G.R. No.

L-4043 May 26, 1952

CENON S. CERVANTES, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Cenon Cervantes in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for respondent.

REYES, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the Auditor General denying petitioner's claim for quarters allowance as manager of
the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation, otherwise known as the NAFCO.

It appears that petitioner was in 1949 the manager of the NAFCO with a salary of P15,000 a year. By a resolution of the Board of
Directors of this corporation approved on January 19 of that year, he was granted quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a
month effective the first of that month. Submitted the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for approval,
the said resolution was on August 3, 1949, disapproved by the said Committee on strenght of the recommendation of the
NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation
prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed
P15,000 a year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of such
allowance.

On March 16, 1949, the petitioner asked the Control Committee to reconsider its action and approve his claim for allowance for
January to June 15, 1949, amounting to P1,650. The claim was again referred by the Control Committee to the auditor General
for comment. The latter, in turn referred it to the NAFCO auditor, who reaffirmed his previous recommendation and
emphasized that the fact that the corporation's finances had not improved. In view of this, the auditor General also reiterated
his previous opinion against the granting of the petitioner's claim and so informed both the Control Committee and the
petitioner. But as the petitioner insisted on his claim the Auditor General Informed him on June 19, 1950, of his refusal to
modify his decision. Hence this petition for review.

The NAFCO was created by the Commonwealth Act No. 332, approved on June 18, 1939, with a capital stock of P20,000,000, 51
per cent of which was to be able to be subscribed by the National Government and the remainder to be offered to provincial,
municipal, and the city governments and to the general public. The management the corporation was vested in a board of
directors of not more than 5 members appointed by the president of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. But the corporation was made subject to the provisions of the corporation law in so far as they were compatible
with the provisions of its charter and the purposes of which it was created and was to enjoy the general powers mentioned in
the corporation law in addition to those granted in its charter. The members of the board were to receive each a per diem of
not to exceed P30 for each day of meeting actually attended, except the chairman of the board, who was to be at the same
time the general manager of the corporation and to receive a salary not to exceed P15,000 per annum.

On October 4, 1946, Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to
effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their operation Pursuant to this authority, the President on October 4, 1947, promulgated Executive
Order No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises Council to be composed of the President of the Philippines as chairman, the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry as vice-chairman, the chairman of the board of directors and managing heads of all such
corporations as ex-officio members, and such additional members as the President might appoint from time to time with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The council was to advise the President in the excercise of his power of
supervision and control over these corporations and to formulate and adopt such policy and measures as might be necessary to
coordinate their functions and activities. The Executive Order also provided that the council was to have a Control Committee
composed of the Secretary of Commerce and Industry as chairman, a member to be designated by the President from among
the members of the council as vice-chairman and the secretary as ex-officio member, and with the power, among others —

(1) To supervise, for and under the direction of the President, all the corporations owned or controlled by the
Government for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy in their operations;
 (2) To pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the respective Boards
of Directors of the said corporations; and

(3) To carry out the policies and measures formulated by the Government Enterprises Council with the approval of
the President. (Sec. 3, Executive Order No. 93.)

With its controlling stock owned by the Government and the power of appointing its directors vested in the President of the
Philippines, there can be no question that the NAFCO is Government controlled corporation subject to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 51 and the executive order (No. 93) promulgated in accordance therewith. Consequently, it was also subject to
the powers of the Control Committee created in said executive order, among which is the power of supervision for the purpose
of insuring efficiency and economy in the operations of the corporation and also the power to pass upon the program of
activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the board of directors. It can hardly be questioned that under
these powers the Control Committee had the right to pass upon, and consequently to approve or disapprove, the resolution of
the NAFCO board of directors granting quarters allowance to the petitioners as such allowance necessarily constitute an item of
expenditure in the corporation's budget. That the Control Committee had good grounds for disapproving the resolution is also
clear, for, as pointed out by the Auditor General and the NAFCO auditor, the granting of the allowance amounted to an illegal
increase of petitioner's salary beyond the limit fixed in the corporate charter and was furthermore not justified by the
precarious financial condition of the corporation.

It is argued, however, that Executive Order No. 93 is null and void, not only because it is based on a law that is unconstitutional
as an illegal delegation of legislature power to executive, but also because it was promulgated beyond the period of one year
limited in said law.

