See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/317979020

The Military's Role in Disaster Management and Response during the 2015
Myanmar Floods: A Social Network Approach

Article  in  International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction · June 2017

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.06.023

CITATIONS READS

6 3,245

2 authors, including:

Thet Zaw
International University of Japan
2 PUBLICATIONS   7 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Thet Zaw on 01 February 2018.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr

The military's role in disaster management and response during the 2015
Myanmar floods: A social network approach
⁎
Thet Naing Zawa,b, Seunghoo Lima,
a
Public Management and Policy Analysis Program, International University of Japan, Minami Uonuma-shi, Niigata 949-7277, Japan
b
Naval Training Command, Myanmar Navy, Thanlyin 11291-11293, Myanmar

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Disaster Management involves cooperative work among multiple organizations from multiple sectors. The or-
Military role in disaster ganizations involved in disaster management achieve their objectives through the creation of a network. This
2015 Myanmar floods study examines the effectiveness of state/province level disaster management and the role of actors in the
Disaster management networks network during Myanmar's 2015 floods using the social network analysis method. Myanmar's 2015 floods were a
Collaboration
nationwide flood event and a large-scale disaster, and the disaster management network involved government
Social network analysis
agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental/non-profit organizations across various sectors. In
this study, the military's role in state/province level disaster risk management and response is analyzed based on
the following four activities: information sharing, resource sharing, searching for the missing and rescuing
victims, and providing humanitarian assistance to the victims. The effectiveness of disaster management is
examined by comparing each actor's centrality in the disaster network structure and its perceived efficacy from
participating in the collaborative disaster network. This study also suggests requirements for disaster manage-
ment at Myanmar's state/province level and has policy implications for effective disaster management in the
future.

1. Introduction In the aftermath of such a horrible incident, Myanmar's government

Located in South East Asia, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar is
a coastal country adjacent to the Bay of Bengal and the Adman Sea.
Myanmar is one of the most disaster-prone nations in the Asia-Pacific
region due to its geographic location and tropical climate. During the
past two decades, Myanmar has suffered a number of natural disasters,
the most common of which are cyclones, tropical storms, floods,
earthquakes, landslides, droughts, and wildfires. According to the
World Risk Report [1], Myanmar ranks sixth in the world (with a score
of 9.15) on the World Risk index because of its level of disaster risk
exposure, vulnerability, and lack of coping capabilities. Although
Myanmar has experienced disasters in the past, before 2008, it had
neither planned well nor properly organized for disaster risk manage-
ment. In 2008, Cyclone Nargis—the most devastating disaster in
Myanmar's history—exposed the country's vulnerability to natural dis-
asters. Since then, disaster management has been a high priority for
Myanmar. The country's lack of preparation and planning for disaster
management resulted in the deaths of approximately 140,000 people as
a result of Cyclone Nargis, and another 2.4 million people were af-
fected.
began paying more attention to disaster risk management.
Nevertheless, the government at that time failed to establish a well-
crafted plan. In 2011, the new civilian government led by President
Thein Sein assumed authority over the state and formulated sector-wide
administrative reforms. The new administration reorganized the gov-
ernment bodies and managed new institutional arrangements—in ac-
cordance with the Constitution—for effective governance. The first step
toward disaster risk-reduction management was the establishment of
the Myanmar Disaster Preparedness Agency in April 2011 [2].
The Disaster Preparedness Agency was led by the Union Minister of
Social Warfare, Relief, and Resettlement as its chairperson and was
composed of 13 members from various ministries and legislative
branches [3]. The agency formed a Management Working committee
and 14 sub-committees for cooperative and systematic preventive
measures; the Union Minister for Defense and the Union Minister for
Home Affairs also co-chaired the agency. In 2013, after the new Natural
Disaster Management Law was legislated, the National Disaster Man-
agement Central Committee—supervised by the chairmanship of Vice
President II—was founded. Its purpose was to enhance the capability of
the agency and to support agencies in effective collaboration and

