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petitioner’s perpetual and full confidence.
PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORPORATION VS. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, PIONEER TEXTURIZING WORKERS
UNION and LOURDES A. DE JESUS, respondents. [G.R. No. 118651.
October 16, 1997]
Doctrines
1. Lack of a just cause in the dismissal from service of an employee
renders the dismissal illegal, despite the employer’s observance of
procedural due process – In the case at bar, the petitioners
accusation of dishonesty and tampering of official records and
documents with the intention of cheating was not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence.
2. While an employer has the inherent right to discipline its
employees, this right must always be exercised humanely, and the
penalty it must impose should be commensurate to the offense
involved and to the degree of its infraction. – the employer should
bear in mind that, in the exercise of such right, what is at stake is
not only the employees position but also his livelihood.
3. While loss of confidence is one of the valid grounds for
termination of employment, the same, however, cannot be used
as a pretext to vindicate each and every instance of unwarranted
dismissal - to be a valid ground, it must be shown that the
employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct or
infraction and that the nature of his participation therein rendered
him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by
his position. – the breach of trust must be related to the
performance of the employee’s function. Surely, the accused who
occupies the position of reviser/trimmer does not require the
4. As a rule, “shall” in a statue commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion - the
presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute is
mandatory. – RA No. 6715, Article 233 of the Labor Code indicates
unequivocal intent to insert a new rule that will govern the
reinstatement aspect of a decision or resolution in any given labor
dispute. In fact, the law as now worded employs the phrase “shall
immediately executory” without qualification emphasizing the need
for prompt compliance.
5. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of
execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement
award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object
and intent of Article 233 of the Labor Code - the immediate
execution of a reinstatement order. – the need for a writ of
execution applies only within 5 years from the date of a decision, an
order or award becomes final and executory. It cannot relate to an
award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending
appeal which Article 223 contemplates. The provision of Article 223
is clear that an award of reinstatement shall be immediately
executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. DLLV XX
6. An award or order for reinstatement is self – executory – after
receipt of the decision or resolution ordering the employee’s
reinstatement, the employer has the right to choose whether to re
– admit the employee to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or reinstate the
employer in the payroll. Thus, an order or award for reinstatement
does not require a writ of execution.
Facts:
De Jesus is petitioners’ reviser/trimmer who based her assigned
work on a paper note posted by petitioners. The posted paper is
identified by its P.O. Number. De Jesus worked on P.O. No. 3853 by
trimming the cloths’ ribs and thereafter submitted tickets
corresponding to the work done to her supervisor. Three days later,
de Jesus received a memorandum requiring her to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her for dishonesty and
tampering of official records and documents with the intention of
cheating as P.O. No. 3853 allegedly required no trimming. The
memorandum also placed her under preventive suspension for
thirty days. In her explanation, de Jesus maintained that she merely
committed a mistake in trimming P.O. No. 3853 and admitted that
she may have been negligent, but not for dishonesty or tampering.
Nonetheless, she was terminated from employment.
De Jesus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners.
The Labor Arbiter held petitioners guilty of illegal dismissal and
were ordered to reinstate de Jesus to her previous position without
loss of seniority rights and with full backwages from the time of her
suspension. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) declared that the status quo between them should be
maintained and affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement,
but without backwages. The NLRC further directed petitioner to pay
de Jesus her back salaries from the date she filed her motion for
execution up to the date of the promulgation of the decision.
Petitioners filed their partial motion for reconsideration which the
NLRC denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an order for reinstatement needs a writ of
execution?
HELD
No. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for
reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal
and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement. To require the application for and
issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of
a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to
the very object and intent of Article 223, i. e., the immediate
execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An
application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed
for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a
scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the
Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ
thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose
envisioned by Article 223. On appeal, however, the appellate
tribunal concerned may enjoin or suspend the reinstatement order
in the exercise of its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and
implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favor of labor. In
ruling that an order or award for reinstatement does not require a
writ of execution the Court is simply adhering and giving meaning to
this rule. Henceforth, we rule that an award or order for
reinstatement is self-executory. After receipt of the decision or
resolution ordering the employee's reinstatement, the employer
has the right to choose whether to re-admit the employee to work
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or to reinstate the employee in the payroll. In either
instance, the employer has to inform the employee of his choice.
The notification is based on practical considerations for without
notice, the employee has no way of knowing if he has to report for
work or not.
238
Pizza Inn VS. NLRC
Doctrines
1. Closure Due to legitimate business reasons; Employee is entitled
to backwages up to the date of closure.
2. Where reinstatement becomes a legal impssobility, NLRC cannot
compel the employer to reinstate the employee. Where an
employer suffered business recession, as in the case at bar such
that its commercial or financial circumstances have changed forcing
it to close one outlet or branch and subsequently all other outlets
also closed, respondent commission, assuming that petitioner was
guilty of unfair labor practice cannot compel the employer to
reinstate private respondent if such reinstatement may exceed the
petitioner’s needs under the altered conditions.
3. Normally, each outlet had only a sufficient number of
employees who served pizzas. It has its own “plantilla” and by
accommodating complainant, it might prejudice and displace other
employees. Reinstatement pre – supposes that the previous
position from which one had been removed still exists or that
there is an unfilled position more or less of similar nature as the
one previously occupied by the employee. Admittedly, no such
position is available. Reinstatement, therefore becomes a legal
impossibility. In such case, the dismissed employee can no longer
be reinstated but shall be entitled to backwages up to the date of
dissolution or closure.
4. When an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice for having
transferred its business operations to another corporation which
later changed its name, to the prejudice of workers, reinstatement
is proper.
Facts
Felicidad Fontanilla (private respondent) was employed by
petitioner in its Quad Carpark Makati outlet on a probationary
status with a monthly salary of 500 pesos. Before the expiration of
the 6 – month probationary period, Fontanilla resigned. Claiming
that she was forced to resign by the petitioner, the former filed a
complaint against the latter.
Fontanilla filed her counter manifestation alleging that petitioner
refused to reinstate complainant despite several representations of
private respondent to the petitioner by the NLRC Sheriff at the
latter’s outlet contending that the Quad Park outlet wherein
Fontanilla worked was merely transferred and not really contrary to
the allegations of petitioner
ISSUE: May an employer be ordered to reinstate private
respondent after the closure of its branch or outlet where private
respondent was employed and to pay private respondent
backwages even after the date of closure and continuously
without limit considering that there was no way to reinstate the
workers anymore?
HELD:
No, the records show that the petitioner’s Pizza - Inn Quad Carpark
outlet ceased its business operations due to poor business sales of
pizzas. The fact of closure was properly reported to the Municipal
Treasurer of Makati wherein petitioner paid the required closure
fee. Even the contract of lease with Ayala Corporation over said
premises was also terminated. Hence the closure, of the business
rendered the reinstatement of complainant to her previous position
impossible. However, she will be entitled to the payment of
bakcwages up to the date of dissolution or closure.

