398288673god and Ultimate Origins A Novel Cosmological Argument

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God and Ultimate Origins: A Novel

Cosmological Argument 
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This book develops a novel argument which combines

the Kalam with the Thomistic Cosmological Argument. 100 Greatest OVERVIEW of CS Bakunin - 1871 - Notes on
It approaches an ongoing dispute concerning whether Science [Compatibility What is Authority and Heide
there is a First Cause of time from… Full description
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PALGRAVE
PALGRAVE FRONTIERS IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
God an
and
d
Ultimate Origins
A Novel Cosmological Argument
Argum ent
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Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion
Series Editors
Yujin Nagasawa
School of Philosophy
University of Birmingham
Birmingham
United Kingdom
Erik Wielenberg
DePauw University
Greencastle
Indiana, USA
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Editorial Board Members

Michael Almeida, University of exas at San Antonio
Lynne Rudder Baker,
Baker, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Jonathan Kvanvig,
Kvanvig, Baylor University
University
Robin Le Poidevin, University of Leeds
Brian Leftow, University of Oxford
Graham Oppy, Monash University
Michael C. Rea, University of Notre Dame
Edward Wierenga, University of Rochester
Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion is a long overdue series w

will pro
provide
vide a uniqu
uniquee platf
platform
orm for the advan
advancement
cement of resresearch
earch in
area. Each book in the series aims to progress a debate in the philoso
of religion by (i) offering a novel argument to establish a strikingly o
inal thesis, or (ii) approaching an ongoing dispute from a radically
point of view. Each title in the series contributes to this aim by utili
recent developments in empirical sciences or cutting-edge research
foundational areas of philosophy (such as metaphysics, epistemology
ethics).
More information about this series at

http://www.springer.com/series/14700
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Andrew Ter Ern Loke
God and Ultimate

Origins
A Novel Cosmological Argument
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Andrew er Ern Loke

Faith and Global Engagement
University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion

ISBN 978-3-319-57546-9 ISBN 978-3-319-57547-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57547-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017939317
© Te Editor(s) (if applicable) and Te Author(s) 2017, corrected publication 2018

Tis work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, w
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting
of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical wa
transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software,
similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
Te use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. i
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are e
from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
Te publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information i
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher n
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Te original version of the book was revised.

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o the Divine First Cause of the Cosmos

Te God who made the world and all things in it
Te Lord of heaven and earth
Who does not dwell in temples made with hands
Nor is He served by human hands, as though He needed anything
Since He Himself gives to all people life and breath and all things
—Acts 17:24–25
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Preface
Issues concerning the ultimate origins of the Universe and God h

generated huge public interest recently with the publication of bo
promoting and responding to the so-called New Atheism. Tere has a
been a resurgence of interest in theistic arguments in academia in rec
decades, one of the most discussed being the Kalam Cosmolog
Argument (KCA) (Copan and Craig 2017). Te KCA, as formula
by its noteworthy recent proponent, William Lane Craig (Craig a
Sinclair 2009), is as follows:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

2. Te Universe began to exist.
3. Terefore, the Universe has a cause.
Craig argues that further analyses of the Cause of the Universe sh

that this Cause possesses various theistic properties, such as be
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x Preface
Universe based on the impossibility of concrete actual infinities begs

question against the existence of an actual infinite.
Tis book develops a novel argument which combines the Ka
with the Tomistic Cosmological Argument. It approaches an ong
dispute concerning whether there is a First Cause of time from a r
cally new point of view, namely by demonstrating that there is su
First Cause without requiring the controversial arguments against c
crete infinities and against traversing an actual infinite (although t
arguments remain defensible, see Chap. 2). Readers would discover
synthesis of a familiar Tomist story about infinite sequences of t
cars with the KCA; this synthesis constitutes one of the novel feat
of this book. Tis point of originality is combined with other novel
such as a new ‘infinite additions of zero’ argument and the replacem
of the traditional Leibnizian/Tomistic focus on the necessity/p
actuality of the First Cause with a focus on the beginninglessnes
the First Cause. Tis book also offers a robust defence of the traditi
form of Kalam by presenting original arguments in response to v
ous objections to the Kalam. Tese include new defences for the a
ment for the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite, and a r
to Puryear’s latest responses to myself and Dumsday in Puryear (20
I defend the coherence of the view that time might be continuous
naturally divide into smallest parts of finite durations, and show
Puryear’s conceptualist view of time is implausible and that it does
block the finitist’s argument in any case.
A key premise of both arguments is the Causal Principle: ‘everyth
that begins to exist has a cause’. Tis book develops a novel philoso
cal argument for the principle which is stronger and more rigorous t
other arguments which have been proposed thus far, and which c
prehensively addresses objections based on metaphysical theorising
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Preface
the case that only universes (rather than other kinds of things) begin
exist; and (ii) the properties of universes and of other kinds of thin
events which differentiate between them would be had by them o
when they had already begun to exist.
In addition, this book offers a more detailed discussion on whet
a First Cause of time can be avoided by a causal loop than other p
lications on the KCA. It makes original contributions to the deb
by engaging with recent work on casual loops by Meyer (2012)
Romero and Pérez (2012), and show that, contrary to these autho
the required causal loop is viciously circular and metaphysically imp
sible. Tis book also draws certain parallels between the conclusion
my novel argument with the Hartle–Hawking (1983) model, sho
that the deeper conceptual problem with the Hartle–Hawking mode
that it cannot satisfactorily address issues concerning the origination
change, and demonstrates that the required property is characteristic
libertarian agency rather than quantum system.
Finally, this book addresses epistemological issues related to the K
which have been relatively neglected by recent publications on
KCA, and demonstrates (contra Hawking et al.) the continual releva
and significance of philosophy for answering ultimate questions. In p
ticular, I present various arguments against scientistic and radical po
modernist views relevant to the Cosmological Argument, demonstr
that philosophical arguments are capable of yielding knowledge ab
reality that are more epistemically certain than scientific discover
develop such a philosophical argument for a personal First Cause, a
explain why the progress of science would never replace the need
such a First Cause.
For very helpful exchanges I would like to thank Professors Grah
Oppy, Garry DeWeese, J.P. Moreland, Jason Colwell, Alister McGra
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xii Preface
and Brian Wong. I hope this monograph will prove worthy of t

efforts, though any mistake remains my responsibility. I am than
for my wonderful colleagues and friends in Hong Kong—in part
lar, Professor Daniel Chua, Grace Lee Baughan, Carmen Bat and K
Wong—for
W ong—for their support and encouragement for this project.
grateful for ‘Seed Fund for Basic Research, University of Hong Ko
(project code: 201611159076) for funding the writing of this mo
graph. I would like to thank my parents, parents-in-law, daughters
Serene, Evangel and my beloved wife Mary for their support for
research. Finally, I would like to thank Prof. William Lane Craig, wh
writings, lectures and debates answered so many of my questions
cerning ultimate origins.
Hong Kong, Hong Kong Andrew er Ern L
References
Copan, Paul and William Lane Craig (ed.) 2017. Te Kal ā m Cosmolo
Argument . 2 Vols . New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
Craig, William Lane, and James Sinclair. 2009. Te Kalam Cosmolo
Argument. In Te Blackwell Companion to Natural Teology , ed. W.L. C
and J.P. Moreland. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Hartle, James, and Stephen Hawking. 1983. Wave Function of the Univ
Physical Review D
D 28: 2960–2975.
Meyer, Ulrich. 2012. Explaining Causal Loops. Analysis 72:
72: 259–264.
Oppy, Graham. 2010. Uncaused Beginnings. Faith and Philosophy 27:
27: 61–
Oppy, Graham. 2015. Uncaused Beginnings Revisited. Faith and Philos
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil20154932
10.5840/faithphil20154932..
Puryear, Stephen. 2016. Finitism, Divisibility, and the Beginning of
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Contents
1 Te Question of Ultimate Origins
2 Is the Number of Prior Causes and Durations Infinite?

An Assessment of the Current Literature
Literature
3 Formulating
Formulating a New Cosmological Argument
4 Is Tere a Causal Loop Which Av

Avoids
oids a First Cause?
5 Did the Initial State of Reality Begin to Exist Uncaused?
6 What is the Natur

Naturee of the First Cause?
7 Te Conclusion of Our Quest

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xiv Contents
Erratum to: Is the Number of Prior Causes and Durations

Infinite? An Assessment of the Current Literature
Author Index
Subject Index
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List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Joining the points between 0 and 1 and the points between
0 and 2 in one-to-one correspondence
Fig. 2.2 Persons grabbing presents this way
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1
The Question of Ultimate Origins
wo things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, t
more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and
moral law within me.
—Immanuel Kant.1
1.1 The Importance of the Question

For a long time humankind has pondered the question of ultim
origins. Te question arises quite naturally as one reflects on the w
ders of the cosmos which ‘fills the mind with ever new and increas
admiration and awe’ (Kant). Te question is of tremendous significan
being related to humanity’s quest to get to the bottom of things
to the meaning and purpose of existence. Is it the case that everyth
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2 A. T. E. Loke
Someone might exclaim ‘the question of ultimate origins is so im

tant: let our hearts not rest until we find the answer!’ Others m
wonder ‘But can this question be answered at all? If not, why both
Yet others might think ‘Shouldn’t this question be answered by scie
If so, why should I be reading this book which attempts to answer
question via philosophical arguments?’ On the one hand, there are s
scientists such as Peter Atkins (1995, p. 97) claiming that ‘Tere
be no denying the proposition that science is the best procedure
discovered for exposing fundamental truths about the world… T
appear to be no bounds to its competence.’ On the other hand, r
cal postmodernists, while arguing that such claims are overblown, h
gone to the opposite extreme by doubting that we can ever know
answer or that there is indeed an answer to Big Questions such as t
In this chapter, I shall address a number of epistemological issues rel
to these views.
1.2 Is Science the Only or the Best Way

to Discover the Answer?
Tere is no doubt that the scientific method is extremely useful for
covering how the natural world works. (Te meaning of the word ‘
ural’ has changed over time; in this book, I take the word natural—
opposed to supernatural—to mean physical.) Te successes of mod
science over the last few centuries have led many to think that t
appears to be ‘no bounds to its competence’, as Atkins puts it. Step
Hawking (1988, pp. 12–13, 175) claims that it is cosmological scie
that will answer ‘why we are here and where we came from… And
goal is nothing less than a complete description of the universe we
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1 The Question of Ultimate Origins
or that anything that can be known must be known scientifica

Scientific evidence therefore becomes the only kind of evidence t
would accept for any item of knowledge. Such views are known
scientism.
In a helpful article, Mikael Stenmark (1997, p. 20) observes t
while the word ‘science’ has a variety of meanings, ‘what is charac
istic of scientism is that it works with a narrow definition of scienc
the advocates of scientism use the notion of science to cover only
natural sciences and perhaps also those areas of the social sciences t
are highly similar in methodology to the natural sciences.’ Such a me
odology typically involves a systematic study using observation
experimentation.
It should be noted, however, that scientism is not science per se. T
is, scientism is not a statement of, say physics, chemistry, biology, e
unlike statements such as ‘E = mc2’, ‘water is H 2O’, ‘smoking cau
genetic damage’. Rather, scientism is a philosophical view about scie
and of reality.
Stenmark (1997) distinguishes between different forms of scientism
Academic internal scientism: Te view that (a) all, or at least so
of the genuine, non-scientific academic disciplines can eventually
reduced to (or translated into) science proper, i.e., natural science.
Methodological scientism: Te attempt to extend the use of
methods of natural science to other academic disciplines in such w
that they exclude (or marginalise) previously used methods conside
central to these disciplines.
Academic external scientism: Te view that all, or at least some
the essential non-academic areas of human life can be reduced to
translated into) science.
Epistemic scientism: Te view that the only reality that we can kn
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4 A. T. E. Loke
Axiological scientism 1: Te view that science is the most valu

part of human learning or culture, or science is the only truly valu
realm of human life. All other realms are of negligible value.
Axiological scientism 2: Te view that science can completely exp
morality and replace traditional ethics.
Redemptive scientism: Te view that science alone is sufficient
dealing with our existential questions or for creating a world view
which we could live.
Comprehensive scientism: Te view that science alone can and
eventually solve all, or almost all, of our genuine problems.
It is important to distinguish between these forms of scient
because their implications are different, and different forms of scient
are subjected to different criticisms. For example, epistemic scien
and rationalistic scientism merely accept that science has some pract
external limits; they do not deny that science cannot set the lim
for what exists (e.g., they do not deny that entities which canno
known by science might exist) (Stenmark 1997, pp. 22–23). Episte
scientism and rationalistic scientism therefore do not imply ontolog
scientism. Ontological scientism, however, entails epistemic scien
because we could not know anything about non-existents; ontolog
scientism claims that only material entities—i.e., only entities that
be studied by science—exist.
Interestingly, the question whether science is the only or the
method for discovering truths is a question which science itself c
not answer, but must be answered philosophically. Stenmark (
pp. 783–5) observes that the main criticism directed against scientism
that its advocates, in their attempt to expand the boundaries of scie
rely in their argument not merely on scientific but also on philoso
ical premises. As Polkinghorne (2011a , p. 23) explains, ‘the phy
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Ontological scientism presupposes that only entities which can

studied by science exist, but this presupposition is a philosophical p
supposition, and it cannot be proven by science itself, since science c
not exclude the existence of entities which by their nature cannot
detected by the scientific method. Given that science cannot do this,
not true that there are no bounds to the competence of science, contr
to the assertion of Atkins. While one must acknowledge the prog
(technological, medical, etc.) which science has brought to human
one must not be so naïve as to ignore the limitations of science.
Verificationism, which was popular in the early twentieth centu
claims that only statements that can be confirmed or disconfirmed
sensory experience are meaningful. It has since been widely rejected,
fallacy being that the statement of Verificationism itself viz. the st
ment that ‘only statements that can be confirmed or disconfirmed
sensory experience is meaningful’ cannot be confirmed or disconfirm
by sensory experience (Alston 2003, pp. 26–34). Tus, the verificat
principle cannot be verified according to its own principle. While
proponents claim that the principle could be regarded as an axiom, t
fails to meet the challenge of why we should adopt such an axiom. T
principle cannot meet its own demands (rigg 1993, p. 20). Likew
while confirmation by observation and repeated experiments is one w
of knowing certain things, it would be wrong to think that this is
only way to know anything, for the view that ‘confirmation by ob
vation and repeated experiments is the only way to know anything
a view which cannot be confirmed by observation and repeated exp
ments (for other ways of knowing, see below).
Additionally, the scientific method cannot avoid the need to pres
pose certain philosophical assumptions. In particular, science requ
various forms of philosophical reasoning, such as deductive and ind
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6 A. T. E. Loke
and to very early times. Additionally, there are limits to our ability to te
the physics relevant at the earliest epochs. Consequently it is inevitab
that (as is also the case for the other historical sciences) philosophic
choices will to some degree shape the nature of cosmological theory, pa
ticularly when it moves beyond the purely descriptive to an explanato
role—that move being central to its impressive progress in recent decade
Tese philosophical choices will strongly influence the resulting unde
standing, and even more so if we pursue a theory with more ambitio
explanatory aims.
With respect to the criteria for a good scientific theory, Ellis obse
the following four areas of assessment:
1. Satisfactory structure: (a) internal consistency; (b) simpl

(Ockham’s razor); and (c) aesthetic appeal (‘beauty’ or ‘elegance’).
2. Intrinsic explanatory power: (a) logical tightness; (b) scope of
theory—the ability to unify otherwise separate phenomena;
(c) probability of the theory or model with respect to some w
defined measure;
3. Extrinsic explanatory power, or relatedness: (a) connectednes
the rest of science; (b) extendability—providing a basis for fur
development;
4. Observational and experimental support, in terms of: (a) testabi
the ability to make quantitative as well as qualitative predictions
can be tested; and (b) confirmation: the extent to which the theo
supported by such tests as have been made.
Ellis acknowledges the importance of philosophy for these criteria, notin

that
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without considering the philosophical difficulties associated with cert

models, such as difficulties concerning infinite regresses and difficul
concerning the postulation of something beginning to exist uncaus
which I shall discuss in the subsequent chapters of this book.
Moreover, science itself cannot answer ‘why scientific results sho
be valued’; the answer to this question is philosophical rather than
entific. Other scientists and philosophers (e.g., Polkinghorne 20
Frederick 2013) have argued that science cannot answer why
unintelligent physical entities of our universe could have cons
ently behaved in an orderly manner describable by elegant and in
cate mathematics, and that this question is best answered by a div
mind.
Given reasons such as those listed above, philosopher Roger r
(1993, pp. 209–231) concludes that
It would seem impossible for science to be able to explain its own occur
rence, since no room is left for a justification of scientific forms of expla
nation in the first place… In the case both of problems about realism an
induction, there appears to be a search for something more than empiri
cal discovery. Appeals to science seem to beg the question since the ques
tions of discovering reality and generalizing from past to future seem t
precede science, rather than simply arising within it. Science cannot b
expected to solve questions which are not only beyond its capabilities, bu
for which it needs an answer in order to get started… So far from bein
the antithesis of the scientific outlook, a metaphysical approach to rea
ity, however conceived, is the only way in which science can be given an
foundation.
It has been shown that science is not unlimited, contrary to Atk

aforementioned assertion that ‘there appear to be no bounds to its co
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8 A. T. E. Loke
say ‘In comparison with philosophy, science seems to be far more us

For when is the last time a philosopher provided a theory to explain h
energy works, how cancer can be cured, etc.?’ For many people, suc
Herman Philipse (2012, Chaps. 6, 9, 10, 11), the superiority of the
entific method is shown by its power to make predictions, indeed
power underlies the great successes of modern science. Te progress
achievements of modern science have made philosophy seems like
outmoded discipline by comparison. As noted earlier, Hawking expre
this sentiment when he complains that ‘Philosophy has not kept up w
modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists h
become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowle
(Hawking and Mlodinow 2010, pp. 1–2).
In reply to Philipse, Andrew Pinsent (2013) observes that, as
goes to higher levels of complexity,
science becomes less a matter of prediction and more a matter of di

covering and unifying phenomena under common explanatory fram
works… So by placing so great an emphasis on prediction as a litmus te
of success in a scientific age, Philipse runs the risk of doing too much,
cutting away… those sciences that are not in the business of making pr
dictions, along with the humanities as well.
Again, it should be noted that the statement ‘science is the best m

for discovering truths’ is not a statement of science (i.e., it is not a st
ment of physics, chemistry, biology, etc.). Rather it is a philosoph
statement about science and reality. ‘Why should the power to make
dictions be valued as an indication of truth’ is a question that canno
answered by science. Rather, it must be answered philosophically, suc
by inductive reasoning (e.g., ‘it is extremely unlikely that the predi
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I would like to clarify that I am not claiming that philosophy

the only way to knowledge. Rather, I am arguing that philosophy
another way of knowing in addition to and in conjunction with
ence. Which way is the best depends on what we want to find out. If
want to discover the regularities of physical processes that occur in t
(e.g., how energy works, how cancer can be cured, etc.), we should
the scientific method. On the other hand, philosophy is concerned w
the analysis, clarification, criticism and justification of the conce
underlying assumptions and principles (such as laws of logic, rules
inference, induction, causality, and ethics) that all disciplines (incl
ing science) require, as well as the fundamental nature, principles
categories of existence, ultimate explanations and first causes. Scient
experiments cannot confirm or exclude the existence of a beginni
less and timeless First Cause, since they can only investigate proce
which occur in time. On the other hand, I shall demonstrate in the
of this book that the question whether such a First Cause exists can
answered using philosophical arguments.
With regards to conceptual analysis, it needs to be emphasised
conceptual issues are of fundamental importance and they underlie
our knowledge, including scientific knowledge. o illustrate: suppos
scientist does not define the terms in his/her scientific hypothesis ca
fully. In that case, it is questionable whether he/she knows what he/
is testing for through the experiment. It is interesting to observe t
a number of scientists who disparage philosophy have committed gr
conceptual errors, such as equivocating on the concept of ‘nothi
(see Chaps. 5 and 6). Teir embarrassment might have been avoi
if they had engaged in a more reflective philosophical analysis of th
views prior to publishing them.
Now proponents of scientism would not deny the principles of r
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10 A. T. E. Loke
can be retorted that philosophy has given us the principles that m

science possible.
Popular scepticism towards philosophical arguments is often based
the presupposition that these arguments are merely based on ‘comm
sense’ and ‘everyday intuitions’, which the history of science in rec
centuries has shown to be highly unreliable. For example, while ‘c
mon sense’ might regard it impossible that something can be a p
cle and a wave at the same time, quantum physics has shown th
can. While our ‘everyday intuitions’ might regard that two parallel l
can never meet (this is postulated as an axiom of Euclidean geomet
General Relativity can construct a model of the Universe accordin
which space is curved and parallel lines can meet. Tese examples
been taken by many as indicating the triumph of science over ‘comm
sense’ and ‘everyday intuitions’. Tey warn that we should be car
about trying to understand reality at levels far beyond our daily e
riences on the basis of philosophical arguments (which they regar
based on ‘common sense’ and ‘everyday intuitions’), and there are
things as far removed from our daily experiences as the issue of ultim
origins. Our concepts of logic, time and causality, for example, m
break down at the beginning of time.
Te warning to exercise caution when discussing matters that are
beyond our daily experiences is well taken. Nevertheless, we need to
tinguish ‘common sense’ and ‘everyday intuitions’ from philosoph
principles of reasoning such as various forms of deductive and ind
tive reasoning which underlie the construction of scientific theo
themselves, including the theories of wave–particle duality and Gen
Relativity mentioned above. In other words, we need to disting
‘common sense’ and ‘everyday intuitions’ from philosophical princi
of reasoning by which we show ‘common sense’ and ‘everyday in
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Additionally, quantum physics’ apparent violation of the laws of

can be interpreted operationally rather than ontologically. Tat is,
apparent violation can be understood merely at the level of elicit
observable measurement results rather than reflecting the real underly
unobserved properties of the quantum system. Tere are different w
of explaining the observable quantum phenomena, and some of th
ways, such as de Broglie-Bohm’s pilot-wave model (Goldstein 2013
further, Chap. 5), are perfectly consistent with the laws of logic. T
while quantum phenomena may appear foreign to our ‘common
and ‘everyday intuitions’, it does not violate deductive reasoning wh
(together with inductive reasoning) is required for quantum phy
itself. (o illustrate, quantum physics is often heralded as a scientific t
ory that is well confirmed by experiments, such as those that reveal qu
tum entanglement. Te confirmation would take the following form:
1. If the experiment reveals quantum entanglement, then the predict

of quantum physics is confirmed.
2. Te experiment reveals quantum entanglement.
3. Terefore, the prediction of quantum physics is confirmed.
Tis form of valid reasoning is known as modus ponens (1. If A, th

B 2. A 3. Terefore, B), which is a form of deductive reasoning. V
deductive reasoning can give a false result if the premise is false,
if the premise is true, then the conclusion which follows from v
deductive reasoning would be true as well.)
On the other hand, an ontological violation of the laws of lo
would be non-existent. For example, consider a ‘shapeless cube’: ‘sha
less’ and ‘cube’ cancel each other out; it is like writing something a
then immediately erasing it, so that there is nothing. Tis illustra
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12 A. T. E. Loke
chapters that, using the laws of logic, various arguments lead to the c
clusion that there is an uncaused and initially timeless First Cause of
Universe.
In summary, the abovementioned examples taken from quan
physics and General Relativity have not shown that we cannot have
understanding of reality at levels far beyond our daily experiences
the basis of philosophical principles of reasoning. On the contrary,
foregoing discussion indicates that we can understand certain aspec
reality at these levels using these philosophical principles on which
entific theories (including quantum physics and General Relativity)
based. In the next few chapters, I shall use these principles to exam
the issue of ultimate origins, and exercise caution by assessing whe
the conclusions of these chapters can be overturned by future scien
discoveries or not.
It should be noted that philosophical reasoning is capable of yi
ing items of knowledge which we can be even more epistemically
tain about than the conclusions of science. For example, an item
knowledge which any person can be most epistemically certain abou
his/her own existence, which he/she cannot reasonably deny; for on
deny it, one would have to assume one’s own existence in the proc
Tis reasoning is philosophical in nature, and cannot be overturned
future discoveries of science.
On the other hand, the conclusions of science do not have this k
of epistemic certainty. Many scientific views are in the process of cha
ing, and many scientific theories are incomplete. For instance, scien
have yet to figure out the relationship between quantum theory and
ativity theory. Tis indicates the incompleteness of these theories, an
is highly likely that some aspects of these theories would be overtur
by future discoveries and that major adjustments or qualificat
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Tis is not to say that we cannot judge which theory is more proba
or reasonable than others, but what this implies is that science can ne
achieve the kind of epistemic certainty philosophical reasoning is ca
ble of yielding. o consider an extreme example, it is logically possi
that scientific observations (including the predicted observations) are
hallucinations caused by—for all we know—an alien. One might ob
that there is no evidence for the existence of an alien which has su
powers, and claim that the existence of such an alien is unlikely. But
can’t know this with as much certainty as we know the non-existence
logically impossible entities such as ‘shapeless cube’, which cannot e
in any possible world. One does not need to observe or scientifically
all possible universes in order to know that shapeless cubes do not a
cannot exist in any universe. It is sufficient to know that ‘shapeless’ a
‘cube’ cancel each other out; it is like writing something and imme
ately erasing it, such that there is nothing. Again, this reasoning is p
osophical in nature, and cannot be overturned by future discoverie
science. Te foregoing discussion indicate that philosophical reason
is capable of yielding items of knowledge which we can be even m
epistemically certain about than the conclusions of science. In the n
few chapters, I shall show that, just as we can reason philosophically a
know that it is impossible that ‘shapeless cubes’ exists, we can likew
reason philosophically and know that an actual infinite regress of cau
is impossible and that a beginningless First Cause exists.
1.3 Are All Possible Answers Necessarily

Relative and Speculative?
My arguments concerning the limitations of science do not imply t
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14 A. T. E. Loke
Many scientific theories are so well-established that no new eviden

is likely to alter them substantially. For example, no new evidence w
demonstrate that the Earth does not orbit around the sun (heliocentr
theory), or that living things are not made of cells (cell theory), th
matter is not composed of atoms, or that the surface of the Earth is n
divided into solid plates that have moved over geological timescales (th
theory of plate tectonics).
Although certain groups of people living thousands of years ago

not regard the statement ‘the Earth orbits around the Sun’ to be tru
was nevertheless a fact back then, regardless of what people at that
believed. Te truth concerning the orbit of the Earth is absolute ra
than relative, and people who denied it were absolutely wrong (By a
lute [as opposed to relative], I mean independent of whether anyb
accepts it or not; by universal, I mean accepted by everyone. On
understanding, the fact that some views are not universally accepted d
not imply that they are not absolutely true.) ‘Items of knowledge’ s
as ‘the Earth orbits around the Sun’ and ‘arsenic is poisonous’ are
merely linguistically, culturally and socially constructed, but facts. T
examples indicate that human rationality and perspective are not lim
to the extent that we cannot know anything. On the contrary, they i
cate that we can know quite a lot about reality through perception
through deductive and inductive reasoning.
Terefore, while scientists such as Dawkins and Hawking h
rightly been criticised for making overblown claims about science
ignoring its limitations, it would be unwise to go the other extreme
embrace the views of radical postmodernism. As Philip Kitcher (
p. 38) observes, the source of trouble with these radical postmod
ists is bad philosophy which involves the dramatic over-interpretatio
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It is true that, when we try to understand certain things, we can

avoid the need to interpret our experiences. Nevertheless, this alo
does not imply that one’s perspectives of the matter are merely on
interpretation and not the correct understanding of the matter. Rad
postmodernists are concerned that the interpretative factor wo
affect one’s ability to arrive at the correct understanding of the mat
However, it should be noted that the power of interpretation is li
ited. For example, in certain circumstances, taking the wrong medic
would kill a person, no matter how the person might choose to
pret his/her experiences. Tere are facts which cannot be interpre
away. As Swoyer (2010) observes, ‘We cannot, on pain of hallucinati
see just anything we hope or expect or are primed to see.’
Hence, we need to acknowledge that there is a reality ‘out there’ tha
in some ways resistant to our powers of interpretation (this position is c
sistent with realism), and to recognise, as Polkinghorne (2005, p. 4) say
the unexpected character often stubbornly displayed by nature. Far from

its behaving like epistemological clay in our pattern-seeking hands, capa
ble of being moulded into any pleasing shape that takes the fancy, th
physical world frequently proves highly surprising, resisting our expecta
tions and forcing us to extend, in unanticipated ways, the range of ou
intellectual understanding.
Polkinghorne (2011b, p. 30) observes that
the counterintuitive ideas of quantum physics are perhaps the most strikin
example of this phenomenon. Who would have supposed that the apparen
ambiguity of wave/particle duality was a rational possibility without bein
driven to it by the stubborn facts of the observed character of light?
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16 A. T. E. Loke
Centuries ago Immanuel Kant famously claimed in his Critiqu

Pure Reason that one cannot know anything about the unknown w
beyond our subjective experiences. Others have pointed out that
view is incoherent. As Oliver Crisp explains
Kant’s certainty that there is a Great Boundary between the phenom

nal world, the contents of which we give structure to, and the noumen
world beyond this, about which we can say nothing, requires that Ka
knows at least one thing about the noumenal: that we can know nothin
about it. But how can he know this if he can know nothing beyond th
Great Boundary of which he speaks? (Crisp and Rea 2009, p. 51n.30).
Moreover, Richard Swinburne (2005, p. 39) notes that the ato

theory of chemistry has shown ‘in precise detail some of the unobs
able causes of phenomena—the atoms whose combinations give
to observable chemical phenomena’. Tis indicates that Kant’s ‘un
servable causes’ of phenomena is not, in principle, unknowable; on
contrary, we can know many details about these unobservable ca
through deductive and inductive reasoning. Tis point is of importa
in the context of this book, which concerns whether we can concl
that an unobserved divine First Cause caused the Universe. Star
from the phenomena of the Universe, one can, in principle, ask ‘W
caused this phenomena?’, and provide reasons to show that there
First Cause of the phenomena which (as will be explained in the res
this book) has the properties of being a personal Creator.
In summary, the examples of scientific theories (heliocentric
ory, cell theory, atomic theory, etc.) mentioned above indicate
we can know many details about reality, including the ‘unobserv
causes’ of phenomena. Now, as noted earlier, philosophical argum
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1.4 Can Science and Philosophy Complement

Each Other in the Quest for an Answer?
Te upshot of the foregoing discussion is that radical postmodernism
well as all forms of scientism (whether ontological or epistemic, str
or weak) are unjustified. Science is not the only way to know thin
nor is it necessarily the best way. Philosophy is another way, and
explained earlier, which way is the best depends on what we want
find out. Cosmologist William Stoeger offers an account of how scien
philosophy and theology can complement one other in our search
the answers to questions concerning ultimate origins:
Physics and cosmology as sciences are incapable of exploring or directl

accounting for the ultimate source of existence and order which philosoph
and theology, properly understood, provide. By the same token, philosoph
and theology are not equipped to investigate and describe the processes an
relationships which contributed to the expansion, cooling and subsequen
structuring of the universe on macroscopic and on microscopic scale
Tus, philosophy and theology seek to provide an understanding of the or
gin and evolution of the universe which is complementary to that whic
physics and cosmology contribute (Stoeger 2010, p. 174)
Richard Swinburne has argued that the existence of a divine Crea

can be confirmed by evidence similar to the way evidences are u
to support scientific hypotheses. Just as scientific hypotheses ab
atoms, genes, forces, etc. explain phenomena, theism explains w
the Universe exists and why it looks the way it looks. ‘Te struct
of a cumulative case for theism was thus… the same as the struct
of a cumulative case for any unobservable entity, such as a quark o
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18 A. T. E. Loke
agent, God cannot be expected to behave in ways similar to phys

entities or natural laws. Additionally, God is, according to the de
tion of monotheistic religions, a beginningless and timeless First C
of the Universe, and scientific observations cannot confirm or excl
an entity that is beginningless and timeless, since scientific observat
are limited to the observation of processes that occur in time. Teref
science cannot confirm or exclude the existence of God in this se
However, one can in principle argue that science can provide the
dences which can be utilised by the premises of deductive and induc
philosophical arguments for the existence of God. As noted previou
deductive and inductive arguments are also what science itself requ
as well. Using these arguments, we shall see if we can infer the existe
of a beginningless, timeless and personal First Cause for the things
observe. Tis will be discussed in the rest of this book.
1.5 Would the Acceptance of a Divine Cause

