DUE PROCESS existing law.
The due process clause was kept intentionally
1. YNOT v. IAC, March 20, 1987
DOCTRINE: The minimum requirements of due process
are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not
be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard
against official arbitrariness. In the exceptional cases
accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission
of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of
the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the
need to correct it.
FACTS: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner had
transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of EO
626-A, an order issued by then Pres. Marcos prohibiting the
interprovincial movement and slaughtering of carabaos,
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and
prohibiting the transport of carabeef from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of
the said EO, as amended, shall be subject to confiscation
and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission
may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. The petitioner
sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the
merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of
the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed the
decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld
the trial court, and he has now come before us in this
petition for review
ISSUE: WON the outright confiscation of the carabaos or
carabeef, as provided in the said EO, is a violation of the
petitioner’s constitutional right to due process and is,
therefore, among other things, unconstitutional.
RULING: The challenged measure is denominated an
executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an
vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This
was felt necessary because due process is not, like some
provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying
down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue
of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process
clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation,
enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing
times and circumstances may require. The minimum
requirements of due process are notice and hearing which,
generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they
are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. In
the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated
by the police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive
order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair
play. It has already been remarked that there are occasions
when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary
action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings
as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only.
In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a previous
hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be
corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the
case before us, there was no such pressure of time or
action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment.
The properties involved were not even inimical per se as
to require their instant destruction. There certainly was
no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive
order should not have been proved first in a court of
justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering
that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No.
626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have
been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of
justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose
the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction
of the accused. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities
of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender
is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to
the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive
Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
2. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL
OPERATORS ASSOC. INC. v. HON. CITY
MAYOR OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-24693, July 31,
1967
DOCTRINE: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee
may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but
in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this
class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying
the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances
must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts
have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion.
The broad taxing authority conferred to cities and
municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range
of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is
for public purposes, just and uniform.
FACTS: Petitioner is a non-stock corporation dedicated to
the promotion and protection of the interest of its 18
members who are operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both
national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes,
employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500
person and representing an investment of more than P3
million.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition against the
City Mayor of Manila with regard the execution and
enforcement of Ordinance No. 4760. Said Ordinance
classifies hotels and motels into first-class and second-class
for purposes of an annual fee of P6,000 and P4,000,
respectively. The Ordinance requires the operators of the
h/m’s to get personal information of anyone who checks in
to their rooms. Petitioner said that the Ordinance is
unconstitutional for being oppressive, arbitrary and against
due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
Manila is violative of the due process clause
RULING: No. The Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
Manila is not violative of the due process clause.
The presumption is all in favor of validity. The
action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be
lightly set aside. The councilors must be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting
the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations
are essential to the well-being of the people. The Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is
not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation.
As in this case, there is no factual foundation laid.
The lower court decided the matter based only upon the
pleadings and the stipulation of facts. Such cannot prevail
over the presumption of validity and judgment against the
Ordinance set aside.
Further, the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police
Power. There is no question but that the challenged
Ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize
prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages
h/m’s in doing any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the LGU concerned. As was
explained more in detail in the Cu Unjieng case: Licenses
for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police
power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the
power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the
license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much
wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former,
and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule,
declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability
of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who
might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of
course, generally an important factor in the determination
of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees
clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have
frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale
of liquors.
Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz v.
Araneta this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced
by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made
to implement the state's police power. Only the other day,
this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing
authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to
cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a
wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax
so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.
 As a matter of fact, even without reference to the
wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing
licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case
that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount," here the license fee of the
operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely
as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this
particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation
from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf
of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the
ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation
and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in
the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also
dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of
which outside the city markets under certain conditions is
permitted. And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals
in the community may be deprived of their present business
or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the
exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons
licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public
need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police
power embark in these occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of
that power."
The due process contention is likewise untenable,
due process has no exact definition but has reason as a
standard. In this case, the precise reason why the Ordinance
was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the City
which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere
singling out of the provisions of the said Ordinance alleged
to be vague.
There is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on
another due process ground by invoking the principles of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in
the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the
alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and
specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give
the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or
companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
necessity for determining whether the companion or
companions referred to are those arriving with the customer
or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With
him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time
later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast
doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a
motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or
operators; another proviso which from their standpoint
would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means
a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do
these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its
face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the
question is to answer it. From Connally v. General
Construction Co. to Adderley v. Florida, the principle has
been consistently upheld that what makes a statute
susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either
forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before
us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean."
3. LUZON SURETY CO., INC. v. JESUS
PANAGUITON, ET AL., G.R. No. L-26054, July
21, 1978
DOCTRINE: A fundamental part of due process is the
essential requisite that a party should be given an
opportunity to be heard by notifying or informing him or
his counsel as to when such a hearing will take place,
affording him reasonable notice of the time fixed for the
hearing or trial of the case.
FACTS: On April 1955, plaintiff, as surety, and defendant
Jesus Panaguiton, as principal, executed jointly and
severally a surety bond for P10,000.00 in favor of the
International Tobacco Co., Inc. to secure the payment of all
his monetary liabilities, as well as the faithful performance
of his obligation to said Company. In consideration of the
execution by plaintiff of the said Surety Bond, there were,
in turn, executed in the latter's favor an Indemnity
Agreement by defendant Panaguiton, and others.