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: thetnz@iuj.ac.jp (T.N. Zaw), seunghoo.lim@gmail.com (S. Lim).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.06.023
Received 18 April 2017; Received in revised form 25 June 2017; Accepted 25 June 2017
2212-4209/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Zaw, T.N., International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.06.023
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim
decision making between and among internal and external organiza-
tions. Although the Disaster Preparedness Agency was systematically
organized based on a collaborative network and complex institutional
structure, there was no “lead organization” [4] that was primarily re-
sponsible or accountable for disaster management or the overall ad-
ministrative network.
Before this new civilian regime was implemented, the military bore
overall responsibility for the country, as it was the strongest and most
consolidated institution during a time of political instability. The
military's primary task was to safeguard the lives and property of
Myanmar's citizens, although it was also responsible for active response
to the disaster. Although the military did have experience managing
various types of disasters, including the Nargis Cyclone catastrophe, its
collaboration with Myanmar's disaster management network was not
effective due to the lack of a well-prepared plan. When the new civilian
government came to power, the disaster management network became
more systematic and effective: responsibilities, procedures and in-
structions for disaster management were standardized and precisely
defined through the promulgation of standard operating procedures
(SOP), a reference handbook, and standing orders.
The overall responsibilities of each ministry and department in-
volved in natural disaster management are detailed in the standing
orders on Natural Disaster Management in Myanmar. Disaster man-
agement in Myanmar is divided into four stages: the normal (non-dis-
aster) stage, the warning stage, the disaster response stage, and the
rehabilitation stage. Because there is no primary agency, such as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the United States or
the Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA) in Japan—assigned
to respond to natural disasters in Myanmar, the military—the country's
strongest and best-prepared organization—plays a critical role in re-
sponding promptly to natural disasters. Therefore, in the Standing
Order on Natural Disaster Management in Myanmar, the Ministry of
Defense assumes a major role in disaster management across all four
stages [5].
In July 2015, an extremely widespread flood broke out in Myanmar,
caused by the torrential rain that resulted from Cyclone Komen. At first,
the flood was at the level of State and Division measure, but later the
flood spread across the country, and 12 states and regions in Myanmar
suffered from widespread flooding simultaneously. When the flood
became a large-scale threat, the government declared a state of emer-
gency in the Sagain and Magway regions and declared the Chin and
Rakhine states to be Disaster-Affected Zones. Disaster risk management
for the flood of 2015 was the first implementation of Myanmar's
emergency response preparedness plan. During the disaster risk man-
agement process, the military, governmental organizations, and non-
governmental organizations performed their tasks cooperatively.
Particularly significant was the widespread involvement of volunteer
non-profit groups and civil organizations in the disaster risk manage-
ment process, which strengthened the government's network relation-
ships. However, the involvement of these groups also complicated the
network's inherently challenging task of carrying out its standardized
procedures and instructions as planned. Moreover, the organizations
involved in the disaster management network are different in terms of
their organizational structures, cultures, capabilities, workflows, re-
sponsibilities, and priorities [6,7]. In this regard, differences among
these organizations led to their different levels of effectiveness in dis-
aster management. Therefore, the effectiveness and significance of each
organization in Myanmar's disaster management network can be ex-
amined to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the overall network.
This study aims to determine whether the role of the military in the
disaster risk management and response process during the flood of 2015
was still central even under the newly implemented civilian regime.
The 2015 flood was a large-scale disaster; the record reflects 99 ca-
sualties. However, the flood's consequences were far less severe than
those of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, which devastated 450,000 homes and
approximately 600,000 ha of farmland and caused economic losses of 4
2
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
billion USD [8]. The UN and the international community credited
Myanmar for its improvement in disaster management in the flood of
2015 [9,10]. Because Myanmar's disaster management process involved
various internal and external organizations that performed as an in-
terconnected network, social network analysis is applicable when ex-
amining the effectiveness of collaboration among the multiple actors
during the flood of 2015, including the military, governmental/non-
governmental organizations, and civil society.
2. Literature review
This section describes the network-based collaboration that char-
acterizes disaster risk management and the military's involvement in
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) measures.
2.1. Collaboration in disaster management
Disaster risk management involves multi-organizational and multi-
sectorial cooperation among actors regardless of the scales, severities,
and scopes of the disasters that must be managed [11,12]. Disaster risk
management and response involves organizations from different fields,
levels, and sectors. Although the tasks of each organization may be
distinct, they are statutorily connected in order to achieve common
goals. Therefore, the organizations involved form a network and col-
laborate with one another to accomplish their objectives in disaster
management. Kapucu et al. [13] described how a network could be
formed in collaborative emergency management to eliminate con-
straints and increase access to actors’ resources. Such a network re-
quires collaboration, which includes coordination, communication,
partnerships, and interoperability.
Effective disaster risk management requires coordination not only
among the internal organizations of the disaster management bodies
but also with the external organizations that are facilitating the man-
agement process. Coordination among the various organizations that
make up the disaster management network is no simple task, as these
organizations are from different sectors and already have their own
working procedures, beliefs, and knowledge. The development of social
media technologies also leads to the increased participation of civil
society in the disaster recovery stage and facilitates collaboration and
communication between either local or distributed networks [14]. Liu
[15] described how the participation of civil society during the disaster
period supports government agencies; however, the institutional
structure of government agencies can sometimes obstruct civil society's
participation in disaster management, as seen in the 2008 Wenchuan
earthquake.
Collaborative governance can be defined as a network structure that
includes both public and private bodies in collective and consensus-
oriented decision-making processes [16–18]. Kapucu [19] showed how
collaborative governance could be applied to disaster management, as
it is difficult for any single jurisdiction or sector to handle the effects of
a disaster. The roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder in the
collaborative environment need to be clearly defined and understood if
optimal and effective collaboration is to be achieved.
Coordination during a crisis situation, such as during the disaster
response stage, can be more difficult to execute properly due to the
pressures and urgencies generated by disasters, communication fail-
ures, and other unanticipated conditions. If the situation turns to chaos,
collaboration among the various organs of the disaster management
body is less likely to proceed as intended. According to Kapucu and
Demiroz [20], the network can be differentiated as a planned network,
an actual network, or a perceived influenced structure, and these dis-
tinct types can be compared to one another to assess the performance of
disaster management efforts. Therefore, measuring how the actual
network has deviated from the planned network can enhance the ef-
fectiveness of disaster risk management.
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim
2.2. The military and disaster risk management
The military plays a major role in various aspects of humanitarian
assistance because of its readiness, preparedness, facilities, capabilities,
mobility, and systematic organizational structure [7,21,22]. The in-
volvement of the military in a disaster relief operation can be mandated
statutorily or requested by the civilian authorities on the basis of the
military's physical assets [23]. Emergency managers need to utilize
essential assets such as military communication networks, facilities, and
manpower in disaster response, and the chain-of-command of the
military is one of the critical elements of an efficient disaster response.
Disaster risk management is generally led by the local government
and authorities, and the relevant government agencies function as re-
sponders to small-scale disasters because they can handle the local re-
sources [24]. However, timely response to a large-scale disaster re-
quires the support of the military. That is, the disaster response
agencies, which are particularly organized for the primary purpose of
disaster management, may need the support and assistance of the
military when an initially small-scale disaster turns into large-scale one.
Rietjens et al. [25] described the military's primary objective in
disaster response as creating a secure environment that can be acces-
sible to relief organizations operating disaster response, transportation,
and communication. The secondary objective could be to provide as-
sistance in disaster areas for rehabilitation, but this objective may be
controversial because it differs from the main objective in terms of
duties [26]. Heaslip and Barber [27] argued that the utilization of
military forces for security reasons only in times of emergency is in-
adequate because the complexity and dynamics of a fragile emergency
state can generate additional requirements for military assistance.1
Historically, military forces were expected to be used for protective
purposes in humanitarian operations, but, in recent decades, military
doctrines have evolved to include the operational aspect of humani-
tarian assistance [25]. Furthermore, in their constitutions or specific
laws, most countries provide legal rights to humanitarian assistance by
the military. The military must support humanitarian assistance by
sharing its assets, providing communication and evacuation, and co-
ordinating with humanitarian agencies according to the UNHCR
Handbook for Emergencies, published by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees [29].2
3. Methods
3.1. Case selection: the floods of 2015 in Myanmar
In mid-July 2015, Myanmar's monsoon season began with torrential
rains that caused major rivers across the country to overflow. On July
30th, the effects of tropical Cyclone Komen hit Bangladesh, causing a
deteriorating weather situation in the northwest regions of Myanmar.
Following Cyclone Komen, heavy rainfall inundated most of the Chin
1
During the Great East Japan Earthquake, which occurred on March 11, 2011, Japan's
Self-Defense Force (SDF) deployed a maximum of 107,000 personnel for the major phase
of disaster response, which lasted 174 days. The Japanese SDF saved 19,286 people (70%
of all people saved), transported 13,906 t of supplies, and provided 32,985 t of water and
5005,484 meals during humanitarian assistance operations [24]. During the Hurricane
Katrina event in the U.S. in 2006, the U.S. military conducted operations to rescue and
evacuate thousands of people from the affected area, provided humanitarian assistance,
and shared military assets with disaster relief operations [28].
2
The United States supports military involvement in disaster relief according to the
Federal Disaster Act of 1950, which states that the president can declare an emergency
situation in response to a “major disaster” and provide the assistance of federal armed
forces when the governor requests aid. Although the military can help civilian commu-
nities in times of disaster, military assistance is subject to authorization by the civilian
administration [30]. Based on the experiences of Haiti, Somalia, and Rwanda, Van
Wassenhove [31] stated that closer coordination between the military and non-govern-
mental organizations can help services effectively reach areas of complex humanitarian
emergencies. Therefore, the military can be considered a component of the disaster re-
sponse bodies that provide humanitarian assistances during calamities.
3
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
and Rakhine States, as well as the Sagain and Magway regions. In Chin
state, rainfall caused not only floods but also landslides, which de-
stroyed major communication routes and isolated the surrounding areas
[32] (see Figs. 1–2).
On July 31st, a state of emergency was declared in the Sagain and
Magway regions, whereas the Chin and Rakhine states were declared
disaster-affected zones. The flood spread quickly from north to south
through the Mandalay, Magway, Bago and Irrawaddy regions, which
are located along the Ayeyarwady River. On August 4th, 2015, the
government of Myanmar called for international aid so that it could
respond to this disaster effectively. The National Natural Disaster
Management Committee (NNDMC) also activated the national disaster
management plan once the disaster had escalated to large-scale. The
Emergency Operations Centre was established and staffed with the
personnel of NNDMC and representatives from 11 committees to assist
the NNDMC in decision making, inter-organizational coordination, and
immediate disaster response operations [33,34].
3.2. Methodology and research questions
Systematic analysis of a complex collaborative network requires
quantitative relational data; such data can also provide a better un-
derstanding of the network's effectiveness. This study aims to examine
the effectiveness of disaster risk management during the 2015 floods in
Myanmar using social network analysis (hereafter SNA). SNA applies
graph theory and linear algebra to illustrate the structures of the net-
works, defining the system by analyzing the positions or roles of the
participants and relations in the network [35]. The descriptions of
structural properties underlying the complex patterns of relationships
or interactions between/among actors within the network are the pri-
mary foci of the SNA, whereas the primary foci of the traditional or
mainstream quantitative approaches in social sciences are correlations
or causalities among each actor's individual attributive characteristics.
In other words, based on dyadic data rather than the attributes of dis-
aster actors, SNA facilitates systematic analyses of specific emerging
formal or informal patterns and structures of connections, interactions,
and information exchanges among the stakeholders observed in inter-
organizational disaster contexts [36,37]. Although most disaster re-
sponses and recovery processes are analyzed based on networks of
formal institutions in which official and unofficial actors have a formal
and informal multiplicity of interconnections and organizational attri-
butes [38,39] rather than wider community networks, the post-disaster
analysis should also consider the larger community network, in which
collaborative activities among stakeholders can be stimulated and fa-
cilitated because of the expanded involvement of diverse stakeholders
[40].
SNA has been applied in many types of studies evaluating complex
social networks in the field of disaster management across response,
recovery, and adaptation [37]. Guo and Kapucu [41] analyzed China's
collaborative disaster response network performance during the Si-
chuan earthquake in 2011 and concluded that the disaster response
network of the Chinese government had difficulty facilitating colla-
boration among agencies due to strict hierarchical centralized com-
mand and control. Abbasi and Kapucu [42] studied the inter-organi-
zational disaster response coordination networks that responded to four
successive hurricanes in the U.S. state of Florida in 2014 using the SNA
approach. Kapucu and Van Wart [43] focused on the public sector's role
in the field of catastrophic disaster management, adopting SNA for a
comparative study of emergency management practices, in the case of
the 2014 “horde hurricanes” in Florida as a routine disaster and the
case of the 9/11 terrorist attack as an unexpected man-made disaster.
In this paper, which focuses on the case of Myanmar during the
floods of 2015, SNA will be utilized to analyze the formation of net-
works across several disaster risk management activities and to address
the following two research questions: (1) “which organizations were in-
fluential in responding to the Myanmar Floods in 2015?,” which will be
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim
identified by tracing how the centrality of each organization changes
according to its activities; and (2) “whether the actual structures of dis-
aster risk management networks differed from their perceived efficacies of
collaboration?,” which will be determined by comparing the actual
shapes or realized configurations of the disaster risk management net-
works with the perceived utility of and satisfaction with their colla-
borative performance.
3.3. Research design
A disaster risk management network can be differentiated into
multiple levels including national, state or provincial, and local levels
[44]; such a network can also be categorized according to its planned,
actual (or observed), and perceived influence structures [20,41,45,46].
However, this study primarily focuses on the disparity between the
actually realized disaster risk management networks and the network
participants’ perceptions of their collaborative experiences with others
as an indicator of the effectiveness of network management across four
disaster response-related activities: i) information sharing, ii) resource
sharing, iii) searching for missing people and rescuing victims, and iv)
providing humanitarian assistance to the victims [20,45]. Therefore,
based on the networks as an observed explanatory factor that emerged
following the floods, this study regards the attributes (such as the roles
or relations measured by centralities and perceived efficacy of colla-
boration) of each actor, including the military, as the outcomes.
Furthermore, as all relevant participants in this case had their own
local branches or grass-rooted organizations representing the research
4
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Fig. 1. Flood affected areas in Myanmar during Flood 2015.
(Source: OCHA, 2015).
areas of this study, the interactions among the involved actors at the
state or province and local levels will also be observed. The boundary of
the disaster risk management networks in this study includes not only
military, governmental, non-governmental, and international agencies
and organizations but also civil society actors (such as representatives
of the victimized communities and the media) across multiple sectors
[21]. This study adopted a multiple-stage snowball sampling design
[47,48]. First, a seed set of stakeholders was selected from the news
articles reporting on the 2015 Myanmar floods, and the network ties not
only among the stakeholders in the seed set but also from or to the
additional stakeholders involved in the targeting disaster response ac-
tivities of this study were identified. Next, network data were collected
from the non-seed set stakeholders which had been added by the initial
seed set actors’ referrals in the previous stage. Accordingly, the re-
petitive processes of the respondent-driven sampling method for iden-
tifying the network boundary—the participants and their ties in this
case—reached 25 actors engaged in the disaster management and re-
sponse processes (See Table 1 and Table C in Appendix).
Relational data representing multiple types of collaborative activ-
ities were collected from both online and field surveys of 25 stake-
holders. To reduce the respondents’ personal experiences and bias and
to obtain responses representing the entire institution, we requested
that the surveys be answered by the persons in charge of each disaster
response activity in each organization during the floods. The ques-
tionnaire survey is designed to analyze the effectiveness of the disaster
risk management network in terms of the gaps between the observed
relations among the respondents and the cognitive evaluation of their
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim
collaborative experiences and perceptions across four disaster response-
related activities. Accordingly, the survey questions are separated into
two sections. The first section of the survey contains 17 open-ended
items adapted from Yun et al. [49] regarding the realized relationships
among all of the actors connected across the four activities (See Table A
in Appendix). The structural or positional characteristics of each actor
within the network can be analyzed by the degree, which is the number
of ties linked to a single node, and the centralities, which are indicators
for determining each node's networking activities or positions in the
network. In particular, among the many measures of centrality, “degree
centrality” presents the number of links among actors and is calculated
for each actor divided by the number of possible links (n−1) [50,51].
Furthermore, considering the directions of the ties, this study provides
in-degree information that represents how many links or interactions a
focal stakeholder receives from other partners and out-degree in-
formation indicating how many links or interactions are initiated by a
focal actor to its partners [36]. The second section consists of 18 general
Likert-type items adapted from Thomson et al. [52] regarding the
participants’ perceived efficacies in five dimensions, including govern-
ance, administration, organizational autonomy, mutuality, and norms
(See Table B in Appendix).
4. Results
4.1. Engaged actors’ perceived efficacy across collaborative disaster
response activities
The local disaster risk management network for the 2015 Myanmar
5
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Fig. 2. Precipitation level of Myanmar in 2015 July and August.
(Source: Emergency Response Coordination Centre, 2015).
floods was studied based on the activities of 25 actors: 17 actors are
military forces, local departments of ministries in the disaster regions,
state or regional governments, or international or local non-govern-
mental organizations, all of which are included in the planned disaster
risk management network. The other 8 actors are non-profit organiza-
tions and media (which are organizations external to the planned net-
work), and victims from the disaster-affected regions. This study not
only examines the practical participation of internal and external or-
ganizations in the network in shaping the configurations of actual
networks but also analyzes the organizations’ perceptions of their ac-
tivities in the different areas in which they were involved.
The survey questionnaires, which consisted of 18 items across four
activities (See Table B, Appendix) and asked about the stakeholders’
satisfaction levels regarding their experience collaborating with others
in this case, were completed by 12 internal organizations and 2 external
organizations that had participated in the disaster risk management
processes. The results in Table 2 show that the local army forces
(Army), the local navy bases (Navy), the local air force bases (AirForce),
the local police departments (police), and a non-profit organization
(NGO 1) fully participated in the four areas and had the highest per-
ceptions of their collaborative activities with other actors. However, the
local departments of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Reset-
tlement (MSRR) and another non-profit organization (NGO 2), which
were also engaged in all four areas, did not perceive their collaborative
participation as effective for the disaster risk management network. In
the same vein, the other organizations were unsure of whether their
activities in the disaster risk management network were effective.
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Table 1
Research subject agencies and organizations.