Be a Science-Stopper?
Te fact that one cannot examine all the appropriate intermed
causal processes linking the divine Cause (if such a divine Cause ex
to the effects has been taken by some atheist philosophers, such as A
Grünbaum, to be a fundamental defect of inferring a divine cre
as the causal explanation in cosmology. Likewise, philosopher K
Parsons claims that divine ‘explanations’ do not explain, asserting
‘When we appeal to the inscrutable acts and incomprehensible p
ers of an occult being to account for mysterious phenomena, we o
deepen the mystery’ (Parsons 1999, p. 84). One might reply that m
ter is also described by some modern physicists in mystifying terms
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whereas in physics there is either an actual specification or at lea

quest for the mediating causal dynamics linking presumed causes to t
effects. Teists would respond by arguing that, if there is a sound ph
sophical argument for thinking that there is a divine first cause, then
should accept it regardless of whether we can examine all the appro
ate intermediate causal processes scientifically.
Many atheist scientists fear that, once people say that ‘God did
they will cease from seeking further explanations, and this would h
der the development of science. Tus, they insist that we should try
find scientific explanations for everything rather than inferring God
an explanation. For them, to say that something (say, the Universe
created by God would be intellectual laziness. In the words of Rich
Dawkins (2011, pp. 22–23):
What would you think of a detective who, baffled by a murder, was

lazy even to try to work at the problem and instead wrote the mystery off
as ‘supernatural’? Te whole history of science shows us that things onc
thought to be the result of the supernatural… actually do have natura
explanations… Tere is absolutely no reason to believe that those thing
for which science does not yet have natural explanations will turn out to b
of supernatural origin, anymore than volcanoes or earthquakes or disease
turn out to be caused by angry deities, as people once believed they were.
Here we need to ask: why do we seek explanations in the first pla

Are we just seeking explanations for the sake of seeking explanatio
Dawkins would say ‘No, we seek explanations for the sake of und
standing the truth of the matter.’ However, unless we have alre
assumed beforehand that the truth of the matter is that God did
create this universe—this would be a circular argument for atheism
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20 A. T. E. Loke
rather than a scientific statement. It is a bad philosophical statem

for it presupposes that the ultimate explanation of the Universe m
be a material and impersonal one, which begs the question agains
immaterial timeless personal Creator. Some might object that metho
logical naturalism allows good science to be done, provided one rea
that there are only certain answers that science can deliver (e.g., scie
cannot affirm or deny the existence of the supernatural [Plantinga
pp. 168–174]). In reply, this view is applicable to the context of fi
ing out how the Universe works, but not to the context of examin
whether the Universe has a supernatural, beginningless and pers
Creator, in which case it becomes question begging to insist on a n
ralistic explanation. In order not to beg the question, we should rem
open to the possibility that the Universe might indeed be ultima
caused by a Creator, and examine the reasons which have been given
While it is true (as Dawkins says) that many things once thou
to have supernatural causes actually do have natural explanations,
would be making a false generalisation to conclude that this implies
all things have natural explanations. (While I consider induction to
necessary for science as noted earlier, that does not imply I accep
forms of inductive reasoning; certain inductive arguments are based
faulty generalisation and ought to be rejected.) Te reason why it wo
be a false generalisation in this case is because the ‘all things’ in ques
are of vastly different character. For example, giving an account of
lightning occurs as a result of laws of nature is very different from gi
an account of what is the ultimate explanation for these laws. In o
to avoid false generalisation, the correct way to proceed is to assess, o
case-by-case basis, which explanation is the best for each case. In the
of this book, I shall show that, when we ask where did natural laws
causes ultimately come from, there are good reasons to think that
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example of many eminent theist scientists throughout history, one

treat science as a discovery of the process by which the Creator crea
the Universe and how created things operate.
With regards to such a process, it has been noted previously that
cannot scientifically examine all the appropriate intermediate cau
processes involving a divine cause because they involve a non-phys
entity. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we cannot discover a
thing about such causal processes at all, for the processes might a
involve physical mechanisms as well. For example, theists prior to
twentieth century would say that God was the cause of the Unive
but with the development of the Big Bang theory in the twentieth c
tury, theists can now say that the Big Bang was part of the causal p
cess by which God created the Universe. Even though (according
theism) there will ultimately be some element in the process by wh
God created the Universe that is beyond the realm of science, th
might be other fascinating details about the physical aspects of this cr
tive process which scientists can continue to discover.
1.6 Would the Acceptance of a Divine Cause

Be Based on Ignorance?
Many atheists regard belief in God as based on ignorance, that is,
gaps in our knowledge. Tey think that the theists’ argument is th
because we don’t know how to explain certain things, we say that G
did it (God-of-the-gaps). Steven Weinberg (2009, pp. 233–234) put
this way,
Of course, not everything has been explained, nor will ever be. T
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22 A. T. E. Loke
It must be admitted that there are many religious believers throu

out history who commit the ‘God-of-the-gaps’ fallacy. For exam
when many in the past did not understand certain natural phenom
(such as lightning and thunder), they thought that these were produ
directly by the gods (e.g., the god of thunder). As scientific understa
ing progresses, however, these explanations are replaced by scien
ones. Nevertheless, the fact that many things which were previo
thought to be explained by a divine cause can now be explained by
ence does not imply that everything which is thought to be explai
by a divine cause can be explained by science. As noted previou
giving an account of how lightning occurs as a result of natural ca
is very different from giving an account of what is the ultimate ex
nation for the natural causes. Can the question of ultimate origin
answered by inferring God as a cause, and would it be a God-of-
gaps answer? I shall return to this question at the end of the book.
1.7 Conclusions of This Chapter and an

Overview of Subsequent Chapters
In this chapter, I have addressed various epistemological issues relate
whether the question of ultimate origins can in principle be answe
and whether it must be answered by science. Concerning the later q
tion, proponents of scientism claim that it must. However, scientism
not science per se, but rather a philosophical view about science
reality. Moreover, it is deficient philosophical view, for it cannot be
tified by science itself and that science itself requires philosophical
soning. Given that scientific experiments can only investigate proce
which occur in time; they cannot confirm or exclude the existence
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yield answers that are more epistemically certain than scientific disc
eries should be regarded as knowledge about reality on at least the sa
level as scientific facts. While science is a way of knowing, philosoph
another way of knowing, and they should complement each other.
A lot of people have failed to give philosophy the respect tha
deserves because they have plenty of misconceptions about philosop
Tey criticise philosophy without knowing what it is that they are c
icising. Tey think that philosophy is mere speculation and that it d
not lead to concrete answers which science does. Te foregoing ar
ments have shown the contrary; they indicate that philosophy und
lies every concrete answer, including those provided by science its
Hence, even though science is extremely useful, it does not have
monopoly on truth. We have to consider science together with philo
phy, and give at least an equal, if not a greater, weight to the latter w
respect to the question of ultimate origins, as the subsequent chapter
this book will argue.
Having addressed various epistemological issues related to whet
the question of ultimate origins can in principle be answered a
whether it must be answered by science, I shall now begin to ans
this question.
Te question of ultimate origins is related to whether an act
infinite temporal regress is possible. In Chap. 2, I assess the relev
literature and show that at present there is no adequate evidence
thinking that any of the cosmological models which propose an infin
past is true (Note that in this book I am using ‘past’ as a shortha
for ‘durations in the earlier-than direction’; it does not imply that
argument is dependent on a tensed/dynamic/A-theory of time). On
other hand, I observe that, while Craig has concluded that we appea
have strong scientific confirmation of the conclusion that the Unive
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24 A. T. E. Loke
actual infinite and the argument for the impossibility of concrete ac

infinities. Tese arguments are not susceptible to Morriston’s ob
tion mentioned above, for they attempt to demonstrate certain c
clusions about the essential nature of infinity which, if true, is true
all possible worlds. While critics have raised various objections. I s
show that these objections are answerable. Nevertheless, in the res
this book I shall develop a novel cosmological argument which has
advantage of being immune to such objections.
In Chap. 3, I explain the KCA, its distinction from other type
cosmological arguments, its history and its contemporary significa
I develop a novel argument which combines the KCA with
Tomistic Cosmological Argument. Unlike the KCA, the novel a
ment demonstrates that there is a First Cause of time without req
ing the controversial arguments against concrete infinities and aga
traversing an actual infinite noted in the previous chapter.
In Chap. 4, I examine whether there exists a causal loop which av
a First Cause. I distinguish between a causal loop in dynamic and st
time and between an open and closed causal loop, and explain th
causal loop in dynamic time does not avoid a First Cause. I note th
cosmological model which postulates a static causal loop has been
posed by cosmologists Gott and Li. I assess the relevant literature
argue that we do not have adequate evidence for thinking that this t
of causal loop exists. I defend the bootstrap paradox which shows
this type of causal loop is metaphysically impossible.
In Chap. 5, I defend the Causal Principle. I respond to the sceptic
concerning the universal applicability of the Causal Principle based
considerations of quantum theory.
I go on and discuss the reasons which Craig and Sinclair have off
for thinking that the Universe cannot begin to exist uncaused, focu
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the initial state of reality could begin to exist uncaused, no entity co

begin to exist uncaused now. In response, I develop an argument for
Causal Principle which shows that, if the initial state of reality began
exist uncaused, then certain states of affairs would begin to exist uncau
around us all the time. Tis consequent is not the case. Terefore, i
not the case that the initial state of reality began to exist uncaused. T
argument I offer contributes to the discussion in another way: contr
to Craig and Sinclair who think that a successful argument for the Cau
Principle would require the dynamic theory of time, my argument d
not presuppose the dynamic theory. I also explain that my argument d
not rule out libertarian free choice, for on agent-causal theories one
understand libertarian free choices as indeterministic but not uncaused
In Chap. 6, I argue that, contrary to Dawkins, who calls the F
Cause ‘the great unknown which is responsible for something ex
ing rather than nothing,’ we can deduce various properties of the F
Cause that would be highly significant for our knowledge of ‘the g
unknown.’ I demonstrate that, on the basis of the arguments in the p
vious chapters, the First Cause must be uncaused, beginningless a
timeless. I observe that the conclusion of an uncaused, beginning
and timeless First Cause has parallels with the Hartle-Hawking mod
which likewise postulates an uncaused, beginningless and timeless
tial state of the Universe. In addition to various technical problems w
Hawking’s proposal, I argue that the deeper conceptual problem w
Hawking’s proposal is that it cannot satisfactorily address problems c
cerning the origination of change. What is required is a timeless en
that is changeless-in-timelessness and which—unlike a quantum stat
possesses a certain property that enables the entity to initiate the fi
change, yet also to have the capacity to prevent itself from changi
I explain that the required property is characteristic of libertarian agen
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26 A. T. E. Loke
References
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Alston, William. 2003. Religious Language and Verificationism. In
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Churchland, P., and C. Hooker. 1985. Images of Science: Essays on Realism
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Parsons, Keith. 1999. Defending Objectivity. Philo 2: 84.

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2
Is the Number of Prior Causes
and Durations Infinite? An Assessment
of the Current Literature
2.1 Introduction
Whether the Universe has an ultimate beginning is a question wh
philosophers and scientists have wrestled with for a long time. Scient
have discovered that there are over 200 billion stars in our galaxy. Even if
could travel at the speed of light—about 300,000 kilometres per second—
would take about 100,000 years to travel from one end of the galaxy t
other. More astounding still is the fact that our galaxy is merely one of
over 100 billion galaxies in existence, many of which have hundreds of m
lions of stars. And this is merely the currently observable universe; the ac
universe is much larger. Te Universe is truly awesome.
What ultimately explains the wonder of the night sky? Where
these billions of stars come from? What caused their existence, and w
is the cause of the cause(s) of their existence? Could there be an act
infinite regress of causes, and could there be an actual infinite tem
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30 A. T. E. Loke
2.2 The Origin of Our Universe: Big Bang

Cosmology
Let us begin with one of the most significant scientific proposals of
twentieth century: the so-called Big Bang theory. In 1917, when Al
Einstein applied his General Teory of Relativity to the cosmos, he r
ised that our universe is not stable: it is either collapsing or expand
Refusing to accept this bizarre conclusion, he made an ad hoc in
tion of a ‘fudge factor’ into his equation so that the Universe wo
appear to be stable. Other scientists (Alexander Friedmann and Geo
Lemaître), however, took this problem seriously and separately wor
out theorems which show that the Universe is expanding. A confir
tion of this finding came in 1929 when the astronomer Edwin Hu
observed the redshifts of galaxies which indicate that the dista
between the galaxies are increasing at a tremendous rate. Subsequen
scientists detected the radiation (Cosmic Background Radiation, C
which indicates that our universe had a hot, explosive beginning.
It is truly astonishing to think that the billions of stars and galaxie
our universe came from this explosion. Cosmologist George Ellis s
marises the evidences for this conclusion:
Observational support for the idea of expansion from a Hot Big Ban
epoch is very strong, the linear magnitude- redshift relation for galaxi
demonstrating the expansion, with source number counts and the exis
ence of the blackbody CBR being strong evidence that there was indee
evolution from a hot early stage. Agreement between measured light el
ment abundances and the theory of nucleosynthesis in the early univer
confirms this interpretation…Tus the present dominant cosmologic
paradigm is a quantum gravity era of some kind followed by inflation;
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2 Is the Number of Prior Causes and Durations Infinite? …
see below). Some have even drawn theistic implications from it, a
regarded it as the process by which God created the Universe. For exa
ple, astronomer Arno Penzias, who won the Nobel Prize in 1978 for
discovery of Cosmic Background Radiation, confesses that his invest
tion of astronomy has led him to see ‘evidence of a plan of divine cr
tion’. He states that ‘the best data we have are exactly what I would h
predicted, had I had nothing to go on but the five books of Moses,
Psalms, the Bible as a whole’ (Browne 1978). Robert Jastrow, the
mer chief of the Teoretical Division of NASA (1958–1961), likew
expresses his astonishment with these words
Te instant of the explosion marked the birth of the Universe… It wa

literally the moment of Creation… Te scientist’s pursuit of the pas
ends in the moment of creation. Tis is an exceedingly strange develop
ment, unexpected by all but the theologians. Tey have always accepte
the word of the Bible: in the beginning God created heaven and earth
(Jastrow 2000, pp. 106–107)
2.3 Does Big Bang Cosmology Disconfirm

Theism?
On the other hand, philosopher Hans Halvorson observes that a vo
minority of philosophers, such as Adolf Grünbaum and Quen
Smith, have claimed that Big Bang cosmology disconfirms thei
Tey argue that the so-called ‘Standard Version’ of the Big Bang (a
known as the Friedmann–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker [FLRW] mo
has no first state at which God could have created the Universe. T
also argue that it makes no sense to claim that the Universe was cau
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32 A. T. E. Loke
is, they both occur at t 0.’ Grünbaum (1994) argues that ‘only events
qualify as the momentary effects of other events, or of the action o
agency. Since the Big Bang singularity is technically a non -event, and t
is not a bona fide time of its occurrence, the singularity cannot be the e
of any cause .’ Grünbaum explains
Points of the theoretical manifold first acquire the physical significance

being events , when they stand in the chrono-geometric relations specifie
by the space-time metric, which does double duty as the gravitation
field in the GR [General Teory of Relativity]. Tus, in the GR,
turns out that ‘the notion of an event makes physical sense only whe
[both] manifold and metric structures are [well] defined around it’ …
And in that theory, space-time is taken to be ‘the collection of all [phy
ical] events’ … Tus, the Big Bang does NO qualify as a physical poin
event of the space -time to which one would assign three spatial coordinat
and one time coordinate . Terefore… the past cosmic time-interval is
or unbounded at t = 0, rather than closed or bounded by a first momen
(Grünbaum 1994)
Grünbaum (1989) postulates that the objects in the Universe co

have come from an infinitude of prior transformations from matte
energy existing earlier in other forms during an unbounded past .
In reply to Grünbaum, it should be noted that, on the one ha
Grünbaum’s conclusions concerning the beginning of our universe
unwarranted, given that the known laws of physics break down at
initial state. As cosmologist William Stoeger explains:
Using a simple physical-mathematical model of such a universe, th

Friedmann–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker (FLRW) model, we find th
at a finite time in the past, such a universe had to be infinitely hot an
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the beginning of the universe. It is only the beginning in time accord

ing to the FLRW model – but precisely in the region where that mode
fails. Te Big Bang as this initial singularity, then, is an artefact of
model which is very reliable at lower temperatures but far from correc
for temperatures above the Planck temperature. Tus, it should be con
sidered only as the past limit of the hotter denser phases of the univers
as one goes back into the past – a limit falling outside the reliability o
the model, as does the Planck era itself. A new physics is needed, which
as we have already indicated, requires a quantum treatment of space-tim
and gravity. Tis is the realm of quantum cosmology. (Stoeger 2010, pp
175–176)
Stoeger’s explanation indicates that, while one cannot assume that th

was a first state of the Universe given that the physics of space-ti
that we know of break down at high temperatures, one cannot be s
that it was unbounded in the way Grünbaum assumed either. Te
that there is no sufficient evidence for such an unbounded beginn
has led scientists to propose a variety of alternative cosmological m
els (such as the Hartle–Hawking model and the Ekyroptic model;
below, Sect. 2.4).
On the other hand, as will be shown in the following sections
this chapter and the next, there are reasons for thinking that an act
infinite regress of changes is metaphysically impossible. Tis wo
imply that Grünbaum’s postulation that the objects of our unive
could have come from an infinitude of prior transformations from m
ter or energy existing earlier in other forms is metaphysically impossib
Moreover, there are arguments for the conclusion that the Univ
did not begin to exist uncaused which do not require the beginn
of universe to be a physical point-event. Rather, these arguments o
require that the Universe had a first duration of existence of a cert
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34 A. T. E. Loke
instant from the infinite number of instants that compose the hour,
still have an infinite number of instants and one hour. But this hour
no first instant! Why? Because there is no instant that immediately
lows the deleted instant that is 12 noon.
(Note that this explanation grants Grünbaum’s assumption that t
is composed of instants. I shall argue in Sect. 2.7 that this assumptio
problematic.)
As explained in Chap. 5, the definition for ‘beginning to exist’ u
in the argument (modified from Craig’s work) is:
x begins to exist at t (‘t ’ could be instants or moments of non-
finite duration) iff
i. x exists at t , and the actual world includes no state of affairs in wh

x exists timelessly,
ii. t is either the first time at which x exists or is separated from
t < t at which x exists by an interval during which x does not exis
′
Given that ‘t ’ could be instants or moments of non-zero finite durat

this definition of ‘beginning to exist’ works for non-zero moments
intervals of time.
Against philosopher Brian Pitts, who raises the worry concern
the compatibility between the lack of first point of time and the Ka
Argument, Craig and Sinclair (2012, p. 99) reply, ‘Pitt’s objection
supposes that beginning to exist entails having a beginning point.
why should we think that?’ Tey go on to explain that it has not
proven that space and time are really composed of an actual infinit
points rather than simply modelled as such in General Relativity (ib
p. 100). Tey also argue that the idea of having a beginning point
one in the ancient Greek paradoxes of motion, viz., if an object O
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Something has a beginning just in case the time during which it ha

existed is finite. ime itself may be said to begin to exist just in case fo
any nonzero, finite interval of time that one picks, there are only a finit
number of congruent intervals earlier than it. (Craig and Sinclair 2009
pp. 185–186)
Alternatively, ‘time begins to exist just in case for some speci

nonzero, finite interval of time, there are no congruent intervals ear
than it. In either case beginning to exist does not entail having a beg
ning point’ (ibid.).
Reichenbach (2016) notes that one could also respond to Grünba
by broadening the notion of ‘event’ by removing the requirement tha
must takes place within a space-time context, i.e., with time prior t
and with space in which it occurs. He observes that, while Grünba
thinks that there is neither time prior to the Big Bang nor a space
which the Big Bang occurs, nevertheless on this view it is still true to
that at the Big Bang the space-time universe commences. Reichenb
concludes
One might consider the Big Bang as either the event of the commencin
of the universe or else a state in which ‘any two points in the observa
ble universe were arbitrarily close together’ (Silk 2001, 63). As such, on
might inquire why there was this initial state of the universe in the finit
past. (ibid.)
(2) We shall now consider the second argument, viz. the argum
that, since there was no time before the Universe began, the Unive
could not be caused. Grünbaum (1991) explains that it would be wr
to say that the Universe ‘came out of’ a prior state of nothing on
FLRW model, since there is no ‘prior’ on this model.
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36 A. T. E. Loke
generalization of our daily experiences, ‘akin to Human beings h

always lived on the Earth, which was true until 1968. Tere does
seem to be anything inherently temporal about a causal relations
(Craig and Sinclair 2009, pp. 188–189). Likewise, Reichenbach (
argues that one need not require that causation embody the Hum
condition of temporal priority, but may treat causation conditionall
as a relation of production.
On the one hand, we must be careful not to beg the question aga
the possibility of a imeless Cause, one that is causally but not tem
rally prior to the Universe. On the other hand, the arguments aga
something beginning to exist uncaused (see Chap. 5) would h
regardless of whether time exists before the Universe began. Tis imp
that on the FLRW model the Universe would still have a cause, one
is not temporally prior to the Universe.
2.4 A List of Proposed Cosmological Models

for Explaining the Big Bang
Te upshot of the foregoing discussion is that there is no good rea
to think that the FLRW model of the Big Bang disconfirms the
Nevertheless, there are problems with drawing the theistic conclu
directly from this model as well. As noted earlier, the fact that the p
ics of space-time that we know break down at the beginning of the
Bang allows for diverse alternative cosmological models which h
been proposed by various cosmologists. While there is no longer
significant doubt that our universe had an explosive beginning ab
14 billion years ago, this conclusion does not imply that there w
beginning to all physical things. As Barr explains, our universe is
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cosmologists are philosophically attracted to the oscillating model, es

cially because… it nicely avoids the problem of Genesis.’ Neverthel
there are also other cosmological models (e.g., Vilenkin’s) in which th
was a beginning to all physical things. As the scientific discipline of c
mology progresses, new cosmological models will continue to be p
posed to explain the Big Bang. Te following is a list of various type
proposals together with a number of contemporary examples:
ype (1): Originates from a finite past ex nihilo: e.g., Vilenk

(1982) ‘Creation from Nothing’ model (see Chap. 5).
ype (2): Originates from Closed imelike Curves (CCs) wh
the Universe ‘creates itself’, e.g., the model by Gott and
(see Chap. 4).
ype (3): Originates from a timeless initial state e.g. the Hart
Hawking no-boundary proposal (see Chap. 6).
ype (4): Originates from an actual infinite temporal regress, e.g.,
• Andrei Linde’s (1994) eternal inflation model

• Baum and Frampton (2007) phantom bounce cosmologies
• Veneziano and Gasperini’s (2003) ‘pre-Big Bang theory’ based
analogues of the dualities of string theory
• the ‘Ekyroptic universe’ initiated by a collision between pre-exist
‘branes’ in a higher dimensional spacetime (Steinhardt and urok 200
• asymptotically static universe: one in which the average expans
rate of the Universe over its history is equal to zero. ‘Te inflati
ary universe emerges from a small static state… Te universe ha
finite initial size, with a finite amount of inflation occurring over
infinite time in the past’ (Ellis and Maartens 2004, p. 223).
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38 A. T. E. Loke
which was born from a black hole in another universe, and so on)
finite past.
A recent paper by Ali and Das (2015) claim to have shown tha
actual infinite past is possible, by arguing that the trajectories al
which particles travel could have avoided converging at a singul
in the past. However, it should be noted that, even if the trajecto
do not converge, this does not prove that the particles which trave
them could have existed forever. Nor does it prove that the trajecto
could have extended infinitely in the past, for there could be metap
ical considerations (such as the arguments against an actual infi
past which are discussed below and in Chap. 3) which imply that
non-converging trajectories (if they exist) would have starting po
In his debate with Craig, Sean Carroll cites the Quantum Eter
Teorem (QE) as evidence that the Universe did not have a be
ning (Carroll and Craig 2014). However, by citing the QE as evid
that the Universe did not have a beginning, Carroll bears the burde
proof. In which case he bears the burden to prove that QE is vali
all moments of time. But he has failed to do this (physicist Aaron W
[2014a ] challenges this and other assumptions Carroll made, and n
that Carroll acknowledges that Quantum Gravity is speculative).
the other hand, I would argue that the philosophical arguments aga
an actual infinite regress of events and against a closed circular l
(see below, Chaps. 3 and 4) would imply that there is an ultimate be
ning and that the QE could not have been valid at all moments of ti
Additionally, the abovementioned proposals are beset by the
lem that we do not currently have a well-established theory of quan
gravity.
Other problems concerning ype (1) proposals (‘Originate fro
finite past ex nihilo’) will be discussed in Chap. 5, problems conc
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Universe is past infinite; ‘observations cannot do so, and the phy

required to guarantee this would happen… is untestable.’
On the other hand, many philosophers and physicists of vari
persuasions (theists, atheists) have argued that cosmological mod
which attempt to avoid a beginning face various technical difficu
related to the Second Law of Termodynamics, acausal fine-tuning
having an unstable or a metastable state with a finite lifetime. Mod
which attempt to avoid a beginning by postulating a reversal of the ar
of time nevertheless have a type of ‘thermodynamic beginning’ wh
still requires an explanation (Craig and Sinclair 2009, pp. 179–1
Bussey 2013; Wall 2014b).
On the basis of the considerations mentioned above as well as o
ers, Craig (2013, pp. 14–15) has concluded that we appear to h
strong scientific confirmation of the conclusion that the Universe h
an absolute beginning. Morriston objects that Craig is overly optim
tic. Morriston argues that what we are really talking about here is j
the Universe as far back in time as we can ‘see’, given currently well
tablished physical theory, and we could have no reason to conclude t
there could not have been an earlier universe operating in accorda
with quite different physical laws. (For example, we don’t know enou
about the so-called ‘early’ universe to say just how far back the Seco
Law of Termodynamics reaches [Morriston 2013, pp. 21–22].)
scientific case which Craig attempts to provide on the basis of curren
well-established physical theories is not without significance, howe
At the very least, it indicates that his conclusion that there was a beg
ning to all physical things is not inconsistent with mainstream scien
It is noteworthy that an eminent and highly motivated opponent
Craig such as cosmologist Laurence Krauss was willing to agree w
Craig in public debate that it is likely that there was such a beginn
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40 A. T. E. Loke
which a thing possesses by its very nature and properties that

merely accidentally, we can say that a proposition is metaphysic
necessary just in case it is true in virtue of the natures of things [F
1994]. Metaphysical impossibility is more expansive than logical im
sibility; for example, it is logically possible but metaphysically impo
ble for something to be red but not extended [Gendler and Hawtho
2002, p. 5].)
Tese two arguments are:
i. Te argument for the metaphysical impossibility of concrete

ties: Craig and Sinclair (2009, pp. 103–117) argues that the abs
ities which result from paradoxes such as Hilbert’s Hotel show
concrete infinities cannot exist, and since an infinite temporal reg
of events is a concrete infinity, it follows that an infinite temp
regress of events cannot exist.
ii. Te argument for the impossibility of traversing an actual infin
Craig and Sinclair (2009, p. 117) argues that a collection formed
successive addition cannot be an actual infinite, and the temp
series of events is a collection formed by successive addition, th
fore, the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite.
Tese arguments are not susceptible to the abovementioned objec

by Morriston, for they attempt to demonstrate certain conclus
about the essential nature of concrete infinities which, if true, are
in all possible worlds. In the rest of this chapter, I shall review the lit
ture on these arguments. Before we discuss these arguments, it is im
tant to clarify what an actual infinite temporal regress means.
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infinite set as any set that has a proper subset that is equivalent to
A proper subset is a subset where ‘at least one member of the orig
set is not also a member of the subset.’ wo sets are said to be equ
alent if the members of one set can be related to the members of
other set in a one-to-one correspondence, that is, so related that a s
gle member of the one set corresponds to a single member of the ot
set and vice versa. Equivalent sets are regarded as having the same nu
ber of members. For example, an original actual infinite set of integ
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6…) has a proper subset of even numbers (2, 4, 6
which has an equivalent number of members as the original ac
infinite set (Craig and Sinclair 2009, pp. 103–105). Tere are two diff
ent kinds of actual infinite, countable infinite and uncountable infin
(which is larger than a countable infinite). Te number of all wh
numbers (…−2, −1, 0, 1, 2…) is a countable infinite known as ale
zero. Te order type of the positive numbers (1, 2, 3…) is ω. Te or
type of the negative numbers (… −3, −2, −1) is ω*. An actual infinit
conceived as a determinate whole with an infinite number of memb
in contrast with a potential infinite which never attains infinity, althou
it increases perpetually towards infinity as a limit. At any point in ti
a potential infinite is actually finite (Craig and Sinclair 2009, pp. 1
105). Craig explains that, because set theory with its definite and disti
elements does not utilise the notion of potential infinity, a set conta
ing a potentially infinite number of members is impossible, indeed no
could capture the essentially dynamic character of potential infinite. S
a collection would be one in which the membership is not definite
number but may be increased without limit. It would best be descri
as indefinite (ibid.). Against Oppy’s tenseless characterisations of pot
tial infinite (Oppy 2006, pp. 261–264; cf. pp. 244–245), Craig obser
that a major shortcoming of these characterisations is that they are in
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42 A. T. E. Loke
we are not asking for causes which potentially existed. Likewise,
events that led to the formation of our sun, for example, had alre
happened, that is, they had already been actualised, and their num
is no longer increasing perpetually but a determinate whole. He
when we ask whether there could be an infinite regress of causes, eve
changes or intervals of time, we are asking whether there could be
actual infinite regress, and not whether there could be potential infi
regress. For given that the number of causes, events, changes or inter
of time prior to any event is a determinate whole, it cannot be a po
tial infinite. Te number of durations earlier than any event is ei
actual infinite or actual finite (Craig and Sinclair 2009, p. 115 expl
that Aquinas’ [Summa Teologiae 1.a.7.4] confusion regarding this p
allows him to reject the possibility of an actual infinite and yet as
that an infinite regress of earlier events is possible).
Te number of events later than any event, however, can be a po
tial infinite if the dynamic (A-) theory of time is true. According to
theory, the members of a series of events come to be one after anot
and the number of events which have happened would be increa
perpetually if the future is unending (although the number of ev
which have happened prior to any actual event(s), say the forma
of our sun, would not be increasing perpetually but is a determi
whole, as noted above). By contrast, according to a static [B-] th
of time, the members of a series of events do not come to be one a
another; rather the series of events is a tenselessly existing manifold
of whose members are equally real. On a static theory of time, the n
ber of later events cannot be a potential infinite; it would be either fi
or actually infinite.
In short, the number of events later than any event can be a po
tial infinite depending on which theory of time is true and whe
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2.6 Craig’s First Argument Against an Actual

Infinite Temporal Regress: The Impossibil
of Concrete Actual Infinities
According to the great mathematician David Hilbert (1964, p. 15
‘Te infinite is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nat
nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought… Te role t
remains for the infinite to play is solely that of an idea’ (note that
‘infinite’ referred to is an ‘actual infinite’, which is different from the d
trine of divine infinity). 1 Even though Hilbert is well aware of the act
infinite in modern set theories, yet he does not think that the act
infinite can exist in the concrete world. Over the last few decades C
has developed and defended Hilbert’s arguments. In particular, he
argued that the absurdities which result from paradoxes such as Hilbe
Hotel show that concrete infinities cannot exist, and since an infin
temporal regress of events is a concrete infinity, it follows that an infin
temporal regress of events cannot exist. Craig explains
Let us first imagine a hotel with a finite number of rooms. Suppose, fur
thermore, that all the rooms are occupied. When a new guest arrives ask
ing for a room, the proprietor apologizes, ‘Sorry, all the rooms are full
and that is the end of the story. But now let us imagine a hotel with a
infinite number of rooms and suppose once more that all the rooms ar
occupied. Tere is not a single vacant room throughout the entire infinit
hotel. Now suppose a new guest shows up, asking for a room. ‘But o
course!’ says the proprietor, and he immediately shifts the person i
room #1 into room #2, the person in room #2 into room #3, the per
son in room #3 into room #4, and so on out to infinity. As a result o
these room changes, room #1 now becomes vacant, and the new gues
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44 A. T. E. Loke
But Hilbert’s Hotel is even stranger than the German mathematicia

made it out to be. For suppose some of the guests start to check ou
Suppose the guest in room #1 departs. Is there not now one fewer perso
in the hotel? Not according to infinite set theory! Suppose the guests
rooms #1, 3, 5, … check out. In this case an infinite number of peop
has left the hotel, but by Hume’s Principle, there are no fewer people
the hotel. In fact, we could have every other guest check out of the hot
and repeat this process infinitely many times, and yet there would nev
be any fewer people in the hotel. Now suppose the proprietor does n
like having a half-empty hotel (it looks bad for business). No matter! B
shifting guests in even-numbered rooms into rooms with numbers ha
their respective room numbers, he transforms his half-vacant hotel in
one that is completely full. In fact, if the manager wanted double occ
pancy in each room, he would have no need of additional guests at a
Just carry out the dividing procedure when there is one guest in eve
room of the hotel, then do it again, and finally have one of the guests
each odd-numbered room walk next door to the higher even-numbere
room, and one winds up with two people in every room! One mig
think that by means of these manoeuvres the proprietor could alwa
keep this strange hotel fully occupied. But one would be wrong. F
suppose that the persons in rooms #4, 5, 6, … checked out. At a sin
gle stroke the hotel would be virtually emptied, the guest register reduce
to three names, and the infinite converted to finitude. And yet it wou
remain true that as many guests checked out this time as when the gues
in rooms #1, 3, 5, … checked out! Can anyone believe that such a hot
could exist in reality? (Craig and Sinclair 2009, pp. 109–110)
Critics have raised various objections to Craig’s Hilbert Ho