The second ground ignores the rule that in the computation of the time for doing an act, the first day is excluded and the last
day included (Section 13 Rev. Ad. Code.) As the act was approved on October 4, 1946, and the President was given a period of
one year within which to promulgate his executive order and that the order was in fact promulgated on October 4, 1947, it is
obvious that under the above rule the said executive order was promulgated within the period given.

As to the first ground, the rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute"
there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among
others, to make reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose
shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines
and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President
had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited,
does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.

It is also contended that the quarters allowance is not compensation and so the granting of it to the petitioner by the NAFCO
board of directors does not contravene the provisions of the NAFCO charter that the salary of the chairman of said board who is
also to be general manager shall not exceed P15,000 per anum. But regardless of whether quarters allowance should be
considered as compensation or not, the resolution of the board of the directors authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner
cannot be given effect since it was disapproved by the Control Committee in the exercise of powers granted to it by Executive
Order No. 93. And in any event, petitioner's contention that quarters allowance is not compensation, a proposition on which
American authorities appear divided, cannot be insisted on behalf of officers and employees working for the Government of the
Philippines and its Instrumentalities, including, naturally, government-controlled corporations. This is so because Executive
Order No. 332 of 1941, which prohibits the payment of additional compensation to those working for the Government and its
Instrumentalities, including government-controlled corporations, was in 1945 amended by Executive Order No. 77 by expressly
exempting from the prohibition the payment of quarters allowance "in favor of local government officials and employees
entitled to this under existing law." The amendment is a clear indication that quarters allowance was meant to be included in
the term "additional compensation", for otherwise the amendment would not have expressly excepted it from the prohibition.
This being so, we hold that, for the purpose of the executive order just mentioned, quarters allowance is considered additional
compensation and, therefore, prohibited.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is dismissed, with costs.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-9553 May 13, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
WILLIAM ERNEST JOLLIFFE, defendant-appellant.

Benedicto C.Balderama and Mabanta and Ysip for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Ramon L. Avanceña and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an appeal taken by defendant William Ernest Jolliffe from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, convicting him
of a violation of Republic Act No. 256, and sentencing him to imprisonment for one (1) year, and to pay a fine of P2,000 and the
costs, as well as decreeing the forfeiture, in favor of the Government, of four (4) pieces of gold bullion valued P35,305.46, and a
travellers' check in the sum of $100.00.

There is no dispute about the main facts, which are set forth in the decision appealed in the following language:

The accused, Mr. William Ernest Jolliffe is a Canadian subject, born in china and residing permanently in Hongkong.
He is the son of a former Chancellor of the West China Union University and had been Trade Commissioner for
Canada in Shanghai and Hongkong, until 1948. The accused to a good reputable family is quite well-known. The
accused had made several trips to Manila, sometimes on business and three times to meet his wife and children
passing thru Manila. He also came to collect the debt owed to him by one T. W. Woo, a prominent businessman in
Hongkong. He came back to Manila on December 4, 1953 to try to collect the debt owed him by T. Y. Woo. although
he had no idea how said debt was to be paid, whether in peso or in gold. He was paid in good which be brought with
him by messenger to his room in the Bay View Hotel. At about plane time he went to his hotel room and carried his
gold around his body underneath his shirt. When he was going towards the door leading to the runway he was
accosted by a woman, Amanda Arimbay, a secret service agent, and was told to go the search room (Quoted from the
statement of facts in the memorandum for the accused.)

When the accused was searched four pieces of gold bullion were found tied to his body a few inches above the waist.
There was also found in his possession a $100.00 travelers check issued by R. McGinty. While he was under arrest
made an offer to settle the case by offering to pay the agents who were then arresting him. He stated also that Mr.
Manikan, Deputy Collector of Customs, told him during the search that the case could have been fixed had he told
him before hand of his desire to export gold from the Philippines. Mr. Manikan, on the other hand, said that when the
accused was about to be searched he offered him P30,000.00 provided the case be settled and forgotten. The Court
accepts the testimony of Mr, Manikan as the true version of the incident because the accused himself said in the
course of is testimony the Mr. Manikan told him that he could say anything in private to him after he (accused) had
signed the written statement, Exhibit I, certifying to the things found in the possession of the accused, among which,
were the four pieces of gold bullion. These facts shows that when Mr. Manikan consented to allow the accused to talk
with him about the case after signing Exhibit I, there was no other desire on the part of Mr. Manikan but to give the
accused every opportunity to explain his side of the case but not for any illegitimate purpose. Mr. Manikan's acts in
this case are above board and the only logical steps that an honest official could take in the present case. But these
minor incident relating to the case are of no importance, taking into consideration the fact that the accused himself
had admitted that on December 7, 1953 when he was about to board in one of the planes of the Pan American World
Airway he had with him four pieces of gold bullion of the approximate value P35,305.46. This being a fact, the only
question before the Court is purely a question of law.

