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court, and is also that of this Court in its most recent decisions on
the matter.

Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as a result of the same vehicular
accident one man died, two persons were seriously injured while another three suffered only
 slight physical injuries, we ruled that the acquittal on a charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution for homicide through reckless
imprudence. In People vs. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954, the ruling was that the dismissal by the
Municipal Court of a charge of reckless driving barred a second information of damage to
property through reckless imprudence based on the same negligent act of the accused. In
People vs, Belga, 100 Phil. 996, dismissal of an information for physical injuries through
needless imprudence as a result of a collision between two automobiles was declared, to block
two other prosecutions, one for damage to property through reckless imprudence and another for
multiple physical injuries arising from the same collision. The same doctrine was reasserted in
Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30, 1959. In none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court
regard as material that the various offenses charged for the same occurrence were triable in
Courts of differing category, or that the complainants were not the individuals.

As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in his Derecho Penal (12th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 439,
has this to say:

Aun cuando de un solo hecho imprudente se originen males diversos, como el hecho culposo es
uno solo, existe un solo delito de imprudencia. Esta es jurisprudencia constante del Tribunal
Supremo. De acuerdo con esta doctrina el automovilista imprudente que atropella y causa
lesiones a dos personas y ademas daños, no respondera de dos delitos de lesiones y uno de
daños por imprudencia, sino de un solo delito culposo.

The said author cites in support of the text the following decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
(footnotes 2 and 3).

xxxx

Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte de una persona y ademas se ocasionan daños,
existe un solo hecho punible, pues uno solo fue el acto, aun cuando deben apreciarse dos
enorden a la responsabilidad civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a consecuencia de un solo acto
imprudente se produjeron tres delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de daños, como todos son
consecuencia de un solo acto culposo, no cabe penarlos por separado, 2 abril 1932. (Emphasis
supplied)

E.g. Samson v. Court of Appeals, 103 Phil. 277 (1958); People v. Cano, 123 Phil. 1086 (1966);
21

Pabulario v. Palarca, 129 Phil. 1 (1967); Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429 (1969).

2267 Phil. 529 (1939) (affirming a conviction for malicious mischief upon a charge for "damage [to
property] through reckless imprudence"). A logical consequence of a Fallerian conceptualization of
quasi-crimes is the sanctioning of the split prosecution of the consequences of a single quasi offense
such as those allowed in El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513 (1940) (finding the separate
prosecutions of damage to property and multiple physical injuries arising from the same recklessness in
the accused’s operation of a motor vehicle not violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause).

23 67 Phil. 529 (1939).

24
E.g. Lontok v. Gorgonio, 178 Phil. 525, 528 (1979) (holding that the "less grave offense" of "damage to
property through reckless imprudence" (for ₱2,340) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the penal
code with a prescribed " slight offense" of "lesiones leves through reckless imprudence," citing Faller);
Arcaya v. Teleron, 156 Phil. 354, 362 (1974) (noting, by way of dicta in a ruling denying relief to an
appeal against the splitting of two charges for "less serious physical injuries and damage to property
amounting to ₱10,000 though reckless imprudence" and "slight physical injuries though reckless
imprudence," that the Quizon doctrine, as cited in Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429 (1969) and People v.
Buan, 131 Phil. 498 (1968), "may not yet be settled in view of the contrary dictum" in Faller).

25 94 Phil. 715 (1954).

26100 Phil. 996 (1957) (barring subsequent prosecutions for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
and damage to property thru reckless imprudence following an acquittal for "reckless imprudence with
physical injury").
27105 Phil. 1307 (1959) (Unrep.) (barring subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries" following
an acquittal for "reckless driving").

28
107 Phil. 737 (1960) (barring subsequent prosecution for "damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" following a conviction for "multiple slight and serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence.")

29No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 95 (barring subsequent prosecution for "homicide thru
reckless imprudence" following an acquittal for "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").

30123 Phil. 48 (1966) (barring subsequent prosecution for "damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" following an acquittal for two counts of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.")

31131 Phil. 498 (1968) (barring subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" following an acquittal for "slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence").

32200 Phil. 486 (1982) (reversing a subsequent conviction for "damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" following a conviction for "slight and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").

33206 Phil. 555 (1983) (barring subsequent prosecution for "homicide thru reckless imprudence"
following a conviction for "serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").

34 131 Phil. 498, 500 (1968).

35 Id.

36 70 Phil. 513 (1940), also cited in other sources as People v. Estipona.

37 Supra note 32.

38
Supra note 31.

39 Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 200 Phil. 486, 491 (1982).