For failure of defendant Panaguiton to comply with
the terms and conditions of the Surety Bond, the
International Tobacco Co., Inc. filed Civil Case at CFI
Manila against plaintiff and said Panaguiton. A decision
was rendered sentencing the defendants therein to pay to
the International Tobacco Co., Inc. Plaintiff paid to the
International Tobacco Co., Inc. and that notwithstanding
demands made by plaintiff on defendants for the
reimbursement, said defendants have failed and refused to
make said reimbursement.
On July 1960, the trial court rendered judgment
ordering defendants to pay plaintiff. On October 1960,
defendant-appellant Custodia J. Vda. de Velasco
(administratrix of the estate of the deceased Angeles
Velasco) filed a petition for relief from judgment which
states the ff: 1) That the said decision is a complete nullity
for the reason that she was not notified of the hearing of the
case; 2) That if she was duly notified of the hearing she
would be able to show that the Indemnity Agreement was
not at all signed by the deceased Angeles Velasco; and 3)
That the petitioning defendant, not having been represented
by legal counsel, was of the mistaken belief that she has 60
days within which to file a petition for new trial, or
reconsideration or appeal from the decision. After the trial
court's denial of her petition for relief from judgment on
December 1960, defendant-appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying her petition for relief,
which motion was also denied, hence the present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in denying
the appellant's petition for relief from judgment without
considering that the decision subject matter of the petition
is a complete nullity in so far as appellant is concerned
because she was never notified of the hearing of the case
and was deprived of her day in court.
RULING: The defendant-appellant was not notified of the
hearings set for March l and May 13, 1960 is borne by the
records. Her name as a party defendant does not even
appear in the list of persons to be given notice of the
hearings by the Clerk of Court. She was, therefore, denied
the fundamental right to be heard, an essential element of
procedural due process. In El Banco Español Filipino vs.
Palanca: Due process of law implies that there must be a
court or tribunal clothed with power to hear and
determine the matter before it, that jurisdiction shall
have been lawfully acquired, that the defendant shall
have an opportunity to be heard, and that judgment
shall be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Philippine jurisprudence is replete with decisions
of this Court laying down as a fundamental part of due
process the essential requisite that a party should be given
an opportunity to be heard by notifying or informing him or
his counsel as to when such a hearing will take place,
affording him reasonable notice of the time fixed for the
hearing or trial of the case.
In the instant case, the trial court had peremptorily
rejected defendant-appellant's petition for relief from
judgment, declaring that her failure to appeal within 30
days from receipt of the decision was fatal to her cause. SC
disagrees with the lower court's ruling. It is precisely
because of the expiration of the period for appeal that
she seeks to avail of the remedy of relief from judgment,
alleging that being a layman and without the benefit of
counsel, she was of the mistaken belief that she had 60
days within which to appeal the decision. Such remedy
of relief from judgment is available to her as provided under
Rule 38, Sec. 2 and 3, Revised Rules of Court. The trial
court gravely erred in denying appellant' s petition for
relief.
4. NAMIL v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150540. October
28, 2003
DOCTRINE: Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings
before the COMELEC requires due notice and hearing. The
proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if
he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his
proclamation.
FACTS: On May 14, 2001, the election for the members of
the Sangguniang Bayan was held in Palimbang, Sultan
Kudarat. On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Palimbang issued Certificate of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation (COCVP) which contained the
petitioners and the Sangguniang Bayan winning
candidates. They took their oath, and assumed their offices
as members of SB of Palimbang. The next day, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang issued a
COCVP which listed the private respondents as winners.
Private respondent Joenime B. Kapina wrote the
COMELEC requesting that she and the others who were
proclaimed as winners on May 21, 2001 be recognized as
the winning candidates and the new members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat.
Commissioner-in-Charge for Region XII, Mehol K. Sadain
conducted an investigation on the matter and required the
Law Department, the Regional Election Registrar and the
Provincial Election Supervisor to submit
reports/memoranda. Acting on the respective memoranda
submitted by the officers, Commissioner Sadain submitted
his recommendation to the COMELEC that there was a
valid proclamation of the private respondents as the
winning candidates. COMELEC issued Resolution No.
4615 for the immediate installation of the private
respondents as the duly elected members of SB Palimbang.
The petitioners contend that the COMELEC’s
Resolution No. 4615 is null and void since it was issued
without according them due notice and hearing, contrary to
the enshrined principle of due process. The petitioners
allege that they were never accorded the chance to present
their side in connection with the investigation that was
purportedly conducted by Commissioner Sadain and on the
memoranda/report of COMELEC’s officers. COMELEC
simply approved the recommendation of Commissioner
Sadain. The petitioners were kept in the dark, learned about
the controversy only when they were notified of the assailed
resolution of the public respondent. On the other hand,
COMELEC asserts that the twin requirement of notice and
hearing in annulment of proclamation is not applicable
when the proclamation of the petitioners as winning
candidates is null and void, citing Utto v. Commission on
Elections.
ISSUE: Whether Resolution 4615 is null and void.
RULING: Yes. While it is true that the COMELEC is
vested with a broad power to enforce all election laws, the
same is subject to the right of the parties to due process. In
this case, the petitioners had been proclaimed as the
winning candidates and had assumed their office. Since
then, they had been exercising their rights and performing
their duties as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat. Their proclamation on May 20,
2001 enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity
since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the
same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office
without due process of law.
Due process in the proceedings before the public
respondent exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires
due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the
COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to
annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, it is
without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation
or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and
hearing.