Appellant alleges that:

1. That the trial court erred in not ruling that Circular 21 of the Central Bank is the only law in point, and that, being
special law, it does not penalize attempted or frustrated violation thereof, but merely consummated violations and,
therefore, under the facts of this case, the accused cannot be held liable;

2. That the trial court erred in not ruling that even attempted violation of Circular 21 punishable, still the accused is
not criminally liable because there was no wilful violation of said circular;
 3. That the trial erred in ruling that mere possession of gold is made illegal by Circular 21 of the Central Bank, the
truth being that the said circular in fact specially authorizes sales gold within the Philippines even without the benefit
of license;

4. That the trial court erred in not ruling Circular 21 of the Central Bank is not a valid law, because it did not comply
with the provisions of section 74 of Republic Act 265, in that:

(a) It was approved by the President of the Philippines;

(b) In its promulgation, the Momentary Board exceeded the authority granted it by the Central Bank Act, because the
context of the circular does not indicate that it was a temporary emergency measure;

(c) It can only be issued as an emergency measure or during crisis, and as issued, has no force and effect, because the
emergency it seeks to remedy never existed or no longer exists;

(d) That the publication of the circular (original and amended) in the November 1951 and October 1952 issues of the
Official Gazette are not the adequate publications required by law, because said publications on their faces showed
them to be incomplete and defective;

(e) That granting, without admitting, that the power to promulgate it was granted to the Monetary Board by Republic
Act 265, and granting without admitting, that the power to so promulgate was validly exercised, still it is invalid
because it constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power and, therefore, unconstitutional and void.

5. That the trial court erred in ordering forfeiture of the four (4) packages of gold, Exhibit G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4, in
favor of the Government.

6. That the trial court erred in ordering the forfeiture of the travellers' check for $100, Exhibit K, in favor of the
Government, in spite of the fact that the accused was acquitted on the charge of illegal possession of dollars under
Circular 20 and 42.

Appellant does not deny that he had no license to export the gold bullions above referred to. Under his first assignment of
error, he maintains, however, that Central Bank Circular No. 21 requiring said license and section 34 of Republic Act No. 265,
prescribing the penalty for violations of said Circular, refer to consummated exportation, not to "attempted or frustrated
exportation." Section 4 of said Circular provides:

Any person desiring to export gold in any form, including jewelry, whether for refining abroad or otherwise, must
obtain a license from the Central Bank. Applicant for export license must present satisfactory evidence that the
import of the gold into the country of the importer will not be in violation of the rules and regulations of such
country.

This section explicity applies to "any person desiring to export gold" and, hence, it contemplates the situation existing prior to
the consummation of the exportation. Indeed, its purpose would be deferred if the penal sanction were deferred until after the
article in question had left the Philippines, for jurisdiction over it, and over the guilty party, would be lost thereby.

Appellant's avowed ignorance of the necessity of license and of the illegality of the act performed by him, alleged in support of
the second assignment of error, is belied by the fact that he had the gold bullions under his shirt; that by objecting, at first, to
being searched, he tried to prevent that the presence of said articles upon his person be discovered; and he tried to bribe the
public officers who searched him.

As regards the third assignment of error, it is not necessary for us to determine whether mere possession of gold bullion is
illegal under Circular No. 21, for his conviction was due, not to such possession alone, but to the fact that appellant tried to
export said gold bullions without the requisite license.

Let us now consider the fourth assignment of error which is based upon several grounds. The first is that the aforementioned
circular has not merited the approval of the President of the Philippines, which is required in section 74 of Republic Act No. 265.
This pretense is untenable. It would appear from Exhibit S and S-1 that the practice of the Monetary Board was to obtain said
approval before the formal enactment and promulgation of circulars necessitating presidential sanction. Indeed, since it has no
authority to subject transactions in gold to license, unless the President agrees thereto, it is, in effect, the duty of the Board to
obtain the assent of the Executive to the policy of requiring said license at a particular time, either upon adoption of the
resolution of this effect, or prior thereto. As a consequence, it must be presumed — in the absence of proof to the contrary,
which is wanting — that such duty has been fulfilled in the case at bar.