Argument. Landon Hedrick (2014), a critic, states Craig’s argumen
follows:
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abstract objects—e.g., numbers propositions, properties, sets, poss

worlds, etc. (2) David Lewis’s modal realism view of possible wo
might be true, according to which there are an infinite number of c
crete worlds; (3) space could be continuous, made up of an infin
number of points. With regards to (3), Hedrick writes
Craig considers this possibility, but he imagines that his opponent mus
be trying to use this as a clear counterexample to (A1). His response is t
point out that the notion that space is continuous is unproven (Craig an
Sinclair 2009, 112). Seemingly, Craig thinks that it’s up to his opponen
to prove it. But again, Craig’s premise seems to entail that space is not lik
this, which is also an unproven claim. rue, if one could prove that con
tinuous space is possible, then we’d have a counterexample to (A1). Bu
since Craig is claiming that it’s not possible, it’s reasonable to expect him
to prove it. (Hedrick 2014, p. 31)
Nevertheless, Hedrick seems to have misunderstood the burden of pr

In the context of Craig’s opponent trying to use (3) or perhaps also (1
(2) as a clear counterexample to (A1), which Craig attempts to justify w
HHA, the burden of proof is on the opponent to justify (1), (2), or (3)
genuine counterexample. In this context, Craig does not bear the burden
proof to offer separate arguments to show that (1), (2), or (3) are not po
ble. Rather, he only needs to show that there is no adequate reason to th
that (1), (2), or (3) is metaphysically possible and relevant, hence ther
no adequate reason to regard any of these as a genuine counterexampl
his claim, which he justifies with HHA.
With regards to abstract objects, Craig has argued that there is
equate reason to think that Platonism is true, and that the prospe
of providing some overriding argument for the reality of mathemat
objects, as well as rebutting defeaters of the abundant number of no
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46 A. T. E. Loke
Moreover, a proponent of KCA can argue that the sort of argum

Hilbert offer are directed only against the existence of an actual infi
number of concrete entities, such as an actual infinite temporal reg
of events. Tey are not directed against the existence of an ac
infinite number of abstract entities. 2 Tis sort of move has been m
for example, by J.P. Moreland. He suggests that the problematic na
of paradoxes such as Hilbert’s Hotel is related to the fact that: (1)
members of the set are finite, located, moveable entities, which op
up the possibility of adding, subtracting, or rearranging the m
bers of the set; and (2) the members of the set are spatially extend
Since abstract entities are not finite, located, moveable entities
spatially extended, the argument against the possibility of the ac
infinite based on paradoxes such as Hilbert’s Hotel does not appl
them (Moreland 2003, p. 379). Alternatively, one might suggest
the problematic nature of paradoxes such as Hilbert’s Hotel is rel
to the fact that the members of the set are embedded in a network
causal relations (hence they could be moved around). Since abst
entities are not embedded in a network of causal relations, the a
ment against the possibility of the actual infinite based on parado
such as Hilbert’s Hotel does not apply to them.
Distinguishing between abstract infinities and concrete infinitie
therefore of importance. Concrete entities have causal powers and
be part of a chain of causes and effects. On the other hand, abst
infinities do not have causal powers, and therefore cannot account
the origin of things such as our universe. (o illustrate the fact
abstract infinities do not have causal powers: if someone asks, ‘Wh
did the baby come from?’, the answer cannot be ‘wo’, because ‘
is an abstract number that has no causal power to produce anyth
Rather, one might answer ‘wo persons: the mother and the fath
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to non-existence. Moreover, it implies that there are intermediate sta

where it is just indeterminate whether something exists or not (tha
there is no fact of the matter, not merely that we cannot discern w
the facts are) (Le Poidevin 2003, pp. 114–115). 3
On the other hand, Ellis notes that ‘the often claimed physical ex
ence of infinities is questionable… One can suggest they are unphysi
in any case such claims are certainly unverifiable.’ He explains,
Te existence of a physically existing spacetime continuum represente

by a real (number) manifold at the micro-level contrasts with quantum
gravity claims of a discrete spacetime structure at the Planck scale, whic
one might suppose was a generic aspect of fully non-linear quantum grav
ity theories. In terms of physical reality, this promises to get rid of th
uncountable infinities the real line continuum engenders in all physica
variables and fields. Tere is no experiment that can prove there is a phys
ical continuum in time or space; all we can do is test space-time structur
on smaller and smaller scales, but we cannot approach the Planck scale
(Ellis 2007, Sect. 9.3.2)
Additionally, others have argued that discrete time (in which

are such things as chronons, i.e., smallest ‘bits’ of time) remains a def
sible possibility (Van Bendegem 2011; Craig 2000a , pp. 239–24
Even if spacetime is continuous, one can argue that it is not made up
actual infinite points. Rather, it could be that spacetime is continu
yet naturally divide into finite number of smallest parts of finite du
tions (Loke 2016a ; see next section).
An objector of Craig might argue that, according to the Stand
Model of particle physics, fundamental particles appear to be poi
which have no physical extension and they are assumed to be
Nevertheless, this has not been proven, and no one knows whether
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48 A. T. E. Loke
Against Craig, Swinburne (2004, pp. 138–139) objects that t

could be made up of an actual infinite number of periods of une
length, of 1/2 h, 1/4 h, 1/8 h, etc., which have already occurred du
the past hour. Craig and Sinclair reply that this sort of objection can
met by distinguishing a potential infinite from an actual infinite. T
explain
While one can continue indefinitely to divide conceptually any distanc

the series of subintervals thereby generated is merely potentially infinit
in that infinity serves as a limit that one endlessly approaches but nev
reaches… one’s ability to specify certain points, like the halfway poin
along a certain distance, does not imply that such points actually exi
independently of our specification of them…if we think of the line
logically prior to any points designated on it, then it is not an ordere
aggregate of points nor actually infinitely divided. ime as duration
then logically prior to the (potentially infinite) divisions we make of
Specified instants are not temporal intervals but merely the bounda
points of intervals, which are always nonzero in duration. (Craig an
Sinclair 2009, pp. 112–113)
While Richard Sorabji (1983, pp. 210–213, 322–324) asserts

the potentially infinite divisibility of a line (the property of being
ceptible of division without end) entails that there is an actually infi
number of positions at which the line could be divided, Craig
Sinclair (2009, p. 114) point out that Sorabji’s argument is guilty
modal operator shift, inferring from the true claim
1. Possibly, there is some point at which x is divided; to the dispu

claim
2. Tere is some point at which x is possibly divided.
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can exist together. It is like arguing ‘because a leaf could be any colo
therefore it can be every colour.’ 4 A leaf obviously cannot be of ev
colour at the same time because of metaphysical constraints. Likew
there might be metaphysical constraints that prevent all the points fr
existing together concretely, even if each point can exist concre
(I shall discuss the metaphysical constraint against concrete actual in
ities below).
It might be objected that one can prove that there is an actual infin
between two points on a line, by showing that there are just as m
real number of points between (say) 0 and 1 as there are between 0 a
2 through joining these points in a one-to-one correspondence (f
examples of joining are shown in Fig. 2.1).
In reply, this argument assumes that every point within the in
vals (0, 1) and (0, 2) exists concretely, which begs the question agai
a concrete finitist who thinks that the points as well as the one-to-o
correspondences merely exist as an abstraction. One could try to m
these points concrete by drawing them (as the four examples of join
in Fig. 2.1 illustrate), but one would end up with a potential infin
rather than an actual infinite (i.e. the number of points drawn wo
increase with time towards infinity, but the number of points dra
would never reach an actual infinite number at any time).
Morriston (2002, p. 162) has argued that one could come up wit
specification relative to which the number of coexistent sub-region
a given region of space R is actual infinite, e.g., ‘starting with R, div
the results of the previous division by half ad infinitum’, and that
do not need to complete the series of divisions in order to know th
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50 A. T. E. Loke
relative to this rule, there is an actual—and not merely a potenti

infinity of sub-regions.
Proponents of KCA can reply to Morriston as follows: Tey
argue that their arguments are directed only against an actual infi
number of concrete entities such as an actual infinite temporal reg
of events; they are not directed against an actual infinite numbe
abstract entities. As noted previously, distinguishing between abst
infinities and concrete infinities is of importance; concrete ent
have causal powers and can be part of a chain of causes and effe
while abstract infinities do not have causal powers and therefore
not account for the origin of things such as our universe. Tey
then reply to Morriston’s Rule by arguing that an actual infinity of s
regions exists only as an abstraction which we conceive relative to
Rule, but an actual infinity of sub-regions does not exist concretel
space itself. Rather, the series of divisions that is actually complete
well as the number of sub-regions that result in the concrete wor
always finite.
Some have claimed that there are physically realised infinities in
mology. For example, the current favoured cosmological model
zero curvature, meaning that space is flat. While some have assum
that a geometrically flat accelerating universe is indeed spatially infi
(Monton 2010), other cosmologists have replied that the flat sp
of the consensus model is probably an abstraction that does not h
physically (Halvorsen and Kragh 2011). In addition, some scien
have argued that the flatness of space is unprovable, due to the ina
ity to achieve an infinitely precise measurement and the limitation
the observability of the Universe by us. Even if space is flat, the in
ity of space is unprovable, due to the inability to demonstrate that
FLRW metrics is maintained indefinitely beyond our cosmic hor
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concept, and the real spatial geometry of the universe is almost certainl
not Euclidean. Tus Euclidean space is an abstraction that is probabl
not physically real. Te infinities supposed in chaotic inflationary mod
els derive from the presumption of pre-existing infinite Euclidean spac
sections, and there is no reason why those should necessarily exist. In th
physical universe spatial infinities can be avoided by compact spatial sec
tions, resulting either from positive spatial curvature, or from a choice o
compact topologies in universes that have zero or negative spatial curva
ture. (ibid.)
Wes Morriston (2002, p. 163) acknowledges that space is

Euclidean and not infinite, but he objects that, even if space is not
fact Euclidean, it seems obvious that it could have been, and that th
are possible worlds in which parallel straight lines never meet and
which finite straight lines can be extended indefinitely, and in wh
space is actually infinite. However, a proponent of HHA can argue t
HHA proves that there cannot be such worlds in the concrete rea
and that what ‘seems obvious’ to Morriston merely refers to abstracti
which cannot be realised as concrete entities. As noted earlier, a pro
nent of HHA can accept that there are abstract actual infinities (such
a Euclidean space) but deny that there are concrete actual infinities.
Ellis (2007, Sect. 9.3.2) observes that ‘Te concept of infinity is u
with gay abandon in some multiverse discussions, without any conc
either for the philosophical problems associated with this statement
for its completely unverifiable character. It is an extravagant claim t
should be treated with extreme caution.’ While singularities have b
postulated as entities when infinite quantities appear, the actual ex
ence of these have not been proven, and various proposals have b
made for how singularities might be removed from scientific theo
(Gambini and Pullin 2013).
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52 A. T. E. Loke
As for the renormalisation of infinities in quantum mechanics

quantum field theory, Oppy points out that this does not by i
demonstrate that there are infinities in nature, because arriving at a
isfactory understanding of physical particles and their interactions w
physical fields is a very difficult task, and one that is still beset with
ficulties. He writes ‘Either we can understand renormalisation in te
of regularisation or there will be no renormalisation in theories of
world better than those that we currently possess. As things stand
isn’t obvious that there is anything in quantum field theory to enc
age friends of concrete infinities’ (Oppy 2006, 145; scientists have b
developing methods leading to an infinity-free renormalisation, see,
example, Wu 2003).
Oppy notes that one can construct scientific models in which
large is approximated by the infinite, and/or the small is approxim
by the infinitesimal, in order to obtain an advantage of some kind,
example, for computational tractability. He observes that such appr
mation has proven to be useful in addressing problems concerning p
dulums, chemical decay, coagulation kinetics, diffusion, convect
economic equilibrium, and fluid flow. Nevertheless, ‘in these ca
there is no commitment to the existence of infinite or infinitesi
quantities in nature, for the theory is merely a convenient approxi
tion to reality in which everything is finite… these theories should
given a merely instrumentalist, or otherwise antirealist, interpretat
(ibid., pp. 150–151).
Against this anti-realist, interpretation, one might cite the Qu
Putnam indispensability argument, which implies that anyone com
ted to the truth of scientific theories that essentially involve infini
mathematics is thereby committed to an ontological actual infinite
reply, Penelope Maddy objects with a number of counterexamples:
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quantized; we take liquids to be continuous substances in fluid dynam

ics, despite atomic theory. On the face of it, an indispensability argumen
based on such an application of mathematics in science would be laugha
ble: should we believe in the infinite because it plays an indispensable ro
in our best scientific account of water waves? (Maddy 1997, p. 143)
With respect to the L’Hospital’s (1661–1704) view that a

may be regarded as the totality of an infinity of straight segments e
infinitely small or as a polygon with an infinite number of sides, A.
Moore notes that ‘it was steeped in the kind of confusion that came w
a completely uncritical acceptance of the infinitely small’ (Moore
pp. 65–66). He observes that Eudoxus and Archimedes had shown th
when using this method, we did not need to think of a curved figur
an infinigon. Rather, we could see it as the limit of a sequence of p
ygons, which we must in turn understand in terms of generalisatio
Tat is, the larger the number of sides of the polygon, the closer i
to a curve, but there will always be a finite value to the angle betw
the sides and it will never become a curve (ibid.). Moore points out t
mathematicians using calculus can uphold claims ostensibly about in
itesimals or about infinite additions, knowing that they are only mak
disguised generalisations about what are in fact finite quantities (ibid.
73). Stanford mathematician Solomon Feferman observes that
infinitary concepts are not essential to the mathematization of science

all appearances to the contrary. And this also puts into question the view
that higher mathematics is justified by science or is somehow embodie
in the world, rather than that it is the conceptual edifice raised by man
kind in order to make sense of the world’ and ‘the actual infinite is no
required for the mathematics of the physical world. (Feferman 1998, pp
19, 30)
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54 A. T. E. Loke
In summary, there is no adequate reason for concluding that an

the above examples taken from the fields of philosophy, physics, ge
etry and mathematics is a concrete infinite, and there is insufficient
tification for thinking that it is metaphysically possible that conc
infinities exist.
But are there adequate reasons for thinking that concrete actual in
ities such as an actual infinite temporal regress cannot exist? As no
previously, Craig has attempted to argue for a beginning of the Univ
based on the impossibility of concrete actual infinities using the Hil
Hotel Argument. With regards to Hilbert’s Hotel’s ability to accom
date new guests by shifting rooms even though it is full, critics ob
that this is what ought to be expected of a hotel with an infinite nu
ber of rooms; to assume otherwise would be to beg the question aga
the existence of an actual infinite (Oppy 2006, p. 48; Philipse
p. 224). After all, mathematicians Richard Dedekind ( 1963, p.
and Geog Cantor (1915, p. 108) have already defined a set as infi
when a part of it is equivalent to the whole, that is, when a part
can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the whole, an
noted previously this is understood similarly in modern day Zerm
Fraenkel axiomatic set theory. Dedekind (1963) had also argued
the Euclidean maxim that the whole is greater than a part holds only
finite systems. Philipse claims that
Geog Cantor showed… these paradoxes of infinity arise because one mi

takenly conceives of infinite sets on the model of finite sets. In order
avoid such confusions, infinite sets should be defined explicitly as se
that can be paired in a one to-one correspondence with a proper su
set…After Cantor’s elimination of the traditional paradoxes of infinit
it seemed to mathematically informed philosophers that the First-cau
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contradictions; they only lead to indefinite answers as one could get

ferent answers depending on which objects one chooses to take aw
Other opponents to KCA have argued that, even if a hotel with
infinite number of rooms is impossible, it does not follow that th
cannot be other kinds of concrete infinities such as an infinite tempo
regress of events (Morriston 2003, pp. 296–297; Hedrick 2014).
In a number of recent papers, I have replied to the above objectio
I shall briefly summarise my arguments here.
o begin, the sort of reply East offers by no means proves that c
crete actual infinities are possible. It should be noted that what is ma
ematically possible is not always metaphysically possible. For examp
the quadratic equation x 2−4 = 0 can have two mathematically cons
ent results for ‘ x ’: 2 or −2, but if the question is ‘how many people
ried the computer home’, the answer cannot be ‘ −2’, for in the conc
world it is metaphysically impossible that ‘ −2 people’ carried a co
puter home. Tus the conclusion of ‘2 people’ rather than ‘ −2 peo
is not derived from mathematical equations alone, but also from m
aphysical considerations: ‘ −2 people’ lack the causal powers to carr
computer home. Tis shows that metaphysical considerations are m
fundamental than mathematical considerations (Loke 2016c). In ot
papers (Loke 2012, 2014b, 2016c), I have offered metaphysical c
siderations against the possibility of certain kinds of concrete infini
such as an actual infinite temporal regress. I shall explain these consid
ations below.
Suppose there is a ‘Christmas present generator’ which has been g
erating similar Christmas presents at fixed temporal intervals as long
time existed. Suppose there is also a ‘person generator’ which has b
generating persons at the same fixed temporal intervals as long as ti
existed. Suppose that the presents and the persons continue exist
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56 A. T. E. Loke
necessarily true only for finite sets, or is it metaphysically necessa

true for ‘any set with any number of concrete members’ that can exi
argue that it is a metaphysically necessary principle that the causal p
ers of a set of things ultimately depend on the things in the set and
the number in conjunction with the things. For example, suppose
a certain thing Z has zero mass. In this case, either a set of ‘twenty
‘ten’ Zs would not make a difference to the reading on the weigh
scale, because 20 × 0 = 0 and 10 × 0 = 0. And in cardinal arithm
of Set Teory, infinity × 0 = 0, because the product of any set A w
the empty set is the empty set (Infinity × 0 is not equal to 0 if we
talking about infinity as a limit, but the concept of infinity as a lim
not relevant here; what we are discussing here concerns a set of enti
and thus we should be talking about infinity as understood in set the
rather than as a limit).
Te point is that whether a set of things has a certain causal powe
not ultimately depends on the things (in the case of the Christmas p
ent scenario, a thing = ‘each person subsequently grabbing one pre
from one position rather than another’), and not the number in c
junction with the things. (Let us call this metaphysical fact F. It sho
be noted that this metaphysical fact is not based on whether a c
crete infinite can exist or not; rather it is based on the abstract na
of numbers. Hence, this metaphysical fact does not beg the ques
against concrete infinities.) ‘Number’ is a mere abstraction of the th
that exist in the set, and the ‘number’ of a set of things is not the
of entity which in conjunction with the things in the set would h
certain causal power that the things would not have had. Since tha
the case, it cannot be claimed that the abstract number n (whether fi
or infinite) of person-present in conjunction with ‘each person su
quently grabbing one present from one position rather than anot
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the range of P over z is concerned. Now we know that P ranges over
z where n is finite (both friends and opponents of infinity are agreed
this). However, since n is irrelevant, it is not the case that P ranges o
any z only where n is finite; on the contrary, it is the case that P ran
over any z for any n. Hence, P is metaphysically necessarily true,
merely ‘for finite sets’, but for ‘any sets with any number of memb
that can exist.
I go on to explain that P will be violated if there were an act
infinite temporal regress: suppose at time t 0 the person who was gen
ated at t 1 picked up the present generated at t 1, the person who
− −
generated at t 2 picked up the present generated at t 2, the person w

− −
was generated at t n picked up the present generated at t n…as foll

− −
(Fig. 2.2).
If there were an infinite temporal regress of events, the result is t
there would not be an infinite number of presents left.
However, if they had grabbed the presents this way: the person w
was generated at time t 1 picked up the present generated at t
− −
person who was generated at t 2 picked up the present generated at

−
the person who was generated at t n picked up the present generated

−
t 2n… as follows (Fig. 2.3).

−
If there were an infinite temporal regress of events, what happen

that each person would walk away with one present, and there wo
be an infinite number of presents left! Te problem arises from the p
tulation that these generators existed from an actual infinite past, fo
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58 A. T. E. Loke
they did not, such situations which violate metaphysical necessity tr

P would not have arisen.
Note that such a violation remains even if, as Oppy (2006, p.
suggests, we vary other features of the story. For example, we can
other features such as stipulating dogs instead of persons and bo
instead of presents, and the violation will still persist. Tus, my a
ment does not depend on persons or Christmas presents; the illus
tion using persons and Christmas presents are merely conceptual t
which help us to understand the metaphysics involved. However
obvious that in this scenario, so long as the temporal regress of even
infinite, the violation will persist, but if the regress were finite, no s
violation would occur. Terefore, the violation of metaphysical ne
sity is related to the assumption of an actual infinite temporal regre
events. Hence, an actual infinite temporal regress of events is metap
ically impossible.
It is important that neither the opponent nor friend of infi
should beg the question in the dialectic. On the one hand, it should
noted that ‘entailment’ is different from ‘basis’: while metaphysical
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friend of infinity should not beg the question by simply asserting t

‘concrete infinities do not obey P, therefore the argument is fallacio
For to argue this way would be to presuppose that concrete infini
can exist, which is precisely what is being denied by the oppone
A friend of infinity should also not simply say ‘Infinite collecti
behave differently from finite collections.’ Of course, infinite collecti
(if they exist) could have properties that are different from finite s
but the problem is that certain infinite collections would have prop
ties that violate metaphysical necessity if they were to exist in the c
crete world; therefore they cannot exist in the concrete world but o
in the abstract realm. Additionally, a friend of infinity should not s
ply claim that ‘it is unproblematic that there could be causal capaci
present in infinite collections that are not present in finite collectio
thus if metaphysical fact F entails the rejection of this unproblem
claim, then it would be question-begging to insist on metaphysical f
F in this context’. For to claim that ‘it is unproblematic that there co
be causal capacities present in infinite collections that are not pres
in finite collections’ would be to beg the question against the oppon
who argues that this claim is problematic, on the basis that it viol
the metaphysical principle that whether a set of things has certain cau
power or not ultimately depends on the things.
In short, a friend of infinity should not beg the question in the dia
tic by merely presupposing that concrete infinities can exist, and ins
that the entailment of violation of P by a concrete infinite serves a
counterexample to the opponent’s argument. Rather, she would have
rebut the independent reason the opponent offers as the basis for
opponent’s argument, and the independent reason in this case would
the fact that numbers are causally inert in the sense explained above.
rebut this, a friend of infinity might try to argue that an actual infin
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60 A. T. E. Loke
respect to leftover presents, is really to claim that such numbers are c

crete particulars with highly active causal powers of their own. If
claim were true, such a number would not be abstract anymore; ra
it would be something that is concrete and existing alongside the set
presents and people! But of course, numbers are not concrete particu
which exist alongside the concrete particulars that they are of.
Hence, it would be problematic for a ‘friend of infinity’ to emb
the reductio of my argument by claiming that the ‘absurd situati
in my Christmas present illustration are just what one ought to ex
if there were concrete infinities (this move is made by Oppy [
p. 48] in response to Craig). Te problem is not (as Philipse thin
that such things are physically impossible on Earth or that it is psyc
logically impossible to imagine them. Rather the problem is that s
things entails the violation of metaphysical necessity. My argumen
not based on conceiving infinite sets on the model of finite sets
Philipse’s objections concerning the paradoxes of infinity), rather
based on metaphysical fact F which is applicable to any concretely e
ing set.
Against Craig, Swinburne (2004, pp. 138–139) suggests that we
allow an infinite number of things without adopting Cantor’s mathem
ics or a particular kind of way of applying it. Likewise, Guminski (
contends that one can have actual infinites in the real world if one ab
dons the standard way of applying set theory to real objects. With res
to actual infinities, Pitts (2008, p. 683) argues (in reply to KCA) that
might deny that cardinality exhausts the notion of sameness of size.
Such replies merely sidestepped the deeper metaphysical p
lems with an actual infinite temporal regress which I explained ab
Consider the problematic situation I describe:
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For (1), the conclusion that there would be no leftover is unavoidable

For (2), the conclusion is likewise unavoidable. If there were no pr
ent generated at t 2n available for the person who was generated at
−
to grab, then there would have been presents lacking from the set
the set would not have been actually infinite. Tis would imply t
there was not an actual infinite temporal regress of events in the s
nario involving the present-generator in the first place, for otherw
there would not have been presents lacking. Additionally, if there w
no actual infinite number of presents leftover, then there would h
been presents lacking from the set and the set would not have b
actually infinite.
Given that the conclusions of (1) and (2) are unavoidable, the afo
mentioned violation of metaphysical necessity which they join
entail is likewise unavoidable. Te metaphysical problem with concr
infinities therefore cannot be avoided by quibbles about cardinalit
Cantor’s mathematics or the kind of way of applying it. 6 Te prob
is not due to our human inability to conceive a concrete infinite, rat
(as I have explained) it is due to the nature of concrete infinities itself
2.7 Craig’s Second Argument Against

an Actual Infinite Temporal Regress:
The Impossibility of Traversing
an Actual Infinite
Craig has offered another argument against an actual infinite tem
ral regress, namely the argument against the possibility of traversing
actual infinite. In Te Blackwell Companion to Natural Teology, C
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62 A. T. E. Loke
3. Terefore, the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infi

(Craig and Sinclair 2009
2009,, p. 117).
Some philosophers have objected to Craig by utilising Zeno’s parado

of motion and claiming that actual infinite sequences are ‘traver
all the time in nature, for example, claiming that whenever an ob
moves from one location in space to another it must pass through
infinite number of halfway points.
Craig replies by noting that the argument for the impossibilit
traversing an actual infinite has two crucial dys-analogies with Ze
paradoxes of motion. In the case of Craig’s argument, the event
a temporal series are actual. Moreover, the events would have to s
up to an actual infinite magnitude in order to avoid a beginning.
contrast, in the case of Zeno’s paradoxes, the interval traversed co
be regarded as being potentially infinitely divisible and not actu
infinitely divided. 7 In other words, one can keep on dividing the in
val by half without ever ending up with an actual infinite numbe
units. Craig argues that ‘Te claim that Achilles must pass thro
an infinite number of halfway points in order to cross the stad
already assumes that the whole interval is a composition of an infi
number of points’ (Craig and Sinclair 2009 2009,, p. 119), 8 an assu
tion for which we have inadequate evidence as argued previousl
2.6..9 Moreover, the points that Achilles must pass through
Sect. 2.6
to a distance that is of merely finite magnitude (Craig and Sin
2009,, p. 119; see also Aristotle Physics , 239b5–32; 263a26–b8).
2009
Likewise, the argument has crucial dys-analogies with an ord
set of real numbers having infinite elements but no first element.
ordered real set can be regarded as abstract rather than concr
Additionally,, the elements summed up to a finite distance (e.g., betw
Additionally
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2 Is the
the Number
Number of Prior Causes and Durations
Durations Infinite? …
In response, on the one hand, such supertasks assume that time

continuum and that a finite time interval consists of an actual infin
number of instants. However, this assumption has not been proven
noted previously.
On the other hand, Craig has argued that there are reasons for thi
ing that such supertasks are metaphysically impossible. Aside fr
the argument against concrete infinities (see previous section), wh
implies that there cannot be an actual infinite number of tasks p
formed in the concrete world, there is the problem of causal disconn
tion. Craig explains
Te fatal flaw in all such scenarios is that the state at ω + 1 is causall
unconnected to the successive states in the ω series of states. Since ther
is no last term in the ω series, the state of reality at ω + 1 appears mys
teriously from nowhere. Te absurdity of such supertasks underlines th
metaphysical impossibility of trying to convert a potential into an actua
2009,, p. 117, n. 15)10
infinite. (Craig and Sinclair 2009
Consider, for example, a man crossing the slabs in progressiv

shorter intervals, the first in a half-minute, the second in a quarter-m
ute, the third in an eighth of a minute, etc. Craig thinks that this s
nario is a fantasy, for the state of reality at ω + 1 appears mysteriou
from nowhere; the man cannot reach the slab numbered ω + 1 with
having stepped there from the immediately preceding slab, but ther
no preceding slab to ω + 1! Craig argues that the denial that there m
be an immediately precedent is hardly a refutation of the claim th
given a series formed throughout by successive addition, the state o
physical object at ω + 1 must be causally connected with an imme
ately preceding state (Craig 2011
2011).).
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64 A. T. E. Loke
we divide them in thought, then we must admit that just as time
itself merely one long interval, the history of the Universe up to
present is in itself just one long event’ (Puryear 2014
2014,, p. 627).
In a subsequent article ‘Finitism, Divisibility, and the Beginnin
the Universe: Replies to Loke and Dumsday,’ Puryear (2016 ( 2016)) addr
the three objections which emerge from the replies to his earlier art
Te first two objections concern the distinction between infinite m
nitudes and infinite multitudes, and the distinction between extensi
and intensively infinite progressions. Te third objection concerns
possibility that time might be continuous yet naturally divide into fi
number of smallest parts of finite durations (Loke 2016a ). ).
Tere are multiple problems with Puryear’s responses to t
objections.
Puryear writes ‘A key claim of my argument is that, if time div
into parts only in so far as we divide it, then reaching the presen
a universe without beginning would not require traversing an actu
infinite multitude of intervals or events. “At most, it would req
traversing an infinite magnitude, something to which finitists have t
cally raised no objection
objection”’”’ (Puryear 2014
2014,, p. 628).
Tis statement is not accurate. As noted earlier, Craig and Sinc
(2009
2009,, p. 119) have pointed out previously that one of the dys- analo
with Zeno
Zeno’’s paradox is that in the case of ZenoZeno’’s paradoxes, the
intervals traversed sum to a merely finite distance, whereas the inter
in an infinite past sum to an infinite distance. Tis point is of sig
cance in the context of discussing the KCA. Te reason is because s
ming to a merely finite magnitude would imply that the past is fi
and thus (according to proponents of the KCA) require a cause
Craig and Sinclair (2009
( 2009,, pp. 102, 185–186) write, one of the pr
ises of the KCA is that ‘everything that begins to exist has a cause’,
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2 Is the
the Number
Number of Prior Causes and Durations
Durations Infinite? …
our conceptual activity’ (Loke 2016a , p. 592) seems to entail that t

is discrete. He supposes that we have a period of time that begins a
and ends at t d, and which naturally divides into two parts, t a –t b and
He argues that, in order to avoid discrete time, t a , t b, t c, and t d sho
be regarded as instants and that t b = t c, which implies that the inst
at which the first part of t a –t d ends is the same instant at which
second part begins. He asks if that is the case, then what makes th
really distinct parts as opposed to parts that we merely conceive in t
period. He concludes that ‘it would seem that an objectively real d
sion would result in non-overlapping parts. But how could time div
into non-overlapping parts and yet still be continuous?’ (Puryear 2016
811).
In reply, the entailment of discrete time does not follow. Te answ
to the question ‘what makes these really distinct parts as opposed
parts that we merely conceive in that period’ is simple: these parts
distinct in virtue of having different properties. Consider Aristot
view that things neither move nor rest at a point, but instead m
or rest only during an interval ( Physics 232a324). Suppose someth
moves at t a –t b and rests at t c–t d. In that case the two parts are distinc
virtue of having something moving in the first part and having the sa
thing resting in the second part. Given that there is an objective disti
tion between moving and resting, there are objectively two distinct p
ods within t a –t d. Tese periods are continuous in virtue of being joi
together at t b = t c.
Puryear notes that I have previously argued that parts that are re
distinct can be ‘joined together’ at the same extensionless instant in
following way:
o illustrate one possible way of joining temporal parts, conside

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66 A. T. E. Loke
Puryear (2016, p. 811) objects that my phrase ‘the extension