Military and government International or local non- Civil societies

bodies government organizations

Army (Local) Local Red Cross or Red Crescent Media

Navy (Local) International Red Cross or Red Non-profit
Crescent Organizations
Air Force (Local) Rescue Team Victims
Local Departments of Ministry
of Information
Local Departments of Ministry
of Communications, Posts
and Telegraphs
Local Departments of Ministry
of Construction
Local Departments of Ministry
of Transportation
Local Departments of Ministry
of Health
Local Governments of Sagain
Division
Local Governments of Bago
Division
Local Governments of
Irrawaddy Division
Local Governments of Chin
State
Local Governments of Rakhine
State
Local Departments of Ministry
of Social
Welfare, Relief and
Resettlement
Local Police Departments

4.2. Realized networks for information sharing

All the events that occurred during the disaster required immediate
responses based on shared information among actors. Disseminating
information at the local level during a disaster can also be complicated,
especially when all parties involved simultaneously share their in-
formation with the network both vertically and horizontally.
Furthermore, disaster response processes should be carried out based
on the reliability of information. Bjerge et al. [53] stated that in-
formation sharing involves communication, which is one of the three
primary levels of coordination (communication, collaboration, and
joint-strategic planning) acknowledged by the International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Jackson [54] noted that
information sharing is also crucial for the safety of emergency re-
sponders during a disaster. He stated that decision makers must have
The perception levels of engaged actors in the 2015 Myanmar Floods.

information about the hazard environment, responder workforce,

evolving safety issues, and safety equipment for effective disaster
management. The local information-sharing network of the 2015
Myanmar floods is examined by categorizing the activities of the par-
ticipant organizations, i.e., information reliability, information ren-
dering, information access and responsiveness (see Figs. 3–6 and
Table 3).
It was found that local military commands and governmental de-
partments are the most reliable sources in the information-sharing
network. The Air Force (Airforce) and Departments of Ministry of Social
Welfare, Relief and Resettlement (MSRR) are the most central actors in
this network. Air Force (11, 0.458), the local department of the Ministry
of Transportation (Department of Meteorology and Hydrology) (MoT)
(7, 0.292) and the Navy (6, 0.25) have the highest out-degree numbers
and out-degree centralities, indicating that they relied heavily on the
other actors for information-sharing during the disaster risk manage-
ment period. The in-degree and in-degree centrality represent the
Table 2

number of organizations that are defined as reliable information

sources by other organizations in the network. The local military

6
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Fig. 3. Information reliability. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception level of
collaborative effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil societies
(see Figs. 3–17)).

Fig. 4. Information rendering. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception level of
collaborative effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil societies
(see Figs. 3–17)).

commands (Army) (6, 0.25), MSRR (6, 0.25), local police departments
(Police) (6, 0.25), and local government in the Irrawaddy region
(Irrawaddy) (6, 0.25) are more frequently regarded as reliable in-
formation sources (see Table 3). Participating organizations’ percep-
tions of their activities coincide with the shape of the actual network
because the central actors are perceived as being strong components of
the network.
The local military commands are indicated as the most active in-
formation-rendering actors in the information-sharing network. Local
Air Force bases (Airforce) (10, 0.417), Naval bases (Navy) (7, 0.292),
and Army bases (Army) (5, 0.238) serve as vital participants in in-
formation rendering, and MoT (7, 0.292) is found to be a main in-
formation-rendering actor according to the out-degree results, which
capture the number of organizations described by each organization

Fig. 5. Information acquiring. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception level of
collaborative effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil societies
(see Figs. 3–17)).

7
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim
Fig. 6. Responsiveness to information returns. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception
level of collaborative effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil
societies (see Figs. 3–17)).
that disseminated information. In addition to military and government
organizations, a non-profit organization (NGO 1) (6, 0.25) also fre-
quently provided information to the network. The out-degree can be
defined as the willingness of each organization to participate in the
network because the out-degree number refers to the number of orga-
nizations contacted by each organization during disaster risk manage-
ment. The most productive information providers, as defined by other
organizations (meaning they had top in-degree scores), are the local
government of Irrawaddy (5, 0.208), Army (5, 0.208), Navy (4, 0.167),
and MSRR (4, 0.167). Based on these results, the most active in-
formation providers are military and government organizations, which
are most responsible for disaster risk management. The top actors in the
network with regard to information-rendering activity are described in
Table 3. The perceived efficacies of collaboration did not differ from the
actual network structure because all actors that were highly perceived
can be observed at the centre of the network.
Information-acquiring activity is influenced by regional military
commands and local departments of government organizations.
According to the out-degree results, the top organizations using the
most contacts with others to acquire information are the Army (9,
0.375), Navy (7, 0.292), Air Force (5, 0.208), and local Red Cross team
(RC (local)) (4, 0.167). The top information receivers can be regarded
as the most responsible actors in disaster risk management (see Table 3)
because these organizations need to acquire as much information as
possible from all available resources to carry out their tasks. The in-
degree results represent the organizations active in information re-
ceiving, as described by other organizations. They include Irrawaddy
(7, 0.292), the rescue team (Rescue) (5, 0.208), the Army (4, 0.167),
and MSSR (4, 0.167), which are top information receivers in the net-
work according to other organizations. The graphical illustration of
information-acquiring activities during disaster response processes
shows the central roles of the local military commands and the local
government of the Irrawaddy region within the network. The inter-
operation among local military commands and local government bodies
are found to be clearly collaborative. The perceived network shows that
Irrawaddy and Rescue are low-level participants in the information-
sharing network. The role of these two organizations with regard to
information-acquiring activity was different because they retrieve in-
formation more frequently from sources other than military and local
government bodies.
The most highly responsive organizations during the disaster re-
sponse process are shown in the in-degree results. The most responsive
organizations with regard to information-sharing—referred to by other
8
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
organizations in the network—are the Army (3, 0.125) and Irrawaddy
(3, 0.125), which are also the most influential actors in the information-
sharing network. The graphical structure of the responsiveness of or-
ganizations in the network is illustrated as a fragmented network,
which means that the entities of the network are separated into their
own groups. The ability to immediately respond to information sharing
can be observed mostly in local military commands that are engaged in
various disaster management mechanisms. Local governments are
found to arrange and control various activities of disaster risk man-
agement by accessing various sources of information across the net-
work.
4.3. Realized networks for resource sharing
The disaster risk management network comprises diverse actors
with different structures, capabilities, resources, and responsibilities.
The nature of disaster response tasks makes it difficult for a single or-
ganization to accomplish them alone, as collaboration is required
among organizations. Haque and Uddin [55] describe disaster man-
agement as a countrywide affair, and governments cannot manage
disasters alone because of resource constraints and the wide range of
tasks they must perform.
Moreover, as the availability of resources for each organization in
the network is different, resource sharing (of materials, assets, in-
formation, and human resources) is also necessary if each organization
in the network is to accomplish its respective responsibilities. The local
resource-sharing network of the 2015 Myanmar floods was analyzed
based on each organization's four main requirements: resource relia-
bility, resource sharing, resource requesting, and responsiveness to
other organizations’ requests (see Figs. 7–10 and Table 4).
The resource reliance or dependency in the network is described
using two measures: the out-degree shows the number of organizations
relied upon for each resource shared by each organization in the net-
work, and the in-degree represents the frequency with which an orga-
nization is defined as a reliable source by other organizations in the
network. Army (6, 0.25), Rescue (4, 0.167), and NGO 1 (4, 0.167) are
described as top organizations that are relied upon by other organiza-
tions. The graphical explanation of resource reliability in the network
shows that Army, Navy, and NGO 1 have the highest centrality, re-
flecting their active participation in the resource-sharing network. The
perceived network for resource reliability is almost identical to the
actual network, except for the perception of the rescue team. Although
the perception of the role of the rescue team in the network is very low,
 T.N. Zaw, S. Lim

Table 3
Major influential organizations in information sharing network.

