Reviewing the History of Air Power Studies

Professor: Takashi Genda

National Defense Academy of Japan

I cannot contain my joy on the establishment of the long-awaited Air

Power Studies Center of Excellence (APSC) in the Air Staff College.
When we look back on the history of air power, we can see how im-
portant theoretical research is. There are several cases where properly
conducted research had a great effect on the battles of a subsequent war.
The following examples are typical of many that can be found in the his-
tory of aerial warfare. In each, theoretical research pushed the boundaries
and developed concepts which were ahead of the technologies or capa-
bilities of their time, but were successful in preparing their nations for
future wars.
The first example is the establishment of the U.S. Army Air Forces
strategic-bombing doctrine.
In 1930, the dominant theory in the U.S. Army Air Corps Tactical
School, according to Billy Mitchell, was “Directing airpower directly
against the core of an enemy nation’s war production capacity and de-
stroy their will to fight.” The instructors of the tactical school began to
grope for “whether we can, through scientific analysis, identify and select
the right targets to attack and bring industrial production to a halt.” Such
an air warfare strategy, called the industrial web theory, was based on the
analogy that “the whole web will come loose if we break key parts of the
web.” To test the theory, they put together some case studies targeting
various cities in the United States, and from these studies they began to
formulate their future air warfare strategy.
Their strategy was to:
・Target military arsenals affecting the execution of the war.
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・Strengthen the destructive capacity that can be brought against a tar-

get as well as the defense capacity of the bomber. Operations against
targets will be conducted by 100’s of bombers.
・Launch sorties from remote bases that the enemy will unlikely be
able to attack, and fly to the target at an altitude out of range of the en-
emy’s anti-aircraft artillery.
・Conduct high-altitude, daylight precision bombing with a high-per-
formance bombsight system. Bombing accuracy was expected to be
high.
This was the “Daylight High-Altitude Precision Bombing (DHAPB)”
doctrine that was used to selected targets and develop the policies con-
cerning organization, equipment, strategic thought, and technical devel-
opment of the Army Air Corp.1 Above all, by positively tackling their
strategic problems the Army Air Corp’s effort led to the development of
the strategic bomber, which was considered costly, but and made a great
contribution to the Allied victory in World War II when their concept was
manifested through the mass-production of the B-17, B-24, and B-29
bombers.
Even after World War II, the U.S. Air Force firmly stuck to their preci-
sion bombing doctrine, refined it even further, and contributed to the vic-
tory of allied forces in the Desert Storm air campaign during the Gulf
War. These are good examples of winning a war by drafting appropriate
doctrine.
The second example is the method used to establish the principle of
unified command of air power.
In the U.S. Army, the local ground forces commander traditionally
commanded the Air Corps in his area. However, the Army Air Corp was
able to persuade senior officials, after a defeat in a 1942-43 North Afri-
can battle, that the army and the air force were mutually and equally in-
dependent military powers, and therefore all air power must be concen-
trated under one commander.
The War Department “Field Manual 100-20” was published in 1943
and indicates that “Airpower’s unique flexibility, which is its greatest as-
set, can only be effectively demonstrated when one Air Force officer has

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command of the whole force, with a direct responsibility to the theater