“point of transition”, which we conceptualise’ implies that ‘apart f
our conception, there is no point of intersection, no coinciding boun
ries, and thus no division.’
In reply, on the one hand, my phrase does not deny that the ‘p
of transition’ can exist apart of our conception. On the other ha
I evidently intend the coincidence of the boundaries to be underst
as a mind-independent reality at which the two intervals join toget
and not merely something that we conceptualise. Puryear cites Arist
and claims that he ‘seems to hold that any such transition point co
be only a potential division in time, since on his view actual divis
introduce discontinuities [ Physics , VIII.8, 263a2330]’ (ibid.). Howe
an actual division of t a –t d into two parts t a –t b and t c–t d should
introduce discontinuities, since t b = t c. Te two parts are distinct
not separated.
Finally, Puryear claims that
the finitist has not yet established the crucial premise that a beginnin
less past would consist in an infinite sequence of events (rather than on
simple event that we divide in thought). In other words, in order for th
finitist argument to go through without falling prey to the Zeno obje
tion, the finitist needs time to have smallest natural parts. But if all th
has been shown is that time could have smallest natural parts, not that
does have such parts, then temporal finitism has not been established. I
order to fully vindicate the finitist argument, then, Loke and Dumsd
not only need to say more in support of the coherence (and indeed th
plausibility) of their alternative conceptions of time; they also need
show that the conceptualist alternative is not plausible, or at least that it
comparatively implausible. Until that has been done, the case for the fin
tist argument remains at best incomplete. (Puryear 2016, p. 812)
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Philosophical Society Meeting at UNC-Chapel Hill. Additionally,

conceptual activity itself has undergone multiple changes. Tus
conceptualist view that the past is one simple event that we divide
thought is not plausible.
Moreover, even if the past consists of only one simple event that
divide in thought, it still remains the case (as I argue below) that, if ti
is beginningless, then it would be the case that a causal series which
members being generated one after another as long as time exists wo
arrived at an actual infinite of generations of members at a particu
time. Te metaphysically impossibility of the consequent—which p
ponents of KCA will argue for—would still imply the metaphysic
impossibility of the antecedent (a beginningless past). Tus, the c
ceptualist view of time does not block the finitist’s argument against
eternal past in any case.
In summary, the abovementioned objections to the argument aga
traversing an actual infinite do not succeed. Nevertheless, a limitat
of Craig’s formulation of the argument, as he himself notes, is that
second premise presupposes a dynamic (A-) theory of time (Craig a
Sinclair 2009, p. 124). Tis limitation makes the argument unacce
able for those who do not hold this theory of time. o persuade th
people, one would have to first show that the dynamic theory is pre
able to the static theory of time—not a straightforward task consider
the vast amount of literature on static versus dynamic theory of tim
(It should be noted, however, that Craig has defended the dynam
theory in a number of publications. See, for example, Craig [200
2000b]. Te issue concerning these theories of time is further discus
in the subsequent chapters of this book.)
Tis problem can be addressed by reformulating the argum
against traversing an actual infinite in such a way that it remains va
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68 A. T. E. Loke
2. It is not metaphysically possible for a causal series which has m

bers being generated one after another as long as time exists to ar
at an actual infinite of generations of members at a particular time
3. Terefore, it is not metaphysically possible that time
beginning-less.
Te justification for premise 2 is that an actual infinite has gre

number than the number of durations and generations of causes-a
effects which can be arrived at one-after-another in time. o illustr
Suppose George begins to exist at t 0, he has a child at t 1 who is the
generation of his descendants, a grandchild at t 2 who is the second
eration, a great-grandchild at t 3 who is the third generation, and so
Te number of generations and durations can increase with time,
there can never be an actual infinite number of them at any time, fo
matter how many of these there are at any time, there can still be m
If there are 1000 generations at t 1000, there can still be more (say 1
at t 1001); If there are 100,000 generations at t 100,000 , there can stil
more (100,001 at t 100,001 ), etc.
Te number of generations at any time is finite, to which there
be more at a later time, and this is true regardless of whether tim
dynamic or static. What this illustrates is Principle P: An actual infi
has greater number than the number of durations and generation
causes-and-effects which can be arrived at one-after-another in ti
(Note that ‘arrived at’ can be understood tenselessly as follows:
entity E arrived at t 0 from t 2 via a process = E exists at t 2, t 1, an
− − −
and the states of E at t 2, t 1, and t 0, are different in a definite mann

− −
It should be noted that P is based on: (i) the nature of the numbe
elements of an actual infinite set, which is an essential property of s
a set; and (ii) the nature of a ‘one-after-another’ process, which i
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from an actual infinite number of prior durations and generations gi

that the number of durations and generations required is the same
(1). Tus, the number of durations and generations prior to Geor
generation must be finite.
One might object ‘if we adopt a static theory of time in which
series of events is a tenselessly existing manifold all of whose memb
(including later events) are equally real, and if we further postulate t
time is infinitely long in the later-than direction, then it is false that o
more generation can always be added to what exists, since an infinit
many generations already exist.’ 11 In reply, on the one hand, one m
be careful not to assume that time is indeed infinitely long, since
would be begging the question in favour of infinite time. On the
hand, the objection ignores the problem which concerns the conc
parts of the series in time. Te problem does not concern whet
one more generation can always be added to what exists, but whet
an actual infinite number of generations can be arrived at any tim
Te objector suggests the hypothesis of a series that is infinitely lo
However, to arrive at an actual infinite number of generations in
first place one needs to first proceed one generation after another, a
the problem is that the result of that process is always finite at any tim
One does not arrive at an actual infinite at any time, not at t 1000, t
or t 1000000 . ime t infinite cannot be in the series. Actual infinite sta
outside of the series, timelessly and abstractly. But here we are talk
about what happens in a temporal series in the concrete world,
timelessly and abstractly. In the concrete world there is never an act
infinite number of generations at any time.
It is instructive to note the difference between a causal series an
number series. Some have attempted to object to the argument aga
an infinite regress by appealing to a negative number series as a co
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70 A. T. E. Loke
each year is only finitely distant from the present year, there are
infinite number of finitely distant years, and that is all it means to
the past is infinite. Tey explain ‘it is like the negative number se
Every negative number, be it minus 65 or minus one trillion, is se
rated from zero by a finite number of negative numbers, but it is no
theless truth that there are an infinite number of negative numbers.’
In reply, some proponents of KCA might defend nominalism
deny the reality of mathematical objects. Alternatively, one might a
that, even if a negative number series exists, this is dys-analogous to
actual infinite temporal regress in a crucial way. A negative number se
is a case of abstract actual infinite which exists timelessly rather tha
a one-after-another temporal process. Tus, it does not provide a co
terexample to the claim that an actual infinite cannot be arrived at
a one-after-another temporal process in the concrete world. While e
member of the abstract negative number series …, −n, …, −3,
−1 is obtained from the preceding member by the addition of a u
this obtaining is in the form of timeless mathematical relation. It is

the case that the abstract number –2 (say) is brought into existenc
time by the addition of a unit to –3. Rather the abstract numbers
and –3 have always existed timelessly, and this is unlike a causal se
of concrete entities existing in time. One can have an abstract ac
infinite number of negative numbers each of which is timelessly s
rated from zero by a finite number of negative numbers. Te exist
of each of the number in the series is not causally dependent on any
vious number, nor is it dependent on the actual infinite number wh
exists outside of the series. However, to arrive by a one-after-ano
causal process is a different matter. In contrast with timeless numb
a temporal series of causes-and-effects are arrived at in time, and e
effect in time is causally dependent on a prior cause. Te process
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temporal regress, then there would be no starting point whatever (So

2004, p. 182). And if this series is beginningless, then it would not
the case that the number of generations of causes-and-effects and fin
durations at any time which can be arrived at via a one-after-anot
process is finite. For in this case there would be an actual infinite nu
ber of generations of causal antecedents at a particular time (i.e.,
by having generations of causal antecedents at certain time intervals
a beginningless series (cf. Morriston 2013, pp. 26–27). Te objec
might therefore insist that P should be restated as follows:
(P ) An actual infinite has greater number than the number of du
′
tions and generations of causes-and-effects which can be arrived

one-after-another in time iff time has a beginning .
Te objector might object that my argument ignores the bicon
tional ‘iff time has a beginning,’ and that my argument begs the qu
tion against an actual infinite temporal regress because it is based on
assumption that time has a beginning.
However, this objection will not work.
o begin, we must be careful not to confuse biconditionals w
basis. Te fact that both conditionals of a biconditional holds toget
does not always imply that one is the basis of the other. Consider
following example involving the laws of logic: ‘Violations of laws
logic are impossible iff there cannot be such things as shapeless cub
Here the two conditionals hold together. However, the claim that ‘v
lations of laws of logic are impossible’ is not simply based on assu
ing that there cannot be such things as ‘shapeless cubes’—which will
begging the question against an objector to the laws of logic! Rathe
is based on an independent reason in the form of a deeper explanat
such as the following: contradictories (e.g., ‘shapeless’ and ‘cube’) can
each other out; it is like writing something and immediately erasing
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72 A. T. E. Loke
On the one hand, one must be careful not to deny or affirm P

simply assuming that time can or cannot be beginningless in the dia
tic, for to do that would be to beg the question. And one must not d
or affirm P by simply assuming that George could or could not hav
actual infinite number of ancestors, since this assumption is being
puted. Te statement ‘if the series is beginningless, then it would be
case that one can arrive at an actual infinite number of generation
causes-and-effects’ does not imply that it is indeed the case that one
arrive at an actual infinite number of generations of causes-and-eff
o assume that this is the case, one would be moving illicitly from
the series is beginning-less’ to ‘the series is beginningless’, which b
the question in favor of beginningless time.
On the other hand, one can offer an independent reason (indepen
in the sense that it is not based on whether George could or could not h
an actual infinite number of ancestors) for thinking that it is metaphysi
impossible that George has an actual infinite number of ancestors. We n
to ask how any concrete series is constituted in the first place. Without
ging the question either way by presupposing whether the number of ea
events is infinite or not, think of a series of ancestors-and-descendants in
midst of producing more generations of descendants.
time t p t q t r t s

→ generation P → generation Q → generation R → generation
Here we are looking at the process without presupposing whether

prior or later generations are infinite or not. Generation P is produce
time t p, generation Q at time t q, generation R at time t r, and genera
S at time t s. Te nature of the process is such that there is one genera
produced at t , there are two generations produced at t and t , there
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Te objector might argue that, if one add a finite number to a fin

number and repeat the operation an actual infinite number of tim
one gets an actual infinite result. In reply, the question is whet
we can repeat an operation an actual infinite number of times in
first place. o repeat an operation actual infinite number of tim
one needs to first proceed one time after another, but the problem
that the result of that process is always finite at any time. As no
previously, certain mathematical entities (e.g., −1) can exist in
abstract realm of mathematics but cannot be exemplified by anyth
in the concrete world. Likewise (I have argued) for an actual infin
number of finite operations. As noted earlier, time t infinite cannot e
in the temporal series. Actual infinite stands outside of the series, tim
lessly and abstractly. But here the proponent of KCA is referring
what happens in the concrete world when he/she argues that tim
finite in the earlier-than direction and that the number of prior cau
in a causal series in a concrete world is likewise finite. 13 If one wa
to talk about the timelessly abstract which has no causal powers, t
would be irrelevant as an objection to the KCA and does not block
conclusion of the argument. In the concrete world finite remains fin
Tere is a gap between finite and infinite which cannot be transcend
Te objector is claiming that there is a distinction between ar
ing at later durations from a particular time (a beginning) and arriv
at that particular time from earlier durations, and while it is impossi
to arrive at an actual infinite in the former case, it is possible to arr
at an actual infinite in the latter case. On this view, whether an act
infinite has greater number than the number of durations and gen
tions of causes-and-effects which can be arrived at via a one-after-anot
process depends on whether the process is from a particular time
later durations, or from earlier durations to a particular time. Howe
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74 A. T. E. Loke
to an actual infinite number of future durations is the same. Tus,

objection fails. It should be noted that my argument for why it fai
not based on the assumption that time has a beginning, which would
begging the question. Rather it is based on an independent reason c
cerning the nature of actual infinite, as well as the nature of a ‘one a
another’ temporal process. Given that my argument is based on this in
pendent reason, it does not beg the question against beginningless t
It should also be noted that the impossibility to traverse an actual infi
is not due to our human inability to conceive this traversal, rather
due to the nature of an actual infinite, which cannot be traversed by
one-after-another process because an actual infinite is ‘too large’ to
traversed that way. Morriston (2013, pp. 26–27) claims that ‘From
fact that we cannot—beginning now—complete the task of enumera
all the events in a beginningless series, it does not follow that the p
ent event cannot arrive or that a beginningless series of events that h
already arrived is impossible. o suppose otherwise would be to con
the items to be enumerated with the enumerating of them—it would
like arguing that there must be finitely many natural numbers becaus
can’t finish counting them.’ In reply, arriving at the present from a be
ningless past would require the number of events completed to be ac
infinite, but an actual infinite is too large to be completed. Te prob
is not due to our ability to enumerate; rather, it is due to the nature o
actual infinite which is too large to be completed via a one-after-ano
process. While there can be an infinite number of natural numbers in
abstract (see Sect. 2.6), to complete an actual infinite in the concrete
separate issue and the real issue here.
Te strength of such philosophical arguments against an ac
infinite number of earlier durations has been acknowledged in a p
reviewed scientific paper by leading cosmologists and philosopher
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inability to be realized in a real physical setting! Tis is why, for exa

ple, a realized past infinity in time is not considered possible from t
standpoint—because it involves an infinite set of completed events
moments. Tere is no way of constructing such a realized set, or actu
ising it (Ellis et al. 2004, p. 927).
2.8 Conclusion
Te development of the Big Bang theory in the twentieth century
led a number of scientists and philosophers to infer an absolute beg
ning to all physical things and a divine Cause of these things. Whil
vocal minority of philosophers such as Adolf Grünbaum and Quen
Smith have claimed that Big Bang cosmology disconfirms theism, I h
explained the reasons why many do not find their case persuasive.
the other hand, the realisation that our current understanding of
physics of space-time break down at the beginning of the Big Bang, t
we currently do not have a well-established theory of quantum grav
and that there might have been an earlier universe operating in acco
ance with quite different physical laws has led some to doubt whether
can infer an absolute beginning to all physical things from the Big Ba
I have argued that this doubt can in principle be addressed by philoso
ical arguments which (if sound) would lead to conclusions that are t
in all possible worlds. I note that Craig has offered two philosoph
arguments for thinking that an actual infinite temporal regress is imp
sible: the argument for the impossibility of concrete actual infinities a
the argument for the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite. Cri
have raised various objections to these arguments. I do not think th
objections are unanswerable, and I have replied to them in this ch
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76 A. T. E. Loke
Notes
1. Craig explains, ‘God’s infinity can be taken to mean that God is
physically necessary, morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, ete
etc., and that none of these need involve an actual infinite numb
things (e.g., “omnipotence is not defined in terms of quanta of po
possessed by God or number of actions God can perform but in t
of His ability to actualize states of affairs”)’ (Craig 2009).
2. For example, an actual infinite number of propositions in the 
Regress (for any proposition, P, P entails that it is true that P, and
proposition that it is true that P entails that it is true that it is true
P, ad infinitum; see Huemer 2014, p. 88).
3. Te other arguments for and against the possibility of extended
ples remain inconclusive, and (in my view) are not as compellin
the argument against the possibility of a concrete actual infinite w
I discuss below. For a survey of the arguments concerning exten
simples, see Sect. 5 of Gilmore (2014).
4. I thank Dr William Lane Craig for this analogy.
5. Peter Lyth claims that my argument conflates number as a numb
events or things with number as an abstract entity (Lyth 2014, 85–
Tis claim is false, because ‘number’ is understood in the same s
throughout the argument, i.e. as an abstract entity with no indep
ent causal power (Loke 2017).
6. Te problem with an actual infinite temporal regress also canno
avoided by using surreal numbers or hyperreal numbers. For a s
mary of details concerning surreal numbers see Oppy ( 2006, p. 2
for hyperreal numbers see Nowacki (2007, p. 75). While there are
ferent kinds of actual infinities with varying sizes (e.g., the set of
numbers has a higher cardinality than the set of integers), it rem
the case that each of these kinds of actual infinities will likewise e
the violation of metaphysical necessities explained in this chapter
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are actual, it is not possible: if they are potential, it is possible’ ( Ph

263b2–5).
8. See also Aristotle Physics 239b5–32; 263a26–b8. Cf. Huemer (
pp. 92–3).
9. Likewise the objection that ‘if someone runs a pencil along a line f
start to finish he/she would have traversed an actual infinite numbe
points on that line concretely’ assumes that that line is composed o
actual infinite number of concrete points, but this assumption can
challenged as noted previously.
10. Consider the type of supertasks consisting of an infinite sequence
actions of the type (a 1, a 2, a 3, … , a n, … ) and thus having the s
type of order as the natural order of positive integers: 1, 2, 3, …,
It is customary to denote this type of order with letter ‘ ω ’ and so
related supertasks can be called supertasks of type ω. See Sect. 1.
Laraudogoitia (2013).
11. I thank Julian Perlmutter for raising this objection.
12. Note that I stated ‘one generation is produced at t p’; I did not stat
assume that there is a total of one generation at t p, which is false if t
are generations before t p.
13. In answer to the question ‘is the one-after-another process selecti
chosen for the purpose of showing a finite past?’, I would answer
the one-after-another process is chosen because we want to find
where we come from ultimately: I came from my parents, they
from their parents… can this one-by-one process be an actual infi
regress?
14. In addition to my publications cited above, see also Loke (2014a
Loke (2016b: this paper addresses the objections Morriston ra
against Craig in their correspondences concerning eternal future).
15. Moreland and Craig (2003, p. 88) observe that there are at least
kinds of defeaters (1) rebutting defeaters, which directly attack the
clusion. (2) Undercutting defeaters, which attack the reasons offered
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78 A. T. E. Loke
Barr, Stephen. 2012. Modern Cosmology and Christian Teology. In

Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity , ed. Alan G. Padgett
J.B. Stump. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Baum, L., and P.H. Frampton. 2007. urnaround in Cyclic Cosmo
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hep-th/0610213.
Bersanelli, Marco. 2011. Infinity and the Nostalgia of the Stars. In Infi
New Research Frontiers , ed. Michael Heller and Hugh Wood. Cambr
Bojowald, M., G. Date, and G.M. Hossain. 2004. Te Bianchi IX Mod
Loop Quantum Cosmology. Classical and Quantum Gravity 21: 3541,
print: http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0404039 .
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3
Formulating a New Cosmological
Argument
3.1 The Distinctions Between Leibnizian,

Thomist and Kalam Cosmological
Arguments
Given that many in the history of humankind have pondered the qu
tion of ultimate origins, it is unsurprising that much has been w
ten on the subject. Indeed, the contributors to the discussion incl
some of the most brilliant thinkers in human history. One of
focal points of discussion has revolved around the plausibility of
so-called Cosmological Argument. Bruce Reichenbach (2016) n
that in Western philosophy the earliest formulation of a version of t
argument is found in Plato’s Laws , 893–6, and that it took its cla
cal expression in Aristotle’s Physics (VIII, 4–6) and Metaphysics (X
1–6). From this, Islamic philosophy developed two types of ar
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86 A. T. E. Loke
the Muslim mutakallimūm (theologians who used argumentation

support their beliefs) such as al-Gh ā zā li (1058–1111) developed it
Eastern philosophy, an abbreviated form of the cosmological argum
can be found in Udayana’s Ny ā yakusum ā ñjali I, 4 (India, tenth cent
(Potter ed. 1977, pp. 100–7).
From an overview of its history, three types of Cosmolog
Argument can be distinguished:
1. Te Tomist (named after Tomas Aquinas; this version attempt

show that the universe has a First Sustaining Cause).
2. Te Leibnizian (named after Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (16
1716; see his Monadology , §32), this version attempts to ground
existence of the contingent realm of things in a necessarily exis
being).
3. Te Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) which, in distinc
from the Tomist and Leibnizian versions, focuses on the issu
beginning of existence and is based on the arguments against conc
actual infinities and/or against traversing an actual infinite (C
1980). While the Leibnizian version and Tomist version are c
patible with the universe having no beginning, the KCA is not.
Te literature on the KCA is huge. Writing in Te Cambr

Companion to Atheism, Quentin Smith (2007, p. 183) notes tha
count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more art
have been published about Craig’s defence of the Kalam argument t
have been published about any other philosopher’s contemporary
mulation of an argument for God’s existence’. Te KCA as formul
by Craig is as follows:
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3 Formulating a New Cosmological Argument
uncaused, beginningless, timeless, enormously powerful and possess

free will (Craig and Sinclair 2009
2009).
).
For premise (2), proponents of the KCA have traditionally defen
two arguments: (i) the argument for the impossibility of conc
actual infinities; and (ii) the argument for the impossibility of trav
ing an actual infinite. Te literature on these two arguments has b
reviewed in Chap. 2. In this chapter, I shall formulate a new type of c
mological argument that is similar to the KCA, except that it has
distinct advantage of not requiring the arguments against concrete in
ities or against traversing an actual infinite. Terefore, it does not h
to address the complicated objections to these arguments which h
arisen over the years. Te new argument utilises certain insights from
Tomist tradition, and I shall explain the advantage of this new ar
ment with respect to the Tomist and Leibnizian version. Before I
that, I shall briefly explain some of the key terms which I will be us
for my argument (I shall further elaborate on my understanding of th
terms in later chapters of the book): time, change, event, and cause.
3.2 Clarifi cationss of Key Terms: Time, Change

Clarification
Event, and Cause
ime: While various philosophers throughout history have propo
various definitions of time, such as ‘a moving image of eternity’ (Pla
‘the number of movements in respect of the before and after’ (Aristot
‘the Life of the Soul in movement as it passes from one stage of act
experience to another’ (Plotinus), ‘a present of things past, memory
present of things present, sight, and a present of things future, expec
tion’ (Augustine), these definitions are unhelpfully circular because t
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88 A. T. E. Loke
view rather than a substantival view of time is that the relational v

would be more relevant to the key question which my argument
be addressing, namely whether there is an initially timeless-and-chan
less First Cause that initiated the first change. Tis does not imply
the success of my argument is dependent on a relational rather tha
substantival view of time (in fact, it isn’t). A temporal series of chan
is different from a spatial series of changes, such as a printing p
simultaneously producing a series of variations on the letter A. 3 A
tial series of changes does not involve different beginnings of existe
(since it is simultaneous), whereas an ordered series of changes in t
involves different beginnings of existence in an earlier than/later t
relation. In addition, time should be distinguished from its meas
ment. As Craig (2014
(2014)) points out, ‘Te error of too many is to eq
time with some physical quantity rather than take it to be a re
which we try to measure by means of physical mechanisms (clocks)
John Lucas memorably put it, time is what what clocks are there to tell.’
tell.’
It is also important to note the distinction between the dynamic
theory of time and the static ( B -)
-) theory of time.
According to the dynamic theory
theory,, the members of a series of
come to be and pass away from the present moment one after anot
Proponents of dynamic theory can either be presentists (holding
view that only the present exists) or growing block theorists (hold
the view that, as the members of a series of events come to be and
away from the present moment, they are being added to a four-dim
sional space-time manifold one after another, thus the present and
past exist but the future does not).
By contrast, according to a static theory of time, the member
a series of events do not come to be and pass away one after anot
rather, the series of events is a tenselessly existing manifold all of wh
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process. Nathan Oaklander (2004( 2004,, p. 39) observes that, ‘Te rock-b
tom feature of time that must be accepted on all sides is that ther
change, and the different views concerning the nature of change con
tute the difference between A- and B - theories of time.’
Change: A change is understood here as involving a thing or part
a thing gaining or losing one or more properties. It can be characteri
as an ordered pair of facts: the fact that obtains prior to the change a
the fact that obtains after the change took place (Von Wright 1963
a dynamic view of time, the gaining/losing of properties involves a co
ing to be/passing away of properties. On a static view of time, the ga
ing/losing of properties does not involve a coming to be/passing away
properties, rather it involves having different temporal parts at differ
times (perdurantism).
Event: I shall define event as a change (Craig and Sinclair 20
p. 106; Lombard 1986
1986)) or the beginning of existence of something. T
question whether all events should be or involve changes of some
has been found by most philosophers to be ultimately a matter of c
ceptual stipulation and hence of little metaphysical import (Casati a
Varzi 2010
2010,, Sect. 3.2
3.2).
). Some philosophers such as Peter Van Inwa
(2009
2009,, p. 14) have denied the existence of events in the sense that
statements that appear to involve quantification over events can be p
aphrased as statements that involve quantification over objects, prop
ties, and times—and the paraphrase leaves nothing out.’ However,
does not deny the existence of the change denoted by an event.
Cause: Penelope Mackie (2005 (2005)) notes that ‘In modern philoso
(as in modern usage in general) the notion of cause is associated w
the idea of something’s producing or bringing about something else
effect); a relation sometimes called “efficient causation”.’ 4 I shall fol
this usage here.
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90 A. T. E. Loke
Others have objected that their arguments do not succeed. For exam
Mathias Frisch points out that a theory of physics is not merely a se
formulas or state-space models. Rather the theory has to contain an in
pretative framework which tells us which parts of the formulas/mo
are intended to represent which parts of the world, and this interpreta
framework arguably includes causal assumptions (Frisch 2012 2012).
). While
so-called scientific laws characterise regularities of events, one needs to
why these
these laws and regul
regularit
arities
ies hold.
hold. As Galen Straw
Strawson
son argues,
argues, the q
tion ‘Why is the world regular (in the particular way that it is)?’ need
be answered by a deeper explanation, for otherwise the regularity is
due to chance, which is highly improbable (Strawson 1989 1989,, pp. 205
Te deeper explanation is provided by the properties of the things
events which are involved in these regular patterns, and such properties
appropriately called ‘causal properties’ (see below).
Consider the following example (taken from Chap. 2) which illust
the fact that mathematical equations cannot be a complete account of
natural world, and that an interpretative framework involving causal
siderations is required. Te quadratic equation x 2−4 = 0 can have
mathematically consistent results for ‘ x
x’: 2 or −2. Both answers are ma
matically possible. However, if the question is ‘how many people carried
computer home’, the answer cannot be ‘ −2’, because in the concrete w
it is metaphysically impossible that ‘ −2 people’ carry a computer ho
regardless of what the mathematical equation shows. Te impossibili
metaphysical, not mathematical, and it illustrates that metaphysical is
are more fundamentally important than mathematics. Te conclusion
‘2 people’ rather than ‘−2 people’ carried the computer home is not der
from mathematical equations, but from causal considerations: ‘ −2 pe
lack the causal powers to carry a computer home.
I have argued that scientific laws and mathematical equations do
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Tere are various places in the machine where beams can be ‘injected
that other components allow ‘suppression’ of dispersion, and that oth
ers allow for the ‘cleanup’ of the beam. Finally, there is the ‘beam dump
where the beam can be deposited with the help of ‘kickers.’ In the detec
tor, when a photon passes through matter, it ‘knocks out’ electrons from
the atoms ‘disturbing the structure of the material’ and ‘creating” loos
electrons. (ibid., citing Pettersson and Lefèvre 1995)
Frisch rightly concludes that, although the word ‘cause’ is not u

in these descriptions, the terms he quoted all describe what Na
Cartwright would characterise as ‘concretely fitted out’ instances
‘causings’ (Frisch 2014, p. 66). In fundamental physics, it still ma
sense to speak of causally necessary conditions, as NASA scient
do when they refer to quantum fluctuations as a cause for virt
particle-antiparticle pairs to continually form and annihilate (Na
2008). It still makes sense to ask whether virtual particle-antipart
pairs or whether universes began to exist without causally necessary c
ditions, and to argue that it cannot be the case (see further, Chap. 5
At present, there is little agreement among philosophers concern
whether causation should be analyzed in terms of instantiation of regu
ities, counterfactual dependence, manipulability, probabilities, netwo
INUS (insufficient but necessary parts of unnecessary but sufficient c
ditions), transfers of conserved quantities or dispositions, or whet
causation should be treated as a theoretical primitive. 5 Nevertheless,
tain theories—such as Regularity Teory, are less popular, 6 and for g
reasons. Regularity Teorists, who analyse causation as invariable patte
of succession, have utilized David Hume’s view that ‘We may defin
cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects s
ilar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second’, and t
7
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92 A. T. E. Loke
• Spurious Regularities (the dropping of barometric pressure in a cer

region is followed by the dropping of the height of the column
mercury in a barometer and afterwards a storm, but it is not the
that the drop of the mercury column causes the storm) (Hitchc
2012). Tis example illustrates that causation is not the sam
correlation.
Stephen Mumford observes that a number of examples would no

easily with the ‘Humean paradigm’ (which Mumford understood
postulating that ‘all events seem entirely loose and separate’). For ex
ple, in the case of two books leaning against each other, each keep
the other from falling, forces are ‘acting’ though, in a sense, nothin
happening. He argues
We have non-events because of the composition of powers to create

static effect. If these are acceptable cases of causation, then there is si
nificance in them. As well as an absence of Humean events, there is n
asymmetric causation, no temporal priority, no clear distinction betwee
cause and effect. Instead we have simultaneous forces acting to preser
an equilibrium state. We might now have arrived at the proposed reco
ceptualisation of causation. It need no longer be an asymmetric, exte
nal relation between discreta. Instead there is reciprocity and causatio
between distinct existences. In such a case, the causal relation would n
even be an external one. Te existence of the causal relata, the power an
its manifestation, is enough alone to ensure that the causal relation exist
Such a relation is called an internal relation. Te essence of a power
that it be connected to such manifestations. Hence nothing could ha
mass without attracting other things with mass in the way described b
the gravitation law. A thing could not have mass and be loose and se
arate from the rest of the world. Finally, it is worth mentioning that th
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(understood as regularities that merely describe these connections),

these connections are based on the nature of matter which has cau
properties.9 As noted earlier, Strawson argues that the question ‘Wh
the world regular (in the particular way that it is)?’ needs to be answe
by a deeper explanation (e.g., ‘Because of the nature of matter’),
otherwise the regularity is just due to chance, which is highly impr
able (Strawson 1989, pp. 205–6). Defenders of Regularity Te
might object that the question ‘what explains the regularity’ is me
pushed back on Strawson’s strategy. For example, if the deeper exp
nation offered is ‘Because of the nature of matter’, they may ask ‘w
explains the nature of matter (or whatever)?’ Since there must after al
some terminus of explanation, why not terminate with the regulari
themselves? (Psillos 2009). In reply, I would argue that terminating w
regularities does not get rid of the problem of the improbability of o
event following another regularly by chance. On the other hand, ter
nating with an alternative explanation such as ‘because of the nature
physical matter’ which, I would argue, is determined by a beginni
less, uncaused and intelligent First Cause and therefore not the re
of chance (see Chap. 6), would avoid this problem. (Te literature
causation is huge. For further discussion, see Chap. 5. It should be no
that the premises of my argument in this chapter—in particular the
claim that the capacity of each entity which has a beginning to begin
exist without a prior cause is ‘0’—does not require a rejection of regu
ity theorists, nor does it require the acceptance or rejection of any ot
particular view of causation. I defend this key claim in Chap. 5.)
3.3 The New Cosmological Argument

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94 A. T. E. Loke

3. If there is an entity that: (i) is a member of a causal series;
(ii) begins to exist, then there is an uncaused entity X .
4. Tere exists an X which is uncaused and beginningless (From
and 3).
5. If X is uncaused and beginningless, nothing exists prior to it,
therefore it is a First Cause.
6. X is a First Cause (From 4 and 5).
I shall explain in Chap. 6 that further analysis shows that

First Cause possesses various theistic properties in addition to b
uncaused and beginningless, namely being initially changeless and en
mously powerful, and possessing free will.
Let us now take a look at the premises of the argument.
3.4 Defending the Key Thomistic Premise

in the New Argument
• Premise 1 is evidently true; we know of many things (e.g., myself
father) which begin to exist and are brought into existence by cau
• Premise 2 is defended in Chap. 5 of this book.
• Premises 3 and 4 are crucial for the argument. Let me explain
an analogy.
Imagine a series of train cars in which each train car requires a prec
ing one to pull it if it begins to move. Te train cars will not begin
move, no matter how many of them there are, unless there is an eng
a First Puller which does not require another train car to pull it (
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Consider now a series of causes in which each of the causes requir

preceding cause if it begins to exist (as premise 2 implies). One can si
ilarly argue that the entities would not have begun to exist, no ma
how many of them there are, unless there is an entity, a beginning
First Cause which can cause another but itself does not require nor h
a cause that brings it into existence. Te reasoning is as follows: If e
entity which has a beginning of existence has ‘0’ capacity to begin
exist without a prior cause, then having two of them would not yi
any such capacity, because 0 + 0 = 0; having three of them would
yield any such capacity, because 0 + 0 + 0 = 0, etc. Even if there w
an actual infinite number of them, 0 + 0 + 0 … is still = 0.10
Someone might object that, if the series itself is beginningless w
each cause in the series having an actual infinite number of prec
ing causes, then it would not need (nor would it have) a beginning
First Cause. In reply, postulating a beginningless causal series wo
not resolve the problem of why the entities in the series begin to e
if each of the entities requires a cause. One might reply the reason
that each of the entities would have a cause in a beginningless ser
However, given that each entity has a beginning and has no capa
to begin to exist without prior cause(s), a beginningless series with
actual infinite number of them would be of no use, because 0 + 0
… is still = 0. What is required is an entity which can exist uncaus
in other words a beginningless First Cause. 11
One might object that infinity x 0 is not equal to 0 if we are talk
about infinity as a limit. However, the concept of infinity as a limi
not relevant here; what we are discussing is a set of entities (‘train ca
‘causes’). Terefore, we should be thinking about infinity as understo
in set theory rather than as a limit, and in cardinal arithmetic of
Teory, infinity x 0 = 0, because the product of any set A with
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96 A. T. E. Loke
concerning ‘beginning’, hence the analogy requires the train cars to

at rest initially.
One might ask, ‘Does the underlying assumption of the argum
viz. “If every member of a causal series has no capacity to begin to e
without prior cause, then all the members (regardless of the numbe
members) would have no capacity to begin to exist without prior ca
commits the fallacy of composition?’ An example of fallacy of c
position would be as follows: since all the bricks in the wall are sm
the wall is small. In reply, as Reichenbach (2016
( 2016)) observes, argum
of the part-whole type are not always guilty of this fallacy; it depe
on the content of the argument. Sometimes the totality has the s
quality as the parts because of the nature of the parts invoked—
wall is brick because it is built of bricks. Likewise, if every membe
a set of entities has zero mass, then all the members (regardless of
number of members) would have zero mass. Similarly, if every m
ber of a series of train cars has zero capacity to begin movement w
out a preceding puller, then all the members (regardless of the num
of members) would have zero capacity to begin movement witho
preceding puller. Te argument offered here resembles this kind of c
If every member of a causal series has zero capacity to begin to e
without prior cause, then all the members (regardless of the num
of members) would have zero capacity to begin to exist without p
cause, because 0 + 0 + 0 … is = 0.12
One might also ask, ‘Why think that this beginningless First C
is God (understood as a personal Creator)?’ In reply, we need to
in what way this First Cause is beginningless. Is it beginningless in
sense of: (i) having an actual infinite past; (ii) being a closed time lo
or (iii) being timeless?
I shall show in Chap. 4 that a closed time loop is metaphysic
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on a substantive view of time (Padgett 19921992)—or

