G.R. No.
173807 April 16, 2009 dated 6 and 10 April 2000,6 about the dishonor of the checks and demanded
JAIME U. GOSIACO, Petitioner,
vs.
LETICIA CHING and EDWIN CASTA, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The right to recover due and demandable pecuniary obligations incurred by
juridical persons such as corporations cannot be impaired by procedural rules.
Our rules of procedure governing the litigation of criminal actions for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) have given the appearance of impairing such
substantive rights, and we take the opportunity herein to assert the necessary
clarifications.
Before us is a Rule 45 petition1 which seeks the reversal of the Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 29488. The Court of Appeals' decision affirmed
the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68 in Criminal Case
No. 120482. The RTC's decision reversed the decision 4 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of San Juan, Branch 58 in Criminal Case No. 70445 which involved a
charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondents Leticia Ching (Ching)
and Edwin Casta (Casta).
On 16 February 2000, petitioner Jaime Gosiaco (petitioner) invested
₱8,000,000.00 with ASB Holdings, Inc. (ASB) by way of loan. The money was
loaned to ASB for a period of 48 days with interest at 10.5% which is equivalent
to ₱112,000.00. In exchange, ASB through its Business Development
Operation Group manager Ching, issued DBS checks no. 0009980577 and
0009980578 for ₱8,000,000.00 and ₱112,000.00 respectively. The checks, both
signed by Ching, were drawn against DBS Bank Makati Head Office branch.
ASB, through a letter dated 31 March 2000, acknowledged that it owed
petitioner the abovementioned amounts.5
Upon maturity of the ASB checks, petitioner went to the DBS Bank San Juan
Branch to deposit the two (2) checks. However, upon presentment, the checks
were dishonored and payments were refused because of a stop payment order
and for insufficiency of funds. Petitioner informed respondents, through letters
replacement checks or the return of the money placement but to no avail. Thus,
petitioner filed a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan against the private respondents.
Ching was arraigned and tried while Casta remained at large. Ching denied
liability and claimed that she was a mere employee of ASB. She asserted that
she did not have knowledge as to how much money ASB had in the banks.
Such responsibility, she claimed belonged to another department.
On 15 December 2000, petitioner moved7 that ASB and its president, Luke
Roxas, be impleaded as party defendants. Petitioner, then, paid the
corresponding docket fees. However, the MTC denied the motion as the case
had already been submitted for final decision.8
On 8 February 2001, the MTC acquitted Ching of criminal liability but it did not
absolve her from civil liability. The MTC ruled that Ching, as a corporate officer
of ASB, was civilly liable since she was a signatory to the checks.9
Both petitioner and Ching appealed the ruling to the RTC. Petitioner appealed
to the RTC on the ground that the MTC failed to hold ASB and Roxas either
jointly or severally liable with Ching. On the other hand, Ching moved for a
reconsideration which was subsequently denied. Thereafter, she filed her notice
of appeal on the ground that she should not be held civilly liable for the
bouncing checks because they were contractual obligations of ASB.
On 12 July 2005, the RTC rendered its decision sustaining Ching's appeal. The
RTC affirmed the MTC’s ruling which denied the motion to implead ASB and
Roxas for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. The RTC also exonerated
Ching from civil liability and ruled that the subject obligation fell squarely on
ASB. Thus, Ching should not be held civilly liable.10
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on the grounds
that the RTC erred in absolving Ching from civil liability; in upholding the refusal
of the MTC to implead ASB and Roxas; and in refusing to pierce the corporate
veil of ASB and hold Roxas liable.
On 19 July 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and
stated that the amount petitioner sought to recover was a loan made to ASB
and not to Ching. Roxas’ testimony further bolstered the fact that the checks
issued by Ching were for and in behalf of ASB. The Court of Appeals ruled that
ASB cannot be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case since it is not a natural person
and in the case of Roxas, he was not the subject of a preliminary investigation.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no need to pierce the
corporate veil of ASB since none of the requisites were present.11
Hence this petition.
Petitioner raised the following issues: (1) is a corporate officer who signed a
bouncing check civilly liable under B.P. Blg. 22; (2) can a corporation be
impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case; and (3) is there a basis to pierce the
corporate veil of ASB?
B.P. Blg. 22 is popularly known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Section 1 of B.P.
Blg. 22 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons, who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
under this Act.
B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to address the rampant issuance of bouncing checks
as payment for pre-existing obligations. The circulation of bouncing checks
adversely affected confidence in trade and commerce. The State criminalized
such practice because it was deemed injurious to public interests 12 and was
found to be pernicious and inimical to public welfare.13 B.P. Blg. 22 punishes the
act of making and issuing bouncing checks. It is the act itself of issuing the
checks which is considered malum prohibitum. The law is an offense against
public order and not an offense against property.14 It penalizes the issuance of a
check without regard to its purpose. It covers all types of checks. 15 Even checks
that were issued as a form of deposit or guarantee were held to be within the
ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.161avvphi1.zw+
When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name he
may be held personally liable for violating a penal statute. 17 The statute imposes
criminal penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud another of money or
property, draws or issues a check on any bank with knowledge that he has no
sufficient funds in such bank to meet the check on presentment.18 Moreover, the
personal liability of the corporate officer is predicated on the principle that he
cannot shield himself from liability from his own acts on the ground that it was a
corporate act and not his personal act.19 As we held in Llamado v. Court of
Appeals:20
Petitioner's argument that he should not be held personally liable for the amount
of the check because it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation and
he signed the same in his capacity as Treasurer of the corporation, is also
untenable. The third paragraph of Section 1 of BP Blg. 22 states: "Where the
check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act."
The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate
check can only be held civilly liable when he is convicted. In the recent case of
Bautista v. Auto Plus Traders Inc.,21 the Court ruled decisively that the civil
liability of a corporate officer in a B.P. Blg. 22 case is extinguished with the
criminal liability. We are not inclined through this case to revisit so recent a
precedent, and the rule of stare decisis precludes us to discharge Ching of any
civil liability arising from the B.P. Blg. 22 case against her, on account of her
acquittal in the criminal charge.
We recognize though the bind entwining the petitioner. The records clearly
show that it is ASB is civilly obligated to petitioner. In the various stages of this
case, petitioner has been proceeding from the
premise that he is unable to pursue a separate civil action against ASB itself for
the recovery of the amounts due from the subject checks. From this premise,
petitioner sought to implead ASB as a defendant to the B.P. Blg. 22 case, even
if such case is criminal in nature.22
What supplied the notion to the petitioner that he was unable to pursue a
separate civil action against ASB? He cites the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, particularly the provisions involving B.P. Blg. 22 cases, which state
that:
Rule 111, Section 1—Institution of criminal and civil action.
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party
shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which
shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complainant or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.23
We are unable to agree with petitioner that he is entitled to implead ASB in the
B.P. Blg. 22 case, or any other corporation for that matter, even if the Rules
require the joint trial of both the criminal and civil liability. A basic maxim in
statutory construction is that the interpretation of penal laws is strictly construed
against the State and liberally construed against the accused. Nowhere in B.P.
Blg. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may be impleaded as an accused or
defendant in the prosecution for violations of that law, even in the litigation of
the civil aspect thereof.
Nonetheless, the substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable
obligations against a debtor-corporation cannot be denied or diminished by a
rule of procedure. Technically, nothing in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action against the juridical person on whose
behalf the check was issued. What the rules prohibit is the reservation of a
separate civil
action against the natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22, including
such corporate officer who had signed the bounced check.
In theory the B.P. Blg. 22 criminal liability of the person who issued the
bouncing check in behalf of a corporation stands independent of the civil liability
of the corporation itself, such civil liability arising from the Civil Code. B.P. Blg.
22 itself fused this criminal liability of the signer of the check in behalf of the
corporation with the corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by
allowing the complainant to recover such civil liability not from the corporation,
but from the person who signed the check in its behalf. Prior to the amendments
to our rules on criminal procedure, it though clearly was permissible to pursue
the criminal liability against the signatory, while going after the corporation itself
for the civil liability.
However, with the insistence under the amended rules that the civil and criminal
liability attaching to the bounced check be pursued jointly, the previous option to
directly pursue the civil liability against the person who incurred the civil
obligation–the corporation itself–is no longer that clear. In theory, the implied
institution of the civil case into the criminal case for B.P. Blg. 22 should not
affect the civil liability of the corporation for the same check, since such implied
institution concerns the civil liability of the signatory, and not of the corporation.
Let us pursue this point further. B.P. Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on
the signatory of the check which is distinct from the civil liability of the
corporation for the amount represented from the check. The civil liability
attaching to the signatory arises from the wrongful act of signing the check
despite the insufficiency of funds in the account, while the civil liability attaching
to the corporation is itself the very obligation covered by the check or the
consideration for its execution. Yet these civil liabilities are mistaken to be
indistinct. The confusion is traceable to the singularity of the amount of each.
If we conclude, as we should, that under the current Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the civil action that is impliedly instituted in the B.P. Blg. 22 action is
only the civil liability of the signatory, and not that of the corporation itself, the
distinctness of the cause of action against the signatory and that against the
corporation is rendered beyond dispute. It follows that the actions involving
these liabilities should be adjudged according to their respective standards and
merits. In the B.P. Blg. 22 case, what the trial court should determine whether or
not the signatory had signed the check with knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds or credit in the bank account, while in the civil case the trial court should
ascertain whether or not the obligation itself
is valid and demandable. The litigation of both questions could, in theory,
proceed independently and simultaneously without being ultimately conclusive
on one or the other.
It might be argued that under the current rules, if the signatory were made liable
for the amount of the check by reason of the B.P. Blg. 22 case, such signatory
would have the option of recovering the same amount from the corporation. Yet
that prospect does not ultimately satisfy the ends of justice. If the signatory does
not have sufficient assets to answer for the amount of the check–a distinct
possibility considering the occasional large-scale transactions engaged in by
corporations – the corporation would not be subsidiarily liable to the
complainant, even if it in truth the controversy, of which the criminal case is just
a part, is traceable to the original obligation of the corporation. While the
Revised Penal Code imposes subsidiary civil liability to corporations for criminal
acts engaged in by their employees in the discharge of their duties, said
subsidiary liability applies only to felonies,24 and not to crimes penalized by
special laws such as B.P. Blg. 22. And nothing in B.P. Blg. 22 imposes such
subsidiary liability to the corporation in whose name the check is actually
issued. Clearly then, should the check signatory be unable to pay the obligation
incurred by the corporation, the complainant would be bereft of remedy unless
the right of action to collect on the liability of the corporation is recognized and
given flesh.
There are two prevailing concerns should civil recovery against the corporation
be pursued even as the B.P. Blg. 22 case against the signatory remains extant.
First, the possibility that the plaintiff might be awarded the amount of the check
in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and in the civil action against the corporation. For
obvious reasons, that should not be permitted. Considering that petitioner
herein has no chance to recover the amount of the check through the B.P. Blg.
22 case, we need not contend with that possibility through this case.
Nonetheless, as a matter of prudence, it is best we refer the matter to the
Committee on Rules for the formulation of proper guidelines to prevent that
possibility.
The other concern is over the payment of filing fees in both the B.P. Blg. 22
case and the civil action against the corporation. Generally, we see no evil or
cause for distress if the plaintiff were made to pay filing fees based on the
amount of the check in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and the civil action. After all,
the plaintiff therein made the deliberate option to file two separate cases, even if
the recovery of the amounts of the check against the corporation could evidently
be pursued through the civil action alone.
Nonetheless, in petitioner’s particular case, considering the previous legal
confusion on whether he is authorized to file the civil case against ASB, he
should, as a matter of equity, be exempted from paying the filing fees based on
the amount of the checks should he pursue the civil action against ASB. In a
similar vein and for a similar reason, we likewise find that petitioner should not
be barred by prescription should he file the civil action as the period should not
run from the date the checks were issued but from the date this decision attains
finality. The courts should not be bound strictly by the statute of limitations or
the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without prejudice to the right of
petitioner Jaime U. Gosiaco to pursue an independent civil action against ASB
Holdings Inc. for the amount of the subject checks, in accordance with the terms
of this decision. No pronouncements as to costs.
Let a copy of this Decision be REFERRED to the Committee on Revision of the
Rules for the formulation of the formal rules of procedure to govern the civil
action for the recovery of the amount covered by the check against the juridical
person which issued it.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
<p
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION 4Dated 08 February 2001 and pendered by Judge Maxwel S. Rosete; id.
Associate Justice at 73-82.