40 Id. at 491-492.

41 No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 95.

42 Supra note 26.

43 No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 95, 97-100 (internal citations omitted).

44 Id. at 100.

45 Id.

46Defined under Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, thus: "Light felonies are
those infractions of law for the commission of which a penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
200 pesos or both is provided."

47 Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga, 97 Phil. 342, 345 (1955).

48 E.g. People v. Lara, 75 Phil. 786 (1946) (involving "homicidio por imprudencia temeraria" with several
victims [or, roughly, "multiple homicide thru reckless imprudence"]); People v. Agito, 103 Phil. 526 (1958)
(involving "triple homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence").

49 E.g. People v. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001 (1927) (sustaining a dismissal on demurrer of a criminal case for
the prosecutor’s failure to amend a charge for "damage to property and of lesions leves [slight physical
injuries] through negligence and imprudence" to remove the charge for the slight offense, under Article
89 of the penal code, the precursor of Article 48); Arcaya v. Teleron, 156 Phil. 354 (1974) (finding no
grave abuse of discretion in the filing of separate charges for "less serious physical injuries and damage
to property amounting to ₱10,000 though reckless imprudence" and "slight physical injuries though
reckless imprudence" arising from the same facts); Lontok v. Gorgonio, 178 Phil. 525 (1979) (granting a
petition to split a single charge for "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple
[slight] physical injuries" by limiting the petitioner’s trial to "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property"). See also Reodica v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 90 (1998) (holding that the "less grave felony
of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property" (for ₱8,542) cannot be complexed under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code with "the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries,"
citing Lontok); People v. De Los Santos, 407 Phil. 724 (2001) (applying Article 48 of the penal code to
hold the accused liable for the "complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with
serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries" (upon an information charging "multiple
murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder.") In a dicta, the decision stated that
separate informations should have been filed for the slight physical injuries the victims sustained which
cannot be complexed with the more serious crimes under Article 48.)

Section 2 of RA 7691 provides: "Section 2. Section 32 of [Batas Pambansa Blg. 129] is hereby
50

amended to read as follows:

‘Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. — Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof.’" (Underlining supplied)

51E.g. Angeles v. Jose, 96 Phil. 151 (1954) (reversing the ruling of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a complaint for "damage to property in the sum of
₱654.22, and with less serious physical injuries through reckless negligence," holding improper the
splitting of the charge). We relied on Angeles for our ruling in People v. Villanueva, 111 Phil. 897 (1962)
resolving similar jurisdictional issue and People v. Cano, 123 Phil. 1086, 1090 (1966) (reversing a
dismissal order which found the complexing of "damage to property with multiple [slight] physical injuries
through reckless imprudence" improper, holding that the Information did not and could not have
complexed the effect of a single quasi-offense per Quizon. The Court noted that "it is merely alleged in
the information that, thru reckless negligence of the defendant, the bus driven by him hit another bus
causing upon some of its passengers serious physical injuries, upon others less serious physical injuries
and upon still others slight physical injuries, in addition to damage to property").

52 Angeles v. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, 152 (1954).

53Thus, we were careful to label the crime in question as "what may be called a complex crime of
physical injuries and damage to property" (id., emphasis supplied), because our prescription to impose
"additional penalty" for the second consequence of less serious physical injuries, defies the sentencing
formula under Article 48 requiring imposition of "the penalty for the most serious crime x x x the same to
be applied in its maximum period."

54Supra note 31 at 502 (internal citation omitted). This also explains why in People v. Cano we described
as "not altogether accurate" a trial court and a litigant’s assumption that a charge for "damage to
property with multiple [slight] physical injuries through reckless imprudence" involved two crimes
corresponding to the two effects of the single quasi-crime albeit complexed as a single charge:

[A]ppellee and the lower court have seemingly assumed that said information thereby charges
two offenses, namely (1) slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence; and (2) damage to
property, and serious and less serious physical injuries, thru reckless negligence — which are
sought to be complexed. This assumption is, in turn, apparently premised upon the predicate that
 the effect or consequence of defendants negligence, not the negligence itself, is the principal or
vital factor in said offenses. Such predicate is not altogether accurate.

As early as July 28, 1955 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, had the occasion to
state, in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, Pampanga x x x, that:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence is not
a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of
criminal liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their
structure can not be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious
mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi-
offense, and dealt separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the "imprudencia punible." Much of the confusion has
arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases as "homicide through reckless
imprudence", and the like; when the strict technical offense is more accurately, "reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide", or "simple imprudence causing damages to property." (People
v. Cano, 123 Phil. 1086,1090 (1966), (Emphasis supplied), reiterated in Pabulario v. Palarca, 129
Phil. 1 (1967) (reversing a lower court which quashed a charge alleging reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and multiple slight physical injuries).

55 See Section 32(2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.