)—or be initially time
and changeless at least sans the creation of time, as Craig ( 1998
1998,, p. 1
argues. In either case, the First Cause would be initially changeless, a
I shall show in Chap. 6 that, for an initially changeless First Cause
cause the first event in time, it must have free will. Moreover, the F
Cause must be enormously powerful in order to cause the entirety
physical reality, including all matter and energy and space-time it
(Craig and Sinclair 2009
2009,, p. 192). Tus the new cosmological argum
(if successful) would yield a First Cause that is uncaused, beginningl
has free will, and enormously powerful; in other words, a God (und
stood as a Personal Creator).
3.5 Comparison with Thomist and Leibnizian

Cosmological Arguments
Readers familiar with Aquinas’ work would recognise that the anal
of train cars is one which is often used to explain the Tomist version
the cosmological argument. Aquinas however does not use such con
erations to argue for a First Cause of time. Aquinas thinks that
It is impossible to proceed to infinity in efficient causes per se—that is t

say, that the causes required per se for some effect are multiplied to infin
ity; as if a stone were moved by a stick, and stick by a hand, and so o
to infinity. But it is not considered impossible to proceed to infinity pe
accidens in agent causes… it is not impossible that man should be gen
erated by man to infinity. But it would be impossible if the generation o
this man depended on that man, and on an elementary body, and on th
sun, and so on to infinity. (Summa Teologiae I I q. 46 a. 2 ad 7)
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98 A. T. E. Loke
the universe and with the possibility of an actually infinite multitud

(spiritual) entities.
Caleb Cohoe (2013
(2013)) points out that Aquinas’ argument is based
ontological dependence of effects on causes in an essentially ord
causal series that is asymmetric, irreflexive, and wholly deriva
Aquinas’ First
First Way
Way is not talking about a temporal succession of mo
rather, Aquinas is committed to the simultaneity of causation (SCG
38.13). Cohoe explains that members in such series serve as causes o
insofar as they have been caused by and are effects of all the pre
ing members, contrasting with a causal series in which each mem
directly depends only on the previous member.
member. Cohoe explains:
Essentially ordered series do not consist of a succession of isolate

dependence relations (as accidentally ordered series do), but of one co
tinuous dependence relation. Gaven Kerr presents a helpful way of fo
malizing this difference: accidentally ordered series can be represented
a series of one–one dependence relations where each member depend
directly only on the previous member: (v → w) → (w → x) → (x →
In essentially ordered series, by contrast, the later members depen
directly on (and derive their membership from) all the earlier mem
bers: (v → (w → (x → y))). (Cohoe 2013 2013,, Sect. 3.6, citing Kerr 201
pp. 543–548)
Concerning Aquinas’ distinction between per se and per acci

causation, John Marenbon (2009
(2009,, pp. 41–2) explains that, ‘in an a
dental chain, each cause is itself regarded as an independent cause
its effect: although there could be no grandson without the gran
ther’s engendering of the father, the father exercised this function in
pendently of his own father. In an essential chain, the subsequent ca
are dependent’.
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members of the series is not simultaneous (the beginning of existe

of my father was many years earlier than mine, for example). Moreo
each member of the series only directly depends on the immed
preceding member: this is especially evident in the case where my fat
exercised the function (with my mother) of generating my existe
independently of his own father.
In reply, there is indeed a certain dys-analogy between a tempo
causal series of the new argument which I defend and the simulta
ous, ‘essentially ordered’ causal series of Aquinas’ argument and of
train car analogy. Nevertheless, there remains points of analogy tha
relevant, namely: (i) in both series each of the members has no requi
capacity; and (ii) both series require a First Cause.
o elaborate, in the case of an ‘essentially ordered’ causal series s
as the pulling of train cars without a First puller, each of the train c
has no capacity to begin movement without a prior ‘puller’. In the c
of a temporal causal series without a First Cause, it is true that
series is not simultaneous and each member of the series only dire
depends on the immediate preceding member. (Evidently, someone
procreate whether or not his/her parents are still alive.) Nevertheless
remains the case that each entity in the series has no capacity to be
to exist without a prior cause, and each entity in the series is (indirec
dependent on the beginning of existence of certain prior causes as n
essary conditions. For example, the beginning of existence of wa
dependent life-forms (including my grandfather, my father and mys
is dependent on the beginning of existence of hydrogen (a few minu
after the Big Bang) billions of years earlier, because without the form
tion of hydrogen, there would not be the formation of such life-for
Likewise, the beginning of existence of hydrogen itself is dependent
earlier causes. Te conclusion that 0 + 0 + 0 … = 0, and the requ
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100 A. T. E. Loke
argues that the Kalam provides a stronger argument for the unive
contingency than the other two arguments which allow for an ete
universe. With respect to the Tomist argument in particular, he th
that it is very difficult to show that things are, in fact, contingent in
special sense required by the argument. He writes
Certainly things are naturally contingent in that their continued exis

ence is dependent on a myriad of factors including particle masses an
fundamental forces, temperature, pressure, entropy level and so forth, b
this natural contingency does not suffice to establish things’ metaphysic
contingency in the sense that being must continually be added to the
essences lest they be spontaneously annihilated. (Moreland and Cra
2003, p. 468)
Craig’s criticism of the Tomistic Cosmological Argument does

affect my new Kalam–cosmological argument, because the new a
ment does not rely on the premise that being must continually be ad
to their essences lest they be spontaneously annihilated. Rather the
argument relies on the Causal Principle which is established on o
grounds (see Chap. 5).
Additionally, the Tomist needs to answer Mackie’s (1982, p.
question ‘why should God, rather than anything else, be taken as
only satisfactory termination of the regress?’ Cohoe (2013, Sect.
replies that
Aquinas’s regress argument requires only the claim that every depende
thing needs something on which to depend. Independent things ha
no such need. Stopping at entities that have the relevant causal powe
non-derivatively, such as a solidly secured pole or a train engine, mak
sense in a way that stopping at rings or train cars does not.
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potentials), and given Aristotle’s principle that a cause cannot g

what it does not have, the First Cause of human intellect and free
must have intellect and free will (and hence must be personal). T
reply depends on multiple controversial metaphysical theses wh
even though they might be defensible against a number of objecti
(Oderberg 2010), are difficult to prove (see the discussion and
sources cited in Parts II and III of Davies and Stump ed. 2012).
any case, there is value in having an additional way (i.e., my new ar
ment) to respond to these questions, because the two ways reinfo
each other’s conclusions. My new argument (as well as the traditio
KCA) provides straightforward answers: First, being beginningless, G
has always existed and therefore does not need to depend on a ca
to produce it. Hence God is independent. Second, the conclusion t
there is such a God (with properties of being uncaused, beginni
less, has free will, and the First Cause) is not simply assumed. Rath
it is argued for via the premises of the KCA and my new argume
as explained previously. In particular, on the KCA as well as my n
argument, the question of how an initially changeless First Cause co
have caused the first event in time provides a consideration for think
that the First Cause must have free will and hence must be personal (
Chap. 6). Tis consideration is lacking in the Leibnizian and Tom
cosmological arguments because they do not address the issue of beg
ning of existence. Terein lies another point of originality to my ar
ment, namely that I replace the traditional Leibnizian/Tomistic fo
on the necessity/pure actuality of the First Cause with a focus on
beginningless-ness of the First Cause.
3.6 Conclusion
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102 A. T. E. Loke
In the subsequent chapters of this book, I shall defend the new a

ment against other objections which have been raised against the Ka
version, namely the objection based on causal loops (Chap. 4) and
objection against the Causal Principle (Chap. 5), and explain in gre
detail the nature of the First Cause (Chap. 6). On these issues the
argument will be defended in very much the same way as one wo
defend the Kalam. I shall, however, contribute new arguments to
defence.
Notes
1. John Philoponus argued against the possibility of an actual infinite
in Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World , frag. 132; Philop
also defended on philosophical grounds the viability of the idea of
atio ex nihilo in Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World , Books
and IX.
2. As Bradley Dowden (2013) explains, ‘Substantival theories are t
ries that imply time is substance-like in that it exists independent
the space-time relations exhibited by physical processes. On the o
hand, relational theories imply time’s existence requires there t
some physical process in the universe–such as a movement or a ch
in a field. In short, no change implies no time.’
3. I thank Professor Reichenbach for suggesting this example.
4. Mackie (2005) notes that efficient causation is to be distinguished
the other three types of causation Aristotle ( Physics 2.3) identi
material (‘that out of which a thing comes to be and which per
e.g., the bronze of the statue), formal (‘the form or the archetype’
the structure of the statue), and final (‘in the sense of end (telos) or
for the sake of which’ e.g., the sculptor sculpting the statue for aest
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used in many different contexts, and the fact that one’s choice of the
of causation can have radical consequences for other areas of phil
phy (ibid., pp. 1–2).
6. In his chapter defending the Regularity View in the Oxford Handb
of Causation, Stathis Psillos concedes that ‘Te Regularity View
Causation is not currently very popular among philosophers, so
hard to find recent papers and/or books that have mounted ser
defences of it. Criticism, on the other hand, abounds’ (Psillos
p. 152).
7. See David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understan
(1748), section VII. Tere is, however, some controversy about w
Hume’s own view is. See Garrett (2009).
8. Tis is known as Singularist theory of causation. For defence,
ooley (1987).
9. Dorato and Esfeld argue that the view that laws are grounded in p
erties (global properties rather than ‘intrinsic’ or local properties
view of quantum entanglement) make intelligible how laws can ‘gov
the behaviour of objects. Tis is the decisive advantage of dispositio
ism over primitivism (the view that laws are primitive, see, for exam
Maudlin 2007).
10. One might object that the series of train cars is dys-analogous t
series of causes in which each of the causes requires a preceding ca
if it begins to exist,’ in that the former is per se causal series while
latter is per accidens . Tis objection is considered in the next sec
in which I compare the Tomist version with the new cosmolog
argument.
11. Alexander Pruss (2009, pp. 80–2) discusses the Hume–Edwar
Campbell Principle (HECP) ‘For any proposition p such that one
explained every conjunct of a proposition, one MIGH have ther
explained the whole.’ Te sceptic might object by defending an e
weaker version: ‘For CERAIN proposition p such that one
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104 A. T. E. Loke
the purported counterexamples to HECP are helpful. I think tha

arguments offered in my book against infinite past (Chaps. 2 an
and circular loop (Chap. 4) are more helpful.
12. Some have tried to resolve the Grim Reaper Paradox by supposing
the reapers collectively cause an effect even though no one reaper
anything (Hawthorne 2000), and this supposition might be take
a counterexample to my argument by illustrating that a whole m
have powers that no element does. In reply, not only is this suppos
unproven, it has been well criticised in the literature as being inco
ent, for it amounts to a form of causeless causation (see Shackel
pp. 408–10).
13. In my view, the idea that God is pure actuality is tied to the idea
divine simplicity and essential divine timelessness which are incom
ble with the best model for the Incarnation (Loke 2014), a doctrin
which there are good reasons to think is true (see Loke 2017; Will
2016).
References
Audi, Robert (ed.). 1999. Te Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy . Cambr
Cambridge University.
Beebee, Helen, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies (eds.). 2009.
Oxford Handbook of Causation . Oxford: Oxford University.
Casati, Roberto and Varzi, Achille. 2010. Events, Te Stanford Encycloped
Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.
ford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/events/.
Cohoe, Caleb. 2013. Tere must be a First: Why Tomas Aquinas Re
Infinite, Essentially Ordered, Causal Series. British Journal for the Histo
Craig, William Lane. 1980. Te Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leib
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Craig, William Lane, and James Sinclair. 2009. Te Kalam Cosmolog

Argument. In Te Blackwell Companion to Natural Teology, ed. Will
Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Davies, Brian, and Eleonore Stump (eds.). 2012. Te Oxford Handboo
Aquinas . Oxford: Oxford University.
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Dispositionalism vs. Primitivism. In Metaphysics in Contemporary Phy
eds. omasz Bigaj, and Christian Wüthrich. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Dowden, Bradley. 2013. ime, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. htt
www.iep.utm.edu/time/. Accessed 5 July 2013.
Feser, Edward. 2009. Aquinas . Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
Frisch, Matthias. 2009. Te most Sacred enet? Causal Reasoning in Phy
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60: 459–474.
Frisch, Mathias. 2012. No Place for Causes? Causal Skepticism in Phy
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Frisch, Mathias. 2014. Causal Reasoning in Physics . Cambridge: Cambr
University.
Garrett, Don. 2009. Hume. In Te Oxford Handbook of Causation, ed. H
Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies. Oxford: Oxf
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Hawthorne, J. 2000. Before-effect and Zeno causality. Noûs 34: 622–633.
Hitchcock, Christopher. 2012. Probabilistic Causation. Te Stan
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Kerr, Gaven. 2012. Essentially Ordered Series Reconsidered. American Cath
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Studies Monograph Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lombard, Lawrence. 1986. Events: A Metaphysical Study , 1986. Lond
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Maudlin, im. 2007. Te Metaphysics Within Physics . Oxford: Ox

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4
Is There a Causal Loop Which Avoids a
First Cause?
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters I have argued for a First Cause of tim
Nevertheless, an objector to the Cosmological Argument might still
to avoid the conclusion of a First Cause by suggesting
A. the possibility that ‘future’ and ‘past’ events are joined together (lik
circle or a loop), such that there is no first event and no First Caus
B. there might be other possibilities (in addition to [1]) which we h
not yet considered.
In reply to (B), the following is a logically exhaustive list of possibiliti

Either
1. Tere is no causal series or

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110 A. T. E. Loke
(2.2) the number of causally prior entities is not actually infinite

which case either (2.2.1) or (2.2.2):
(2.2.1) causally prior and posterior entities are joined together (li
circle or a loop), in which case either
(2.2.1.1) the entities follow one-after-another in dynamic time,
or
(2.2.1.2) the entities follow one-after-another in static time.
(2.2.2) causally prior and posterior entities are not joined togethe
in which case there is a First Cause.
Concerning (1) ‘there is no causal series’‚ this is contradicted by un
niable evidences of changes following one after another in a ca
manner‚1 such as I was brought into existence at an earlier time by
parents, who were brought into existence at an even earlier time by
grandparents, etc.
Concerning (2.1) ‘the number of causally prior entities is actu
infinite’, this is contradicted by the arguments against concrete infin
and against traversing an actual infinite discussed in Chap. 2. Moreo
it has been argued in Chap. 3 that an infinite series of caused ent
each of which requires a cause is not viable.
With regards to (2.2.1), philosophers distinguish whether there wo
be an endless number of reoccurrences of a state of the world (this
supposes a linear ordering in time of all the cycles, so there would n
to be some ‘hyper-time’ in addition to ordinary time), or whether e
state of the world would occur just once because each state would no
discernible from the repeated state (Dowden 2013). An endless num
of reoccurrence presupposes a dynamic theory of time, while the v
that each state would occur just once presupposes a static theory of ti
While some philosophers have asserted that time travel can only
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4 Is There a Causal Loop Which Avoids a First Cause?
be required. Tis is contradicted by the arguments against conc

infinities and against traversing an actual infinite discussed in Chap
Moreover, it has been argued in Chap. 3 that an infinite past serie
caused entities each of which requires a cause is not viable.
In the rest of this chapter, we shall focus our attention on (2.2.1
‘the entities follow one-after-another in static time’. In this case, it
that history repeats itself. Rather, as Le Poidevin (1996, p. 7) describe
Te events occur once and once only, but no event is the first. For exam
ple, take the event of my birth. Te closed time model entails, not that
will be born again, but (and this will no doubt seem rather puzzling) tha
my birth is both in the relatively recent past and in the future—thoug
the very distant future, if the circle is a large one.
One might ask, suppose time is circular with (say) a 20 billion year
cumference, and suppose there is an immortal person who reads
sentence in April 9, 2015, would he recall reading it again as his
exists at each moment around the circle and he lives beyond Apri
2015? Te answer would be no; given that the circle has an extent
20 billion years, no memory (indeed, nothing!) would exist for m
than 20 billion years. 2 Te person’s memory would somehow have to
extinguished at some point of his life prior to April 9, 2015, and e
event in the circle happens only once.
Philosophers also distinguish between two types of causal loo
closed and open causal loops. As Bradley Morton explains, ‘A closed lo
is one where a is the sole cause of b, b is the sole cause of c , and
on back to a . An open loop, by contrast, is one where, for at least t
events in the causal loop f and g , f
is one cause of g , but there is anot
cause of g that is not an event in the loop’ (Monton 2007, pp. 54–5
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112 A. T. E. Loke
causes of one another, nor do they need to be complete effects of on

another. In a causal loop, the arrows of causation go around in a circl
but there might be additional arrows that lead into the circle, or arrow
that lead out of it. If there are no such branches then the loop is said
be causally isolated.
A cosmological model which utilised the idea of a loop has been

posed by cosmologists Richard Gott, III and Li-Xin Li (1998). T
note that ‘Te question of first-cause has been troubling to philosop
and scientists alike for over two thousand years.’ In response, they
gest that the temporal series of events at the beginning of the Univ
is a small time loop, thus allowing it to create itself similar to the
a time traveller could travel to the past and become her own mot
Back in 1949, Kurt Gödel (1949, p. 560) had found that there are s
tions to the field equations in Einstein’s General Teory of Relati
that allow for looping pathways such as closed timelike curves (C
Earman and Wüthrich (2010) explain a CC as
the world line of some possible observer whose life history is linear
ordered in the small but not in the large: the observer has a consiste
experience of the ‘next moment,’ and the ‘next,’ etc., but eventually th
‘next moment’ brings her back to whatever event she regards as the star
ing point.
Utilising General Relativity, Gott and Li propose that the early univ
contains a region of CCs. Given this, asking what the earliest point
might be like asking what the easternmost point on the Earth is. ‘You
keep going east around and around the Earth—there is no eastern-m
point. In such a model every event in the early universe would have ev
that preceded it’ (Gott and Li 1998, p. 1). Tey conclude that, on t
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a First Cause. He argues, ‘If circumstances and the laws of nature coop
ate, then every event in a loop can admit of a causal explanation in ter
of the events that precede it in the loop, plus events outside it if the lo
is not causally isolated’ (Meyer 2012, p. 260). After giving his reasons
rejecting Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, he concludes that cau
loops ‘admit all the explanation one can reasonably ask for.’ He writes
If the laws of nature cooperate then the events that make up a loop ca
be explained causally. o ask for more, and to request a ‘full’ explanatio
of causal loops, is to ask for something that is impossible. In this case
the blame would fall on the person asking the question, not on our ina
bility to answer it. Causal loops are no more mysterious than infinitel
descending causal chains, and Gott-Li universes are no more mysteriou
than universes in which there have always been electrons. (ibid., p. 263)
Gott and Li’s model is closely related to the issue of time tra
to the past, although it has been argued by some that time tra
can occur without a causal loop (Monton 2007). In his article ‘
Paradoxes of ime ravel,’ philosopher David Lewis defines time tra
as follows: An object time travels if and only if the difference betw
its departure and arrival times as measured in the surrounding wo
does not equal the duration of the journey undergone by the ob
(Lewis 1976, p. 145).
ime travel has certainly captured the imagination of many a
seems possible in light of Einstein’s theory of relativity. Nevertheles
shall argue that there is no adequate reason for thinking that a cau
loop which avoids a First Cause exists, on the other hand there are go
reasons for thinking that such a causal loop does not exist. We shall n
discuss these in turn.
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114 A. T. E. Loke
With respect to causal loops and CCs in general, while scien

have suggested various possible types of CCs, such as a wormhole
black holes linked by a tunnel; this would connect two different reg
of space-time) or cosmic ‘strings’ (Gott 1991, p. 1126), none of t
has been shown to exist. Cosmologist Sean Carroll observes that un
black holes, which almost certainly exist in the real world and for wh
we have observational evidence, wormholes are entirely conject
playthings of theorists (Carroll 2010, pp. 111, 116; Carroll adds
even if we found a wormhole and know a way to keep it open, cha
are that it would be unstable—the slightest disturbance would sen
collapsing into a black hole). Carroll argues that CCs face the d
culties concerning having a consistent arrow of time in the presenc
closed time-like curves, as well as the compatibility between CCs
the laws of thermodynamics (‘events along a closed timelike curve…
general they cannot be compatible with an uninterrupted increas
entropy along the curve’; ibid., p. 103).
Physicists have considered backward causation in the context of
cussing the possibilities of tachyons (particles travelling with a gre
speed than light), but the existence of tachyons remain dispu
(Carroll 2010, p. 94). Alluding to physicist Richard Feynman’s
ory, Gott and Li (1998, p. 42) suggest that the creation and annih
tion of a virtual positron—electron pair can be viewed as creation
a small closed loop, where the electron travelling backward in tim
complete the loop appears as a positron. However, this interpreta
of positron—electron pair is widely disputed. As philosopher of scie
John Earman (1967, p. 220) points out,
Feynman’s theory does not justify the identification of particular electro

with particular positrons in such a way as to make time travel possib
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alternative interpretations. For example, consider the Delayed Cho

Quantum Eraser (Kim et al. 2000), which measures entangled pair
photons and which seem to indicate that the behaviour of the phot
detected 8 ns before their partners is determined by how the partn
will be detected. Jan Faye (2010) explains,
If we consider the notion of the entangled state in quantum mechanic

we find that it is characterized as a unified, non-separable state due to
help of the notion of superposition of possible states represented by on
common wave function for the correlated pair. Such a superposition i
neither distance-dependent nor time-dependent. Terefore it is not sur
prising that based on the correct predictions of quantum mechanics it i
impossible to find support of the violation of normal causation withi
this kind of experiment.
In summary, there is no adequate evidence for thinking that C

exist. Terefore, while scientists continue to speculate about exp
ments concerning CC (e.g., whether particles that don’t kill their f
mer selves can make their way back to the past), they acknowledge t
it is currently unknown whether CCs exist at all (Lloyd et al. 2011
With respect to Gott–Li’s proposal, in particular, objectors
that the conditions of their model require a high degree of fine-tun
(Craig and Sinclair 2009, p. 135). Moreover, on their model‚ space-t
contains incomplete histories, and therefore does not provide a satis
tory model of a universe without a beginning (Vilenkin 2006, p. 219
Additionally, one should note the limitations concerning the
ory of relativity which Gott–Li’s proposal appeals to. While the p
dictions of this theory have been confirmed via observations in m
different fields of inquiry, it is nevertheless not a complete theory
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116 A. T. E. Loke
postulates the existence of such laws, arguing that ‘[i]t seems th

is a chronology protection agency, which prevents the appearanc
closed timelike curves and so makes the universe safe for historia
Not everyone agrees with Hawking; Earman and Wüthrich (
acknowledges that Hawking may be right, but argues that to
there are no convincing arguments that such a chronology protec
agency is housed in either classical general relativity theory or in se
classical quantum gravity, and it is too early to tell whether this age
is housed in loop quantum gravity or string theory. On the o
hand, there are other cosmologists who agree with Hawking (Car
2010). In any case, regardless of whether one agrees with Hawk
what can minimally be said is that to date there are no convin
arguments that something like a chronology protection law of phy
has been excluded.
One should also note the limitations of mathematical calculat
While mathematical calculation is an important part of theore
physics and it has often led to scientific discoveries, it is not always
case that the results of mathematical calculations can exist in the c
crete world. Tis has already been explained in previous chapters u
the example of quadratic equations yielding two possible mathem
ical results, only one of which is applicable as an answer. Te ex
ple illustrates that metaphysical considerations are more fundame
than mathematical calculations. If there are strong metaphysical c
siderations against CCs of the type that is supposed to avoid a F
Cause‚ then the Gödelian proof might be dismissed as ‘a mere m
ematical artefact, not reflecting any possible situation’ (Schaffer
Sect. 2.2).
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chapter (see Craig 2000a , b; Ellis 2014), there are two kinds of parado
which have been offered to show that this type of CC is metaph
cally impossible: (1) Bootstrap Paradoxes; and (2) Consistency parado
(such as the famous Grandfather paradox). In the rest of this chapte
shall focus on the Bootstrap Paradoxes.
A typical illustration of a Bootstrap Paradox is described by Da
Lewis (1976, pp. 148–149) as follows:
Recall the time traveller who talked to himself. He talked to himse

about time travel, and in the course of the conversation his older se
told his younger self how to build a time machine. Tat information wa
available in no other way. His older self knew how because his younge
self had been told and the information had been preserved by the causa
processes that constitute recording, storage, and retrieval of memor
traces. His younger self knew, after the conversation, because his older se
had known and the information had been preserved by the causal pro
cesses that constitute telling. But where did the information come from
in the first place? Why did the whole affair happen? Tere is simply n
answer. Te parts of the loop are explicable, the whole of it is not.
Lewis himself responds to this paradox by arguing ‘Almost everyo

agrees that God, or the Big Bang, or the entire infinite past of the u
verse or the decay of a tritium atom, is uncaused and inexplicable. T
if these are possible, why not also the inexplicable causal loops that a
in time travel?’ (ibid., p. 149).
Lewis’ response is not satisfactory.
First, as will be argued in Chap. 5, there is no adequate reason
thinking that the Big Bang or the decay of an atom is uncaused, on
contrary there are good reasons for thinking that these events are caus
Second, it has been argued in previous chapters that the unive
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118 A. T. E. Loke
no other way), and his older self is supposed to obtain information f

his younger self who is supposed to be told by his older self. 3 In a s
lar vein, philosopher Jan Faye asks us to consider a causal loop in wh
c is supposed to be caused by b, b is supposed to be caused by
a is supposed to be caused by c . Faye writes, ‘the problem here is
the occurrence of a presupposes the occurrence of c ; in other words,
cause presupposes its effect. But how can something be required of w
itself requires?’ (Faye 2010).
Someone might reply by questioning why we must combine the l
explanations of events in the loop in terms of their immediate prede
sors into a composite explanation of the event e in terms of itself;
she might deny the transitivity of causal relations, and deny that
effect of a (Meyer 2012, pp. 261–263).
In response, a denial of the transitivity of causal relations does
apply in om’s case, in which the obtaining of information by
younger self presupposes the obtaining of information by the o
self, which presupposes the obtaining of information by the youn
self. Te problem here is how can older om be required to pro
the information to younger om, when older om himself requires
information from younger om in order to travel back to meet youn
om.4
In their reply to the Kalam Cosmological Argument, Gus
Romero and Daniela Pérez (2012, p. 109) claim that it is possibl
affirm causal loops without contradiction in space-times with non-
ial topology. Tey would regard the information in om’s case to
self-existent in the following sense: ‘it exists in a finite region of sp
time, but it has neither beginning nor end. Nonetheless, every stat
the object is causally related to a locally previous state.’
In reply to Romero and Pérez, the problem here is not that ther
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work. Likewise, a causal loop—in which A requires B to bring it

existence, B requires C to bring it into existence, and C require
to bring it into existence—is viciously circular. It is like a scenario
which railway wagon A requires wagon B to bring it into motion
by pulling it), wagon B requires wagon C to bring it into motion, a
wagon C requires wagon A to bring it into motion. It is evident
such a viciously circular setup—in which the state of each of the enti
in a causal loop is supposed to be dependent on another entity wit
the loop—would not work, and this is true regardless of whether ti
is static or dynamic.6 As has been argued in Chap. 3, a series of cau
entities each of which requires a cause is not viable, and this is t
whether the series is infinite or circular, because 0 + 0 + 0 … is still
One might object that one could conceive of a closed loop in wh
the kind of setup described above does not occur, i.e., a closed loop
which there is no such causal relationship between the entities wit
the loop. However, the causal relation between the entities in the k
of setup described above is analogous to that of the causal relat
between the entities in a causal loop of the type that is supposed to av
the problem of First Cause , which is what a Gott–Li universe is suppo
to be. In such a loop, the beginning of a certain event X leading to
beginning of the Big Bang, for example, is required to provide ca
ally necessary conditions for the beginning of existence of other eve
within a closed loop, while the beginning of X itself requires the beg
ning of existence of these other events. We can conclude that suc
vicious circular setup would not work as well.
In response to the worry that explanations in a causal loop wo
be unacceptably circular, Meyer suggests that the composite expla
tion that we obtain by tracing the causal ancestry of an event e arou
a causal loop would also make reference to events outside the lo
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120 A. T. E. Loke
However, Meyer’s reply does not get rid of the bootstrapping p

lem in the case of a causal loop of the type that is supposed to avo
First Cause. o begin, it is true that there could be other kinds of ca
loops, such as those which are not causally isolated and which make
erence to events outside the loop as causal explanations for events in
the loop, and such kinds of loop would not suffer from the Boots
Problem. Nevertheless, such causal loops face difficulties. In particu
if an appeal to dependence on events outside the loop as causal ex
nations for events inside the loop is made, then the following ques
arises concerning the causal explanations for these events outside
loop: what caused these events? o avoid a First Cause and an ete
past with an actual infinite temporal and causal regress—which is
intention of the proposal by Gott–Li—the loop itself must termi
the regress without depending on causal explanations outside the lo
but it would then be beset by the Bootstrapping Problem. Nei
appealing to the laws of nature, nor asserting the completeness of ca
explanations in terms of local explanations, addresses the problem
vicious circularity explained above with respect to Gott–Li’s loop
such a loop, there is supposed to be no dependence on entities out
the loop, and this is analogous to the postulation that the informa
for building time machine was available in no other way in the ab
mentioned scenario involving om. As explained previously, this kin
setup would not work.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have defended an argument, formulated in term
the Bootstrap Paradox, against a causal loop of the type that is suppo
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While there could be a plurality of causes prior to the origin of

universe at the Big Bang, given the arguments in the previous chap
this causal chain must ultimately terminate with a First Cause. But
the First Cause begin to exist uncaused? We shall find out in the n
chapter.
Notes
1. As explained in Chap. 3, in this book ‘time’ is understood relation
unless otherwise stated, and that the definition of change remains v
on static theory of time (which is sometimes misleadingly regarded
timelessness).
2. I thank Graham Oppy for pointing this out to me in private correspo
ence: ‘If I ask you to suppose that there is finite linear time that lasts for
billion years, and that there are creatures that live for 21 billion years, yo
respond by saying that the supposition is incoherent. It is no less inco
ent if you try to make this supposition with respect to circular time.’
3. Modified from Lewis (1976). Lewis calls it ‘inexplicable’, with
addressing the problem of vicious circularity which I explain below
4. Hanley (2004) misses this point when he argues that the only poss
objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidenc
required to explain them.
5. Another kind of paradox, the Consistency Paradox, attempts to sh
that there is logical contradiction.
6. Te problem here is not friction but beginning of motion. As note
Chap. 3, the suggestion that the wagons have always been movin
dys-analogous with the problem of beginning of existence of each of
entities in the causal loop.
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122 A. T. E. Loke

Examination, Synthese Library 294. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Craig, William Lane, and James Sinclair. 2009. Te Kalam Cosmolo
Argument. In Te Blackwell Companion to Natural Teology, ed. Wil
Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland. Chichester: Wiley.
Dowden, Bradley. 2013. ime. Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
www.iep.utm.edu/time/. Accessed 5 July 2013.
Earman, John. 1967. On Going Backward in ime. Philosophy of Science
211–222.
Earman, John, and Christian Wüthrich. 2010. ime Machines. Te Stan
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 edition), ed. Edward N. Z
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/time-machine/.
Ellis, George. 2014. ime Really Exists! Te Evolving Block Universe.
7(2014): 11–26.
Faye, Jan. 2010. Backward Causation. Te Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos
(Spring 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford
archives/spr2010/entries/causation-backwards/.
Gödel, Kurt. 1949. A Remark about the Relationship Between Relat
Teory and Idealistic Philosophy. In Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scie
ed. P. Schilpp. La Salle: Open Court.
Gott III, Richard. 1991. Closed imelike Curves Produced by Pairs of Mo
Cosmic Strings—Exact Solutions. Physical Review Letters 66: 1126.
Gott III, Richard, and Li-Xin Li. 1998. Can the Universe Create It
Physical Review D 58: 023501–1.
Hanley, Richard. 2004. No End in Sight: Causal Loops in Philosophy, Ph
and Fiction. Synthese 141: 123–152.
Hawking, Stephen. 1992. Chronology Protection Conjecture. Physical Re
D 46: 603.
Keller, S., and M. Nelson. 2001. Presentists Should Believe in ime-r
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79: 333–345.
Kim, Y.-H., et al. 2000. A Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser. Physical Re
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Monton, Bradley. 2003. Presentists Can Believe in Closed imelike Cur