ATTESTATION 5 The letter was signed by Luke Roxas; id. at 60

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in 6 Id. at 62.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division. 7 Id. at 67-71

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING 8 Records, p. 764.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division 9 See note 4.

CERTIFICATION 10 See note 3.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division 11 See note 2.
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the 12Lozano v. Martinez, Nos. L-63419, L-66839-42, L-71654, 74524-25, L-
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. 75122-49, L-75812-13, 75765-67, L-75789, 18 December 1986, 146
SCRA 323.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice 13People v. Laggui, G.R. Nos. 76262-63, 18 March 1989, 171 SCRA
305, 311.
14 See Note 12.
Footnotes
15 Id.
1 Rollo. pp. 3-44.
16 Que v. People, Nos. L-75217-18, 21 September 1987, 154 SCRA 160.
2Dated 19 July 2006 and penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier
Ranada and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Alino- 17§ 1643 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations citing Semones v. Southern Bell
Hormachuelos, Chairperson Fourth Division, and Amelita G. Tel. & Tel.Co., 106 N.C. App. 334, 416 S.E.2d 909 (1992).
Tolentino. id. at 88-95.
18Id. citing Walker v. State, 467 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d
3Dated 12 July 2005 and penned by Judge Santiago G. Estrella; id. at Dist.1984).
83-87.
19 68 A.L.R. 2D 1269.
 20
Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99032, 26 March 1997, 270
SCRA 423.
21 G.R. No. 166405, 6 August 2008.
22 A traditional theory in criminal law is that a corporation cannot be
prosecuted . B.P. 22 clearly adheres to the traditional theory, as nothing
therein holds a juridical person liable for the violation of the said law.
Nonetheless, a more modern rule pronounces that a corporation may be
criminally liable for actions or omissions made by its officers or agents in
its behalf. And that while a corporation cannot be imprisoned, it may be
fined, its charter may be revoked by the state, or other sanctions may be
imposed by law. See Cox, James. Corporations. 2nd ed. Aspen
Publishers. New York. © 2003 p. 130.
23 Section 1, Rule 111(b), 2000 Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado explained the rationale for the implementation of the
abovementioned rule. The reason was to declog the courts of B.P. 22
cases because ordinarily payment of docket fees is not required in a
criminal case for actual damages because prior to its amendment, it
became the practice of creditors to use the courts as their personal
collection agencies by the mere expediency of filing a B.P. Blg. 22 case.
See Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II. 9th
revised ed. pp. 293-294.
24See Revised Penal Code, Art. 103. "Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of
other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties. "
25Santiago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.103959, 21 August 1997, 278
SCRA98,113, citing Rañeses v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
Republic of the Philippines
76518, 13 July 1990, 187 SCRA 404, and as cited in Cometa v. Court of
SUPREME COURT
Appeals, G.R. No. 141855, 6 February 2001, 351 SCRA294, 310.
Manila
</p
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants
of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian
of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald
Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of
plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married
at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with
whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the
son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally
prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section
1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and
or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin
Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant
through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of
the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following
order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants
on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the
arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be
meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is
hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above
entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21,
Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY
UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c)
OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS
NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
 III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO
2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case
No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent
to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us
with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not
dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so,
when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father,
Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the
motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues
presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and
further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence
as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction
in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the
basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa
aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with
pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of
recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given
act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the
Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In
that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent
and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action.
And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it
was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp.
615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have
been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence
causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence
being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after
such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability
arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also
made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
(p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we
are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the
past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any
degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a
crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed
to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life.
We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but
can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise.
there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi
jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given
rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely
to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal
Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence
and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust
of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually
extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the
Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which
involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of
the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually
that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II,
Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the
underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo
emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of
the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that
"(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice
Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of
the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after
the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby
making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter.
Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which
is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-
delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)
through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider
the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient
origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable
by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for
civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-
delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report
of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the
intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil
Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a
civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of
law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow
the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the
instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by
marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free
from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place
"by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.
Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer
his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian."
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against
appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a Separate Opinions
situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint
and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is
that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by
marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the
parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa,
Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial
action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real
property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their
consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is
blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of
liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See
article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil
action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an
adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil.
576, 579).

