Republic of the Philippines war, but by the commission of that offense he incurred a criminal responsibility for which
SUPREME COURT he was amenable only to the military jurisdiction. That criminal responsibility, however,
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 448 September 20, 1901
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
LADD, J.:
The offense charged in the complaint is punishable under the Penal Code now in force
by arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. (Art. 418.) By Act No. 136 of the
United States Philippine Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of First Instance are given
original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months'
imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed." The offense was
therefore cognizable by the court below unless the fact that the appellant was at the time
of its alleged commission an employee of the United States military authorities in the
Philippine Islands, and the further fact that the person upon whom it is alleged to have
been committed was a prisoner of war in the custody of such authorities, are sufficient to
deprive it of jurisdiction. We must assume that both these facts are true, as found, either
upon sufficient evidence or upon the admissions of the prosecuting attorney, by the court
below.
Setting aside the claim that the appellant was "acting in the line of duty" at the time the
alleged offense was committed, which is not supported by the findings or by any evidence
which appears in the record, the contention that the court was without jurisdiction, as we
understand it, is reducible to two propositions: First, that an assault committed by a soldier
or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense under the Penal Code; and
second, that if it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless the military character
sustained by the person charged with the offense at the time of its commission exempts
him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.
As to the first proposition, it is true, as pointed out by counsel, that an assault of the
character charged in the complaint committed in time of war by a military person upon a
prisoner of war is punishable as an offense under the Spanish Code of Military Justice (art.
232), and it is also true that under the provisions of the same Code (arts. 4, 5) the military
tribunals have, with certain exceptions which it is not material to state, exclusive
cognizance of all offenses, whether of a purely military nature or otherwise, committed by
military persons. But the fact that the acts charged in the complaint would be punishable
as an offense under the Spanish military legislation does not render them any less an
offense under the article of the Penal Code above cited. There is nothing in the language
of that article to indicate that it does not apply to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction
of the law. Under articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Military Justice above cited a military
person could not be brought to trial before a civil tribunal for an assault upon a prisoner of
arose from an infraction of the general penal laws, although the same acts, viewed in
another aspect, might also, if committed in time of war, constitute an infraction of the
military code. We are unable to see how these provisions of the Spanish Military Code, no
longer in force here and which indeed never had any application to the Army of the United
States, can in any possible view have the effect claimed for them by counsel for the
appellant.
The second question is, Does the fact that the alleged offense was committed by an
employee of the United States military authorities deprive the court of jurisdiction? We
have been cited to no provision in the legislation of Congress, and to none in the local
legislation, which has the effect of limiting, as respects employees of the United States
military establishment, the general jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts of First Instance
by Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission above cited, and we are not
aware of the existence of any such provision. The case is therefore open to the application
of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military
or other special character of the person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly
established in the law of England and America and which must, we think, prevail under any
system of jurisprudence unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary. (United
States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710.) The appellant's claim that the acts alleged to
constitute the offense were performed by him in the execution of the orders of his military
superiors may, if true, be available by way of defense upon the merits in the trial in the
court below, but can not under this principle affect the right of that court to take jurisdiction
of the case.
Whether under a similar state of facts to that which appears in this case a court of one of
the United States would have jurisdiction to try the offender against the State laws (see In
re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149), it is not necessary to consider. The present is not a case
where the courts of one government are attempting to exercise jurisdiction over the military
agents or employees of another and distinct government, because the court asserting
jurisdiction here derives its existence and powers from the same Government under the
authority of which the acts alleged to constitute the offense are claimed to have been
performed.
It may be proper to add that there is no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions in the
present case nor any claim of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunals. On the
contrary it appears from the findings of the court below that the complaint was entered by
order of the commanding general of the Division of the Philippines, a fact not important,
perhaps, as regards the technical question of jurisdiction, but which relieves the case from
any practical embarrassment which might result from a claim on the part of the military
tribunals to exclusive cognizance of the offense.
The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
COOPER, J., concurring:

I concur in the result of the decision of the court, but am not prepared to assent to all that
is said in the opinion. An offense charged against a military officer, acting under the order
of his superior, unless the illegality of the order is so clearly shown on its face that a man
of ordinary sense and understanding would know when he heard it read or given that the
order was illegal, and when the alleged criminal act was done within the scope of his
authority as such officer, in good faith and without malice, and where the offense is against
the military law — that is, such law as relates to the discipline and efficiency of the Army,
or rules and orders promulgated by the Secretary of War to aid military officers in the
proper enforcement of the custody of prisoners — is not within the jurisdiction of the courts
of the Civil Government. (In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149.) The civil courts, however, may
examine the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the act alleged to be criminal
was done in the performance of duty under the circumstances above indicated, but should
cease to exercise jurisdiction upon such facts appearing.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-44 September 13, 1945

LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD, ET AL., respondents.
Guillermo B. Guevarra for petitioners.
J.A. Wolfson for respondents.
HILADO, J.:
Alleging in their petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dated August 30, 1945, that they have
been and are being "confined, restrained and deprived" of their liberty in the Correctional
Institution for Women, petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link
Infante, pray that the officers therein named, to wit, Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L.
Twindle of the CIC, U.S. Army, "or whoever acts in her place or stead," be directed to
appear before this Court and produce the bodies of petitioners, and to show cause why
petitioners should not forthwith be set at liberty.
Respondent Lt. Col., Bradford, having been served with this Court's order to show cause
dated August 31, 1945, made return thereto dated September 5, 1945, to which are
attached as parts thereof certain commitment orders marked Schedules A, A-1 and A-2,
the first and last emanating from the Headquarters of the Sixth Army, 306th Counter
Intelligence Corps Detachment, and the second from that of the United States Army
Forces in the Far East, 493rd Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment.
Respondent Captain Caroline De Eason, WAC, having been served with this Court's order
to show cause dated September 7, 1945, made return thereto dated on the same day,
incorporating therein by reference Schedules A, A-1 and A-2 of her co-respondents' return
above mentioned.
It appears from these returns, as well as from the arguments of counsel, that by virtue of
the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur on December 29, 1944,
petitioner Lily Raquiza was on March 13, 1945, arrested by the 306th Counter Intelligence
Corps Detachment of the U.S. Sixth Army, and detained under Security Commitment
Order No. 385 (Schedule A), wherein she was charged as follows:
Commitment Order. — The person named and described above is deemed a risk to the
security of the U.S. Forces for the reasons set forth above. The commanding officer of any
military stockade, jail, or comparable installation in which this person may be confined is
authorized and directed to detain him in custody until released by competent military
authority.
In said Schedule A the specific complaint or charge against complaint or charge against
petitioner Lily Raquiza is "Espionage activity for Japanese."
As to petitioner Haydee Tee Han Kee, it appears that by virtue of the aforesaid
proclamation she, on February 25, 1945, was arrested by the same 306th Counter
Intelligence Corps Detachment, and detained under Security Commitment Order No. 286
(Schedule A-2) wherein the Commitment Order is in exactly the same terms as in
Schedule A. The specific complaint or charge against petitioner Tee Han Kee in Schedule
A-2 is "Active collaboration with the enemy."
With regard to petitioner Emma Link Infante, it appears that by virtue of the same
proclamation she, on April 10, 1945, was arrested by the 493rd Counter Intelligence Corps
Detachment of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, and detained under
Commitment of that date (Schedule A-1), wherein she was charged with "Active
collaboration with the Japanese." Her previous association with the enemy constitutes a
present security risk to the United States Armed Forces.
The said proclamation reads:
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
PROCLAMATION
PROVIDING FOR MILITARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN UPON THE APPREHENSION
OF CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHO VOLUNTARILY HAVE GIVEN AID,
COMFORT AND SUSTENANCE TO THE ENEMY.
WHEREAS evidence is before me that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have
given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the
Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS military necessity requires that such persons be enemy in violation of
allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines; and
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, United States Army, as
Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area, hereby do publish and declare it to be my
purpose to remove such persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and
economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the
war; whereafter I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon
their respective cases.
Done at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, in the field, this twenty-ninth day
of December, 1944.
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General of the Army
United States Army
Commander-in-Chief
Of course, the power of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army to issue the
foregoing proclamation cannot be seriously questioned. It has not been questioned in this
case. Where opinions are divided as to its interpretation and effects.
General of the Army MacArthur therein published and declared it to be his purpose, among
other things, to hold in restraint the persons referred to, when apprehended, "for the
duration of the war; whereafter, I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its
judgment upon their respective cases." He premised his proclamation upon two grave
reasons, to wit, (1) that evidence was before him "that certain citizens of the Philippines
voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance
due the Government of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines;" and
(2) that "military necessity requires that such persons be removed from any opportunity to
threaten the security of our military forces or the success of our military operations."
In the very nature of things, the Commander in Chief of the Army of liberation at the time of
issuing that proclamation had to act upon the evidence then before him. The exigencies of
the mighty military operations that he had then but recently begun for the destruction or
defeat of the powerful enemy who was at that time occupying the Islands, did not permit of
any other procedure. And to deny him the exclusive power and competency to determine
the strength and sufficiency of such evidence would have been destructive of that military
efficieny with which, in the interest of all the citizens of the Philippines themselves, not
excluding the herein petitioners, the operations for their liberation had to be conducted.
And once having apprehended the persons to whom the proclamation referred, the same
exigencies required that the said Commander in Chief be invested with the exclusive
power and authority to decide when he should deliver them to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.
Has the war terminated within the meaning of that part of his proclamation wherein the
Commander in Chief declared his purpose to hold such persons in restraint "for the
duration of the war"? We are of opinion that it has not.
In the case of United States vs. Tubig (3 Phil., 244, 254), this Court said:
From that day the fighting continued, and the insurrection did not end officially until the
President proclaimed it an end, July 4, 1902. It is necessary to refer to a public act of the
Executive Department to fix the date of the closing of the war. (Freeborn vs. The Protector,
79 U.S., 700.)
If it be alleged that, notwithstanding the insurrection, there were no actual hostilities in
Nueva Ecija at the times above mentioned, the answer is that the condition of hostility
remained impressed on the whole island until it was removed by the proclamation of the
President. . . .
War, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminates at the time of, some formal
proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the
political department, and not of the judicial department, of government to determine when
war is at an end. . . . (67 C.J., 429, sec. 195.)
And even if the war had terminated, we are of opinion that under the aforesaid
proclamation the petitioners, who are held in restraint thereunder, would continue legally
under custody of the proper military authorities of General of the Army MacArthur's or his
successors' command, for a reasonable time after termination of the war.
If General of the Army MacArthur had, in express terms, declared in his aforesaid
proclamation that after termination of the war he will release the persons therein named to
the Philippine Government within a reasonable time, we think that he could have done so
within his legitimate powers as Commander in Chief of the United States Army; and not
only this, but that for obvious reasons he should be the best and, therefore, the only judge
of how long or how short that time should be under the circumstances. And in order to give
his proclamation a reasonable construction, we are of opinion that this should be implied
from the context. Otherwise, we would be giving to this solemn document the irrational
interpretation that said Commander in Chief thereby announced a purpose which would be
physically impossible for him to carry out; namely, to make delivery to the Philippine
Government immediately upon termination of the war of persons under restraint whose
number he could not then foresee but which he could reasonably expect to be more or less
considerable, with their respective charges and pertinent evidence, papers, and the like. It
was not a matter of delivering a certain quantity or amount of personal property but human
beings who although under custody, had to be properly housed, maintained and otherwise
treated as becoming the "dignity of the human person," which is one of the cardinal
principles of democracy for which the United Nations have fought in this war.
The fact that, as this Court can take judicial notice of, delivery of certain persons under
custody of the United States Army pursuant to the said proclamation has already begun
does not mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already terminated, which it clearly has
not. Such delivery is undoubtedly within the power of the proper military authorities to
make even before the termination of the war. The existence of the military necessity to
which General of the Army MacArthur refers in his proclamation, as well as its
continuance, is a question exclusively for the military authorities to determine, as regards
each and every person under detention. For obvious reasons, the civil courts should not
here interfere, and it is to be presumed that in the judgment of said military authorities that
necessity no longer requires the detention by them of the persons whom they have already
delivered to the Philippine Government.
In the case of Coleman vs. Tennessee (97 U.S., 509), the Supreme Court of the United
States, among other things, said:
It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be
stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and
the criminal jurisdiction of the place. The sovereign is understood, said this court in the
celebrated case of The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 139, to cede a portion of his territorial
jurisdiction when he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions: "In
such case, without any express declaration waiving jurisdiction over the army to which this
right of passage has been granted, it would certainly be considered as violating his faith.
By exercising it, the purpose for which the free passage was granted would be defeated,
and a portion of the military force of a foreign independent nation would be diverted from
those national objects and duties to which it was applicable, and would be withdrawn from
the control of the sovereign whose power and whose safety might greatly depend on
retaining the exclusive command and disposition of this force. The grant of a free passage,
therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops during their passage, and
permits the foreign general to use that discipline and to inflict those punishments which the
government of this army may require." (Emphasis ours.)
In the case of the United States Army of liberation, not only has the Commonwealth
Government asked, and the United States Government agreed, that it come and be
stationed in the Philippines, but it is here for the very realization of the overruling and
vehement desire and dream of the Filipino to be freed from the shackles of Japanese
tyranny, and to see this was brought to a victorious end. If a foreign army permitted to be
stationed in a friendly country, "by permission of its government or sovereign," is exempt
from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place, with much more reason should the Army
of the United States which is not only permitted by the Commonwealth Government to be
stationed here but has come to the islands and stayed in them for the express purpose of
liberating them, and further prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion, be exempt
from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of this place, at least for the time covered by said
agreement of the two Governments. By analogy, an attempt of our civil courts to exercise
jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period expires, would be considered
as a violation of this country's faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep and
uphold. By exercising it, paraphrasing the foregoing quotation, the purpose for which the
stationing of the army in the islands was requested or agreed upon may be hampered or
prejudiced, and a portion of said military force would be withdrawn from the control of the
sovereign to whom they belong. And, again, by analogy, the agreement, for the stationing
of the United States Army or a part of its forces in the Philippines implies as a waiver of all
jurisdiction over their troops during the time covered by such agreement, and permits the
allied general or commander in chief to retain that exclusive control and discipline which
the government of his army may require.
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Schooner Exchange (7 Cranch, 139), gave the
reasons underlying the doctrine of mutual waiver of jurisdiction between nations in the
following paragraphs:
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal
independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, and by
an interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, all
sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar
circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories
which sovereignty confers.
xxx xxx xxx
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest
impelling them to mutual intercourse, and interchange of good offices with each other,
have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the
exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated
to be the attribute of every nation.
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the present petitioners, while under the custody of
the United States military forces, may be considered as prisoners of war. In volume II,
Hydee International Law, page 345, section 676, we read:
. . . It should be borne in mind that an army in the field, in the course of any operation in
any locality . . . may also avail itself, of the right to make civilians prisoners of war.
The author cites from the Rules of Land Warfare which contain an enumeration of civilians
who may be made prisoners of war. This enumeration includes:
(c) Persons whose services are of a particular use and benefit to the hostile army or its
government, such as the higher civil officials, diplomatic agents, couriers, guides, etc. . . .
(Emphasis ours.)
We think that the petitioners would prima facie come within this classification under the
charges of "Espionage activity for Japanese," "Active collaboration with the Japanese,"
and "Active collaboration with the enemy."
We are not unmindful of the fact that the detention of the petitioners may have subjected
them to hardships, but this situation is one of those born of all wars where hardships of all
description are visited upon even the most innocent people. At any rate, we do not think
that the petitioners are totally without remedy. We think they may have recourse to the
proper military authorities by making due representation to them.
These military authorities, we can safely presume, will not deny to the petitioners any
remedy which may be available under the military laws and under the prevailing
circumstances. The United States army forces which have come to the Philippines for the
express purpose of liberating the Filipinos and to restore them the blessings of liberty
under a democratic government, just as fast as the military situation would permit, would
not be — we can justly assume — the very ones to take from them any of those liberties
without legal reason or justification. But the present state of the world is such that military
exigencies or military necessity may, under certain circumstances, still require some
limitation on the restoration or enjoyment of those liberties. The present case is, in our
opinion, one such situation.
Whether the doctrine here laid down would be applicable to cases arising in time of peace,
we do not decide.
In conclusion, we hold that the petition should be dismissed. No special pronouncement as
to costs. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya and Pablo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
OZAETA, J., dissenting:
We dissent from the majority opinion which sanctions the long-continued deprivation of the
petitioners of their sacred liberty without due process of law.
The petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee, and Emma Link Infante, were
arrested by an agent of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of the United States Army on
March 13, 1945, February 25, 1945, and April 10, 1945, respectively, and have since then
been confined in the custody of the respondents. The returns filed by the respondents
herein simply say that the petitioners were arrested and being detained by virtue of the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur on December 29, 1944, which reads as
follows:
WHEREAS evidence is before me that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have
given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the
Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS military necessity requires that such persons be removed from any opportunity
to threaten the security of our military forces or the success of our military operations;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army United States Army, as
Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area, hereby do publish and declare it to be my
purpose to remove such persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and
economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the
war; whereafter I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon
their respective cases.
Done at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, in the field, this twenty-ninth day
of December, 1944. (41 Off Gaz., 148, 149.)
Attached to the returns as Schedules A, A-1, and A-2 are copies of confidential security
commitment orders which shows: as to the petitioner Lily Raquiza, "Complaint: Espionage
activity for Japanese;" as to the petitioner Emma Link Infante, "Remarks: Active
collaboration with the Japanese;" and as to the petitioner Haydee Tee Han Kee,
"Complaint: Active collaboration with the enemy."
Up to this date the petitioners have not been informed of the nature of the accusation
against them, no complaint or information charging them with any specific offense has
been filed against them in any court or tribunal, and they have never been given a
summary hearing. They have not been turned over to the Philippine Government for its
judgment upon their respective cases, and no allegation or intimation is made in the
returns as to whether and when the respondents will release the petitioners to the
Philippine Government.
The petitioners now invoke from this Court the writ of habeas corpus to recover the
precious liberty of which they have long been and are still being deprived. The important
question before us is whether this Court has jurisdiction or legal power to afford relief to
the petitioners in the sad and sorry plight to which they have been and are being
subjected. Six members of the Court voted for the negative and three for the affirmative.
Our affirmative and dissenting vote is based on the following considerations:
The guaranty of due process of law found in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, which declares "that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law," is incorporated in section 1, Article III of the Constitution of the
Philippines, which we have solemnly sworn to support and defend.
"The essential elements of due process of law are notice and an opportunity to be heard
and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal
having jurisdiction of the cause. One of the most famous and perhaps the most often
quoted definition of due process of law is that of Daniel Webster in his argument in the
Dartmouth College Case, in which he declared that by due process of law is meant 'a law
which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only
after trial.' Somewhat similar is the statement that it is a rule as old as the law that no one
shall be personally bound until he has been duly cited to appear and has been afforded an
opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and opportunity lacks all the
attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and oppression and can never
be upheld where justice is fairly administered." (12 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. 573.)
The right to due process of law is more than a prerogative. It is an immanent and
inalienable right of every man, woman, and child living under a government of laws. It
cannot be dispensed with or brushed aside either in time of war or in time of space. In time
of war martial law may be declared. But even under martial law appropriate tribunals such
as courts-martial are set up to hear and decide the case before anybody can be punished.
General MacArthur's proclamation of December 29, 1944, says that "evidence is before
me that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and
sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the governments of the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines;" that "military necessity requires that
such persons be removed from an opportunity to threaten the security of our military forces
or the success of our military operations;" and that it was his purpose "to remove such
persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the
Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war; whereafter, I shall
release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases."
If that proclamation was meant to be a sentence pronounced by General MacArthur
against certain specific persons who, when apprehended, were to be held in restraint for
the duration of the war, such sentence did not constitute, or was totally devoid of, due
process of law because those persons had not been heard before they were condemned;
the evidence before him, whatever it was, must have been taken at the back and without
the knowledge of said persons, everyone of whom, under the Bill of Rights, to the
protection of which every person living under the American flag is entitled, had "the right to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf." Such
sentence, moreover, is void on its face because the persons condemned were not named
therein, so that anybody whom the agents of the Army might apprehend could be held
thereunder for the duration of the war; and even if the persons condemned had been
named, the proclamation could not be upheld because, in so far as it purports to
pronounce judgment of treason on "certain citizens" who have not been tried in the courts,
it partakes of the nature of a bill of attainder which is likewise prescribed by the Bill of
Rights. If that proclamation was promulgated and intended as a military law or order
whereby those who had committed treason might be apprehended and held in restraint for
the duration of the war, then the persons affected should have been accused and tried by
a military tribunal before they were consigned to imprisonment for the duration of the war.
Otherwise, how could it have been legally and justly determined that the accused fell within
the purview of the proclamation — that they had voluntarily given aid, comfort, and
sustenance to the enemy? In either case there was failure of the indispensable requisites
of due process of law.
We take for granted the military necessity that gave rise to General MacArthur's
proclamation — the Court is not competent to inquire into it. But we understand that
military necessity to an army of liberation like that of General MacArthur was not intended
to override law and justice as regards the lives and liberties of the citizens of the country
being liberated; and law and justice required that no accused be condemned without
hearing. Even the most notorious war criminals of Germany and Japan who are publicly
known to have committed horrible, inhuman atrocities during the war have to be accused
before and tried by duly consisted tribunals before punishment can be meted out to them.
To be held in restraint for the duration of the war was in itself a punishment. It may,
parenthetically, be observed here that the petitioners and thousands of other Filipino
citizens held in restraint for the duration of the war by virtue of the proclamation in question
have suffered that punishment with fortitude and abnegation. While the war was in
progress they refrained from questioning the legality of the drastic military measure taken
by General MacArthur in order not to place any obstacle to his titanic task of driving the
enemy out of their country. The Filipino people's gratitude to General MacArthur for their
liberation from the clutches of their Japanese oppressors was so great that they did not
mind the hardship suffered by them in connection with his prosecution of the war — even
the restraint of the liberties of thousands of them for the duration of the war.
But now that the enemy has surrendered and the war is over, no one can blame the
petitioners for knocking at the portals of justice and demanding their inalienable right not to
be further deprived of their liberty without due process of law. The majority opinion turns a
deaf ear to their pathetic supplication on the supposition that the war is not yet over, for the
final treaty of peace between the belligerents has not yet been signed and the Congress of
the United States has not yet proclaimed the termination of the war, and that therefore the
military necessity to hold the petitioners in restraint still subsists, for which reason the
Court has no jurisdiction to order the respondents to discharge them from custody. We
cannot yield to such supine attitude. It disregards "fundamental human rights" and "the
dignity and worth of the human person" for which this global war has been fought and won.
(See Charter of United Nations.)
We have shown that with or without war the petitioners are entitled to due process of law,
and that without due process of law their confinement by the respondents is illegal. Section
1 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. .
. ." Section 2 of the same Rule provides that "writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, . . . in the instances
authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. . .
."
It is true that section 529 of Act No. 190, as amended by Acts Nos. 272 and 421, provided,
among other things, that it shall be a conclusive answer to a writ of habeas corpus against
a military officer or soldier, and sufficient excuse for not producing the prisoner in all other
organized provinces than those therein named, if the commanding general or any general
officer in command of the department or district shall certify that the prisoner is held by him
as a prisoner of war. But when section 529 of the Code of Civil Procedure was reenacted
as section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, that provision was omitted and therefore
impliedly abrogated.
The only exceptions, then, to the application of the writ of habeas corpus are those now
found in section 4 of Rule 102, namely: (1) if the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue
of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order; (2) the case of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or in any part of the United
States, and who ought to be delivered up to the executive power of the United States, or of
any State or territory thereof; and (3) the case of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment. The case of the petitioners herein does not fall under any of these
exceptions.
The majority are of the opinion that the Court has no jurisdiction over the respondents as
members of the United States Army. We do not share that opinion. General MacArthur
himself, on the occasion of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government on February
27, 1945, addressed to the President of the Philippines the following eloquent words:
. . . God has indeed blessed our arms! The girded and unleashed power of America
supported by our Allies turned the tide of battle in the Pacific and resulted in an unbroken
series of crushing defeats upon the enemy culminating in the redemption of your soil and
the liberation of your people. My country has kept the faith!
These soldiers have come here as an army of free men, dedicated, with your people, to
the cause of human liberty and committed to the task of destroying those evil forces that
have sought to suppress it by brutality of the sword. An army of free men that has brought
your people once again under democracy's banner, to rededicate their churches, long
desecrated, to the glory of God and public worship; to reopen their schools to liberal
education; to till the soil and reap its harvest without fear of confiscation; to reestablish
their industries that they may again enjoy the profit from the sweat of their own toil, and to
restore the sanctity and happiness of their homes unafraid of violent intrusion.
Thus to millions of your now liberated people comes the opportunity to pledge themselves
— their hearts, their minds, and their hands — to the task of building a new and stronger
nation — a nation consecrated in the blood nobly shed that this day might be — a nation
dedicated to making imperishable those sacred liberties for which we have fought and
many have died.
On behalf of my Government I now solemnly declare, Mr. President, the full powers and
responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here
reestablished as provided by law.
Your country thus is again at liberty to pursue its destiny to an honored position in the
family of free nations. Your capital city, cruelly punished though it be, has regained its
rightful place — Citadel of democracy in the East. (41 Off. Gaz., 86, 87.)
Thus General MacArthur himself, as Commander in Chief of the United States, Army in
this area and as the representative of the Government of the United states, declared the
full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution restored of the Commonwealth. This
Court functions under by virtue of the Constitution. As the highest court of the land it is the
bulwark of civil rights and individual liberties. It is its inescapable duty to apply the law no
matter on whom it falls. It would be an astonishing manifestation of judicial timidity for the
Court to hesitate to subject any person or class of persons to its mandate in a proper case
for fear of lack of physical power to enforce it.
It is the undying glory of our democratic form of government implanted here in America
herself, that no man living under it is above the law. General McArthur himself as the
peerless defender of democracy, would be the first to recognize this fundamental principle,
and his "army of free men, dedicated, with your people, to the cause of human liberty,"
cannot but graciously obey the law as interpreted by the courts. We know of no law which
places members of the army beyond the power and jurisdiction of the civil courts in matters
affecting civil rights. In the instant case, the fact that in due time the respondents filed their
returns to the order of this Court to show cause is a positive acknowledgment by them of
the Court's jurisdiction over their persons.
The majority are not satisfied with the spontaneous recognition by the respondents
themselves of the Court's jurisdiction over their persons. To justify their stand the majority
opinion cites and applies the rule of the international law mentioned in the case
of Coleman vs. Tennesse (97 U.S., 509; 24 Law ed., 1118), to the effect that a foreign
army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission
of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the
place. The case cited has no applicability whatsoever to the case at bar. It appears in that
case that Coleman, while a regular soldier in the military service of the United States,
committed the crime of murder on March 7 1865, in the State of Tennesse and was
convicted by a general court-martial regularly convened for his trial at Knoxville, Tennesse,
and sentenced to death by hanging. Pending the execution of that sentence Coleman was
indicted in the Criminal Court for the District of Knox Country, Tennesse, on the 2d of
October, 1874, for the same murder. Under that indictment he was tried and convicted and
sentenced to death, and on appeal to the Supreme Court of the State the judgment was
affirmed. Pending the appeal to the State Supreme Court, the defendant was brought
before the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Tennesse
on habeas corpus, upon a petition stating that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty
and imprisoned by the sheriff of Knox County, upon the charge of murder, for which he had
been indicted, tried, and convicted by the general court-martial. The question brought
before the Supreme Court of the United States was whether the Criminal Court of the
State of Tennessee had jurisdiction to try the case.
The Supreme Court of the United States declared that the judgment and conviction in the
Criminal Court should have been set aside and the indictment quashed for want of
jurisdiction. It held that the State of Tennessee, at the time the crime was committed
therein, was an enemy territory under the military occupation of the United States and that
the military tribunals had exclusive jurisdiction to try and punish offenses of every grade
committed by persons in the military in the military service. The court said that "officers and
soldiers of the armies of the Union were not subject during the war to the laws of the
enemy, or amenable to his tribunals for offenses committed by them. They were
answerable only to their own government, and only by its laws, as enforced by its armies,
could they be punished." The court then mentioned the rule of international law quoted in
the majority opinion and argued as follows: "If an army marching through a friendly country
would thus be exempt from its civil and criminal jurisdiction, a fortiori would an army
invading an enemy's country be exempt?" Thus it is clear that the rule of international law
above mentioned formed no part of the holding of the court in the said case.
Neither can such rule of international law of itself be applicable to the relation between the
Philippines and the United States, for the reason that the former is still under the
sovereignty of the latter. The United States Army is not foreign to the Philippines. It is here
not by permission or invitation of the Philippine Government but by right of sovereignty of
the United States over the Philippines. It has the same right to be here as it has to be in
Hawaii or California. The United States has the same obligation to defend and protect the
Philippines, as it has to defend and protect Hawaii or California, from foreign invasion. The
citizens of the Philippines owe the same allegiance to the United States of America as the
citizens of any territory or the State of the Union.
If instead of the Philippines California had been invaded by Japan, and General MacArthur
had issued the same proclamation in question against certain citizens of that State, we do
not doubt, from our knowledge of the American people and their tradition and
jurisprudence, that any of such citizens apprehended and confined by virtue of said
proclamation without due process of law would have been set at liberty by any competent
court there through the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. If, as seems to us
indisputable, a citizen of the Philippines is entitled to the protection of the same Bill of
Rights, particularly as regards due process of law, as any citizen of the United States, one
would be at a loss to understand why under the same facts and circumstances the latter
would be entitled to his liberty and the former not.
Our Habeas corpus Law is of American origin. It is substantially the same law that reigns in
very State of the Union. If it can be successfully invoked from the courts there under a
given set of facts, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked from the courts here under
the same circumstances. The Philippine courts are vested with the same power and
jurisdiction to grant the writ as the American courts.
The case at bar is not like the Coleman case wherein a member of the United States army
of occupation was indicted by the enemy state for a crime committed against a citizen of
the latter after he had been tried and convicted by a proper court-martial. This is a case
wherein nationals of the United States living under the protection of the army of the United
States are being deprived of their liberty by members of that Army without due process of