Analysis 63: 199–202.
Monton, Bradley. 2007. ime ravel Without Causal Loops. Philosoph
Quarterly 59: 54–67.
Romero, Gustavo, and Daniela Pérez. 2012. New Remarks on
Cosmological Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
103–113.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2008. Te Metaphysics of Causation. Te Stan
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. htt
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/causation-metaphysics/.
Vilenkin, Alexander. 2006. Many Worlds in One . New York: Hill and Wang
Weinstein, Steven, and Rickles, Dean. 2011. Quantum Gravity. Te Stan
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Z
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/quantum-gravity/.
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5
Did the Initial State of Reality Begin
to Exist Uncaused?
Tat neither existence, nor any mode of existence, can begin without an efficie
cause, is a principle that appears very early in the mind of man; and it is so
universal, and so firmly rooted in human nature, that the most determined
scepticism cannot eradicate it.
– Tomas Reid (1710–1796)1
5.1 Introduction
For a long time in the history of human thought, the Causal Princi
‘everything that begins to exist has a cause’ has been widely accepted
indicated by the above quotation from Tomas Reid. Nevertheless,
principle has been challenged in recent years by opponents of the Kal
Cosmological Argument who propose that the initial state of rea
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126 A. T. E. Loke
Te meaning of ‘uncaused’ stated in the preceding paragraph sho

be distinguished from a second sense of ‘uncaused’ which is used
indeterministic events, such as (as many libertarians would affirm
genuinely free choice. It should be noted that such a choice does
imply that there is no causally necessary condition for the making o
the existence of the agent, for example, would be a causally neces
condition. In this book, unless otherwise specified, ‘uncaused’ is un
stood in the first sense, that is, for any x , if x begins to exist uncau
then the beginning of existence of x does not have a causally neces
condition (CN). In this chapter, I shall assess the arguments which h
been offered for and against the claim that the initial state of rea
begun to exist without causal antecedent.
5.2 Quantum Physics and Causation

Te increased popularity of scepticism concerning the Causal Princ
is related to considerations of quantum physics. For example, aga
the Causal Principle used in the Kalam Cosmological Argument, ph
opher Colin Howson (2011, p. 93) claims that nature is simply rep
with uncaused events according to quantum physics, and that
Universe could be generated out of nothing from the quantum vacu
With regards to the implications of the latter on our understandin
causality, Adolf Grünbaum writes:
Consider within our universe, the grounds for the demise in 20th centu
quantum theory of the universal causation familiar from Newton’s phy
ics, as codified by Laplace’s ‘determinism’. Tis empirically well-founde
quantum theory features merely probabilistic rather than universal caus
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But this objection is debatable, since it assumes that quantum–mechan

indeterminacy is an ontological and not merely an epistemological matt
Te following considerations should be noted:
1. In any case, quantum particles do not come into existence fr
non-being. Rather, they emerge from the quantum vacuum which
not non-being but something that possesses energy. As John Daint
(2009) explains, ‘A vacuum state does not mean a state of nothi
Because one is dealing with quantum mechanics, the vacuum state
a zero-point energy (Te energy remaining in a substance at the ab
lute zero of temperature (0 K), which gives rise to vacuum fluct
tions).’ Te energy in the quantum vacuum is therefore something th
is causally antecedent to the beginning of existence of the quant
particles which emerge from the quantum vacuum.
While some scientists have argued recently that the universe co
have begun to exist from ‘nothing’ (e.g., Vilenkin 2006; Kra
2012), what they mean by ‘nothing’ is not the absence of anythi
but rather an energy-possessing quantum vacuum or at the very le
something that can behave according to the equations of quant
physics. Cosmologist George Ellis observes that the efforts by th
scientists cannot truly ‘solve’ the issue of creation, ‘for they rely
some structures or other (e.g., the elaborate framework of quant
field theory and much of the standard model of particle phys
pre-existing the origin of the universe, and hence themselves requ
ing explanation’ (Ellis 2007, Sect. 2.7). Even if it is the case that
negative gravitational energy of our universe exactly cancels the p
tive energy represented by matter so that the total energy of the u
verse is zero, as portrayed in some cosmological scenarios (Sten
2007, pp. 116–117), that does not imply that the positive and ne
tive energy arose uncaused from zero energy. One still has to answ
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128 A. T. E. Loke
As for the radioactive disintegration of atomic nuclei, even if

such as the decay of a given atom of 235U at this instant rather tha
weeks from now do not have a sufficient cause, there is strong justi
tion for maintaining that the phenomena (the decay and statistics
exhibit) themselves have underlying proportionate causal explanations
they exhibit regularities that strongly indicate the existence of more fun
mental ordered causes (Stoeger 2001, p. 87). Tese fundamental ord
causes would be entities that are causally antecedent to the radioactive
integration of atomic nuclei. Physicist Peter Bussey (2013, p. 20) n
that ‘beta-decay is due to the so-called “weak nuclear force”, in w
absence the decay would not occur. So the cause of the new nuclear s
is the weak force acting on the previous nuclear state.’ Hence, in non
the examples from quantum physics is there a case in which an entit
an event began to exist without any causal antecedent whatsoever.
2. Our present inability to predict certain phenomena (e.g., radi
tive decay of a specific nucleus) does not imply that there is no ca
for these phenomena; rather, as Philipse suggests, it could be due to
limitation of our present knowledge. John Polkinghorne explains
the conclusion that quantum physics is probabilistic can arise f
either of two reasons: epistemic ignorance or ontological indetermin
Tere is no question that quantum physics has turned out to be prob

bilistic. Te quantum physicist can calculate the chance of a radioacti
nucleus decaying within the next hour, but it is not possible to determin
whether a specific nucleus will actually undergo decay within that perio
However, probabilities can arise for two quite different reasons. One
simply ignorance of all the factors which, if they were known, would
fact be sufficient to determine what will happen. Te fall of a die is a pa
adigm example. Maybe all those radioactive nuclei have, so to speak, hi
den internal clocks whose settings determine exactly when each nucle
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physics has been confirmed in many respects, it is nevertheless no

complete or the final physical theory. On the other hand, there ar
number of problems besetting quantum physics. Possible, though t
tative solutions have been proposed for some of them, for example,
concept of decoherence has been proposed as a solution to the me
urement problem (i.e., what is the process that brings about a defin
answer on each actual occasion of measuring a property of quant
entity?) (ibid., p. 41). 3 Nevertheless, scientists are concerned that
tain clouds on the horizon may prove as great a threat to the contin
success of quantum theory as were the anomalies confronting class
physics at the end of the nineteenth century, such as problems of rec
ciling it with general relativity (Butterfield 2001, p. 113). Tese pr
lems indicate that the theories are incomplete; and that a more com
theory which could also reveal the causes of the currently unpredicta
phenomena might well be found in the future. One can follow physi
John Wheeler by regarding quantum mechanics as provisional, and t
some deeper theory, waiting to be discovered, would explain in a c
and rational way all the oddities of the quantum world, and would
turn explain the apparent fuzziness in the quantum classical bound
(Ford 2011, p. 263).
3. Many different interpretations of quantum physics exist, and so
of them, such as de Broglie–Bohm’s pilot-wave model, are perfe
deterministic (Goldstein 2013). Polkinghorne notes that contribut
of Bohm as follows,
In the 1950s David Bohm… achieved this remarkable feat by divorcin

wave and particle, which Bohr had proclaimed to be indissolubly unite
as complementary aspects of individual quantum entities. In Bohm
theory there are particles which are as unproblematically objective an
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130 A. T. E. Loke
Polkinghorne observes that ‘Te empirical equivalence of these

interpretations of quantum theory means that the question of wh
one is to be preferred is not an issue that can be settled by phy
alone… the choice… is not a scientific matter, but it requires an
of metaphysical decision’ (ibid.). Polkinghorne (2000, p. 144) th
that, based on the scientific evidence alone, it is ‘perfectly possibl
the twenty-first century to hold an account of the physical world th
as unproblematically objective and deterministic as was the eightee
century mechanics of Newton and Laplace’.
Nevertheless, Polkinghorne and others have offered the follow
philosophical criticisms for rejecting Bohm’s theory. Bohm’s borrowin
the Schrödinger equation for the sake of ensuring empirical equival
is considered to be ad hoc and has an air of contrivance (Polkingho
2011, pp. 38–40). Additionally, there is unease with Bohm’s postula
of additional entities without experimental evidence; in particular, Boh
introduction of ‘hidden variables’ and accounting of ‘non-locality’ (tha
the possibility that widely separated particles can form a unified quan
system) is considered to be ad hoc (Holder 2012, p. 222). Along this
of criticism, Stoeger (2001, pp. 82–84) argues that we need to
let quantum facts to speak for themselves… we should avoid, as much

possible, introducing theoretical entities or fields or processes that are n
demanded or warranted by experiment or observation, particularly tho
that express unjustified philosophical presupposition that go beyond th
phenomena.
Tese philosophical criticisms are not unanswerable, however. Concer

Schrodinger’s equation, this can be argued to follow from the internal l
of de Broglie’s original theory (from which Bohm’s theory was deri
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for a purpose foreign to its origins, when the original purpose of th

Schrödinger equation was in fact to describe de Broglie’s waves.
Physicist John Bell (1964, pp. 195–200) has shown that quant
theory itself is irreducibly non-local in any case, hence the ‘non-local
in Bohm’s interpretation should not be considered as a drawback wh
compared to Bohr’s. As for the ‘hidden variables’ in Bohm’s theory, B
(1987, p. 201) explains,
Absurdly, such theories are known as ‘hidden variable’ theories. Absurdl

for there it is not in the wavefunction that one finds an image of the vis
ible world, and the results of experiments, but in the complementar
‘hidden’ (!) variables. Of course the extra variables are not confined to th
visible ‘macroscopic’ scale. For no sharp definition of such a scale could b
made. Te ‘microscopic’ aspect of the complementary variables is indee
hidden from us. But to admit things not visible to the gross creatures tha
we are is, in my opinion, to show a decent humility, and not just a lamen
table addiction to metaphysics. In any case, the most hidden of all varia
bles, in the pilot wave picture, is the wavefunction, which manifests itse
to us only by its influence on the complementary variables.
Contrary to popular opinion, Bell has not demonstrated the imp

sibility of hidden variables, but only the inevitability of non-locality
quantum physics; Bell himself defended Bohm’s hidden variable the
(Goldstein 2013). Likewise, Alain Aspect (2002), the noted experimen
of quantum entanglement, agrees that his experiment does not vio
determinism but only the locality condition. While Bohmian mechan
addition of the guiding equation to Schrödinger’s equation has been
basis of the objection that it is too complicated or inelegant, Hilary Putn
(2005, p. 622) replies ‘Te formula for the velocity field is extremely s
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132 A. T. E. Loke
deeper explanation of its phenomenon, Bohm’s theory provides su

deeper explanation. As Bell (1987, p. 191) argues,
Is it not clear from the smallness of the scintillation on the screen th

we have to do with a particle? And is it not clear, from the diffractio
and interference patterns, that the motion of the particle is directed by
wave? De Broglie showed in detail how the motion of a particle, passin
through just one of two holes in screen, could be influenced by wav
propagating through both holes. And so influenced that the particle do
not go where the waves cancel out, but is attracted to where they coope
ate. Tis idea seems to me so natural and simple, to resolve the wave-pa
ticle dilemma in such a clear and ordinary way, that it is a great myste
to me that it was so generally ignored.
Goldstein (2013) has also responded to various other object

against Bohmian mechanics (cf. d’Espagnat 2006, pp. 200–206).
Physicist Mike owler at Cambridge University summarises the
lowing reasons for thinking that Bohm’s pilot-wave theory is superio
Bohr’s:
• It preserves a realist ontology wherein particles possess determi

values of space-time location and momentum.
• Tey continue to possess such values between various acts of obse
tion- measurement, rather than acquiring them only in conseque
of being measured with respect to this or that parameter.
• Tis allows for greater continuity with certain components of
cal (pre-quantum) physics such as the conservation laws respec
matter-energy and angular momentum.
• Te pilot-wave hypothesis produces results in perfect accorda
with those obtained in standard QM by of the Schrödin
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• Pilot-wave theory also seeks to explain quantum effects such

photon deflection or multipath interference without proposin
massively expanded ontology of parallel worlds, shadow univer
multiple intersecting realities, etc. (owler 2009a , b).
Now Bohm’s theory is not the only possible deterministic quant

theory, and other deterministic quantum theories that are better th
Bohm’s (as well as better than Bohr’s indeterministic theory) might w
be discovered in the future. Nevertheless, the availability of alternat
apart from Bohr’s indeterministic interpretation, such as Bohm’s t
ory which is arguably superior to Bohr’s, together with the other r
sons mentioned above, indicate that quantum theory has not sho
that something can begin to exist without any causally necessary c
dition. As physicist Victor Stenger puts it, ‘other viable interpretati
of quantum mechanics remain with no consensus on which, if any
the correct one,’ and thus we have to remain ‘open to the possibi
that causes may someday be found for such phenomena’ (Stenger 20
pp. 188–189, 173).
5.3 Philosophical Doubts Concerning the

Causal Principle
Te upshot of the foregoing discussion is that no compelling scient
evidence has been offered against the Causal Principle. Neverthel
a number of philosophers have cast doubts about this principle.
example, Kant ( Critique of Pure Reason, Preface to the Second Editi
thinks that, while the principle of causality is valid for objects as p
nomena, it may not be valid for objects as things in themselves (
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134 A. T. E. Loke
philosophers following Hume have argued that the ideas of cause

effect are distinct and we can conceive of an uncaused beginning-t
of an object (Mackie 1982, p. 89).4
Others have replied that Hume’s argument in no way make
plausible to think that something could really begin to exist with
a cause (Craig and Sinclair 2009, p. 189). For example, Eliza
Anscombe (1974, p. 150) argues that, from my being able to imag
a rabbit coming into being without a cause, nothing whatever foll
about what it is possible to suppose ‘without contradiction or absu
ity’ as holding in reality. Hume himself confesses, in a letter wri
in 1754, ‘But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absur
Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause: I only m
tain’d that, our Certainty of the Falsehood of that Proposition
ceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from ano
Source’ (Hume 1932, i., p. 187). Tus, it seems that Hume him
would agree that mere conceivability does not provide suffic
grounds for rejecting the Causal Principle. On the other hand, the
lowing arguments have been offered in the literature in support of
Causal Principle. Tese arguments are: (i) Section 5.4.1 an induc
argument; (ii) Section 5.4.2 a conceptual argument; and (iii) Sec
5.4.3 a reductio ad absurdum argument. I shall discuss these argum
before addressing the philosophical doubts mentioned above in
conclusion of this chapter.
5.4 Arguments for Causal Principle

5.4.1 Empirical Evidence
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Principle, and every success of science in reconstructing the causal an

cedents of particular events and classes of events provides confirmat
of it (Koons 2000, pp. 108–109).
One might object that there is a distinction between
(a) beginning to exist simpliciter (there was no material entity and

there was an existent material thing);
(b) a certain state of affairs beginning to exist (i.e., matter that was p
viously air and wood is now flame),5 and claim that the evidence
the latter does not support the former. In reply, there are two for
of inductive arguments. Te first is that ‘we have ample evide
that the causal antecedents of particular events can be found w
they are sought after, and therefore we inductively conclude that
particular events have causal antecedents’. Te second is as follo
‘We have ample evidence that events do not begin to exist with
causal antecedents, and therefore we inductively conclude that
events have causal antecedents.’ On the second formulation,
evidence supports the conclusion regarding beginning of existe
simpliciter as well.
Some (e.g. Bertrand Russell, see Russell and Copleston 1964, p. 1

object that the argument ‘since the parts of a universe are caused,
whole universe must have a cause’ commits the Fallacy of Compositi
In reply, as noted in Sect. 3.4, arguments of the part-whole type
not always guilty of this fallacy; it depends on the content of the ar
ment. Sometimes the totality has the same quality as the parts beca
of the nature of the parts invoked—the wall is brick because it is b
of bricks (Reichenbach 2016). Likewise, since every single person o
group requires oxygen, the whole group of people requires oxygen. T
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136 A. T. E. Loke
we cannot ask about the cause of something like the Universe the be
ning of which we have not directly experienced. In reply, the fact th
concept is derived in a certain way does not imply that its applicatio
restricted to that way. For example, cosmologists who derived the c
cept of expansion from particular things have applied it to the Univ
(Swinburne 2004, p. 134). It is evident that we can reason deducti
and inductively to arrive at justified conclusions regardless of whe
we have direct experience of those conclusions.
Oppy objects that ‘in experience, we only ever meet with obj
whose coming into existence is preceded by times at which
objects do not exist. Nothing in experience bears on the question
the causal antecedents of objects that begin to exist at t = 0’ (O
2006, p. 149). It might also be objected that, while it is imposs
for things to begin to exist uncaused in time, the universe itself
begin to exist uncaused at a first moment of time. In reply, C
argues that, if something cannot begin to exist uncaused at t , wh
is preceded by earlier moments of time, why think that if we wer
annihilate all moments earlier than t , then that thing could begin
exist uncaused at t ? (Craig and Sinclair 2009, pp. 186–187; it sho
be noted that this question needs to be answered regardless of whe
the spatiotemporal manifold has an independent existence or real
An explosion today would warrant the conclusion that it had a
an explosion 1000 years ago, 10,000 years ago or 10 million years
would warrant the same conclusion as well. So why would the con
sion be different for the Big Bang 13.8 billion years ago, or for w
ever event that preceded it?
Craig goes on to ask, given that the Causal Principle is consta
confirmed in our experience and also used, reasonably, in interpre
our experience, why not accept it as plausible and reasonable—at
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5.4.2 The Concept of Non-being
As noted earlier, when some scientists propose that the universe
have come from ‘nothing’, what they mean by ‘nothing’ is not ‘n
being’, but rather an energy-possessing quantum vacuum, or at the v
least something that can behave according to the equations of quant
physics. Craig argues that we can never have a physics of non-be
(ibid., pp. 182–190). If, for example, someone suggests that the em
gence of an entity is in accordance with the laws of quantum phys
that from which the entity emerges must have the potential to beh
in accordance with these laws, and the existence of the potential wo
be something and not non-being. Tus, the conclusion that everyth
that begins to exist has a cause can never in principle be overturned
physics. Bussey makes a similar point when he argues, in response
Krauss’ (2012) book A Universe from Nothing , that ‘true nothing d
not exist to have a relationship with anything’:
A major problem here is a shifting definition of ‘nothing’, which coul

refer to ‘empty’ space-time within which a new universe is generated b
quantum effects, possibly on vacuum fields, or else to ‘true nothing’. I
the first case, the reply is that the previously existing space and its vac
uum fields, together with relevant laws of nature, cause the universe t
appear—but they are obviously not ‘nothing’ and they too need a cause…
o say that a universe appears ‘from’ true nothing makes no literal sense
because true nothing does not exist to have a relationship with anything
such as a universe; the term is being inappropriately reified. Droppin
the misleading terminology, proposals of this latter kind mean simpl
that there was an absolute beginning to the universe. Te cause of th
universe in such scenarios is usually said to be, in effect, ‘laws of nature
Te first issue here is that laws of nature, as normally used, are laws o
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138 A. T. E. Loke
knowledge (see Chap. 1). Now the concept of non-being is the abse
of anything: no matter, no energy, not even the potential for anyth
Terefore it is metaphysically impossible that anything—whether
Universe itself or anything in the phenomena or noumenal worl
could begin to exist from non-being (Craig and Sinclair 2009, pp. 1
190). Mark Nowacki (2007, p. 108) adds that neither could there e
be a probability that something will begin to exist without any ca
antecedent, for probability requires a positive state description in o
to be rendered meaningful: relative to some positive state of affai
may be possible to calculate the likelihood of some event occurring,
in the absence of anything causally prior to the first event there is
positive state description.
Craig mentions a limitation to the foregoing argument, namely
it will not work on the static (B-) theory of time, according to wh
the Universe does not in fact come into being from nothing but ‘e
tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is fin
extended in the earlier than direction’ (Craig and Sinclair 2009
182–183). For further discussion concerning static theory of time
Causal Principle, see below.
5.4.3 Why Do Other States of Affairs Not Begin to E

Uncaused?
Craig writes,
If things really could come into being uncaused out of nothing, then
becomes inexplicable why just anything or everything does not com
into existence uncaused from nothing. Why do bicycles and Beethove
and root beer not pop into being from nothing? Why is it only univers
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Elsewhere, Craig formulates the argument more rigorously as follows
(a) If it is possible for something to come into being without a caus

a first moment of time, then it is possible for things to come i
being without a cause at later moments of time.
(b) It is not possible for things to come into being without a cause
later moments of time.
(c) Terefore, it is not possible for something to come into being
out a cause at a first moment of time (Craig 2010).6
In a recent paper, Oppy (2010) replies by arguing that one can m

a number of claims that would amount to a denial of premise (a).
begin, one can claim that a contingent initial state of reality and the c
tingent things that feature therein are the only kinds of things that
begin to exist without a cause (p. 62), and that ‘the properties of be
initial and non-initial states of reality are essential properties of sta
of reality’ (p. 63). Oppy notes the objection that, since there is no
ing prior to the coming into existence of those contingent initial sta
to place constraints on their nature and features, it is arbitrary to sin
out certain sorts of things as uncaused features of an initial conting
state of reality. In reply, Oppy argues that, since things can only e
as parts of larger networks of related entities, it can be claimed that
initial state of reality is the kind of thing that can exist even though th
is nothing else in existence, and that there are very few possible sta
of reality that could have met this requirement. Furthermore, it can
claimed that the things that feature in the initial state of reality are kin
of things that can exist as parts of an initial state of reality, and that th
are very few possible kinds of things that could have met this requ
ment (pp. 63–64). Oppy then argues that one can hold a view of alet
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140 A. T. E. Loke
causally prior to some concrete object occupying the space curre

occupied by another concrete object, the current occupant must va
the space to make room for the new object. Tus, the former occupa
ceasing to occupy the space is a cause (but not the sole cause) of
new object’s coming into being. Generalizing this line of thought, O
writes,
Pick any tiger shaped space in the room. In order for a tiger to occup
that space, that space must have appropriate internal and boundary prop
erties: there are after all, lots of ways that the boundary and interior
that space could be that are simply inconsistent with the occupatio
of that space by a tiger. But, if that’s right, then it seems to me that w
should allow that… the coming about of the consistency of the boun
ary and interior of the space with occupation by a tiger—is a cause
the coming into existence of the tiger. And as before, if this is a cause
the coming into existence of the tiger, then it . . . isn’t true that the tig
‘comes into existence uncaused out of nothing. (p. 67)
Oppy then goes on to make a few remarks concerning possible ob

tions to his argument, claiming, among other things, that even if t
is no cause of the table’s ceasing to occupy the location that it curre
occupies, it will still be the case that the table’s ceasing to occupy
location is a cause of the coming to existence of the tiger. Addition
even if most of the universe consists of tiger-shaped spaces the inte
and boundary conditions of which are consistent with occupation
a tiger, it would still be the case that the coming about of such sp
would be a cause of the popping into existence of a tiger in that
Te reason Oppy offers is that ‘causal factors do not cease to be c
merely because they are nearly ubiquitous’ (pp. 66–67). In his repl
Craig’s critique, Oppy (2015) claims that the central arguments of
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(a) If it is possible for something to come into being without a caus

a first moment of time, then it is possible for things to come i
being without a cause at later moments of time,
I shall argue that
(a ) If the initial state of reality began to exist uncaused, then cert
′
states of affairs would begin to exist uncaused at later moment

time.
I will then proceed to argue that
(b ) It is not the case that those states of affairs begin to exist uncau
′
at later moments of time.

(c) Terefore, it is not the case that the initial state of reality began
exist uncaused.
Elsewhere, Craig considers the worry that the Causal Principle mi

not hold for the beginning of the Universe if the static (B-) theory
time is true. He writes
For B-Teorists deny that in beginning to exist the universe came int
being or became actual. Tey thereby focus attention on the theory of tim
underlying the kalam cosmological argument. From start to finish, th
kalam cosmological argument is predicated upon the A-Teory of tim
On a B-Teory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being o
become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimen
sional space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direc
tion. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being
and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is miscon
ceived. Although G.W.F. Leibniz’s question, Why is there (tenselessly
something rather than nothing?, should still rightly be asked, there woul
be no reason to look for a cause of the universe’s beginning to exist, sinc
on tenseless theories of time the universe did not begin to exist in virtue o
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142 A. T. E. Loke
this is not so for a dynamic theory of time. Craig rejects the static th
ry’s understanding for his definition of ‘begins to exist’ when he writ
In affirming that things which begin to exist need a cause, the mutakalli
assumes the following understanding of that notion, where ‘ x ’ rang
over any entity and ‘ t ’ ranges over times, whether instants or moments
nonzero finite duration:
A. x begins to exist at t iff x comes into being at t .
B. x comes into being at t iff (i) x exists at t , and the actual world includ
no state of affairs in which x exists timelessly, (ii) t is either the first tim
at which x exists or is separated from any t < t at which x existed by a
′
interval during which x does not exist, and (iii) x ’s existing at t is a tens
fact. (ibid.)
Defining ‘begins to exist’ in this way makes Craig’s argument u

ceptable to those who do not hold a dynamic theory of time. o
suade these people, one would have to first show that the dyna
theory is preferable to the static theory. As noted in Chap. 2, th
not a straightforward task considering the vast amount of literature
static versus dynamic theory of time (although Craig has defended
dynamic theory in a number of publications) (Craig 2000a , b).
Te argument I shall offer below contributes to the discussion
another way: it does not require the demonstration that the dynamic
ory is preferable to the static theory of time. My argument shall atte
to show that, even if time is static, it is unreasonable to think that
Universe had a beginning and yet was uncaused, for otherwise other k
of things would also begin to exist uncaused and our universe would
very different from what it is. Te definition of ‘begins to exist’ th
will be usin is different from Craig’ in that it doe not have the phr
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Craig’s definition of ‘begins to exist at t’ (where ‘t’ ranges over tim

whether instants or moments of nonzero finite duration), as follows:
x begins to exist at t iff
(i) x exists at t , and the actual world includes no state of affairs
which x exists timelessly,8
(ii) t is either the first time at which x exists, or is separated from
t < t at which x exists by an interval during which x does not exi
′
Tis definition is compatible with both static and dynamic theories

time.
o begin my argument, recall Oppy’s suggestion that, since in
reality that we now inhabit, the spaces the interior and boundary con
tions of which are consistent with occupation by any entity x would
a causally necessary condition (call this condition CN 1) for the beg
ning of existence of x in that space, x could not begin to exist uncau
now. In a more recent paper, Oppy suggests the reason why it is imp
sible for a raging tiger to ‘suddenly come into existence uncaused
of nothing’ in the room in which you are reading this is that there is
place in that room for a tiger to come to occupy uncaused. He writes
In the causal order, the displacing activity of the displacing object—th

object ‘popping into existence’—would have to be both (causally) prior
the displacement of the displaced object (in order to cause the displace
ment) and (causally) posterior to the displacement of the displaced objec
(in order that the displacing object exists and hence is able to bring abou
the displacement). But that’s impossible. (Oppy 2015, p. 4)
He also argues that,

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144 A. T. E. Loke
o address Oppy’s suggestion, first consider a certain entity or stat

affairs, A. (Te following descriptions of A, B, and C are meant to p
out essential properties; I am stipulating that A, B, and C are dist
entities or distinct states of affairs.) Let’s suppose A is ‘an increasin
strength of a pre-existent electric field’. Oppy would argue that, s
an increase in strength of a pre-existent electric field requires sp
the interior and boundary conditions of which are consistent with
increase, this state of affairs cannot begin to exist uncaused.
Now consider another state of affairs, B. Let’s suppose B is
increasing in strength of a pre-existent electric field where the requ
ment for “spaces the interior and boundary conditions of which
consistent with this increasing” is already met’. In other words, B is
increasing in strength of a pre-existent electric field where the requ
ment for condition CN1 is already met’. Here B refers to a stat
affairs involving something pre-existing taking on a new state. Whi
involves pre-existing entities, the ‘increased strength’ described is a
state which could subsequently begin to exist.
Note that Oppy cannot argue that, since an increase in strength
a pre-existent electric field requires condition CN 1 (that is, the sp
whose interior and boundary conditions are consistent with
increase), B could not begin to exist uncaused. Te reason is beca
B is not ‘an increasing in strength of a pre-existent electric field’
se; rather, B is ‘an increasing in strength of a pre-existent electric fi
where the requirement for condition CN1 is already met’. Condi
CN1 is causally necessary for the beginning of existence of an ‘incr
ing in strength of a pre-existent electric field’ simpliciter. Howe
condition CN1 is not causally necessary for the beginning of existe
of ‘an increasing in strength of a pre-existent electric field where
requirement for condition CN is already met’.
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any causal antecedents such as, say, without having to switch on

electric field generator under certain circumstances’.
In short, my reply to Oppy is that one can think examples
‘uncaused beginnings’ which do not involve displacement of obj
or vacation of spaces. An example would be ‘an electric field incre
ing in strength uncaused under certain circumstances’, where ‘field
understood as a region of space in which there is a force. It is obser
that the space that is occupied by the electric field is compatible w
their existing and increasing. Furthermore, it is observed that differ
strengths of electric fields (as well as other fields) can occupy the sa
amount of space, unlike Oppy’s case of tigers where an increased nu
ber of tigers would require more space.
Te first step of my argument, therefore, is
(1) Let B = entity/state of affairs the beginning of existence of wh
does not require condition CN1 (CN1 = the spaces the interior
boundary conditions of which are consistent with occupation by
entity/state of affairs).
It should be noted that B can begin to exist around us. For exa
ple, under certain current conditions the strength of electric fie
around an electric field generator will be increased if the generato
switched on, and under certain current conditions the strength of m
netic fields around a magnetic field generator will be increased if
generator is switched on. Given that it is not metaphysically impossi
that B begins to exist around us, Oppy cannot make the argument th
since in the reality that we inhabit the beginning of B is metaphysic
impossible, B cannot begin to exist uncaused now.
Nevertheless, there are certain circumstances where it would be l
ically impossible that B begins to exist. For example, in the abse
of pre-existent fields or ‘spaces the interior and boundary conditi
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146 A. T. E. Loke
is an impossible state of affairs, similar to ‘shapeless cubes’. S

impossibilities cannot exist in any logically possible world. Tu
pre-existent electric fields or the required spaces are not present at a
tain time t , then it is logically impossible for B to begin to exist.
Now let C be a certain entity/state of affairs. Suppose someone
tulates that the circumstances are such that it is not logically or m
aphysically impossible for B and C to begin to exist, and that onl
begins to exist caused . If she were asked, ‘What makes it the case
it is C rather than B that begins to exist caused ?’, the answer woul
simple: in these circumstances, the causally antecedent conditio
makes it the case that it is C rather than B that begins to exist.
Now suppose someone postulates that the circumstances are s
that it is not logically or metaphysically impossible for B and C to be
to exist, and that only C begins to exist uncaused . Te important q
tion to ask is, ‘What makes it the case that it is C rather than B
begins to exist uncaused, that is, in the absence of any causally ante
ent condition?’ (By ‘makes it the case’, I mean ‘provides metaphy
grounding’.)
In this case, one cannot appeal to causally antecedent condition
He/she also cannot appeal to the circumstances or to the property
B would have that might make its beginning of existence metaphysic
impossible, since it has already been stipulated that the circumsta
are such that it is not logically or metaphysically impossible for B
begin to exist. It is also not enough to make counterfactual statem
such as ‘if C begins to exist, C would be uncaused’ and ‘if B begin
exist, B would be caused’; one has to explain the grounds for think
that these statements are true. Nor could he/she simply say that ‘onl
begins to exist uncaused’ is a brute fact, on the contrary the restric
(i.e., the restriction to ‘only C’ [and not, say, B or other entities] be
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In other words,
(2) Let C be a certain entity/state of affairs, and suppose that the
cumstances are such that it is logically and metaphysically possible fo
and C to begin to exist. If C begins to exist uncaused and only C beg
to exist uncaused, then it would be the case that C possesses a uniq
property/set of properties S that is not possessed by B, and only ‘
possession of S by C’ would make it the case that only C begins to e
uncaused.
In this case, the possession of S by C would make it different fr
B, and this difference would make it the case that it is not B but o
C that begins to exist uncaused. Someone might suggest that the
ference between C and B is that the beginning of C is indetermini
whereas that of B is deterministic. However, ‘deterministic’ and ‘in
terministic’ is merely a description of the manner of entities’ beginn
of existence, they do not explain why B has a causally necessary con
tion but C does not, and some other special property S which is p
sessed only by C is still required.
Now here is where a problem arises. Te first time S is possessed
C is at time t c, where t c is the first time at which C exists. Given tha
is stipulated to be an essential property of C and possessed by C on
and given that C only begins to exist at t c, S would only begin to exis
t c. It follows that ‘the possession of S by C’ can make it the case that
is only C, rather than B, that begins to exist uncaused’ only when C
already existing at t c. But what this means is that ‘the possession of S
C’ is actually superfluous in accounting for the uncaused beginning
C instead of B. Tis is because, if it is required that C is already exist
in order that ‘the possession of S by C’ can account for the uncau
beginning of C instead of B, then ‘the possession of S by C’ is not w
accounts for the uncaused beginning of C instead of B in the first pla
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148 A. T. E. Loke
already begun its existence, thus there is nothing for account