It is frequently said that a presumption of regularity the performance of administrative duties. That is, when an act
has been completed, it is to be supposed that the act was done in the manner prescribed and by an officer authorized
by law to do it. The presumption is of course a rebuttable one, but the bare allegation that there has been a failure to
observe statutory requirements has been regarded as a mere conclusion of the pleader; where the administrative
order is accompanied by a statement that there has been compliance and there is no showing of fact to the contrary,
the presumption of regularity is ordinarily sufficient to support the official act of a public officer. (Administrative Law
— Cases and Comments by Gellhorn, pp. 315-316.)

Contrary to appellant's pretense, it is not essential that the administrative acts of the President be made in writing, unless the
law says so. Thus, for instance, in Ykalina vs. Oricio, (93 Phil., 1076; 49 Off. Gaz., [12], 5431), this Court quoted approvingly the
following passage from Corpus Juris Secundum:

While the appointment of an officer is usually evidenced by a commission, as a general rule it is not essential to the
validity of an appointment that a commission issue, and an appointment may be made by an oral announcement of
his determination by the appointing power.

In U.S. vs. Fletcher (148 U.S. 84, 89-90, 37 Law Ed. 387, 379-380), the Federal Supreme Court said:

The presumption is that the Secretary and the President performed the duties developed upon them respectively,
and it would be unreasonable to construe the Secretary's indorsement as meaning that he had reviewed the
proceedings for the action of the President in conformity with Article 65, and had approved them himself and ordered
execution of the sentence in contravention of the article. . . . While in the case on hand it is said that the proceedings
were submitted to the President, it is stated that they had been forwarded to the Secretary of War for the action of
the President, and as that is followed by an approval and the direction of the execution of the sentence, which
approval and sentence could only emanate from the President, the conclusion follows that the action taken was the
action of the President.

We regard the certification of the Secretary of War . . . as perceive no ground upon which the order of that date can
be a sufficient certification of the judgment of the President, and treated as null and void for want of the required
approval.

What is more, in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil., 451, 463), the majority of the members of this Court expressed
the view that:

After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on the broad
proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and
considering the department organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 21, Article VII, of
our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads
of the various executive departments are assistant and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive. (Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122 U.S. 543; 30 Law ed. 1167; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1141;
see also U.S. vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet. 291; 10 Law ed. 968; Pones vs. U.S. [1890], 137 U.S. 202; 34 Law ed. 691; 11
Supp. Ct. Rep. 80; Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880] 101 U.S. 755; 25 Law ed. 916; Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet. 498; 10
Law ed. 264.)

Needless to say, the case cited by appellant herein refer to the presidential approval of legislative enactments, which the
Constitution explicity requires to be evidenced by the signatures of the Executive (Art. VI, section 20 [1]) There is no similar
provision in Republic Act No. 265.
It is urged, however, that the authority of the Monetary Board to suspend or restrict the sales of exchange by the Central Bank
and to subject all transactions involving foreign exchange to license, is temporary in nature and may be exercised only during an
exchange crisis, as an emergency measure to combat such crisis, and that the context of the circular in question, as amended,
does not indicate that it was a temporary emergency measure. It is not necessary, however, for the legality of said circular that
its temporary character be stated on its face, so long as the circular has been issued during an exchange crisis, for the purpose
of combating the same. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, which has not been introduced or offered in the present
case, it is presumed that the provision of section 74 of Republic Act No. 265, under the authority of which the aforementioned
circular was issued, has authority of which the aforementioned circular was issued, has been complied with. Besides, the fact
that there has been an exchange crisis in the Philippines and that such crisis, not only existed at the time of the issuance of said
circular in 1949 and 1950, but, also, remained in existence up to the present, may be taken judicial cognizance of.

Although, from a purely theoretical and legal viewpoint, the Monetary Board and the President could have specified in Circular
21 the period of its effectivity, their failure to do so did not necessarily impair its validity. As a measure taken under the police
power of the state, said period had to be commensurate with the crisis that led to its adoption, and the duration of said crisis
could not be anticipated with reasonable certainly. Upon the termination of the aforementioned crisis, as determined by
competent authority, the circular would become inoperative. Thus, in Rutter vs. Esteban, (49 Off. Gaz., 1807), Commercial
Investment vs. Garcia (49 Off. Gaz., 1801), Salvador vs. Locsin, (93 Phil., 225), and Nicolas vs. Matias, L-5250 (May 29, 1953), we
held that, although the moratorium laws enacted in the Philippines, upon its liberation from the Japanese forces, could not be
permanent in character and did not specify the duration thereof, it was valid and effective until the emergency for which it was
intended had already disappeared.