In this case, the public respondent nullified the
proclamation of the petitioners and ousted them from their
office as members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Palimbang, based solely on the recommendations
of its law department and of Commissioner Sadain, and on
the memoranda of its officers. The petitioners were not
accorded a chance to be heard on the said recommendations
and the memorandum of Regional Election Director Clarita
Callar, certification of Celia Romero, and certification of
Election Officer Malic Sansarona dated September 12,
2001 before it issued the assailed resolution.
Although public office is not property under
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one
cannot acquire a vested right to public office, it is,
nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in quasi-
judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due
notice and hearing. The proclamation of a winning
candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of
any motion to set aside his proclamation. The public
respondent’s reliance on the ruling of this Court in Utto vs.
Commission on Elections is misplaced. The Court, in that
case, held that the twin-requirement of notice and hearing
in an annulment of proclamation is not applicable because
of the illegality of petitioner’s proclamation. The factual
circumstances in the instant petition are far different from
those obtaining in Utto. In the Utto case, a notice of appeal
was filed questioning the ruling of the board of canvassers
but, the latter proceeded in proclaiming Utto as the winning
candidate. This made the proclamation illegal. In the
present case, nobody questioned the petitioner’s
proclamation.
5. NHA v. Evangelista, May 16, 2005
DOCTRINE: A person who was not impleaded in the
complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered
therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in
which he is a stranger.
FACTS: NHA filed a case for recovery involving a real
property measuring 915.50 square meters and located in V.
Luna Road, Quezon City, originally awarded in 1968 by the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (petitioner’s
predecessor) to a certain Adela Salindon.
After the death of Salindon, her heirs executed an
extra-judicial settlement where the property was transferred
to Arsenio Florendo, Jr., Milagros Florendo, Beatriz
Florendo and Eloisa Florendo-Kulphongpatana. However,
the award in favor of Salindon was nullified and set aside
by the court in 1984 for having been issued in excess of
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, and
petitioner was declared the owner of the property.
Despite said decision, the property was auctioned
off by the Quezon City Treasurer’s Office on April 23,
1986, for unpaid real property taxes by the Florendos. The
highest bidder was Luisito Sarte. Because the Register of
Deeds refused to register the final deed of sale issued by the
City Treasurer, Sarte filed a petition for issuance of title and
confirmation of sale, which was granted by the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 84). Consequently, the
Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 28182 in the name of Sarte, who divided the property
into Lot 1-A, measuring 570.50 square meters and covered
by TCT No. 108070, and Lot 1-B, measuring 345 square
meters and covered by TCT No. 108071.
It was in 1991 that petitioner filed Civil Case No.
Q-91-10071 with Sarte, the City Treasurer of Quezon City
and the Quezon City Register of Deeds, as defendants.
While the case was pending, Sarte executed in favor of
respondent Jose Evangelista, a Deed of Assignment dated
December 2, 1994, covering Lot 1-A. TCT No. 108070 was
cancelled and TCT No. 122944 was issued in the name of
respondent on December 21, 1994. Subsequently, the
Register of Deeds annotated on TCT No. 122944 an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim of petitioner.
On May 1, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for leave
to file supplemental complaint in Civil Case No. Q-91-
10071, seeking to include respondent Evangelista, Northern
Star Agri-Business Corporation and BPI Agricultural
Development Bank as defendants. The proposed additional
defendants were the subsequent purchasers of Lots 1-A and
1-B. The trial court, however, denied the motion.
Thus, petitioner, on May 31, 1995, filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 82) a
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT
Nos. 122944 and 126639, and Damages, against Sarte,
respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business
Corporation, BPI Agricultural Development Bank and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
RTC dismissed this second case on the ground of
litis pendencia. In 1995, it rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner declaring the auction sale to Sarte as well as the
TCT issued in his name as null and void. Paragraph 3 of
said decision also declares any transfer made by Sarte or his
agents before or during the pendency of the case as void.
Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of the trial court’s judgment, particularly to the
portion referring to the nullity of any transfer, assignment,
sale or mortgage made by Sarte. In his petition, respondent
alleged extrinsic fraud as ground. According to respondent,
since he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, he
was prevented from ventilating his cause, right or interest
over the property, and the judgment was not binding on
him, as the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person.
The CA granted the petition and declared null and
void paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion of the trial
court’s decision insofar as petitioner’s title to the property
is concerned. The CA found that respondent was not a party
to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 and the trial court did not
acquire any jurisdiction over his person. The CA also ruled
that the judgment violated respondent’s right against
deprivation of the property without due process of law. Its
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA,
petitioner took the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in annulling
paragraph 3 of the trial courts decision on grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and lack of due process of law.
RULING: No. It is basic that no man shall be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a
case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never
made a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. Yet, the
assailed paragraph 3 of said decision decreed that (A)ny
transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature
of the parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant
Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during
the pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null
and void, together with any transfer certificates of title
issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered
to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs.
Respondent is adversely affected by such judgment, as he
was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from
Sarte, and title was already transferred to him. It will be the
height of inequity to allow respondents title to be nullified
without being given the opportunity to present any evidence
in support of his ostensible ownership of the property.
Much more, it is tantamount to a violation of the
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law. Clearly, the trial courts
judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive
portion is concerned.
6. Government of Hongkong Special Administrative
Region v. Hon Olalia, April 19, 2007
DOCTRINE: An extradition proceeding being sui generis,
the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance
of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object
of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extradite from fleeing our jurisdiction.