explaining/grounding the uncaused beginning of C instead of B.
Someone might ask ‘given that objects cannot have properties w
they do not exist, what is the alternative you have in mind here c
cerning the initial state of reality?’ In reply, the alternative (offered
proponents of the Kalam Cosmological Argument) is a First C
which is beginningless and timeless (i.e., a First Cause which has alw
existed; see Chap. 6).
Oppy might object by asking ‘couldn’t the explanation for C’s be
ning to exist uncaused (rather than B’s beginning to exist uncaused
non-causal and that the explanation exists together with C’s existe
rather than prior to it, similar to the way certain theistic non-ca
explanations are used for the case of God? If theists can invoke s
explanations, why cannot the atheist do the same?’ 10 Proponents of
Kalam would argue that God being uncaused can be explained by G
being beginningless (see Chap. 6), in which case being beginningle
a non-causal explanation and a property that is possessed by God w
God already exists. Couldn’t the atheist likewise argue that S expl
why only C began uncaused in a similar non-causal sense?
In reply, the objector is attempting to argue that the reasoning for
and (B) is similar:
(A) ‘Te possession of beginninglessness by God’ can make it the

that God exists uncaused (whereas B, which does not have
property of beginninglessness, cannot exist uncaused); this is
even though beginninglessness would be possessed by God o
when God already exists.
(B) ‘Te possession of S by C’ can make it the case that C began to e
uncaused (whereas B, which does not have the property of S,
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why God exists uncaused whereas B (which lacks ‘beginninglessne

cannot, because ‘beginningless’ implies that the entity possessing t
property has always existed and therefore was not brought into ex
ence. Whereas in the case of (B), S is supposed to explain why C beg
uncaused but B (which lacks S) does not begin to exist uncaused,
S is possessed when C already begins, which makes S superfluous
argued previously.
One might object that the foregoing argument seems to dema
that some property S must be instantiated prior to the existence o
in order to account for the uncaused beginning of C instead of B,
this demand is absurd if C is supposed to have begun to exist uncau
without anything prior to it. But that is precisely one of the proble
with postulating an uncaused beginning as Oppy does, namely tha
cannot account for C being the only thing that begins to exist uncau
without absurdity (supposing now that C is the initial state of reality
explained under the next few steps, the supposition that only the ini
state of reality began to exist uncaused is essential to Oppy’s argumen
In summary,
(3) It cannot be the case that ‘the possession of S by C’ makes it
case that only C begins to exist uncaused, because S would be posses
by C only when C is already existing.
But if it cannot be the case that ‘the possession of S by C’ make
the case that it is only C rather than B that begins to exist uncaus
then, according to (2), nothing else could. For there would be no ess
tial difference between B and C where beginning to exist uncaused
concerned, since there is no ‘possession of some special set of proper
S by C’ that could make C different from B where beginning to e
uncaused is concerned. Te conclusion from (2) and (3) is:
(4) Terefore, suppose that the circumstances are such that it is l
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150 A. T. E. Loke
necessary conditions for the beginning of existence of B. Since

existent fields do not exist at t 1 (as there are no fields prior to t 1
logically impossible for B to begin to exist uncaused at t 1 if C be
to exist uncaused at t 1. (Tis qualification takes into account Op
argument that the existence of states/entities other than the initial s
of reality requires the existence of larger networks of related ent
(Oppy 2010, p. 64).
Now consider the conditions at later t at which electric and m
netic fields and ‘spaces the interior and boundary conditions of wh
are consistent with an increasing in strength of a pre-existent elec
field’ pre-existed. In particular, consider the conditions around us.
experiences indicate that in the reality that we inhabit, pre-exis
fields (for example, electric and magnetic fields) and ‘spaces the inte
and boundary conditions of which are consistent with an increasin
strength of a pre-existent electric field’ are found around us. Tis can
seen from the fact that, when we switch on an electric or magnetic
generator around us, there will be an increase in strength in the r
vant field around it. Indeed, in our experiences we have observed m
instances of B beginning to exist. What this shows is that
(5) Our circumstances are such that it is logically and metaphysic
possible for B to begin to exist around us, and that B does begin to e
(premise).
Te next move is to let C be the initial state of reality. As noted
lier, Oppy claims that the initial state of reality began to exist uncau
Now one cannot simply say that the initial state is uncaused sim
in virtue of being initial, because ‘initial’ is merely descriptive of
sequential position of the state; it does not explain why that state
be uncaused. While the First Cause must be uncaused, the First C
must have a certain property that explains why it can uncaused
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In reply, I have argued in steps 2 to 4 that, if that is the case, C (e

space-time itself) would have to possess a unique property S (which
not possessed by B) that makes it the case that only C begins to e
uncaused. But there cannot be such properties, because the propertie
C (such as S) would be had by C only when C already exists. In wh
case S cannot be what makes it the case that C begins to exist uncau
and only the beginning of existence of C does not require CN. 12
Oppy might object that it is not a property of C that differentiate
from B, but the fact that there is not a prior existing thing at a previ
time for C, whereas there is a prior existing thing for B. 13
However, this difference is not relevant for why C begins to e
uncaused but not B, because having a prior existing thing at a pr
ous time for B does not prevent B from beginning to exist uncaused
explained in step 1), just as NO-having a prior existing thing at a p
vious time for C does not prevent C from beginning to exist uncau
(as explained by Oppy).Given that this difference is not relevant, so
other difference is required (step 2), and the rest of my argum
follows.
Terefore,
(6) Let C be the initial state of reality; if C begins to exist uncaus
then the beginning of B around us would also be uncaused. (From
and 5)
Now what (6) implies is that, if the initial state of reality beg
to exist uncaused at t 1, the beginning of ‘an increasing in stren
of pre-existent fields where the requirement for “spaces the inter
and boundary conditions of which are consistent with this incre
ing” is already met’ around us would not have causally necess
conditions.
But this is contrary to my experience: I (thankfully!) do not exp
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152 A. T. E. Loke
(8) Terefore, it is not the case that the initial state of reality be
to exist uncaused. (From 6 and 7)
I would like to make two comments on the above argument.
First, the objector might ask, ‘Could it be that C exists first as
initial state of reality, after which C imposes a causal law which
vents subsequent uncaused beginnings, such as B beginning to
uncaused?’14
In reply, for any x , the beginning of x is susceptible to being
vented by a law (or, for that matter, by anything else) if and only if
law acts on the causally necessary conditions or on the circumstance
prevent x from beginning to exist. However, it has been shown tha
C begins to exist uncaused, the beginning of existence of B would
not have causally necessary conditions (step 4). Moreover, it has b
explained previously that the circumstances around us have been sho
to be such that B’s beginning of existence is logically and metaph
cally possible, and in fact does occur when we switch on an electric
generator. Terefore, it is not the case that the uncaused beginnin
B around me is being prevented by a causal law, if C begins to e
uncaused.
Second, my argument does not rule out libertarian free choice, s
one can understand libertarian free choices as indeterministic but
uncaused. As Randolph Clarke and Justin Capes explain, on ag
causal theories, a free decision (or some event internal to such a d
sion) must be caused by the agent; and it must not be the case
either what the agent causes or the agent’s causing that event is cau
determined by prior events. Tus, an agent is in a strict and literal s
an originator of her free decisions. Tis combination of indetermin
and cause (origination) is thought to capture best the idea that, w
we act freely a plurality of alternatives is open to us and we determ
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explains, acting for a reason means that the reason for which the ag
acted is simply the reason which the agent chose to act upon. Be
‘responsive’ to a reason for acting in this manner is not being determi
to act in a certain way by that reason. Tus indeterminism and causa
can both be affirmed.
5.5 Conclusion
While a number of philosophers and scientists have expressed
ticism concerning the Causal Principle, no compelling argument
been offered against it. In particular, quantum physics has not provi
such an argument, given that: (1) quantum events do not begin to e
without causal antecedents; (2) our current understanding of physic
limited; and (3) there are viable deterministic interpretations of qu
tum phenomena.
On the other hand, it has been shown in this chapter that, if
entity or state of affairs—such as the initial state of reality—be
to exist uncaused, then certain states of affairs would begin to e
uncaused around us, which is not the case. In relation to the views
Hume and Kant, my argument shows that the Causal Principle is
only valid for our experiences of reality, but also for reality itself, fo
it isn’t our experiences would be very different from what they are.
reply to those philosophers who suggest that the Causal Principle m
not hold with respect to the beginning of the universe itself, my ar
ment shows that it is not the case that the initial state of reality began
exist uncaused.
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154 A. T. E. Loke
of the macroscopic environment whereby the interference terms am

the different possible outcomes are very rapidly dissipated, thus y
ing a set of classical outcomes, each with its particular probabilit
being realized’.
4. Hume writes, ‘As all distinct ideas are separable from each other,
the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, ‘twill be easy fo
to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existen
next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or produ
principle. Te separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that
beginning of existence is plainly possible for the imagination, and
sequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible th
implies no contradiction or absurdity’ (Hume 1978, p. 79).
5. I thank Karen Zwier for highlighting this distinction, noting th
goes back to at least Aristotle.
6. Compare Oppy’s (2010, p. 62) reformulation of Craig’s argumen
If it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state under
causal relation—i.e., it is possible for reality to have a contingent in
state that has no cause—then it is possible for other (non-overlapp
parts of reality to have no cause. (Premise) (ii) It is not possible
other (non-overlapping) parts of reality to have no cause. (Premise)
(Hence) It is not possible for reality to have a contingent initial
that has no cause. (Conclusion) Against Oppy’s tenselessly-formu
premises in his reconstruction of the argument on behalf of the ca
premise of the kalam cosmological argument, Craig argues tha
Oppy is to allow the argument in question its full intuitive force,
it must be reformulated along tensed lines (Craig 2010, pp. 73–74)
7. Being finite in the earlier-than direction does not imply having a b
ning, for a static closed time loop has no beginning and yet it is fi
(see Chap. 4).
8. ‘Te actual world includes no state of affairs in which x exists t
lessly’ excludes God, who, as Craig argues, exists timelessly sans c
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static and the perceived passage of time would be illusory.’ In re

one could argue that a timeless and beginningless basketball is ph
cally impossible or that there is no evidence for such a basketball,
also point out that Bobier seems to have confused static time w
timelessness.
9. ‘Separated from any t < t at which x exists by an interval during wh
′
x does not exist’ allows for the possibility that something can ‘begin
exist’ at multiple times. See Craig (2002, p. 98).
10. A similar objection lies at the heart of Oppy (2015), in which he cla
that considerations about causation and the shape of causal reality
not decide between naturalism and theism.
11. I thank Chan Man Ho for suggesting this. Tis view presupposes
substantival view that spacetime is like a container which can e
independent of the entities in them. As explained in Chap. 3
view can be challenged by the alternative relational view of time wh
regards time as an ordered series of changes and/or the presence of
lier than/later than relation.
12. Furthermore, there are other things concerning which it is not logic
or metaphysically impossible that they could come into existence as
initial state of reality at t 1. For example, Craig observes that there
other entities (e.g., various elementary particles) that can exist a
from larger networks, and there are ‘whole interrelated networks’ (e
solar system with rabbits on Earth) other than the actual initial stat
reality that could pop into being (Craig 2010, pp. 74–76).
13. I thank Karen Zwier for suggesting this objection, which concerns
distinction between: (a) beginning to exist simpliciter (there was no
ing and then there was an existent thing); and (b) a certain state
affairs beginning to exist, which is discussed in Section 5.4.1.
14. I thank Chan Kai-yan for suggesting this.
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156 A. T. E. Loke
Bacciagaluppi, G., and A. Valentini. 2009. Quantum Teory at the Crossr

Reconsidering the 1927 Solvay Conference . Cambridge: Cambridge Unive
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Bell, J.S. 1964. On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox. Physics 1 (3): 195–
Bell, J.S. 1987. Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics . Cambr
Bliss, Ricki, and Kelly rogdon. 2014. Metaphysical Grounding. In
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , (Winter 2014 Edition), ed. Edw
N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/groun
Accessed 21 Jan 2017.
Bobier, Christopher. 2013. God, ime and the Kalā m Cosmolo
Argument. Sophia 52: 593–600.
Bussey, Peter. 2013. God as First Cause—a Review of the Kalam Argum
Science & Christian Belief 25: 17–35.
Butterfield, Jeremy. 2001. Some Worlds of Quantum Teory. In Quan
Mechanics: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert Russell e
Vatican City State/Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/Center for Teo
and the Natural Sciences.
Clarke, Randolph, and Justin Capes. 2013. Incompatibilist (Nondetermin
Teories of Free Will. In Te Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Sp
2013 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/arch
spr2013/entries/incompatibilism-theories/. Accessed 20 Jan 2014.
Craig, William Lane. 2000a. Te ensed Teory of ime: A Critical Examin
Synthese Library 293. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Examination Synthese Library 294 . Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Craig, William Lane. 2010. Reflections on Uncaused Beginnings. Faith
Craig, William Lane. 2002. Must the Beginning of the Universe Ha
Personal Cause? Faith and Philosophy 19:94–105. Available at http://w
reasonablefaith.org/must-the-beginning-of-the-universe-have-a-perso
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d’Espagnat, Bernard. 2006. On Physics and Philosophy . Princeton: Prince

University Press.
Ellis, George. 2007. Issues in the Philosophy of Cosmology. In Philosoph
Physics , ed. J Butterfield and J Earman. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Feynman, Richard. 1967. Te Character of Physical Law . Cambridge, M
MI Press.
Ford, Kenneth. 2011. 101 Quantum Questions: What You Need to Know A
the World You Can’t See . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Goldstein, Sheldon. 2013. Bohmian Mechanics. In Te Stanford Encyclop
of Philosophy , (Spring 2013 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://p
stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/qm-bohm/. Accessed 13 Jan 2015
Grünbaum, Adolf. 2004. Te Poverty of Teistic Cosmology. Te Br
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55: 561–614.
Grünbaum, Adolf. 2009. Why is there a Universe A ALL, Rather than
Nothing? Ontology Studies 9: 7–19.
Holder, Rodney. 2012. Quantum Teory and Teology. In Te Black
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6
What is the Nature of the First Cause?
6.1 Uncaused, Beginningless and Timeless

In the previous chapters it has been shown that there must be a F
Cause. So who or what is this First Cause? Richard Dawkins ( 20
pp. 184–185) calls the First Cause ‘the great unknown which
responsible for something existing rather than nothing’. In this chap
it will be shown that, contrary to Dawkins, we can discover vari
properties of the First Cause which would be highly significant for
knowledge of ‘the great unknown’.
Let us begin with the following three possibilities: the First Caus
either caused-by-another, caused-by-self, or uncaused.
Tis First Cause cannot be caused-by-another, for otherwise it wo
not be the First (cause).
Te First Cause cannot be caused-by-self, because in order
something to be self-caused, it must have already existed prior to ca
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160 A. T. E. Loke
Terefore, the First Cause must be uncaused, i.e., without ca

antecedent.
Furthermore, the First Cause must be beginningless, bec
everything that begins to exist has a cause (see previous chapter), and
First Cause is uncaused.
As noted earlier in Chap. 3, we need to ask in what way is the F
Cause beginningless. Is it beginningless in the sense of: (i) having
actual infinite past; (ii) being a closed time loop; or (iii) being timel
I have argued in Chaps. 2, 3 and 4 that the First Cause cannot be c
posed of an actual infinite temporal regress of events, and that a clo
time loop is metaphysically impossible. Tus, this First Cause m
either have an actual infinite past without an actual infinite reg
of events—this would imply that the First Cause was in an init
changeless state with an actual infinite past extension on a substan
view of time (Padgett 1992)—or be initially timeless and changeless
below). In either case, the First Cause would be initially changeless.
Against the idea of a timeless First Cause causing the first
Morriston (2002, p. 240) claims that the principle, ‘at least part of
total cause of every event precedes it in time’, enjoys the same empi
support as the premise that something cannot begin to exist uncau
but it contradicts KCA’s second premise that there is a first inte
of time. In addition, Quentin Smith (Craig and Smith 1993, p. 1
has timeless entities change are causes, and therefore there cannot
cause for the first event.
In reply, Craig argues that the notion that in our daily experien
causes always stand in temporal relations can be treated ‘merely a
accidental generalisation, akin to Human beings have always lived
the Earth, which was true until 1968. Tere does not seem to be a
thing inherently temporal about a causal relationship.’ Te univ
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6 What is the Nature of the First Cause?
involve the transformation of already existing materials, or that t

must be events. Concerning whether pre-existing materials are requir
God as a causal agent could have causal powers which other enti
(e.g., humans) do not have. While humans, for example, require p
existing materials to work from in order to create (say) a table, G
does not require that. 1 Concerning events, one can defend an alterna
ontological analysis according to which causality does not have to b
relation between events, rather the causes can be underlying substan
such as agents (see the discussion on agent causation in Chap. 5).2
On the other hand, one must be careful not to beg the quest
against the possibility of a timeless immaterial divine cause exist
causally prior to the first event, and freely choosing to actualise the fi
event in time. Additionally, there are independent arguments for
conclusion that an actual infinite temporal regress of events is impo
ble (Chaps. 2 and 3). Tus, it cannot be the case that every event wo
have at least part of the total cause preceding it in time, as Morris
claims. Rather there must be a first event. Moreover, there are in
pendent arguments for the causal principle that everything that beg
to exist has a cause (see Chap. 5). Terefore, the first event which h
beginning of existence would have a First Cause that is initially chan
less. Note, in particular, that the conceptual argument (Sect. 5.4.2
the reductio ad absurdum argument (Sect. 5.4.3) are not dependent
inductive considerations, and that because of Sects. 5.4.2 and 5.4.3
addition to Sect. 5.4.1) the causal principle enjoys greater support t
Morriston’s principle that ‘at least part of the total cause of every ev
precedes it in time’ which in any case can be regarded as an acciden
generalisation as Craig argues.
One might object that if time is relational, and the underly
relation is causal, causal priority would entail temporal priority.
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162 A. T. E. Loke
followed by another, causal priority does not imply temporal prio

One must not think of the uncaused existence being changeless
first-event and changes with the first event as a temporal successio
two states, because the original changeless state is not a state in time
timeless (time only starts with the first event), hence this is not a cas
succession of two temporal states.
Grünbaum (1994) objects that there is no generally accepted acco
that makes causal order independent of time order, and he claims
Craig has not provided an explication of that sense in which the ti
less First Cause is causally prior to the first event in time. In reply,
could simply say that the timeless First Cause is causally prior jus
case the timeless First Cause brings about the first event in time. S
the present issue is raised as an objection to the KCA, the obje
needs to bear the burden of proof to exclude the possibility of a ti
less Cause being causally prior to the first event in time. Given the
of justification for the assumption that causal priority implies temp
priority,3 this objection has no force.
It might be objected ‘if there is no time separating the timeless F
Cause and the first event, then the two must coexist. In that case, h
can it be that the First Cause is timeless sans (without) the first eve
In response, the difference in properties between timelessness and t
implies that the timeless First Cause and the first event do not co-e
and that the First Cause can be timeless without the first event.
6.2 A Timeless First Cause Cosmological

Model: Hartle–Hawking Model
A cosmological model which postulates a physical and impersonal ti
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of the universe was governed by the laws of science and doesn’t n

to be set in motion by some god’ (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010
134–135). He thinks that ‘once we add the effects of quantum the
to the theory of relativity, in extreme cases warpage can occur to su
a great extent that time behaves like another dimension of space… T
realization that time behaves like space… removes the age-old object
to the universe having a beginning’ (ibid.).
Hawking first suggested that time can behave like space back
the 1980s with a cosmological model named after himself and Jam
Hartle, also known as the No Boundary Proposal (Hartle and Hawk
1983). Te Hartle–Hawking model attempts to replace that initial s
gularity with some sort of quantum mechanical event. Cosmolo
William Stoeger states the background of this model as follows:
In the 1960s, John A. Wheeler and Bryce DeWitt had formulated th

elegant and well-known Wheeler–DeWitt equation, which describes th
quantum wave function of the universe. Tis essentially represents th
probability of different universes emerging from the initial cosmic quan
tum state. Under certain conditions on the Wheeler–DeWitt equation
there will be a definite probability that our particular universe will emerg
and begin to expand and cool as the FLRW model prescribes. It is impor
tant to realise that the Wheeler–DeWitt equation itself does not explicitl
contain time. In the quantum regime it describes, the wave function of th
universe in some definite sense just is. ime can emerge from the equa
tion with the fulfilment of appropriate boundary conditions. Ten in th
1980s, Hartle and Hawking showed, using the Wheeler–DeWitt equation
that with no initial three-dimensional spatial boundary for the cosmi
wave function, we can obtain a universe like ours. (Stoeger 2010, p. 178)
On the Hawking–Hartle model, the universe has a beginning

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164 A. T. E. Loke
effectively four dimensions of space and none of time… time as we kno

it does not exist!… Te realization that time can behave like anoth
direction of space means one can get rid of the problem of time having
beginning. (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010, p. 134)
Elsewhere, Hawking (2005) states that ‘to ask what happened be

the beginning of the universe would become a meaningless quest
because there is nothing south of the South Pole’. He elaborates,
ime, as measured in degrees of latitude, would have a beginning at th

South Pole, but the South Pole is much like any other point, at least so
have been told. I have been to Antarctica, but not to the South Pole. T
same laws of Nature hold at the South Pole as in other places. Tis wou
remove the age-old objection to the universe having a beginning; that
would be a place where the normal laws broke down. Te beginning
the universe would be governed by the laws of science. (ibid.)
With regards to the beginning of our universe, Hawking explains,
Te picture Jim Hartle and I developed of the spontaneous quantu

creation of the universe would be a bit like the formation of bubbles
steam in boiling water. Te idea is that the most probable histories of th
universe would be like the surfaces of the bubbles. Many small bubbl
would appear, and then disappear again. Tese would correspond
mini universes that would expand but would collapse again while still
microscopic size. Tey are possible alternative universes but they are n
of much interest since they do not last long enough to develop galaxi
and stars, let alone intelligent life. A few of the little bubbles, howeve
grow to a certain size at which they are safe from recollapse. Tey w
continue to expand at an ever increasing rate, and will form the bubbl
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In more recent years, Hawking has expressed that his favourite candid
for the physical theory that would unite all existing theories is
M-theory. He writes ‘M-theory is the only candidate for a complete t
ory of the universe’ (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010, p. 181).
Hawking has repeatedly expressed the implications of his proposal
the theism–atheism debate. In his bestseller A Brief History of ime
famously stated that ‘So long as the universe had a beginning, we co
suppose it had a creator. But if the universe is really self-contain
having no boundary or edge, it would have neither a beginning nor
end. It would simply BE. What place, then, for a creator?’ (Hawk
1988, pp. 140–141). A few other scientists and philosophers h
expressed their agreement with Hawking. For example, Fang and W
(1986, p. 75) claim that quantum cosmology implies that ‘in princi
one can predict everything in the universe solely from physical la
Tus, the long-standing “first cause” problem intrinsic in cosmol
has been finally dispelled.’ Philosopher Quentin Smith ( 1998) arg
that the ‘Hartle–Hawking’ cosmology is inconsistent with theism,
on this model the quantum wave function of the universe in Ha
and Hawking’s paper gives a probabilistic and non-causal explanat
of why our universe exists. In his more recent book Te Grand Des
Hawking explicitly claims that science is already able to explain ‘w
is there something rather than nothing’ and that there is no need
philosophy or God. His answer to the ultimate question of origin is t
‘Because there is a law like gravity, the universe can and will create it
from nothing’ (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010, p. 180).
6.3 Criticisms of Hawking

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166 A. T. E. Loke
that what Hawking (as well as other scientists who propose a univ
from ‘nothing’, such as Lawrence Krauss (2012) and Alexander Vilen
(2006) means by ‘nothing’ is not ‘non-being’, but rather an ene
possessing quantum vacuum (Daintith 2009), or at the very least so
thing that can behave according to the equations of quantum phy
As physicist Stephen Barr (2012, pp. 182–183) observes, in discus
‘quantum creation of universe’ from a ‘zero universe state’ one is not s
ing with sheer nothingness or blank non-existence, rather one start
assuming a ‘system’ that has a number of possible states, governed by
cific dynamical laws that have a precise logical and mathematical form
Moreover, physicist Aaron Wall argues that the Wheeler–DeWitt e
tion does not imply timelessness, rather it concerns the measurem
of time. Wall (2014) writes ‘when we say that the wavefunction doe
change with time, what this really means is that the choice of time c
dinate is arbitrary,’ not that time is an illusion or that it does not e
‘“ime” needs to be measured relative to some physical clock. Tere i
absolute “t” coordinate relative to which everything else moves’ (ibid.)
Te point of the above criticisms is that Hawking has not satisfacto
answered the ‘Big Questions’, such as ‘Where did everything (includ
nature and the laws of physics) come from?’ Lennox (2011, p. 31)
cinctly summarises the above criticisms against Hawking when he wri
It is seldom that one finds in a single statement two distinct levels of co

tradiction, but Hawking seems to have constructed such a statement. H
says the universe comes from a nothing that turns out to be a somethin
(self-contradiction number one), and then says the universe creates itse
(self-contradiction number two). But that is not all. His notion that a la
of nature (gravity) explains the existence of the universe is also self-con
tradictory, since a law of nature, by definition, surely depends for its ow
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On behalf of Hawking, however, it can be argued that what he re

wants to say is this: ‘Te initial state of the Universe consisted of
quantum vacuum in a timeless (no boundary) state in four-dimensio
curved space-time. According to general relativity, gravity is a c
sequence of curved space-time. Hence, the answer to the quest
“Where did gravity come from?” is that gravity existed because of
curved space-time, which existed timelessly and hence beginni
lessly and uncaused. Tis gravity caused a quantum particle to eme
from the quantum vacuum (which Hawking calls “nothing”), a
this resulted in the Big Bang. Tus there is no need for a Creator
the First Cause, rather the timeless initial state of the Universe its
is the First Cause of everything else that exists in the Universe (thi
my understanding of what Hawking is trying to convey when he wr
“Te Universe can and will create itself”). Since the initial state of
Universe is timeless, it has no beginning, and therefore does not n
a cause. o ask for a cause of this timeless state would be as meani
less as asking what is south of the South Pole. Te same laws of Nat
would hold at this timeless initial state of the Universe. Hence
beginning of the Universe would be governed by the laws of science.’
Tis interpretation of Hawking has certain parallels with the Kal
Cosmological Argument (KCA). As noted in previous chapters,
argument has been formulated by Craig as follows:

2. Te Universe began to exist.
3. Terefore, the Universe has a cause.
Craig argues that further analyses of the Cause of the Unive

show that this First Cause possesses various theistic properties, such
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168 A. T. E. Loke
implies that something that begins to exist has a cause, but, accord
to Hawking, the initial state of the Universe did not have a beginnin
Hence, while the abovementioned criticisms by Lennox and
ers raise legitimate questions and reveal the flaws in the way Hawk
stated his proposal, the criticisms have failed to strike the hear
Hawking’s proposal. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the ab
reply offered on behalf of Hawking’s proposal—i.e., using the no
of timelessness which cannot be empirically tested, and explaining
timelessness implies that there is no need for a cause—is philosoph
rather than scientific in nature. Terefore, contrary to Hawking, ph
ophy is not dead but very much alive, and needs to be alive if Hawk
wants to defend his own proposal. It should be noted, however
the fact that philosophy is alive only makes it possible for Hawkin
defend his proposal; it does not imply that Hawking’s proposal is t
On the contrary, I shall argue below that there are in fact stronger p
osophical reasons for thinking that his proposal is false.
Now Craig also offers three reasons for thinking that the First C
is personal:
1. A first state of the Universe cannot have a scientific explanation: s

there is nothing before it, it cannot be accounted for in terms of
operating on initial conditions. It can only be accounted for in te
of an agent and his volitions, in other words a personal explanatio
2. Tere appear to be only two kinds of entities which can be im
terial beginningless, uncaused, timeless, and spaceless: either
abstract object or an unembodied mind. But an abstract object
not be the cause of the Universe, because abstract objects do not h
independent causal powers. Tus, the cause of the Universe mus
an unembodied mind.
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freely bringing about conditions which were not previously present. Fo

example, a man sitting changelessly from eternity could freely will to stan
up; thus, a temporal effect arises from an eternally existing agent. Similarly
a finite time ago a Creator endowed with free will could have freel
brought the world into being at that moment. In this way, the Creato
could exist changelessly and eternally but choose to create the world i
time. By ‘choose’ one need not mean that the Creator changes his min
about the decision to create but that he freely and eternally intends to cre
ate a world with a beginning. By exercising his causal power, he therefor
brings it about that a world with a beginning comes to exist. (ibid.)
However, Hawking might object that the three reasons Craig offers
thinking that the First Cause is personal are insufficient. For exam
it might be objected that, if the initial state of the Universe is time
and beginningless as Hawking suggests, then it would not need to
accounted for, because it would be uncaused. Moreover, the time
initial state of the Universe would be an uncaused First Cause tha
material and spatial, and therefore something other than an abstr
object or an unembodied mind. Additionally, Hawking’s prop
would also show how a temporal effect (e.g., the Big Bang) could
from a timeless first cause in the way described earlier.
Nevertheless, the above replies made on Hawking’s behalf do
imply that Hawking’s proposal is therefore plausible. Philosophers a
scientists have highlighted various technical problems with the propo
For example, the so-called ‘imaginary time’ which is used in the mo
has been criticised for being physically unintelligible and having no c
crete meaning (similar to an imaginary number such as √-1), and th
fore merely a mathematical trick used for avoiding a singularity. W
imaginary numbers are used to represent the time coordinate in relati
theory, this should be regarded merely as an analytical device and illus
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170 A. T. E. Loke
not correspond to physical reality. In that case, Hawking’s model wo

not achieve Hawking’s intended purpose of justifying the claim that
beginning of the universe… doesn’t need to be set in motion by s
god’ (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010, pp. 134–135). Moreover, it w
not block the cosmological argument which Craig, myself and ot
have presented, because the reasons we have offered in support for
cosmological argument implies that the conclusion of the argum
(i.e., there is a personal Creator) should be taken in a realist manner
Additionally, Hawking’s endorsement of the M-theory has been
icised because the theory is not well-defined and lacks evidence in s
port (Lennox 2011, pp. 53–54). Hawking’s cosmological model has
been criticised as being ad hoc in the sense that it does not flow fro
more comprehensive unification of general relativity and quantum
ory (Halvorson and Kragh 2011). Ellis (2007, Sect. 2.7.2) explains
the attempt to develop a fully adequate quantum gravity approach
cosmology is hampered by the lack of a fully adequate theory of qu
tum gravity, as well as by the problems at the foundation of quan
theory (the measurement problem, collapse of the wave function, e
which can be ignored in many laboratory situations but have to be f
in the cosmological context.
Gott and Li have criticised the Hawking–Hartle model for igno
the ‘zero-point energy’. Tey explain that when the ‘zero-point ene
is considered, we see that the initial state is a tiny oscillating Big B
universe that oscillates between Big Bangs and Big Crunches. ‘It is m
astable, so this oscillating universe could not have existed forever: aft
finite half-life, it is likely to decay’ (Gott and Li 1998, p. 38).
In view of the above criticisms, Hawking has certainly not sho
that science is already able to explain ‘Why is there something ra
than nothing?’ without the need for a Creator, contrary to his cla
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with Hawking’s model and argue that cosmological models wh

postulate a timeless impersonal First Cause 5 can never in principle
rid of the long-standing ‘First Cause problem’ intrinsic in cosmology
6.5 Deeper Conceptual Problem

with Hawking’s Model
Te ‘First Cause problem’ arises from difficulties with an actual infin
regress of causal explanations in answer to the question concerning u
mate origins. Hawking’s proposal can be understood as an attempt
terminate this regress with the postulation of an initial timeless state
the universe as the beginningless First Cause.
Now it has already been argued in Chaps. 2, 3 and 4 that an ac
infinite regress of temporal events ( = changes), each of which ha
beginning, is contradicted by the argument against concrete infinit
the argument for the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite, a
premise 3 of my new cosmological argument, and that a causal loop t
avoids a First Cause is metaphysically impossible as well. Tus, th
must be a first change requiring a beginningless First Cause which m
therefore have been either in: (1) an initially changeless-in-timeless st
causally antecedent to the first change; or (2) an initially changeless s
with an actual infinite past extension on a substantive view of time, ca
ally and temporally antecedent to the first change (this view is propo
by Alan Padgett (1992); according to this view, God exists before
ation in an undifferentiated, non-metric time). In either case, the F
Cause would be initially changeless. Someone might suggest an alter
tive possibility that the first change began to exist without causal an
cedent, but this is contradicted by the arguments offered in Chap. 5
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172 A. T. E. Loke
an initially timeless First Cause with free will, and that such an en
freely brought the first event (and with it, the first moment of ti
into existence (Craig 1979).6 Concerning how an initially timeless
changeless First Cause could change and cause the first event in t
it should be noted that ‘changeless-in-timelessness’ only means ‘with
change in timelessness’; it does not imply an inability to change. I h
not affirmed a changeless entity that remains changeless. Rather, I h
affirmed an entity that is initially without change sans (without)
first event.
On the one hand, it is not incoherent to suggest that an entity w
a free will that is initially without change sans (without) the first ev
could freely decide to change. One might object that for x to chan
for x to have property p at t m that x does not have at t n, and there
it is impossible that timeless entities change. However, proponent
KCA can argue that ‘for x to change is for x to have property p a
that x does not have at t n, or for x to have p in timelessness that x
not have at t ,’ and thus there is no incoherence there.
On the other hand, the First Cause must have the capacity to cha
in order to cause the first effect that led to the creation of our unive
What we need to ask is how it could be possible for the First
to change from an initial changeless state. For the First Cause tha
initially changeless to change, the First Cause must have:
1. the capacity to initiate change, for the change cannot be caused

another entity since the First Cause is the First.
2. the capacity to prevent itself from changing initially (i.e., the capa
to prevent the capacity to initiate change from initiating it initia
for otherwise the First Cause would not have been initially chan
less. (Hence the problem is not that the first effect would be coe
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would already be there in the initial timeless state of the universe

gravity would beginninglessly be there as well, and under the effe
of gravity the initial timeless state would not be initially changel
(Tere is also nothing in Hawking’s proposal that would endow
initial timeless state with the capacity to prevent itself from chang
initially.) On the contrary, there would be changes such as parti
emerging spontaneously from the quantum vacuum as a result of gr
ity (as explained previously, Hawking uses this to explain how the u
verse is created from the quantum vacuum), as well as the curved sp
having changing relations with these emerging particles. Terefo
Hawking’s proposal is conceptually inadequate.
6.6 Is the First Cause a Person?