Information Reliance Information Rendering Information Acquiring Information Quick Respond Perception

Ranks Out Out In Degree In Degree Out Out In Degree In Degree Out Out In Degree In Degree Out Degree Out Degree In Degree In Degree
Degree Degree Centrality Degree Degree Centrality Degree Degree Centrality Centrality Centrality
Centrality Centrality Centrality

1 Airforce Airforce Army Army Airforce Airforce Irrawaddy (5) Irrawaddy Army Army Irrawady (7) Irrawady Army Army Army Army Army
(11) (0.458) (6) (0.250) (10) (0.417) (0.208) (9) (0.375) (0.292) (1) (0.042) (3) (0.125) (5)
2 MoT MoT MSRR MSRR Navy Navy Army Army Navy Navy Rescue Rescue Irrawaddy (1) Irrawaddy Irrawaddy (3) Irrawaddy Navy
(7) (0.292) (6) (0.250) (7) (0.292) (5) (0.208) (7) (0.292) (5) (0.208) (0.042) (0.125) (5)
3 Navy Navy Police Police MoT MoT Navy Navy Airforce Airforce Army Army Airforce Airforce Airforce Airforce Airforce
(6) (0.25) (6) (0.250) (7) (0.292) (4) (0.167) (5) (0.208) (4) (0.167) (1) (0.042) (1) (0.042) (5)
4 RC RC (local) Irrawaddy (6) Irrawaddy NGO 1 NGO 1 MSRR MSRR RC RC (local) MSRR MSRR MSSR MSSR MSSR MSSR Police

9
(local) (0.167) (0.250) (6) (0.250) (4) (0.167) (local) (0.167) (4) (0.167) (1) (0.042) (1) (0.042) (5)
(4) (4)
5 NGO 2 NGO 2 Rescue Rescue Army Army Police Police NGO 1 NGO 1 Airforce (3) Airforce MCPT MCPT NGO 1 NGO 1 NGO 1
(4) (0.167) (3) (0.292) (5) (0.208) (4) (0.167) (4) (0.167) (0.125) (1) (0.042) (1) (0.042) (5)
6 MoH MoH NGO 1 NGO 1 MoI MoI NGO 1 NGO 1 NGO 2 NGO 2 MoH MoH MoT MoT MoI MoI MSRR
(3) (0.125) (3) (0.292) (3) (0.125) (4) (0.167) (3) (0.125) (3) (0.125) (1) (0.042) (1) (0.042) (4.6)
7 MoI MoI MoT MoT Police Police Airforce Airforce NGO 3 NGO 3 MoI MoI Police Police Sagain Sagain MoT
(3) (0.125) (3) (0.292) (2) (0.083) (3) (0.125) (3) (0.125) (3) (0.125) (1) (0.042) (1) (0.042) (4.2)
8 NGO 1 NGO 1 Navy Navy RC RC (local) MoH MoH Police Police Police Police MoC MoC Chin Chin NGO 2
(3) (0.125) (2) (0.250) (local) (0.083) (3) (0.125) (2) (0.083) (3) (0.125) (1) (0.042) (1) (0.042) (4.2)
(2)
9 Army Army Airforce Airforce NGO 2 NGO 2 MoI MoI MSRR MSRR Media Media NGO 1 NGO 1 – – MoI
(2) (0.083) (2) (0.250) (2) (0.083) (3) (0.125) (1) (0.042) (2) (0.083) (1) (0.042) (4)
10 MSRR MSRR MCPT MCPT NGO 3 NGO 3 Rescue Rescue MCPT MCPT NGO 1 NGO 1 NGO 2 NGO 2 – – MoH
(2) (0.083) (2) (0.250) (2) (0.083) (3) (0.125) (1) (0.042) (2) (0.083) (1) (0.042) (4)
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Fig. 7. Resource reliance. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception level of collaborative
effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil societies (see
Figs. 3–17)).

its actual engagement in the network is higher than the level at which it
is perceived.
According to the out-degree expression, the best resource providers
in the network are regional military commands, as indicated by the
number of resource-providing organizations. According to the out-de-
gree result, the local Air Force (10, 0.417) provided resources to 10
different organizations in the network, and its result is considerably
higher than that of the other top providers- Navy (4, 0.167) and Army
(2, 0.083). Although the Air Force has the highest out-degree score, the
top resource providers as defined by other organizations (i.e., the or-
ganizations with the top in-degree results) are Army (4, 0.167), MSRR
(4, 0.167), Rescue (4, 0.167), and NGO 1 (4, 0.167). Although the re-
sults of in-degree and out-degree analyses are quite different, the net-
work figures for resource provision in the network illustrate that mili-
tary actors are central actors in the network. According to the military
news [56], the Air Force provided 809 sorties of flights, the Army used
1934 vehicles, and the Navy used its vessels 35 times for transportation,
rescue missions and delivering humanitarian aid in the disaster-affected
regions. Therefore, the expectation that military actors will be major
resource providers is consistent with the result of the illustrated net-
work. In the graphical illustration, the degree centrality of Rescue and
MSRR is higher than their perception levels in the perceived network,
whereas the degree centrality of local police forces can be observed as
lower than their perceived levels.
Local Air Force bases (8, 0.333), Army (4, 0.167), and the local
department of the Ministry of Health (MoH) (3, 0.125) are the most-
requested senders of resources in the network based on the out-degree
results. The in-degree result shows that Army (4, 0.167), MSRR (3,
0.125), MoH (3, 0.125), and Irrawaddy (3, 0.125) are the top organi-
zations requested by other organizations needing resource assistance.
The illustrated network diagram shows collaboration for resource
sharing among the military forces and local departments of govern-
mental organizations in the network. The actual structure of resource-
requesting activity accords closely with the perceptions of organiza-
tions in the network.
The responsiveness of participant organizations to resource requests

Fig. 8. Resource rendering. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception level of
collaborative effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil societies
(see Figs. 3–17)).

10
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Fig. 9. Resource request. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception level of collaborative
effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil societies (see
Figs. 3–17)).

Fig. 10. Responsiveness to resource request. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception
level of collaborative effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil
societies (see Figs. 3–17)).

from other organizations in the disaster management network is very
low according to the in-degree results. The structure of the actual
network is fragmented because the survey question for responsiveness
of organizations is designed to indicate which organizations are most
responsive to requests. The result of the in-degree analysis shows that
the Army (3, 0.125) is the most responsive actor compared to other
organizations.
4.4. Realized network for evacuation, search, and rescue missions
Evacuation, Search, and Rescue missions are central elements of the
disaster response process and require timely, cooperative efforts among
responsible actors in the network in order to save lives and property. In
the pre-disaster period, people require immediate evacuation to safer
areas. Nonetheless, especially in developing countries, the responsible
authorities and organizations concerned are less likely to have the
capabilities, resources, institutions or facilities necessary to carry out
preventive measures. The effective coordination of capacity and re-
sources among organizations is critical not only for the safe and timely
evacuation of people threatened by the disaster but also for the provi-
sion of shelter and assistance [57]. Hence, during the disaster period or
the post-disaster period, search and rescue tasks in the disaster areas
cannot be managed only by the local authorities, as they lack sufficient
capabilities and facilities. Poteyeva et al. [58] describe search and
rescue as components of the emergency disaster response system;
emergency and volunteer responses are critical for search and rescue
operations because most victims are saved within the first two days
following a disaster. Therefore, collaboration between local govern-
ment bodies and other organizations is a fundamental requirement for
timely and effective disaster management. The tasks of evacuating
victims, searching for missing people, and rescuing victims at the local
level are analyzed based on three activities: (1) requesting evacuation;
(2) collaborating to evacuate, search for, and rescue victims; and (3)
rescuing victims using the abilities of each organization (see
Figs. 11–13 and Table 5).
With regard to requesting assistance from other organizations in the
network with evacuation, searching for and rescuing victims, the most
influential organizations are the military, the local government de-
partments responsible for these tasks, and non-governmental organi-
zations. MSRR (7, 0.292), Army (6, 0.25), Navy (5, 0.208), NGO 1 (5,
0.208), and Police (4, 0.167) are found to be the top senders of requests
to the other organizations in the network based on out-degree results.
The in-degree results, which identify those organizations that are most
often requested by other organizations, are similar to those of the out-
degree results. The Army (6, 0.250), MSRR (5, 0.208), Air Force (5,
0.208), Navy (4, 0.167), and Rescue are the top organizations in terms
of receiving help requests from other organizations within the network.
The local departments of the MSRR (which are primarily responsible for
rescuing victims) and local military commands have the highest degree
of centrality in the network (see Fig. 11). According to the illustrated
network figures, mutual interconnections within the network reveal
strong collaboration among the military, local government bodies, and
non-governmental organizations. According to the perceptions of or-
ganizations in the network, the actual network is not much different,

11
 T.N. Zaw, S. Lim

Table 4
Major influential organizations in resource sharing network.