FACTS: On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the
Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an “Agreement for the Surrender of Accused
and Convicted Persons.” It took effect on June 20, 1997. On
July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s
Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
Private respondent Munoz was charged before the
Hong Kong Court within three (3) counts of the offense of
“accepting and advantage as agent,” in violation of Section
9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201
of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense
of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of
Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999,
warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he
faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years of
charge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the
Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then
forwarded the request to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest
of private respondent. On September 23, 1999, the RTC,
Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and
detained him. On October 14, 1999, private respondent
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus
questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. On
November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
 As early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch
10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part,
private respondent filed in the same case a petition for bail
which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, or on
October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order
denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that
private respondent is a high “flight risk.”
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by the respondent
judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 subject to
conditions.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not there is nothing in the Constitution
or statutory law providing that a potential extradite has a
right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
2.) Whether or not Juan Munoz as a potential extradite
be granted the right to bail on the basis of clear and
convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders processes of the extradition court.
RULING:
The Philippines, along with the other members of
the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article
II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified.
In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international treaties giving
recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the
right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s
ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power
to deprive an individual of his liberty is nit necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine, have likewise been detained. Second, to limit
bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to
our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not
limited the exercise of the right to bail criminal proceedings
only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not
involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been
allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during
the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights.
If a bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see
no justification why it should not be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After
all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail
in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty
of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2 (a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
“extradition” as the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a
penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of
the requesting state or government. It has been
characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by
treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted
of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the
demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the
potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding
is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a
crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to
treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial
to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is
merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent
the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and
to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the
purpose of trial or punishment.
 But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding,
it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of the liberty on the part of the potential
extradite and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose
of extradition is also “the machinery of criminal law”. This
is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) which mandates the “immediate arrest
and temporary detention of the accused” if such “will best
serve the interest of justice.”
While our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extradite, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right
to due process under the constitution.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the
standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can
neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal
cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character,
the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition
law which is to prevent the prospective extradite from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in
Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extradite must prove by “clear and convincing
evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all
the orders and processes of the extradition court.
7. Espero Salaw v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90786, September
27, 1991
DOCTRINE: It is true that administrative and quasi-
judicial bodies are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure in the adjudication cases. However, the right to
counsel, a very basic requirement of substantive due
process, has to be observed.
FACTS: Petitioner, Espero Santos Salaw, worked as
employee (credit investigator-appraiser—his duties include
inspecting and appraising the company’s foreclosed assets)
of private respondent Associated Bank.
Sometime in November, the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary extracted a
sworn statement of petitioner, WITHOUT THE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, to the effect that he, along
with a co-employee Madrigal, sold twenty sewing
machines and electric generators foreclosed by the
company and divided the proceeds by themselves.
In December, petitioner was requested by the bank
manager to appear before the bank’s Personnel Discipline
and Investigation Committee (PDIC) and requested in a
letter that he should appear WITHOUT COUNSEL. Later
on, petitioner was terminated from employment. The Labor
Arbiter held that he was illegally dismissed, but it was
reversed by NLRC, hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the requirements of due process was
satisfied.
RULING: No because the investigation of Petitioner by the
respondent Bank violated his constitutional right to due
process. He was not given the opportunity to defend himself
as provided in the IRR of the Labor Code, Section 5. It
provides that "the employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative, if he so desires." Here, he
was perfunctorily denied the assistance of counsel during
investigation to be conducted by the PDIC. No reasons
preferred which vitiated the denial with irregularity and
unfairness. Even the minutes of the proceeding during the
investigation were not presented. This is a glaring denial of
due process.
Under the Labor Code, as amended, the
requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee by his
employer are two-fold: the substantive and the procedural.
It must be for a valid or authorized cause (substantive) and
there must be notice and hearing (procedural).
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in
the adjudication cases. However, the right to counsel, a very
basic requirement of substantive due process, has to be
observed. Indeed, rights to counsel and to due process of
law are two of fundamental rights guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution to person under investigation, be the
proceeding administrate civil, or criminal. Section 12(1),
Article III thereof specifically provides: "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to ... have compete and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing in the presence of
counsel." To underscore the inviolability this provision, the
third paragraph of the same section explicitly states that,
"any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be inadmissible evidence
against him.
Thus, petitioner’s admission before the CIS is
inadmissible.
Case Notes:
 The cardinal primary rights must be respected even
in proceedings of administrative character. As provided in
the Ang Tibay Case:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing,
which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. This means the rudimentary requirements of fair
play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity
to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights, which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity that
cannot be disregarded namely, that of having something to
support its decision.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
"substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations (now the
National Relations Commission) or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate arriving at a
decision
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations (now NLRC)
should, in controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, the reasons for the decisions
rendered.
8. PO2 RUEL C. MONTOYA vs. POLICE
DIRECTOR REYNALDO P. VARILLA,
G.R. No. 180146, December 18, 2008
DOCTRINE: The cardinal precept is that where there is
a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted
from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to
due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which
cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent,
a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction. The rule must be equally true for quasi-
judicial administrative bodies, for the constitutional
guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process is unqualified by what type of
proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) he stands
to lose the same.
FACTS: Montoya was dismissed due to failure to attend
LEEC and AWOL for 67 days. Montoya filed MR to PNP
Regional Director (RD). RD then cancel the dropping of
Montoya from rolls but with preventive suspension.