law, and wherein no conflict of jurisdiction between the military court and the civil court is
involved. In fact, no military court is claiming jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners.
And yet while sympathizing with the petitioner this court, by the majority opinion, declares
itself impotent to grant them any relief, and suggests that "they may have recourse to the
proper military authorities by making due representations to them" — the very same
military authorities who have long been and are depriving them of their liberty without due
process of law. That is tantamount to throwing a meritorious case out of court on the
ground that the plaintiff may seek his remedy from the defendant himself by making due
representations to him. One might wonder what the court is good for.
Another reason given to support the judgment is that while under the custody of the United
States military forces the petitioners may be considered as prisoners of war, citing Hydee
on International Law to the effect that an army in the field in the course of any operation in
any locality, may also avail itself of the right to make civilians prisoners of war, such for
example as of "persons whose services are of a particular use and benefit to the hostile
army or its government, such as higher civil officials, diplomatic agents, couriers, guides,
etc." We do not dispute that rule of international law; but again, we think it has no
application to the case before us. That rule evidently refers to civilians of the enemy
country of whom the hostile army operating in that country may make prisoners of war.
The Philippines is not an enemy of the United States, whose army came here to liberate
this country and not to conquer or invade it. Under the rule cited, as we understand it, the
United States Army could not make prisoners of war of Japanese civilians. It could not
make prisoners of war of Filipinos any more than it could make them of Americans. Of
course, if the petitioners were Japanese subjects who were held as prisoners of war by the
United States Army, no one in his right mind would contend that this court should entertain
a petition for habeas corpus from them. But that is clearly not the case, and with all due
respect we think the citation of the rule to support the majority opinion is out of place here.
In the case of Payomo vs. Floyd (42 Phil., 788), it appears that one Calixto Mendigorin, a
civilian resident of Subic, Zambales, was arrested by a naval officer and arraigned and
sentenced by the naval reservation police judge for violation of the laws and regulations
which prohibited the cutting of timber on the naval reservation without a permit from the
proper officer. Upon petition for habeas corpus originally filed in this court by Juliana
Payomo in behalf of Mendigorin, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Street, held that
the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippines Islands have
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for the writ of habeas corpus to set at liberty a civilian
person who is alleged to have been detained by the naval authorities of the United States;
that in this respect said courts have the same authority as the Federal courts in the United
States; and that the naval authorities of the United States have no authority to establish a
tribunal in the Olongapo Reservation with jurisdiction to try and sentence civilian persons
for offenses committed on said reservation in violation of the penal laws enacted by the
Philippine Legislature. The prisoner was ordered released.
The refusal of this court now to exercise similar jurisdiction over the respondents herein
because they are members of the United States Army constitutes, in our opinion, a
reversal of or a retrogression from the sound and the liberal doctrine laid down by this
same court in that case.
We think it is idle to discuss whether the war has terminated as a matter of law or has
ended as a matter of fact. In his proclamation of December 29,1944, General MacArthur
announced that after the war he would release the prisoners to the Philippine Government,
and the fact that the CIC has partially turned over said prisoners to the Philippine
Government shows that they themselves recognized that the war has ended within the
purview of said proclamation.
The war having ended as a matter of fact with the unconditional surrender of Japan
formalized on September 2, 1945, the petitioners, who have been deprived of their liberty
without due process of law since they were arrested five or six months ago, are
peremptorily entitled now to that due process. Due process will not commence for them
until and unless they are turned over by the CIC to the Commonwealth Government.
Respondents not having intimated in their returns whether and when they will release the
petitioners to the Philippine Government, the court has no alternative but to order their
immediate discharge.
Paras, J., concurs.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
The petitioners complain that they are being illegally detained and pray that they be set at
liberty without delay.
They allege that they had been taken from their respective residence in the City of Manila
by certain individuals posing themselves as agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps
(CIC), Lily Raquiza on March 13, 1945; Haydee Tee Han Kee on February 25, 1945; and
Emma Link Infante on April 10, 1945; and since then had been restrained and deprived of
their liberty in the Correctional Institution for Women in Mandaluyong.
They allege also that no formal complaint or accusation for any specific, offense had been
filed against them, nor any judicial writ or order for their commitment has at any time been
issued so far, and that they did not commit, either individually or collectively, any offense
for which they may be arrested or deprived of their liberty without any formal charge or
judicial warrant, and that, according to reliable information, they are being unlawfully
detained by a temporary warden named Captain Inez L. Twidle, by order and at the behest
of one Lieutenant Colonel L.J. Bradford of the Counter Intelligence Corps, and that, there
being no martial law in the Philippines and the civil government having been formally
delivered to the authorities of the Commonwealth and the Constitution of the
Commonwealth being in full operations, the confinement of the petitioners is illegal..
Respondent, Lieutenant Colonel L. J. Bradford, of the United States Army, alleges in his
return that he is attached on duty in the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of the United
States Army; that petitioners were detained by virtue of the proclamation issued by
General MacArthur on December 29, 1944, and were immediately turned over to the
Provost Marshall at Bilibid Prison on the dates specified in Schedules A, A-1 and A-2,
attached to the writ, and since then respondent had nothing to do with petitioners, and has
absolutely no connection with the correctional institution for women.
Respondent alleges further that he is not acquainted and has no official connection with
Captain Inez L. Twidle; that Captain Twindle is in no manner connected with the Counter
Intelligence Corps and at the date of petition, August 30, 1945, with the correctional
Institution for Women.
In Schedule A it appears that petitioner Lily Raquiza was arrested on March 13, 1945, by
Lieutenant Colonel L. J. Bradford, accused of espionage activities for Japanese and under
commitment order worded as follows:
The person named and described above is deemed a risk to the security of the United
States Forces for the reasons set forth above. The Commanding Officer of any military
stockade, jail, or comparable installation in which this person may be confined is
authorized and directed to detain him in custody until released by competent military
authority.
In the same schedule that said petitioner was delivered to Bilibid Prison on March 13,
1945.
In Schedule A-1 it appears that Emma Link Infante has been delivered to the Provost
Marshall in Bilibid Prison on April 10, •1945, pursuant to the authority of the proclamation
issued by the Commander in Chief, GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area, dated 29, December,
1944, accused of active collaboration with the Japanese and because her previous
association with the enemy constitutes security risk to the United States Armed Forces.
In Schedule A-2 it appears that petitioner Haydee Tee Han kee has been arrested on
February 25, 1945, for active collaboration with the enemy under a commitment order
identical to what appears in Schedule A and was delivered on the same day to the Provost
Marshall in Bilibid Prison.
There is absolutely no mention in the return of any formal complaint or charge filed against
any of the petitioners nor of any legal proceedings regarding the offenses imputed to them
as mentioned in Schedules A, A-1 and A-2, nor of any judicial order or writ issued by
competent authority for the detention or commitment of petitioners.
Attorney for petitioners filed a reply alleging that, no denial having been made of the
essential allegations of the petition, to the effect that petitioners had been deprived of their
liberty, following the doctrine set in the case Villavicencio vs. Lukban (39 Phil., 778), the
Supreme Court should the grant writ of the habeas corpus and order Lieutenant Colonel L.
J. Bradford and Captain Caroline De Eason or whoever actually is in command of the
Women's Detention Centre in Welfareville to appear before this Court and produce the
bodies of petitioners and explain then and there why they should not be set at liberty
immediately.
Lest we forget it is timely to remember that at the hearing of this case it was denounced by
counsel that one of the petitioners, since her custodian received that order of the Supreme
Court to show cause why petition should not be granted, has been subjected to harsh
maltreatment, confined into a solitary cell, and deprived of the opportunity of the verifying
the truth of the denunciation by hearing the testimony of the petitioners, because the writ
of habeas corpus was not issued as we have twice proposed.
The nature and gravity of the charge against, the petitioners, we hope, will not induce us to
consider with prejudice their case. Whatever our feelings are against the enemy and those
who helped him as spies or collaborators, and no matter how sincere and strong those
feelings might be, it is our inescapable duty not allow them to sway our judgment and
reasoning. Our position imposes upon us the responsibility of applying the law above all
considerations, and it is one of the great elemental principles of law that all accused are
presumed innocent until, after due legal process, they are finally found guilty beyond guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
Perhaps it is worthy of note that the United States Army, instead of following the ordinary
military course with regard to spies and collaborators, and of subjecting them to summary
trial and immediate execution, had chosen merely to keep the petitioners restrained of
liberty, abstaining completely from trying them by court-martial, and proposing to deliver
them to the Commonwealth Government. That the might mean that evidence of guilt of the
petitioners is not strong enough to justify a drastic action, and that if they are guilty, they
belong to the harmless type, and, therefore, will not endanger the safety of military
personnels and installations nor jeopardize public order.
As a matter of fact, it was authoritatively stated at the hearing of this case that many other
persons placed in identical situation as the petitioners are being turned over to the
Government of the Commonwealth.
Respondent Captain Caroline De Eason, in her return, states that petitioners are detained
in the Women's Correctional Institution, of which she is in charge, by virtue of the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur on December 29, 1944, and the commitments
Schedules A, A-1 and A-2.
The proclamation of General MacArthur relied upon by the respondent, it seems, is in
conformity with the statement made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, upon signing S.J.
Resolutions Nos. 93 and 94, on June 29 1944, the first of them laying down a policy for the
granting of independence and for the acquisition of base adequate to provide for the
mutual protection of the United States and the Philippines. President Roosevelt said:
. . . The measure makes it possible to proclaimed independence as soon as practicable
after constitutional process and normal functions of government have been restored in the
Philippines.
It is contemplated that as soon as conditions warrant, civil government will be set up under
constitutional officers. It will be their duty forthwith to take emergency measures to alleviate
the physical and economic hardship of the Philippine people, and to prepare the
Commonwealth to received and exercise the independence which we have promised
them. The latter includes two tasks of great importance: Those who have collaborated with
the enemy must be removed from the authority and influence over the political and
economic life of the country, and the democratic from of government guaranteed in the
constitution of the Philippines must be restored for the benefit of the people of the Islands.
(41 Off., Gaz., No. 1, p. 85.)
The proclamation of General MacArthur, issued in the filed on the 29th of December, 1944,
is as follows:
Whereas evidence is before me that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have
given; comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due to Governments
of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
Whereas military necessity requires that such persons be removed from any opportunity to
threaten the security of our military forces or the success of our military operations;
Now, therefore, I, Douglas MacArthur General of the Army, United States Army, as
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, hereby do publish and declare it to be my
purpose to remove such persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and
economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the
war; whereafter I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon
their respective cases, (41 Off. Gaz., No. 2, pp. 148, 149.)
It may appear at first blush that the persons whose liberty is restrained under the
Proclamation, which shall hereafter be referred to as the December proclamation, may be
considered as military prisoners.
But they are not. They are political prisoners. As a matter of fact, if we delve into the
history of the December proclamation, we will find out that the same has been issued to
accommodate the Commonwealth Government and to relieve it from a difficult position
under the circumstances, at the time it began to function in Leyte, immediately after the
landing of the Armed Forces of Liberation, when many political prisoners were intending to
seek habeas corpus relief and the Commonwealth Government handicapped by lack of the
facilities, was not in a position to cope with the extraordinary situation confronting it.
Of course, General MacArthur had the technical right to issue the December proclamation,
under the extraordinary powers wielded by a military commander in chief during war
operation, but let us analyze carefully the text of the document and we will see that the
persons included under it, although they may also be considered as military prisoners as
indicated in the second "Whereas" are in fact civil prisoners, accused of offense of political
character, not emenable to military justice but to the ordinary administration of the justice
in civil courts.
It is true that in the second "Whereas" military necessity is invoked for the removal of
affected persons from any opportunity to threaten the security of the military forces, but in
the dispositive part of the December proclamation, which is the controlling part, it is
catergorically stated that it is THE PURPOSE of General MacArthur "to removed such
persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the
Philippines," and just "to hold them in restraint," NOT TO PROSECUTE, NOR TO TRY,
NOR TO PUNISH, "for the duration of the war."
Finally, General MacArthur says: "Whereafter I shall release them to the Philippine
Government for its judgment upon their respectives cases." That is saying in other way
that their cases belong to the civil jurisdiction of the Commonwealth ordinary tribunals, and
not the court-martial or other military tribunal's jurisdiction.
Taking into consideration the December proclamation in conjunction with President
Roosevelt's declaration, the conclusion is inevitable that said document is, in fact, a
political proclamation, not military.
If the petitioners are political prisoners subject to the civil jurisdiction of ordinary courts of
justice if they are to be prosecuted at all, the army has no jurisdiction, nor power, nor
authority, from all legal standpoints, to continue holding them in restraint. They are entitled,
as a matter of fundamental right, to be immediately released, any allegation as to whether
the war was ended or not, notwithstanding, as the Supreme Court of the United States of
America, the highest tribunal under the American flag, has stated that the constitutional
guaranties of personal liberty are a shield for the protection "OF ALL CLASSES, AT ALL
TIMES, AND UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES."
The constitutional guaranties of personal liberty are a shield, for the protection of all
classes, at all times, and under all circumstances; and the writ of habeas corpus issues to
inquire into the legality of the detention of an accused. (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 2.)
It is alleged that petitioners are being held as a measure of military necessity and that the
army Commander in Chief, and not an outsider, including the members of this Supreme
Court, is the competent judge as to the existence of military necessity.
Certainly, the army Commander in Chief is supposed to be the most competent judge as to
whether military necessity requires or not the detention of petitioners, and ordinarily this
Court should accept his judgment as conclusive.
But in this case there is nothing to show that General MacAthur, as the Commander in
Chief of the American Armed Forces, is of the opinion that military necessity requires the
detention of petitioners. The only opinion that we have in the record is the one expressed
by respondent Bradford AT THE TIME OF THE APPREHENSION of petitioners. In his
return dated September 5, 1945, said respondent stated that petitioners "were temporarily
detained" by virtue of the December proclamation, and nothing is said whether military
necessity still requires their further detention. In fact said respondent washes his hands
when he alleges that immediately after the apprehension of petitioners, he ceased to have
nothing to do with said persons, while respondent Captain Caroline De Eason, in cotinuing
to restrain the liberty of petitioners, is invoking the authority of the commitment orders of Lt.
Col. Bradford, the other respondent. So it seems that the two respondents are mutually
throwing responsibility to each other's shoulders.
Under the circumstances, we are entitled to opine that no competent or authoritative
statement is on record to the effect that petitioners must remain under restraint as a matter
of military necessity. Many other persons placed in the same situation are being released
to the Commonwealth Government.
It is easy to understand the absence of such statement if we take into consideration that
the state of war has ceased to exist.
The contention that, notwithstanding the historical facts leading to the conclusion that war
has ended, we cannot declare that the war has terminated unless and until a treaty of
peace has been formally signed, like the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-
American war, or a formal declaration of the United States Congress to the effect that
peace has been restored, as it was done two years after the termination of hostilities in the
First World War, is untenable.
Shall the members of this Supreme Court be blind enough to maintain the existence of a
state of war between the Allied Nations and Japan after Japanese Foreign Minister
Mamoru Sigemitsu has signed on V-J Day, September 2, 1945, the document of
unconditional surrender of Japan, by accepting completely the July 26, 1945, Potsdam
declaration?
The following indubitable historical facts are matters of judicial notice, and they are
officially recorded in the Official Gazette:
1. On August 10,1945, the Japanese Government declared its readiness to accept the
Potsdam allied joint declaration "with the understanding that the said declaration does not
compromise any demands which prejudices the prerogatives of his Majesty as a sovereign
ruler."
2. On August 11, 1945, the Allies answered that from the moment of surrender "the
authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government shall be subject to the Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers."
3. On august 14, 1945, the Japanese Government accepted the Allied counter-proposal.
The Japanese reply was considered by President Truman as "a full acceptance of the
Potsdam Declaration which specifies the unconditional surrender of Japan."
According, on September 2, 1945, the document of formal surrender was signed by the
Japanese representatives at Tokyo Bay, aboard the battleship Missouri, Admiral Halsey's
flagship, in the presence of General MacAthur, as Supreme Allied Commander, of
representative of individual allied nations.
One day after, General Yamashita, the biggest Japanese military figure in the last war, the
Conqueror of Singapore and called as the "Tiger of Malaya," signed the surrender of all his
forces in the Philippines.
We do not believe it right to maintain the existence of war when, as a matter of fact, war is
over. The immediate and main objective of a warring motion is victory. Once attained, war
ceases to exist. War cannot exist without two contending parties. It is a strungle between
two opposing nations or combination of states. No fight can exist if there is only one
fighter. In the last war, which ended on September 2, 1945, there were two opposing
parties, the Allied Nations on the hand, and on the other, Japan. And Japan laid down
arms, refused to continue to fight, surrendered completely. If it is maintained that there is
still war, among whom is it being fought? Certainly, it is not between the United Nations
and Japan, because Japan is not willing to put up any fight anymore. It is preposterous to
think that the Allied Nations shall engage in a shadow war.
Therefore, the formality of a treaty of peace or a resolution of the Congress of the United
States, declaring the war is over, is absolutely unnecessary. At most, it is a mere
technicality that cannot add anything to the stark reality which is facing us. With or without
congressional declaration, the Supreme Court cannot close its eyes to the reality of the
termination of war which is confronting us with the same tangibility of a fist blow.
Suppose the Congress of United States of America does not make any formal declaration
about the end of war within two or three years, as it seems improper for the Allied Powers
to sign any peace treaty with vanquished Japan subject to the authority of the Allied
Supreme Commander, shall the Supreme Court of the Philippines declare that war is going
on, that war continues to exist that far? To do that we must lose all sense of truth.
We hope nobody will suppose that we will have to endure the Japanese self-delusion of
not accepting the existence of a state of war between Japan and China in what they used
to call a mere incident, although for years since the Marco Polo bridge action took place in
1937, thousands of soldiers and millions of Chinese innocent, civilians had died during
protracted military hostilities in wide areas of China, ending only with the unconditional
surrender of Japan at the Tokyo Bay.
In considering the case of the petitioners, we believe that instead of the December
proclamation, we must take into consideration what we shall call hereafter the October
proclamation, issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944.
It is declared therein that the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is the
"sole and only Government having legal and fundamental jurisdiction over the people in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," which is the case of the
place wherein the petitioners are being held in restraint; that the "laws now existing in the
statute books" and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto "are in full force and
effect and legally binding," including the Constitution which guarantees that "no person
shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law" (sec. 1 Article III) and the laws
affording the relief of habeas corpus to all who are illegally detained.
It is further announced by General Douglas MacArthur in the October proclamation that it
is his purpose to restore and extend to the people of the Philippines "the sacred right of the
government by constitutional process."
It is not logical to entertain the idea that, with the issuance of the December proclamation,
General MacArthur had the least idea of jeopardizing the personal liberty of any citizen of
the Philippines, which is one of the fundamental human rights guaranteed by our
Constitution and laws.
On the morning of February 27, 1945, upon turning over to President Osmeña the full
powers and responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government at a ceremony held at
Malacañang Palace, General MacArthur declared in a stirring speech that his soldiers
have come here as an army of free men, dedicated, with our people, "to the cause of
human liberty," and that with our liberation, millions of our people will have the opportunity
to pledge themselves to the task of building a new and stronger nation "dedicated to
making imperishable those sacred liberties for which many have fought and died."
These words are in line with the United Nations' joint declaration made on January 1,
1942, to the effect that complete victory over the enemies "is essential to defend life,
liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserved human rights and justice."
It is again General MacArthur who, in the speech delivered at a special session of our
Congress on July 9, 1945, said:
Since the beginning of the time men have crusaded for freedom and for equality. It was
this passion for liberty which inspired the architects of my own government to proclaim so
immutably and so beautifully that "all men are created equal" and "that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights — that among these are Life, Liberty, and
the pursuit of Happiness." On such rights rest our basic concept of human freedom, in
defense of which we have fought and still continue to fight on the battle fields of the world.
These rights are the very antithesis to the totalitarian doctrine which seeks to regiment the
people and control the human will as the price for presumed efficiency in government.
And as a final declaration, binding to all United Nations, including the United States of
America and the Philippines, it is stated in the Charter adopted in the Conference on June
26, 1945, that it is one of the main purposes of the organization to promote and encourage
"respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion." (Sec. 3, Article I, Chapter I of the Charter of the United
Nations.)
It is interesting to note that counsel for respondent is invoking section 4 of Rule 102 and
Act No. 190, as amended by Acts Nos. 272 and 421, to maintain that this Supreme Court
is without jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
We cannot help declaring that they very legal provisions invoked precisely show that
petitioners are entitled to the relief sought in the petition.
The pertinent provision of Act No. 190, as amended, were enacted specifically that relief
by habeas corpus cannot be afforded to military prisoners.
We shown already that petitioner are not military prisoners.
The provisions of Act No. 190, as amended, were enacted specifically for special
extraordinary situations, and said provisions are no longer in effect, as procedural
provisions on habeas corpus are incorporated in the present judicial rules, wherein said
provisions are ommited. When the Supreme Court adopted the rules, by ommitting said
provisions, it intended clearly to repeal them, and with good reason, because they are
incompatible with democratic principles and with the provisions of our Constitution.
It has been argued with energy by those oppose our issuing the order for the release of the
petitioners, that if we decide to issue it, the United State Army might refuse to set them at
liberty, with the result that the order of release will become a mere scrap of paper and the
supreme court of the Philippines will be placed in the unenviable position of utter ridicule.
We have to answer in the most definite way that we cannot agree with such •a narrow
point of view.
As Greece was the cradle of democracy in the West, so the Philippines is the cradle of
democracy in the East. If the first occidental democracy was born in Greece centuries
before the Christian Era, at the end of the last century the Philippines gave birth to the first
democracy in the Orient, the abode of more than one-half of all humanity. That first oriental
democracy was born with the drafting of the Malolos Constitution in the most difficult and
trying circumstances, under conditions less appropriate for a healthy and vigorous growth,
when our country was enduring the hardships of an uphill bloody struggle for national
independence. But America, the greatest occidental democracy, came to offer us a helping
hand as a second mother. With solicitude she nursed the small child. She reared and
cared for her with the self-sacrificing earnestness of maternal love. The child has grown
into a brown girl, full of the joy of life. The girl learned from the American teacher the full
meaning of constitutional guaranties, of civil liberties, of fundamental human rights. She
studied at heart the accomplishments of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln. She followed
the teaching of Franklin, Hamilton, and Madison. She saw how law is really above all men,
and how a humble police officer in the discharge of his official duties, arrested President
Grant, and how the Chief Magistrate of that great nation, the United States of America,
submitted to the arrest. That girl has grown into full maturity, the personification of beauty,
bewitching, the sweetheart of one billion lovers, the greatest pride of America in the
continent of Asia, on the shores of the vast Pacific.
Now, who shall dare to lay hands on her? Who shall dare to destroy that most beautiful
masterpiece of the greatest American democratice virtues? Who shall have heart to
straggle the neck of Philippine democracy, the beloved daughter of American democracy?
Certainly, not the United States Army, nor the heroic and glorious Army of Liberation not
the gallant warriors who fought thousands of battles to return to rescue Philippine
democracy from the Japanese monsters, with the same romantic courage of a knight of old
in the rescue of the beloved princess in captivation. No, certainly not. the American Army
shall never allow itself to stand indicted before the bar of the whole world as the cold-
blooded murdered of the liberated little daughter of American democracy.
But suppose the most unexpected should happen, that there might be members of the
United States Armed Forces who will be blind to ignore the order of this Supreme court, to
make a mockery of the administration of justice, shall that unthinkable hypothesis deter us
from doing our duty? Our answer is simple. No. no one and nothing whole world, neither
the all-powerful army which humbled Germany and forced the surrender of the "invincible"
Japanese Army, nor weapons more dreadful than the atomic bomb, nor the menace of an
imminent catastrophe, shall be powerful enough to make us flinch from complying with our
plain duty as justices of the Supreme court. We must do our duty as justices of the
supreme Court. We must do our consequences. Law and justice might suffer setbacks,
endure eclipses, but at the end they shall reign with all the splendors of real majesty.
Justice Cooley, one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, said:
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half
have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its
establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could in his speech on the petition
of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the
extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas
corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the
protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, it so easy
as is claimed here. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
Referring to this opinion of Justice Cooley our Supreme Court said:
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts.
(Rivers vs. Citchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep.,
1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.) (Villavicencio vs. Lukban 39 Phil., 791-793.)
We have the almost one-fourth-century-old legal doctrine laid down by this Supreme Court
to the effect that this tribunal and the courts of first instance of the Philippines have
jurisdiction to set free, through habeas corpusproceedings, a civilian who has been illegally
arrested or is unduly being detained by military or naval authorities of the United States.
(Payomo vs. Floyd [Feb. 17, 1922], 42 Phil., 788.)
We agree that, while war is going on, ordinary civil laws shall remain silent, in order not to
impede the effectiveness of war operations. It is legal maxim that laws are silent amidst
arms. Silent leges inter arma. But when the din of war is over, when the clang of arms has
ceased, civil laws are restored with full effectiveness, and it is the function of tribunals to
interpret and apply them. If they fail to apply them in a proper case submitted to them, they
will be recreant to their judicial duties, and are liable to be marked with a stigma they
cannot be proud of. Legem terrae amittentes perpetaum infamiae notam inde merito
incurrunt. Those who do not preserve the law of the land, thence justly incur the
ineffaceable brand of infamy.
It is evident that petitioners are being deprived of their personal liberty without due process
of law.
More than three years under the arbitrary rule of the Japanese kempei might have
habituated us to view with some leniency the illegal deprivation of individual freedom. The
gestapo procedures of apprehending indiscriminately our citizens at any time of the day,
mostly after midnight, employed by the ruthless Japanese military police, were a daily
occurrence, and it might have deadened our sense of personal freedom, and might make
us insensible to the injustice being done to petitioners, to their moral sufferings in their
involuntary imprisonment, and, therefore, might have closed our eyes to a situation that
requires immediate relief, and our ears to the anguishing clamors of the victims of the
injustice. But the fact that immediately after we assumed jurisdiction in this case, and
respondents have been required to show cause why relief should not be granted to
petitioners, one of them has been subjected to maltreatment, to an inquisitorial procedure
hardly justifiable to be used against a Japanese prisoner, must arouse us to the full
realization that here there is a case which needs prompt relief, if the final victory won by
the United Nations at Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945, must have a substantial meaning.
With the facts confronting us in this case, we cannot remain indifferent. They present a
question that affects us in the deepest recesses of our being. It is a human freedom which
is at stake. It is one of the fundamental rights which have existed since mankind began to
live in this world, much before the Code of Hammurabi has been written, anterior and
superior to any constitutional guarantees, and recognized before the organization of
society and of any government, because they have their roots in human nature. We cannot
remain unmoved when we see how such natural right is disregarded, and violated by
official representatives of a democratic government.
If we allow freely such flagrant trampling of the personal freedom of three of our citizens,
we shall shake the faith of one hundred million fellow malayans in the effectiveness of
democratic processes, and one billion orientals shall cease to look here for the
MacArthur's Citadel of Democracy. If the facts presented to us shall happen to reach such
public forums as our Congress and the American Congress, they will not fail to arouse
waves of protest and indignation. This is the first case submitted to the new Supreme
Court of the Philippines, as reconstituted since our liberation, wherein our power is invoked
for the protection of personal liberty, flagrantly violated. Shall we shrink from doing our
plain duty?
If we refuse to grant the redress sought by petitioners, we are afraid we are sanctioning
and perpetuating the same procedure which made Fort Santiago a veritable house of
horrors, which branded with eternal infamy the Axis concentration camps, Buchenwald,
Dachau, Maidanak predicated on the supremacy of the torture among the functions of
government, in which case the only peace possible is the peace of death. And then, what
was the use of requiring our boys to fight, to shed their blood, to die in the battle fields of
Bataan? What was the purpose of fighting in the whole world to crush Germany and
Japan, if we are to follow their procedures? What meaning will the gospel of fundamental
freedoms preached by Roosevelt have?
We will not conclude without challenging the applicability of the quotation in the majority
opinion of what has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the
case of Coleman vs. Tennessee (97 U.S., 509), recognizing the privilege of
extraterritoriality in a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be
stationed in it.
The American Army of Liberation is not a "foreign army." It represents the same
sovereignty of the United States of America under which the Philippines is placed. That
army is waving the same American flag that waves in the government offices of the
Commonwealth. From our point of view, we must consider it as a domestic army. Is it not
the continuation of the Fil-American Army which fought in Bataan and Corregidor? Did not
the American boys and our boys mix their blood in the same holocaust, in the same
battles? Are not the dead American soldiers resting in the same graves with the dead
Filipino soldiers in an eternal embrace of brotherhood, sanctified by the noblest ideals?
There is no analogy between that of a foreign army which is granted free passage in a
friendly country and that of the American Army in the Philippines, which has belonged here
since the American flag began to fly in this country, had to return to vindicate the honor of
the American sovereignty, wantonly insulted in the treacherous attack of Pearl Habor, and
shall remain, even after the formal proclamation of our national independence, to protect
that independence, as has been solemnly pledged by President Roosevelt, and to
maintain vigilance in the first line of defense of the United States of America.
With regards to the privilege of extraterritoriality granted to a foreign army, permitted to
march through a friendly country, it must be understood as limited to the internal matters of
said army. That is, it is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place as far as
it does not affect the substantial rights of the nationals of the friendly country where it is
stationed. Those substantial rights, specially if guaranteed in the Constitution, in proper
cases, shall always merit the protection of the courts of the territory. That official duty of
the courts shall be more imperative if we take into consideration the stress given in the
Charter of the United Nations upon the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
We cannot accept the position of those who maintain that our civil courts should not
exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army, the very army of a country which
recognizes no one as being above the law, no matter how high his position is or how
powerful he is, a country wherein a humble police officer, in the performance of his official
duty, may legally arrest the Chief Magistrate of the nation. Such position is subersive of the
fundamental tenets of democracy. We cannot accept it in the same way that we cannot
accept military dictatorship or any other kind of dictatorship. Under the American
Constitution or the Philippine Constitution, the army is always placed under the authority of
civil government, functioning through its legislative, executive and judicial branches. The
supreme commander of the army is the President, a civil officer elected by the people. The
army has to obey the laws. The jurisdiction of the courts is granted by the Constitution and
by the laws. We cannot accept a theory that might revive or reproduce the military tyranny
of Himmler or of the Japanese Kempei. With all our admiration for the gallant American
Army, with all our deep gratitude for the freedom it has restored to us, we cannot recognize
in it any power that is above the law of our land. All tyranny is hateful, even if it be
exercised by our own parents, the very persons to whom we owe our lives and all
opportunities and happiness. We must do all we can to show our recognition, respect, and
gratitude to the American Army, but we should never renounce the supremacy of the law.
If we should falter in our national duty of upholding law, we will be unworthy of the efforts
and sacrifices undergone by the American Army to liberate our country. And we can
uphold the law by applying it in the proper case and, if its application requires the exercise
of jurisdiction over the American troops, nothing shall make us hesitate to exercise that
jurisdiction. It is the only way of keeping alive the public faith in the effectiveness of the
courts as the bulwark of the rights of the people.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that an order should be issued by this Court without delay
for the immediate release of petitioners.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000]
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in
1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he
was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two
counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171.
Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners
bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol"
from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity
from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in
the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit,
the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The
latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion
was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter
court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration
was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that
he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was
held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA
that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is
covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In
receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases
without notice to the prosecution, the latters right to due process was violated. It should be
noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The
needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances
requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper
time.[1] At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does
not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.[2]
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act
was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case
falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the
chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its
controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the
name of official duty.[3] The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official
functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or
in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. [4] It appears that even the
governments chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken
by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,
assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.[5] As
already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it
to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the
MeTC such as the one at bar.[6]Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may
be invoked only when specifically granted by law. [7] The rule on criminal procedure is clear
that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
MeTC.[8] Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the courts
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.[9]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides: Jksm