Resource Reliance Resource Rendering Resource Request Responsiveness to Resource Perception

Request

Ranks Out Degree Out Degree In Degree In Degree Out Degree Out Degree In Degree In Degree Out Degree Out Degree In Degree In Degree In Degree In Degree
Centrality Centrality Centrality Centrality Centrality Centrality Centrality

1 Navy Navy Army Army (0.250) Airforce (10) Airforce Army Army Airforce (8) Airforce Army Army Army Army Army
(6) (0.25) (6) (0.417) (4) (0.167) (0.333) (4) (0.167) (3) (0.125) (5)
2 Army Army (0.167) Rescue Rescue Navy Navy (0.167) MSRR MSRR Army Army MSRR MSRR MoH MoH Navy
(4) (4) (0.167) (4) (4) (0.167) (4) (0.167) (3) (0.125) (1) (0.042) (5)
3 Airforce Airforce NGO 1 NGO 1 Army Army Rescue Rescue MoH MoH (0.125) MoH MoH Irrawaddy Irrawaddy Airforce
(3) (0.125) (4) (0.167) (2) (0.083) (4) (0.167) (3) (3) (0.125) (1) (0.042) (5)
4 MoH MoH (0.125) Navy Navy (0.083) MoH MoH (0.083) NGO 1 NGO 1 Navy Navy (0.083) Irrawaddy (3) Irrawaddy Chin Chin Police

12
(3) (2) (2) (4) (0.167) (2) (0.125) (1) (0.042) (5)
5 RC (local) (3) RC (local) Irrawaddy (2) Irrawaddy NGO 1 (2) NGO 1 Navy Navy RC (local) RC (local) NGO 1 NGO 1 – – NGO 1
(0.125) (0.083) (0.083) (1) (0.042) (2) (0.083) (3) (0.125) (5)
6 MSRR MSRR (0.083) MSRR MSRR NGO 2 (2) NGO 2 Airforce Airforce NGO 1 (2) NGO 1 Navy Navy – – MSRR
(2) (2) (0.083) (0.083) (1) (0.042) (0.083) (2) (0.083) (3.8)
7 NGO 1 NGO 1 Media Media NGO 3 (2) NGO 3 MCPT MCPT NGO 2 (2) NGO 2 Airforce Airforce – – MoH
(2) (0.083) (2) (0.083) (0.083) (1) (0.042) (0.083) (2) (0.083) (3.6)
8 NGO 2 NGO 2 Airforce Airforce Police Police MoI MoI MSRR (1) MSRR MoT MoT – – Irrawaddy
(2) (0.083) (1) (0.042) (1) (0.042) (1) (0.042) (0.042) (1) (0.042) (3.6)
9 NGO 3 NGO 3 MoH MoH (0.042) – – Police Police MoC MoC (0.042) Police Police – – MoC
(2) (0.083) (1) (1) (0.042) (1) (1) (0.042) (3.4)
10 Irrawaddy (1) Irrawaddy Police Police – – Chin Chin (0.042) – MoC MoC – – NGO 2
(0.042) (1) (0.042) (1) (1) (0.042) (3)
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Fig. 11. SAR request. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception level of collaborative
effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil societies (see
Figs. 3–17)).

Fig. 12. SAR collaboration. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception level of
collaborative effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil societies
(see Figs. 3–17)).

with the exception of the perception of the rescue team. Although
Rescue is perceived as having very low participation, their participation
in the network is actually more frequent compared to other organiza-
tions.
According to the results of collaboration activity in Table 5, the
local military commands are found to play an influential role in colla-
borating with other organizations in the network. The out-degree re-
sults show the Air Force, Police, Army, MSRR, and Navy as major
organizations that have collaborated or attempted to collaborate with
other organizations. The in-degree results show that the participant
organizations frequently collaborated with the Army, Navy, MSRR, and
Police. The collaboration network figure shows greater interconnection
and collaboration among the military, government bodies, and non-
governmental organizations. Very little difference was found between
the participating organizations’ perceived levels of collaborative effi-
cacy and the observed structure of the actual network. Despite its low

Fig. 13. Rescue conducted by organizations. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception
level of collaborative effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil
societies (see Figs. 3–17)).

13
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Table 5
Influential organizations in evacuation, search and rescue missions, and rescue of victims.

Request for Evacuation, Search and Rescue the victims Collaboration for Evacuation, Search and Rescue the victims Rescued by Organizations Perception

Ranks Out Degree Out Degree In Degree In Degree Out Degree Out Degree In Degree In Degree In Degree In Degree
Centrality Centrality Centrality Centrality Centrality

1 MSRR MSRR Army Army Airforce Airforce Army Army Army Army Army
(7) (0.292) (6) (0.250) (7) (0.292) (7) (0.292) (6) (0.25) (5)
2 Army Army MSRR MSRR Police Police Navy Navy Navy Navy Navy
(6) (0.250) (5) (0.208) (7) (0.292) (5) (0.208) (2) (0.083) (5)
3 Navy Navy Airforce Airforce Army Army Airforce Airforce Airforce Airforce Airforce
(5) (0.208) (5) (0.208) (6) (0.25) (5) (0.208) (1) (0.042) (5)
4 NGO 1 NGO 1 Navy Navy MSRR MSRR MSRR MSRR – – Police
(5) (0.208) (4) (0.167) (6) (0.25) (5) (0.208) (4.6)
5 Police Police Rescue Rescue Navy Navy Police Police – – NGO 1
(4) (0.167) (4) (0.167) (5) (0.208) (5) (0.208) (4.2)
6 Airforce Airforce Police Police RC (local) RC (local) Rescue Rescue – – MSRR
(3) (0.125) (3) (0.125) (5) (0.208) (4) (0.167) (4.2)
7 NGO 2 NGO 2 MoH MoH NGO 1 NGO 1 NGO 1 NGO 1 – – MoH
(2) (0.083) (2) (0.083) (3) (0.125) (4) (0.167) (4)
8 NGO 3 NGO 3 NGO 1 NGO 1 NGO 2 NGO 2 MoH MoH – – Irrawaddy
(1) (0.042) (2) (0.083) (3) (0.125) (2) (0.083) (3.6)
9 – – Irrawaddy Irrawaddy – – MCPT MCPT – – RC (local)
(1) (0.042) (1) (0.042) (3.6)
10 – – Chin Chin – – MoT MoT – – NGOs 2
(1) (0.042) (1) (0.042) (3.2)

perceived level of participation, the role of the rescue team in colla-
boration can be considered important because it cooperates with the
four most influential organizations.
Regional military commands are identified as the major actors re-
sponsible for saving people in the disaster area based on the stake-
holders’ responses to the question “Which organization helped you
evacuate, searched for you, or rescued you from the affected areas
during the 2015 Myanmar floods?” (see Table A, Appendix). The survey
assumes that regional military commands, local government bodies,
and non-profit organizations helped victims, especially those located in
the disaster-affected areas. According to the survey, nine respondents
described being evacuated or rescued by military forces. Myanmar's
military reported that 57,997 households and 5414 animals were res-
cued by military forces during disaster periods [6].
4.5. Realized networks for humanitarian assistance provided to victims
Providing humanitarian aid to victims is an essential step in disaster
risk management and is therefore part of the disaster relief process
during times of emergency. Humanitarian assistance can play a vital
role for disaster-affected people if such assistance is cooperatively dis-
tributed to meet real needs [59]. Humanitarian action can be defined as
an emergency service that helps to distribute the humanitarian burden
[60]. Throughout the pre-disaster, emergency, and post-disaster per-
iods, people evacuated from disaster-damaged areas must be provided
with shelter, food, and medical support until they can return home.
Because states are responsible for providing relief assistance during
times of disaster, government organizations lead the provision of food,
shelter, and healthcare to victims [61].
Although local government bodies bear primary responsibility for
providing humanitarian aid to victims in their jurisdictions, they may
be hindered by having to conduct various disaster response activities at
the same time. Therefore, they must cooperate with other internal or
external organizations to provide humanitarian assistance. The chal-
lenge of providing humanitarian aid to the victims is examined based
on the four activities of organizations in the network: requesting hu-
manitarian assistance, providing shelter, providing food and water, and
providing medical support (see Figs. 14–17 and Table 6).

Fig. 14. Requesting humanitarian assistance. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception
level of collaborative effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil
societies (see Figs. 3–17)).

14
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Fig. 15. Shelter providing. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception level of
collaborative effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil societies
(see Figs. 3–17)).

Fig. 16. Providing food and water. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception level of
collaborative effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil societies
(see Figs. 3–17)).

Fig. 17. Medical supporting. (Notes: The size of the actor (i.e., node) is proportional to the degree centrality for each actor and its color refers to each actor’s perception level of
collaborative effectiveness. Using different shapes, the types of actor are classified into four groups: military, government organizations, non-government organizations and civil societies
(see Figs. 3–17)).