Summary Dismissal Proceeding follows dismissing
Montoya. Montoya filed MR to PNP Chief but because
decision of RD is only appealable to RAB, he then filed MR
to RAB. RAB then ordered reinstatement of Montoya. RD
filed MR to DILG but denied. RD filed MR to CSC and
reaffirmed the decision of dismissal. Montoya filed MR to
DILG but denied, then filed petition for certiorari in CA but
denied.
ISSUE: WON the right to due process of petitioner was
violated.
RULING: Yes, right to due process was violated.
(Although Montoya filed MR of RD’s decision of
dismissing him beyond the 10 days of receipt of copy of
decision) As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period permitted by law is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and the failure to
perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final
and executory. The Court, however, reiterates its previous
pronouncements herein that the Summary Dismissal
Proceedings were conducted without notice to Montoya
and in violation of his right to due process. The violation of
Montoyas fundamental constitutional right deprived the
NCR Regional Director of jurisdiction over Montoyas
administrative case; and the decision rendered by the NCR
Regional Director therein was void. A void judgment does
not become final and executory and may be challenged at
any time.
Facts:
REASON FOR DISMISSAL
Ruel C. Montoya, a police officer assigned in
Quezon City, when the NAPOLCOM issued Special Order
No. 1044 on 9 September 1998 dropping him from the rolls
(as a member of PNP), effective 15 August 1998, for
failure to attend the Law Enforcement and
Enhancement Course (LEEC). Montoya had been absent
without official leave (AWOL) for a period of 67 days,
from 23 January 1998 to 31 March 1998.
FILE MR TO PNP REGIONAL DIRECTOR
 Four months after he was dropped from the rolls,
Montoya filed a Motion for Reconsideration addressed to
the PNP Regional Director (NCR), explaining that on 22
January 1998, he went to the Baler Police Station/Police
Station 2 to have his Sick Leave Form approved by the
station commander. Allegedly due to the fact that his
name had already been forwarded to the NCRPO for the
LEEC, his Sick Leave Form was not approved. Montoya
averred that his failure to attend the LEEC was beyond
his control, since he was suffering from arthritis with on
and off symptoms of severe body pain. Montoya attached
to his Motion a certification simply dated 1998, issued by a
certain Dr. Jesus G. de Guzman, and authenticated by
Police Chief Inspector (P/CINSP.) Ethel Y. Tesoro, Chief,
Medical Service, CPD.
CANCEL THE ORDER OF DROPPING FROM
ROLLS BUT WITH PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
Upon the recommendation of the Chief of the
NCRPO Legal Division, the NCR Regional Director issued
on 11 June 1999 Special Order No. 990 canceling Special
Order No. 1044 (the order of dropping him from the rolls)
. Montoya was also preventively suspended for 30 days,
from 8 June to 8 July 1999, pending Summary Proceedings
of his administrative liability. The 67 days when Montoya
went on absence without leave (AWOL) were immediately
deducted from his leave credits.
SUMMARY DISMISSAL PROCEEDINGS
The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against
Montoya were conducted by Hearing Officer Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.) Francisco Don C. Montenegro,
and based on his findings, the NCR Regional Director
rendered a Decision on 23 June 2000 dismissing Montoya
from the police service for Serious Neglect of Duty (due to
AWOL), effective immediately. Montoya received a copy
of said Decision on 20 July 2000.
FILED MR TO PNP CHIEF
Allegedly unassisted by counsel, Montoya filed on
1 August 2000 with the CPD office a Petition for
Review/Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 June 2000
Decision of the NCR Regional Director, which he
addressed to the PNP Chief. In a Memorandum issued on 3
July 2002, Montoya’s Petition/Motion was denied for lack
of jurisdiction, since a disciplinary action involving
demotion or dismissal from service imposed by a PNP
regional director may only be appealed to the Regional
Appellate Board (RAB).
FILED MR TO RAB
Montoya next filed on 2 September 2002 an appeal
of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director
before the RAB of the National Capital Region (RAB-
NCR), alleging lack of due process considering that he was
not even notified of any hearing by the Summary Hearing
Officer and was thus deprived of the opportunity to present
evidence in his defense. The Summary Hearing Officer in
the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against him
recommended his dismissal from police service based on
his failure to report for the LEEC, without even looking into
his side of the controversy.
RAB ORDERED REISTATEMENT
On 11 December 2002, the RAB-NCR rendered its
Decision granting Montoyas appeal and ordering his
reinstatement.
REGIONAL DIRECTOR (NCR) APPEAL THE RAB
DECISION TO DILG
Thereafter, the NCR Regional Director authorized
Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Rufino Jeffrey L.
Manere (Manere) to appeal several RAB-NCR decisions
involving different police officers, including the Decision
dated 11 December 2002 on Montoyas case, before the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). The
NCR Regional Director assailed the RAB-NCR decision
reinstating Montoya in the police service.
MONTOYA et.al. FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS
AND/OR OPPOSITION
On 8 August 2003, Montoya, together with the
other police personnel reinstated in the service by RAB-
NCR (hereinafter collectively referred to as Montoya, et
al.), filed before the DILG an Urgent Motion to Dismiss
and/or Opposition to the Appeal of the NCR Regional
Director.
DILG DENIED THE APPEAL OF THE NCR
REGIONAL DIRECTOR
On 10 November 2003, DILG Secretary Jose D.
Lina, Jr. issued an Order denying the appeal of the NCR
Regional Director.
BEYOND REGLEMANTARY PERIOD- DILG
Secretary Lina noted that the NCR Regional Director
received a copy of the RAB-NCR decision on Montoya’s
case on 10 February 2003, but it only appealed the same to
the DILG on 30 April 2003, beyond the 15-day
reglementary period for appeals.