"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:

a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent.
Cardenas and Casal for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine
Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction
of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection
having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to
preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal
action filed against him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First
Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the
reason that under Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the
Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the
courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is
conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not
entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the
laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S.,
403; 34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of
the laws of the country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388;
Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The substantial question raised in this case is
one of jurisdiction.
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the
United States governs this case. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the question
whether the constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner extended ex propio
vigore over the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental change in the
political and legal status of the Philippines. On the date mentioned the Constitution of the
Philippines went into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
Not only the members of this court but all other officers, legislative, executive and judicial,
of the Government of the Commonwealth, are bound by oath to support the Constitution.
(Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes its own existence to the great instrument, and
derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is
bound by the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original
jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls." In deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond this
constitutional provision.
2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by
the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is
exclusive. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific terms,
but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate
jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the
original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls."
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises whether
the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive.
The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from section 17 of Act
No. 136, which reads as follows: The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warrantoin the
cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and
determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law."
Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas
corpus was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure.
(Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction
possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of
First Instance. Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the
Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in the
pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution of the
United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional
provision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original jurisdiction thus
conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction, and
that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from conferring original
jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of the Union. (U.
S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth
conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal cases to
which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred
dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of
criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated, consuls, not
being entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or ministers, are subject to
the laws and regulations of the country where they reside. By Article XV, section 2, of the
Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution were to continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth;
thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution until
amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. The original jurisdiction
granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was not made exclusively by
any, law in force prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the
conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction,
the laws in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be
deemed to remain operative and in force, subject to the power of the National Assembly to
amend alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. vs. Insular Collector of Customs,
U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp. 620, 623.)
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the
petitioner, an that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring:
In my humble opinion, there are three reasons why the jurisdiction of this court over the
petitioner in the instant case is concurrent and not exclusive. The strictly legal reason is set
forth in the preceding illuminating opinion. The other reasons are (a) historical and based
on what I consider is the (b) theory upon which the grant of legislative authority under our
Constitution is predicated.
(a) As the provision in our Constitution regarding jurisdiction in cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, has been taken from the Constitution of
the United States, considerable light would be gained by an examination of the history and
interpretation thereof in the United States.
The fifth resolution of the New Jersey plan (Paterson resolutions of June 15, 1787) gave
the Supreme Court of the United States, the only national court under the plan, authority to
hear and determine "by way of appeal, in the dernier resort . . . all cases touching the
rights of ambassadors . . . ." This clause, however, was not approved. On July 18, the
Convention of 1787 voted an extraordinarily broad jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
extending "to cases arising under laws passed by the general legislature, and to such
other questions as involve the national peace and harmony." This general proposition was
considerably narrowed by Randolph in his draft of May 29 which, however, did not mention
anything about ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. But the Committee of
Detail, through Rutledge, reported on August 6 as follows: "Article XI, Section 3. The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls; . . . In . . . cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, . . . this jurisdiction shall be original . . . ."On September 12, the
Committee on Style reported the provision as follows: "Article III, Section 2. The judicial
power shall extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls . . . In (all) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls . . .
the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." This provision was approved in the
convention with hardly any amendment or debate and is now found in clause 2, section 2
of Article III of the Constitution of the United States. (The Constitution and the Courts,
Article on "Growth of the Constitution", by William M. Meigs, New York, 1924, vol. 1, pp.
228, 229. See also Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Yale University
Press, 1934, 3 vols.; Warren, The Making of the Constitution, Boston, 1928, pp. 534-537.)
The word "original", however, was early interpreted as not exclusive. Two years after the
adoption of the Federal Constitution, or in 1789, the First Judiciary Act (Act of September
24, 1789, 1 Stat., c. 20, 687) was approved by the first Congress creating the United
States District and Circuit Courts which were nisi prius courts, or courts of first instance
which dealt with different items of litigation. The district courts are now the only federal
courts of first instance, the circuit courts having been abolished by the Act of March 3,
1911, otherwise known as the Judicial Code. The Judiciary Act of 1787 invested the district
courts with jurisdiction, exclusively of the courts of the several states, of all suits against
consuls or vice-consuls and the Supreme Court of the United States with original but not
exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party. By the
passage of the Act of February 18, 1875 (18 Stat., 470, c. 137), the clause giving the
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction was repealed and, since then state courts have had
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over civil or criminal proceedings against a
consul or vice-consul. At the present time, the federal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction
"of suits or proceedings against ambassadors or other or other public ministers, or their
domestics or domestic servants, as a court of law can have consistently with the law of
nations; and original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction, of all suits brought by ambassadors or
other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul is a party." (Act of March 8,
1911, 36 Stat., 1156, reenacting sec. 687 of the Act of September 24, 1789; 28 U. S. C. A.,
sec. 341; Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934, sec. 233.) The district
courts now have original jurisdiction of all suits against consuls and vice-consuls." (Act of
March 3, 1911, 36 Stat., 1093; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 41, subsec. 18; Hopkins' Federal
Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934, sec. 24, par. 18.)
The Judiciary Act of 1789 was one of the early and most satisfactory acts passed by the
Congress of the United States. It has remained essentially unchanged for more than 145
years. It was prepared chiefly by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut (1 Ann. Cong., 18, April 7,
1789) one of the ablest jurists in the Constitutional Convention, who was later Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States (1796-1800). It is interesting to note that 10 of
the 18 senators and 8 of the members of the House of the first Congress had been among
the 55 delegates who actually attended the Convention that adopted the federal
Constitution (Warren, Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme Court [Boston, 1935],
p. 99). When, therefore, the first Congress approved the Judiciary Act of 1789 vesting in
the Supreme Court original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or a
vice-consul shall be a party, express legislative interpretation as to the meaning of the
word "original" as not being exclusive was definitely made and this interpretation has never
been repudiated. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ames vs. Kansas
([1884], 111 U. S., 449; 4 S. Ct., 437; 28 Law. ed., 482):
In view of the practical construction put on this provision of the Constitution by Congress,
at the very moment of the organization of the government, and of the significant fact that,
from 1789 until now, no court of the United States has ever in its actual adjudications
determined to the contrary, we are unable to say that it is not within the power of Congress
to grant to the inferior courts of the United States jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme
Court has been vested by the Constitution with original jurisdiction. It rests with the
legislative department of the government to say to what extent such grants shall be made,
and it may safely be assumed that nothing will ever be done to encroach upon the high
privileges of those for whose protection the constitutional provision was intended. At any
rate, we are unwilling to say that the power to make the grant does not exist.
Dicta in some earlier cases seem to hold that the word "original" means "exclusive" and as
observed by Justice Field in United States vs. Louisiana ([1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct.,
17; 31 Law. ed., 69), the question has given rise to some differences of opinion among the
earlier members of the Supreme Court of the United States. (See, for instance, dissenting
opinion of Iredell, J., in U. S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388.) Reliance
was had on more or less general expressions made by Chief Justice Marshall in the case
of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch, 137; 2 Law. ed., 60), where it was said:
"If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the
constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where
the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in
the constitution, is form without substance." But Chief Justice Marshall who penned the
decision in this case in 1803 had occasion later, in 1821, to explain the meaning and
extent of the pronouncements made in the Marbury case. He said:
In the case of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 172; 2 Law. ed., 60), the
single question before the court, so far as that case can be applied to this, was, whether
the legislature could give this court original jurisdiction in a case in which the Constitution
had clearly not given it, and in which no doubt respecting the construction of the article
could possibly be raised. The court decided, and we think very properly, that the legislature
could not give original jurisdiction in such a case. But, in the reasoning of the court in
support of this decision, some expressions are used which go far beyond it. The counsel
for Marbury had insisted on the unlimited discretion of the legislature in the apportionment
of the judicial power; and it is against this argument that the reasoning of the court is
directed. They say that, if such had been the intention of the article, "it would certainly have
been useless to proceed farther than to define the judicial power, and the tribunals in
which it should be vested." The court says, that such a construction would render the
clause, dividing the jurisdiction of the court into original and appellate, totally useless; that
"affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those which
are affirmed; and, in this case (in the case of Marbury vs. Madison), a negative or
exclusive sense must be given to them, or they have no operation at all." "It cannot be
presumed," adds the court, "that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without
effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it." The
whole reasoning of the court proceeds upon the idea that the affirmative words of the
clause giving one sort of jurisdiction, must imply a negative of any other sort of jurisdiction,
because otherwise the words would be totally inoperative, and this reasoning is advanced
in a case to which it was strictly applicable. If in that case original jurisdiction could have
been exercised, the clause under consideration would have been entirely useless. Having
such cases only in its view, the court lays down a principle which is generally correct, in
terms much broader than the decision, and not only much broader than the reasoning with
which that decision is supported, but in some instances contradictory to its principle. The
reasoning sustains the negative operation of the words in that case, because otherwise the
clause would have no meaning whatever, and because such operation was necessary to
give effect to the intention of the article. The effort now made is, to apply the conclusion to
which the court was conducted by that reasoning in the particular case, to one in which the
words have their full operation when understood affirmatively, and in which the negative, or
exclusive sense, is to be so used as to defeat some of the great objects of the article. To
this construction the court cannot give its assent. The general expressions in the case of
Marbury vs. Madison must be understood with the limitations which are given to them in
this opinion; limitations which in no degree affect the decision in that case, or the tenor of
its reasoning. (Cohens vs. Virginia [1821], 6 Wheat., 264, 400; 5 Law. ed., 257.)
What the Supreme Court in the case of Marbury vs. Madison held then was that Congress
could not extend its original jurisdiction beyond the cases expressly mentioned in the
Constitution, the rule of construction being that affirmative words of the Constitution
declaring in what cases the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction must be
construed negatively as to all other cases. (See Ex parte Vallandigham [1864], 1 Wall.,
243, 252; 17 Law. ed., 589; Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee [1816], 1 Wheat., 305, 330; 4 Law.
ed., 97; U. S. vs. Haynes [D. C. Mass., 1887], 29 Fed., 691, 696.) That was all.
It should be observed that Chief Justice Marshall concurred in the opinion in the case of
Davis vs. Packard (11833], 7 Pet., 276; 8 Law. ed., 684). In this case the jurisdiction of the
state court of New York over a civil suit against a foreign consul was denied solely on the
ground that jurisdiction had been conferred in such a case upon the district courts of the
United States exclusively of the state courts. Such a ground, says Justice Harlan in
Bors vs. Preston ([1884], 111 U. S., 252; 4 S. Ct., 407; 28 Law. ed., 419), would probably
not have been given had it been believed that the grant of original jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court deprived Congress of the power to confer concurrent original jurisdiction in
such cases upon subordinate courts of the Union, concluding that the decision in the case
"may be regarded, as an affirmance of the constitutionality of the Act of 1789, giving
original jurisdiction in such cases, also, to District Courts of the United States." Of the
seven justices who concurred in the judgment in the case of Davis, five participated in the
decision of Osborn vs. Bank of the United States ([1824], 9 Wheat., 738; 6 Law. ed., 204),
also penned by Chief Justice Marshall and relied upon as authority together with
Marbury vs. Madison, supra.
The rule enunciated in Bors vs. Preston, supra, is the one followed in the United States.
The question involved in that case was whether the Circuit Court then existing had
jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws of the United States to hear and determine any
suit whatever against the consul of a foreign government. Justice Harlan said:
The Constitution declares that "The judicial power of the United States shall extend . . . to
all cases affecting ambassadors or other public ministers and consuls;" to controversies
between citizens of a state and foreign citizens or subjects; that "In all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, . . . the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction;" and that in all other cases previously mentioned in the same clause
"The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." The Judiciary Act of
1789 invested the District Courts of the United States with jurisdiction, exclusively of the
courts of the several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls, except for
offenses of a certain character; this court, with "Original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all
suits . . . in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party;" and the circuit courts with
jurisdiction of civil suits in which an alien is a party. (l Stat. at L., 76-80.) In this act we have
an affirmance, by the first Congress — many of whose members participated in the
Convention which adopted the Constitution and were, therefore, conversant with the
purposes of its framers — of the principle that the original jurisdiction of this court of cases
in which a consul or vice-consul is a party, is not necessarily exclusive, and that the
subordinate courts of the Union may be invested with jurisdiction of cases affecting such
representatives of foreign governments. On a question of constitutional construction, this
fact is entitled to great weight.
In this case of Bors, Justice Harlan adopted the view entertained by Chief Justice Taney in
the earlier case of Gittings vs. Crawford (C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1, 10). In that
case of Gittings, it was held that neither public policy nor convenience would justify the
Supreme Court in implying that Congress is prohibited from giving original jurisdiction in
cases affecting consuls to the inferior judicial tribunals of the United States. Chief Justice
Taney said:
If the arrangement and classification of the subjects of jurisdiction into appellate and
original, as respects the Supreme Court, do not exclude that tribunal from appellate power
in the cases where original jurisdiction is granted, can it be right, from the same clause, to
imply words of exclusion as respects other courts whose jurisdiction is not there limited or
prescribed, but left for the future regulation of Congress? The true rule in this case is, I
think, the rule which is constantly applied to ordinary acts of legislation, in which the grant
of jurisdiction over a certain subject-matter to one court, does not, of itself, imply that that
jurisdiction is to be exclusive. In the clause in question, there is nothing but mere
affirmative words of grant, and none that import a design to exclude the subordinate
jurisdiction of other courts of the United States on the same subject-matter. (See
also U.S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; United States vs. Louisiana
[1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69; Ex parte Baiz [1890],135 U. S., 403; 10
S. Ct., 854; 34 Law. ed., 222, denying writ of prohibition Hollander vs. Baiz [D. C. N. Y.,
1890]; 41 Fed., 732; Iasigi vs. Van de Carr [1897], 166 U.S., 391; 17 S. Ct., 595; 41 Law.
ed., 1045; Graham vs. Strucken [C. C. N. Y., 1857]; 4 Blatchf., 58; Lorway vs. Lousada [D.
C. Mass., 1866]; Fed. Cas., No. 8517; St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay [C. C. N. Y., 1855]; 3
Blatchf., 259; State of Texas vs. Lewis [C. C. Tex., 1882], 14 Fed., 65; State of
Alabama vs. Wolffe (C. C. Ala., 1883], 18 Fed., 836, 837; Pooley vs. Luco [D. C. Cal.,
1896], 76 Fed., 146.)
It is interesting to note that in the case of St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay, supra, the
jurisdiction of circuit courts exclusive of state courts over aliens, no exception being made
as to those who were consuls, was maintained. (See1 U. S. Stat. at L., c. 20, sec. 11, pp.
78, 79.)
From the history of, and the judicial interpretation placed on, clause 2, section 2 of Article
III of the Constitution of the United States it seems clear that the word "original" in
reference to the jurisdiction of Supreme Court of the United States over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, was never intended to be exclusive as to
prevent the Congress from vesting concurrent jurisdiction over cases affecting consuls and
vice-consuls in other federal courts.
It should be observed that the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 placed cases affecting the
official representatives of foreign powers under the jurisdiction of Federal Supreme Court
to prevent the public peace from being jeopardized. Since improper treatment of foreign
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be a casus belli, it was thought that
the federal government, which is responsible for their treatment under international law,
should itself be provided with the means to meet the demands imposed by international
duty. (Tucker, The Constitution of the United States [1899], vol. II, 760, 772; vide, The
Federalist, No. LXXXI, Ashley's Reprint [1917], 415.) Bearing in mind in the distinction
which international law establishes between ambassadors and other public ministers, on
the one hand, and consuls and other commercial representatives, on the other, Congress
saw it fit to provide in one case a rule different from the other, although as far as consuls
and vice-consuls are concerned, the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court, as already
observed, though original is not exclusive. But in the United States, there are two judicial
systems, independent one from the other, while in the Philippines there is but one judicial
system. So that the reason in the United States for excluding certain courts — the state
courts — from taking cognizance of cases against foreign representatives stationed in the
United States does not obtain in the Philippines where the court of the lowest grade is as
much a part of an integrated system as the highest court.
Let us now turn our own laws as they affect the case of the petitioner. Undoubtedly
Philippine courts are not federal courts and they are not governed by the Judiciary Acts of
the United States. We have a judicial system of our own, standing outside the sphere of
the American federal system and possessing powers and exercising jurisdiction pursuant
to the provisions of our own Constitution and laws.
The jurisdiction of our courts over consuls is defined and determined by our Constitution
and laws which include applicable treaties and accepted rules of the laws of nations. There
are no treaties between the United States and Uruguay exempting consuls of either
country from the operation of local criminal laws. Under the generally accepted principles
of international law, declared by our Constitution as part of the law of the nation (Art. II sec.
3, cl. 2), consuls and vice-consuls and other commercial representatives of foreign nations
do not possess the status and can not claim the privilege and immunities accorded to
ambassadors and ministers. (Wheaton, International Law, sec. 249; Kent, Commentaries,
44; Story on the Constitution, sec. 1660; Mathews, The American Constitutional System
[1932], 204, 205; Gittings vs. Crawford, C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1; Wilcox vs. Luco,
118 Cal., 639; 45 Pac., 676; 2 C. J., 9 R. C. L., 161.) The only provisions touching the
subject to which we may refer are those found in the Constitution of the Philippines. Let us
trace the history of these provisions.
The report of the committee on the Judicial Power, submitted on September 29, 1934, did
not contain any provisions regarding cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls. The draft of the sub-committee of seven of the Sponsorship Committee,
submitted on October 20, 1934, however, contains the following provision:
Article X, Section 2. The Supreme Court shall have such original jurisdiction as may be
possessed and exercised by the present Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution, which jurisdiction shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other foreign ministers and consuls . . . ." The Special Committee on the
Judiciary, composed principally of Delegates Vicente J. Francisco and Norberto
Romualdez, included in its report the provisions which now appear in sections 2 and 3 of
Article VIII of the Constitution. Section 2 provides:
The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribed, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other ministers and consuls . . . . And the
second sentence of section 3 provides:
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
The provision in our Constitution in so far as it confers upon our Supreme Court "original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls" is
literally the same as that contained in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the United States
Constitution.
In the course of the deliberation of the Constitutional Convention, some doubt was
expressed regarding the character of the grant of "original jurisdiction" to our Supreme
Court. An examination of the records of the proceedings of the Constitutional convention
show that the framers of our Constitution were familiar with the history of, and the judicial
construction placed on, the same provision of the United States Constitution. In order to
end what would have been a protracted discussion on the subject, a member of the
Special Committee on the Judiciary gave the following information to the members of the
Convention:
. . . Sr. Presidente, a fin de poder terminar con el Articulo 2, el Comite esta dispuesto a
hacer constar que la interpretacion que debe dard a la ultima parte de dicho articulo es la
misma interpretacion que siempre se ha dado a semejante disposicion en la Constitucion
de los Estados Unidos. (January 16,1935.) Without further discussion, the provision was
then and there approved.
It thus appears that the provision in question has been given a well-settled meaning in the
United States — the country of its origin. It has there received definite and hitherto
unaltered legislative and judicial interpretation. And the same meaning was ascribed to it
when incorporated in our own Constitution. To paraphrase Justice Gray of the Supreme
Court of the United States, we are justified in interpreting the provision of the Constitution
in the light of the principles and history with which its framers were familiar. (United
States vs. Wong Kin Ark [1897], 169 U. S., 649; 18 S. Ct., 456; 42 Law. ed., 890, cited with
approval in Kepner vs. United States, a case of Philippine origin [1904]; 195 U. S., 100; 49
Law. ed., 114.)
(b) What has been said hereinabove is not unnecessary attachment to history or idolatrous
adherence to precedents. In referring to the history of this provision of our Constitution it is
realized that historical discussion while valuable is not necessarily decisive. Rationally,
however, the philosophical reason for the conclusion announced is not far to seek if certain
principles of constitutional government are borne in mind. The constitution is both a grant
of, and a limitation upon, governmental powers. In the absence of clear and unequivocal
restraint of legislative authority, the power is retained by the people and is exercisable by
their representatives in their legislature. The rule is that the legislature possess plenary
power for all purposes of civil government. A prohibition to exercise legislative power is the
exception. (Denio, C. J., in People vs. Draper, 15 N.Y., 532, 543.) These prohibitions or
restrictions are found either in the language used, or in the purpose held in view as well as
the circumstances which led to the adoption of the particular provision as part of the
fundamental law. (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; 73 S. W., 811; 108 Am. St. Rep.,
929.)
Subject to certain limitations, the Filipino people, through their delegates, have committed
legislative power in a most general way to the National Assembly has plenary legislative
power in all matters of legislation except as limited by the constitution. When, therefore,
the constitution vests in the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, without specifying the exclusive
character of the grant, the National Assembly is not deprived of its authority to make that
jurisdiction concurrent. It has been said that popular government lives because of the
inexhaustible reservoir of power behind. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of
government is vested in the representatives of the people, and that these representatives
are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument
imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which, by clear intendment, have that
effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, p.139, ante.) What the Constitution prohibits is
merely the deprivation of the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls and while it must be admitted that
original jurisdiction if made concurrent no longer remains exclusive, it is also true that
jurisdiction does not cease to be original merely because it is concurrent.
It is also quite true that concurrent original jurisdiction in this class of cases would mean
the sharing of the Supreme Court with the most inferior courts of cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls such that the Supreme Court would have
concurrent jurisdiction with the lowest courts in our judicial hierarchy, the justice of the
peace of the courts, in a petty case for the instance, the violation of a municipal ordinance
affecting the parties just mentioned. However, no serious objection to these result can be
seen other that the misinterpreted unwillingness to share this jurisdiction with a court
pertaining to the lowest category in our judicial organization. Upon the other hand, the
fundamental reasoning would apply with equal force if the highest court of the land is made
to take recognizance exclusively of a case involving the violation of the municipal
ordinance simply because of the character of the parties affected. After alluding to the fact
that the position of consul of a foreign government is sometimes filled by a citizen of the
United States (and this also true in the Philippines) Chief Justice Taney, in
Gittings vs. Crawford, supra, observed:
It could hardly have been the intention of the statesmen who framed our constitution to
require that one of our citizens who had a petty claim of even less than five dollars against
another citizen, who had been clothed by some foreign government with the consular
office, should be compelled to go into the Supreme Court to have a jury summoned in
order to enable him to recover it; nor could it have been intended, that the time of that
court, with all its high duties to perform, should be taken up with the trial of every petty
offense that might be committed by a consul by any part of the United States; that consul,
too, being often one of our own citizens.
Probably, the most serious objection to the interpretation herein advocated is, that
considering the actual distribution of jurisdiction between the different courts in our
jurisdiction, there may be cases where the Supreme Court may not actually exercise either
original — whether exclusive or concurrent — or appellate jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
grant of original jurisdiction in this class of cases to the Supreme Court. If, for instance, a
criminal case is brought either in a justice of the peace court or in a Court of First Instance
against a foreign consul and no question of law is involved, it is evident that in case of
conviction, the proceedings will terminate in the Court Appeals and will not reach the
Supreme Court. In this case, the Supreme Court will be deprived of all jurisdiction in a
case affecting a consul notwithstanding the grant thereto in the Constitution of original
jurisdiction in all cases affecting consuls. This is a situation, however, created not by the
Constitution but by existing legislation, and the remedy is in the hands of the National
Assembly. The Constitution cannot deal with every casus omissus, and in the nature of
things, must only deal with fundamental principles, leaving the detail of administration and
execution to the other branches of the government. It rests with the National Assembly to
determine the inferior courts which shall exercise concurrent original jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
considering the nature of the offense and irrespective of the amount of controversy. The
National Assembly may as in the United States (Cooley, Constitutional Law, 4th ed. [1931],
sec. 4, p. 156), provide for appeal to the Supreme Court in all cases affecting foreign
diplomatic and consular representatives.
Before the approval of the Constitution, jurisdiction over consuls was exercisable by our
courts. This is more so now that the Independence Law and Constitution framed and
adopted pursuant thereto are in force. The fact that the National Assembly has not enacted
any law determining what courts of the of the Philippines shall exercise concurrent
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court is of no moment. This can not mean and should not be
interpreted to mean that the original jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by the
Constitution is not concurrent with other national courts of inferior category.
The respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila having jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the criminal case brought against the petitioner, the writ of
prohibition should be denied.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act
No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon
appealed to this court, where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under
the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that
Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the United
States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient
to support the conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull
was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard,
which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos,
and other animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said
accused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of
December, 1908, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and
bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng,
Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty
and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull,
master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit
and suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then
and there cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their
noses, and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of
said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason
of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing
said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and
many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and
cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from
any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the
vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable
sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage
from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be
provided with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours
from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section
1 thereof the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from
any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for
securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering
to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other
animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported, without cruelty or
unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from
vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to the
thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully
fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to
pay a penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars,
United States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any
Court of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such
animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court
was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed
on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance
or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are
disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides
generally for the organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely
extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses committed on the high
seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the Philippine
Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This
jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which such
ship or water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the
commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine
registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is
expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and established
public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the
question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on
board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which
constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters
of the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or
crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but
when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the
entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles
became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int.,
sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to
the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency. This
offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these
waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor.
During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the
jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have
existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at
the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to
constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed
forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the
objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted
by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and
jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may
not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is now conceded that in
the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ship of all
friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such
waters was not established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-
General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that
"the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from
the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This
theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British
Government as late as 1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden
(7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under
which such vessels enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing
exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights
of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which
announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been
admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded
on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec.
256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local
official exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew
are justiciable by their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe
allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based
entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that experience
shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulation which
are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and convenience
does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels.
There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to
them, According to the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a
merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the
crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The
French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board
French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another.
(See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp.
338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such
jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right, although she has
frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British
Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a
theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading
English authority, says that —
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels
that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local
jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p.
263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel
enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local
sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to
waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig.,
sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice
Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that —
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient
and dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the
government to degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local
allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of
one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the
laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in
peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the
treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of
July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each
country "The right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise between
the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are
committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless the
conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the
country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to
controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes
regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass.,
188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which do not
amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew
upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge
whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on
board the vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of
the peace, but the United States district attorney was instructed by the Government to take
the necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of
Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr.
Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876;
Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to
amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the
Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an
assault and battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it
was held that there was nothing in the treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made through
diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary
of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection
with the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the
treaty of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations
contained in the last clause of that article . . . are those under which it is contended by you
that jurisdiction is conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such differences
of a civil nature growing out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to
disposing of controversies resulting from personal violence involving offense for which the
party may be held amenable under the local criminal law.
This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad
interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to
their right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise between captains
and crews of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the captain
or crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a
complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the crew of
the vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it is
competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the local
laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty which
the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must
necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in
the United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of
the local order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in
the conviction of the party accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be
defined against the offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2,
p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses
committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which
amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and
reasonable construction of the language requires un to hold that any violation of criminal
laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the country. The offense with which the appellant is
charged had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a
violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus
find that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of
the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the court
of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information
in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the
animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is
essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon
this issue would be to construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the
Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the
completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers
jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are
then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation
is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the
disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it
does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the
defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals
while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the
complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed
knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the
word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that
the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented
to, designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was
said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that
the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered
by the respondent's counsel — that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same
meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design — done for a certain
purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the
same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with
the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his
defense rests upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying
cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and
comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done was done
knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only
necessary to state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public
offense in ordinary and concise language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in
the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce judgment according to
right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil.
Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to
"provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty
and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in
English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty
and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid
neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals
were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of
said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not
charge him with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are
"medios suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original
complaint was prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable by the
words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to the context and
circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the fact
that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a
failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the
amendment thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the
constitutional law of these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to
the transportation of live stock between foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands,
and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been enacted by the
legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of
Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11
L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled
by constitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The
importance of the question thus presented requires a statement of the principles which
govern those relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative power
of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion
and considerable diversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are
established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and
treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or
treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against the
possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its government being questioned, the
framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress should have the
power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting territory and
other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition
of the territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into the Union, the
duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern the
territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate thereto the
ordinary powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has
been the usual procedure. Congress has provided such governments for territories which
were within the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has
been customary to organize a government with the ordinary separation of powers into
executive, legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general
conditions in accordance with which the local government should act. The organic act thus
became the constitution of the government of the territory which had not been formally
incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature
was determined by its conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National
Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government
Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed
necessary for the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the
action of the local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has
been exercised during the entire period of the history of the United States. The right of
Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned.
(Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such
territory, although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous
territory tended to create an impression upon the minds of many people that it went there
by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this
territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those prohibitions of the Constitution
which go to the very root of its power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other
respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S.,
244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138;
Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United
States, and legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of
the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides
that "The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable
shall have the same force and effect within all the organized territories, and in every
Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States." When Congress
organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of
the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as
a result of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently
proceeded in conformity with the principles above state. The city of Manila was
surrendered to the United States on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was
directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a peace which should
determine the control, disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty then devolved
upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect person and property within
the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and on August 26
General Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed
December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the
destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had practically effected the
conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein,
and that by the treaty of peace the future control, disposition, and government of the
Islands had been ceded to the United States. During the periods of strict military
occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until
Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed under
the military authority of the President as commander in chief. Long before Congress took
any action, the President organized a civil government which, however, had its legal
justification, like the purely military government which it gradually superseded, in the war
power. The military power of the President embraced legislative, executive personally, or
through such military or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in
his report for 1901 —
The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive,
legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a
military commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different powers — the
exercise of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial
power by determination of right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rules
prescribed and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as
conditions would permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government was
initiated by the appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be gradually
transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the
President. "that part of the military power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is
legislative in its character" was transferred from the military government to the
Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by
the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil government should be established,
or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the
Commission was declared to include "the making of rules and orders having the effect of
law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and
expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system to
secure an efficient civil service; the organization and establishment of courts; the
organization and establishment of municipal and departmental government, and all other
matters of a civil nature which the military governor is now competent to provide by rules or
orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to the Commission was to
be exercised in conformity with certain declared general principles, and subject to certain
specific restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The Commission were to bear in
mind that the government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression
of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the
Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should be made to conforms to their
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the
accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The
specific restrictions upon legislative power were found in the declarations that "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall
be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist
except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of
the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress
of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner
amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all
military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until
otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall be
exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct, for the
establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of
said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on
July 4, 1901, the authority, which had been exercised previously by the military governor,
was transferred to that official. The government thus created by virtue of the authority of
the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer the
affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President until by the Act of July 1, 1902,
Congress assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection
with the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which the
President had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and
approved the action of the President in organizing the government. Substantially all the
limitations which had been imposed on the legislative power by the President's instructions
were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the
Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of
individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of the President in
creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in creating the office of
the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission
establishing certain executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified.
Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after the ratification
of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902;
Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.)
Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby
and herein provided." In the future the enacting clause of all statutes should read "By
authority of the United States" instead of "By the authority of the President." In the course
of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all parts of the Islands not inhabited
by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two
houses — the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of the
Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory
not incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form
and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional
relation which unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation
and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however,
operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It
is the creation of the United States, acting through the President and Congress, both
deriving power from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and
the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the
President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its
organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the President and
Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies upon any subject
relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercise such power its act
is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a
constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete
governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the
functions commonly assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as
complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this
separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the
Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some
extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to
exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the executive
department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but
as executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government
on the model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for
the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and
priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general
constitutional doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature
must enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under
the national Constitution, and the States under the national and state constitutions. The
executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all
governments operating under written constitutions, must determine the validity of
legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing
these functions it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in
the United States. Under no other constitutional theory could there be that government of
laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of rights under a free and orderly
government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is
apparent that the courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of
the State legislature. The Federal Government exercises such powers only as are
expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while the
States exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central government. The
former operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of
Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of
express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the
Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the
legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has not been expressly
disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by
congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic
laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms
subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on
certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is
true that specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain
subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects.
These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress
was fully informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local
legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the
Government of the Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of
construction the Government of the Philippines should be regarded as one of general
instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new government
was to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress from the necessity
of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant general legislative
power to the new government, subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions, and
reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was
therefore provided "that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall
be reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the
same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts
of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by Congress, or when approved,
expressly or by acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the
Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U.
S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the
Legislature has been expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of
the Constitution of the United States operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no
application to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign
commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the territory
belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It may
do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to which its power in
this respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties which
shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the
Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors
and navigable waters. A few other specific provisions relating to foreign commerce may be
found in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left to the Government of the
Philippines, subject to the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does
not meet with its approval. The express limitations upon the power of the Commission and
Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the regulation of
commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the
control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner
amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil
government instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or
administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the territory.
(Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.)
This Act has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by
Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied
that the Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact
laws for the regulation of commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the
Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can
not be left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be
determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull
brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from
the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing said animals
while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary
to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The
trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as
the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December,
1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese
ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as
aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which
ship was anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in
front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that
fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were
dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were transported and carried upon said
ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without
suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger
and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were so transported abroad
said ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the city of Manila,
without any provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold
thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship
coming into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for
such cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear
thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of that in
case of storms, which are common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to
stand without slipping and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the
production of panics and hazard to the animals on account or cattle were transported in
this case. Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and
experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated
positively that since the introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall
system for the transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during
the last year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according to
his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is
preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the
case is not maintainable, either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with
logic that, for instance, three hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or any
other protection for them individually can safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon
the decks and in the holds of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal
falling or pitching, if he is untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the
wounding of half the animals upon the ship if transported in the manner found in this case.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty
pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The
sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
ARELLANO, C. J.:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
stated that he "carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96
kilogrammes of opium," and that "he had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos
worth prepared opium."
The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of which was the
more than one crime was charged in the complaint. The demurrer was sustained, as the
court found that the complaint contained two charges, one, for the unlawful possession of
opium, and the other, for the unlawful sale of opium, and, consequence of that ruling, it
ordered that the fiscal should separated one charge from the other and file a complaint for
each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns only the unlawful possession of
opium. It is registered as No. 375, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and as No. 5887
on the general docket of this court.
The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial court:
The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the present month
(stated as August 19, 1909), several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and Milliron,
chief of the department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu,
respectively, went abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found,
first in a cabin near the saloon, one sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards in the hold, another
sack (Exhibit B). The sack referred to as Exhibit A contained 49 cans of opium, and the
other, Exhibit B, the larger sack, also contained several cans of the same substance. The
hold, in which the sack mentioned in Exhibit B was found, was under the defendant's
control, who moreover, freely and of his own will and accord admitted that this sack, as
well as the other referred to in Exhibit B and found in the cabin, belonged to him. The said
defendant also stated, freely and voluntarily, that he had bought these sacks of opium, in
Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and
that, as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he ordered two other
Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A.
It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as Exhibits A and B,
properly constitute the corpus delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of opium, marked,
as Exhibit C, was the subject matter of investigation at the trial, and with respect to which
the chief of the department of the port of Cebu testified that they were found in the part of
the ship where the firemen habitually sleep, and that they were delivered to the first officer
of the ship to be returned to the said firemen after the vessel should have left the
Philippines, because the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions
he had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted to retain certain amounts of opium,
always provided it should not be taken shore.
And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus delicti and important
as evidence in this cause. With regard to this the internal-revenue agent testified as
follows:itc-alf
FISCAL. What is it?
WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from the defendant by a secret-service
agent and taken to the office of the governor to prove that the accused had opium in his
possession to sell.
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be stricken out "because
it refers to a sale." But, with respect to this answer, the chief of the department of customs
had already given this testimony, to wit:
FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel?
WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said that a party brought him
a sample of opium and that the same party knew that there was more opium on board the
steamer, and the agent asked that the vessel be searched.
The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground of its being hearsay
evidence, and the court only ordered that the part thereof "that there was more opium, on
board the vessel" be stricken out.
The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles mentioned as
Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium and were found on board the steamship Erroll, a
vessel of English nationality, and that it was true that the defendant stated that these sacks
of opium were his and that he had them in his possession.
According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the defendant stated to him, in
the presence of the provincial fiscal, of a Chinese interpreter (who afterwards was not
needed, because the defendant spoke English), the warden of the jail, and four guards,
that the opium seized in the vessel had been bought by him in Hongkong, at three pesos
for each round can and five pesos for each one of the others, for the purpose of selling it,
as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that on the 15th the vessel arrived at
Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium; that he had tried to sell opium for P16 a can;
that he had a contract to sell an amount of the value of about P500; that the opium found
in the room of the other two Chinamen prosecuted in another cause, was his, and that he
had left it in their stateroom to avoid its being found in his room, which had already been
searched many times; and that, according to the defendant, the contents of the large sack
was 80 cans of opium, and of the small one, 49, and the total number, 129.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from
Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu.
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no
jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The
fiscal, at the conclusion of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the law be
imposed upon the defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium seized. The
court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed
within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.

The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000,
with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to exceed one
third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs. It further ordered the
confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government, of the exhibits presented in the case, and
that, in the event of an appeal being taken or a bond given, or when the sentenced should
have been served, the defendant be not released from custody, but turned over to the
customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of the existing laws on immigration.

From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court.lawphi1.net

The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein by the parties, it
is found: That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands,
aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule,
constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being
considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the
article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of
opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of
the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at
the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place itself
had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject matter
of the present case, was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two
penalties fixed by the law on the subject, should be imposed in the maximum degree.

Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000,
respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of
this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Sanz for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the
defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and
sentencing him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a
fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which
arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon.
The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the
steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to
Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on
making a search found the eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes
below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner
of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to
his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the
prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show
that the intention of the accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine
Islands, was introduced.
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands been proven?
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, but with the
intimation that there exists inconsistently between the doctrines laid down in the two cases.
However, neither decision is directly a precedent on the facts before us.
In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573), in the opinion handed
down by the Chief Justice, it is found —
That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime
triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does no apply when the article, whose use
is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed
from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the
land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.1awphil.net
A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts in the present
instance is readily observable. In the Look Chaw case, the charge case the illegal
possession and sale of opium — in the present case the charge as illegal importation of
opium; in the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit — in the present case the
foreign vessel was not in transit; in the Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil — in the present case of United States vs. Jose ([1916], 34
Phil., 840), the main point, and the one on which resolution turned, was that in a
prosecution based on the illegal importation of opium or other prohibited drug, the
Government must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, that the vessel
from which the drug is discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with
the drug on board. In the Jose case, the defendants were acquitted because it was not
proved that the opium was imported from a foreign country; in the present case there is no
question but what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu. However, in the opinion in the
Jose case, we find the following which may be obiter dicta, but which at least is interesting
as showing the view of the writer of the opinion:
The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying it anchored in
Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium discharged or that it be taken from the
ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the Philippine Islands
on a boat destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a port of the
Philippine Islands with intent to discharge its cargo.
Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the views just quoted, we return
to an examination of the applicable provisions of the law. It is to be noted that section 4 of
Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug
into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal
Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without
breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932,
933.) And again, the importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom house, but
merely the bringing them into port; and the importation is complete before entry of the
Custom House. (U. S. vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19
Fed. Cas., 258.) As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person
unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the
prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from
a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such
case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances
exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurb to
think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and
Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that
the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use. No better
explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium
to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that there was illegal
importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any
possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not relate to foreign
vessels in transit, a situation not present.
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as
charged and the sentence of the trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results
that the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery
and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque
brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance.
Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas,
but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of
rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another
Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other
boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of
days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the
Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by
six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but
once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and
brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the
persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed
on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of
fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder
were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were
able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu
with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros,
based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not
constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the
demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered
finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment
(cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been
robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the
costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio.
By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present.
Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is
again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the
case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular
state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country
where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy
unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by
all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a
foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs.
Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first
time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are
still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another
nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who
commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical
injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in
paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter
II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code,
when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national
territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be
considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to
the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known.
The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so
far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the
characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the
main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and
peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct
action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc.,
R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the
Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the
Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered
territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the
punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible
with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying
belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force,
and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the
occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also
General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy
were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to
article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of
the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by
the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code
are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law.
This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this
respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to
define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against
the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the
statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas,
commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into
or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290;
penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the
members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal
conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to
piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical
construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy,
would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United
States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the
expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat
similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil.,
533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which
would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers
in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as
follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall
be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably
articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to
article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited
article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was
accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons
without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to
determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In
this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused
to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not
necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that
means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be
taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and
importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be
offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of
the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of
the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of
the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez,
registers his nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results,
therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is
affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of
the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place
as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two
appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall
indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and
shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1988 February 24, 1948
JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED STATES
ARMY, respondents.
Lorenzo Sumulong and Esteban P. Garcia for petitioner.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus Miquiabas against the
Commanding General Philippine-Ryukyus Command, United States Army, who is alleged
to have petitioner under custody and to have appointed a General Court-Martial to try
petitioner in connection with an offense over which the said court has no jurisdiction.
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the
Philippines, who has been charged with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things
belonging to the United States Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of the United
States. He has been arrested for that reason and a General Court-Martial appointed by
respondent tried and found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. This
sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review.
It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction
over all offenses committed within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement,
consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over
certain offenses committed within certain portions of said territory. On March 11, 1947, the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America, entered
into an agreement concerning military bases, and Article XIII thereof is as follows:
JURISDICTION
1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise
jurisdiction over the following offenses:
(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base except where the offender and
offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the
United States on active duty) or the offense is against the security of the Philippines;
(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the
United States in which the offended party is also a member of the armed forces of the
United States; and
(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the
United States against the security of the United States.
2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses
committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States.
3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire not to exercise the
jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the officer holding the
offender in custody shall so notify the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province in
which the offense has been committed within ten days after his arrest, and in such case
the Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction.
4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may desire not to exercise the jurisdiction
reserved to it in paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or
province where the offense has been committed shall so notify the officer holding the
offender in custody within ten days after his arrest, and in such a case the United States
shall be free to exercise jurisdiction. If any offense falling under paragraph 2 of this article
is committed by any member of the armed forces of the United States.
(a) While engaged in the actual performance of a specific military duty, or
(b) during a period of national emergency declared by either Government and the fiscal
(prosecuting attorney) so finds from the evidence, he shall immediately notify the officer
holding the offender in custody that the United States is free to exercise jurisdiction. In the
event the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) finds that the offense was not committed in the
actual performance of a specific military duty, the offender's commanding officer shall have
the right to appeal from such finding to the Secretary of Justice within ten days from the
receipt of the decision of the fiscal and the decision of the Secretary of Justice shall be
final.
5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercises jurisdiction the custody of the accused,
pending trial and final judgment, shall be entrusted without delay to the commanding
officer of the nearest base, who shall acknowledge in writing that such accused has been
delivered to him for custody pending trial in a competent court of the Philippines and that
he will be held ready to appear and will be produced before said court when required by it.
The commanding officer shall be furnished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) with a copy
of the information against the accused upon the filing of the original in the competent court.
6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is naturally agreed that in time of war the
United States shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses which
may be committed by members of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippines.
7. The United States agrees that it will not grant asylum in any of the bases to any person
fleeing from the lawful jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should such person be found in any
base, he will be surrendered on demand to the competent authorities of the Philippines.
8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense is exercised by the United States, the
offended party may institute a separate civil action against the offender in the proper court
of the Philippines to enforce the civil liability which under the laws of the Philippines may
arise from the offense.
Under paragraph 1 (a), the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction over the criminal
case against petitioner if the offense had been committed within a base. Under paragraph
1 (b), if the offense had been committed outside a base, still the General Court-Martial
would have jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by a "member of the armed
forces of the United States" there being no question that the offended party in this case is
the United States. It is not necessary therefore, to consider whether the offense is against
"the security of the United States" under paragraph 1 (c), or whether petitioner committed it
in "the actual performance of a specific military duty" or in time of a declared "national
emergency" under paragraph 4, or whether we are still in a state of war under paragraph 6,
for in all these instances the military jurisdiction depends also upon whether the offender is
a member of the armed forces of the United States. We shall then determine in this case
(1) whether the offense has been committed within or without a base, and, in the second
instance, (2) whether the offender is or is not a member of the armed forces of the United
States.
As to the first question, Article XXVI of the Agreement provides that "bases are those area
named in Annex A and Annex B and such additional areas as may be acquired for military
purposes pursuant to the terms of this Agreement." Among the areas specified in Annexes
A and B, there is none that has reference to the Port Area of Manila where the offense has
allegedly been committed. On the contrary, it appears in Annex A that "army
communications system" is included, but with "the deletion of all stations in the Port of
Manila Area."
Paragraph 2 of Article XXI is invoked by respondent. The whole article is as follows:
TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall retain the right to occupy temporary
quarters and installations now existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex A and Annex
B, for such reasonable time, not exceeding two years, as may be necessary to develop
adequate facilities within the bases for the United States armed forces. If circumstances
require an extension of time, such a period will be fixed by mutual agreement of the two
Governments; but such extension shall not apply to the existing temporary quarters and
installations within the limits of the City of Manila and shall in no case exceed a period of
three years.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Port of Manila
reservation with boundaries as of 1941 will be available for use to the United States armed
forces until such time as other arrangements can be made for the supply of the bases by
mutual agreement of the two Governments.
3. The terms of this agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to temporary
quarters and installations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article while they are so
occupied by the armed forces of the United States; provided, that offenses committed
within the temporary quarters and installations located within the present limits of the City
of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases but shall be governed by
the provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, except that the election not to exercise
the jurisdiction reserved to the Philippines shall be made by the Secretary of Justice. It is
agreed that the United States shall have full use and full control of all these quarters and
installations while they are occupied by the armed forces of the United States, including
the exercise of such measures as may be necessary to police said quarters for the security
of the personnel and property therein.
The subject matter of this article, as indicated by its heading, is "Temporary Installations."
Paragraph 1 refers to temporary quarters and installations existing outside the bases
specified in Annex A and Annex B, which may be retained by the United States armed
forces for such reasonable time as may be necessary not exceeding two years in duration,
extendible fro not more than three years, the extension not being applicable to existing
temporary quarters and installations within the limits of the City of Manila.
Paragraph 2, of Article XXI, refers to the Port of Manila Reservation, which will be available
for use to the United States armed forces, also as a temporary quarters and installations,
its temporariness not being for a definite period of time, but "until such time as other
arrangements can be made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two
Governments." There is in paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that may be construed as
placing the Port of Manila Reservation in the category of a permanent base.
Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed within the temporary
quarters and installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be
considered as offenses within the bases but shall be governed by the provisions of Article
XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4." Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered as
committed within, but without, a base, since it has been committed in the Port of Manila
Area, which is not one of the bases mentioned in Annexes A and B to the Agreement, and
is merely temporary quarters located within the present limits of the City of Manila.
The next inquiry is whether or not the offender may be considered as a member of the
armed forces of the United States under Article XIII, paragraph 1 (b). As above stated,
petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the
Philippines. Under the terms of the Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered
as a member of the armed forces of the United States. Articles XI, XVI and XVIII of the
Agreement make mention of civilian employees separately from members of the armed
forces of the United States, which is a conclusive indication that under said Agreement
armed forces do not include civilian employees.
Respondent invokes Articles II of the Articles of War of the United States, which
enumerates, among the persons subject to military law, persons accompanying or serving
with the armies of the United States. But this case should be decided not under the Articles
of War, but under the terms of the Base Agreement between the United States and the
Philippines. And not because a person is subject to military law under the Articles of War
does he become, for that reason alone, a member of the armed forces under the Base
Agreement. And even under the Articles of War, the mere fact that a civilian employee is in
the service of the United States Army does not make him a member of the armed forces of
the United States. Otherwise, it would have been necessary for said Article to enumerate
civilian employees separately from members of the armed forces of the United States.
Respondent maintains that petitioner has no cause of action because the Secretary of
Justice had not notified the officer holding the petitioner in custody whether or not the
Philippines desired to retain jurisdiction under Article XXI, paragraph 3, of the Military Base
Agreement. It is sufficient to state in this connection that in cases like the present where
the offender is a civilian employee and not a member of the Unites States armed forces,
no waiver can be made either by the prosecuting attorney of by the Secretary of Justice,
under paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article XIII in connection with paragraph 3 of Article XXI, of
the Agreement.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the General Court-Martial appointed by
respondent has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense allegedly committed by him
and, consequently, the judgment rendered by said court sentencing the petitioner to 15
years' imprisonment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent without prejudice to any
criminal action which may be instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.
Let a copy of this decision be sent immediately to the Honorable, Secretary of Justice.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ, concur.
 Upon this ground, petitioner is entitled to be released by respondent and by the court
martial which tried him.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
One of the attributes of national sovereignty is the power to try and punish offenses,
criminal and otherwise. The exercise of that power is, by virtue of express provision of our
Constitution, vested in the Supreme Court and in inferior courts established by law. (Sec.
1, Art. VIII) The fundamental law refers to inferior courts created by an enactment of a
national legislature, Assembly or Congress, not to foreign courts martial, created by foreign
countries.
All this is in accordance with elemental principles of political law.
If petitioner is liable for a criminal offense, according to our laws, the jurisdiction to try him
belongs to a justice of the peace or municipal court or to a court of first instance.
The jurisdiction can be transferred to other courts by virtue of a law that may be enacted to
said effect. The law, to be effective, must not violate the constitutional Bill of Rights, among
them the guarantee of fair trial in favor of an accused, the equal protection of the law, the
due process of law, the guarantees against illegal detentions and searches, and others.
Even in the erroneous hypothesis that the waiver clauses of the agreement are valid, we
concur in the reasoning of the Chief Justice in support of the position that petitioner is not
comprehended in said waiver clauses. With more reason, respondent has no power nor
jurisdiction to hold petitioner in confinement, nor to have him tried by a U.S. army court-
martial.
Notice must be served to the whole world that, in rendering the decision in this case, the
Supreme Court, in the fullness of judicial maturity, acted not as a mere agency of national
sovereignty, but in the consciousness that the administration of justice, more than national,
is a human function, untethered by the narrow provincialism of the points of view of a
country, but founded on the universal and permanent interests of mankind, as expressed
in principles with equal value regardless of the hemisphere of the latitude where a person
may be placed.
There is a suggestion that, because it has not found articulate expression in this case, it
should be ignored, when it is boiling in many minds, and it is that respondent, shielded by
his military power and the overwhelming national power of his country, may ignore our
decision, and we will be powerless to enforce it. The fact that respondent appeared before
us, through counsel, without any reservation, answers the suggestion, and gives full justice
to the sense of moral values of the respondent.

Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the U. S. Army, rendering services
in the Philippines. He attacks the power of the Commanding General, Philippine Ryukus
Command, U.S. Army, to have him under military custody and tried by a general court-
martial of said army. Respondent invokes, in opposing the petition, the provisions of the
agreement on military Bases entered into by the Republic of the Philippines and the
government of the United States of America on March 14, 1947.
Besides, in the present state of international affairs, when America is engaged in the noble
task of making a reality the ideal of one world, it can not compromise its moral leadership
by any showing of reckless disregard to the decision of a court of justice. The cry that there
must be one world or none can receive but one satisfactory answer; the reality of world
justice. Only in justice hinges the salvation of humanity. Only justice can give real peace
and provide the basis for contentment and happiness.

The agreement appears to be a concession to two weaknesses: the American distrust in We concur in the decision, ordering the immediate release of the petitioner.
Philippine tribunals and Filipino yielding to much distrust; on one hand, undisguised
prejudice, — national, racial, or otherwise, — on the other, meek submission to the natural
consequences of an unreasonable prejudice; on one side, the haughtiness of a powerful
nation, proud in the consciousness of its power, on the other, the moral surrender of a new
nation, not yet so sure in the exercise to their fullness of sovereign prerogatives. Extra-
territoriality is wrong per se.

It is, therefore, assailable on two opposing fronts. On constitutional ground, it is hardly

defensible.

The Bill of Rights has been embodied in the Constitution for the protection of all human
beings within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. All persons covered by the
waivers made in the agreement, whether Americans or Filipinos, whether citizens or
aliens, are denied the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the law. Their
fundamental rights are safeguarded by the Constitution, and the agreement places them
outside the Constitution.

Our conclusion is, therefore, that the agreement in question, so far as it stipulates waiver
of the jurisdiction of our courts of justice on the class of persons mentioned therein, is null
and void, being in open conflict with clear provisions of our fundamental law.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971
MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO
PADUA and PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A.
Torres and Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by petitioners, five in number, for
their release from imprisonment. Meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion
with murder and other crimes, they would invoke the People v. Hernandez 1 doctrine,
negating the existence of such an offense, a ruling that unfortunately for them was not
handed down until after their convictions had become final. Nor is this the first instance, a
proceeding of this character was instituted, as in Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons,2 likewise
a petition for habeas corpus, a similar question was presented. The answer given was in
the negative. Petitioners plead for a new look on the matter. They would premise their
stand on the denial of equal protection if their plea would not be granted. Moreover they
did invoke the codal provision that judicial decisions shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines,3 necessarily resulting in the conclusion that the Hernandez decision once
promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of the Revised Penal
Code as to penal laws having such character even if at the time of their application a final
sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving the same." 4 These arguments
carry considerable persuasion. Accordingly we find for petitioners, without going so far as
to overrule Pomeroy.
Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to
suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery,
arson and kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio
Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and
other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in decisions rendered,
as to the first two, on March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on December 15, 1955. The last
petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder and other offenses and on January 12, 1954 penalized with reclusion perpetua.
Each of the petitioners has been since then imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions.
Each of them has served more than 13 years.5
Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez,6 as above noted, this Court ruled that the
information against the accused in that case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson
and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there being
no such complex offense.7 In the recently-decided case of People vs. Lava,8 we expressly
reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the plea of the Solicitor General for
the abandonment of such doctrine. It is the contention of each of the petitioners that he
has served, in the light of the above, more than the maximum penalty that could have been
imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being illegal. 9
The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their release on a habeas
corpus proceeding prompted petitioners, as had been mentioned, to ask that it be
appraised anew and, if necessary, discarded. We can resolve the present petition without
doing so. The plea there made was unconvincing, there being a failure to invoke the
contentions now pressed vigorously by their counsel, Attorney Jose W. Diokno, as to the
existence of a denial of a constitutional right that would suffice to raise a serious
jurisdictional question and the retroactive effect to be given a judicial decision favorable to
one already sentenced to a final judgment under Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code. To
repeat, these two grounds carry weight. We have to grant this petition.
1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas corpus under
the circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of restraint and
detention be avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty
for nothing. The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether
there is any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be such a
showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If there be a valid sentence it cannot, even
for a moment, be extended beyond the period provided for by law. Any deviation from the
legal norms call for the termination of the imprisonment.
Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights provision"
in the fundamental law. 10Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as "one of the
principal safeguards to personal liberty." 11 For Willoughby, it is "the greatest of the
safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and illegal imprisonment by
whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered." 12 Burdick echoed a similar
sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most important bulwarks of liberty." 13 Fraenkel
made it unanimous, for to him, "without it much else would be of no avail." 14 Thereby the
rule of law is assured.
A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of liberty
coupled with its limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief Justices
Arellano, 15 Avanceña, 16 Abad Santos, 17 Paras, 18Bengzon, 19 and the present Chief
Justice. 20 It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to emphasize quite a few times the
breadth of its amplitude and of its reach. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, 21 the remedy came in
handy to challenge the validity of the order of the then respondent Mayor of Manila who,
for the best of reasons but without legal justification, ordered the transportation of more
than 150 inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. After referring to the writ of habeas
corpus as having been devised and existing "as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint" the opinion of Justice Malcolm continued: "The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." 22
The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus petitions even if
presented in pleadings on their face devoid of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v.
Quilen, 23 where this Court, again through Justice Malcolm, stated: "As standing alone the
petition for habeas corpus was fatally defective in its allegations, this court, on its motion,
ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case entitled Thomas Casey, et al. v.
George Ganaway." 24 It is to Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde v. Rivera, 25 to whom is
traceable the doctrine, one that broadens the field of the operation of the writ, that a
disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of jurisdiction and entitles
the accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom." 26
So it is in the United States. An 1830 decision 27 of Chief Justice Marshall put the matter
thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law, the
great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient
cause." Then there is this affirmation from an 1869 decision 28 of the then Chief Justice
Chase: "The great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The passing of the years has only served to
confirm its primacy as a weapon on in the cause of liberty. Only the other year, Justice
Fortas spoke for the United States Supreme Court thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless
state action. ... The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of
illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes — have
always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature
of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to
insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected." 29 Justice
Fortas explicitly made reference to Blackstone, who spoke of it as "the great and
efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement." Implicit in his just estimate of its pre-
eminent role is his adoption of Holmes' famous dissent in Frank v. Mangum: 30 "But habeas
corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure."
2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially
ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed.
For if "the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order," the writ does not lie. 31 That principle dates back to 1902, 32 when this
Court announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where the person detained was in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or magistrate. This is
understandable, as during the time the Philippines was under American rule, there was
necessarily an adherence to authoritative doctrines of constitutional law there followed.
One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of jurisdictional defect. As
summarized by Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, an 1880 decision: "The only ground on
which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on
habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of
jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its
proceedings void." 33
There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept in mind. Once a
deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment
is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the
legality of the detention. 34
3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial of
equal protection. According to their petition: "In the case at bar, the petitioners were
convicted by Courts of First Instance for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez,
Geronimo, and others were convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the
very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not and has not been
changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can we, in conscience,
allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?" 35
They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal protection, people similarly
situated were not similarly dealt with. What is required under this required constitutional
guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and
the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: "Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall
be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law
be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest." 36
The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring. The continued incarceration
after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in
accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed,
is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the
contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical
offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one being before the
Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime would
be made to suffer different penalties. Moreover, as noted in the petition before us, after our
ruling in People v. Lava, petitioners who were mere followers would be made to languish in
jail for perhaps the rest of their natural lives when the leaders had been duly considered as
having paid their penalty to society, and freed. Such a deplorable result is to be avoided.
4. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely on Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive effect. In
support of their contention, petitioners cite U.S. v. Macasaet, 37 U.S. vs.Parrone, 38 U.S. v.
Almencion, 39 People v. Moran, 40 and People v. Parel. 41 While reference in the above
provision is made not to judicial decisions but to legislative acts, petitioners entertain the
view that it would be merely an exaltation of the literal to deny its application to a case like
the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As was previously noted, the Civil Code
provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution, as well as
legislation, form part of our legal system. Petitioners would even find support in the well-
known dictum of Bishop Hoadley:
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is
truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first thought or
spoke them." It is to be admitted that constitutional law scholars, notably
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial review as well as the jurist
John Chipman Gray, were much impressed with the truth and the soundness of the above
observations. We do not have to go that far though. Enough for present purposes that both
the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code allow, if they do not call for, a retroactive
application.
It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a retroactive effect
petitioners had served the full term for which they could have been legally committed, is
habeas corpus the appropriate remedy? The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back as
1910 the prevailing doctrine was announced in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. 45Thus: "The
courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the power of
the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold
that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the proposition that
such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the
rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas
corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid." 46 There is a
reiteration of such a principle in Director v. Director of Prisons 47 where it was explicitly
announced by this Court "that the only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal
provision favorable to the accused ... is the writ of habeas corpus." 48 While the above
decision speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the case, insofar as the remedy of
habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of
benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true.
Petitioners clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of justifying their release.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is ordered that petitioners
be forthwith set at liberty.
Dizon and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Castro and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:
The petitioners at bar, three of whom pleaded guilty1 and two of whom stood
trial,2 were meted out life terms in 1953, 1954 and 1955 for the so-called complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder and other crimes, and have served or are now entering into
their 17th year of imprisonment, save for petitioner Epifanio Padua who was sentenced on
December 15, 1955 and is completing his 15th year of imprisonment, (excluding the
periods they were under pre-conviction detention). The leaders of the rebellion who were
meted out death and life sentences for the same charge by the Court of First Instance of
Manila had their sentences reduced last near to ten years of prision mayor by the Court
in People v. Lava,3 wherein the Court expressly re-affirmed the doctrine first laid down in
1956 in People vs. Hernandez,4 that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other
common crimes since such common crimes "assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients and consequently cannot be punished separately
from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty." The Court rejected therein the State's plea for the reexamination and setting
aside of such doctrine, declaring that "(T)his Court has given this plea of the Solicitor
General a very serious consideration, but after a mature deliberation the members of this
Court have decided to maintain that ruling in the Hernandez case and to adhere to what
this Court said in that case." The said leaders have since been duly freed as having served
out their penalty, but their followers, herein petitioners, are still serving their life sentences.
I concede the validity of the ruling in Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons5 that "(W)ith
reference to persons in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule is that the writ
of habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot
function as a writ of error." "I grant, too, that at the time of the Pomeroy decision in 1960,
as noted therein, "the existence of the 'complexed' rebellion (was) still upheld by a sizable
number of lawyers, prosecutors, judges and even justices of this Court." But with the
doctrine first enunciated in 1956 in Hernandez by a bare six-to-four majority vote having
withstood the test of time6 and having been just last year unreservedly reaffirmed without a
single dissent in Lava, it cannot now be gainsaid that it is now part of our legal system that
the crime of "complexed" rebellion does not exist in our Revised Penal Code. No
prosecutor would now file an information for "complexed" rebellion but simply for the
offense of simple rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and even if
such an information for "complexed" rebellion to be so filed, the trial courts would be bound
to quash such information as not charging an offense on the strength
of Lava and Hernandez.
Petitioners have therefore properly invoked in their favor the provisions of Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code that:
ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
in relation to the provisions of Article 8 of the Civil Code that "(J)udicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines."
The situation of petitioners is no different than it would be if, say, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua were imposed by statute for the crime of simple rebellion at the time of their
conviction and they were accordingly sentenced, and the statutory penalty were now
reduced to prision mayor or 12 years imprisonment; having served out the maximum
penalty of 12 years now imposed by the amended statute, they would be entitled to invoke
the retroactive effect of the statute favoring them.lâwphî1.ñèt The only difference between
the situation given and the present case is that here it is this Supreme Court, interpreting
the laws in discharge of its constitutional prerogative, that has laid down the doctrine
since Hernandez in 1956 that no offense of "complexed" rebellion exists and petitioners
should therefore be now equally entitled to the retroactive favorable effect of such doctrine.
The actual case of petitioners is that at the time of their conviction, it was
believed — erroneously — that the crime committed by them was punishable by life
imprisonment, but the Court has subsequently judicially determined it not be so and that
the maximum imposable penalty is prision mayor or 12 years. Petitioners-convicts are
entitled to the benefit of this later judicial declaration, just as if a statutory amendment had
been enacted—not because the sentencing court had no jurisdiction or is now ousted of
jurisdiction. The writ prayed for should issue, since as held in Directo vs. Director of
Prisons,7 "the only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the
accused where the trial judge has lost jurisdiction over the case, is the writ of habeas
corpus."
The question of jurisdiction of the sentencing court therefore is moot, for it is universally
recognized that relief by habeas corpus may be properly sought in cases of imposition of
excessive penalty, such that the part of the sentence beyond or in excess of the power of
the court to impose is held void, the applicant having already served out the entire part of
the sentence within the court's power. 8 As pointed out by the Court in Rodriguez vs.
Director of Prisons,9 furthermore, "Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code ... extends its
benefits even to convicts serving sentence, and the only legal remedy open to them to
make use of such benefits is the writ of habeas corpus inasmuch as, if the penalty
imposed upon them under the former penal law was decreased by the revised code, the
excess has become illegal."
Regardless, therefore, of whether the trial courts that sentenced petitioners to life
sentences had jurisdiction or not to impose such penalty, or were right or wrong in
imposing such penalty, the only relevant question now is whether petitioners have served
the maximum — and lesser — sentence of prision mayor that this Court has by firm judicial
doctrine since 1956 determined to be the penalty that the Revised Penal Code fixes for the
crime of rebellion. Since they have actually served much more than the maximum
imposable penalty, the excess of the sentence imposed upon them over the imposable
maximum of twelve years of prision mayor cannot but be declared illegal and they should
now be set free.
In People vs. Parel, 10 the Court held that the provisions of a new law (Act 3030) for the
prescription of certain election offenses (fixing the same at one year after commission)
were more favorable to the accused than those of the pre-existing law and were therefore
retroactive as to the same offenses committed before the enactment of the new law. In
meeting the objection that the reduced prescription period was by its terms applicable only
to offenses resulting from the new law (which amended the pre-existing Election Law) and
could not be given retroactive effect, the Court found "that practically all of the offenses
defined in the former law are also defined in the same language in Act 3030 (the new law),
the only difference being that the penalties have been increased." Holding that the
retroactivity clause of Article 22 of the Penal Code must apply in all in which the new law is
more favorable to the accused, in the absence of any express statutory exception, the
Court drew this analogy: "Let us suppose that a statute is enacted defining the crime of
murder in the same language in which it is defined in the Penal Code, but providing that
the maximum penalty for the crime defined in the new statute shall be life imprisonment,
the statute containing no provision that it shall not be retroactive in its effect. Would
anyone then maintain that the death penalty might still be imposed for murder committed
before the new statute was enacted?"
The case at bar for petitioners is much stronger. Here, there is no question even as to the
enactment of a law statute describing the crime in the same language and imposing a
lesser penalty, but the settled doctrine of this Court that there does not exist in our legal
system the complex crime of rebellion of which the petitioners stand convicted, "since
rebellion cannot form a complex with common crimes, because the latter are either
absorbed by the rebellion itself or are punishable as independent offenses." 11 Petitioners
here have been convicted for the very same rebellion and under the very same law for
which their leaders, Jose Lava et al., have been convicted. Yet, while their leaders have
since been freed after serving their sentences of ten years of prision mayor, petitioners as
mere followers are serving out the life sentences imposed on them, notwithstanding their
already having served out much more than the maximum penalty of twelve years of prision
mayor imposable upon them. The fact that the legal doubts about the non-existence of the
crime of "complexed" rebellion were cleared up only in 1956 after they had already been
convicted and were serving their sentences does not make the excess in the penalty
imposed upon them beyond the maximum of twelve years any less illegal.
The rule of prospective and non-retroactive operation of judicial doctrines, and its corollary
rule of the law of the case, have no application here. These salutary rules decree that
rights of parties having been decisively settled and determined by final judgment of the
court of competent jurisdiction with the party adversely affected having had the opportunity
to raise in the case all relevant questions, the decision becomes the law of the case, and
vested rights would be impaired, judicial chaos and disorder ensue and litigation would be
never-ending and would become more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to
redress, should an adjudicated case be reopened simply because in another and
subsequent case, this Court adopted a new or different construction of the law under which
a different result of the adjudicated case might have been obtained. Here, the whole
question
turns — simply — on the nature of the crime of rebellion as defined in section 134 of the
Revised Penal Code and the maximum penalty imposable therefor under section 135 of
the same Code. As this Court had ruled since 1956--which is now settled doctrine—that
only the crime of simple rebellion exists in our legal system for which the maximum penalty
of prision mayor may be imposed, the excess of the life sentences imposed upon
petitioners over the imposable maximum of prision mayor cannot stand and must
necessarily be declared void.
Prescinding then from the question of jurisdiction of the sentencing courts, the case at bar
presents a clear case of an excess in penalty imposed beyond twelve years of prision
mayor which has become illegal by virtue of this Court's settled doctrine that the crime of
rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes. On this ground, as well as on
the further and more fundamental ground that to hold them liable to continue serving life
sentences for a crime that the law—at the time of their conviction as well as now—
punishes only with prision mayor which they have more than fully served, would be to deny
them their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the law.
Any further detention of petitioners, in my view as above discussed, is illegal and
unconstitutional and the petition for habeas corpus should be granted and petitioners
forthwith set at liberty.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:
The petitioners at bar, three of whom pleaded guilty1 and two of whom stood
trial,2 were meted out life terms in 1953, 1954 and 1955 for the so-called complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder and other crimes, and have served or are now entering into
their 17th year of imprisonment, save for petitioner Epifanio Padua who was sentenced on
December 15, 1955 and is completing his 15th year of imprisonment, (excluding the
periods they were under pre-conviction detention). The leaders of the rebellion who were
meted out death and life sentences for the same charge by the Court of First Instance of
Manila had their sentences reduced last near to ten years of prision mayor by the Court
in People v. Lava,3 wherein the Court expressly re-affirmed the doctrine first laid down in
1956 in People vs. Hernandez,4 that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other
common crimes since such common crimes "assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients and consequently cannot be punished separately
from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty." The Court rejected therein the State's plea for the reexamination and setting
aside of such doctrine, declaring that "(T)his Court has given this plea of the Solicitor
General a very serious consideration, but after a mature deliberation the members of this
Court have decided to maintain that ruling in the Hernandez case and to adhere to what
this Court said in that case." The said leaders have since been duly freed as having served
out their penalty, but their followers, herein petitioners, are still serving their life sentences.
I concede the validity of the ruling in Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons5 that "(W)ith
reference to persons in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule is that the writ
of habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot
function as a writ of error." "I grant, too, that at the time of the Pomeroy decision in 1960,
as noted therein, "the existence of the 'complexed' rebellion (was) still upheld by a sizable
number of lawyers, prosecutors, judges and even justices of this Court." But with the
doctrine first enunciated in 1956 in Hernandez by a bare six-to-four majority vote having
withstood the test of time6 and having been just last year unreservedly reaffirmed without a
single dissent in Lava, it cannot now be gainsaid that it is now part of our legal system that
the crime of "complexed" rebellion does not exist in our Revised Penal Code. No
prosecutor would now file an information for "complexed" rebellion but simply for the
offense of simple rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and even if
such an information for "complexed" rebellion to be so filed, the trial courts would be bound
to quash such information as not charging an offense on the strength
of Lava and Hernandez.
Petitioners have therefore properly invoked in their favor the provisions of Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code that:
ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
in relation to the provisions of Article 8 of the Civil Code that "(J)udicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines."
The situation of petitioners is no different than it would be if, say, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua were imposed by statute for the crime of simple rebellion at the time of their
conviction and they were accordingly sentenced, and the statutory penalty were now
reduced to prision mayor or 12 years imprisonment; having served out the maximum
penalty of 12 years now imposed by the amended statute, they would be entitled to invoke
the retroactive effect of the statute favoring them. The only difference between the
situation given and the present case is that here it is this Supreme Court, interpreting the
laws in discharge of its constitutional prerogative, that has laid down the doctrine
since Hernandez in 1956 that no offense of "complexed" rebellion exists and petitioners
should therefore be now equally entitled to the retroactive favorable effect of such doctrine.
The actual case of petitioners is that at the time of their conviction, it was
believed — erroneously — that the crime committed by them was punishable by life
imprisonment, but the Court has subsequently judicially determined it not be so and that
the maximum imposable penalty is prision mayor or 12 years. Petitioners-convicts are
entitled to the benefit of this later judicial declaration, just as if a statutory amendment had
been enacted—not because the sentencing court had no jurisdiction or is now ousted of
jurisdiction. The writ prayed for should issue, since as held in Directo vs. Director of
Prisons,7 "the only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the
accused where the trial judge has lost jurisdiction over the case, is the writ of habeas
corpus."
The question of jurisdiction of the sentencing court therefore is moot, for it is universally
recognized that relief by habeas corpus may be properly sought in cases of imposition of
excessive penalty, such that the part of the sentence beyond or in excess of the power of
the court to impose is held void, the applicant having already served out the entire part of
the sentence within the court's power. 8 As pointed out by the Court in Rodriguez vs.
Director of Prisons,9 furthermore, "Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code ... extends its
benefits even to convicts serving sentence, and the only legal remedy open to them to
make use of such benefits is the writ of habeas corpus inasmuch as, if the penalty
imposed upon them under the former penal law was decreased by the revised code, the
excess has become illegal."
Regardless, therefore, of whether the trial courts that sentenced petitioners to life
sentences had jurisdiction or not to impose such penalty, or were right or wrong in
imposing such penalty, the only relevant question now is whether petitioners have served
the maximum — and lesser — sentence of prision mayor that this Court has by firm judicial
doctrine since 1956 determined to be the penalty that the Revised Penal Code fixes for the
crime of rebellion. Since they have actually served much more than the maximum
imposable penalty, the excess of the sentence imposed upon them over the imposable
maximum of twelve years of prision mayor cannot but be declared illegal and they should
now be set free.
In People vs. Parel, 10 the Court held that the provisions of a new law (Act 3030) for the
prescription of certain election offenses (fixing the same at one year after commission)
were more favorable to the accused than those of the pre-existing law and were therefore
retroactive as to the same offenses committed before the enactment of the new law. In
meeting the objection that the reduced prescription period was by its terms applicable only
to offenses resulting from the new law (which amended the pre-existing Election Law) and
could not be given retroactive effect, the Court found "that practically all of the offenses
defined in the former law are also defined in the same language in Act 3030 (the new law),
the only difference being that the penalties have been increased." Holding that the
retroactivity clause of Article 22 of the Penal Code must apply in all in which the new law is
more favorable to the accused, in the absence of any express statutory exception, the
Court drew this analogy: "Let us suppose that a statute is enacted defining the crime of
murder in the same language in which it is defined in the Penal Code, but providing that
the maximum penalty for the crime defined in the new statute shall be life imprisonment,
the statute containing no provision that it shall not be retroactive in its effect. Would
anyone then maintain that the death penalty might still be imposed for murder committed
before the new statute was enacted?"
The case at bar for petitioners is much stronger. Here, there is no question even as to the
enactment of a law statute describing the crime in the same language and imposing a
lesser penalty, but the settled doctrine of this Court that there does not exist in our legal
system the complex crime of rebellion of which the petitioners stand convicted, "since
rebellion cannot form a complex with common crimes, because the latter are either
absorbed by the rebellion itself or are punishable as independent offenses." 11 Petitioners
here have been convicted for the very same rebellion and under the very same law for
which their leaders, Jose Lava et al., have been convicted. Yet, while their leaders have
since been freed after serving their sentences of ten years of prision mayor, petitioners as
mere followers are serving out the life sentences imposed on them, notwithstanding their
already having served out much more than the maximum penalty of twelve years of prision
mayor imposable upon them. The fact that the legal doubts about the non-existence of the
crime of "complexed" rebellion were cleared up only in 1956 after they had already been
convicted and were serving their sentences does not make the excess in the penalty
imposed upon them beyond the maximum of twelve years any less illegal.
The rule of prospective and non-retroactive operation of judicial doctrines, and its corollary
rule of the law of the case, have no application here. These salutary rules decree that
rights of parties having been decisively settled and determined by final judgment of the
court of competent jurisdiction with the party adversely affected having had the opportunity
to raise in the case all relevant questions, the decision becomes the law of the case, and
vested rights would be impaired, judicial chaos and disorder ensue and litigation would be
never-ending and would become more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to
redress, should an adjudicated case be reopened simply because in another and
subsequent case, this Court adopted a new or different construction of the law under which
a different result of the adjudicated case might have been obtained. Here, the whole
question
turns — simply — on the nature of the crime of rebellion as defined in section 134 of the
Revised Penal Code and the maximum penalty imposable therefor under section 135 of
the same Code. As this Court had ruled since 1956--which is now settled doctrine—that
only the crime of simple rebellion exists in our legal system for which the maximum penalty
of prision mayor may be imposed, the excess of the life sentences imposed upon
petitioners over the imposable maximum of prision mayor cannot stand and must
necessarily be declared void.

Prescinding then from the question of jurisdiction of the sentencing courts, the case at bar
presents a clear case of an excess in penalty imposed beyond twelve years of prision
mayor which has become illegal by virtue of this Court's settled doctrine that the crime of
rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes. On this ground, as well as on
the further and more fundamental ground that to hold them liable to continue serving life
sentences for a crime that the law—at the time of their conviction as well as now—
punishes only with prision mayor which they have more than fully served, would be to deny
them their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the law.