Claimant imputes bad faith on the part of petitioner in refusing to

reinstate her in petitioner’s other Pizza Inn outlets or branches then
still existing. There is indeed authority for the proposition that
complainant be reinstated to her position, if available. However
where an employer suffered business recession, as in the case at
bar such that its commercial or financial circumstances have
changed forcing it to close one outlet or branch , respondent
commission, assuming that petitioner was guilty of unfair labor
practice cannot compel the employer to reinstate private
respondent if such reinstatement may exceed the petitioner’s needs
under the altered conditions.
239
Kunting VS NLRC
Doctrines
1. The decision of the NLRC is reviewable by way of petition for
certiorari under Rule 65
2. The peculiar circumstances surrounding the dismissal of
petitioner do not show such kind of strained relationship as to
warrant the severance of the working relationship between the
parties. – Indeed, an illegally dismissed employee’s right to
reinstatement is not absolute. The court has a long line of decisions
concerning non – reinstatement of illegally dismissed employees on
various grounds. One of these grounds is when there is a finding
that the relationship between the parties has become so strained
and ruptured as to preclude a harmonious working relationship. In
the case at bar, however, the dismissal of petitioner do not show
such kind of strained relationship as to warrant the severance of the
working relationship between the parties.
3. Strained relations must be of such nature or degree as to
preclude reinstatement. But where the differences between the
parties are neither personal nor physical, nor serious, then there is
no reason why the illegally dismissed employee should not be
reinstated rather than simply given separation pay and
backwages. More so if the cause of the perceived “strained
relations” is the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, the
principle of strained relations cannot be applied indiscriminately.
4. No strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of
asserting one’s right, otherwise, an employee who shall assert his
right could be easily separated from service by merely paying his
separation pay on the excuse that his relationship with his
employer had already become strained.
5. Award of backwages in case of illegal dismissal initiated before
the effectivity of RA 6715 will have to be resolved by applying the
3 – year limit – while RA 6715 grants full backwages to dismissed
employees computed from the date of their illegal dismissal up to
the date of actual reinstatement, the same cannot be applied in the
case at bar.
6. The rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity are
not controlling in labor proceedings.
Facts
Consuelo Kunting was employed as a teacher by respondent St.
Joseph School in Zamboanga City. She was paid a basic pay and
emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) except during summer
period when she was paid only the basic pay.
Every year from 1969 until the school year 1987 - 1988, Kunting and
St. Joseph School executed a teacher’s contract. For the school year
1987 – 1988, her performance rating was very satisfactory. In spite
of this, St. Joseph School did not renew her employment contract
for the school year 1988 - 1989, thereby terminating her
employment with the school.
Consuelo filed a complaint against St. Joseph School, its Director Fr. without loss of seniority rights with payment of backwages for three
Aloysious Chang and Principal for illegal dismissal, reinstatement (3) years and 13th month pay for 1988.
and backwages, wage differentials.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in

ordering the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
notwithstanding its finding that she had been illegally dismissed? –
that as a consequence of the NLRC’s finding of illegal dismissal, she
is entitled to reinstatement with full backwages from the time of
her illegal dismissal up to the date of actual reinstatement

HELD: In the case at bar, the peculiar circumstances surrounding the

dismissal of petitioner simply do not show the kind of strained
relationship as to warrant the severance of the working relationship
between the parties. There is no proof that such conduct actually
caused animosity between the parties. There is no clear showing
that the perceived “strained relations” between the parties is of so
serious nature or of such degree as to justify petitioner’s dismissal.

Whatever resentment had been harboured by petitioner upon her

dismissal after having been employed by St. Joseph School for more
than 16 years is understandable. Such resentment, however, would
not suffice to deny her re – employment because to do so would
render for naught her constitutional right to security of tenure AND
HER RIGHT TO REINSTATEMENT. Petitioner is, after all, a permanent
teacher as she had rendered more than 3 years of satisfactory
service.

Thus, premises considered, St. Joseph School is hereby ordered to

reinstate petitioner Kunting to her former or equivalent position