 NO PERSONALITY - DILG Secretary Lina also
declared that neither Manere nor the NCR Regional
Director has personality to appeal the RAB-NCR decision
to the DILG.
LACK OF JURISDICTION OF RAB- Finally, DILG
Secretary Lina explained that the filing of an appeal by
either party under Section 45 of Republic Act No.
6975 covers only demotion and dismissal from the service
and never exoneration and suspension.
Thus, the appeal of the RAB-NCR decision exonerating
Montoya should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and
for the reason that the said decision had already become
final and executory.
NCR REGIONAL DIRECTOR APPEALED TO CSC
The NCR Regional Director, represented by
Manere, appealed the Order dated 10 November 2003 of
DILG Secretary Lina to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). The NCR Regional Director asserted its right to
appeal citing Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy.
NCR REGIONAL DIRECTOR REINSTATED
MONTOYA et.al.
On 23 March 2004, the NCR Regional Director
issued Special Order No. 611 reinstating Montoya, et
al., without prejudice to the pending appeal of the NCR
Regional Director before the CSC.
CSC AFFIRMED THE DISMISSAL OF MONTOYA
et. al.
Subsequently, the CSC issued on 24 August
2005 Resolution No. 05-1200 which recognized the right of
the PNP disciplining authorities to appeal the decision of
the RAB-NCR to the DILG. The CSC set aside the 10
November 2003 Order of DILG Secretary Lina and
affirmed the decisions of the NCR Regional Director
dismissing Montoya, et al., from police service. According
to the CSC, Montoya, in particular, was guilty of laches and
abandonment of his position. It also held that the 11
December 2002 Decision of the RAB-NCR on Montoyas
case, affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina, was based on mere
affidavits which were not substantiated.
MONTOYA FILED MR BUT DENIED
The CSC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
Montoya, et al., in Resolution No. 06-1500 dated 23
August 2006 for lack of new evidence or any valid reason
that warrants the setting aside or modification of its
Resolution No. 05-1200.
MONTOYA FILED PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
W/ TRO AND PRELIMINARY INJUCTION (RULE
43) BUT DISMISSED
Montoya, et al., sought recourse to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 43 with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction, but on 9 August 2007, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing the same,
since there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the CSC.
ISSUES:
1. WON Montoya failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.
2. WON Respondent Manere (representative of RD)
has legal personality to appeal the decision
exonerating the petitioner.
3. WON the right to due process of petitioner was
violated.
4. WON petitioner delayed in appealing the decision
summarily dismissing him
5. WON petitioner deserved to be dismissed from
service.
RULING:
1. Montoya’s reliance on the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is misplaced, for said doctrine
does not find application in the instant case. The doctrine
intends to preclude premature resort from a quasi-judicial
administrative body to the court. Such is not the situation in
this case. Montoya is questioning the supposed premature
resort of the NCR Regional Director from the decision of
the DILG Secretary to the CSC, instead of to the Office
of the President; obviously, he is challenging the
resort from one administrative body to another.
2. No, it should be the PNP as a bureau. The
party who has the personality and interest to appeal the
decisions of the RAB-NCR and DILG Secretary Lina
exonerating Montoya from the administrative charges
against him and reinstating him to the service is the PNP
as a bureau. It was the PNP, in the exercise of its authority
to implement internal discipline among its members, which
instigated the administrative investigation of Montoya, so
it may be deemed the prosecuting government party. And it
is the PNP which stands to suffer as a result of the
purportedly wrongful exoneration of Montoya, since it
would be compelled to take back to its fold a delinquent
member.
Given all of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision
of the RAB-NCR, affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina, reinstating
Montoya to the service. It was only the RAB-NCR which properly
acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed before it and was able to 1.
render a decision after a consideration of both sides to the
controversy.
3. Yes, the right to due process of petitioner was
violated. In the instant case, the Summary Dismissal
Proceedings against Montoya were flawed from the very
beginning when these were conducted without due notice
to him. The NCR Regional Director, through Manere,
never contested the fact that the Hearing Officer proceeded
with his investigation without giving notice to Montoya.
Without notice, Montoya was unable to attend the hearings,
present written or oral arguments, and submit evidence in
his favor; he was completely deprived of the opportunity
to be heard on the administrative charges against him
and was irrefragably denied due process.
4. No. the petitioner is not delayed in appealing.
The decision of the summarily dismissing him. The
Court reviews the vital dates. Montoya was able to receive
a copy of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional
Director dismissing him from service on 20 July 2000. He
erroneously filed his Petition for Review/Motion for
Reconsideration with the PNP Chief on 1 August
2000. The PNP denied Montoyas Petition/Motion on 3
July 2002, two years after the filing thereof, citing lack of
jurisdiction, considering that the proper appellate body is
the RAB-NCR. Thus, Montoya was only able to file his
appeal of the decision of the NCR Regional Director before
the RAB-NCR on 2 September 2002.
Obviously, Montoyas appeal on 2 September
2002 with the RAB-NCR, the appellate body with
jurisdiction, was filed way beyond 10 days from his
receipt of a copy of the NCR Regional Directors decision
on 20 July 2000. However a void judgment does not
become final and executory and may be challenged at any
time.
5. Yes, HEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Philippine National
Police is ORDERED to reinstate petitioner PO2 Ruel C.
Montoya to the police service without loss of seniority
rights and with full payment of his salaries and backwages
covering the period effective from the time of his dismissal
from the service up to his reinstatement.