15
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim
Requests for humanitarian assistance are frequently sent within the
network among local military commands and local departments of
government organizations. According to the in-degree results, the Army
(8, 0.333), Navy (5, 0.208), NGO 1 (5, 0.208), Police (4, 0.167) and RC
(local) (4, 0.167) receive the most humanitarian aid requests in the
network. The out-degree results show that the main organizations re-
questing humanitarian aid are the Army (6, 0.250), MSRR (4, 0.167),
MoH (4, 0.167), Air Force (3, 0.125), and Irrawaddy (3, 0.125). The
graphical illustration of the network shows that the regional military
commands played the primary role in requesting humanitarian aid for
victims. The military forces cooperated with each other and requested
that other organizations provide humanitarian aid to victims. Although
the interconnection between the state or regional government and the
local departments of ministries are described in the network figure,
cooperation between military forces and state or regional government is
not significant because no interconnection was described between these
entities. The participants’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the net-
work's collaboration are similar to what occurred in the actual network,
with the exception of the role of the local government of the Irrawaddy
region.
It is essential that victims be provided with safe shelter before they
can resettle in their original locations. The provision of shelter during
the 2015 Myanmar floods was mainly arranged by local armed forces
and local government organizations. The in-degree results show the
Army (9, 0.375), MSRR (8, 0.333), and Irrawaddy (5, 0.208) as the top
shelter providers. The MSRR and government of Irrawaddy were the
government organizations most responsible for providing shelters to the
victims, and the local armed forces had considerable resources to use in
carrying out disaster relief functions. Therefore, the roles of the major
actors in the network are similar to those of the actors in the planned
network. The regional military commands and local departments of the
MSRR have the highest centralities in the network based on the results
shown in Fig. 14. The perceived involvement of MSRR is lower than its
actual involvement in shelter provision, although the actual network
structure is not different from the perceptions of participants in the
network.
The role of non-profit organizations can be observed in the provi-
sion of food and water to the victims of the 2015 Myanmar floods.
Support from external organizations (including non-profit organiza-
tions and social communities) for disaster risk management processes
are one of the important features of the 2015 Myanmar floods. Support
from non-profit organizations and social communities reinforced the
government agencies’ efforts during the disaster relief process. The in-
degree results indicate that MSRR (8, 0.333), NGO 1 (7, 0.292), Army
(6, 0.250), Air Force (5, 0.208), and Rescue (5, 0.208) actively parti-
cipated in providing food and water to the victims during the disaster
relief process. The top actors in providing food and water include four
different groups, i.e., regional military commands, local government
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and civil society orga-
nizations. Therefore, it is evident that the network that provided food
and water to the victims consists of diverse organizations across mul-
tiple sectors and that they operated collaboratively. The actual parti-
cipation levels of military forces and NGO 1 are similar to their per-
ceived levels of perception, but the actual participation levels of MSRR
and Rescue are higher than their perceived levels.
Medical support is necessary not only for healing the sick but also
for preventing and controlling diseases during the relief process. Large-
scale disasters may result in high demand for medical support. In ad-
dition, it is difficult for local governments to handle medical support on
their own. In this respect, local governments require support from the
other internal and/or external organizations in their disaster relief
networks. The network that provided medical support to the victims of
the 2015 Myanmar floods also included organizations from different
sectors. The influential organizations in this network are the Army (8,
0.333), MoH (8, 0.333), RC (local) (6, 0.250), and Rescue (4, 0.167),
and their influence is found to be consistent with the in-degree results.
16
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
The results show that the organizations with medical support cap-
abilities play an influential role in providing medical support to victims.
The in-degree result for the local army forces is the same as the results
for the local departments of the MoH because the local army forces
dispatched their medical forces to the disaster-affected areas to re-
inforce the requirements of the MoH by providing additional medical
support. According to the report of Myanmar's military, 58,104 civilians
received medical treatments from military medical forces [56]. The
medical support network figure shows that the Army and MoH have the
highest degree centralities in the network, but there is no involvement
of the state or regional governments in the network. The actual network
is quite different from the perception of participant organizations in the
network. Although RC (Local), MSRR, and MoH were perceived as
having low participation, their actual participation was higher.
4.6. The military's role in realized networks across four disaster response-
related activities
Military assistance in disaster management and response during the
2015 Myanmar floods was found to be significant in all analyzed areas.
In the area of information sharing, military actors are found to be the
most reliable information sources and active information sharing actors
in the networks. The regional air force base (Airforce) (11, 0.458) is the
top actor, which heavily relied on the other actors for information
sharing, and the regional army command (Army) (6, 0.25) is defined as
the most reliable information source in the network according to the
out-degree and in-degree results. These perceptions coincide with the
illustrated network. The results of information rendering and acquiring
showed that the regional military commands actively participated and
collaborated with governmental and non-governmental organizations
in the information sharing network. During the disaster period, regional
military commands could be more engaged than local governments in
the disaster response in many places because the military had a greater
resource capacity. The wide engagement of the military in disaster re-
sponse allowed the regional military commands to gather more in-
formation, and the regional military commands’ communication assets
facilitated information dissemination within the network during the
emergency. Since the regional military commands engaged in various
disaster response mechanisms, regional military commands are re-
garded as the most highly responsive actor in terms of information
sharing.
The resource-sharing network is found to have relied upon the re-
gional military commands, based on the results of each activity. The
results of the resource-sharing network showed that regional military
commands were influential actors in the network because they were
recognized as reliable resource sources and active resource providers in
the disaster management network. The availability of military assets
and the readiness of military forces are the main reasons for the in-
volvement and influence of military actors in the disaster management
network when the local government needed assistance to handle the
large-scale disaster. The results on responsiveness to resource requests
indicate that the regional military command (Army) was the most re-
sponsive actor. The illustrated network shows that the perceptions of
military actors were not different from those of the actual network
structure.
The military's role is highly significant based on the results of eva-
cuation, search and rescue activities during disaster response. The
various organizations in the network requested that all regional mili-
tary commands, naval bases, and air force bases help with evacuation,
search and rescue missions because of the very high degree of centrality
of regional military commands in the collaboration network for eva-
cuation, search and rescue missions. These perceptions coincided with
those of the actual network. The position of infantry battalions under
the regional military commands, regional naval commands, and re-
gional air force commands are usually located near major cities. Since
evacuation, search and rescue missions are timely tasks that require
 T.N. Zaw, S. Lim

Table 6
Major organizations providing humanitarian aid to victims.

Humanitarian Assistance Request Shelter Support Food and Water Support Medical Support Perception

Ranks Out Out In Degree In Degree Out Out Degree In Degree In Degree Out Out In Degree In Degree Out Out In In Degree
Degree Degree Centrality Degree Centrality Centrality Degree Degree Centrality Degree Degree Degree Centrality
Centrality Centrality Centrality

1 Army Army Army Army Airforce Airforce Army Army Airforce Airforce MSRR MSRR Army Army Army Army Army
(8) (0.333) (6) (0.25) (11) (0.458) (9) (0.375) (10) (0.417) (8) (0.333) (8) (0.333) (8) (0.333) (5)
2 Navy Navy MSRR MSRR NGO 1 NGO 1 MSRR MSRR Army Army NGO 1 NGO 1 Airforce Airforce MoH MoH Navy
(5) (0.208) (4) (0.167) (5) (0.208) (8) (0.333) (5) (0.208) (7) (0.292) (6) (0.25) (8) (0.333) (5)
3 NGO 1 NGO 1 MoH MoH Navy Navy Irrawaddy (5) Irrawaddy Navy Navy Army Army NGO 1 NGO 1 RC RC (local) Airforce
(5) (0.208) (4) (0.167) (4) (0.167) (0.208) (5) (0.208) (6) (0.25) (5) (5) (local) (0.25) (5)
(6)
4 Police Police Airforce Airforce Police Police Rescue Rescue Police Police Airforce (5) Airforce NGO 3 NGO 3 Rescue Rescue Police
(4) (0.167) (3) (0.125) (4) (0.167) (3) (0.125) (4) (0.167) (0.208) (4) (4) (4) (0.167) (5)
5 RC RC (local) Irrawaddy (3) Irrawaddy Army Army NGO 1 NGO 1 NGO 1 NGO 1 Rescue Rescue Navy Navy MSRR MSRR NGO 1

17
(local) (0.167) (0.125) (3) (0.125) (3) (0.125) (4) (0.167) (5) (0.208) (3) (3) (3) (0.125) (5)
(4)
6 Airforce Airforce NGO 1 NGO 1 RC RC (local) Navy Navy MSRR MSRR Navy Navy Police Police MoT MoT Irrawaddy
(3) (0.125) (3) (0.125) (local) (0.125) (2) (0.083) (3) (0.125) (3) (0.125) (3) (3) (3) (0.125) (4)
(3)
7 NGO 2 NGO 2 Navy Navy Victim 1 Victim 1 Police Police RC RC (local) Irrawaddy (2) Irrawaddy Victim 1 Victim 1 Navy Navy MoH
(2) (0.083) (3) (0.125) (Iwd) (Iwd) (2) (0.083) (local) (0.125) (2) (Iwd) (Iwd) (2) (0.083) (3.75)
(3) (0.125) (3) (3) (3)
8 MSRR MSRR Police Police MoH MoH MoH MoH NGO 3 NGO 3 RC (Inter) (2) RC (Inter) Victim 3 Victim 3 RC RC (Inter) RC(local) (3.5)
(1) (0.042) (2) (0.083) (2) (0.083) (2) (0.083) (2) (0.083) (2) (UR) (UR) (Inter) (0.083)
(3) (3) (2)
9 MoH MoH RC (local) (2) RC (local) Vicitim Vicitim 2 Airforce Airforce Victim 1 Victim 1 MCPT MCPT MSRR MSRR NGO 1 NGO 1 MSRR
(1) (0.042) (0.083) 2 (Iwd) (Iwd) (1) (0.042) (Iwd) (Iwd) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2) (0.083) (3.25)
(2) (0.083) (2) (0.083)
10 – Rescue Rescue MSRR MSRR Chin Chin Victim 3 Victim 3 MoH MoH RC RC (local) Airforce Airforce NGO 2
(2) (0.083) (1) (0.042) (1) (0.042) (UR) (UR) (1) (1) (local) (2) (1) (0.042) (2.5)
(2) (0.125) (2)
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim
sufficient assets and manpower, it is best to request assistance from the
regional military commands for such tasks. In contrast, government
bodies lack sufficient resources for evacuation, search and rescue mis-
sions. Therefore, the military must help the local government save ci-
vilian lives. According to our results, most of the respondents described
the regional military command (Army) as the main actor responsible for
saving people during the disaster.
The results for humanitarian assistance to the victims showed that
the military actors actively participated and collaborated with other
actors in requesting humanitarian assistance, providing shelter, food
and water, and medical services to the victims. The graphical network
structure illustrated that the military closely collaborated with both
governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations in
providing humanitarian assistance and the military actors had high
degree centrality results in each activity. The illustrated actual network
structure of each activities expressed that the military actors played a
critical role, similar to the government bodies that were primarily re-
sponsible for providing humanitarian assistance to the victims in the
disaster management network. During the disaster period, the military
actors must use their military resources and supported local govern-
ment bodies in providing humanitarian assistance to the victims be-
cause the huge size of the disaster-affected population was difficult for
the local government to manage alone. It is obvious that the military's
involvement in humanitarian assistance activities facilitated the gov-
ernment's disaster management mechanism at the state and local levels.
5. Discussion
The coordination of the disaster response and management of the
2015 Myanmar floods could be found not only among local government
bodies as planned but also among non-governmental organizations,
civil organizations, and military. The military's involvement in the
disaster management and response network during this emergency was
based on two major factors: local governmental bodies’ resource and
manpower constraints and the armed forces’ statutory duties. According
to Article 341 of the 2008 Constitution [62], the Defense Services must
help citizens when calamities affect the country. The Standing Order on
Natural Disaster Management in Myanmar [3] states that the military
must prepare to assist in disaster response and management at the alert
and early warning stages. Because the military prepared its assistance
before the disaster, its readiness and capabilities facilitated the local
governments’ disaster responses during the emergency.
Among the governmental bodies, the influential actor MSRR has
more experience in disaster response and management than the other
governmental agencies, and it is the only agency that was found to have
been ready to provide a disaster response. The collaboration among
government bodies is found to be based on the sub-committees’ com-
positions, which are under the State/Region Disaster Management
Committee. The government agencies in the sub-committees collabo-
rated on sub-committee work, and the sub-committees collaborated on
state/regional disaster management work. The state and local level
government agencies vary in terms of their financial power, resources,
manpower, and positions in government structure. The effective utili-
zation of resources from the organizations in the disaster management
network is critical because the network is based on sharing among in-
ternal organizations. Because the resource constraints of local govern-
ment bodies and the inherent nature of disaster management requires a
variety of tasks to be performed in a timely fashion, local governments
must accept assistance from external organizations. The involvement of
non-governmental organizations and civilian volunteer organizations in
the disaster management network reinforced the local government's
ability to support people affected by the disaster. Collaboration with
external organizations can be increased and more effective if state/local
governments can provide more space for non-governmental organiza-
tions in the state-level disaster management sub-committees and or-
ganize donations from civil volunteer organizations through
18
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
government donation management teams for effective distribution to
the victims.
6. Conclusion
This study has identified influential organizations in a disaster
management network and investigated the effectiveness of their en-
gagement in the disaster response process through a comparative ana-
lysis of the actual network and perceived network structure. This study
focuses on disaster management at the state, province or local levels
across multiple sectors to identify a genuine network operating in the
field. Identifying the roles of both internal and external organizations,
the structure of collaboration, and the perceptions of each actor re-
garding its experiences of collaboration in the network in different
areas of disaster response and relief will provide deeper understanding
of the actual disaster management network structure and its effective-
ness.
In Myanmar, the floods of 2015 were not only the first disaster
experience for the new civilian government but also the very first dis-
aster management experience for the National Natural Disaster
Management Committee (NNDMC). Nevertheless, the NNDMC suc-
cessfully managed to carry out its disaster response and relief processes
in accordance with the disaster management plan. Generally, the goal
of NNDMC, which is to respond to disaster by effectively collaborating
with different agencies and organizations, was accomplished at the
national level. However, there were some gaps in state and local level
disaster management processes because government departments lack
adequate resources to address large-scale disasters. This lack of ade-
quate resources and preparedness among local government agencies is
the primary impetus behind the call for military support in disaster
management.
On the other hand, the military can be said to be the strongest in-
stitution in the country in terms of its strengths, resources, prepared-
ness, readiness, reliability, and capabilities, which enable it to respond
to emergency situations more quickly and effectively than other in-
stitutions and organizations. This study shows that the military's in-
volvement in the disaster management process was significantly high
and played a major role in state and local level disaster management.
Thus, integrating the appropriate number of representatives from the
regional military command into the state and local level disaster
management committee would facilitate the military's collaboration
with governmental and non-governmental organizations. The provision
of suitable disaster response and relief training and knowledge to
military forces and government bodies together would enhance civil-
military collaboration in disaster management. Moreover, capacity
building, reinforcing resources and exercising emergency response
plans are also required for local government bodies in the network to
sustain emergency preparedness. Keeping pace with the April 2011
establishment of the civilian Disaster Preparedness Agency and
Myanmar's transitional democracy, these efforts to reduce the gaps
between civilian capacity and the military's role will lead to healthier
and more balanced civil-military relationships in disaster management
and recovery processes [7].
The involvement of voluntary non-profit organizations and civil
society in disaster relief is one of the significant facets of disaster
management processes. According to the post-disaster report from
President's Office of Myanmar [33,34], the monetary value of voluntary
donations from NPOs and civil society during the 2015 disaster period
was 12.8 billion Kyats (11.6 million dollars), not including the value of
other assets. Therefore, it is important to create an effective manage-
ment plan for the sound distribution of the humanitarian aid donated
by civil societies. The government should also elevate the role of vo-
luntary actors and civil society in the local level disaster relief process,
which would allow donors or cooperators to interact directly with local
authorities and victims.
The media's involvement in information sharing at the local level
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