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill

notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch
as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Separate Opinions
Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is
blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of
liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See
article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil
action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an
adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil.
576, 579).
Footnotes
1 Referring to Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919.
2 Referring to Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil. 821.
3 Referring to Bernal et al, vs. House et al., 54 Phil. 327.
4 Parenthetically, Manresa seemingly holds. the contrary view
thus:
"Sin embargo, para no ineurrir en error hay que tener en cuenta
que los lineage. del precepts contenido en el presente articulo son
bastante mas reducidos, pues no se hallan comprendidos en el
todos los datios que pues tener por causa la culpa o la
negligencia.
"En efecto, examinando detenidamente la terminos general de la
culpa y de la negligencia. se observe que, tanto en una como en
otra de dichas causas, hay tres generoso o tres especies
distintas, a saber:
1. La que represents una accion u omision voluntaria por la que
results incumplida una obligacion anteriormente constituida.
2. La que sin existencia de una obligacion anterior produce un
dano o perjuicio que, teniendo su origen en un hecho ilicito, no
reviste los caracteres de delito o falta; y
3. La que teniendo por origen un hecho que constituya delito o
falta produce una responsabilidad civil como accesoria de la
responsabilidad criminal.
"La primera de estas tres especies de culpa o negligencia es
siempre accesoria de una obligacion principal, cuyo
incumplimiento da origen a la terminos especial de la culpa en
materia de contratos, y el eatudio de esta debe harms al examinar
cada contrato, en especial, como lo hicimos asi, analizando
entoces los peculiares efectos de dicha culpa en cada uno de
ellos.
"La tercera de las especies citadas es accesoria tambien, pues no
puede concebirse su existencia sin la de un delicto o falts que la
produzca. Es decir, que solo al lado de la responsabilidad criminal
puede supuesto esa responsabilidad civil y la obligacion
proveniente de la culpa, ineurrir como una consecuencia de la
responsabilidad criminal, y, por consiguente, su examen y
regulacion perusal. al Derecho penal.
"Como consecuencia de ello, results que la unica especie de
culpa y omisiones o negligencia que puede ser y es meanwhile.'
del presente capitulo, es la separability, o sea la que sin la
existencia de una obligacion anterior, y sin ningun antecedents
contractual, produce un dano o perjuico que tiene su origen en
una accion u omision culpable solo civilmente; as decir, que
siendo ilicita, no reviste sin embargo, los caracteres de un delito o
falta por no estar penada por la ley. Y aun dentro de estos lineage
hay que restringir aun mas los terminos o la materia propria de
este articulo, el cual se refiere unicamente a la culpa o negligencia
personates del obligado, pero no a las que prudencia de actos o
de omisiones de persons., distintas de este." (pp. 642-643, Vol.
XII, Manresa, Codigo Civil Espanol.)
5 "Nuestro Codigo no ha seguido la escuela italiana, sino que mas
bien se ha instantaneous, en el criterio de la doctrina full-grown
puesto que impone la obligacion de reparar, el dano causado en
virtud de una presuncion juris tecum de culpa por parte del que
tiene bajo su autoridad o dependecia al causante del daho,
derivada del hicimos de no haber puesto el cuidado y la vinculos
debida en los actos de sus subordinados para evitar dicho
resultado. Asi es que, segun el parrafo ultimo del art. 1,903, cesa
dicha responsabilidad cuando se prueba que los obligados por los
actos ajenos emplearon toda la diligencia de un buen padre de
familia. Luego no es la causa de la obligacion impuesta la
representacion, ni el interes, ni la necesidad de que haya quienes
responda del dano causado por el que no tiene personalidad in
garantias de specialist. para responsabilidad por siendo sino el
incumplimiento implicito o supuesto de los deberes de precaucion
y de prudencia que impuesta los vinculos civiles que unicamente
al obligado con las persons., por quienes debe representacion, el
mal causado, Por ese motivo coloca dicha obligacion entre las
que prudencia de la culpa of negligentj (pp. 670671, Manresa,
Codigo Civil Espanol, Vol. XII.)

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio
Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on
June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed
the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to
file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission
of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of
accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case
of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for
the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil
liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the
Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in
a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the
affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of
Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a
consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It
reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
— Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question.
The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said
liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the
legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a
judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is
lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870
which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas
personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias,
solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere
recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term
"sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready
answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la
fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por
las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro
de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al
efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is
definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina
y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena
determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused
becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused
die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni
delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as
Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before
judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination
by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil
action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no
party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p.
421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised
Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected
in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body
mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already
enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his
right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected
funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment
employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond
recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it
cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the
felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without
reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate
civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of
necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the
case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p.
964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco,
Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly,
Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely
on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found
guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's
criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by
reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we
must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be
faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon
to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof —
criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated
in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held
criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are
to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the
Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et
al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the
Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the
accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been
established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment
in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability
of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his
death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971
Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56
O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be
dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura
Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court
of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was:
Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before
final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim
therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant
therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all
criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by
the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil
action for damages on account of physical injuries,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil
action for damages was to be considered instituted together with
the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated
without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party
under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the
extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the
civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated
differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of
the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not
apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely
nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the
accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled
the first and second vendees of the property subject matter of the
contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of
the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his
civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the
accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death
pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied
on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose
death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI),
then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be
heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had
rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the
offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and
the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the
rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the
same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated
differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the
criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from
this long-established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was
charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification
of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of
the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal
but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to
survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent
on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision
was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire
appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite
dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly
liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after
final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the
Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its
reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct
from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil.
1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal
(Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67
SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the
funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability
(U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab,
66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal
liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged
criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been
instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose,
his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of
the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or
not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil
liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to
our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our
abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the
criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire
appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our
decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the
civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of
the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance
of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained
of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling
in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when
his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In
the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of
said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will
have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance
of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking
Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the
criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex
delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as
to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of
Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso
facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed
under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a
separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one
which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and
separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of
criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory
authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering
civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal
action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to
death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution
of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the
demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot
survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts
which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable
consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the
criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated
under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate
civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this
fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an
independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30,
the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main
decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of
showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability
for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly
made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced
adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense
charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same
as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not
applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is
no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein
for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is
on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another
basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type
involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be
continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by
holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of
procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As
correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained
implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together
with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the
judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise
appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the
component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and
abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary
civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its
application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together
with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in
law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an
ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary
money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the
estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light
of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which
in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are
contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are
contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex
delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section
5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed
against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness,
judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It
is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive
enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil
action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim
therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be
extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of
the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil
liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated
not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The
source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines
against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may,
by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal),
the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of
the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against him.
18
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala where we held that, in
recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based
on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate
under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for
money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money
claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those
which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract,
the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused,
pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action
for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution
of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based
solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with
costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
#Footnotes
1 Nos. L-33252, L-33253 and L-33254, 81 SCRA 120.
2 No. 22211-R, November 4, 1959, 56 O.G. No. 23, p. 4045.
3 supra.
4 L-30612, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 523.
5 No. L-28397, June 17, 1976, 71 SCRA 273.
6 No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.
7 No. L-24098, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 970.
8 No. L-40336, October 24, 1975, 67 SCRA 394.
9 Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
these rules.
10 Supra.
11 People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, November 21, 1991, 204
SCRA 122; Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, August
16, 1991, 200 SCRA 644; Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, No. L-
51625, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 269; Rufo Mauricio
Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75357,
November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 712; People v. Salcedo, No. L-
48642, June 22, 1987, 151 SCRA 220; People v. Pancho, No. L-
32507, November 4, 1986, 145 SCRA 323; People v. Navoa, No.
L-67966, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 410; People v. Asibar,
No. L-37255, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 856; People v. Tirol,
No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558; and People v.
Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.
12 Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion observed that:
. . . this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liability
arising from a criminal offense without the need of any criminal
proceeding to prove the commission of the crime as such, that is
without having to prove the criminal liability of the defendant so
long as his act causing damage or prejudice to the offended party
is proven by preponderance of evidence.
13 Supra, p. 134.
14 Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed,
barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the decedent,
arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for
money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited
in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they
may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor
or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an
action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the
debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the
decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court
as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each
other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of
the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the
true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been
presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved
at their present value.
15 As explained by J. Regalado in the deliberation of this case.
16 Sec. 1. Institute of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The
institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil
actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions
shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence
and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these
Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is
alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing
fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in
court for trial.
17 Justice Regalado cited the Court's ruling in Belamala that since
the damages sought, as a result of the felony committed amounts
to injury to person or property, real or personal, the civil liability to
be recovered must be claimed against the executor/administrator
and not against the estate.
18 Ibid.
19 Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: "The civil liability
may still be pursued in a separate civil action but it must be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, except when
by statutory provision an independent civil action is authorized
such as, to exemplify, in the instance enumerated in Article 33 of
the Civil Code." Justice Regalado stressed that:
Conversely, such civil liability is not extinguished and survives the
deceased offender where it also arises simultaneously from or
exists as a consequence or by reason of a contract, as in Torrijos;
or from law, as stated in Torrijos and in the concurring opinion
in Sendaydiego, such as in reference to the Civil Code; or from a
quasi-contract; or is authorized by law to be pursued in an
independent civil action, as in Belamala. Indeed, without these
exceptions, it would be unfair and inequitable to deprive the victim
of his property or recovery of damages therefor, as would have
been the fate of the second vendee in Torrijos or the provincial
government in Sendaydiego."
20 See Articles 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the Civil Code;
see related provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 111.
21 Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they
are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial
demand by the creditors, and when there is any written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
22 As explained by J. Vitug in the deliberation of this case.
 DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 78149 affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. 743-C(’93) convicting the accused Ernesto Ancheta of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

The Antecedents

Ernesto Ancheta was employed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
(PRBLI) as driver of one of its passenger buses. On July 23, 1993, an
Information was filed with the RTC of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, charging
Ancheta with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The inculpatory portion
of the Information reads:

That on November 23, 1992 at around 11:50 o’clock (sic) in the morning,
at Brgy. Dolores, Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then the driver and person-in-charge of a Philippine Rabbit Bus
bearing Plate No. CVE-707 with MVRR No. 63044987, registered in the
name of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. of Tarlac, Tarlac, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with reckless
imprudence and managed the said Philippine Rabbit Bus at Brgy.
Dolores, Capas, Tarlac, in a careless, negligent and imprudent manner,
without due regard to laws, regulations, ordinances and traffic code and
without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to persons
and damage to property and in violation of the Land Transportation
Laws, said bus driven by the accused while cruising the MacArthur
Highway towards the south direction, bumped the left rear side of a
Toyota jeep with Plate No. TAB 929 with MVRR No. 64284647 owned by
G.R. No. 160355 May 16, 2005 Zenaida B. Dizon of 193 M. Santos St., Pasay City, Metro Manila, and
driven by Eduardo Mangawang towards the north direction, and as a
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, result thereof said Eduardo Mangawang ultimately died and the jeep he
vs. was then driving sustained damages of an undetermined amount, to the
HEIRS OF EDUARDO MANGAWANG and PEOPLE OF THE damage and prejudice of the deceased and the owner thereof.
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Contrary to law.3
The accused was assisted by Atty. Crispiniano Lamorena, Jr., whom the PRBLI
assigned as counsel de parte. Atty. Andres Pangilinan entered his appearance
as private prosecutor.
The trial court rendered judgment on November 12, 1999, convicting the
accused of the crime charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused, ERNESTO ANCHETA, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.
Accordingly, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional in its minimum period as minimum to six
(6) years of prision correccional in its maximum period as maximum.
For the civil liability of the accused, Ernesto Ancheta is hereby ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Eduardo Mangawang the amounts of P28,600.00
as actual or compensatory damages and P1,436,466.30 representing
loss of earning capacity. The accused is similarly ordered to pay the
amounts of P50,000.00 by way of indemnification for the death of
Eduardo Mangawang and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.4
The accused appealed the decision to the CA. On November 10, 2000, the
appellate court issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal due to Ancheta’s
failure to file his brief as accused-appellant.5 The resolution of the CA
dismissing the appeal became final and executory, thus, entry of judgment was
made of record on December 7, 2000. After the transmission of the records to
the RTC, it issued an Order on June 5, 2001 for the arrest of the accused.6
On June 29, 2001, the PRBLI, as Ancheta’s employer, filed a Notice of Appeal
of the decision of the RTC. On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order denying
due course to the notice of appeal, on its finding that the notice was filed long
after the judgment of the RTC had become final and executory. 7 The PRBLI
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, claiming that it was not
served with a copy of the decision of the RTC convicting the accused of the
crime charged; hence, could not have appealed the same. On August 1, 2001,
the trial court issued an Order denying the said motion. The PRBLI filed an
urgent motion, this time for clarification of the said order, which the trial court
denied in an Order dated August 31, 2001. Undaunted, the PRBLI filed a
manifestation with motion, citing the ruling of this Court in Ozoa v. Vda. de
Madula.8 On October 17, 2001, the trial court issued an Order, this time,
granting the motion and giving due course to the appeal of the PRBLI. The trial
court, likewise, ordered the records to be transmitted to the CA for the
consideration of the appeal, where the latter made the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF
THE FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ATTRIBUTING
SUPPOSED NEGLIGENCE AND LACK OF FORESIGHT ON THE PART
OF THE ACCUSED ANCHETA.
III
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SO GENEROUSLY
AWARDING UNCONSCIONABLE AMOUNTS IN SUPPOSED
DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF EDUARDO MANGAWANG. 9
On October 10, 2003, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the
decision of the RTC. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 12,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Criminal
Case No. 743-C(’93) is hereby AFFIRMED with the correction that the
actual damages to be awarded should only be P5,000.00. All other
respects remain. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.10
The appellate court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision of the
RTC had long become final and executory when the PRBLI appealed the
decision. It ruled that the PRBLI was bound by the said decision against the
accused therein.11 Nevertheless, the appellate court resolved the appeal on its
merits and affirmed the decision of the RTC, but with modification.12
The PRBLI forthwith filed the present petition for review on certiorari, assailing
the decision of the CA on the following grounds:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED HAS ATTAINED FINALITY AS
AGAINST PETITIONER.
B.
PETITIONER MUST BE AFFORDED THE STANDING AND THE
OPPORTUNITY TO QUESTION THE ACCUSED’S CONVICTION.13
The petitioner submits the ruling of this Court in Pajarito v.
Seneris14 and Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,15 that "the decision of
the trial court convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the civil liability but also, with regard to its
amount," should not apply to it. It avers that unlike in Pajarito and Miranda, the
counsel of the accused therein was given ample opportunity to defend the
accused during the trial and on appeal in the CA. The petitioner laments that in
this case, the counsel it provided to defend the accused was remiss in the
performance of his duties and failed to notify it of the RTC decision, the
November 10, 2000 Resolution of the CA, as well as the June 5, 2001 Order of
the RTC; consequently, it was not apprised of its civil liability to the heirs of the
deceased, thus depriving the petitioner of its right to due process. It avers that it
was only on account of its own diligence that it discovered the decision of the
RTC, the November 10, 2000 Resolution of the CA and the June 5, 2001 Order
of the RTC.
The petitioner further avers that it was not furnished with a copy of the said CA
Resolution, and of the Arrest Order of the RTC dated June 5, 2001. The
petitioner posits that until it is furnished with such copies, the period within
which to assail the decision of the RTC on its civil liability to the heirs of the
deceased had not commenced to run.
The petitioner submits that it is unjust and unreasonable for the CA to deprive it
of its right to question its civil liability to the heirs of the deceased, considering
the gross negligence of the counsel that it had provided the accused.
By way of comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends that the decision of the RTC convicting Ancheta of the crime charged
had become final and executory, following the dismissal of his appeal before the
CA. The decision of the RTC was conclusive on the petitioner, not only with
regard to its civil liability but also as to the amount thereof, absent any collusion
between the accused-employee and the private complainant. The petitioner was
not a direct party in the criminal case; hence, was not entitled to a copy of the
decision of the RTC or to appeal therefrom; it was, likewise, not entitled to be
furnished a copy of the CA Resolution dated November 10, 2000 and the Order
of the RTC dated June 5, 2001. Hence, according to the OSG, it cannot
complain of denial of its right to due process. The OSG further asserts that the
petition at bar is premature, considering that no writ of execution has yet been
issued by the RTC, and cites the ruling of this Court in Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. v. People16 to buttress its stance.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
The ruling of the CA dismissing the petitioner’s appeal of the RTC decision
convicting Ancheta of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is correct.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying the decision of the RTC.
The petitioner, as the employer of the said accused, had no right to appeal from
the said decision because, in the first place, it was not a party in the said case.
While the subsidiary liability provided for by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code may render the petitioner a party in substance and, in effect, it is
not, for this reason, entitled to be furnished a copy of the decision of the RTC,
as well as the resolution and decision of the CA.
Indeed, the petitioner was entitled to protect its interest by taking actual
participation in the defense of its employee, Ancheta, by providing him with
counsel. It cannot leave its employee to his own fate because his failure is its
failure.17 The petitioner, as the employer of the accused, would thereby be
apprised of the progress of the case and the outcome thereof from time to time
through the said counsel. The failure of such counsel to apprise the petitioner of
the progress of the case is thus not equivalent to lack of due process. The
pronouncement of the Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc. 18 is
instructive on this score:
It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal
case instituted against his employee but in substance and, in effect, he is
considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is his
concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be
protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense
of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure
is also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is
convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be
heard to complain, if brought to court for the enforcement of his
subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in court. It was not
without purpose that this Court sounded the following stern warning:
"It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in
selecting his employees, taking real and deep interest in their
welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by
reason of or as a result of the performance of their duties, if only in
the way of giving them the benefit of counsel; and, consequently,
doing away with the practices of leaving them to their fates. If
these be done, the American rule requiring notice on the part of
the employer shall have been satisfied." (Martinez v. Barredo,
supra.)19
In Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula,20 the Court explained the effect of a judgment of
conviction against the employee on the subsidiary liability of the employer, as
follows:
To be sure, the correctness of the legal principles cited by the Court a
quo cannot be gainsaid. A person criminally liable is also civilly liable;
and upon the institution of the criminal action, the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime is also impliedly
instituted unless waived, or the filing of a separate action therefor is
reserved. The employer is subsidiarily answerable for the adjudicated
civil liability ex delicto of his employee in the event of the latter’s
insolvency; and the judgment in the criminal action pronouncing the
employee to be also civilly liable is conclusive on the employer not only
as to the actuality of that liability but also as to its amount. 21
Since the petitioner was not a party in the RTC and in the CA on the appeal of
its employee (Ancheta), the petitioner cannot justifiably claim that it was
deprived of its right to due process. As explained by this Court in Martinez v.
Barredo:22
The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court,
because the situation before us is not one wherein the employer is sued
for a primary liability under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in
which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and
dependent upon his driver’s criminal negligence which is a proper issue
to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other words, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver’s
conviction and upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the same way that
acquittal wipes out not only the employee’s primary civil liability but also
his employer’s subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. (Almeida,
et al. v. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, affirmed in 218 U.S. 476; 54 Law ed.,
1116; Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320; Francisco v. Onrubia, 46
Phil. 327; Province of Ilocos Sur v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56 Phil.
829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403.)23
Besides, as gleaned from the brief of the petitioner, as appellant in the CA, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 78149, it sought the reversal of the decision of the RTC and
the acquittal of its employee. In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
People,24 this Court held that such an appeal would be impermissible for the
following reasons:
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole
case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called
upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the appellant. This is the risk involved when the accused
decides to appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate courts
have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower
court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.
 If the present appeal is given [due] course, the whole case against the
accused-employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty
higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may
be meted out to him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his right
against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become
subject to modification without his consent.25
Indeed, to allow an employer to dispute its civil liability in the criminal
case via an appeal from the decision of the RTC would be to annul, nullify or
defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. 26
The Court cannot second guess whether Ancheta’s failure to file his brief as
appellant in the CA was through the negligence of his counsel or because of the
belief that, indeed, he was guilty of the crime charged and it was purposeless
and futile for him to still file such brief.
We agree with the contention of the OSG that the right of the petitioner as the
employer of the accused to due process occurs during the hearing of the motion
for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, on the basis of the sheriff’s return
that the writ of execution issued by the court for the enforcement of its decision
on the civil liability of the accused was not satisfied because of the latter’s
insolvency, the sheriff being unable to locate any property in the name of the
accused. Such return is prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the accused.27
During the hearing of the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution,
the prosecution must prove that (a) the petitioner PRBLI was the employer of
the accused; (b) it was engaged in some kind of industry; (c) the crime was
committed by the employee in the discharge of his duties; and (d) execution
against the employee is unsatisfied.28 The prosecution may offer in evidence
the sheriff’s return as prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the accused.
The petitioner, as the employer of the accused, may adduce evidence on
questions which may be involved in the execution since the trial court which
rendered the decision has a general supervisory control over the process of
execution.29
From a ruling adverse to the employer, it may appeal by writ of error on
questions of facts, or mixed questions of facts and of law, or by certiorari on
questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the trial court, thus:
It goes without saying that the determination thus made as regards the
employer’s subsidiary civil liability is not conclusive in the sense of being
non-reviewable by higher judicial authority. It may be appealed to a
higher court at the instance of the aggrieved party – either the offended
party or the employer – by writ of error seeking review of questions of
fact or mixed questions of fact and law, or through a petition for review
on certiorari, limited to a consideration only of questions of law. Or review
may be sought by the institution of a special civil action of certiorari, upon
the theory that the determination was made by the trial court without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.30
Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying the decision of the RTC which
had long become final and executory. A final and executory decision, even if
erroneous, can no longer be modified.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal of the petitioner is
AFFIRMED. However, that portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
modifying the decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated November 12, 1999, is
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166836 September 4, 2013
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,
vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B.
ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N.
SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O.
SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V.
AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the
buyer of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title
(TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a
criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No.
9571 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is
a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-
delivery of the TCTs.
Antecedents
Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic
corporation engaged in the real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and
April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty.
Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver
appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2 130 residential
lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of
44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of ₱106,248,000.00. The
transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale. 3 The TCTs
covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to
San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a
total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed of sale,
executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of
₱39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for
parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain
had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after
being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on
May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC.4
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August
15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas) charging respondent
directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of
Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S.
No. 00-2256).5
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific
performance in the HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183),6 praying to
compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256,7 respondent
directors and officers of BF Homes refuted San Miguel Properties’ assertions by
contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties’ claim was not legally demandable
because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992
and 1993 due to his having been replaced as BF Homes’ rehabilitation receiver
by the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale conveying the lots were
irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been
brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in
receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed
corporation in order to enable the receiver to effectively exercise its powers free
from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue
of the distressed company; and (e) the lots involved were under custodia legis
in view of the pending receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP
Las Piñas of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.
On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend
proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas,8 citing the pendency of BF Homes’
receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF Homes opposed
the motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated BF
Homes’ receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties
to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes’ comment/opposition coupled
with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to the
intervening termination of the receivership.9
On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution,10 dismissing
San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a receiver
without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation of
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the
jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating
the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the
distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the
HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made;
that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for not being
the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.
On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties’
motion for reconsideration filed on November 28, 2000, holding that BF Homes’
directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery of the TCTs
under Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on the legality of
Atty. Orendain’s actions; and that the criminal liability would attach only after BF
Homes did not comply with a directive of the HLURB directing it to deliver the
titles.11
San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the
Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal on
October 15, 2001, holding:
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to
disturb the ruling of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Established
jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City Prosecutor concerned.
There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957,
there is still pending with the Housing and Land Use Resulatory Board (HLURB,
for short) a complaint for specific performance where the HLURB is called upon
to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales transactions involving the
lots in question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF
Homes.
As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the
Supreme Court had ruled that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving real estate business and practices under PD 957. This is reiterated in
the subsequent cases of Union Bank of the Philippines versus HLURB, G.R.
[No.] 953364, June 29, 1992 and C.T. Torres Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191
SCRA 286.
The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the
validity of the transactions involving the lands in question with specific reference
to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes in the said transactions,
there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for non-delivery of the
subject land titles. In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal
provision of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall have ruled and
decided on the validity of the transactions involving the lots in question.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration. 13
Ruling of the CA
Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the CA on
certiorari and mandamus (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008), contending that
respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave abuse in denying their appeal
and in refusing to charge the directors and officers of BF Homes with the
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the
issue of whether or not HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183 presented a
prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957.
In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
73008,14 the CA dismissed San Miguel Properties’ petition, holding and ruling
as follows:
From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on
prejudicial question generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.
However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by
the respondents. In this case, an issue in an administrative case was
considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil case which,
consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination of
the administrative proceedings.
Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed
the application of the rule on prejudicial question.
In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly
applied the rule on prejudicial question when it directed petitioner therein to put
up a bond for just compensation should the demolition of private respondents’
building proved to be illegal as a result of a pending cadastral suit in another
tribunal.
City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action
involving a boundary dispute was considered a prejudicial question which must
be resolved prior to an administrative proceeding for the holding of a plebiscite
on the affected areas.
In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the
interest of good order, courts can suspend action in one case pending
determination of another case closely interrelated or interlinked with it.
It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion
x x x when he applied the rule on prejudicial question to the instant proceedings
considering that the issue on the validity of the sale transactions x x x by x x x
Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is closely intertwined with the purported
criminal culpability of private respondents, as officers/directors of BF Homes,
Inc., arising from their failure to deliver the titles of the parcels of land included
in the questioned conveyance.
All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the HLURB
proceedings is not determinative of the criminal liability of private respondents
under PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we were to assume that the
HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the subject titles, it would be
highly irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal case
against private respondents for the non-delivery of certificates of title which they
are not under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutorial
arm of the government as represented by herein public respondent, courts will
not interfere with the discretion of a public prosecutor in prosecuting or
dismissing a complaint filed before him. A public prosecutor, by the nature of his
office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal
justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie
case has been established by the complaining party.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 15 October 2001 and 12
July 2002 of the Department of Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 15
The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration on January
18, 2005.16
Issues
Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the following for
consideration and resolution, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER’S CERTIORARI
AND MANDAMUS PETITION TO ORDER AND DIRECT RESPONDENT
SECRETARY TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 25,
PD. 957 IN THAT:
THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO
PETITIONER THE TITLES TO 20 FULLY-PAID LOTS IS MANDATED BY
SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAD
DULY CONFIRMED THE SAME PER ITS DECISION DATED 27 JANUARY