9. ATENEO DE MANILA VS. HON. CAPULONG,
MAY 27, 1993
DOCTRINE: Minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as Petitioner University herein, thus:
The students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against
them
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf; and
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.
FACTS: As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a
fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School, a fraternity
organized in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites
on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in
joining its ranks. As a result of such initiation rites,
Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of
petitioner university, died of serious physical injuries at
Chinese General Hospital on February 10, 1991. He was
not the lone victim, though, for another freshman by the
name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the
Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned
by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the
same occasion.
February 11, 1991 - Petitioner Dean Cynthia del
Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate
and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances
surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also
required respondent students to submit their written
statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt.
Although respondent students received a copy of the
written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime,
they were placed on preventive suspension.
February 14, 1991 – JSAF Investigating
Committee, after receiving the written statements and
hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima
facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule
3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then required to file their
written answers to the formal charge on or before February
18, 1991; otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived
their right to present their defenses.
February 20, 1991 - Petitioner Dean Castillo
created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against
respondent students.
 In a letter dated February 20, 1991 – (Respondent
students were informed that they had violated Rule No. 3
of the Rules on Discipline contained in the Law School
Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The complaint/charge
against you arose from initiations held on February 8-10,
1991. The evidence against you consist of testimonies of
students, showing your participation in acts prohibited by
the School regulations." Finally, it ordered respondent
students to file their written answers to the above charge on
or before February 22 1991, otherwise they would be
deemed to have waived their defenses.
In a motion dated February 21, 1991 - respondent
students, through counsel, requested that the investigation
against them be held in abeyance, pending action on their
request for copies of the evidence against them.
Respondent students were then directed by the
Board to appear before it at a hearing on February 28, 1991
to clarify their answer with regard to the charges filed by
the investigating committee for violation of Rule No. 3.
However, in a letter to a petitioners dated February
27, 1991, counsel for respondent students moved to
postpone the hearing from February 28, 1991 to March 1,
1991.
Respondent students were directed to appear on
March 2, 1991 for clarificatory questions.
March 5, 1991 - Petitioner Bernas wrote Dean
Castillo that, "in cases where the Disciplinary Board is not
prepared to impose the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer
that the Board leave the decision on the penalty to the
Administration so that this case be decided not just on the
Law School level but also on the University level."
In a resolution dated March 9, 1991 - The Board
found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of
the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits
participation in hazing activities. The Board found that
respondent students acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies"
during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the
"auxies privilege," which allows them to participate in the
physical hazing.
However, the respondent students claim that they
were there to assist and attend to the needs of the neophytes,
actually they were assigned a definite supportive role to
play in the organized activity.
In conclusion, the Board pronounced respondents
guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through
acquiescence. However, in view of the lack of unanimity
among the members of the Board on the penalty of
dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the
University Administration.
Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative
to review the decision of the Board and left to the President
of the University the decision of whether to expel
respondents or not.
In a resolution dated March 10, 1991- petitioner Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de Manila
University, accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus:
"that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's
privilege;' that even assuming they did not lay hands on the
neophytes," respondents students are still guilty in
accordance with the principle that "where two or more
persons act together in the commission of a crime, whether
they act through the physical volition of one or of all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose
will contributes to the wrongdoing is responsible for the
whole."
Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which led to
the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the "offense of
the respondents can be characterized as grave and serious,
subversive of the goals of Christian education and contrary
to civilized behavior." Accordingly, he imposed the penalty
of dismissal on all respondent students.
In a resolution dated March 18, 1991- The Board
excluded respondent students Abas and Mendoza from the
coverage of the resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch as
at the time the latter resolution was promulgated, neither
had as yet submitted their case to the Board. Said resolution
also set the investigation of the two students on March 21,
1991.
On March 18, 1991- Respondent students filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 14
alleging that they were currently enrolled as students for the
second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a
temporary restraining order is issued, they would be
prevented from taking their examinations. The petition
principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in
their dismissal. (Granted)
Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining
order the enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent
students and stopping the former from conducting hearings
relative to the hazing incident.
On April 7, 1991- The temporary restraining order
were issued on March 18, 1991 lapsed. Consequently, a day
after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean
del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the
charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and
Mendoza.
Respondent students reacted immediately by filing
a Supplemental Petition of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction, to include the aforesaid
members of the Special Board, as additional respondents to
the original petition.
Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement
Petition arguing that the creation of the Special Board was
totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack
of due process in the conduct of investigations by the
Disciplinary Board against respondent students; that a
supplemental petition cannot be admitted without the same
being set for hearing and that the supplemental petition for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in effect,
extend the previous restraining order beyond its mandatory
20-day lifetime.
Acting on the urgent motion to admit the
supplemental petition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of
respondents Judge Capulong, granted respondent students'
prayer on April 10, 1991.
On May 17, 1991- Respondent Judge ordered
petitioners to reinstate respondent students.
Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to conduct
special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which
allegedly the students were not allowed to take, and
enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard to the
cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final
determination of the issue of the instant case. Lastly, it
directed respondent students to file a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00. The Special Board investigating petitioners
Abas and Mendoza and directed the dropping of their
names from its roll of students.
May 21, 1991- Respondent judge issued the writ of
preliminary injunction upon posting by respondents of a
bond dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a school is within its rights in expelling
students from it economic community pursuant to its
disciplinary rules and moral standards
2. Was there a denial of dues process against the
respondent students
RULING: We grant the petition and reverse the order of
respondent judge ordering readmission of respondent
students. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when he ruled that respondent students had been
denied due process in the investigation of the charges
against them.