during the flood disaster was relatively low based on the results of this
study. The media was neither identified as a reliable information source
nor as an active actor in information sharing at the local level during
this state of emergency. The reasons for the low participation of the
media at the local level can be inferred based on a number of factors,
such as communication failure in the disaster regions, transportation
problems in accessing the affected areas, and lack of official informa-
tion due to efforts of the local government authorities and agencies to
prevent rumors and the dissemination of misinformation. However, the
government should encourage the media's involvement in information
sharing at the local level in order to ensure access to reliable in-
formation in a timely manner.

Appendix A

see Table A1

Table A1
Survey items used to identify collaborative relationships with engaged actors in the case.
Source: Adapted from Yun et al. (2014: 287).

Information sharing
1. On which organizations did you/your organization rely for information during the “2015 Myanmar floods”?
2. With which organizations did you/your organization share information during the “2015 Myanmar floods”?
3. Which organizations requested information from you/your organizations during the “2015 Myanmar floods 2015″?
4. Which organization responded most quickly to your organization's information request during the “2015 Myanmar floods”? (Please select only one organization)
Resource sharing (Resource means any tangible materials, assets, and human resource)
5. On which organizations did you/your organization rely to get resources to respond to the “2015 Myanmar floods”?
6. With which organizations did you/your organization share resources to respond to the “2015 Myanmar floods”?
7. Which organizations requested resources from you/your organizations during the “2015 Myanmar floods”?
8. Which organization responded most quickly to your organization's resource request during the “2015 Myanmar floods”? (Please select only one organization)
Evacuating the victims, searching the missing and rescuing the victims
9. To which organizations did you/your organization request help in evacuating victims, searching for the missing or rescuing victims during the “2015 Myanmar floods”?
10. With which organizations did you/your organization collaborate in evacuating victims, searching for the missing or rescuing victims during the “2015 Myanmar floods”?
11. Did your requested organization respond quickly to evacuating victims, searching for the missing or rescuing victims during the “2015 Myanmar floods”?
12. Did your requested organization respond effectively to evacuating victims, searching for the missing or rescuing victims during the “2015 Myanmar floods”?
13. Which organization helped you evacuate, searched for you or rescued you from the victim areas during the “2015 Myanmar floods”? (Please select only one organization)
Humanitarian service provision to the victims
14. To which organization did you/your organizations request to provide humanitarian services to the victims during “Myanmar Floods 2015″?
15. Which organizations did provide shelter to you/your organization during “Myanmar Floods 2015″?
16. Which organizations did provide foods and water to you/your organization during “Myanmar Floods 2015″?
17. Which organizations did provide medical services to you/your organization during “Myanmar Floods 2015″?

Appendix B

see Table B1

Table B1
Survey items used to measure the levels of satisfaction with and utilities of collaboration in the case.
Source: Adapted from Thomson et al. (2009: 31–32)

Information Sharing
1. Your partner organization relied on your organization's information to respond “Myanmar Floods 2015″.
2. Your partner organization couldn’t achieve their goals without your organization's information.
3. Sharing information was vital to achieve your organization and your partner organization goals during collaboration.
4. Sharing information strengthened the collaboration of your organization and your partner organization.
5. Sharing information was effective to respond “Myanmar Floods 2015″.
Resource Sharing
6. Your partner organization relied on your organization's resources to respond “Myanmar Floods 2015″.
7. Your partner organization couldn’t achieve their goals without your organization's resources.
8. Sharing resources was vital to achieve your organization and your partner organization goals during collaboration.
9. Sharing resources strengthened the collaboration of your organization and your partner organization.
10. Sharing resources was effective to respond “Myanmar Floods 2015″.
Evacuating the victims, searching the missing and rescuing the victims
11. Your partner organizations were supportive in evacuating the victim, searching and rescuing the victims during “Myanmar Floods 2015″.
12. Your partner organizations were effective in evacuating the victim, searching and rescuing the victims during “Myanmar Floods 2015″.
13. Your partner organizations could not success without your collaboration in evacuating the victim, searching and rescuing the victims during “Myanmar Floods 2015″.
14. Your organization relied on the plan of your partner organization in evacuating the victim, searching and rescuing the victims during “Myanmar Floods 2015″.
Humanitarian services provision to the victims
15. Your partner organizations were supportive in providing humanitarian services to the victims during “Myanmar Floods 2015″.
16. Your partner organizations were effective in providing humanitarian services to the victims during “Myanmar Floods 2015″.
17. Your partner organizations could not success without your collaboration in providing humanitarian services to the victims during “Myanmar Floods 2015″.
18. Your organization relied on the plan of your partner organization in providing humanitarian services to the victims during “Myanmar Floods 2015″.

19
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Appendix C

see Table C1

Table C1
Acronym of Agencies and Organizations.

No. ACRONYM Name

1 Army Army Command (Local)

2 Navy Navy Command (Local)
3 Airforce Air Force Command (Local)
4 MSRR Local Department of Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement
5 MCPT Local Department of Ministry of Communication, Post and Telegraph
6 MoT Local Department of Ministry of Transportation
7 MoH Local Department of Ministry of Health
8 MoI Local Department of Ministry of Information
9 Police Local Police Department
10 MoC Local Department of Ministry of Construction
11 Sagain Local Government of Sagain Division
12 Irrawaddy Local Government of Irrawaddy Division
13 Bago Local Government of Bago Division
14 Chin Local Government of Chin State
15 Rakhine Local Government of Rakhine State
16 RC(local) Local Red Cross or Red Crescent
17 RC(Inter) International Red Cross or Red Crescent
18 Rescue Rescue Team
19 Media Media
20 NGO 1 Non-profit Organization 1
21 NGO 2 Non-profit Organization 2
22 NGO 3 Non-profit Organization 3
23 Victims 1(Iwd) Victims from Irrawaddy Region
24 Victims 2(Iwd) Victims from Irrawaddy Region
25 Victims (UR) Victims from Unknown Region

References Res. Theory 18 (4) (2008) 543–571.