Any further detention of petitioners, in my view as above discussed, is illegal and

unconstitutional and the petition for habeas corpus should be granted and petitioners
forthwith set at liberty.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gonzalo B. Callanta (counsel de oficio) for defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato,
Branch I, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1815 and 1816 for murder which, after a joint trial,
resulted in the conviction of the accused in a decision rendered on September 8, 1970,
with the following pronouncement:
Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The proper penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION PERPETUA (Arts.
248 and 64, Revised Penal Code).
Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder,
(a) In Criminal Case No. 1815, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Davis Q. Fleischer in the sum of P 12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P 10,000.00 as moral damages, P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees,
the offended party having been represented by a private prosecutor, and to pay the costs;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 1816, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Flaviano Rubia in the sum of P12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the
offended party having been represent by a private prosecutor, and to pay the costs (p. 48,
rec.).
The facts are summarized in the People's brief, as follows:
At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and
Cesar Ibanez together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were
fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place was in
the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by George Fleischer. This is located
in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the place of the fencing is the house and
rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp. 179-182, t.s.n., Pieza II). At that time,
appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of his house were being
chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on,
appellant would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So
he addressed the group, saying 'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if
possible we will talk it over what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is
appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit,
proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot
Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing
there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him (pp. 127-133, t.s.n.,
Defense transcript). Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shotting' (pp. 9-14,
t.s.n., Pieza I, pp. 8-9, Appellant's Brief, p.161, rec.).
It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle
between the Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased Fleischer was the secretary-
treasurer and deceased Rubia the assistant manager, on the one hand, and the land
settlers of Cotabato, among whom was appellant.
From the available records of the related cases which had been brought to the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 28858-R and 50583-R) and to this Court on certiorari (G.R. No. L-
26757 and L-45504), WE take judicial notice of the following antecedent facts:
Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to
Mindanao in 1937 and settled in Maitum, a former sitio of Kiamba and now a separate
municipality of South Cotabato. He established his residence therein, built his house,
cultivated the area, and was among those who petitioned then President Manuel L.
Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and nearby Kalaong
Plantation totalling about 2,000 hectares, for distribution among the settlers.
Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an American
landowner in Negros Oriental, filed sales application No. 21983 on June 3, 1937 over the
same area formerly leased and later abandoned by Celebes Plantation Company, covering
1,017.2234 hectares.
Meanwhile, the subdivision was ordered and a public land surveyor did the actual survey in
1941 but the survey report was not submitted until 1946 because of the outbreak of the
second world war. According to the survey, only 300 hectares Identified as Lots Nos. 22,
26 and 38, Ps. 176 Kiamba, were set aside for Sales Application No. 21983, while the rest
were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6 hectares each to be distributed among the settlers
(pp. 32-33, G.R. No. L-45504).
The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was
declared open for disposition, appraised and advertised for public auction. At the public
auction held in Manila on August 14, 1948, Fleischer and Company was the only bidder for
P6,000.00. But because of protests from the settlers the corresponding award in its favor
was held in abeyance, while an investigator was sent by the Director of Lands to Kiamba in
the person of Atty. Jose T. Gozon Atty. Gozon came back after ten days with an amicable
settlement signed by the representative of the settlers. This amicable settlement was later
repudiated by the settlers, but the Director of Lands, acting upon the report of Atty. Gozon,
approved the same and ordered the formal award of the land in question to Fleischer and
Company. The settlers appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
who, however, affirmed the decision in favor of the company.
On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato which then consisted only of one sala, for the purpose of annulling the order of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which affirmed the order of the Director
of Lands awarding the contested land to the company. The settlers as plaintiffs, lost that
case in view of the amicable settlement which they had repudiated as resulting from
threats and intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation and fraudulent machination on the part
of the company. They appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 28858-R) which
likewise affirmed on August 16, 1965 the decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of
the company.
This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the Court of First Instance dated
September 24, 1966, from the land which they had been occupying for about 30 years.
Among those ejected was the appellant who, to avoid trouble, voluntarily dismantled his
house, built in 1947 at a cost of around P20,000.00, and transferred to his other house
which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway. The second house is not far from the site
of the dismantled house. Its ground floor has a store operated by Mrs. June Talens who
was renting a portion thereof. He also transferred his store from his former residence to the
house near the highway. Aside from the store, he also had a rice mill located about 15
meters east of the house and a concrete pavement between the rice mill and the house,
which is used for drying grains and copra.
On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Jose V.
Gamboa and other leaders filed Civil Case No. 755 in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, Branch I. to obtain an injunction or annulment of the order of award with prayer
for preliminary injunction. During the pendency of this case, appellant on February 21,
1967 entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby he agreed to lease an
area of approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No. 38 from the company (Exh. 9,
p. 1, Folder of Exhibits for Defense) for a consideration of P16.00 monthly. According to
him, he signed the contract although the ownership of the land was still uncertain, in order
to avoid trouble, until the question of ownership could be decided. He never paid the
agreed rental, although he alleges that the milling job they did for Rubia was considered
payment. On June 25, 1968, deceased Fleischer wrote him a letter with the following
tenor:
You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co., Inc. for that portion of land in
which your house and ricemill are located as per agreement executed on February 21,
1967. You have not paid as as even after repeated attempts of collection made by Mr.
Flaviano Rubia and myself.
In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the agreement, I have no alternative
but to terminate our agreement on this date.
I am giving you six months to remove your house, ricemill, bodega, and water pitcher
pumps from the land of Fleischers & Co., Inc. This six- month period shall expire on
December 31, 1966.
In the event the above constructions have not been removed within the six- month period,
the company shall cause their immediate demolition (Exhibit 10, p. 2, supra).
On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their laborers, commenced fencing Lot
38 by putting bamboo posts along the property line parallel to the highway. Some posts
were planted right on the concrete drier of appellant, thereby cutting diagonally across its
center (pp. 227-228, t.s.n., Vol. 2), with the last post just adjacent to appellant's house (p.
231, t.s.n., supra). The fence, when finished, would have the effect of shutting off the
accessibility to appellant's house and rice mill from the highway, since the door of the
same opens to the Fleischers' side. The fencing continued on that fateful day of August 22,
1968, with the installation of four strands of barbed wire to the posts.
At about 2:30 p.m. on the said day, appellant who was taking a nap after working on his
farm all morning, was awakened by some noise as if the wall of his house was being
chiselled. Getting up and looking out of the window, he found that one of the laborers of
Fleischer was indeed chiselling the wall of his house with a crowbar (p. 129, t.s.n., Vol. 6),
while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and deceased Fleischer was
commanding his laborers. The jeep used by the deceased was parked on the highway.
The rest of the incident is narrated in the People's Brief as above-quoted. Appellant
surrendered to the police thereafter, bringing with him shotgun No. 1119576 and claiming
he shot two persons (Exh. Pp. 31, Defense Exhibits).
Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction, assigning the following errors:
First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting defendant-appellant
despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person; and
Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in convicting defendant-
appellant although he acted in defense of his rights (p. 20 of Appellant's Brief, p. 145, rec.).
The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant admitted
having shot them from the window of his house with the shotgun which he surrendered to
the police authorities. He claims, however, that he did so in defense of his person and of
his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from criminal liability.
Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, par.
1 of the Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be appreciated, the following requisites
must occur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (Art. 11,
par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended).
The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by deceased Fleischer of
the following words: "Hindi, sigue, gademit, avante", in answer to his request addressed to
his compadre, the deceased Rubia, when he said, "Pare, hinto mona ninyo at pag-usapan
natin kung ano ang mabuti" (pp. 227-229, t.s.n., Vol. 6). This was in reaction to his having
been awakened to see the wall of his house being chiselled. The verbal exchange took
place while the two deceased were on the ground doing the fencing and the appellant was
up in his house looking out of his window (pp. 225-227, supra). According to appellant,
Fleischer's remarks caused this reaction in him: "As if, I lost my senses and unknowingly I
took the gun on the bed and unknowingly also I shot Mr. Fleischer, without realizing it, I
shot Mr. Fleischer" (p. 132, supra). As for the shooting of Rubia, appellant testified:
When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon hearing the shot, Mr.
Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer and when Mr. Fleischer fell down, Mr. Rubia ran towards the
jeep and knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep and thinking that if he will take that
firearm he will kill me, I shot at him (p. 132, supra, Emphasis supplied).
The foregoing statements of appellant were never controverted by the prosecution. They
claim, however, that the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of ownership over
the land in question, when they did the fencing that sealed off appellant's access to the
highway.
A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne by the evidence reveals that
five persons, consisting of the deceased and their three laborers, were doing the fencing
and chiselling of the walls of appellant's house. The fence they were putting up was made
of bamboo posts to which were being nailed strands of barbed wire in several layers.
Obviously, they were using tools which could be lethal weapons, such as nail and hammer,
bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers, crowbar, and other necessary gadgets. Besides, it was not
disputed that the jeep which they used in going to the place was parked just a few steps
away, and in it there was a gun leaning near the steering wheel. When the appellant woke
up to the sound of the chiselling on his walls, his first reaction was to look out of the
window. Then he saw the damage being done to his house, compounded by the fact that
his house and rice mill will be shut off from the highway by the fence once it is finished. He
therefore appealed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, to stop what they were doing
and to talk things over with him. But deceased Fleischer answered angrily with 'gademit'
and directed his men to proceed with what they were doing.
The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing
would have resulted in the further chiselling of the walls of appellant's house as well as the
closure of the access to and from his house and rice mill-which were not only imminent but
were actually in progress. There is no question, therefore, that there was aggression on
the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia was actually participating in the
fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his property
rights.
The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to
fence off the contested property, to destroy appellant's house and to shut off his ingress
and egress to his residence and the highway?
Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land
or tenements.
However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968, Civil Case no. 755 for annulment
of the order of award to Fleischer and Company was still pending in the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato. The parties could not have known that the case would be dismissed
over a year after the incident on August 22, 1968, as it was dismissed on January 23, 1970
on ground of res judicata, in view of the dismissal in 1965 (by the Court of Appeals) of Civil
Case No. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment of the award to the company, between the
same parties, which the company won by virtue of the compromise agreement in spite of
the subsequent repudiation by the settlers of said compromise agreement; and that such
1970 dismissal also carried the dismissal of the supplemental petition filed by the Republic
of the Philippines on November 28, 1968 to annul the sales patent and to cancel the
corresponding certificate of title issued to the company, on the ground that the Director of
Lands had no authority to conduct the sale due to his failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements for publication. The dismissal of the government's supplemental petition was
premised on the ground that after its filing on November 28, 1968, nothing more was done
by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines except to adopt all the evidence and
arguments of plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs.
Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favorable
judgment in Civil Case No. 755 filed on November 14, 1966 and his execution of the
contract of lease on February 21, 1967 was just to avoid trouble. This was explained by
him during cross-examination on January 21, 1970, thus:
It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we better rent the place because
even though we do not know who really owns this portion to avoid trouble. To avoid trouble
we better pay while waiting for the case because at that time, it was not known who is the
right owner of the place. So we decided until things will clear up and determine who is
really the owner, we decided to pay rentals (p. 169, t.s.n., Vol.6).
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh.10, p. 2, Defense
Exhibits) within which to vacate the land. He should have allowed appellant the peaceful
enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of chiselling the walls of his house and
closing appellant's entrance and exit to the highway.
The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right
to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if
the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be
disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles 536 and 539, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause
damage to appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was
pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The assault on appellant's
property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by law.
Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and
imminent kind (People vs. Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).
In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which he
had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property (Emphasis supplied).
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance
of self-defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal
Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his
resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his property. As a matter
of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and was
only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers. His plea for the
deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no provocation at all.
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the
elements for justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the
death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of treachery
cannot be appreciated in this case because of the presence of provocation on the part of
the deceased. As WE held earlier in People vs. Manlapaz (55 SCRA 598), the element of
a sudden unprovoked attack is therefore lacking.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, "it must clearly appear that the method of
assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to the
accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party
assailed might have made. This cannot be said of a situation where the slayer acted
instantaneously ..." (People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 481).
WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation not
sufficiently established. The only evidence presented to prove this circumstance was the
testimony of Crisanto Ibañez, 37 years old, married, resident of Maitum, South Cotabato,
and a laborer of Fleischer and Company, which may be summarized as follows:
On August 20, 1968 (two days before the incident) at about 7:00 A.M., he was drying corn
near the house of Mr. and Mrs. Mamerto Narvaez at the crossing, Maitum, South
Cotabato, when the accused and his wife talked to him. Mrs. Narvaez asked him to help
them, as he was working in the hacienda. She further told him that if they fenced their
house, there is a head that will be broken. Mamerto Narvaez added 'Noy, it is better that
you will tell Mr. Fleischer because there will be nobody who will break his head but I will be
the one.' He relayed this to Mr. Flaviano Rubia, but the latter told him not to believe as they
were only Idle threats designed to get him out of the hacienda (pp. 297-303, t.s.n., Vol. 2).
This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. As WE have consistently held, there must be
"direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim, .... it is not enough that
premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the criminal intent must be evidenced by
notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the crime" (People vs.
Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238). Besides, there must be a "showing" that the accused
premeditated the killing; that the culprit clung to their (his) premeditated act; and that there
was sufficient interval between the premeditation and the execution of the crime to allow
them (him) to reflect upon the consequences of the act" (People vs. Gida, 102 SCRA 70).
Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a laborer of the deceased Davis
Fleischer, neutralizes his credibility.
Since in the case at bar, there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill
the victims nor that the accused premeditated the killing, and clung to his premeditated act,
the trial court's conclusion as to the presence of such circumstance may not be endorsed.
Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to stop the
fencing and destroying his house and to talk things over just before the shooting.
But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, it appearing that appellant surrendered to the authorities soon after
the shooting.
Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime. The
appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and its accessibility to the highway as
well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. Not only was his house being unlawfully
violated; his business was also in danger of closing down for lack of access to the
highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his first house was
dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have so
aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing him to reach for his
shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of his rights. Considering the antecedent facts of
this case, where appellant had thirty years earlier migrated to this so-called "land of
promise" with dreams and hopes of relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle
crumbling at the hands of the deceased, his dispassionate plea going unheeded-all these
could be too much for any man-he should be credited with this mitigating circumstance.
Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not being
attended by any qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but extenuated by the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense-in view of the presence of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
appellant-and by two generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and passion
and obfuscation.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide as reclusion
temporal. Pursuant to Article 69, supra, the penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be
imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions
required to justify the same. Considering that the majority of the requirements for defense
of property are present, the penalty may be lowered by two degrees, i.e., to prision
correccional And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same may further be reduced by one
degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the presence of two mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstance.
The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. In the case of Zulueta vs. Pan
American World Airways (43 SCRA 397), the award for moral damages was reduced
because the plaintiff contributed to the gravity of defendant's reaction. In the case at bar,
the victims not only contributed but they actually provoked the attack by damaging
appellant's properties and business. Considering appellant's standing in the community,
being married to a municipal councilor, the victims' actuations were apparently designed to
humiliate him and destroy his reputation. The records disclose that his wife, councilor
Feliza Narvaez, was also charged in these two cases and detained without bail despite the
absence of evidence linking her to the killings. She was dropped as a defendant only upon
motion of the prosecution dated October 31, 1968. (p. 14, CFI rec. of Crim. Case No.
1816), but acted upon on November 4, 1968 (p. 58, CFI rec. of Criminal Case No. 1815).
Moreover, these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on the part of Fleischer and
Company, despite its extensive landholdings in a Central Visayan province, to extend its
accumulation of public lands to the resettlement areas of Cotabato. Since it had the
capability-financial and otherwise-to carry out its land accumulation scheme, the lowly
settlers, who uprooted their families from their native soil in Luzon to take advantage of the
government's resettlement program, but had no sufficient means to fight the big
landowners, were the ones prejudiced. Thus, the moral and material suffering of appellant
and his family deserves leniency as to his civil liability.
Furthermore, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires a person convicted of prision
correccional or arrests mayor and fine who has no property with which to meet his civil
liabilities to serve a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day for each P 2.50.
However, the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 5465 on April 21, 1969 made
the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of the damage
caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Considering
that Republic Act 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may
be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES, MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY TWO (2)
GENERIC MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND
OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS
HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4) MONTHS OF
ARRESTO MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF HEIRS OF DAVIS FLEISCHER
AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND (P 4,000.00) PESOS,
WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT ANY AWARD FOR MORAL
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON AUGUST
22,1968, HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera,
Escolin Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., is on leave.
Plana, J., in the result.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful aggression on
persons, not property Plana, J., in the result.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
While I agree with the order to release the appellant, I am constrained to dissent in part. It
is true that Art. 429, Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that the owner or legal
possessor of a thing may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or
prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. It
seems to me, however, that an attack on the person defending his property is an
indispensable element where an accused pleads self-defense but what is basically
defended is only property.
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of property
can only be invoked when it is coupled with some form of attack on the person of one
entrusted with said property. The defense of property, whether complete or incomplete, to
be available in prosecutions for murder or homicide must be coupled with an attack by the
one getting the property on the person defending it.
In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence that an attack was attempted,
much less made upon the person of appellant. The mere utterance "No, gademit proceed,
go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression which entitles appellant to the pela of self-
defense. I agree with the majority opinion that the crime is homicide but without any
privileged mitigating circumstance.
Therefore, since the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) homicides,
mitigated by the two generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
obfuscation, without any aggravating circumstance, maximum the sentence the appellant
should have served was prision mayor plus the indemnification to each group of heirs of
Davis Fleischer and of Flamiano Rubia of the sum of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos,
without subsidiary imprisonment, but without any award for moral damages and attorney's
fees.
Considering that appellant has been under detention for almost fourteen (14) years now
since August 22, 1968, he has served the penalty and should be released.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful aggression on
persons, not property Plana, J., in the result.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
While I agree with the order to release the appellant, I am constrained to dissent in part. It
is true that Art. 429, Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that the owner or legal
possessor of a thing may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or
prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. It
seems to me, however, that an attack on the person defending his property is an
indispensable element where an accused pleads self-defense but what is basically
defended is only property.
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of property
can only be invoked when it is coupled with some form of attack on the person of one
entrusted with said property. The defense of property, whether complete or incomplete, to
be available in prosecutions for murder or homicide must be coupled with an attack by the
one getting the property on the person defending it.
In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence that an attack was attempted,
much less made upon the person of appellant. The mere utterance "No, gademit proceed,
go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression which entitles appellant to the pela of self-
defense. I agree with the majority opinion that the crime is homicide but without any
privileged mitigating circumstance.
Therefore, since the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) homicides,
mitigated by the two generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
obfuscation, without any aggravating circumstance, maximum the sentence the appellant
should have served was prision mayor plus the indemnification to each group of heirs of
Davis Fleischer and of Flamiano Rubia of the sum of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos,
without subsidiary imprisonment, but without any award for moral damages and attorney's
fees.
Considering that appellant has been under detention for almost fourteen (14) years now
since August 22, 1968, he has served the penalty and should be released.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123918. December 9, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AUGUSTO LORETO RINGOR,
JR., accused-appellant.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] ated November 13, 1995 of Branch 6 of the
Regional Trial Court in Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr.
guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death in
Criminal Case No. 13102-R, also guilty of illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No.
1866 in Criminal Case No. 13100-R for and disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 13102, the Court Finds (sic) the accused Augusto Loreto Ringor
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 6, RA 7659, qualified by
Treachery and as further qualified by the use of an unlicensed firearm and hereby
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of Death; to indemnify the heirs of deceased
Marcelino Florida, Jr., the sum of P50,000.00 for his death and the sum of P100,000.00 as
Moral damages for his death, both indemnification being without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
2. In Criminal Case No. 13100-R, the Court Finds (sic) accused Augusto Loreto Ringor
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 1 PD 1866 (Illegal
Possession of firearm and ammunitions) as charged in the Information and hereby
sentences him, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an imprisonment ranging
from 17 years 4 months and I day as Minimum to 20 years as Maximum and to pay the
costs.
The subject gun, caliber .38 (Paltik) bearing Serial Number 853169 (Exh. A) being the
subject of the offense is hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State.
The accused Augusto Loreto Ringor is entitled to be credited in the service of his sentence
four fifth (4/5) of his preventive imprisonment in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Filed on June 28, 1994, the Informations against accused-appellant, alleges:
In Criminal Case No. 13102-R
That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with
a Caliber 38 handgun paltick with Serial Number 853169 and with intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot MARCELINO
BUSLAY FLORIDA, JR. thereby inflicting upon the latter hypovolemic shock secondary to
massive hemorrhage; multiple gunshot wounds of the liver, stomach, small intestine and
mesentric blood vessels, which injuries directly caused his death.
That the qualifying circumstance of TREACHERY attended the commission of the crime
when the accused suddenly attacked victim and shot him several times at the back, with
the use of a handgun, thus employing means, methods of forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
and in Criminal Case No. 13100-R
That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and carry outside of his residence, a firearm,
Caliber .38 revolver (Paltik) bearing Serial Number 853169, without any legal authority or
permit from any government official or authority concerned, in violation of the above cited
provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
With the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entering a plea of Not Guilty upon
arraignment, a joint trial of the two cases ensued.
The inculpatory facts and circumstances sued upon are succinctly summarized in the
Appellees Brief as follows:
On June 23, 1994, at around 6:00 P.M.(sic), Fely Batanes, a waitress at Peoples
Restaurant located at Kalantiao St., Baguio City, saw appellant Ringor and his two
companions enter the restaurant. (Tsn, December 8, 1994, p. 4). After seating themselves,
the group ordered a bottle of gin (ibid., p. 6). Minutes later, appellant approached one of
the tables where Florida, the restaurants cook was drinking beer.Without any warning,
appellant pulled Floridas hair and poked a knife on the latters throat. Florida stood up and
pleaded with appellant not to harm him (ibid., p. 7). Appellant relented and released his
grip on Florida. Thereafter, he left the restaurant together with his companions. However, a
few minutes latter he was back (ibid, p.8).
Appellant brandished a gun and menacingly entered the restaurant. Not encountering any
resistance, he thus proceeded to the kitchen where Florida worked (ibid). Stealthily
approaching Florida from behind, appellant fired six successive shots at Florida who fell
down (Ibid., p. 9). His evil deed accomplished, appellant left the kitchen and fled (ibid).
Appellant was chased by a man who while running, shouted at onlookers that the person
he was running after was armed and had just killed somebody. Alerted, SPO2 Fernandez,
who was then in the vicinity, went into action and nabbed appellant. He frisked appellant
and recovered from him a Paltik revolver, caliber. 38, with Serial Number 853169 (Exh.
A). He checked the revolvers cylinder and found six empty cartridges (Exhs. T to T-6). He
noted that it smelled of gunpowder. He and PO1 Ortega turned over appellant and the
confiscated firearm to the Investigation Division of the Baguio Police and then executed a
Joint Affidavit of Arrest (Exhibit O). On the same night, Fely Batanes gave her sworn
statement (Exhibit E) to the Baguio Police wherein she positively identified appellant as the
assailant.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
NBI Forensic Chemist Ms. Carina Javier found both hands of appellant positive for nitrates
as stated in her Chemist Report No. C-94-22. She conducted a microscopic chemical
examination on the subject firearm and found that the gun was fired within one week prior
to June 27, 1994.
Elmer Nelson Piedad, Ballistician of the Firearm Investigation Division, NBI, Manila, tested
and concluded that the slugs recovered from the victim were fired from appellants
firearm. Upon verification from the Firearms Explosive division, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, it was found that appellant is not a licensed firearm holder nor, was the subject
firearm duly registered with the said office (Exh. A).[5]
The autopsy conducted by Dr. John Tinoyan on the cadaver of the deceased yielded a
Necropsy Report, which states:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body of a male, 1.66 m. height, medium built, with complete rigor mortis, lividity well
developed on the dependent parts, cloudy cornea and dilated pupils with very pale
papebral conjunctive.
Gunshot wounds: GSW no.1 measuring 10 x 10 mm. serrated edges, positive powder
burns located at the left mid clavicular line, posterior, 2 inches below the shoulder. It was
directed downward towards the mid-body, penetrating the skin. (sic) soft tissue, middle 3rd
of the 3rd rib, the upper and lower lobes of the left lung to the diaphragm, through and
through the stomach, lacerating the superior mesentric vessels, perforating the small
intestine then lodged at the superior surface of the urinary bladder (slug was recovered
marked no. 1)
GSW no.2 measures 8 mm. diameter, positive powder burns, located on the right shoulder
near the s. joint posteriorly, penetrating the skin, soft tissue, then lodged at the surface of
the fractured surgical neck of the humorous (sic) (slug recovered). Marked no. 2.
GSW no. 3 measures 8 mm. Diameter, positive powder burns, located on the right
shoulder posteriorly near the joint penetrating the skin, soft tissues, and the head of the
Humorous, (sic) then dislodged form the same entry point.
GSW no. 4 measures 8 x 10 mm, oval shaped, with abrasion superiorly located at the
anterior left parasternal line at the level of the 6th ICS. It was directed downward towards
the posterior of the body, penetrating the skin, soft tissue, the left lobe of the liver with
partial avulsion, then perforating the stomach through and though the duodenum lumbar
muscle then lodged underneath the skin, (1) paravertebral, level of L3 (slug recovered
marked no. 4).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
HYPOVOLEMIC SHOCK SECONDARY TO MASSIVE HEMORRHAGE; MULTIPLE
GUNSHOT WOUND(S) OF THE LIVER, STOMACH, SMALL INTESTINE AND
MESENTRIC BLOOD VESSELS.Multiple Gunshot Wound(s) of the body. [6]
Accused-appellant admitted shooting the victim but theorized that he acted in self-
defense. As embodied in the Appellants Brief, the defense version runs thus:
3.01 On June 23, 1994, at a little after five oclock in the afternoon, appellant, together with
two (2) other companions, entered the Peoples Restaurant in Baguio City to order
drinks. They sat at a table next to another then occupied by Marcelino B. Florida, Jr.
(Florida) and a woman companion (TSN, Testimony of Augusto Loreto G. Ringor, Jr., May
4, 1995, pp. 3-6).
3.02 Soon after receiving their orders, appellants companion, Ramon Fernandez, stood up
and approached Florida to inquire about his (Fernandez) brother, Cesar. Florida angrily
responded to the query and said, Putang ina ninyo! anong pakialam ko diyan!
3.03 A quarrel thereafter ensued between Fernandez and Florida prompting the appellant
to intervene and pacify Fernandez. When Fernandez drew out a gun from his waist,
appellant immediately seized the same directing his friend to leave the restaurant before
he started hurting other people with his gun. No sooner had Fernandez stepped out,
however, Florida, armed with a bolo, came charging in from the kitchen and headed
towards the appellant. (Ibid, pp. 6 - 7)
3.04 Surprised, appellant shot Florida with the gun he was holding just as the latter was
about to hit him with the bolo. Thereafter, appellant put the gun on the table and walked
out of the restaurant. Once already outside the restaurant, appellants other companion,
Virgilio, followed him and handed to him the gun he (appellant) left at the table. He then
proceeded to surrender the gun and report the incident at the nearest police station. (Ibid,
pp. 8 - 9)
3.05 Before appellant could reach the police station, however, appellant was already
arrested by off-duty policeman who brought him back to the Peoples Restaurant. Appellant
was thereafter incarcerated at the Baguio City Police Station. (Ibid, pp. 10 - 12)[7]
On November 13, 1995, the trial court handed down the decision under automatic
review. Accused-appellant contends that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT FOR SIMPLE ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER AN
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE OF 17 YEARS AND 1 DAY AS MINIMUM TO 20 YEARS
AS MAXIMUM.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF MURDER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO DEATH
ON THE GROUNDS THAT: (i) THE CHARGE OF MURDER WAS NOT PROVED BY THE
PROSECUTION; AND (ii) ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT MURDER WAS COMMITTED
BY APPELLANT, THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY FOR THE OFFENSE IS RECLUSION
PERPETUA THERE BEING NO AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE TO RAISE THE
PENALTY TO DEATH.[8]
Well-settled is the rule that in interposing self-defense, the offender admits authorship of
the killing. The onus probandi is thus shifted to him to prove the elements of self-defense
and that the killing was justified;[9] otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is
inescapable. Concomitantly, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on
the weakness of the prosecutions evidence.[10]
For self-defense to prosper, it must be established that: (1) there was unlawful aggression
by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression was
reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.[11]
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. The allegation that the victim allegedly went out of the kitchen armed with a
bolo, and was about to hack him (accused-appellant) who was then at an almost prone
lying position on the table he was occupying,[12] is a self-serving and unconvincing
statement which did not in anyway constitute the requisite quantum of proof for unlawful
aggression. Prosecution witness Fely Batanes, a waitress in the restaurant where the
shooting incident occurred, was firm in her declaration that the victim was in the kitchen
unarmed[13]hen the accused-appellant shot him. The victim had no weapon or bolo. He
was neither threatening to attack nor in any manner manifesting any aggressive act which
could have imperiled accused-appellants safety and well-being.
No improper motive having been shown on the part of Fely Batanes to testify falsely
against accused-appellant or to implicate him in the commission of the crime, the logical
conclusion is that there was no such improper motive and her testimony is worthy of full
faith and credit.[14]
What is more, the testimony of Fely Batanes is buttressed by the fact that immediately
after the incident, the body of the victim was found lying in the kitchen and not outside;
thus weakening further the theory of accused-appellant that he shot the victim while they
were at the dining area.[15]
Then too, the nature, location and number of gunshot wounds inflicted on the deceased
belie accused-appellants theory of self-defense.[16] The deceased sustained three gun shot
wounds on the back and one in front. Dr. John Tinoyan, who conducted the autopsy on the
cadaver of the victim, testified that the gunshot wound on the frontal portion of the victims
body showed a downward trajectory of the bullet on his chest, penetrating the liver,
perforating the stomach down to the small intestine, and then lodged underneath the
skin.[17] Verily, such finding negates the claim of accused-appellant that he shot the victim
while he was at an almost prone lying position and the victim was standing in front of him
about to strike with a bolo. If this were true, the trajectory of the bullet should have been
upward or better still, it should have been at the level at which the gun was fired while he
(accused-appellant) was in a prone lying position.
Rather telling are the three gunshot wounds on the back of the victim, which wounds
showed traces of gunpowder which, according to Dr. Tinoyan, indicated that the weapon
used was at a distance of less than one meter.[18] Evidently, accused-appellant stealthily
approached the victim from behind and fired at him six successive shots, four of which hit
him, to ensure his death.[19] If he shot the victim merely to defend himself, there would
have been no cause for accused-appellant to pump several bullets into the body of the
victim.
In light of the foregoing, the imputation of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
cannot be believed. Absent the element of unlawful aggression by the deceased, there can
be no self-defense, complete or incomplete. If there was no unlawful aggression, there
was nothing to prevent or repel and the second and third requisites of self-defense would
have no basis.[20]
The Court a quo properly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of treachery which
qualified the crime to murder. It was clearly established that the accused-appellant fired six
successive shots on the victim, suddenly, without warning, and from behind, giving the
victim no chance to flee or to prepare for his defense or to put up the least resistance to
such sudden assault. There is treachery when the means, manner or method of attack
employed by the offender offered no risk to himself from any defensive or retaliatory act
which the victim might have taken.[21]
All things studiedly considered and viewed in proper perspective, the mind of the Court can
rest easy on a finding that accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and did not act in self-defense.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for the crime of murder. When, as in this case, neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance is attendant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua has to be
applied,[22] in accordance with Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearms under
P. D. No. 1866, it was held in the case of People vs. Molina[23] nd reiterated in the recent
case of People vs. Ronaldo Valdez,[24] that in cases where murder or homicide is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate conviction for
the crime of illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments
introduced by Republic Act No. 8294. Thereunder, the use of unlicensed firearm in murder
or homicide is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance in the murder or
homicide and no longer as a separate offense. Furthermore, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearms shall be imposed provided that no other crime is committed. [25] In
other words, where murder or homicide was committed, the penalty for illegal possession
of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating
circumstance.[26]
It bears stressing, however, that the dismissal of the present case for illegal possession of
firearm should not be misinterpreted to mean that there can no longer be any prosecution
for the offense of illegal possession of firearms. In general, all pending cases involving
illegal possession of firearms should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes
expressly provided in R. A. No. 8294 are involved (murder or homicide, under Section 1,
and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d etat, under Section 3). [27]
Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, where the new law is favorable to the
accused, it has to be applied retroactively. Thus, insofar as it spares accused-appellant a
separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 has to be
given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. 13100-R.
On the matter of the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in the
commission of murder or homicide, the trial court erred in appreciating the same to qualify
to death the penalty for the murder committed by accused-appellant. It should be noted
that at the time accused-appellant perpetrated the offense, the unlicensed character of a
firearm used in taking the life of another was not yet an aggravating circumstance in
homicide or murder; to wit:
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or murder with
death if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider
such use merely as a qualifying circumstance and not as an offense. That could not have
been the intention of the lawmaker because the term penalty in the subject provision is
obviously meant to be the penalty for illegal possession of firearm and not the penalty for
for homicide or murder. We explicitly stated in Tac-an:

There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating

circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information charging homicide or
muder, the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to
increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to
death (or reclusion perpetua under the 1987 Constitution).The essential point is that the
unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in destroying human life or
committing some other crime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating circumstances
set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.

A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an unlicensed firearm as a

qualifying circumstance.[28] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, before R.A. No. 8294 (which took effect on July 6, 1997) made the use of unlicensed
firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, the penalty for the murder
committed by accused-appellant on June 23, 1994 was not death, as erroneously imposed
by the trial court. There was yet no such aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm to raise the penalty for murder from reclusion perpetua to death, at the time of
commission of the crime.

The amendatory law making the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating

circumstance in murder or homicide, cannot be applied here because the said provision of
R.A. No. 8294 is not favorable to accused-appellant, lest it becomes an ex post
facto law.[29]

WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 13102-R is AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It is understood that the civil liabilities imposed
below are UPHELD.