2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203, ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF HOMES, INC.".
A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO
DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE SUBJECT TITLES CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL
OFFENSE PER SECTIONS 25 AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH IT IS THE
MINISTERIAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.
IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A "PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION" TO THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE SINCE THE FORMER
INVOLVES AN ISSUE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE
INVOLVED IN THE LATTER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE HLURB CASE HAS NO
CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE TO THE PRESENT CRIMINAL CASE
WHICH CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.
IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
EMANATE FROM THEIR MALA PROHIBITA NON-DELIVERY OF THE TITLES
TO TWENTY (20) FULLY-PAID PARCELS OF LAND TO PETITIONER, AND
NOT FROM THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE HLURB’S RULING IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.
NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONER’S CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE
OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.17
It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for specific
performance and damages that San Miguel Properties instituted in the HLURB
simultaneously with its filing of the complaint for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 957. On January 25, 2002, the HLURB Arbiter ruled that the HLURB was
inclined to suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of Atty.
Orendain’s authority to enter into the transactions in BF Homes’ behalf,
because the final resolution by the SEC was a logical antecedent to the
determination of the issue involved in the complaint before the HLURB. Upon
appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board), citing the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, affirmed the HLURB Arbiter’s decision, holding
that although no prejudicial question could arise, strictly speaking, if one case
was civil and the other administrative, it nonetheless opted to suspend its action
on the cases pending the final outcome of the administrative proceeding in the
interest of good order.18
Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of
the President (OP), arguing that the HLURB erred in suspending the
proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the OP reversed the HLURB Board’s ruling,
holding thusly:
The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance under Section
25 of the Presidential Decree (PD) 957 – "The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers’ Protective."
As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the authority
of the HLURB, as successor agency of the National Housing Authority (NHA), to
regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in relation to PD 1344, the real estate trade, with
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases "involving specific
performance of contractual and statutory obligation filed by buyers of
subdivision lots … against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman,"
the HLURB, in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers and functions, "must
interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these
contracts and award[s] damages whenever appropriate."
Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURB’s decision to await for some
forum to decide – if ever one is forthcoming – the issue on the authority of
Orendain to dispose of subject lots before it peremptorily resolves the basic
complaint is unwarranted, the issues thereon having been joined and the
respective position papers and the evidence of the parties having been
submitted. To us, it behooved the HLURB to adjudicate, with the usual dispatch,
the right and obligation of the parties in line with its own appreciation of the
obtaining facts and applicable law. To borrow from Mabubha Textile Mills
Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on the finding of others to
discharge this adjudicatory functions.19
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed to the CA
(C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631), raising as issues: (a) whether or not the HLURB had
the jurisdiction to decide with finality the question of Atty. Orendain’s authority to
enter into the transaction with San Miguel Properties in BF Homes’ behalf, and
rule on the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract; and (b) whether
or not the HLURB properly suspended the proceedings until the SEC resolved
with finality the matter regarding such authority of Atty. Orendain.
The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631,20 decreeing that
the HLURB, not the SEC, had jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties’
complaint. It affirmed the OP’s decision and ordered the remand of the case to
the HLURB for further proceedings on the ground that the case involved matters
within the HLURB’s competence and expertise pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, viz:
[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB has
jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision
developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision
developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.
Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint
because it pertains to matters within the HLURB’s competence and expertise.
The proceedings before the HLURB should not be suspended.
While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be remanded to the
HLURB. This is in recognition of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The fairest
and most equitable course to take under the circumstances is to remand the
case to the HLURB for the proper presentation of evidence.21
Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
dismissal of San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of probable cause and for reason of a
prejudicial question?
The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case brought to
compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a reason to suspend the proceedings
on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
1.
Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an
administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes’ posture that the
administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial
question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of
Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal
case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is
determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused.22 The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.23 The essential elements of
a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case.
Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’ submission that there could be no
prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial
question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB
raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings
determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 25 24 of Presidential
Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance
was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the
HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.25
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because
of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the
pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues
raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957,
such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of
the question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the
two cases involved is thus necessary.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact
performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or
according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill
it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there
must first be a breach of the contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191
of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in
case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become
impossible. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or
rescission with damages. As presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the
remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124
of the former Civil Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of
resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a party’s breach of
the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled the injured party
to rescission. The present article, as in the former one, contemplates alternative
remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to pursue, as principal
actions, either the rescission or the specific performance of the obligation, with
payment of damages in either case.28
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale
of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the increasing number of
incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and
maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports
of alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, 29 such as
failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances.
Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the
registration and license of the real estate subdivision owners, developers,
operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as provides the procedure
to be observed in such instances; it prescribes administrative fines and other
penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the
HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally
entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal
action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must
obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel
Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty.
Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to
his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal
liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would
evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not
conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the
prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have been adequately
alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet
presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested
its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit.30
2.
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable
That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in
the HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of no consequence at all. As
earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance, although civil in nature,
could be brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of administrative
agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to
the judicial adjudication of controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized
skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their resolution. The Court has
observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts
and the determination of private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely
judicial function exercisable only by the regular courts.31
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on
matters demanding the special competence of administrative agencies even if
such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case
that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and
knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves
technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an
appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The
application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court
but only for its suspension until after the matters within the competence of the
administrative body are threshed out and determined.32
To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not
determine a controversy involving a question within the competence of an
administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so placed within the special
competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that
instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the
administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the
courts cannot resolve a question that is within the legal competence of an
administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the latter,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory
statute administered, suspension or dismissal of the action is proper.33
3.
Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted
It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 as malum prohibitum, by
which criminal liability attached to BF Homes’ directors and officers by the mere
failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the suspension
unsustainable.34 The mere fact that an act or omission was malum prohibitum
did not do away with the initiative inherent in every court to avoid an absurd
result by means of rendering a reasonable interpretation and application of the
procedural law. Indeed, the procedural law must always be given a reasonable
construction to preclude absurdity in its application.35 Hence, a literal application
of the principle governing prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if such
application would produce unjust and absurd results or unreasonable
consequences.
San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly raise
the prejudicial question as a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings
because respondents had not themselves initiated either the action for specific
performance or the criminal action.1âwphi1 It contends that the defense of a
prejudicial question arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised
by the party who filed or initiated said related case.
The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no
distinction as to who is allowed to raise the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we ought not to
distinguish.36
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24,
2004 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 73008; and ORDERS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989
EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING, respondents.
Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for petitioner.
Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by
a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City" 1 The
respondent Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of the court a quo that
the said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car,
was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the
direction of the provincial capitol, and that private respondent sustained physical
injuries as a consequence. 2
Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207
thereof. 3 Private respondent, as the complaining witness therein, did not
reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the
prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor. 4 Petitioner was
acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt".5
On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner
in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, 6 docketed therein as
Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil action involved the same subject matter
and act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027. 7 In his answer filed therein,
the petitioner alleged as special and affirmative detenses that the private
respondent had no cause of action and, additionally, that the latter's cause of
action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207
inasmuch as when said criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also
deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and
actively participated in the criminal case. 8
Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court
issued on April 3, 1975 an order of denial, with the suggestion that "(t)o enrich
our jurisprudence, it is suggested that the defendant brings (sic) this ruling to
the Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate remedy, to review the
ruling of the court". 9
On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-
40992, 10 assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court. Said petition was
dismissed for lack of merit in the Court's resolution of July 23, 1975, and a
motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason in a
resolution of October 28, 1975. 11
After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the
herein private respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay the former the
sum of P 6,920.00 for hospitalization, medicines and so forth, P2,000.00 for
other actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's
fees, and costs. 12
On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals 13 affirmed the decision of
the lower court except as to the award for moral damages which it reduced from
P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. A motion for reconsideration was denied by
respondent court on September 18, 1987. 14
The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is whether the
private respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution
thereof without reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission
complained of, can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same
act or omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action
on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the
judgment of acquittal.
Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting the
respondent court for refusing to resolve an assignment of error in his appeal
therein, said respondent court holding that the main issue had been passed
upon by this Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore mentioned. It is petitioner's
position that the aforesaid two resolutions of the Court in said case, the first
dismissing the petition and the second denying the motion for reconsideration,
do not constitute the "law of the case' which would control the subsequent
proceed ings in this controversy.
1. We incline favorably to petitioner's submission on this score.
The "doctrine of the law of the case" has no application at the aforesaid posture
of the proceedings when the two resolutions were handed down. While it may
be true that G.R. No. L-40992 may have involved some of the issues which
were thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits by the two lower courts,
the proceedings involved there was one for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus assailing an interlocutory order of the court a quo, specifically, its
order denying therein defendants motion to dismiss. This Court, without
rendering a specific opinion or explanation as to the legal and factual bases on
which its two resolutions were predicated, simply dismissed the special civil
action on that incident for lack of merit. It may very well be that such resolution
was premised on the fact that the Court, at that stage and on the basis of the
facts then presented, did not consider that the denial order of the court a
quo was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 15 To repeat, no rationale for
such resolutions having been expounded on the merits of that action, no law of
the case may be said to have been laid down in G.R. No. L-40992 to justify the
respondent court's refusal to consider petitioner's claim that his former acquittal
barred the separate action.
'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on
a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once
irrevocably established, as the controlling legal rule of
decision between the same parties in the same case continues to
be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or
not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court (21 C.J.S.
330). (Emphasis supplied). 16
 It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of
last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought
before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law
of that particular case . . . (Emphasis supplied). 17
It is a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate
court in a case is the law of the case on the points presented
throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the
trial and the appellate courts, and no question necessarily
involved and decided on that appeal will be considered on a
second appeal or writ of error in the same case, provided the facts
and issues are substantially the same as those on which the first
question rested and, according to some authorities, provided the
decision is on the merits . . . 18
2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now consider the
principal plaint of petitioner.
Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission (in
this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds
of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil
liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a
delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability
may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both
types of liability. 19
We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa vs. De la Cruz, et al., 20 it
was held that where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from
the offense charged in the criminal case through her intervention as a private
prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the
subsequent civil action based upon the same cause. It is meet, however, not to
lose sight of the fact that the criminal action involved therein was for serious oral
defamation which, while within the contemplation of an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code, constitutes only a penal omen and cannot
otherwise be considered as a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code. And while petitioner draws attention to the
supposed reiteration of the Roa doctrine in the later case of Azucena vs.
Potenciano, et al., 21 this time involving damage to property through negligence
as to make out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code, such secondary reliance is misplaced since the therein plaintiff Azucena
did not intervene in the criminal action against defendant Potenciano. The
citation of Roa in the later case of Azucena was, therefore, clearly obiter and
affords no comfort to petitioner.
These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and even
statutory, 22 changes on the matter of civil actions arising from criminal
offenses and quasi-delicts. We will reserve our discussion on the statutory
aspects for another case and time and, for the nonce, We will consider the
doctrinal developments on this issue.
In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and intervened
in the prosecution of the criminal suit against petitioner. Under the present
jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable
doubt, it could very well make a pronounce ment on the civil liability of the
accused 23 and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel
the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. 24
Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil aciton after such
acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code. We have ruled in the
relatively recent case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. 25 that:
In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was
acquitted on the ground that 'his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt' the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a
separate civil action to recover damages from the defendants-
appellants (See Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113). The well-
settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still
be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil
liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist'. (Padilla
vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 cited in People vs. Rogelio
Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno
Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January
7, 1988). The ruling is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code which
provides:
 When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action
for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a rate of speed and in violation of the provisions of the
preponderance of evidence ... 26
Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the
failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to
the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the
civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere
provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer
enforceable. 27
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered
through the application of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from
the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in the view that, under such
circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of
criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its
penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in
effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or
prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of
evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the
rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an
acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.
The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is
constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner, thus:
3. That in the evening of July 7, 197l at about 7:00
o'clock, the plaintiff crossed Iznart Street from his
restaurant situated at 220 lznart St., Iloilo City,
Philippines, on his way to a meeting of the
Cantonese Club at Aldeguer Street, Iloilo City and
while he was standing on the middle of the street as
there were vehicles coming from the Provincial
Building towards Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he was
bumped and sideswiped by Volkswagen car with
plate No. B-2508 W which was on its way from
Plazoleta Gay towards the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo
City, which car was being driven by the defendant in
a reckless and negligent manner, at an excessive
Revised Motor Vehicle (sic) as amended, in relation
to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code as well
as in violation of existing city ordinances, and by
reason of his inexcusable lack of precaution and
failure to act with due negligence and by failing to
take into consideration (sic) his degree of
intelligence, the atmospheric conditions of the place
as well as the width, traffic, visibility and other
conditions of lznart Street; 29
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to
reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal
case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages. 30 The
Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill 31 that —
... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
also actually charged criminally, to recover damages on both
scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused . . .
The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. involved
virtually the same factual situation. The Court, in arriving at the conclusion
hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure of the therein plaintiff to
reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention in
the criminal case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages,
especially considering that the accused therein was acquitted because his guilt Dominador L. Natividad for private respondents,
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the two cases were anchored on
two different causes of action, the criminal case being on a violation of Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for damages
was based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the ANTONIO, J.:
aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved. Consequently, said
civil case may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil Code. Original special civil action for certiorari.

Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of respondent court
aside, We hold that on the issues decisive of this case it did not err in sustaining
the decision a quo.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent Joselito Aizon was charged before the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch 11 (respondent Judge Alberto V. Seneris,
presiding), with Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence or a violation
of Section 48 of Republic Act No. 4136. The pertinent portion of the Information
reads as follows:
That on or about May 9, 1975, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the driver of an Isuzu
Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. SB-511 owned and operated by
FELIPE AIZON, operating on the public road, and without taking
the necessary precautions, considering the width, traffic, visibility,
grades, crossing, curvatures, and other conditions of the road, so
as to avoid accident to persons or damage to properties, did then
and there, through reckless and fast driving, caused the said Isuzu
Passenger Bus to turn turtle, as a result of which, the persons of
MYRNA PAJARITO DE SAN LUIS and MUSA BARING, both
passengers on board the said Isuzu passenger bus sustained
injuries on their persons which caused their death. (Emphasis
supplied.)

G.R. No. L-44627 December 14, 1978 Upon arraignment, said respondent entered a plea of guilty. In view of said plea,
the court rendered judgment convicting him of the offense charged and
LUCIA S. PAJARITO, petitioner, sentencing him "to indemnify the heirs of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis
vs. the amount of P12,000.00 ... ."
HON. ALBERTO V. SEÑERIS, Presiding Judge of Branch II, Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga; JOSELITO AIZON, and FELIPE After the judgment had become final and executory, a Writ of Execution was
AIZON, respondents. issued against Joselito Aizon for the indemnity of P12,000.00, but the same was
returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency. Whereupon, petitioner Lucia S.
Geronimo Pajarito for petitioner. Pajarito, mother of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis, filed with the court a
quo a motion for the issuance of Subsidiary Writ of Execution and served a
copy thereof to private respondent Felipe Aizon, employer of Joselito Aizon as
alleged in the Information. Felipe Aizon opposed the motion on the grounds, to
wit: (1) that he is not the employer of Joselito Aizon, the vehicle in question
having been sold already to Isaac Aizon, father of Joselito, but that the deed of
transfer has not been executed because the full price has not yet been paid;
and (2) that in case of insolvency, Joselito has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment
to satisfy the judgment insofar as the indemnity is concerned.
The court denied petitioner's motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution on the
ground that Felipe Aizon, alleged employer of Joselito, was not a party in the
aforesaid criminal case. Said the court:
It is therefore, the well considered opinion of this Court that a
separate civil action must be filed by movant Lucia S. Pajarito
against Felipe Aizon in order to enforce the subsidiary liability of
the latter under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, but the same was
denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the enforcement of tile subsidiary liability under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code may be filled under the same criminal case,
under which the subsidiary liability was granted; that respondent Felipe Aizon,
alleged employer of Joselito Aizon, was given his day in court, as he was
furnished a copy of the motion for issuance of the Subsidiary Writ of Execution,
to which he filed his opposition; and that, although not made a party in the
criminal case, the employer, Felipe Aizon, should have taken active
participation in the defense of his employee, Joselito Aizon.
On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment to the petition which We
consider their Answer, maintain that to enforce the subsidiary liability under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a separate civil action
must be filed against the employer because under our present judicial system,
before one could be held subsidiary liable, he should be made a party
defendant to the action, which in this case is not legally feasible because
respondent Felipe Aizon was not accused together with Joselito Aizon in
Criminal Case No. 512 (1313) for Double Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence.
Obviously, the question to be considered here is whether the subsidiary civil
liability established in Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be
enforced in the same criminal case where the award was made, or in a separate
civil action. Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable. As a consequence, the institution of the
criminal action carries with it the institution of the civil action arising therefrom,
except when there is a separate civil action or reservation of the latter on the
part of the complainant. As explained in Ramcar, Incorporated v. De
Leon: 1 "When no civil action is expressly instituted, according to subsection (a)
of section 1 of Rule 107, it shall be impliedly jointly instituted with the criminal
action.' That means as if two actions are joined in one as twins, each one
complete with the same completeness as any of the two normal persons
composing a twin. It means that the civil action may be tried and prosecuted,
with all the ancillary processes provided by law."
Pursuant to Article 103, in relation to Article 102, of the Revised Penal Code, an
employer may be subsidiary liable for the employee's civil liability in a criminal
action when: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the
employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (3) he is
insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability. 2 The subsidiary civil liability of
the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the
criminal case. In Martinez v. Barredo, 3 this Court ruled that a judgment of
conviction sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity in the
absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is
conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's
subsidiary liability.
... The stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses in effect and
implications mere civil liability. Common sense dictates that a
finding of guilt in a criminal case in which proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary, should not be nullified in a subsequent civil
action requiring only preponderance of evidence to support a
judgment, unless those who support the contrary rule should also
hold that an absolution in a civil case will operate to automatically
set aside the verdict against the defendant in the criminal case. It
is anomalous, to say the least, to suppose that the driver, excelling
'Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde', could be guilty of reckless negligence in
so far as his obligation to pay indemnity is concerned, and at the
same time could be free from any blame when said indemnity is
 sought to be collected mom his employer, although the right to the
indemnity arose from and was based on one and the same act of
the driver.
The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in
court, because the situation before us is not one wherein the
employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the
Civil Code, but one in which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary
civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's criminal
negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in
a criminal action. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto
subsidiarily liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of
the latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not
only the employee's primary civil liability but also his employer's
subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. (Almelda et al. vs.
Abaroa, 8 Phil., 178, affirmed in 218 U.S., 476, 54 Law ed., 1116;
Wise & Co. vs. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320; Francisco us. Onrubia,
46 Phil., 327; Province of Ilocos Sur us. Tolentino, G.R. No.
34186, 56 Phil. 829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
II, p. 403)
It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in
selecting his employees, taking real and deep interest in their
welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by
reason of or as a result of the performance of their duties, if only in
the way of giving them the benefit of counsel; and consequently
doing away with the practice of leaving them to their fates. If these
be done, the American rule requiring notice on the part of the
employer shall have been satisfied. (At pp. 3-4)
4
In Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., this Court further amplified the
rule that the decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon
the employer, "not only with regard to (the latter's) civil liability but also with
regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated
but follows that of his employee. That is why the law says that his liability is
subsidiary (Article 103, Revised Penal Code). To allow an employer to dispute
the civil liability fixed in the criminal case would be to amend, nullify, or defeat a
final judgment rendered by a competent court." And this Court, in Miranda,
further explained that the employer is in substance and in effect a party to the
criminal case, considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law.
It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the
criminal case instituted against his employee, but in substance
and in effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed
upon him by law. It is his concern, as well as of his employee, to
see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by
taking virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He
cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is also his.
And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is
convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later
be heard to complain, if brought to court, for the enforcement of
his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in court . (At
p. 675. Emphasis supplied.)
The conclusiveness upon the employer of the judgment of conviction
sentencing the employee to pay civil indemnity, for the enforcement of the
employer's subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 was again reiterated
in Manalo and Salvador v. Robles Transportation Company, Inc., 5 where the
Court ruled that the sheriff's return submitted in evidence in the action against
the employer, Robles Transportation Company, Inc., showing that the two writs
of execution were not satisfied because of the insolvency of the driver, is
a prima facie evidence of the employee's insolvency. Similarly, this Court ruled
that the defendant's insolvency may be proven by the certificate of the Director
of Prisons that the employee is serving subsidiary imprisonment; 6 or by the
certificate of the sheriff that the employee has not satisfied his pecuniary liability
and that no properties have been found registered in his name. 7
Considering that the judgment of conviction, sentencing a defendant employee
to pay an indemnity under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, is
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the latter's civil liability but
also with regard to its amount, this Court stated in Rotea, 8 that in the action to
enforce the employer's subsidiary liability, the court has no other function than
to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and
has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been
committed in the decision.
In view of the foregoing principles, and considering that Felipe Aizon does not liability of the alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus. Costs against
deny that he was the registered operator of the bus but only claims now that he private respondents.
sold the bus to the father of the accused, it would serve no important purpose to
require petitioner to file a separate and independent action against the employer Fernando (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary civil liability. Under the
circumstances, it would not only prolong the litigation but would require the heirs
of the deceased victim to incur unnecessary expenses. At any rate, the
proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered
as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an
execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings
on the execution are proceedings in the suit. 9 There is no question that the
court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its Separate Opinions
process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every
question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.