Instead of Hawking’s timeless initial quantum state of the Unive
what is required is an entity that is initially changeless, and which
unlike a quantum state—possesses a certain property that enab
the entity to initiate the first change, yet also to have the capacity
prevent itself from changing initially. Te required property fits
description of libertarian agency, which postulates a personal agent h
ing the power to initiate change as a first mover (without being ca
ally necessitated by prior events), and also having the ability to refr
from exercising this power (Moreland 1997, 1998, pp. 266–267).
possession of libertarian agency therefore explains how an entity tha
initially changeless could change and cause entities that exist in ti
Craig (2002) explains that ‘Such an account of the origin of the u
verse will work only for agent causation, for only a libertarian ag
could interrupt the static reign of being of the First Cause sans the u
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174 A. T. E. Loke
personal Creator given that the First Cause possesses libertarian

will. Hence, contrary to Hawking, there is still a place for the Creato
the First Cause.
Craig has replied to various objections against the conclusion that
First Cause of the universe is a divine person (see, for example, C
1998, 2000, pp. 241–244; (Craig and Sinclair 2009), Sect. 3.0).
example, against the worry that, if every beginning has a cause, t
the beginning of the event which is ‘ an agent’s causing an event’
cause (Rowe 2003, p. 73), which appears to generate an infinite reg
of causes, Craig explains that ‘Partisans of agent causation typically
that the agent’s causing some effect is not an event requiring a ca
either because it is not itself an event, but just a way of describ
an agent’s causing an event, or if it is an event, then it is not fur
caused’(Craig and Sinclair 2009 p. 194n. 101, citing O’Connor
Chap. 3).
It might be objected that, if an event in the First Cause led to
series of events of our universe, the event in the First Cause wo
have to be part of all the events of the Universe. Terefore, the F
Cause has to be part of the Universe and cannot be considered its c
tor, and thus the argument is self-defeating. Tis objection is based
the assumption that no event can be outside of the space-time of
Universe, and that space-time is the mereological sum of all events o
things. However, it can be replied that this assumption begs the q
tion against the existence of non-physical entities which can be space
but temporal. One can conceive of God as a spaceless agent who is
part of the Universe but who can be in time, and one must be car
not to hold assumptions that beg the question by presupposing
such a God does not exist.
Quentin Smith (1996) contends that there is no standard theor
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bring about certain effects, and if God’s being a cause cannot be acco
modated by Smith’s philosophical definition of causality, then that pl
sibly constitutes a counterexample to the definition (Craig 2000
241–244). One must be careful not to beg the question against a div
cause by defining causality in such a way that the definition expresse
prejudice against the possibility of divine cause, by excluding a div
cause on the basis of definition without independent argument.
Morriston (2000, p. 165) has argued that God’s changeless s
of willing the universe is sufficient for the existence of the unive
and is an instance of state–state causation. In reply, Craig denies t
God’s eternally willing to create the Universe, properly understo
is sufficient for the existence of the universe. Citing J.P. Morela
Craig argues that it is insufficient for P to have merely the intent
and power to bring about R, rather there must also be a basic act
on the part of P, a free undertaking, endeavouring or exercising of
causal powers which took place simultaneously with the first effect
time. Craig concludes
the failing of Morriston’s objection is that in speaking of God’s willin

that the universe exist, he does not differentiate between God’s timeles
intention to create a temporal world and God’s undertaking to create
temporal world. Once we make the distinction, we see that creation e
nihilo is not an instance of state–state causation and is therefore not sus
ceptible to Morriston’s objection. (Craig 2002)
It has been claimed that the idea that an atemporal, changeless be

can be transformed into a temporal being is as absurd as a person i
painting suddenly rising up and leaving his material frame (remb
2004). Now it is indeed absurd for a person in the painting to le
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176 A. T. E. Loke
It has also been objected that a timeless agent cannot remem

anticipate, reflect, deliberate, etc., and therefore cannot be persona
response, Craig notes that timelessness could be a contingent prop
of the uncaused entity such that such an entity ‘might be quite c
ble of remembering, anticipating, reflecting, and so forth; only w
he to do so, then he would not then be timeless’ (Craig 1998, p. 1
Moreover, the activities mentioned above are not essential to perfect
sonhood; for example, reflecting and deliberating are ‘essential only
persons who are not omniscient. For a perfect knower reflection
deliberation in any temporal sense are precluded, since he would alre
know the conclusions to be arrived at’ (ibid.). 7
Craig points out that the weakness of the objection is that it
conflates common properties of persons with essential properties of pe

sons. Te sorts of activities delineated above are certainly common pro
erties of temporal persons. But that does not imply that such properti
are essential to personhood. Arguably, what is necessary and sufficien
for personhood is self-consciousness and free volition, and these are n
inherently temporal notions. (Craig 1999, p. 736)
Craig cites John Yates (1990, p. 173), who writes, ‘Tere does
seem to be any essential temporal element in words like … “un
stand”, to “be aware,” to “know,” and so on… an atemporal deity co
possess maximal understanding, awareness, and knowledge in a sin
all-embracing vision of himself and the sum of reality.’
Against Craig’s view that God is timeless sans creation and in
with creation, Leftow argues that, since being temporal is intrin
while timeless God cannot become temporal. Moreover, Leftow
that Craig’s hybrid view would deny that God exists without beginn
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initiate change in the state of timelessness. Tis hybrid view affir

that, where God’s existence in time is concerned, there is a first mom
and a beginning. However, this does not imply that ‘God’s existence
a beginning’ simpliciter, because God’s existence is not limited to ex
ence in time only, rather God exists timelessly sans creation. As arg
previously, one must not think of God being timeless sans creation
in time with creation as a temporal succession of two states. Te rea
is because the original state is not a state in time but timeless (time o
start with first event), hence this is not a case of succession of two te
poral states.
6.7 The Ultimate Source of the Universe

I have argued that our universe has a personal First Cause. Being
ultimate cause of our universe, the First Cause would be the ultim
source of the laws of nature as well. Given that an actual infinite regr
is impossible as well as the other premises which I have defended,
answer to the question which Lennox posed to Hawking, viz., ‘Wh
did the laws of nature come from?’, is that they came from a Perso
Creator of the universe.
On the other hand, the laws of nature would be another reason,
addition to the argument that the First Cause must have libertar
free will in order to cause the first effect from an initial changeless st
for thinking that the First Cause must be personal in virtue of be
the Mind behind these ‘laws’. For such a Mind would explain why
mindless bits of matter in the universe could behave in a consistent a
coordinated manner that is describable by elegant mathematical eq
tions. As Polkinghorne argues with respect to atheism and theism us
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178 A. T. E. Loke
a happy accident… Science surveys a world whose order makes it appe

shot through with signs of mind, and the religious believer can affir
that this is so because it is indeed the Mind of God that is revealed
the works of creation. (Polkinghorne 2006, pp. 62–64; see also Frederi
2013, pp. 269–283)
Given that the causation of the first event from an initial change
state requires a freely chosen act of the First Cause (as argued pr
ously), and given that the act resulted in a universe with intricate l
which can be described by elegant mathematical equations(and
might add in considerations from the so-called Fine uning of the
verse as well, see Lewis and Barnes 2016), there are good reasons
thinking that the first event was freely chosen and intelligently plan
by the First Cause rather than a random event.
Finally, Craig and Sinclair (2009, p. 192) argue that the First C
must be enormously powerful in order to cause the entirety of phy
reality, including all matter and energy and space-time itself.
In conclusion, it has been shown in this chapter that the First C
is uncaused, beginningless, initially changeless, personal, the ultim
source of the laws of nature, and enormously powerful. Te significa
of this conclusion will be discussed in the final chapter of this book.
Notes
1. I thank Fr. Michael Dodds for this point.
2. See also Alfred Freddoso’s comparison of Suarez’s analysis of causa
with contemporary theories in Freddoso’s Introduction to Suarez (
3. See further the discussion in Sect. 2.2 of Schaffer (2008). Sch
discusses a number of arguments for and against, none of whic
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B-theory does not imply that events which lie in our future are caus
determined with respect to antecedent event. Indeed, some such ev
could be wholly undetermined by antecedent causes. On any sta
ard definition of libertarian freedom, therefore, such an event could
a genuinely free choice.’ He also argues that, ‘on a B-theory of ti
although we cannot change the future, we can act in such a way th
we were to act in that way, the future would be different’ (ibid.).
7. Te other activities with respect to perfect personhood are discusse
Craig (1998, pp. 115–23).
References
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Craig, William Lane. 1998. Divine imelessness and Personho
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Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/ent
cosmology-theology/.
Hartle, James, and Stephen Hawking. 1983. Wave Function of the Univ
Hawking, Stephen. 1988. A Brief History of ime . London: Bantam.
Hawking, Stephen. 1993. Black Holes and Baby Universes and Other E
New York: Bantam.
Hawking, Stephen. 2005. Te Origin of the Universe. http://www.hawk
org.uk/the-origin-of-the-universe.html. Accessed 21 Jan 2017.
Hawking, Stephen, and Leonard Mlodinow. 2010. Te Grand Design
York: Bantam Books.
Howson, Colin. 2011. Objecting to God . New York: Cambridge Unive
Press.
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Leftow, Brian. 2010. Eternity. In A Companion to Philosophy of Religion

C. aliaferro, P. Draper, and P. Quinn, 2nd ed. Chichester: Wiley.
Lennox, John. 2011. God and Stephen Hawking . Oxford: Lion.
Lewis, Geraint, and Luke A. Barnes. 2016. A Fortunate Universe: Life
Finely uned Cosmos . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moreland, J.P. 1997. Agent Causation and the Craig/Grünbaum De
about Teistic Explanation of the Initial Singularity. American Cath
Philosophical Quarterly 71: 539–554.
Moreland, J.P. 1998. Te Explanatory Relevance of Libertarian Agency.
Mere Creation, ed. William Dembski. Downer’s Grove: Intervarsity.
Morriston, Wes. 2000. Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Perso
Cause? A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.
and Philosophy 17: 149–169.
Morriston, Wes. 2002. Causes and Beginnings in the Kalam Argument: R
to Craig. Faith and Philosophy 19: 233–244.
O’Connor, imothy. 2000. Persons and Causes: Te Metaphysics of Free W
Padgett, Alan. 1992. God, Eternity, and the Nature of ime . New York:
Martin’s.
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of Religion and Science , ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson. Oxf
Rowe, William. 2003. Reflections on the Craig-Flew Debate. In Does
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182 A. T. E. Loke
Stoeger, William. 2010. God, Physics and the Big Bang. In Te Camb
Companion to Science and Religion, ed. Peter Harrison. Cambr
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talkreason.org/articles/Craig.cfm. Accessed 5 July 2013.
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ty-theorem/. Accessed 20 Jan 2017.
Yates, John. 1990. Te imelessness of God . Lanham: University Pres
America.
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7
The Conclusion of Our Quest
Te question of ultimate origins is one of the biggest questions hum

can ever ask. In Chap. 1, I explained that science and philosophy
complement one another in our quest for the answer, and that ph
sophical arguments are capable of yielding answers concerning rea
which are more epistemically certain than scientific discoveries.
In Chap. 2, I observed that, on the one hand, there is presently
adequate evidence for thinking that any of the cosmological mod
which propose an infinite temporal regress is true. On the other ha
the conclusion that there was a beginning to all physical things is
inconsistent with mainstream science. Indeed, a number of emin
physicists (including atheists and theists) have argued that the curr
scientific evidence indicates that it is likely that there was such a beg
ning. I explained that the concern that there might have been an ear
stage in which physical things operate in accordance with quite diff
ent physical laws can be addressed by philosophical arguments wh
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184 A. T. E. Loke
impossibility of traversing an actual infinite. Critics have raised var

objections to these arguments, which I have replied to in Chap. 2.
In Chap. 3, I developed a new argument which demonstrates
there is a First Cause of time. Te new argument is as follows:
1. Tere exist entities that: (i) are members of a causal series; and
begin to exist.
3. If there is an entity that: (i) is a member of a causal series; and
begins to exist, then there is an uncaused entity X.
4. Tere exists an X which is uncaused and beginningless (From 1, 2 and
5. If X is uncaused and beginningless, nothing exists prior to it,
therefore it is a First Cause.
6. X is a First Cause (From 4 and 5).
I defended the premises and showed that, in a series of causes in wh

each of the causes requires a preceding cause if it begins to exist,
entities would not have begun to exist, no matter how many of th
there are, unless there is an entity which can cause another but i
does not require a cause, in other words it is uncaused and be
ningless. And since this entity is beginningless and uncaused, n
ing exists prior to it, and therefore it is a First Cause. I explained
my argument utilises the insights of both the Kalam and the Tom
Cosmological Arguments. It has advantages over the Kalam a
demonstrates the existence of a First Cause of time without requi
the argument for the impossibility of concrete actual infinities and
argument for the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite. I
therefore, immune to objections which attempt to undercut these a
ments. It has advantages over the Tomist and Leibnizian Cosmolog
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7 The Conclusion of Our Quest
In Chap. 4, I observed that we currently do not have good reas

for thinking that a causal loop which avoids a First Cause exists.
the other hand, there are good reasons for thinking that such a lo
cannot exist. Te postulation that such a loop exists in dynamic t
would require an actual infinite past cycles of caused events. Ti
contradicted by the arguments against concrete infinities and aga
traversing an actual infinite discussed in Chap. 2, and by the argum
in Chap. 3. Te postulation that such a loop exists in in static tim
beset by the problem of vicious circularity.
In Chap. 5, I showed that objections against the Causal Princ
(such as those that are supposedly based on quantum physics) are ba
on misunderstandings. I offered a novel argument for the causal princ
which demonstrates that, if something (e.g., the Universe) begins to e
uncaused, then other kinds of things/events which can begin to e
would also begin to exist uncaused. As explained in detail in Chap.
reason is because
i. there would not be any causally antecedent condition which w

make it the case that only universes (rather than other kinds
things) begin to exist; and
ii. the properties of universes and of other kinds of things/events wh
differentiate between them would be had by them only when t
had already begun to exist.
I explained that my argument shows that the Causal Principle is

only valid for our experiences of reality, but also for reality itself, a
that it is not only valid within the Universe but also with respect to
beginning of the Universe itself, for if it isn’t our experiences wo
be very different from what they are. In addition, it is unreasonable
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186 A. T. E. Loke
In Chap. 6, I demonstrated that, on the basis of the arguments in

previous chapters, the First Cause is uncaused, beginningless and
tially changeless. Such a First Cause must have the capacity to cha
in order to cause the first effect that eventually led to the creation of
universe. For the First Cause that is initally changeless to change,
First Cause must have:
1. the capacity to initiate change, for the change cannot be caused

another entity since the First Cause is the First.
2. the capacity to prevent itself from changing, for otherwise the F
Cause would not have been initially changeless.
Tis property is not characteristic of quantum systems which ar

constant change, rather it is characteristic of a libertarian agent, i.e
Person with libertarian free will. Moreover, the First Cause would
be the ultimate source of the ‘laws of nature’. Finally, the First Ca
must be enormously powerful in order to bring about all of phy
reality.
Tus, our journey in search of an answer to the question of ultim
origins has arrived at a First Cause who is uncaused, beginningless,
tially changeless, personal, the ultimate source of the ‘laws of natu
and enormously powerful. Such a First Cause has all the essential pr
erties of being a Personal Creator of the Universe. Laurence Kr
(2012, xi–xiii) had asked ‘what is the difference between arguing
favor of an eternally existing creator versus an eternally existing univ
without one?’ Te difference is that an eternally existing Creator is
sonal while an eternally existing universe is not, and it has been sho
that there exists a First Cause who is personal. Terefore, an etern
existing Personal Creator of the universe exists.
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be beginningless. Te rest of the properties—initially changeless, perso

the ultimate source of the laws of nature‚ and enormously powerful—
likewise derived on the basis of reasons rather than ignorance, as shown
Chap. 6.
Can the conclusion of the argument be overturned by future sci
tific discoveries?
On the one hand, I have explained in Chap. 1 that our inabi
to observe such a First Cause does not prove that such a First Ca
does not exist. On the other hand, it has been shown in the rest of
chapters that, using the deductive-inductive principles of reason
which underlie science itself, it can be demonstrated that there is a F
Cause of the things which we observe, and who is a Personal Crea
and the ultimate source of the laws of nature as well. Without th
principles and this Creator, science would not have been possible.
explained previously in Chap. 1, the conclusion that such a Crea
exists is not a science-stopper, for one can regard science as a discov
of the processes by which the Creator created the universe and how c
ated things operate. While the progress of science would generate ne
scientific explanations for physical reality to replace older ones, it wo
never replace the need for such a First Cause to explain the existence
physical reality and of science itself.
Moreover, it has been explained in previous chapters that metaph
cal impossibility is stronger than scientific impossibility. For while ‘la
of nature’ may vary from one possible world to another and differ
possible worlds may have different ‘laws’ (Sidelle 2002), logically
metaphysically necessary truths such as ‘shapeless cubes do not ex
and ‘an actual infinite regress of causes does not exist’ are true in all
sible worlds. Since such conclusions are true in all possible worlds, t
cannot be overturned by future scientific discoveries.
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188 A. T. E. Loke
quadratic equation example discussed in Chap. 2. Te lesson we l

from this example is that what is mathematically possible is not a
ally possible if it violates certain metaphysical considerations. Likew
cosmological models which are mathematically possible are not a
ally possible if they violate certain metaphysical considerations. On
other hand, it should be noted that what is mathematically impos
is metaphysically impossible as well. For example, 2 x 2 cannot be eq
to anything else other than 4. Likewise, 0 + 0 + 0… cannot be a
thing else other than 0—this is utilised as a justification for the a
ment presented in Chap. 3. In view of the importance of philosoph
considerations explained in Chap. 1‚ the cosmologist should not b
models of space–time without considering the metaphysical difficu
associated with certain models. However‚ there are some cosmolo
who may choose to ignore these philosophical problems because of t
scientism‚ which (perhaps unbeknown to them) is also a philosoph
view and‚ as explained in Chap. 1‚ an erroneous one.
It has been shown in previous chapters that my arguments for a F
Cause are based on metaphysical necessary truths, while the deriva
of the various properties of the First Cause follows from logical anal
As explained in Chap. 1, the conclusions of those philosophical a
ments which can yield answers that are more epistemically certain t
scientific discoveries should be regarded as knowledge about reality
at least the same level as scientific facts, rather than as mere spec
tion. Hence, the conclusion that there is a Creator can be regarded t
at least as epistemically certain as the firmest conclusions of science
fact, there are good reasons for thinking that the conclusion is stron
than the conclusions of science, for even the radical sceptic who do
the existence of the world external to his/her mind cannot avoid
conclusion that this Personal First Cause exists. Te reason is bec
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Dawkins (2006, p. 77) has complained that cosmological argume

‘rely upon the idea of a regress and invoke God to terminate it. T
make the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immu
to the regress.’ However, in this book I did not first define God a
then invoke God to terminate the regress. Rather, I have argued for
existence of the First Cause, and then deduce the properties which
First Cause must have. Tese properties turn out to be the same a
number of properties many people associate with God, i.e., uncaus
beginningless, personal, the ultimate source of the laws of nature‚ a
enormously powerful.
Dawkins (2006, p. 188) has also asked the infamous question ‘W
designed the designer?’ In reply, design presupposes causation; if som
thing is designed by a person, then the person is a cause of that th
being what it is. Tus, if something is uncaused, then it cannot
designed. As explained in Chaps. 5 and 6, only things which begin to e
require a cause. On the other hand, something that is without beginn
has always existed and therefore does not require a cause or a design
As argued in previous chapters, the Cosmological Argument shows
there cannot be an actual infinite regress of causes ( =>there cannot be
infinite regress of designers), therefore there must be an uncaused F
Cause who is beginningless and does not require a designer.
Finally, Dawkins (2006, pp. 101–102) complains that
Cosmological Argument does not prove that this First Cause has ot
properties which many people associate with God, viz., perfect, omn
cient, omnipotent, omnipresent, etc., and it does not prove that ther
only one Creator.
In reply, as Craig points out, believing that there is a single u
fied First Cause is very reasonable, for it is consistent with the wid
accepted scientific principle (Ockham’s razor) that causes should
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190 A. T. E. Loke
the laws of nature‚ and enormously powerful (and who might wel
omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, perfect, and so on)?’ (Craig 20
If we do not call this First Cause God, then what shall we call H
Even if we do not call Him God, we should at least call Him
Creator, given that He is personal and the First Cause of all thing
our universe. We might seek to find out whether there are eviden
which indicate that this Creator had revealed Himself in other
for example, in history. 2 For He might have provided us with a
tional reasons for thinking that He is indeed omniscient, omnipot
omnipresent, perfect and so on, as well as revealed to us His purp
for creation. For given that this Creator exists, it may not be true
there is ‘at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, noth
but blind pitiless indifference’, as Dawkins puts it. On the contrary
should seek to know the Creator if we want to find out whether ther
at bottom, any purpose or goodness. And there is some indication
there is, for the wonder that we experience when we gaze into the n
sky and our moral conscience seem to point to it. 3 Te Creator is
answer to the question of ultimate origins, and the One in whom
may find the ultimate meaning and purpose of existence.
Notes
1. It should be noted that this argument does not exclude the possib
that we could have other reasons (e.g., historical evidences of divine
elation) for thinking that the single ‘First Cause’ is a ri-unity of Per
(i.e., a single First Cause in which there are three Persons). See More
and Craig (2003, pp. 575–596); Loke (2017).
2. I provide an assessment of some of the evidences in Loke (2017).
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Craig, William Lane. 2010. Te New Atheism and Five Arguments for G
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-new-atheism-and-five-arguments-f
god. Accessed 21 Jan 2017.
Dawkins, Richard. 2006. Te God Delusion. London: Bantam Press.
Einstein‚ Albert. 1987. Letters to Solovine‚ translated by Wade Baskin‚ with
introduction by Maurice Solovine . New York: Philosophical Library.
Krauss, Lawrence. 2012. A Universe from Nothing: Why Tere is Somet
Rather than Nothing . New York: Free Press.
Lewis, Geraint, and Luke A. Barnes. 2016. A Fortunate Universe: Life
Finely uned Cosmos . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Loke‚ Andrew. 2017. Te Origins of Divine Christology. Society for N
estament Studies Monograph Series. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer
Press.
Moreland, J.P., and William Lane Craig. 2003. Philosophical Foundations f
Sidelle, Alan. 2002. On the Metaphysical Contingency of Laws of Nat
In Conceivability and Possibility , ed. amar Gendler, and John Hawtho
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Erratum to: Is the Number of Prior Cause

and Durations Infinite? An Assessment
of the Current Literature
Erratum to:
Chapter 2 in: A. . E. Loke, God and Ultimate Origins , Palgr
Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57547-6_2
Te original version of the book was inadvertently published wit

paragraph missing on page 74 of Chapter 2. Te following paragra
has been inserted: Morriston (2013, pp. 26–27) claims that ‘From
fact that we cannot—beginning now—complete the task of enume
ing all the events in a beginningless series, it does not follow that
present event cannot arrive or that a beginningless series of events t
have already arrived is impossible. o suppose otherwise would be
confuse the items to be enumerated with the enumerating of them—
would be like arguing that there must be finitely many natural
bers because we can’t finish counting them.’ In reply, arriving at
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E2 A. T. E. Loke
completed. Te problem is not due to our ability to enumerate; rat

it is due to the nature of an actual infinite which is too large to be c
pleted via a one-after-another process. While there can be an infi
number of natural numbers in the abstract (see Sect. 2.6), to comp
an actual infinite in the concrete is a separate issue and the real i
here.
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Author Index
A Bojowald, Martin 37
Ali, Ahmed Farag 38 Bussey, Peter 39, 128, 137
Anscombe, Elizabeth 134 Butterfield, Jeremy 129
Aquinas, Tomas 42, 85, 86, 97–99
Aristotle 62, 65, 66, 76, 87, 102,
154 C
Aspect, Alain 131 Cantor, Geog 54
Atkins, Peter 2, 5, 7 Capes, Justin 152
Audi, Robert 87 Carroll, Sean 38, 114, 116
Casati, Roberto 89
Churchland, Paul M. 18
B Clarke, Randolph 152
Bacciagaluppi, Guido 130 Cohoe, Caleb 98, 100
Barnes, Luke A. 178, 185 Craig, William Lane 23–25, 34
Barr, Stephen 36, 166 38–45, 47, 48, 54, 60–64
Baum, Lauris 37 75–77, 86–89, 97, 99, 100
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194 Author Index
D Gasperini, Maurizio 37
Daintith, John 127, 166 Gendler, amar 40
Das, Saurya 38 Gödel, Kurt 112
Date, Ghanashyam 37 Goldstein, Sheldon 11, 129, 131
Davies, Brian 101 132
Dawkins, Richard 1, 14, 19, 20, 25, Gott, Richard III 24, 37, 112–11
159, 189, 190 120, 170
Dedekind, Richard 54 Grünbaum, Adolf 17, 18, 31, 33
Dorato, Mauro 103 75, 126, 162
Dowden, Bradley 102, 110 Guminski, Arnold 60
E H
Earman, John 112, 114, 116 Halvorson, Hans 31, 50, 170
East, James 54 Hanley, Richard 121
Einstein, Albert 30, 185 Hartle, James 25, 33, 37, 162–16
Ellis, George 5, 6, 30, 37, 38, 47, 50, 170
51, 74, 75, 127, 170 Hawking, Stephen 2, 8, 25, 33
Esfeld, Michael 103 115, 162–165, 170
Hawthorne, John 40, 104
Hedrick, Landon 44, 46, 55
F Hilbert, David 43
Fang, L.Z. 162, 165 Hitchcock, Christopher 92
Faye, Jan 115, 118 Holder, Rodney 130
Feferman, Solomon 53 Hooker, Clifford A. 18
Feser, Edward 100 Hossain, Golam Mortuza 37
Feynman, Richard 131 Howson, Colin 126, 159
Fine, Kit 40 Huemer, Michael 76, 77
Ford, Kenneth 47, 129 Hume, David 91, 103, 133, 154
Frampton, P.H. 37
Freddoso, Alfred 178
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Author Index
Kitcher, Philip 14 Monton, Bradley 50, 110, 111,

Koons, Robert 75, 135 Moore, Adrian William 53
Kragh, Helge 50, 170 Moreland, James Porter 46, 77,
Krauss, Lawrence 39, 127, 137, 166, 173, 175, 190
186 Morriston, Wes 39, 49, 51, 55,
175
Morton, Bradley 111
L Mumford, Stephen 92
Leftow, Brian 176
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 86, 141
Lemaître, Georges 30–32 N
Lennox, John 165, 166, 170 Naeye, Robert 91
Le Poidevin, Robin 46, 111 Nelson, Michael 110
Levy, Neil 152 Nowacki, Mark 76, 138
Lewis, David 45, 113, 117, 121
Li, Li-Xin 24, 37, 112, 114, 119,
120, 170 O
Linde, Andrei 37 Oaklander, Nathan 33, 69, 89
Lloyd, Seth 115 O’Connor, imothy 174
Loke, Andrew 77, 104, 190 Oderberg, David 101
Lombard, Lawrence 89 Oppy, Graham 41, 51, 54, 58,
Lowe, E.J. 152 69, 76, 121, 133, 139, 140
Lucas, John 88 143, 150, 155
Lyth, Peter 76
P
M Padgett, Alan 97, 160, 171
Maartens, Roy 37 Parsons, Keith 18
Mackie, John Leslie 89, 102, 134 Pérez, Daniela 118
Maddy, Penelope 52, 53 Perlmutter, Julian 77
Marenbon, John 98 Philipse, Herman 8, 54, 126
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196 Author Index
Poplawski, Nikodem Janusz 37 Strawson, Galen 90, 93

Potter, Karl 86 Stump, Eleonore 101
Pruss, Alexander 103 Swinburne, Richard 16, 17, 136
Psillos, Stathis 93, 103
Pullin, Jorge 51
Puryear, Stephen 64–66 T
Putnam, Hilary 131 ooley, Michael 103
owler, Mike 132, 133
remblay, Francois 175
R rigg, Roger 5, 7
Rea, Michael 16 urok, Neil 37
Reichenbach, Bruce 35, 36, 85, 96,
97, 135
Reid, Tomas 125, 153 V
Rickles, Dean 115 Valentini, Antony 130
Romero, Gustavo 118 Van Bendegem, Jean Paul 47
Rowe, William 174 van Fraassen, Bas 18
Russell, Bertrand 69, 89, 135 Varzi, Achille 89
Veneziano, Gabriele 37
Vilenkin, Alexander 37, 115, 127
S 166
Schaffer, Jonathan 116, 178 Von Wright, Georg Henrik 89
Sidelle, Alan 187
Silk, Joseph 35
Sinclair, James 25, 34–36, 39–42, W
44, 45, 48, 62–64, 67, 87, 97, Wall, Aaron 38, 39, 166
115, 134, 136, 138, 141, 160, Waters, Ben 75
167, 168, 172, 174, 178, 189 Weinberg, Steven 21, 36
Smith, Quentin 31, 33, 69, 75, 86, Wolchover, Natalie 49
125, 160, 165, 174, 178 Wüthrich, Christian 112, 116
Smith, Sheldon 89 Wu, Yue-Liang 52
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Subject Index
A Bootstrap Paradoxes 24, 117, 120

Acausal fine-tuning 39
Actual infinite temporal regress 23,
29, 37, 39, 40, 46, 50, 58, 60, C
61, 70, 75, 76, 96, 160, 161. Casual Principle
See also Infinities conceptual argument 134, 161
definition 29 philosophical doubts 134
metaphysical issues 39, 96, 160 reductio ad absurdum argumen
Agent causation 161, 168, 173, 174 161
Aquinas’s regress argument 100 scepticism 24, 126
Atheism 19, 165, 177 Causality
theories 102, 175
Causal loop
B closed 24, 111
Big Bang open 24, 111, 119
issues 31 Causal priority 153, 161, 162
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198 Subject Index
material 102 F
Singularist theory 103 Finite past 35, 37, 38
Suarez’s analysis 178 Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-
theories of 102 Walker model 31, 32
Cause
definition 87, 174, 175, 179
timeless 9, 18, 22, 25, 36, 162, G
171 General Teory of Relativity 30
Changes 112
spatial series 88 God-of-the-gaps fallacy 22
temporal series 40, 62, 88, 110 Grim Reaper Paradox 104
Closed circular loop 38, 142
Closed timelike curves (CCs) 37,
112, 116 H
Consistency paradoxes 117, 121 Hartle–Hawking model 25, 33
Cosmological argument 162, 163
Kalam 86, 99, 100, 102, 126, Hidden variable 130, 131
141, 148, 154, 167, 184 Hilbert’s Hotel 40, 43, 44, 46,
Leibnizian 86, 99, 101, 184 Hume-Edwards–Campbell Princ
Tomist 24, 86, 87, 97, 99–101, 103
103 Hume’s principle 44
Creatio ex nihilo 102
I
D Infinities
Decoherence 129, 153 abstract, definition of 45, 46
Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser 51, 56, 59, 60, 62, 70, 168
115 169
Divine Cause 17, 18, 20–22, 31, 75, actual, definition of 13, 19,
161, 175 24, 29, 33, 38
Doctrine of divine infinity 43 arguments against concrete ac
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Subject Index
potential, definition of 40, 42, 48, Pilot-wave theory. See Bohmian

49, 63, 66, 76 mechanics
renormalization 52 Potentially infinite divisibility of
the impossibility of traversing line
actual 23, 40, 62, 75, 171, Morriston’s Rule 50
184, 188 objection 46, 48
Initial singularity 32, 163 Pre-Big Bang theory 37
Priority of the Whole with respec
Events (PWE) 63
K Priority of the Whole with respec
Kalam Cosmological Argument 118, ime (PW) 63
125, 126, 148, 154, 167
Q
L Quantum Eternity Teorem (QE
L’Hospital’s view 53 38
Libertarian free choice 25, 152 Quantum Gravity 30, 38, 47, 75
Loop Quantum Gravity model 37 116, 170
Quine-Putnam indispensability
argument 52
M
Modal realism view of possible
worlds 45 R
Motion Radical postmodernism 14, 17
paradoxes of 34, 62 Reasoning
M-theory 165, 170 deductive 5, 10, 11, 14, 16–18
136, 187
inductive 5, 8, 11, 14, 16–18
O 134, 161, 187
Omnipotence 76
Ontological indeteminism 128

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