Criminal Case No. 13100-R instituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866 is
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 100210. April 1, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as
Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and ANTONIO A.
TUJAN, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
Is the Court of Appeals, in affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court, correct in ruling
that Subversion is the main offense in a charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, and that,
therefore, the said charge should be quashed in view of a previous charge
of Subversion under R.A. No. 1700, as amended by P.D. No. 885, against the same
accused pending in another court?
Stated differently, is the accused charged with the same offense in both cases, which
would justify the dismissal of the second charge on the ground of double jeopardy?
This is the pith issue presented before us in this appeal by certiorari interposed by the
People under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking a review of the decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth Division) dated May 27, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24273,
entitled THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus HON. OSCAR B.
PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and ANTONIO A.
TUJAN, Respondents.
The record discloses the following antecedent facts:
As early as 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with Subversion under
Republic Act No. 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law), as amended, before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch 45), National Capital Region, docketed as Criminal Case No.
64079.[2] As a consequence thereof, a warrant for his arrest was issued on July 29,
1983,[3] but it remained unserved as he could not be found.
Almost seven (7) years thereafter, or on June 5, 1990, Antonio Tujan was arrested on the
basis of the warrant of arrest in the subversion case.[4] When arrested, an unlicensed .38
caliber special revolver and six (6) rounds of live ammunition were found in his
possession.[5]
Consequently, on June 14, 1990, Antonio Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148), docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1789. The Information reads:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1990, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being a member of a communist party of the Philippines, and its front organization, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody, in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, a
special edition ARMSCOR PHILS. caliber .38 special revolver with Serial No. 1026387 and
with six (6) live ammunitions, without first securing the necessary license or permit thereof
from competent government authority.[6]
The above Information recommended no bail for Antonio Tujan, which recommendation
was approved by the trial court in an Order dated June 19, 1990.[7] The same order also
directed the continued detention of Antonio Tujan at MIG 15 of the Intelligence Service of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), Bago Bantay, Quezon City, while his case
is pending.
On June 26, 1990, Antonio Tujan, through counsel, filed a motion [8] invoking his right to a
preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court
and praying that his arraignment be held in abeyance until the preliminary investigation is
terminated.
However, on June 27, 1990, during the hearing of Antonio Tujans motion for preliminary
investigation, his counsel withdrew the motion since he would file a motion to quash the
Information, for which reason counsel requested a period of twenty (20) days to do
so. This was granted by the trial court on that same day. [9]
On July 16, 1990, Antonio Tujan did file the motion to quash [10] the Information in Criminal
Case No. 1789 on the ground that he has been previously in jeopardy of being convicted
of the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 64079 (for subversion) of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch 45). The said ground is based on Sections 3 (h) and 7, Rule 117
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In support of the motion, Antonio Tujan contends
that common crimes such as illegal possession of firearms and ammunition should actually
be deemed absorbed in subversion,[11] citing the cases of Misolas vs. Panga, et al. (G. R.
No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648) and Enrile vs. Salazar, et al. (G. R. No.
92163, June 5, 1990, 186 SCRA 217). Antonio Tujan then avers that the present case is
the twin prosecution of the earlier subversion case and, therefore, he is entitled to invoke
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. [12]
The petitioner opposed[13] the motion to quash, arguing that Antonio Tujan does not stand
in jeopardy of being convicted a second time because: (a) he has not even been arraigned
in the subversion case, and (b) the offense charged against him in Criminal Case No.
64079 is for Subversion, punishable under Republic Act No. 1700; while the present case
is for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion,
punishable under a different law (Presidential Decree No. 1866). Moreover, petitioner
contends that Antonio Tujans reliance on the Misolas and Enrile cases is
misplaced.[14] Tujan merely relies on the dissenting opinions in the Misolas case. Also,
the Enrile case which involved a complex crime of rebellion with murder is inapplicable to
the instant case which is not a complex offense. Thus, the absorption rule as held
applicable in the Enrile ruling has no room for application in the present case because
(illegal) possession of firearm and ammunition is not a necessary means of committing the
offense of subversion, nor is subversion a necessary means of committing the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. [15]
The trial court, in an order dated October 12, 1990, granted the motion to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 1789, the dispositive portion of the order reading:
WHEREFORE, the motion to quash the information is hereby GRANTED, but only in so far
as the accused may be placed in jeopardy or in danger of being convicted or acquitted of
the crime of Subversion and as a consequence the Information is hereby quashed and the
case dismissed without prejudice to the filing of Illegal Possession of Firearm.
SO ORDERED.[16]
It is best to quote the disquisition of the respondent court in quashing the information and
dismissing the case:
xxxxxxxxx
In other words, the main offense the accused is being charged in this case is also
Subversion considering that the alleged Illegal Possession of the Firearm and
Ammunition is only in furtherance thereof.
Now, subversion being a continuing offense as has been previously held by the Supreme
Court, the fact that the accused has been previously charged of Subversion before another
court before the institution of this instant case is just a continuing offense of his former
charge or that his acts constituting subversion is a continuation of the acts he committed
before.
The court therefore cannot subscribe to the position taken by the prosecution that this case
is very different from the other case and that double jeopardy will attach in this particular
case.
This court agrees with the position taken by the defense that double jeopardy will attach to
the accusation of subversion, punishable now under Republic Act 1700, as Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court particularly Section 1 thereof, provides:
Time to move to quash- At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to
quash the complaint or information.(1a)
In other words, there is no necessity that the accused should be arraigned first before he
can move to quash the information. It is before he pleads which the accused did in this
case.
On the other submissions by the prosecution, that the possession of firearms and
ammunitions is not a necessary means of committing the offense of subversion or vice
versa, then if the court follows such argument, there could be no offense of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in furtherance of Subversion, for even the
prosecution admits also that in subversion which is an offense involving propaganda,
counter propaganda, a battle of the hearts and mind of the people does not need the
possession or use of firearms and ammunitions.
The prosecution even admits and to quote:
The defense of double jeopardy, while unquestionably available to the accused, had not
been clearly shown to be invokable(sic) at this point in time.
But the rule says otherwise as previously stated as provided for under Section 1 of Rule
117 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, if ever the accused is caught in possession of a firearm and ammunition
which is separate and distinct from the crime of subversion and is not a necessary
ingredient thereof and the court believed so, the prosecution will have to file another
information as they may wish. The court therefore has to grant the motion to quash
on the aforestated grounds, subject to Section 5 of Rule 117, considering that the
only offense to which the accused in this case may be placed in jeopardy is
Subversion and not Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions.
The prosecution may file any information as warranted within ten (10) days from receipt of
this order otherwise the court will order the release of the accused, unless he is in custody
for some other offense.[17](Emphasis ours)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[18] was also denied in an order dated December 28,
1990.[19]
The petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 24273. However, the appellate court found that the trial court
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
quashing the questioned Information. In dismissing the petition, the appellate court, in its
decision dated May 27, 1991, basically reiterated the aforequoted ruling of the trial court.
Petitioner now comes to this Court, claiming that: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals
is not in accord with the law and applicable jurisprudence; and (2) it was deprived of due
process to prosecute and prove its case against private respondent Antonio Tujan in
Criminal Case No. 1789.
We agree with the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals considered as duplicitous the Information for violation of P.D. No.
1866 filed against private respondent Antonio Tujan. It ruled:
The foregoing information (for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in
Furtherance of Subversion) filed before the Makati court shows that the main case is
subversion considering that there is an allegation that the alleged illegal possession of
firearms was made in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion. Also, the information alleged likewise that the accused is a member of a
communist party of the Philippines and its front organization. Basically, the information
refers to the crime of Subversion qualified by Illegal Possession of Firearms. x x x.[20]
The ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, under which Antonio Tujan is charged in
Criminal Case No. 1789 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148), provides
as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture
of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearms, the penalty of
death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection
with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be
imposed.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any
public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow
any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any
person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor. (Emphasis ours)
The above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1866 are plain and simple. Under the first
paragraph of Section 1, the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm or
ammunition is the crime itself which carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The third paragraph of the same Section makes
the use of said firearm and ammunition in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection
with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion a circumstance
to increase the penalty to death. Thus, the allegation in the Information in Criminal Case
No. 1789 that the unlicensed firearm found in the possession of Antonio Tujan, a member
of the communist party of the Philippines and its front organization, was used in
furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion does not
charge him with the separate and distinct crime of Subversion in the same
Information, but simply describes the mode or manner by which the violation of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 was committed[21] so as to qualify the penalty to death.
There is, therefore, only one offense charged in the questioned information, that is, the
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by its being used in furtherance
of subversion.[22] There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866, specifically Section 1 thereof, which
decrees categorically or by implication that the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or
subversion are the very acts that are being penalized. This is clear from the title of the law
itself which boldly indicates the specific acts penalized under it:
CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL
POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF
FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE
MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING
STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT
PURPOSES. (Emphasis ours)
On the other hand, the previous subversion charge against Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case
No. 64079, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45), is based on a different
law, that is, Republic Act No. 1700, as amended. Section 3 thereof penalizes any person
who knowingly, wilfully and by overt act affiliates with, becomes or remains a member of a
subversive association or organization x x x. Section 4 of said law further penalizes such
member [of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any
subversive association] (who) takes up arms against the Government. Thus, in the present
case, private respondent Antonio Tujan could be charged either under P.D. No. 1866 or
R.A. No. 1700,[23] or both.
This leads us to the issue of whether or not private respondent Antonio Tujan was placed
in double jeopardy with the filing of the second Information for Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion.
We rule in the negative.
Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Emphasis ours)
Complementing the above constitutional provision, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged,
or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
x x x x x x x x x.
The right of an accused against double jeopardy is a matter which he may raise in a
motion to quash to defeat a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The pertinent
provision of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
the following grounds:
xxxxxxxxx
(h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted,
or acquitted of the offense charged. (2a) (Emphasis ours)
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused,
the following requisites must have obtained in the first criminal action: (a) a valid complaint
or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; [24] and
(d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. [25]
Suffice it to say that in the present case, private respondents motion to quash filed in the
trial court did not actually raise the issue of double jeopardy simply because it had not
arisen yet. It is noteworthy that the private respondent has not even been arraigned in the
first criminal action for subversion. Besides, as earlier discussed, the two criminal charges
against private respondent are not of the same offense as required by Section 21, Article
III of the Constitution.
It is clear from the foregoing, that the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is not in
accordance with the law and jurisprudence and thus should be reversed.
While we hold that both the subversion charge under R.A. No. 1700, as amended, and the
one for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion under
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, can co-exist, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No.
7636 on September 22, 1992, totally repealing R.A. No. 1700, as amended, has
substantially changed the complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the said repealing
law being favorable to the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent,
should be given retroactive effect.[26]
Although this legal effect of R.A. No. 7636 on private-respondents case has never been
raised as an issue by the parties obviously because the said law came out only several
months after the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated and while
the present petition is pending with this Court we should nonetheless fulfill our duty as a
court of justice by applying the law to whomsoever is benefited by it regardless of whether
or not the accused or any party has sought the application of the beneficent provisions of
the repealing law.[27]
That R.A. No. 7636 should apply retroactively to accused-private respondent is beyond
question. The repeal by said law of R.A. No. 1700, as amended, was categorical, definite
and absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal. The legislative intent of totally
abrogating the old anti-subversion law is clear. Thus, it would be illogical for the trial courts
to try and sentence the accused-private respondent for an offense that no longer exists. [28]
The subversion charge against accused-private respondent Antonio A. Tujan in Criminal
Case No. 64079 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45, is hereby DISMISSED.
The other Information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of
subversion against the same accused in Criminal Case No. 1789 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 148, is DEEMED AMENDED to Simple Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition. The accused-appellant is hereby ordered RELEASED
IMMEDIATELY from detention for the reason stated above, unless he is being detained for
any other offense.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No pronouncement as to costs.

As early as 1935, we ruled in People vs. Tamayo:[29] SO ORDERED.

There is no question that at common law and in America a much more favorable attitude
towards the accused exists relative to statutes that have been repealed than has been
adopted here. Our rule is more in conformity with the Spanish doctrine, but even in
Spain, where the offense ceases to be criminal, prosecution cannot be had. (1
Pacheco Commentaries, 296) (Emphasis ours)

Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which was
penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense is
obliterated.[30] It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the
courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violation of the old
law prior to the repeal.[31]

With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-
private respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed.

As regards the other charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by
subversion, this charge should be amended to simple illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition since, as earlier discussed, subversion is no longer a crime.

Moreover, the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is now
bailable under Republic Act No. 8294 which was enacted on June 6, 1997. R.A. No. 8294
has amended Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, by eliminating the provision in
said P.D. that if the unlicensed firearm is used in furtherance of subversion, the penalty of
death shall be imposed.[32] Under the new law (R.A. No. 8294), the penalty prescribed for
simple illegal possession of firearm (.38 caliber) is now reduced to prision correccional in
its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00).[33] The reduced penalty of imprisonment - which is four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years - entitles the accused-private respondent to
bail. Considering, however, that the accused-private respondent has been detained since
his arrest on June 5, 1990 up to the present (as far as our record has shown), or more
than seven (7) years now, his immediate release is in order. This is so because even if he
were convicted for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the length of his detention
while his case is pending has already exceeded the penalty prescribed by the new law.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 27, 1991, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 24273, including the orders dated October 12, 1990 and December 28, 1990
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148), National Capital Region, in Criminal
Case No. 1789, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
[G.R. No. 149453. May 28, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., vs. PANFILO M. LACSON.
RESOLUTION
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated August 24, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034.[2] The
said Decision of the appellate court granted respondent Lacsons Second Amended
Petition for Prohibition with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,
(1) assailing the Order issued by Judge Herminia Pasamba of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, that allowed the continuation of the re-investigation of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or the Kuratong Baleleng cases; and (2)
praying for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112 entitled
People of the Philippines v. Panfilo Lacson, et al. pending before Branch 81 of the RTC of
Quezon City.
The following appear in the records of this case:
(1) On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a
press conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
(KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that day.[3]
(2) On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes
had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a rub-out or summary
execution and not a shootout.[4]
(3) In an affidavit he executed the following day, delos Reyes stated, among others, that
he was part of a composite police team called the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Force Group (ABRITFG) composed of elements of the National Capital Region
Command (NCRC) and headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffic
Management Command, headed by Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.;
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M.
Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de
Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed by Chief Superintendent
Romeo Acop. Delos Reyes claimed that the police team arrested the eleven (11) gang
members in early morning of May 18, 1995at the gangs safe house in Superville
Subdivision, Paraaque; that after their arrest, the gang members were made to board two
vans, their hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame where a
decision to summarily execute them was made, and later to Commonwealth Avenue where
they were shot to death by elements of ABRITFG.[5]
(4) On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an
affidavit corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes. Dela Cruz claimed that she
was with delos Reyes from the time the eleven (11) KBG members were arrested up to the
time they were killed in Commonwealth Avenue. [6]
(5) On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed an affidavit stating
that he was present when the KBG members were arrested in Superville Subdivision. [7]
(6) On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation,
filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers
and personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder
charges against the same officers and personnel. [8]
(7) Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then created a panel of investigators to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the murder charges. The panel was headed by Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs Bienvenido Blancaflor. On October 20, 1995, the panel
issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of the charges for lack of probable cause.
(8) Ombudsman Desierto referred the resolution for review by a panel composed of Over-
all Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa as head, and Special Prosecutor Leonardo
Tamayo and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera as members. On November 20,
1995, the review panel reversed the Blancaflor resolution and found probable cause for the
prosecution of multiple murder charges against twenty-six (26) officers and personnel of
ABRITFG.[9]
(9) On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eleven (11)
Informations for MURDER, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, against
respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of
them were charged as principals.[10] The following appear to be the victims: Meleubren
Sorronda in Crim. Case No. 23047; Welbor Elcamel in Crim. Case No. 23048; Carlito Alap-
ap in Crim. Case No. 23049; Jevy Redillas in Crim. Case No. 23050; Ray Abalora in Crim.
Case No. 23051; Joel Amora in Crim. Case No. 23052; Alex Neri in Crim. Case No. 23053;
Rolando Siplon in Crim. Case No. 23054; Manuel Montero in Crim. Case No. 23055;
Sherwin Abalora in Crim. Case No. 23056; and Pacifico Montero in Crim. Case No. 23057.
(10) Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the
Ombudsman for reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended Informations were filed
against the same twenty-six (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was
downgraded from principal to accessory. Arraignment then followed and respondent
entered a plea of not guilty.[11]
(11) With the downgrading of charges against him, respondent Lacson questioned the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear the criminal cases as none of the principal
accused in the Amended Informations was a government official with a Salary Grade (SG)
27 or higher, citing Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975 then prevailing. Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court. [12]
(12) The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the transfer.
Pending resolution of the motion, R. A. No. 8249 took effect on February 23, 1997,
amending R. A. No. 7975. In particular, the amendatory law deleted the word principal in
Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
include all cases where at least one of the accused, whether principal, accomplice or
accessory, is a government official of Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher. The amendment is
made applicable to all cases pending in any court in which trial has not yet begun as of the
date of its approval.[13]
(13) In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,[14] respondent Lacson challenged the
constitutionality of the amendment and contended that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the criminal cases. This Court, while dismissing the constitutional
challenge, nonetheless ordered the transfer of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial
Court on the ground that the Amended Informations for murder failed to indicate that the
offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official
functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249.
(14) Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 were raffled off to Branch 81 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., and re-docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689.
(15) Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes,
Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted their affidavits which
implicated respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members.
On the other hand, private complainants Myrna Abalora, [15] Leonora Amora,[16] Nenita Alap-
ap,[17] Imelda Montero,[18] Margarita Redillas,[19] Carmelita Elcamel[20] and Rolando
Siplon[21] also executed their respective affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no
longer interested to prosecute these cases.[22]
(16) Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent
Lacson, filed five separate but identical motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance
the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of
probable cause.
(17) The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended parties
were notified of the hearing on March 22, 1999[23] held by Judge Agnir to resolve the
motions filed by respondent Lacson and the other accused.
(18) During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do not appear to
have been presented on the witness stand. In their stead, Atty. Godwin Valdez testified
that he assisted them in preparing their affidavits of desistance and that he signed said
affidavits as witness. On the other hand, Atty. Aurora Bautista of the Philippine Lawyers
League presented the affidavits of recantation of prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los
Reyes, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez. Only prosecution witness Corazon de la Cruz
testified to affirm her affidavit.[24]
(19) On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution[25] dismissing Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, as follows:
As already seen, the documents attached to the Informations in support thereof have been
rendered meaningless, if not absurd, with the recantation of the principal prosecution
witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants. There is no more evidence to
show that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof.
Following the doctrine above-cited, there is no more reason to hold the accused for trial
and further expose them to an open and public accusation. It is time to write finis to these
cases and lay to rest the ghost of the incident of May 18, 1995 so that all those involved---
the accused, the prosecution witnesses and the private complainants alike--- may get on
with their lives.
The Court is not unmindful of the admonition in the recent case of People vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999) where the Supreme Court said that the
general rule is that if the Information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest
error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts
should not dismiss it for want of evidence, because evidentiary matters should be
presented and heard during the trial, and that the ruling in Allado vs. Diokno is an
exception to the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly
shown to exist.
This Court holds that the circumstances in the case at bench clearly make an exception to
the general rule.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds no probable cause for the
issuance of the warrants of arrest against the accused or to hold them for trial.
Accordingly, the Informations in the above-numbered cases are hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[26]
(20) On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of
Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos
regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of
this indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate
the matter. On April 17, 2001, the respondent was subpoenaed to attend the investigation
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.[27]
(21) On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their
constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with application
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary
investigation. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-100933 and raffled to
Branch 40, presided by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba.[28]
(22) The plea for temporary restraining order was denied by Judge Pasamba in an
Order[29] dated June 5, 2001, viz:
After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689 is not one on the merits and without any recorded arraignment and entered
plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct consequence of the
finding of the Quezon City RTC that no probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants
of arrest against petitioners herein and to hold them for trial. The arraignment had with
the Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a different perspective since
the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the
People of the Philippines who is the complainant in the Kuratong Baleleng case and
remains to be the complainant in the present investigation initiated thru a letter of PNP
Chief Mendoza dated March 27, 2001 (Exhibit B) together with the sworn statements of
witnesses Ramos and Yu (Exhibits 2 and 3 - supportive of the refiling of the case (Exhibit
9).
xxx xxx xxx
Above considered, this Court finds petitioners have not preliminarily established that they
have a right to be preserved pending hearing on the injunctive relief.
WHEREFORE, the prayer for temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[30]
(23) On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. The
new Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent
Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.
(24) On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari[31] against Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of Justice, the PNP Chief, State
Prosecutors Ong and Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin, and the People of
the Philippines. The said petition was amended to implead as additional party-respondents
State Prosecutor Claro Arellano and the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 81 in which the
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed.[32]
(25) The Second Amended Petition[33] dated June 14, 2001 and admitted by the Court of
Appeals on June 26, 2001, alleged:
The reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and injunction against the questioned Order (Annex A)
and the new Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 pending before
respondent Yadao (Annex B) are founded upon the grave abuse of discretion by
respondent Judge Pasamba of her discretion in its issuance, the illegality of the
proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors as they cannot revive complaints which
had been dismissed over two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued, and
the invalidity of the new Informations for Murder filed against petitioners and others, all in
defiance of law and jurisprudence as shown by the following:
(a) Respondent judge had ruled on the merits of the main prohibition action a
quo rendering the same moot and academic by concluding that the dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 by the QC RTC was not final and executory, hence
[i] the complaints therein can be reinvestigated, and [ii] petitioners arraignment while the
case had not yet been remanded to the QC RTC and while the Sandiganbayan had valid
jurisdiction thereover [Criminal Cases No. 23047-2048] was void, notwithstanding that the
only issue in the TRO application was the existence or lack of a valid complaint as defined
in S1 and S3, Rule 110.
(b) Respondent Judge ruled that respondent State Prosecutors could proceed to re-
investigate and thereafter file new Informations on June 6, 2001 covering those offenses
subject of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 on the basis of affidavits filed
after said cases were dismissed on March 29, 1999, despite the fact that under Section 8,
Rule 117, cases similar to those filed against the petitioner and others (where the penalty
imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or more) cannot be revived after two (2) years
from the date the dismissal order was issued.
(c) Respondent Judge held that the petitioner had not shown a right to be preserved
despite evidence showing the short cuts taken by respondent State prosecutors in re-
investigating a dismissed case, in not complying with Rules in respect of its re-opening,
and in insisting that a valid complaint was filed in clear violation of the Rules and case law
thereon, and despite the fact that the petitioner had shown that an inextendible deadline of
June 5, 2001 was given him to file his counter-affidavit without which his indictment for a
non-bailable offense is assured because of DOJ Secretary Hernando Perezs political
schemes.[34]
(26) In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also filed with the RTC-QC
Branch 81 (presided by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause and in the absence thereof, to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent
Lacson, however, filed a Manifestation and Motion dated June 13, 2001 seeking the
suspension of the proceedings before the trial court. [35]
(27) The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Yadao
from issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112.[36]
(28) On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), rendered the now
assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689 as provisional dismissal, and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to
01-101112 as mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the
respondent, viz:
In sum, this Court is of the considered view that the subject dismissal of [the] criminal
cases was provisional in nature and that the cases presently sought to be prosecuted by
the respondents are mere revival or re-opening of the dismissed cases. The present
controversy, being one involving provisional dismissal and revival of criminal cases, falls
within the purview of the prescriptive period provided under Section 8, Rule 117 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The second paragraph of the said provision is
couched in clear, simple and categorical words. It mandates that for offenses punishable
by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, as the subject criminal cases, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after the issuance of the order without the
case having been revived. It should be noted that the revival of the subject criminal cases,
even if reckoned from the DOJs issuance of subpoenas to petitioner, was commenced
only on April 19, 2001, that is, more than two (2) years after the issuance, on March 29,
1999, of RTC-Quezon Citys Resolution, provisionally dismissing the criminal cases now
sought to be revived. Applying the clear and categorical mandate of Section 8, Rule 117,
supra, such efforts to revive the criminal cases are now definitely barred by the two-year
prescriptive period provided therein.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Temporary Restraining Order
earlier issued against the conduct of further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112, including the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioner,
PANFILO M. LACSON, is hereby made PERMANENT. Accordingly, with respect to said
accused, the proceedings conducted by respondent State Prosecutors in respect of the
said criminal cases are declared NULL AND VOID and the corresponding Informations,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Panfilo M. Lacson, et al. and filed before respondent Judge Maria Theresa
L. Yadao of Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, are hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[37]
The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations
against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang. This rule which took effect on December 1, 2000 provides:
SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.- A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall
become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been
revived.
Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect.
However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual
bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional
dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered
by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has
already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond
the 2-year period.
There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases
against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself
who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge
Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent.
The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness
whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases against the
respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of
then Judge Agnir that the relatives of the victims who desisted did not appear during the
hearing to affirm their affidavits. Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty.
Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in preparing their
affidavits and he signed them as a witness. It also appears that only seven (7) persons
submitted their affidavits of desistance, namely:
a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalora
b. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;
c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora;
d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap;
e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;
f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and
g. Rolando Siplon.
From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were
affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) [38] other victims, namely:
Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show
whether they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not
fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8,
Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time.
The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition
with application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by
respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the
prosecutors from reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in
said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson
against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by
Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants.
Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11)
informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC
of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in
the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate
court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived
informations for multiple murder against him.
This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never
considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson
raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the
multiple murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did not require the
parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties
before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and
company. To be sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the appellate court to the
effect that records show that the prosecution and the private offended parties were notified
of the hearing x x x.[39] It is doubtful whether this finding is supported by the records of the
case. It appears to be contrary to Judge Agnirs finding that only seven (7) of the
complainants submitted affidavits of desistance.
Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the
multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the
2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - - whether it
is from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates
the Order were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity
of the new rule.
If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity
to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize
the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can
therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar.
In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine
the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not
the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be
enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent
Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the
presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule
depends. They involve disputed facts and arguable questions of law. The reception of
evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the case at bar is remanded to the RTC - Quezon City,
Branch 81 so that the State prosecutors and the respondent Lacson can adduce evidence
and be heard on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied
with on the basis of the evidence of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether
the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or
not. Pending the ruling, the trial court is restrained from issuing any warrant of arrest
against the respondent Lacson. Melo and Carpio, JJ., take no part.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR
JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A.
ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M.
LACSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration [1] of the Resolution[2] dated
May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 81, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-
accused with the said court. In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-
accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male
persons identified as Manuel Montero, a former Corporal of the Philippine Army, Rolando
Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who was 16 years old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel
Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren Sorronda, who was 14 years old, [3] Pacifico Montero, Jr.,
of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap
of the Zamboanga PNP, and Alex Neri, former Corporal of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the
Philippine Army, bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The respondent
opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration.[4]
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express consent of the
respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also
held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the
requirements for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve
the following:
... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the
accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; (3)
whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any
justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to the
offended parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed by
then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives
of the three (3) other victims; (7) whether the multiple murder cases against respondent
Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.
The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first
determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties,
or from the date of effectivity of the new rule. According to the Court, if the cases were
revived only after the two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its
failure to comply with the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to
penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in
court. However, the State is not precluded from presenting compelling reasons to justify
the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied
retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS
NOT APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential
requirements for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his
resolution of March 29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners
maintain that the respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge
Agnir, Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly
admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during the hearing thereat that
he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal
thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the
dismissal of the said cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the
respondents express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases and the notice to all
the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon are
conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the
new rule.
The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be remanded to the
RTC to determine whether private complainants were notified of the March 22, 1999
hearing on the respondents motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable
cause. The records allegedly indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was
furnished a copy of the notice of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence
that private prosecutor Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly retained and authorized by all
the private complainants to represent them at said hearing. It is their contention that Atty.
Valdez merely identified the purported affidavits of desistance and that he did not confirm
the truth of the allegations therein.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its Resolution and
Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved for the provisional
dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the
respondent and the other accused filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal of
the criminal cases should the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them.
The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the public and private
prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the hearing thereof. He contends that it
was sufficient that the public prosecutor was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on
the motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause because criminal
actions are always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private complainants
merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the petitioners
meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall
become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been
revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court
of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first
paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the
case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar
in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the
express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him
from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double
jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.[5]
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been
revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public
prosecutor who has control of the prosecution[6] without the criminal case having been
revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is
served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a
positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its
meaning.[7]Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional
dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express
consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. [8] The mere inaction or
silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case [9] or his failure to
object to a provisional dismissal[10]does not amount to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to
such provisional dismissal.[11] If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the
new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the
express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The
case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of
the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy [12] or that such revival
or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations. [13]
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the
Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense
necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary
investigation.[14] However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their
testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the
State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation[15] must be conducted before an
Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also
required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new
criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new
criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal
complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to
that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits
and evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the
role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to
assist the court in dispensing that justice.[16]
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the
first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any
motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent
merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of
prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the
decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other cases, there was a need for the
trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned
before the court for its examination. The respondent contended therein that until after the
trial court shall have personally determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant of
arrest should be issued against the respondent and if one had already been issued, the
warrant should be recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be
issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at
a hearing scheduled therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the
meantime until the resolution of this incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.[18]
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a
mere provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in his reply filed with the Court of Appeals,
respondent emphasized that:
... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for
Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other co-accused in
the said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the
case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and
(2) that warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the You were present during the proceedings?
meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the dismissal
of the case was made with the consent of the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion is ATTY. FORTUN:
hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex A. [19]
Yes, Your Honor.
During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the respondent, through
counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared that he did not file any motion JUSTICE ROSARIO:
to dismiss the criminal cases nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof, thus:
You represented the petitioner in this case?
JUSTICE SALONGA:
ATTY. FORTUN:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good
ATTY. FORTUN: Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of
provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was dismissal of the case.
simply a judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then
Judge Agnir, upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who JUSTICE GUERRERO:
had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this case
lacking in probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination
not justify proceeding to trial. of probable cause?

JUSTICE SALONGA: ATTY. FORTUN:

And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally Yes, Your Honor.
dismissed except when it is with the express conformity of the accused.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
ATTY. FORTUN:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what
That is correct, Your Honor. should the Court do?

JUSTICE SALONGA: ATTY. FORTUN:

And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any
statement, which would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other
matters, including other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal
courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on this matter of
provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to come forward, and the judge himself
or herself explains the implications of a provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba
dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In
fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it
said: Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an
order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their
witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of
the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this
incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your
prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net
effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the
case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain
is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any
assent to the provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any motion for
reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had
already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was
concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me,
and therefore I did not take any further step in addition to rocking the boat or
clarifying the matter further because it probably could prejudice the interest of my
client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.[20]
In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the
respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan
without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC: Upon
raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for
his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations,
contrary to respondent OSGs claim.[21]
The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of
Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his
admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions. [22]
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add
to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included
therein.This the Court cannot and should not do. [23]
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing
thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as
mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in
crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties
or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended
party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the
public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the
victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the
hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the
offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively
comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between
the prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby
depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable;
or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the accused
from detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other
prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the
destruction or loss of the prosecutions physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights
of the offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or
furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary
attachment against his property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of probable cause
and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the
heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March
22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999
and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof.
Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not
show that notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the victims or that
subpoenae were issued to and received by them, including those who executed their
affidavits of desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or Pian, Zamboanga del Norte
or Palompon, Leyte.[24] There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor
notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22,
1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private prosecutor, [25]he did so
only for some but not all the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda
Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and
Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon)[26] executed their respective affidavits of
desistance.[27] There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr.,
and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims were
served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. In fine,
there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the
private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the
hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said
heirs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the respondents motion and to
protect their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present
when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set
forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly
consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondents motion before the hearing
thereon and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the
eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To
apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-
accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce,
and diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple
murder. They posit that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty
years within which to file the criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the
new rule, the State only had two years from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive the
said cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one
year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The
period for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. They submit that in case of
conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former should
prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently relied on the prescriptive periods
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it
would forever be barred beyond the two-year period by a retroactive application of the new
rule.[28] Petitioners thus pray to the Court to set aside its Resolution of May 28, 2002.
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no
substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases
in question since [t]he States witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their
testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically
expedient in April 2001 for them to do so. [29] According to the respondent, penal laws,
either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the
accused.[30] He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and
lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly
indict him.[31] In any event, the State is given the right under the Courts assailed Resolution
to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not broaden the substantive right of double jeopardy to the prejudice of
the State because the prohibition against the revival of the cases within the one-year or
two-year periods provided therein is a legal concept distinct from the prohibition against
the revival of a provisionally dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule
117. Moreover, he claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do not
modify or negate the operation of the prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised Penal Code simply becomes irrelevant upon
the application of Section 8, Rule 117 because a complaint or information has already
been filed against the accused, which filing tolls the running of the prescriptive period
under Article 90.[32]
The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of
limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the
sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes
are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that
prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to
explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary for the protection of the accused have
by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability. [33] The periods fixed under such statutes
are jurisdictional and are essential elements of the offenses covered. [34]
On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of
the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.[35]
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.[36] It is but a limitation of the right of the State to
revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but
subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the
lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have
abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal
becomes ipso factopermanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or
another crime necessarily included therein. [37] He is spared from the anguish and anxiety
as well as the expenses in any new indictments. [38] The State may revive a criminal case
beyond the one-year or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for
the delay.[39] By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused
because the trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under
the Revised Penal Code are not thereby diminished. [40] But whether or not the prosecution
of the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under
the new rule, the effect is basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of Illinois held:
This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of the
state to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be punishedto be
deprived of his libertyshall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action which
the state had acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the crime had
created in the offenders title to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper than
statutes barring civil remedies usually do. They expressly take away only the remedy by
suit, and that inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy would enforce, and
perfect the title which such remedy would invade; but this statute is aimed directly at the
very right which the state has against the offenderthe right to punish, as the only liability
which the offender has incurred, and declares that this right and this liability are at an
end. [41]
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied
retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by
which one who has committed a crime is to be punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,[42] this Court held that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent.The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested
right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of
his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so
would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the
independence of the Court. In a per curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma,[43] the
United States Supreme Court ruled that where a decision of the court would produce
substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding the
injustice of hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity. [44] A construction of which a statute is
fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, and injurious consequences.[45] This Court should not adopt an interpretation of a
statute which produces absurd, unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such
interpretation could be avoided.[46] Time and again, this Court has decreed that statutes
are to be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. In construing a statute, the reason for the enactment should be kept in mind and
the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose.[47]
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and
implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied
retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the
new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its
operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the
administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular. [48] In a per curiam decision
in Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in
determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given
retrospective or prospective effect:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the
new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one
year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may
appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal
interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases
with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial
rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the
time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with
the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the
Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient
that the rule becomes a denial of justice. [50] The petitioners failed to show a manifest
shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal
justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating
the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion
of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival
thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There
were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes
beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the
lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused
despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal
proceedings.[51]
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates
in his favor,[52] especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and
conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have
been known to expire.[53]
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its
witnesses.Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown
dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. [54] The accused
may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time
from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the
crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may
disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence.[55] He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the
passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus
eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.[56]
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued
the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the
accused; not for the accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the
two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor
received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is
inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to
revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do
so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on
March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the
new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until
March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-
year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied
prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December
1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the
new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd,
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the
computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at
the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even
be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or
that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. As
the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People:[57]
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law
and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights .
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the
accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive
application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so
would cause an injustice of hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration of
justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of
a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the
effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-
bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The
State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December
1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification
for not reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal
cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State. As the United States
Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of
Massachussetts,[58] the concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
filament. We are to keep the balance true. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[59] this Court emphasized
that the judges action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of
the State and offended party to due process of law. This Court further said:

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been
wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a
denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society
offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be
rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended
party, on the other.