It is further argued that, as published in the Official Gazette, Circular No. 21, in its original, as well as in its amended form, did
not bear the approval of the President and that, accordingly, said publication was not sufficient to give the effect contemplated
by law therefore. This pretense is based upon false promise. The original circular subjecting to licensing by the Central Bank "all
transaction in gold and foreign exchange", Circular No. 20, which, as approved and published, states, that, "pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 265", it had been adopted by "the Monetary Board, by unanimous vote and with the approval of
the President of the Philippines." What is more, the last paragraph of Circular No. 20, provides that "further regulations in
respect to transactions covered by this circular will be issued separately." Thus, the President had approved not only the
licensing by the Central Bank" of "all transactions in gold and foreign exchange," but, also, the issuance, subsequently to the
promulgation of Circular No. 20, of "further regulations in respect" of such transactions. Said further regulations were
incorporated into Circular No. 21, which thus bears the stamp of presidential sanction, although this is not specifically required
by law. It is only the decision of the Monetary Board to subject to license by the Central Bank all transactions in gold and foreign
exchange that needs the approval of the President. Once the same has been given, the details in the implementation of said
decision may be determined by said Board, through such regulations as may be promulgated from time to time. The assent of
the President is not a prerequisite to the validity and effectivity of these regulations, as distinguished from the aforementioned
decision thereby sought to be enforced or executed. The authority of the Monetary Board to make regulations is governed, not
by section 74 of Republic Act No. 265, but by section 14 thereof, in the language of which:

In order to exercise the authority granted to it under this Act the Monetary Board shall:

(a) Prepare and issue such rules and regulations as it considers necessary for the effective discharge of the
responsibilities and exercise of the power assigned to the Monetary Board and to the Central Bank under this Act.

Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue the same constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our system of government, said power may not be delegated except
to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be and another thing to
delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the
rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable
standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has
kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." (Yakus vs. United Sates, 88 L. ed. 848.) Referring the case at bar, section
74 of Republic Act No. 265 conferred upon the Monetary Board and the President the power to subject to licensing all
transactions in gold and foreign exchange "in order to protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an exchange
crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in which to take constructive measures to combat such crisis."
The Board is, likewise, authorized "to take such appropriate remedial measures" to protect the international stability of the
peso, "whether the international reserve is falling, as a result of payment or remittances abroad which, in the opinion of the
Monetary Board, are contrary to the national welfare" (section 70, Rep. Act No. 265). It should be noted, furthermore, that
these powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which are,
among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to promote a rising level of production, employment
and real income in the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265.) These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest
in the delegated authority the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant of said
authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers (Cardon vs. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil., 547;
Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Utility, 34, Phil., 136; Rubi vs. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; Alegre vs. Collector of
Customs, 53 Phil., 394; People vs. Rosentral, 63 Phil., 328; Antamok Gold vs. C.I.R., 68 Phil., 340; Calang vs. Williams, 70 Phil.,
276; Cervantes vs. Auditor General, 91 Phil., 359; Phil., Association of Colleges & Universities vs. Sec. of Education, 97 Phil., 806;
51 Off. Gaz., (12) 6230; Mutual Films Corp. vs. Industrial Commission, 276 U.S. 230; Mulford vs. Smith, 307 U.S. 48; National
Broadcasting Co. vs. U.S. 319 U.S. 225; Yakus vs. White, 321 U.S. 414; Ammann vs. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245).

Under the fifth assignment of error, appellant maintains that Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code authorizing the forfeiture of
the proceeds of a crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed, does not apply to the case at bar, the crime
involved herein being covered by a special law. However, pursuant to section 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the provisions of
said Code shall be "supplementary" to special laws, "unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary", and there is no
such provision to the contrary in Republic Act No. 265 (U.S. vs. Parrone, 24 Phil., 29; People vs. Moreno, 60 Phil., 712; People vs.
Ramayo, 61 Phil., 225; Copiaco vs. Luzon Brokerage, 66 Phil., 184).

The last assignment of error refers to the propriety of the order of confiscation of the traveller's check for $100, the lower court
having found that the accused had no knowledge of the fact that it was in his physical possession, and that therefore, he had no
criminal intent in connection therewith. We feel that this point is well taken, and that, accordingly, said travellers' check should
not be forfeited to the Government.

With this modification, the decision, appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all other respects, with costs against
the defendant-appellant. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.