Issue 1: Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the power to
dismiss its erring students therefore it had validly exercised
such power. The students do not deserve to claims such
venerable instirtuion such as Ateneo as their own a minute
longer for they may foreseeable cast a malevolent
institution on students currently enrolled as well as those
who come after them. We have consistently upheld the
salutary proposition that admission to an institution of
higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same
being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a
right. While under the education Act of 1982, students have
a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down
by the academic institution
It will seriously impair petitioner university's
academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935,
1973 and the present 1987 Constitutions. At this juncture,
it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed
by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic
freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
37 thus:
1. who may teach:
2. what may be taught;
3. how it shall be taught; and
4. who may be admitted to study.
Issue 2: It is the threshold argument of respondent students
that the decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then
President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them
was arrived at without affording them their right to
procedural due process. We are constrained to disagree as
we find no indication that such right has been violated. On
the contrary, respondent students' rights in a school
disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in the cases of
Guzman v. National University, 22 Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C.
Branch 23 and Non v. Dames II 24 have been meticulously
respected by petitioners in the various investigative
proceedings held before they were expelled.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as Petitioner University herein, thus:
1. The students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against
them
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf; and
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
There was no denial of due process because the
Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within
twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident,
27 the records show that instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their counsel, copies
of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were
adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February
14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted that the February 20,
1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of
Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School
Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent
students. Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11,
February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students
were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their
behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when,
from the very start of the investigations before the Joint
Administration Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of
Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its
appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent
students. Respondent students may not use the argument
that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and
examine the written statements which became the basis of
petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied
procedural due process. Granting that they were denied
such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from
the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases
involving students need not necessarily include the right to
cross examination.
It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the
doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case
involves a question of law, 36 as in this case, where the
issue is whether or not respondent students have been
afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal
from petitioner university.
10. JONATHAN I. SANG-AN vs. EQUATOR
KNIGHTS DETECTIVE AND SECURITY
AGENCY, INC., G.R. No. 173189, February 13,
2013
DOCTRINE: In order to validly dismiss an employee, the
observance of both substantive and procedural due process
by the employer is a condition sine qua non. The
termination of employment must be based on a just or
authorized cause and the dismissal can only be effected,
after due notice and hearing.
Procedural due process requires that the employee
be given a notice of the charge against him, an ample
opportunity to be heard, and a notice of termination.
Jurisprudence has expounded on the guarantee of due
process, requiring the employer to furnish the employee
with two written notices before termination of employment
can be effected: a first written notice that informs the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
or her dismissal is sought, and a second written notice
which informs the employee of the employer's decision to
dismiss him. In considering whether the charge in the first
notice is sufficient to warrant dismissal under the second
notice, the employer must afford the employee ample
opportunity to be heard.
The Labor Code provides that an employee may be
dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct. The
misconduct, to be serious within the meaning of the Labor
Code, must be of such grave and aggravated character and
not merely trivial or unimportant. It is also important that
the misconduct be in connection with the employee's work
to constitute just cause for his separation.
FACTS: The Petitioner was the Assistant Operation
Manager of the Respondent, who was tasked with the duty
of assisting in the operations of the security services and
safekeeping of firearms. On April 21, 2001, Respondent
discovered that two firearms were missing from its
inventory, and the investigation revealed that it was the
Petitioner who might have been responsible for the loss. As
a result, the Petitioner was temporarily suspended from
work pending further investigation.
During the suspension of the Petitioner, a security
guard under the supervision of the former was apprehended
for having an unlicensed firearm, of which was issued by
the Petitioner. Accordingly, the Respondent dismissed the
Petitioner based on the two violations he committed, on the
ground of serious misconduct, a just cause to terminate an
employee.
The Petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for
illegal suspension with prayer for reinstatement, however,
he treated his case as one for illegal dismissal and alleged
that he had been denied due process when he was The Supreme Court’s review of the records shows
dismissed. Likewise, the Petitioner contended that no that the Petitioner was not furnished with any written notice
charge had been laid against him, and there was no hearing that informed him of the acts he committed justifying his
or investigation of any kind, as well as and he was not given dismissal from employment. Additionally, the Petitioner
any chance or opportunity to defend himself. was never given any notice that allowed him to air his side
and to avail of the guaranteed opportunity to be heard.
Respondent opposed that they substantially
complied with the procedural requirements of due process
for a letter was given to the Petitioner, which did not mean
as his dismissal, rather, he was only suspended – the very
reason for the case for illegal suspension was filed by the
Petitioner before the LA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner was afforded both

substantive and procedural due process by the Respondent
in order for the former to be validly dismissed from
employment.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the Respondent

was able to comply with the substantive due process since
the Petitioner clearly committed a serious misconduct, a
just cause to terminate an employee. However, the
Respondent fails to comply with the procedural due process
as prescribe in Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code.

The rules require that for termination of

employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282
of the Labor Code the following procedure must be observe
by the employer:

(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying

the ground or grounds for termination, and giving
to said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the
employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel
if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence, or
rebut the evidence presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration of
all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

Also, jurisprudence has expounded on the

guarantee of due process, requiring the employer to furnish
the employee with two written notices before termination
of employment can be effected: a first written notice that
informs the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
which his or her dismissal is sought, and a second written
notice which informs the employee of the employer's
decision to dismiss him. In considering whether the charge
in the first notice is sufficient to warrant dismissal under the
second notice, the employer must afford the employee
ample opportunity to be heard.