In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were
filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within the two-year period.

In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners meritorious.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28, 2002, is SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is
REVERSED. The Petition of the Respondent with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 with deliberate dispatch.

No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 149453. October 7, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR
JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A.
ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M.
LACSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus
Motion;[1] (b) Motion for Reconsideration;[2] (c) Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration;[3] (d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments.[4]
The Omnibus Motion
The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003 Resolution of this Court
which granted the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The respondent thereafter prays
to allow Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Conchita C.
Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna to voluntary inhibit themselves or,
absent their consent, rule that such inhibition is in order and to recuse them from further
deliberating, discussing or, in any manner, participating in the resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration. The respondent
points out that the aforenamed members of the Court were appointed by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and after the case at bar
was submitted for the decision of the Court. He asserts that although A.M. No. 99-8-09-
SC[5] specifically provides that it applies only to the divisions of the Court, it should likewise
apply to this case, in light of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of this Court which set aside its
Resolution dated May 28, 2002, apart from the constitutional issues raised by the
respondent in his motion for reconsideration and its supplement. As such, according to the
respondent, the instant case should be unloaded by Justice Callejo, Sr. and re-raffled to
any other member of the Court.
The Court resolves to deny the respondents motion for lack of merit.
The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent filed an urgent motion for
the recusation of Justices Renato C. Corona and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez for the reason
that they were appointed to the Court after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and did
not participate in the integral portions of the proceedings. Justices Corona and Austria-
Martinez refused to inhibit themselves and decided to participate in the deliberation on the
petition.[6] On March 18, 2003, the respondent filed a motion with the Court for the
recusation of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. on account of his voluntary inhibition when the
case was pending before the Court of Appeals.
On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the respondents Motion dated
March 18, 2003. The respondent thereafter filed his motion for reconsideration of the April
1, 2003 Resolution of the Court in which he prayed, inter alia, for the inhibition of Justice
Callejo, Sr. under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC and that the case be re-raffled to another member
of the Court who had actually participated in the deliberation and the rendition of its May
28, 2002 Resolution. The respondent likewise sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C.
Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna, again for the reason that they were appointed to the Court
after the oral arguments on February 19, 2002 and after the case had already been
submitted for decision.
On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the aforesaid motions of the
respondent.[7] The Court ruled that A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC is applicable only to cases
assigned to the divisions of the Court:
The respondents reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99-8-09 is misplaced. As
admitted by the respondent, the said circular is applicable only to motions for
reconsideration in cases assigned to the Divisions of the Court. For cases assigned to the
Court En Banc, the policy of the Court had always been and still is, if the ponente is no
longer with the Court, his replacement will act upon the motion for reconsideration of a
party and participate in the deliberations thereof. This is the reason why Justice Callejo, Sr.
who had replaced retired Justice De Leon, prepared the draft of the April 1, 2003
Resolution of the Court.[8]
The Court also ruled that there was no need for its newest members to inhibit themselves
from participating in the deliberation of the respondents Motion for Reconsideration:
Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna
were not yet members of the Court during the February 18, 2002 [9] oral arguments before
the Court, nonetheless they were not disqualified to participate in the deliberations on the
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the May 28, 2002 Resolution of the Court or of the
instant motion for reconsideration. Neither is Justice Callejo, Sr. disqualified to prepare the
resolution of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent. When the
Court deliberated on petitioners motion for reconsideration, Justices Conchita Carpio-
Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Adolfo S. Azcuna were already members of the Court.
It bears stressing that transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the February 18, 2002
hearing and oral arguments of the parties are parts of the records of this case. Said
transcripts are available to the parties or to any member of the Court. Likewise, Attys.
Rene A.V. Saguisag and Felix Carao, Jr. may not yet have been the counsel of the
respondent on February 18, 2002 but by reading the said transcripts and the records of
this case they are informed of what transpired during the hearing and oral arguments of
the parties.[10]
It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the respondent in his omnibus motion had already
been passed upon and resolved by this Court. The respondent did not make any new
substantial arguments in his motion to warrant a reconsideration of the aforesaid
resolutions.
Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo
S. Azcuna only after they had already concurred in the Courts Resolution dated April 1,
2003.Case law has it that a motion for disqualification must be denied when filed after a
member of the Court has already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale
being that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court, only to
raise an objection of this sort after a decision has been rendered. [11]
The Motion to Set the Case for
Oral Arguments
The Court denies the motion of the respondent. The parties have already extensively
discussed the issues involved in the case. The respondents motion for reconsideration
consists of no less than a hundred pages, excluding the supplement to his motion for
reconsideration and his reply to the petitioners comment on his motion. There is no longer
a need to set the instant case for oral arguments.
The Issue as to the Application of
the Time-bar under Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure Whether
Prospective or Retroactive
The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court and
thereafter reinstate its Resolution of May 28, 2002.
He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial
practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RRCP) should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations,
only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law
on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it
being a branch of criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely
crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused
to a speedy disposition of his case. It is primarily a check on the State to prosecute
criminal cases diligently and continuously, lest it loses its right to prosecute the accused
anew. The respondent argues that since Section 8 is indubitably a rule of procedure, there
can be no other conclusion: the rule should have retroactive application, absent any
provision therein that it should be applied prospectively. Accordingly, prospective
application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29,
1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondents right to due
process and equal protection of the law.
The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to
the accused. In this case, the State had been given more than sufficient opportunity to
prosecute the respondent anew after the March 29, 1999 dismissal of the cases by then
Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even before the RRCP took effect on December 1,
2000. According to the respondent, the petitioners filed the Informations with the RTC in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation of his
right to a speedy trial, and that such filing was designed to derail his bid for the Senate.
In their comment on the respondents motions, the petitioners assert that the prospective
application of Section 8 is in keeping with Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides in part that the rules of procedure which the Court may promulgate shall
not diminish, increase or modify substantial rights. While Section 8 secures the rights of
the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to
public justice. If such right to public justice is taken away, then Section 8 can no longer be
said to be a procedural rule. According to the petitioners, if a procedural rule impairs a
vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive
application. They contend that the right of the accused to a speedy trial or disposition of
the criminal cases applies only to outstanding and pending cases and not to cases already
dismissed. The petitioners assert that the refiling of the cases under Section 8 should be
taken to mean as the filing of the criminal complaint with the appropriate office for the
purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation, and not the actual filing of the criminal
complaint or information in court for trial. Furthermore, according to the petitioners, the
offended parties must be given notices of the motion for provisional dismissal of the cases
under Section 8 since the provision so expressly states. Thus, if the requisite notices to the
heirs of the deceased would be taken into consideration, the two-year period had not yet
even commenced to run.
In his consolidated reply to the comment of the petitioners, the respondent asserts that the
State is proscribed from refiling a criminal case if it can be shown that the delay resulted in
a violation of the right of the accused to due process. In this case, there was an inordinate
delay in the revival of the cases, considering that the witnesses in the criminal cases for
the State in March 1999 are the same witnesses in 2001. The State had reasonable
opportunity to refile the cases before the two-year bar but failed to do so because of
negligence; and perhaps institutional indolence. Contrary to the petitioners contention, the
respondent posits that the revival of the cases contemplated in Section 8 refers to the filing
of the Informations or complaints in court for trial. The operational act then is the refiling of
the Informations with the RTC, which was done only on June 6, 2001, clearly beyond the
two-year bar.
The Court finds the respondents contentions to be without merit.
First. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5,
paragraph 5 of the Constitution which reads:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to
the accused. It must be noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to
reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case. The
time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused;
not for the accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one
year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may
appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal
interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases
with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial
rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the
time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with
the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the
Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient
that the rule becomes a denial of justice.[12]
In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court, in the interest of
justice, may make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation make the rule
prospective. The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a rule is not automatically determined
by the provision of the Constitution on which the dictate is based. Each constitutional rule
of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background or precedent, and
its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine
must inevitably vary with the dictate involved. [13]
Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute. [14] To
paraphrase the United States Supreme Court per Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court in
defining the limits of adherence may make a choice for itself between the principle of
forward operation and that of relating forward. [15]
The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5,
paragraph 5 of the Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it
the power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive
effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules
to actions pending before it if in its opinion their application would not be feasible or would
work injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall apply. [16]
The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective application only does not
proscribe the prospective application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the
new rule to be given retroactive and prospective effect. If the statutory purpose is clear, the
provisions of the law should be construed as is conducive to fairness and justice, and in
harmony with the general spirit and policy of the rule. It should be construed so as not to
defeat but to carry out such end or purpose.[17] A statute derives its vitality from the
purpose for which it is approved. To construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats
such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law. [18] In Cometa v. Court of Appeals,[19] this Court
ruled that the spirit rather than the letter of the statute determines its construction; hence, a
statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. [20] While we may not read into the law
a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for
its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the letter that killeth but to the spirit that vivifieth,
to give effect to the lawmakers will.[21]
In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied
prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would
defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two
years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of
the accused.It would be a denial of the States right to due process and a travesty of justice
for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent
insists, considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir,
Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive
application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the
State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.
Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC) provisionally dismissed a criminal case with
the express consent of the accused in 1997. The prosecution had the right to revive the
case within the prescriptive period, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. On December 1, 2000, the time-bar rule under Section 8 took effect, the
prosecution was unable to revive the criminal case before then.
If the time-bar fixed in Section 8 were to be applied retroactively, this would mean that the
State would be barred from reviving the case for failure to comply with the said time-bar,
which was yet to be approved by the Court three years after the provisional dismissal of
the criminal case. In contrast, if the same case was dismissed provisionally in December
2000, the State had the right to revive the same within the time-bar. In fine, to so hold
would imply that the State was presumed to foresee and anticipate that three years after
1997, the Court would approve and amend the RRCP. The State would thus be sanctioned
for its failure to comply with a rule yet to be approved by the Court. It must be stressed that
the institution and prosecution of criminal cases are governed by existing rules and not by
rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or
ideal existence before it was approved by the Court. The past cannot be erased by a
capricious retroactive application of the new rule.
In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the
criminal cases provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, this Court
explained, thus:
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the
two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor
received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is
inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to
revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do
so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on
March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the
new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until
March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-
year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied
prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December
1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the
new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd,
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999[22] should be excluded in the
computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at
the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even
be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or
that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. As
the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People,
351 US 12 (1956):
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law
and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the
accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive
application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so
would cause an injustice of hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration of
justice in general and of criminal laws in particular. [23]
Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurters opinion in Griffin v. People,[24] he said, it is much
more conducive to laws self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations that give
prospective content to a new pronouncement of law. That this is consonant with the spirit
of our law and justified by those considerations of reason which should dominate the law
has been luminously expounded by Mr. Justice Cardozo shortly before he came here and
in an opinion which he wrote for the Court.
Parenthetically, the respondent himself admitted in his motion for reconsideration that
Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have been expected to comply with the notice requirement
under the new rule when it yet had to exist:
99. Respondent submits that the records are still in the same state of inadequacy and
incompletion. This however is not strange considering that Section 8, Rule 117 had not
existed on March 29, 1999, when the criminal cases were dismissed, and then Judge
Agnir did not have its text to guide his actions. How could the good judge have complied
with the mandate of Section 8, Rule 117 when it yet had to exist? [25]
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent,
procedural laws are retroactive.[26] Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had
long been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the new rule took effect on December 1,
2000.When the petitioners filed the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112 on June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long
since been terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned from the
March 29, 1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but from
December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect. While it is true that the Court applied
Section 8 of Rule 110[27] of the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with
this Court and not to cases already terminated with finality.
The records show that after the requisite preliminary investigation conducted by the
petitioners in accordance with existing rules, eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed with the RTC on June 6, 2001, very well within the
time-bar therefor. The respondent cannot argue that his right to due process and to a
speedy disposition of the cases as enshrined in the Constitution had been violated. [28]
The respondents plaint that he was being singled out by the prospective application of the
new rule simply because before the Court issued its April 1, 2003 Resolution, he
announced his candidacy for the presidency of the Republic for the 2004 elections has no
factual basis whatsoever.[29] The bare and irrefutable fact is that it was in this case where
the issue of the retroactive/prospective application of the new rule was first raised before
the Court. The ruling of the Court in its April 1, 2003 Resolution and its ruling today would
be the same, regardless of who the party or parties involved are, whether a senator of the
Republic or an ordinary citizen.
The respondents contention that the prospective application of the new rule would deny
him due process and would violate the equal protection of laws is barren of merit. It
proceeds from an erroneous assumption that the new rule was approved by the Court
solely for his benefit, in derogation of the right of the State to due process. The new rule
was approved by the Court to enhance the right of due process of both the State and the
accused. The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases as much as the accused.
Due process has never been and perhaps can never be precisely defined. It is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. The
phrase expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness, a requisite whose meaning can
be as opaque as its importance is lofty.[30] In determining what fundamental fairness
consists of in a particular situation, relevant precedents must be considered and the
interests that are at stake; private interests, as well as the interests of the government
must be assessed. In this case, in holding that the new rule has prospective and not
retroactive application, the Court took into consideration not only the interests of the
respondent but all other accused, whatever their station in life may be. The interest of the
State in the speedy, impartial and inexpensive disposition of criminal cases was likewise
considered.
The Respondent Failed to Comply
with the Essential Prerequisites of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure
The respondent argues that the issue involved in the Court of Appeals is entirely different
from the issue involved in the present recourse; hence, any admissions he made in the
court below are not judicial admissions in this case. He asserts that the issue involved in
the CA was whether or not he was placed in double jeopardy when he was charged with
murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 despite the dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; whereas the issue in this Court is whether the
prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 was barred by Section 8,
Rule 117 of the RRCP. The respondent avers that the proceedings in the appellate court
are different from those in this Court.
The respondent posits that this Court erred in giving considerable weight to the admissions
he made in his pleadings and during the proceedings in the CA. He stresses that judicial
admissions may only be used against a party if such admissions are (a) made in the
course of the proceedings in the same case; and (b) made regarding a relevant fact,
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 and Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence. He
contends that contrary to the ruling of the Court, when he filed his motion for the judicial
determination of probable cause in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, he
thereby prayed for the dismissal of the said cases. His motion carried with it, at the very
least, the prayer for the dismissal of the criminal cases. Absent a finding of probable
cause, Judge Agnir, Jr. had no recourse but to dismiss the criminal cases. Moreover, the
respondent avers that his motion included the general prayer for such other reliefs as may
be equitable in the premises. The respondent also points out that the public prosecutor
agreed to the averments in his motion as the latter did not even file any motion for the
reconsideration of Judge Agnir, Jr.s order dismissing the cases.
The respondent further contends that the Court is not a trier of facts. It has no means to
ascertain or verify as true the contrasting claims of the parties on the factual issues, a
function best left to the trial court as the trier of facts. He posits that there is a need for the
case to be remanded to the RTC to enable him to present evidence on whether or not
Judge Agnir, Jr. complied with the notice requirements of Section 8. Echoing the May 28,
2002 ruling of this Court, the respondent contends that it is not fair to expect the element of
notice under Section 8 to be litigated before Judge Agnir, Jr., for the said rule was not yet
in existence at the time he filed his motion for a determination of probable cause.
The respondent avers that the requirement for notices to the offended parties under
Section 8 is a formal and not an essential requisite. In criminal cases, the offended party is
the State and the role of the private complainant is limited to the determination of the civil
liability of the accused. According to the respondent, notice to the prosecution provides
sufficient safeguard for the private complainant to recover on the civil liability of the
accused based on the delicts; after all, the prosecution of the offense is under the control
and direction of the public prosecutor.
The contentions of the respondent have no merit.
First. The issue posed by the respondent in the CA and in this Court are the same. To
recall, in Civil Case No. 01-100933,[31] the respondent[32] sought injunctive relief from the
RTC of Manila on his claim that in conducting a preliminary investigation in Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, the petitioners thereby placed him in double jeopardy under
Section 7, Rule 117 of the RRCP.[33] When the RTC denied his plea for injunctive relief, the
respondent filed his petition for certiorari in the CA, again invoking his right against double
jeopardy, praying that:
13. Inasmuch as the case subject of the preliminary investigation was dismissed for the ATTY. FORTUN:[38]
reasons mentioned, there currently exists no complaint upon which a valid investigation
can be had in light of the clear provisions of Rule 110 which requires the existence of a No, no, I am not talking of the effects, I am talking of the doctrine, you are not invoking the
sworn written statement charging a person with an offense as basis for the doctrine of double jeopardy?
commencement of a preliminary investigation under Rule 112.
ATTY. FORTUN:
For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly the same offenses over which he had been
duly arraigned and a plea validly entered before the Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Your Honor, double jeopardy does not apply Section 8, 117 they are (interrupted)
Nos. 23047 to 57) before its remand to the QC RTC. Hence, to proceed therewith on
similar charges will put him in jeopardy of being twice punished therefor (Article III, 21, JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Constitution).[34]
That is right.
The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 by Judge Agnir, Jr. amounted to a judgment of acquittal; ATTY. FORTUN:
hence, he could no longer be charged and prosecuted anew for the same offense without
violating his right against double jeopardy. However, the respondent filed a second They are two different claims.
amended petition wherein he invoked for the first time Section 8 of Rule 117 of the RRCP:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
(e) the new criminal cases for Murder filed by respondents against petitioner and the other
accused on June 6, 2001 (docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112) and That is what I am trying to rule out so that we do not have to discuss it.
pending before respondent Judge Yadao (Annex B) is dismissible on its face as they
involve exactly the same accused, facts, and offenses which had previously been ATTY. FORTUN:
dismissed by the QC RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on March 29, 1999,
hence, can no longer be revived two (2) years after such dismissal in accordance with the Very well, Your Honor.
clear provisions of Section 8, Rule 117.[35]
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Indeed, the CA granted the respondents petition based on Section 8, Rule 117 of the
RRCP. In this case, the respondent invoked the same rule and the Constitution. Thus, You are not invoking double jeopardy?
during the oral arguments in this Court, the respondent, through counsel, admitted that he
was indeed invoking Section 8 anew and the provisions of the Constitution on double ATTY. FORTUN:
jeopardy:
As I mentioned we are saying that the effects of a permanent dismissal vest the effects
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: (interrupted)

You are saying that Sen. Lacson can no longer be prosecuted forever for that crime, for JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
the killing of the 11 in 1995?
No, I am not talking of the effects, I am asking about the application, you are not asking the
ATTY. FORTUN: Court to apply the doctrine of double jeopardy to prevent a prosecution of Mr. Lacson?

That is my submission, Your Honor. ATTY. FORTUN:

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Because the element of double jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117.

Let us see your reason for it? JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

[36]
ATTY. FORTUN: So, the answer is yes?

First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not? ATTY. FORTUN:
[37]
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a permanent dismissal vests the rights of
double jeopardy upon the accused who invokes it.
Allow me to qualify the effects of double jeopardy occur with permanent dismissal that is
my submission. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
What you are saying is the effects, I am not asking about the effects, I will ask that later. Yes, Your Honor.[39]

ATTY. FORTUN: Second. The respondents answers to the questions of Madame Justice Josefina Salonga
during the hearing in the CA where he admitted, through counsel, that he gave no express
They are two different (interrupted) conformity to the dismissal of the cases by Judge Agnir, Jr., were in relation to Section 8 of
Rule 117 and not to Section 7 of Rule 117 on double jeopardy, thus:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Later, I am asking about doctrines. Since you are not invoking the doctrine of double
jeopardy you are resting your case win or lose, sink or sail on the application of 8,117? Do we get it from you that it is your stand that this is applicable to the case at bar?

ATTY. FORTUN: ATTY. FORTUN:

On the constitutional right of the accused under Section 16 of Article 3 which is speedy It is my submission, that it is, Your Honor. In addition, of course, to my proposition that Mr.
disposition of cases which implemented 8,817, that is our arguments in this bar. Lacson is covered by the rule on double jeopardy as well, because he had already been
arraigned before the Sandiganbayan prior to the case being remanded to the RTC.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Are you not resting on 8,117?
You are referring to those cases which were dismissed by the RTC of Quezon City.
ATTY. FORTUN:
ATTY. FORTUN:
That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor.
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
So, you are resting on 8,117?
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
ATTY. FORTUN:
Not exclusive, Your Honor.
It was in that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir,
[Jr.] upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had
And the Constitution? withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking
in probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not
ATTY. FORTUN: justify proceeding to trial.

The Constitution which gave life to 8,117. JUSTICE SALONGA:

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except [if] it is with the express conformity of the accused.
To speedy disposition?
ATTY. FORTUN:
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
And with notice to the offended party.
Can a Court, let us see your theory then your theory rest on two provisions: first, the Rules
of Court 8,117 and Second, the Constitution on speedy disposition? ATTY. FORTUN:

ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement
which would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including
other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had
taught me that a judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact,
they ask the accused to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the
implications of a provisional dismissal. [40]
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In
fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it
said: Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an
order be issued directing the prosecution to present private complainants and their
witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of
the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this
incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?

The respondent, through counsel, even admitted that despite his plea for equitable relief in
his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause in the RTC, he did not agree to a
provisional dismissal of the cases. The respondent insisted that the only relief he prayed
for before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that warrants for his arrest be withheld pending a finding of
probable cause. He asserted that the judge did not even require him to agree to a
provisional dismissal of the cases:
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your
prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net
effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the
case?

ATTY. FORTUN: ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor. Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain
is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any
JUSTICE ROSARIO: assent to the provisional dismissal.

You represented the petitioner in this case? JUSTICE GUERRERO:

ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good
Judge Agnir, [Jr.] who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of
provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional
dismissal of the case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination
of probable cause?
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal, did you not file any motion for
reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir, [Jr.] that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had
already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was
concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me,
and therefore I did not take any further step in addition to rocking the boat or
clarifying the matter further because it probably could prejudice the interest of my
client.

ATTY. FORTUN: JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Yes, Your Honor. Continue.[41]

JUSTICE GUERRERO: In his memorandum, in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the
respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what
should the Court do? Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan
without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC. Upon
ATTY. FORTUN: raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 91. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for
his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to
respondent OSGs claim.[42]
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course
of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her attorney, in
the course of judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy.It is a voluntary concession of fact by a party or a partys attorney during such
judicial proceedings, including admissions in pleadings made by a party. [43] It may occur at
any point during the litigation process. An admission in open court is a judicial
admission.[44] A judicial admission binds the client even if made by his counsel. [45] As
declared by this Court:
... [I]n fact, judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of attorney of record, who
is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made ...
for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, ... they bind the client, whether made
during, or even after the trial.[46]
When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial determination of probable
cause, and that he did not give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of the said
cases, he in fact admitted that one of the essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was
absent.
The respondents contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during the
hearing in the CA cannot be used in the present case as they were made in the course of
a different proceeding does not hold water. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings
before the Court was by way of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, from the proceedings in the CA; as such, the present recourse is but a mere
continuation of the proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a new trial, but a review
of proceedings which commenced from the trial court, which later passed through the
CA. The respondent is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA, and such
admissions so hold him in the proceedings before this Court. As categorically stated
in Habecker v. Clark Equipment Company:[47]
... [J]udicial admissions on issues of fact, including those made by counsel on behalf of a
client during a trial, are binding for the purpose of the case ... including appeals.
While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it finds
no probable cause, absent the express consent of the accused to such provisional
dismissal, the latter cannot thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar a revival thereof. Neither may
the accused do so simply because the public prosecutor did not object to a motion of the
accused for a judicial determination of probable cause or file a motion for the
reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the case. Even a cursory reading of the
respondents motion for a judicial determination of probable cause will show that it
contained no allegation that there was no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for
the respondents arrest as a prayer for the dismissal of the cases. The respondent was only
asking the court to determine whether or not there was probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant for his arrest and in the meantime, to hold in abeyance the issuance of the said
warrant. Case law has it that a prayer for equitable relief is of no avail, unless the petition
states facts which will authorize the court to grant such relief. [48] A court cannot set itself in
motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their
pleadings. Anything that is resolved or decided beyond them is coram non judice and
void.[49]
Third. There is no need for the Court to remand the instant case to the trial court to enable
the respondent to adduce post facto evidence that the requisite notices under Section 8
had been complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court has thoroughly examined the
voluminous records from the Sandiganbayan and the RTC[50] and found no proof that the
requisite notices were even served on all the heirs of the victims. The respondent himself
admitted that, as held by this Court, in its May 28, 2002 Resolution, Judge Agnir, Jr. could
not have complied with the mandate under Section 8 because said rule had yet to exist.[51]
One final matter. The records show that Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
were assigned, through the customary raffle of cases, to Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon
City, the same branch which dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 99-81679 to 99-81689.[52] In
the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court, the Presiding Judge of Branch 81 of the RTC of
Quezon City was directed to try and decide Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
with reasonable dispatch. The Court notes, however, that in Administrative Order No. 104-
96, it designated six branches of the RTC of Quezon City[53] as special courts, exclusively
to try and decide heinous crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659. Since the accused in the said
cases are charged with murder, which under Rep. Act No. 7659, is classified as a heinous
crime, the above cases should be consolidated and re-raffled by the Executive Judge of
the RTC of Quezon City to a branch thereof designated as a special court, exclusively to
try and decide heinous crimes.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panfilo M. Lacsons Omnibus Motion
and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondents Motion for
Reconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch
to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a special
court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138962. October 4, 2002]
PRESCILLA TUATES and ANDRES DE LA PAZ, petitioners, vs. HON. LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN, as Presiding Judge, Branch 96, RTC Quezon City, People of the
Philippines and I.C. Construction, Inc., respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to annul the following: (1) Decision dated April 30, 1999 and Resolution dated June 9,
1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46845;[1] (2) Decision dated
September 10, 1997 and the Order dated January 28, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-70428 and Q-97-
70429;[2] and (3) Decision dated December 16, 1996 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 38) in Criminal Cases Nos. 38-0130 and 38-0131.[3]
The facts are as follows:
Convicted by the MTC-Quezon City (Branch 38) of the crime of Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law, petitioners Prescilla Tuates and Andres de la
Paz, appealed to the RTC of Quezon City (Branch 96). Their conviction was affirmed in
toto by the RTC in its decision dated September 10, 1997. Pending resolution of their
motion for reconsideration, however, Republic Act No. 8368, An Act Repealing Presidential
Decree No. 772, entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts was enacted.
In its Order, dated January 28, 1998, the RTC ruled that only petitioners criminal
convictions were extinguished by R.A. 8368, and the civil aspect, i.e., the removal of
petitioners illegally constructed house and improvements, shall remain executory against
them.[4]
On a petition for review, the Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC and denied
due course to the petition per its Decision, dated April 30, 1999. [5] Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its Resolution dated June 9, 1999. [6]
Hence, the present recourse taken by petitioners, raising the following issues:
1. That petitioners, being charged with Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, the
express repeal of said decree absolves the petitioners of any criminal or civil liability;
2. That public respondent erred in holding that the civil aspect of the judgment rendered x
x x shall be executory against the accused; and
3. That the Honorable Court of Appeals, in affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (Branch 96), dated June 9, 1999, grossly erred in ignoring applicable laws
and jurisprudence.[7]
Petitioners argue that the repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 carries with it the extinction of
both the criminal and civil aspects of the crime. Private respondent, however, insists that
public respondents were correct in ruling that only the criminal liability was absolved and
the civil liability remains inasmuch as it was not extinguished in accordance with Article
113 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
ART. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. -- Except in case of extinction of his civil
liability as provided in the next preceding article, the offender shall continue to be obliged
to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the
fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or
has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of
sentence or any other reason.
In its Motion to Deny Due Course, private respondent also argues that the petition should
now be denied as its title to the land subject of this case has already been adjudged in its
favor. [8]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondents, agrees
with petitioners that both the criminal and civil liability were rendered extinct with the repeal
of P.D. 772, and recommended that the assailed issuances be reversed and set aside.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
Republic Act No. 8368, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997,
provides:
SECTION 1. Title. -- This Act shall be known as the Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of
1997.
SEC. 2. Repeal. -- Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other
Similar Acts is hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. Effect on Pending Cases. -- All pending cases under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.
SEC. 4. Effect on Republic Act No. 7279. -- Nothing herein shall be construed to nullify,
eliminate or diminish in any way Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7279 or any of its
provisions relative to sanctions against professional squatters and squatting syndicates.
SEC. 5. Effectivity. -- This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in two
(2) newspapers of national circulation.
Approved, October 27, 1997.[9]
The repeal of P.D. No. 772 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8368 is explicit, categorical,
definite and absolute. As such, the act that was penalized by P.D. 772, i.e., squatting,
ceases to be criminal under R.A. 8368, and the previous offense is obliterated. [10]
In the same vein, the absolute repeal of P.D. 772 has the effect of depriving a court of its
authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This is
because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal
what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it
is as if the person who committed it never did so. [11] Specially so, as in the present case
where it is unconditionally stated in Section 3 of R.A. No. 8368 that: (A)ll pending cases
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity
of this Act.[12] Obviously, it was the clear intent of the law to decriminalize or do away with
the crime of squatting. Hence, there being no criminal liability, there is likewise no civil
liability because the latter is rooted in the former. Where an act or omission is not a crime,
no person can be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, logically, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question. [13]

In fact, in People v. Leachon, Jr.[14] we implicitly recognized the unconditional repeal of

P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 when we ordered the dismissal of the petition filed in said case,
without any qualification whatsoever, because of the enactment of R.A. 8368, viz.:

But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding, the petition cannot
now prosper because on October 27, 1997, Republic Act No. 8368, entitled An Act
Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772 Entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar
Acts was enacted. Section 3 of the said Act provides that all pending cases under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this
Act.[15]

This is not to say, however, that people now have the unbridled license to illegally occupy
lands they do not own. R.A. No. 8368[16] was unanimously approved by the members of
the Senate of the Philippines present on its third reading. [17] The legislature considered it a
major piece of legislation on the countrys anti-poverty program[18] as it sought to confront
the perennial problem of poverty at its root, abolish an otherwise inutile and oppressive
law, and pave the way for a genuine urban housing and land reform program. Senate
records reveal that it is the manifest intent of the authors of R.A. 8368 to decriminalize
squatting but does not encourage or protect acts of squatting on somebody elses
land.[19] The law is not intended to compromise the property rights of legitimate
landowners.[20] Recourse may be had in cases of violation of their property rights, such as
those provided for in Republic Act No. 7279 or the Urban Development and Housing Act,
penalizing professional squatters and squatting syndicates as defined therein, who commit
nefarious and illegal activities [21]; the Revised Penal Code providing for criminal
prosecution in cases of Trespass to Property,[22] Occupation of Real Property or
Usurpation of Real Rights in Property,[23] and similar violations, and, cases for Forcible
Entry and Unlawful Detainer under the Rules of Court, [24] as well as civil liability for
Damages under the Civil Code.

