Everson v Board of Education 330 US 1

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Everson (Petitioner), in his status as a taxpayer, filed suit
challenging the ability of the Respondent, Board of Education (Respondent), to reimburse funds
to parents of parochial school students for the transportation of their children to and from
school.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case stands for the proposition that, while no law respecting an
establishment of religion will stand under the United States Constitution (Constitution), neutral
laws, which afford benefits to children will be upheld.

Facts. The Petitioner in his status as a taxpayer filed suit challenging the ability of the
Respondent to reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students for the transportation of
their children to and from school. The Petitioner brought suit alleging that the New Jersey
reimbursement statute respects the establishment of religion, by allowing the parents of
parochial school students to benefit from the reimbursement scheme. The New Jersey Court of
Appeals held that the statute did not violate the Constitution and the Supreme Court of the
United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari to consider the issue.
Issue. This case considers whether the parents of parochial school children can benefit from the
same services afforded to the parents of public school children.

Lemon v Kurtzman 403 US 602

Brief Fact Summary. The state reimburses parochial schools for certain expenses associated
with the education of its children.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. To be valid, a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, must
not advance or inhibit religion, and must not excessively entangle church and state.
Facts. Pennsylvania has a statute that reimburses religious schools for teacher salaries,
textbooks, and other instructional materials. Rhode Island has a similar statute that allows the
state to pay private school teachers a 15% salary supplement.
Issue. Is it constitutional for the state to provide financial assistance to religious schools for the
cost of teaching secular subjects?

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent

A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living
with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son
with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According
to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear
as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective
when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of
the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and
sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely
abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In
the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or
bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the
symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public
and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided
it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for
it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts: Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition
against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman
Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the
Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason: The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the
respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose
was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took
advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the
Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court
stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when
the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon
Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

GARCES VS. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981]

Saturday, February 07, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This
provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting
shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and
cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the
image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and
until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic
Churchduring the celebration of the saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The
image was temporarily placed in the altar of theCatholic Church of the barangay. However, after
a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it
was the church’s property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case
against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain
Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of
the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church,
contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The
image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio
residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patronsaint(such as the
acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image wasplaced in a layman’s custody so that it could
easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection
with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore
it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided
to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used.
Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has
some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and
state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly
“offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by
law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against
contrary religious beliefs.

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the
respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on
appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the
respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied
permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that
the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV
series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA
decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?

(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program?

III. THE RULING

[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the
respondent Board’s X-rating petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also
voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent
MTRCB to review petitioner’s TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]

1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the
respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious programs
like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene
section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed.”
[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that
reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present
danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment
to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez
faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels
the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in
our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the
free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to
the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not
stand still.

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing
of petitioner’s religious program.

[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be
greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It
failed in the case at bar.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking”
either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show
that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of
other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not
presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary
to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD
1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right
to free exercise of religion. xxx.

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against
an attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of
petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens
to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no
difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against
bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it
is best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time
permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is
the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and
present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: “The
constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be
justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.” In Victoriano
vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
extent necessary to avoid the danger.”

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject
video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence
of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified
by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has
taken the life of a reality already on ground.

CASE DIGEST : Taruc Vs De La Cruz

G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005 DOMINADOR L. TARUC, WILBERTO DACERA, NICANOR
GALANIDA, RENERIO CANTA, JERRY CANTA, CORDENCIO CONSIGNA, SUSANO ALCALA,
LEONARDO DIZON, SALVADOR GELSANO and BENITO LAUGO, Petitioners, vs. BISHOP
PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ, REV. FR. RUSTOM FLORANO and DELFIN BORDAS, Respondents.

FACTS : he antecedents show that petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent
Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano
were the bishop and parish priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners,
led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de
la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife
belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Taruc’s, thus the animosity between the two
factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife’s political camp. Bishop de la Cruz,
however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish Taruc tried
to organize an open mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town
fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed Bishop de la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to
dissuade him from pushing through with it because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the clergy
of the diocese of Surigao and his credentials as a parish priest were in doubt On June 28, 1993,
Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional
Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on
the theory that they conspired with the Bishop to have petitioners expelled and excommunicated
from the PIC. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial
thus violating their right to due process of law

ISSUE : WON the court has jurisdiction

HELD : The SC hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from each other. "Give
to Ceasar what is Ceasar’s and to God what is God’s." upon the examination of the decisions it
will be readily apparent that cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have
always received the profoundest attention from the courts, not only because of their inherent
interest, but because of the far reaching effects of the decisions in human society. [However,]
courts have learned the lesson of conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having been
found that, in a form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical
authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in
matters of an ecclesiastical nature The SC agree with the Court of Appeals that the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best
left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization The
amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or
abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding
from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts

Fact:

In the course of its ministry, Petitioner’s Philippine agency has been distributing and selling
bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. Respondent informed
Petitioner that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945,
without providing itself with the necessary Mayor’s permit and municipal license, in violation of
the City Ordinances, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit
and license fees. Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded
that plaintiff deposit and pay under protest. To avoid the closing of its, paid the defendant under
protest the said permit and license fees. In its complaint plaintiff prays that judgment be
rendered declaring the said Municipal Ordinances illegal and unconstitutional, and that the
defendant be ordered to refund to the plaintiff paid under protest, together with legal interest
thereon, and the costs, plaintiff further praying for such other relief and remedy as the court
may deem just equitable. CFI Dismissed the Petition for lack of merit, which the petitioner raised
the issue to the CA which certified the case to SC for the reason that the errors assigned to the
lower Court involved only questions of law. Adrian Avilado Antazo

Issues:

1. Whether the Selling activity of the Petitioner is exempted from Taxation?

2. Whether the Mayor’s Permit requirement impair Petitioner’s right to the free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of
religious beliefs?

Held:

1. Yes, It may be true that in this said case, the price asked for the bibles and other religious
pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but
this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
“merchandise” for profit. For the reason that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance
No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its
free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs.

2. No, the Mandatory obtention of the Mayor’s permit before any person can engage in any
of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein do not imposes any charge
upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of
 religious practices. That Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even
if applied to plaintiff Society.

EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU [219 SCRA 256 ; G.R. NO. 95770; 1 MAR
1993]

Saturday, February 07, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and
consolidated for raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without
or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered
expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias
in Cebu. Public school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the “Panatang Makabayan” required by RA1265. They are Jehovah’s
Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against
their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades
protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the
precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a
system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and
it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not mean exception from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and
singing national anthem. This exemption disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings
of civic consciousness and duties of citizenship.

Issue: Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated.

Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to
religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought.
2.) Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation
to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health
and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school
is not justified.

The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who
refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and
worship. Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right
does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students
expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it
doesn’t present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioner’s
request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion
of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizen’s right to free
education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of
patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic
consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due
to religious beliefs is unjustified.

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. Expulsion is ANNULLED