[1] M.W. Beck, C. Shepard, J. Birkmann, J. Rhyner, T. Welle, M. Witting, et al., World
Risk Report2012, Alliance Development Works, Berlin, Germany, 2012.
[2] Ministry of Social Warfare, Relief and Resettlement, Myanmar Action Plan on
Disaster Risk Reduction, Relief and Resettlement Department, Nay Pyi Taw,
Myanmar, 2012, pp. 1–15.
[3] Myanmar Disaster Preparedness Agency, Standing order on natural disaster man-
agement in Myanmar, Nay Pyi Daw. (2014).
[4] K.G. Provan, P. Kenis, Modes of network governance: structure, management, and
effectiveness, J. Public Adm. Res. Theory 18 (2) (2008) 229–252.
[5] The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Myanmar Disaster Management Reference
Handbook, The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Nay Pyi Taw, 2014.
[6] R.A. Hall, A. Cular, Civil-military relations in disaster rescue and relief activities:
response to the mudslide in Southern Leyte, Philippines, South Afr. J. Mil. Stud. 38
(2) (2010) 62–88.
[7] M. Malesic, The impact of military engagement in disaster management on civil-
military relations, Curr. Sociol. 63 (7) (2015) 980–998.
[8] H. Siddique (July 21, 2008). Cyclone Nargis cost Burma $4bn, says UN report. The
Guardian. From 〈https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/21/
cyclonenargis.burma〉. (Accessed 12 August 2016).
[9] U.S. Agency for International Development (March 30. Success Story: Strengthening
Disaster Management Systems in Burma. 〈http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/
success-story-strengthening-disaster-management-systems-burma〉. (Accessed 16
July 2016).
[10] T. Mclaughlin, H.Y. Zaw. Government, military win pre-vote plaudits for flood re-
sponse. The Irrawaddy, August 11 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.com/election/
news/government-military-win-pre-vote-plaudits-for-flood-response. (Accessed 21
July 16).
[11] N. Kapucu, V. Garayev, X. Wang, Sustaining networks in emergency management: a
study of counties in the United States, Public Perform. Manag. Rev. 37 (1) (2013)
104–133.
[12] W.L. Waugh, G. Streib, Collaboration and leadership for effective emergency
management, Public Adm. Rev. 66 (S1) (2006) 131–140.
[13] N. Kapucu, Tolga Arslan, F. Demiroz, Collaborative emergency management and
national emergency management network, Disaster Prev. Manag. 19 (4) (2010)
452–468.
[14] J.N. Sutton, Twittering Tennessee: Distributed Networks and Collaboration
Following a Technological Disaster. ISCRAM, 2010.
[15] J. Liu, Interorganizational network dynamics in the Wenchuan earthquake re-
covery, in: E.C. Jones, A.J. Faas. (Eds.), Social Network Analysis of Disaster
Response, Recovery, and Adaptation, Elsevier, Cambridge, MA, 2017, pp. 143–158.
[16] C. Ansell, A. Gash, Collaborative governance in theory and practice, J. Public Adm.
[17] K. Emerson, T. Nabatchi, S. Balogh, An integrative framework for collaborative
governance, J. Public Adm. Res. Theory 22 (1) (2012) 1–29.
[18] N. Kapucu, Network Governance in Response to Acts of Terrorism: Comparative
Analyses. Routledge, New York, NY, 2012.
[19] N. Kapucu, Collaborative governance and disaster recovery: the National Disaster
Recovery Framework (NDRF) in the US, in: R. Shaw. (Ed.), Disaster Recovery,
Springer, Japan, 2014, pp. 41–59.
[20] N. Kapucu, F. Demiroz, Measuring performance for collaborative public manage-
ment using network analysis methods and tools, Public Perform. Manag. Rev. 34 (4)
(2011) 549–579.
[21] T.C. Fontainha, A. Leiras, R.A. de M. Bandeira, L.F. Scavarda, Public-private-people
relationship stakeholder model for disaster and humanitarian operations, Int. J.
Disaster Risk Reduct. 22 (June) (2017) 371–386.
[22] C.A. Hofmann, L. Hudson, Military responses to natural disasters: last resort or
inevitable trend? Humanit. Exch. 44 (September) (2009) 29–31.
[23] F.C. Cuny, Use of the military in humanitarian relief, Crisis Manag. Disaster
Response Cent. Excell. Proc. 2014–2015 (2015) 150–171.
[24] T. Yoshizaki, The Military’s Role in Disaster Relief Operations: A Japanese
Perspective. NIDS International Symposium on Security Affairs, 2011.
[25] S.J.H. Rietjens, G. Voordijk, S.J. De Boer, Coordinating humanitarian operations in
peace support missions, Disaster Prev. Manag. 16 (1) (2007) 56–69.
[26] E. Barber, Military involvement in humanitarian supply chains, in: G. Kovacs,
K. Spens (Eds.), Relief Supply Chain Management for Disasters: Humanitarian Aid
and Emergency Logistics, IGI Global, Hershey, PA, 2011, pp. 123–146.
[27] G. Heaslip, E. Barber, Using the military in disaster relief: systemising challenges
and opportunities, J. Humanit. Logist. Supply Chain Manag. 4 (1) (2014) 60–81.
[28] N. Kapucu, The role of the military in disaster response in the US, Eur. J. Econ.
Political Stud. 4 (2) (2016) 7–33.
[29] UNHCR, Handbook for Emergencies, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Geneva, 2007.
[30] W.A. Anderson, Military organizations in natural disaster: established and emergent
norms, Am. Behav. Sci. 13 (3) (1970) 415–422.
[31] L.N. Van Wassenhove, Humanitarian aid logistics: supply chain management in
high gear, J. Oper. Res. Soc. 57 (5) (2006) 475–589.
[32] A.M. Soe, Landslides hit Chin State. The Global New Light of Myanmar, Aug 1, 2015
From http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/landslides-hit-chin-state. (Accessed 21
July 2016).
[33] National Natural Disaster Management Committee, Situation Report 1. Nay Pyi Taw,
Nay Pyi Taw: National Natural Disaster Management Committee, 2015.
[34] National Natural Disaster Management Committee, Situation Report 4. Nay Pyi
Taw, Nay Pyi Taw: National Natural Disaster Management Committee, 2015.
[35] S.P. Borgatti, M.G. Everett, J.C. Johnson, Analyzing Social Networks, Sage, London,
UK, 2013.

20
T.N. Zaw, S. Lim
[36] S. Celik, S. Corbacioglu, Interorganizational coordination: analysis of 2011 Van
earthquake, in: N. Kapucu, C.V. Hawkins, F.I. Rivera. (Eds.), Disaster Resiliency:
Interdisciplinary Perspective, Routledge, New York, NY, 2013, pp. 308–333.
[37] E.C. Jones, A.J. Faas (Eds.), Social Network Analysis of Disaster Response,
Recovery, and Adaptation, Cambridge, MA: Elsevier, 2017.
[38] E.J. Carlson, M.S. Poole, N.J. Lambert, J.C. Lammers, A study of organizational
responses to dilemmas in interorganizational emergency management, Commun.
Res. 44 (2) (2017) 287–315.
[39] N. Kapucu, Q. Hu, Understanding multiplexity of collaborative emergency man-
agement networks, Am. Rev. Public Adm. 46 (4) (2016) 399–417.
[40] M. Diani, The Cement of Civil Society: Studying Networks in Localities, Cambridge
University Press, New York, NY, 2015.
[41] X. Guo, N. Kapucu, Examining collaborative disaster response in China: network
perspectives, Nat. Hazards 79 (3) (2015) 1773–1789.
[42] A. Abbasi, N. Kapucu, A longitudinal study of evolving networks in response to
natural disaster, Comput. Math. Organ. Theory 22 (1) (2016) 47–70.
[43] N. Kapucu, Van Wart Montgomery, The evolving role of the public sector in
managing catastrophic disasters lessons learned, Adm. Soc. 38 (3) (2006) 279–308.
[44] C.R. Wise, Organizing for homeland security after Katrina: is adaptive management
what's missing? Public Adm. Rev. 66 (3) (2006) 302–318.
[45] X. Guo, N. Kapucu, Network performance assessment for collaborative disaster re-
sponse, Disaster Prev. Manag. 24 (2) (2015) 201–220.
[46] M.D. Siciliano, C. Wukich, Network features and processes as determinants of or-
ganizational interaction during extreme events, Complex. Gov. Netw. 2 (1) (2015)
23–44.
[47] C. Prell, Social Network Analysis: History, Theory, & Methodology, Sage, Thousand
Oaks, CA, 2012.
[48] G. Robins, Doing Social Network Research: Network-based Research Design for
Social Scientists, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2015.
[49] S.-J. Yun, D. Ku, J.-Y. Han, Climate policy networks in South Korea: alliances and
conflicts, Clim. Policy 14 (2) (2014) 283–301.
[50] J. Scott, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, Sage, London, 2000.
21
View publication stats
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
[51] L.C. Freeman, Centrality in social networks, Social. Netw. 1 (3) (1979) 215–239.
[52] A.M. Thomson, J.L. Perry, T.K. Miller, Conceptualizing and measuring collabora-
tion, J. Public Adm. Res. Theory 19 (1) (2009) 23–56.
[53] B. Bjerge, N. Clark, P. Fisker, E. Raju, Technology and information sharing in dis-
aster relief, PLoS One. 11 (9) (2016) e0161783.
[54] B.A. Jackson, Information Sharing and Emergency Responder Safety Management,
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2006.
[55] C.E. Haque, M.S. Uddin, Disaster Management Discourse in Bangladesh: A Shift
from Post-event Response to the Preparedness and Mitigation Approach through
Institutional Partnerships. INTECH Open Access Publisher, 2013.
[56] Myanmar Tatmadaw, Tatmadaw helps rehabilitation in flooded regions. Myanmar
Tatmadaw, September 22, 2015, http://www.myanmartatmadaw.net/2015/09/
blog-post_87.html. (Accessed 1 January 2017).
[57] Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster, The MEND
Guide: Comprehensive Guide for Planning Mass Evacuations in Natural Disasters.
Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster. Retrieved
March 10, 2017, 2014 from http://www.globalcccmcluster.org/tools-and-
guidance/publications/mend-guide.
[58] M. Poteyeva, M. Denver, L.E. Barsky, B.E. Aguirre, Search and rescue activities in
disasters, in: H. Rodriuez., E.L. Quarantelli., R.R. Dynes. (Eds.), Handbook of
Disaster Research, Springer, New York, NY, 2007, pp. 200–216.
[59] Pan American Health Organization, Humanitarian Assistance in Disaster Situations:
A Guide for Effective Aid, Pan America Health Organization, Washington D.C,
1999.
[60] D. Zhang, L. Zhou, J.F. Nunamaker Jr, A knowledge management framework for the
support of decision making in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, Knowl. Inf.
Syst. 4 (3) (2002) 370–385.
[61] P. Harvey, Towards Good Humanitarian Government: The Role of the Affected State
in Disaster Response, Overseas Development Institute, London, UK, 2009.
[62] The Republic of Union of Myanmar, Constitution 2008, The Republic of Union of
Myanmar, Nay Pyi Taw, 2008.