Considering that prosecution for criminal as well as civil liability under P.D. 772 has been
rendered nugatory with the passage of R.A. 8368, both criminal and civil aspects of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-70428 and Q-97-70429 in the RTC as well as Criminal Cases
Nos. 38-0130 and 38-0131 in the MTC filed against petitioners should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition for review to be with merit, the Decision dated April 30,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46845, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new judgment is hereby entered modifying the Decision dated September 10, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in Criminal Cases No. Q-97-70428 and Q-
97-70429 and the Decision dated December 16, 1996 issued by the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 38), to the effect that the dismissal of the aforementioned
criminal cases likewise include the dismissal of the civil aspects thereof, without prejudice
to the filing of civil and/or criminal actions under the prevailing laws.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125359. September 4, 2001]
ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision rendered on May 23, 1996, by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35719. CA-G.R. SP No.
35928 had affirmed the order dated September 6, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, Branch 26, insofar as it denied petitioners respective Motions to Quash the
Informations in twenty-five (25) criminal cases for violation of Central Bank Circular No.
960. Therein included were informations involving: (a) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos.
91-101879 to 91-101883 filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Roberto S. Benedicto, and
Hector T. Rivera; (b) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892 filed
against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto; and (c) Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969
also against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto. Note, however, that the Court of Appeals already
dismissed Criminal Case No. 91-101884.
The factual antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were
indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960[1] in relation to Section 34[2] of the
Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-
101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign
exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said
Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange
accounts abroad without prior authorization from the Central Bank. [3] It also required all
residents of the Philippines who habitually earned or received foreign currencies from
invisibles, either locally or abroad, to report such earnings or receipts to the Central Bank.
Violations of the Circular were punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the
Central Bank Act.
That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with the
same offense, but involving different accounts, were filed with the Manila RTC, which
docketed these as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. The accusatory portion
of the charge sheet in Criminal Case No. 91-101888 reads:
That from September 1, 1983 up to 1987, both dates inclusive, and for sometime
thereafter, both accused, conspiring and confederating with each other and with the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residents of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
fail to submit reports in the prescribed form and/or register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within 90 days from October 21, 1983 as required of them
being residents habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or receiving foreign exchange
from whatever source or from invisibles locally or from abroad, despite the fact they
actually earned interests regularly every six (6 ) months for the first two years and then
quarterly thereafter for their investment of $50-million, later reduced to $25-million in
December 1985, in Philippine-issued dollar denominated treasury notes with floating rates
and in bearer form, in the name of Bank Hofmann, AG, Zurich, Switzerland, for the benefit
of Avertina Foundation, their front organization established for economic advancement
purposes with secret foreign exchange account Category (Rubric) C.A.R. No. 211 925-02
in Swiss Credit Bank (also known as SKA) in Zurich, Switzerland, which earned, acquired
or received for the accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her late husband an interest of
$2,267,892 as of December 16, 1985 which was remitted to Bank Hofmann, AG, through
Citibank, New York, United States of America, for the credit of said Avertina account on
December 19, 1985, aside from the redemption of $25 million (one-half of the original $50-
M) as of December 16, 1985 and outwardly remitted from the Philippines in the amounts of
$7,495,297.49 and $17,489,062.50 on December 18, 1985 for further investment outside
the Philippines without first complying with the Central Bank reporting/registering
requirements.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The other charge sheets were similarly worded except the days of the commission of the
offenses, the name(s) of the alleged dummy or dummies, the amounts in the foreign
exchange accounts maintained, and the names of the foreign banks where such accounts
were held by the accused.
On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the
same offense, again in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same court,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. The Informations were
similarly worded as the earlier indictments, save for the details as to the dates of the
violations of Circular No. 960, the identities of the dummies used, the balances and
sources of the earnings, and the names of the foreign banks where these accounts were
maintained.
All of the aforementioned criminal cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the said
trial court.
On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 were filed, the Central
Bank issued Circular No. 1318[5] which revised the rules governing non-trade foreign
exchange transactions. It took effect on January 20, 1992.
On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank, pursuant to the governments policy of further
liberalizing foreign exchange transactions, came out with Circular No. 1353, [6] which
amended Circular No. 1318. Circular No. 1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central
Bank approval for foreign exchange-funded expenditures obtained from the banking
system.
Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a saving clause, excepting from
their coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of Circular No. 960 and, in the
case of Circular No. 1353, violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular No. 1318.
On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to
return to the Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges instituted
against them, including the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter cases.
On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both pleaded not
guilty to the charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had earlier
entered a similar plea during her arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them in
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 91-101959
to 91-101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping,
extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960, prescription, exemption
from the Central Banks reporting requirement, and the grant of absolute immunity as a
result of a compromise agreement entered into with the government.
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion. A similar motion filed on
May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases against her due
to the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the trial court in its order dated
June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court likewise
denied this motion on October 18, 1994.
On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration. The trial court, in its order of November 23, 1994, denied petitioners
motion and set the consolidated cases for trial on January 5, 1995.
Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition, with similar prayers for temporary
restraining orders and/or writs of preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
35719 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35928, were respectively filed by Mrs. Marcos and petitioners
with the Court of Appeals. Finding that both cases involved violations of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, the appellate court consolidated the two cases.
On May 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals disposed of the consolidated cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in
denying petitioners respective Motions to Quash, except that with respect to Criminal Case
No. 91-101884, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the Motion to Quash Criminal Case No.
91-101884 is hereby nullified and set aside, and said case is hereby dismissed. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Dissatisfied with the said decision of the court a quo, except with respect to the portion
ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 91-101884, petitioners filed the instant
petition, attributing the following errors to the appellate court:
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INFORMATIONS/CASES
FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE QUASHABLE BASED ON THE
FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
(A) LACK OF JURISDICTION/FORUM SHOPPING/NO VALID PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
(B) EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1) REPEAL OF CB CIRCULAR NO. 960 BY CB CIRCULAR NO. 1353;
2) REPEAL OF R.A. 265 BY R.A. 7653[8]
(C) PRESCRIPTION
(D) EXEMPTION FROM CB REPORTING REQUIREMENT
(E) GRANT OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.[9]
Simply stated, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to Quash for lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the trial court, forum shopping by the prosecution, and absence of a valid
preliminary investigation?
(2) Did the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular
No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of
petitioners?
(3) Had the criminal cases in violation of Circular No. 960 already prescribed?
(4) Were petitioners exempted from the application and coverage of Circular No. 960?
(5) Were petitioners' alleged violations of Circular No. 960 covered by the absolute
immunity granted in the Compromise Agreement of November 3, 1990?
On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. They aver
that the dollar-salting charges filed against them were violations of the Anti-Graft Law or
Republic Act No. 3019, and the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
their cases.
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the
law in force at the time the action is instituted. [10] The 25 cases were filed in 1991-92. The
applicable law on jurisdiction then was Presidential Decree 1606.[11] Under P.D. No. 1606,
offenses punishable by imprisonment of not more than six years fall within the jurisdiction
of the regular trial courts, not the Sandiganbayan.[12]
In the instant case, all the Informations are for violations of Circular No. 960 in relation to
Section 34 of the Central Bank Act and not, as petitioners insist, for transgressions of
Republic Act No. 3019. Pursuant to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, violations of
Circular No. 960 are punishable by imprisonment of not more than five years and a fine of
not more than P20,000.00. Since under P.D. No. 1606 the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction to try criminal cases where the imposable penalty is less than six years of
imprisonment, the cases against petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960 are,
therefore, cognizable by the trial court. No error may thus be charged to the Court of
Appeals when it held that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to hear and try the dollar-
salting cases.
Still on the first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the cases for violations of
Circular No. 960 before the RTC of Manila constitutes forum shopping. Petitioners argue
that the prosecution, in an attempt to seek a favorable verdict from more than one tribunal,
filed separate cases involving virtually the same offenses before the regular trial courts and
the Sandiganbayan. They fault the prosecution with splitting the cases. Petitioners
maintain that while the RTC cases refer only to the failure to report interest earnings on
Treasury Notes, the Sandiganbayan cases seek to penalize the act of receiving the same
interest earnings on Treasury Notes in violation of the Anti-Graft Laws provisions on
prohibited transactions. Petitioners aver that the violation of Circular No. 960 is but an
element of the offense of prohibited transactions punished under Republic Act No. 3019
and should, thus, be deemed absorbed by the prohibited transactions cases pending
before the Sandiganbayan.
For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action pending in
one court and another action before another court: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.[13] Here, we find that the single act of receiving unreported interest earnings
on Treasury Notes held abroad constitutes an offense against two or more distinct and
unrelated laws, Circular No. 960 and R.A. 3019. Said laws define distinct offenses,
penalize different acts, and can be applied independently. [14] Hence, no fault lies at the
prosecutions door for having instituted separate cases before separate tribunals involving
the same subject matter.
With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings violate Circular No. 960
in relation to Republic Act No. 265 because the same was unreported to the Central Bank.
The act to be penalized here is the failure to report the interest earnings from the foreign
exchange accounts to the proper authority. As to the anti-graft cases before the
Sandiganbayan involving the same interest earnings from the same foreign exchange
accounts, the receipt of the interest earnings transgresses Republic Act No. 3019 because
the act of receiving such interest is a prohibited transaction prejudicial to the government.
What the State seeks to punish in these anti-graft cases is the prohibited receipt of the
interest earnings. In sum, there is no identity of offenses charged, and prosecution under
one law is not an obstacle to a prosecution under the other law. There is no forum
shopping.
Finally, on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation by the
Department of Justice was invalid and in violation of their rights to due process. Petitioners
argue that governments ban on their travel effectively prevented them from returning home
and personally appearing at the preliminary investigation. Benedicto and Rivera further
point out that the joint preliminary investigation by the Department of Justice, resulted to
the charges in one set of cases before the Sandiganbayan for violations of Republic Act
No. 3019 and another set before the RTC for violation of Circular No. 960.
Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. [15] It
is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof.[16] Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is personal. It is afforded to the
accused by statute, and can be waived, either expressly or by implication. [17] The waiver
extends to any irregularity in the preliminary investigation, where one was conducted.
The petition in the present case contains the following admissions:
1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993on the condition that he face
the criminal charges pending in courts, petitioner-appellant Benedicto, joined by his co-
petitioner Rivera, lost no time in attending to the pending criminal charges by posting bail
in the above-mentioned cases.
2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the preliminary investigation
because of their forced absence from the Philippines then, petitioners-appellants invoked
their right to due process thru motions for preliminary investigationUpon denial of their
demands for preliminary investigation, the petitioners intended to elevate the matter to the
Honorable Court of Appeals and actually caused the filing of a petition for
certiorari/prohibition sometime before their arraignment but immediately caused the
withdrawal thereofin view of the prosecutions willingness to go to pre-trial wherein
petitioners would be allowed access to the records of preliminary investigation which they
could use for purposes of filing a motion to quash if warranted.
3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department of Justicerespondent
Judge set the case for pre-trial in order to afford all the accused access to the records of
the prosecution
xxx
5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-appellants Benedicto and
Rivera moved for the quashing of the informations/cases[18]
The foregoing admissions lead us to conclude that petitioners have expressly waived their
right to question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary investigation or to ask for a
new preliminary investigation. Petitioners, in the above excerpts from this petition, admit
posting bail immediately following their return to the country, entered their respective pleas
to the charges, and filed various motions and pleadings. By so doing, without
simultaneously demanding a proper preliminary investigation, they have waived any and
all irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. [19] The trial court did not err in
denying the motion to quash the informations on the ground of want of or improperly
conducted preliminary investigation. The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a
ground to quash the information. [20]
On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted for acts
punishable under laws that have already been repealed. They point to the express repeal
of Central Bank Circular No. 960 by Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 as well as the express
repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653. Petitioners, relying on Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code,[21] contend that repeal has the effect of extinguishing the right
to prosecute or punish the offense committed under the old laws. [22]
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its
authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. [23] This
is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering
legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists
and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. There are, however, exceptions to
the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that
the repeal shall have no effect on pending actions. [24] Another exception is where the
repealing act reenacts the former statute and punishes the act previously penalized under
the old law. In such instance, the act committed before the reenactment continues to be an
offense in the statute books and pending cases are not affected, regardless of whether the
new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the accused. [25]
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular
No. 1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or
profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions.[26] Second, even the most cursory
glance at the repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a
saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect
on pending actions for violation of the latter Circular. [27] A saving clause operates to except
from the effect of the repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the new law. [28] In
the present case, the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly
manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State to prosecute and punish offenses for
violations of the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending or under
investigation.
Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265, particularly Section
34,[29] by Republic Act No. 7653, removed the applicability of any penal sanction for
violations of any non-trade foreign exchange transactions previously penalized by Circular
No. 960. Petitioners posit that a comparison of the two provisions shows that Section
36[30] of Republic Act No. 7653 neither retained nor reinstated Section 34 of Republic Act
No. 265. Since, in creating the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Congress did not include in its
charter a clause providing for the application of Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 to
pending cases, petitioners pending dollar-salting cases are now bereft of statutory penalty,
the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 notwithstanding. In other words, absent a provision
in Republic Act No. 7653 expressly reviving the applicability of any penal sanction for the
repealed mandatory foreign exchange reporting regulations formerly required under
Circular No. 960, violations of aforesaid repealed Circular can no longer be prosecuted
criminally.
A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko Sentrals charter repealing
the former show that in consonance with the general objective of the old law and the new
law to maintain internal and external monetary stability in the Philippines and preserve the
international value of the peso,[31] both the repealed law and the repealing statute contain a
penal clause which sought to penalize in general, violations of the law as well as orders,
instructions, rules, or regulations issued by the Monetary Board. In the case of the Bangko
Sentral, the scope of the penal clause was expanded to include violations of other
pertinent banking laws enforced or implemented by the Bangko Sentral. In the instant
case, the acts of petitioners sought to be penalized are violations of rules and regulations
issued by the Monetary Board. These acts are proscribed and penalized in the penal
clause of the repealed law and this proviso for proscription and penalty was reenacted in
the repealing law. We find, therefore, that while Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 was
repealed, it was nonetheless, simultaneously reenacted in Section 36 of Republic Act No.
7653. Where a clause or provision or a statute for that matter is simultaneously repealed
and reenacted, there is no effect, upon the rights and liabilities which have accrued under
the original statute, since the reenactment, in effect neutralizes the repeal and continues
the law in force without interruption.[32] The rule applies to penal laws and statutes with
penal provisions. Thus, the repeal of a penal law or provision, under which a person is
charged with violation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the same act
done by him under the old law, will neither preclude the accuseds prosecution nor deprive
the court of its jurisdiction to hear and try his case. [33] As pointed out earlier, the act
penalized before the reenactment continues to remain an offense and pending cases are
unaffected. Therefore, the repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653 did not
extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners for transgressions of Circular No. 960 and
cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be made a basis for quashing the
indictments against petitioners.
Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in reenacting
Section 34 of the old Central Act, increased the penalty for violations of rules and
regulations issued by the Monetary Board. They claim that such increase in the penalty
would give Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto application, violating the Bill of
Rights.[34]
Is Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto legislation?
An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of
the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a
crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (3) changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters
the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil
rights, and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.[35]
The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution is:
Does the law sought to be applied retroactively take from an accused any right that was
regarded at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and
liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against
him?[36]
The crucial words in the test are vital for the protection of life and liberty. [37] We find,
however, the test inapplicable to the penal clause of Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws
and laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses
and prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively. [38] Penal laws cannot be
given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused. [39] Nowhere in
Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular Section 36, is there any indication that the
increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate retroactively. There is,
therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest earnings subject of the
criminal cases instituted against them were remitted to foreign banks on various dates
between 1983 to 1987. They maintain that given the considerable lapse of time from the
dates of the commission of the offenses to the institution of the criminal actions in 1991
and 1992, the States right to prosecute them for said offenses has already prescribed.
Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in computing the prescriptive period from
February 1986. Petitioners theorize that since the remittances were made through the
Central Bank as a regulatory authority, the dates of the alleged violations are known, and
prescription should thus be counted from these dates.
In ruling that the dollar-salting cases against petitioners have not yet prescribed, the
court a quo quoted with approval the trial courts finding that:
[T]he alleged violations of law were discovered only after the EDSA Revolution in 1986
when the dictatorship was toppled down. The date of the discovery of the offense,
therefore, should be the basis in computing the prescriptive period. Since (the) offenses
charged are punishable by imprisonment of not more than five (5) years, they prescribe in
eight (8) years. Thus, only a little more than four (4) years had elapsed from the date of
discovery in 1986 when the cases were filed in 1991. [40]
The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by Section 34 of Republic Act
No. 265 by a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and by
imprisonment of not more than five years. Pursuant to Act No. 3326, which mandates the
periods of prescription for violations of special laws, the prescriptive period for violations of
Circular No. 960 is eight (8) years.[41] The period shall commence to run from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.[42] In the instant case, the indictments against petitioners charged them with
having conspired with the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in transgressing Circular No.
960.Petitioners contention that the dates of the commission of the alleged violations were
known and prescription should be counted from these dates must be viewed in the context
of the political realities then prevailing. Petitioners, as close associates of Mrs. Marcos,
were not only protected from investigation by their influence and connections, but also by
the power and authority of a Chief Executive exercising strong-arm rule. This Court has
taken judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Marcos, his family, relations, and close associates
resorted to all sorts of clever schemes and manipulations to disguise and hide their illicit
acquisitions.[43] In the instant case, prescription cannot, therefore, be made to run from the
dates of the commission of the offenses charged, for the obvious reason that the
commission of those offenses were not known as of those dates. It was only after the
EDSA Revolution of February, 1986, that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth became a highly
prioritized state policy,[44] pursuant to the explicit command of the Provisional
Constitution.[45] To ascertain the relevant facts to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by
the leaders and supporters of the (Marcos) regime[46] various government agencies were
tasked by the Aquino administration to investigate, and as the evidence on hand may
reveal, file and prosecute the proper cases. Applying the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed,[47] we are more inclined to believe that the violations for which
petitioners are charged were discovered only during the post-February 1986 investigations
and the tolling of the prescriptive period should be counted from the dates of discovery of
their commission. The criminal actions against petitioners, which gave rise to the instant
case, were filed in 1991 and 1992, or well within the eight-year prescriptive period counted
from February 1986.
The fourth issue involves petitioners claim that they incurred no criminal liability for
violations of Circular No. 960 since they were exempted from its coverage.
Petitioners postulate that since the purchases of treasury notes were done through the
Central Banks Securities Servicing Department and payments of the interest were coursed
through its Securities Servicing Department/Foreign Exchange Department, their filing of
reports would be surplusage, since the requisite information were already with the Central
Bank. Furthermore, they contend that the foreign currency investment accounts in the
Swiss banks were subject to absolute confidentiality as provided for by Republic Act No.
6426,[48] as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1035, 1246, and 1453, and fell outside
the ambit of the reporting requirements imposed by Circular No. 960. Petitioners further
rely on the exemption from reporting provided for in Section 10(q), [49] Circular No. 960, and
the confidentiality granted to Swiss bank accounts by the laws of Switzerland.
Petitioners correctly point out that Section 10(q) of Circular No. 960 exempts from the
reporting requirement foreign currency eligible for deposit under the Philippine Foreign
Exchange Currency Deposit System, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended. But, in order to avail of the aforesaid exemption, petitioners must show that they
fall within its scope. Petitioners must satisfy the requirements for eligibility imposed by
Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426.[50] Not only do we find the record bare of any proof to
support petitioners claim of falling within the coverage of Republic Act No. 6426, we
likewise find from a reading of Section 2 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act that said law
is inapplicable to the foreign currency accounts in question. Section 2, Republic Act No.
6426 speaks of deposit with such Philippine banks in good standing, as maybe designated
by the Central Bank for the purpose.[51] The criminal cases filed against petitioners for
violation of Circular No. 960 involve foreign currency accounts maintained in foreign banks,
not Philippine banks. By invoking the confidentiality guarantees provided for by Swiss
banking laws, petitioners admit such reports made. The rule is that exceptions are strictly
construed and apply only so far as their language fairly warrants, with all doubts being
resolved in favor of the general proviso rather than the exception.[52] Hence, petitioners
may not claim exemption under Section 10(q).
With respect to the banking laws of Switzerland cited by petitioners, the rule is that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. [53] Laws of foreign jurisdictions
must be alleged and proved.[54] Petitioners failed to prove the Swiss law relied upon, either
by: (1) an official publication thereof; or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied by a certification from the
secretary of the Philippine embassy or legation in such country or by the Philippine consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent stationed in such country, or by any other
authorized officer in the Philippine foreign service assigned to said country that such officer
has custody.[55] Absent such evidence, this Court cannot take judicial cognizance of the
foreign law invoked by Benedicto and Rivera.
Anent the fifth issue, petitioners insist that the government granted them absolute immunity
under the Compromise Agreement they entered into with the government on November 3,
1990. Petitioners cite our decision in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 226 SCRA 314
(1993), upholding the validity of the said Agreement and directing the various government
agencies to be consistent with it. Benedicto and Rivera now insist that the absolute
immunity from criminal investigation or prosecution granted to petitioner Benedicto, his
family, as well as to officers and employees of firms owned or controlled by Benedicto
under the aforesaid Agreement covers the suits filed for violations of Circular No. 960,
which gave rise to the present case.
The pertinent provisions of the Compromise Agreement read:
WHEREAS, this Compromise Agreement covers the remaining claims and the cases of
the Philippine Government against Roberto S. Benedicto including his associates and
nominees, namely, Julita C. Benedicto, Hector T. Rivera, x x x
WHEREAS, specifically these claims are the subject matter of the following cases (stress
supplied):
1. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 9
2. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 24
3. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34
4. Tanodbayan (Phil-Asia)
5. PCGG I.S. No. 1
xxx
WHEREAS, following the termination of the United States and Swiss cases, and also
without admitting the merits of their respective claims and counterclaims presently involved
in uncertain, protracted and expensive litigation, the Republic of the Philippines, solely
motivated by the desire for the immediate accomplishment of its recovery mission and Mr.
Benedicto being interested to lead a peaceful and normal pursuit of his endeavors, the
parties have decided to withdraw and/or dismiss their mutual claims and
counterclaims under the cases pending in the Philippines, earlier referred to (underscoring
supplied);
xxx
II. Lifting of Sequestrations, Extension of Absolute Immunity and Recognition of the
Freedom to Travel
a) The Government hereby lifts the sequestrations over the assets listed in Annex C
hereof, the same being within the capacity of Mr. Benedicto to acquire from the exercise of
his profession and conduct of business, as well as all the haciendas listed in his name in
Negros Occidental, all of which were inherited by him or acquired with income from his
inheritanceand all the other sequestered assets that belong to Benedicto and his
corporation/nominees which are not listed in Annex A as ceded or to be ceded to the
Government.
Provided, however, (that) any asset(s) not otherwise settled or covered by this
Compromise Agreement, hereinafter found and clearly established with finality by proper
competent court as being held by Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto in trust for the family of the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos, shall be returned or surrendered to the Government for appropriate
custody and disposition.
b) The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized under the pertinent
provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, to Benedicto, the members of his
family, officers and employees of his corporations above mentioned, who are included in
past, present and future cases and investigations of the Philippine Government, such that
there shall be no criminal investigation or prosecution against said persons for acts (or)
omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986, that may be alleged to have violated any
laws, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any
asset treated, mentioned or included in this Agreement.
x x x[56]
In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the parties by looking at the
words employed to project their intention. In the instant case, the parties clearly listed and
limited the applicability of the Compromise Agreement to the cases listed or identified
therein. We have ruled in another case involving the same Compromise Agreement that:
cannot be construed to include matters distinct from those with respect to which the parties
intended to contract.[64]
In sum, we find that no reversible error of law may be attributed to the Court of Appeals in
upholding the orders of the trial court denying petitioners Motion to Quash the Informations
in Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 92-101959
to 92-101969. In our view, none of the grounds provided for in the Rules of Court [65] upon
which petitioners rely, finds application in this case.
One final matter. During the pendency of this petition, counsel for petitioner Roberto S.
Benedicto gave formal notice to the Court that said petitioner died on May 15, 2000. The
death of an accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon.[66]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed consolidated Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No.
35719, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the charges against deceased petitioner,
Roberto S. Benedicto, particularly in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-
101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969, pending before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 26, are ordered dropped and that any criminal as well as civil liability ex
delicto that might be attributable to him in the aforesaid cases are declared extinguished
by reason of his death on May 15, 2000. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[T]he subject matters of the disputed compromise agreement are Sandiganbayan Civil
Case No. 0009, Civil Case No. 00234, Civil Case No. 0034, the Phil-Asia case before the
Tanodbayan and PCGG I.S. No. 1. The cases arose from complaints for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, members of his family, and alleged cronies, one of whom was respondent
Roberto S. Benedicto.[57]

Nowhere is there a mention of the criminal cases filed against petitioners for violations of
Circular No. 960. Conformably with Article 1370 of the Civil Code,[58] the Agreement relied
upon by petitioners should include only cases specifically mentioned therein. Applying the
parol evidence rule,[59] where the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, the
contents of the writing constitute the sole repository of the terms of the agreement between
the parties.[60] Whatever is not found in the text of the Agreement should thus be construed
as waived and abandoned.[61] Scrutiny of the Compromise Agreement will reveal that it
does not include all cases filed by the government against Benedicto, his family, and
associates.

Additionally, the immunity covers only criminal investigation or prosecution against said
persons for acts (or) omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be alleged
to have violated any penal laws, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in
relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned, or included in this
Agreement.[62] It is only when the criminal investigation or case involves the acquisition of
any ill-gotten wealth treated, mentioned, or included in this Agreement [63] that petitioners
may invoke immunity. The record is bereft of any showing that the interest earnings from
foreign exchange deposits in banks abroad, which is the subject matter of the present
case, are treated, mentioned, or included in the Compromise Agreement. The phraseology
of the grant of absolute immunity in the Agreement precludes us from applying the same to
the criminal charges faced by petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960. A contract
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2873 February 28, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO GARCIA Y MADRIGAL, defendant-appellant.
Dominador A. Alafriz for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Rafael P. Cañiza for
appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the appellant, being 17 years of age
at the time of at the time of the commission of the crime, was entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of article 68, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The lower
court, ignoring defendant's minority, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of from 4
years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime
of robbery of which he was found guilty. He was also sentenced to pay the offended party,
jointly and severally with the other accused, the sum of P85 as indemnity.
Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing
from 18 to 16 the age below which accused have to "be committed to the custody or care
of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution," instead of being convicted and
sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy. The Solicitor General believes that
the amendment by implication has also amended paragraph 2 of article 68 of the Revised
Pena Code, which provides that when the offender is over fifteen and under eighteen
years age, "The penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period."
There are well recognized rules of statutory construction which are against the
Government's contention.
One of these rules is that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that
effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting intention in the
same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an
unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.)
This rule applies in the construction of a statute and its amendment, both being read
together as whole. "An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute
has been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been
adopted in its stead; or, as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any action
after the adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been originally enacted in its
amended form the amendment becomes a part of the original statute as if it had always
been contained therein, unless such amendment involves the abrogation of contractual
relations between the state and others. Where an amendment leaves certain portions of
the original act unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the same meaning
and effect they had before the amendment. So where an amendatory act provides that an
existing statute shall be amended to read as recited in the amendatory act, such portions
of the existing law as are retained, either literally or substantially, are regarded as a
continuation of the existing law, and not as a new enactment." (59 C. J., 1096, 1097.)
We find no irreconcilable conflict between article 68, paragraph 2, as it nowstands and
article 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between granting accused of the ages
of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age of
persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. In other words, there is no
inconsistency between sending defendants of certain ages to prison and giving them a
penalty lower than the imposable one on adults under the same or similar circumstances.
Let it be remember that the privilege of article 68, supra, is not by its nature inherent in age
but purely statutory and conventional, and that this privilege is granted adult offenders
under given conditions.
At least there is no clear intention on the part of the Congress to amend article 68. Indeed
the rational presumption is that if there had been such an intention the lawmakers should
have said so expressly, instead of leaving the change to inference.
One other rule of interpretation that quarrels with the theory of implied repeal or
amendment is that penal law is to be construed, in case of doubt, strictly against the state.
"Criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed, that is, they cannot be enlarged or
extended by intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. In other words,
the language cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to
carry into effect the general purpose for which the statute was enacted. Only those
persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be
considered within the statute's operation. They must come clearly within both the spirit and
the letter of the statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in
favor of the person accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in doubt will be
resolved in favor of those from whom the penalty is sought." (Statutory Construction,
Crawford, pp. 460-462.)
The offense charged in the information of which the appellant was found guilty is
punishable under article 294, case No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
section 6 of Republic Act No. 18, with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period. The penalty one degree lower than this is arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. There being no modifying
circumstance, the appropriate penalty in the present case is from 6 months and 1 day
of arresto mayor to 2 years and 4 months ofprision correccional. Being entitled to an
indeterminate penalty as provided in section 1 of Act No. L-4103 as amended, the accused
should be, and he is hereby sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 4 months
of arresto mayor and not more than 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional. In all
other respect the appealed judgment is affirmed. The appellant will pay the costs of this
appeal.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres,
JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
April 12, 1950
TUASON, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision.
The main theme of the Solicitor General's argument is that articles 13 (2) and 68 (2) of the
Revised Penal code "complement each other;" that "the application of article 68 takes
place only when the court has to render judgment and impose a penalty upon a minor who
has been proceeded against in accordance with article 80 and who had misbehaved or is
found incorrigible," and that "article 80 must be applied first before article 68 can come into
operation, and the court can not apply the latter article in total disregard of the former." In
short, as we infer from this line of reasoning, what article 80 does not touch, article 68 can
not touch.
We do not think the premise and conclusion of the motion are correct. There seems to be
a confusion of ideas.
It may do us well to make brief review of the legislation, past and present, relative to
juvenile offenders and dissect and analyze its various provisions and the differences
between them and the role assigned to each. .
Article 68 of the Revised Penal code provides:.
Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender
is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the
paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from
liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a
discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that
prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed but always in the proper period.
Sub-paragraph 1 and 2 of the foregoing article are a reproduction of article 85 of the
Spanish Penal Code.
Into the Revised Penal Code, the Juvenile Delinquency Act was incorporated. It has
become in the new code article 80, the first paragraph of which provides that "whenever a
minor under 18 years of age, of either sex, be accused of a crime, the court . . . shall
commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable,
institution, etc." And in the paragraph immediately preceding the last, it is further provided
that "In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulation of the
institution to which he has been committed, or with the conditions imposed upon him when
he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in case he should be found
incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be inadvisable, he shall be
returned to the court in order that the same may render the judgment corresponding to the
crime committed by him."
The latest legislation on the subject was Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80 of
the Revised Penal Code so as to reduce to below 16 the age of minors coming within its
purview.
A close examination of articles 68 and 80 will disclose that article 68, according to its main
paragraph, is to lay off and watch while the minor is in the hands of a charitable institution
or person mentioned in article 80 trying to reform him or her. This has to be so because
article 68 is a rule for the application of penalties, and there is no penalty when there is no
judgment when the delinquent is in Welfareville or other place of similar character or
entrusted to the care of a private person. However, if and when the minor turns out to be
hopeless or incorrigible, he is returned to the proper court and the court passes sentence
on him or her. In other words, article 80 withdraws, as it were, and sub-paragraph 1 and 2,
as the case maybe, of article 68 takes control.
From this it will be seen that article 68 is not dependent on article 80, nor do these articles
complement each other if by complement is meant that they are two mutually completing
parts so that article 68 could not stand without article 80. It is more appropriate to say that
article 68 merely adjusts itself to article 80 but is, in all other respects, self-sufficient and
independent of the latter. Parts of one system of penology and working in coordination with
each other, they pursue different ends. It is to be noticed that article 68 falls under section
2 of Chapter IV entitled "Application of Penalties," while article 80 comes under section 1 of
Chapter V entitled "Execution and Service of Penalties." Two different subjects, these.
It will also be seen that article 68, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code do not function at the same time and are designed for different purposes.
Each has its assigned, separate sphere of action without in any way intermingling with the
other. When article 80 operates, article 68 keeps out of the way; article 68 steps in when
article 80 steps out.
While a minor is in the process of being reformed he is, in a manner of speaking, in an
intermediate or indeterminate state, neither in prison nor free. Through repentance and by
observing good conduct, he is rewarded with freedom, released upon reaching the age of
majority or before, but if he shows no promise of turning a new leaf, Bilibid claims him.
It is the minors so situated; it is selection of two should be committed to are formatory
school or to the custody of a private person with which article 80 has to do, and no more.
Article 80 does not concern itself with what should be done with minors when they are
consigned to jail because of misbehavior; much less is it concerned over minors who, after
the passage of Republic Act No. 47, are condemned to prison without having been under
the custody of a benevolent institution or private person like youths between 16 and 18. On
the other hand, article 68 is intended for minors who are sent to jail, a matter foreign to the
province of article 80.
To press the argument further, article 85 of the original Penal Code conferred upon minors
under 18 the right to a penalty. Then came the Juvenile Delinquency Act giving additional
concession to juvenile delinquents. When, later, Republic Act No. 47 amended article 80
so as to eliminate from its beneficent provisions minor of the age of 16 or over and under
18, the logical effect of the amendment can no other than to correspondingly reduce the
age of minors regarding whom the suspensory inhibition on article 68 is to be confined.
Only to the extent and within the limits that article 80 applies is article 68 bound to defer to
that article. Where article 80 does not apply article 68 is supreme. When article 80 says
that it will deal only with minors below 16, it relinquishes authority over minors above that
age in favor of article 68. When and if article 80 should by amendment further reduce the
age to 15, to that extent the operation of article 68 will be correspondingly enlarged.
In fact, if Republic Act No. 47, instead of limiting the operation of article 80 to minors under
16, had totally abolished the scheme of juvenile reformation, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 of
article 68 of the Revised Penal Code would, in our opinion, remain intact, with the only
difference that, as before, they would have full sway, unhampered by any consideration of
suspended judgment. The predecessor of article 68 was in the original Penal Code since
that code was put in force in Spain in 1870 and in the Philippines in 1884, long before the
idea embodied in article 80 was conceived. Before the Revised Penal Code went into
effect, article 85 of the old Penal Code and the Juvenile Delinquency Act worked in the
manner herein set forth although there was not any express provision coordinating their
operation. It can safely be said that the main paragraph of article 68 was inserted merely to
explain in clear and express terms when it should stand aloof and when it should play its
role. The Revised Penal Code merely states the obvious as befits a scientific system of
law.
case. The preamble or explanatory note to Republic Act No. 47 can not be used as basis
for giving it an meaning not apparent on its face. A preamble or explanatory not is resorted
to only for clarification in cases of doubt. There is no ambiguity in Republic Act No. 47.
The motion and the request to set it for oral argument are denied.

In conclusion, when Republic Act No. 47 amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by
reducing the age of persons who may be placed on probation under that article, the
amendment did not change in any form or manner the degree of punishment that should
be meted out to those who are to be committed to jail or how they are to treated. After the
minor is turned over to the court for sentence, article 80 ceases to have any interest in him
or her. In saying that the 16-and 18-year old should no longer be given a trial or placed on
probation in a reformatory institution but should go straight to prison upon conviction,
Republic Act No. 47 does not, by implication or otherwise, connote that such minors
should also be deprived of a reduced penalty. In no standard of statutory construction is
there support for the proposition that the mitigating circumstance which minors between 16
and 18 enjoyed before Republic Act No. 47 came into being, notwithstanding the fact that
they had shown evidence of incorrigibility, should be denied them now for no other reason
than that the right to be committed to a reformatory school has been taken away from
them; now that they are confined in jail without having committed any fault other than the
crime for which they were prosecuted in the first instance.

Let it be remembered that by virtue of the amendment minors between 16 and 18 do not
now come under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80.

Of course, the effect of a law amendment would different if the amendatory law had
absorbed the law which it had amended. In that case, the original law become part and
parcel of the new law, with the result that if the amendatory law be later repealed, both that
law and the law which it had superseded or amended would be considered abrogated.
There was no law of its own force could survive. But, as we have indicated, article 68 as
well as its predecessor is an independent provision and has not been merged with article
80 or any other article of the Revised Penal code. It is an independent provision
inoperative only during the suspension of the sentence but possessing all the vigor which
article 85 of Spanish Code had, when the minors are sentenced to jail.

In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we emphasize the rule of statutory construction

to the effect that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect
may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting intentions in the same
statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an
unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.) The motion for reconsideration has not pointed to
any conflict, and we can not find any, between the retention of the privileged or special
mitigating circumstance in favor of minors below 18 and over 16 and the fact that such
minors are not entitled to the benefits of article 80 under any circumstances. The motion
for reconsideration is conspicuous for its silence on any incongruity or absurdity that might
result from our ruling on the scope and extent of Republic Act No. 47.

The sole consideration that might commend itself in favor of the Government's position is
the general welfare. For the good of society it may have been better if Republic Act No. 47
had amended articles 13 and 68 also by correspondingly reducing the age of accused
minors entitled to a mitigating circumstance by reason of age. But it is write to say that we
are not authorized to insert into a law what we think should be in it or to supply what we
think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called to the omission.
This is specially true in penal legislation which, as we have repeatedly stressed in our
decision, has to be construed strictly. But there is not even room for construction in this