commander.2” Thus, the doctrine of “Centralized Control & Decentral-
ized Execution” was established. Since then this doctrine has become the
foundation of air power management.
The doctrine of unified command of air power that was specified in
“Field Manual 100-20” has been passed on to the “Air Force Manual
1984 edition (AFM) 1-1” and further developed. In the 1991 Gulf War,
the USAF 9th Air Force Commander, General Charles A. Horner, was
appointed as Commander of US Central Command Air Forces, Airspace
Control Command, and the Aerospace Defense Command. Horner con-
tributed greatly to the victory by uniting the total aerial warfare power of
the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and coalition forces un-
der one chain of command and one leader.3 All the aircraft and weapons
flying in the sky were under the direction of one commander, as it was
supposed to be, according to the the principle of unified command of air
power.
The third example is the establishment of AirLand battle doctrine.
Due to their experience with close air support during the Vietnam War,
the Tactical Air Command (TAC) realized, in the 1970’s, that they need-
ed to enhance cooperation with the U.S. Army. They were particularly
concerned about NATO’s central combat theater, since it was a core U.S.
interest, but were struggling to find a way to win a potential war with air-
power, but without nuclear weapons, against the overwhelmingly
superior ground forces of the Warsaw Pact’s armies.
In 1973, General Robert Dickson, TAC Commander, and General Wil-
liam E. DePuy, Commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-
mand (TRADOC), established a joint research organization and started
discussions. In 1976, the AirLand Battle doctrine was completed.
AirLand Battle doctrine consisted of three phases:
①Deter war by demonstrating NATO’s superior air power.
②If deterrence fails and war begins, conduct defensive actions, pre-
vent and delay the enemy’s attack, debilitate a superior enemy.
③After enemy has been debilitated, counterattack.
The counterattack portion of the strategy could best be described as

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a modern blitzkrieg operation, in which TAC and the armored cav-

alry cooperated closely. TAC’s primary duty, assuming that the War-
saw Pact launched a pre-emptive attack, was to strike the Warsaw
Pact’s Follow-on-Forces and prevent them from advancing or from
reinforcing their frontline forces. The ultimate aim was to also at-
trite them and render the Warsaw Pact armies combat ineffective in
a short period of time.4
The AirLand Battle doctrine was completed in 1981, adopted by
NATO forces in 1982, and was included in the U.S. Army’s Field Manu-
al’s and in the U.S. Air Force’s basic doctrine in 1984. After that, TAC
played a large role in the deterrent power of the United States during the
Cold War as it constantly strove to maintain the system required to exe-
cute AirLand Battle doctrine. It developed the special-purpose tank-kill-
ing aircraft, the A-10, and created an integrated air defense command
system. The U.S. military pioneered joint operations by establishing the
AirLand Battle doctrine.
I have some particular thoughts on AirLand Battle. I was working for
the Air Staff Office during the second half of the 1980’s and was study-
ing the AirLand Battle doctrine. However, as I carried out the study, it
became clear that applying this doctrine to the Western Pacific Ocean
would be very difficult, since it only consists of many little islands. So I
abandoned my research in the middle of my studies. At that time, I
thought Japanese-U.S. cooperation in East Asia and in the East China
Sea could be called AirSea Battle, but since the Soviet Union was in the
process of collapse, the end of the Cold War was coming, and the Far
East Soviet Navy was in significant chaos and clearly inferior at that
point, combined with the fact that the Chinese Navy at the time was still
just a coastal force, there was no driving force to duplicate AirLand Bat-
tle doctrine.
It has been 30 years since then, and now China, which has dramatical-
ly strengthened as an economic power, is attempting to spread its influ-
ence into the sea by strengthening its maritime and air force capabilities.
It is aiming to become a great maritime power. In particular, the maritime
force is transforming into a Blue-Water Navy. Here and now we have a

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need for Air Sea Battle doctrine.

Air Sea Battle, with the Western Pacific Ocean as a battlefield, is an
integrated / united strategy conducted in a vast maritime area and its cor-
responding airspace. Its aspect is much more complex and wide-ranging
than AirLand Battle, primarily due to developments in military technolo-
gy, and especially in the Information Technology field. Doctrine always
has to be match the times. Therefore, establishing a fresh Air Sea Battle
doctrine is an urgent task.
I hold great hopes for the APSC, the only research institution in our
country that will perform air power studies.

Notes
1 “History and strategy of the U.S. Air Force” written by Takashi Genda, (Published by
Fuyoshobo in 2008) p.36-39.
2 Command and Employment of the Air Power (War Department Field Manual FM100-
20, 1943, 7, 21).
3 Edward C. Mann, Thunder and Lighting: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates (Ala-
bama: Air University Press, 1995), p. xi.
4 Robert F. Futrell, Idea, Concept, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United State Air
Force 1961-1984, Volume II (Alabama: Air University Press, 1989), pp.539-555.

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