The validity of the claim of Felipe Aizon that he is no longer the owner and
operator of the in fated bus as he sold it already to Isaac Aizon, father of the
accused Joselito Aizon, is a matter that could be litigated and resolved in the
same criminal case. In support of his opposition to the motion of the
complainant, served upon him, for the purpose of the enforcement of his
subsidiary liability Felipe Aizon may adduce all the evidence necessary for that
purpose. Indeed, the enforcement of the employer's subsidiary civil liability may
be conveniently litigated within the same proceeding because the execution of
the judgment is a logical and integral part of the case itself. This would certainly
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of the contending parties.
"The purpose of procedure", observed this Court in Manila Railroad Co. v.
Attorney General, 10 "is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of the contending parties. It was created
not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice." In proceedings to apply justice, it is the duty of the courts "to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of their rival
claims. Thus, the Rules require that they should be liberally construed "to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 11
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Court in Criminal Case No. 512 (1313)
dated July 27, 1976 and August 14, 1976 are hereby set aside. The Court a
quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur, but to make matters clearer, I must add that the only issues open at
the hearing to be held by the court a quo are: (1) whether or not Felipe Aizon
was the owner of the vehicle driven by the convicted accused, Joselito Aizon,
or, whether or not he was the employer of said accused at the time of the
commission of the offense on May 9, 1975, and (2) whether or not said Joselito
Aizon is insolvent. As stated in the main opinion, the judgment in the criminal
case is conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to his civil liability but
also with regard to its amount which is that found in the judgment of conviction.
In other words, what is to be decided by the trial court is not strictly speaking the
subsidiary liability of the employer, Felipe Aizon, for the judgment in the criminal
case is deemed to include that liability, but only the two issues related to it that I
have mentioned.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur, but to make matters clearer, I must add that the only issues open at
the hearing to be held by the court a quo are: (1) whether or not Felipe Aizon
was the owner of the vehicle driven by the convicted accused, Joselito Aizon,
or, whether or not he was the employer of said accused at the time of the
commission of the offense on May 9, 1975, and (2) whether or not said Joselito
Aizon is insolvent. As stated in the main opinion, the judgment in the criminal
case is conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to his civil liability but
also with regard to its amount which is that found in the judgment of conviction.
In other words, what is to be decided by the trial court is not strictly speaking the
subsidiary liability of the employer, Felipe Aizon, for the judgment in the criminal
case is deemed to include that liability, but only the two issues related to it that I
have mentioned.
G.R. No. 202124
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
1
This resolves the appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the
judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon,
finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted
Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening,
at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a
minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the
level of the umbilicus, directed upward toward the left upper abdomen."
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter
Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"
which directly caused their instant death.
That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not
given provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to
facilitate the commission of the offense.
Contrary to law.2
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and
Roger San Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at
Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill,
qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto
Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by
overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous
desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife
Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both
elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against
them. At said proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement
stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and
Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a
firearm while the other two had no participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo
further stated that Roger San Miguel was not present at the crime scene. Based
on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima
facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.4 Thus, upon motion of
the prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and
Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to appellant. 5
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the
victim, and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate
and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and Claudine,
died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet
wounds showed that the victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but
she could not tell what kind of ammunitions were used.6
Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in
the evening of June 6, 2002, as his entire family lay down on the floor of their
one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly stripped
off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the
wall gone, the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto
clearly saw their faces which were illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging
in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert Estores
and Roger San Miguel.
The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to
do so. The men then uttered, "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon."
Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at
marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for
mercy, a gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his
children and wife in an attempt to protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he
heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his family huddled
together in their hut.7
When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that
his two (2) young daughters were wounded. His wife went out of their house to
ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the two (2)
wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to
the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts
to revive her.8
In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from
appellant, Norberto replied that he had a previous altercation with appellant who
was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against appellant's two
other brothers for molesting his daughter.9
On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his
defense. Appellant's testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San
Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just
watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for
several years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and the
other witnesses admitted that said house was a mere five-minute walk away
from the crime scene.10
Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the
testimony of Norberto, the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established
that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the
family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal
Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G
reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo
Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and
punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced
to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to
indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to
suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine Divina and accused is
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of
Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims
actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in
Criminal Case No. 7702-G, reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo
Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined
and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal
Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and
TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the offended
parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina.
Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On
January 30, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction
for the crimes charged.13
Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On
July 30, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution14 notifying the parties that they
may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both parties manifested that
they will no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively
discussed their positions before the CA.15
The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies
in Norberto's testimony, such as his failure to state from the beginning that all
three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify appellant as the one
holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s children.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given
the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-
examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and
affirmed by the CA.16
The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed
by the CA, that appellant acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of
them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at Norberto and his family,
killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants
with their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside their house
that had been laid bare after its walling was stripped off, to wit:
Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the
same time, do you have light in your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of light was there?
A: A gas lamp.
Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?
A: In the middle of our house.
xxxx
Q: when did they fire a shot?
A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.
Q: How many gunshots did you hear?
A: Only one.
Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?
A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)
xxxx Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?

Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot? A: Less than five minutes, sir.

A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?
daughters were hit.
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see
Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time? what happened to them?

A: All of them. A: Yes, sir, they were hit.

Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were x x x17

having one firearm each? Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of
Norberto's daughters because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired
A: Yes, sir. to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.
Q: And they fired shots at the same time? Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of
the crime is not necessary as long as their concerted acts reveal a common
A: Yes, sir. design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of all.18
Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of
Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that Norberto together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer
night? necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired from
appellant's firearm that killed the children.
A: To the place where we were.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful
Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by
your position then? circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation.19 The presence of
any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient
A: I ordered my children to lie down. to qualify a killing as murder.20 The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is
liable for murder because treachery attended the killing of Norberto’s two
Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children, thus:
children to lie down?
x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body down side by side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the
and ordering them to line (sic) down face down) evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by [appellant]
Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores].
They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea
for mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The
family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very tender
ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years
old and 3 ½ years old respectively. In this case, the victims were defenseless
and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants when they were gunned
down. There was clear showing that the attack was made suddenly and
unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend
themselves. Norberto and his wife and his children could have already been
asleep at that time of the night. x x x 21
Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to
murder. As held in People v. Fallorina,22 the essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest
provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years,
cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks
a child, treachery exists.
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court held:
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime
committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no
intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated
murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill
may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons
used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the
words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the
victim.
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part
of appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered 24during, as well
as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes with
approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted
murder, viz.:
In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony
of murder first by suddenly stripping off the wall of their house, followed by
successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out
of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming their target,
not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the
family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of
Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for
Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as
[appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is
liable for the crime committed.25
Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he
failed to state from the very beginning that all three assailants were carrying
firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm that killed the
children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's
credibility. An examination of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no
real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor
inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the
credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as
the perpetrators of the crime."27 Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto's
candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees
no reason why it should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v.
People28 that:
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings
and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by
the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would
justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because
the trial court's determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under
grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in unique position to
assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness,
honesty and candor x x x.29
The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no
outstanding or exceptional circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-
standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's ruling
that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina
identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the
prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that appellant
is one of the perpetrators of the crime.
However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by
the trial court to identify the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is
some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the terms "Double Murder"
and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing
penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize
appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted
Murder.
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as
proven during trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of
Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result of
a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein,
appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not
Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that
the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only
one offense.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense,
otherwise, the same is defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of
the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station,
et al.,30 thus:
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations
is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and
enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap
upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense.
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint
or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the
accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea,
otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and
failed to move for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived
his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure
of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to
the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the
court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and
impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.31
Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder
and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a
complex crime as defined in Article 4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the
eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one
crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime.
The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime
proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of
two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts
result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims
expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 34
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant
and the two others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of
Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but
his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a
series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several
individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What appellant and
his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held
in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their
respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons
constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex
crime."36
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take
into account dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact
that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain
sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:
That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not
given provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to
facilitate the commission of the offense.37
Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:
x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined
calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied
by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the
crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident
other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused x x x38
In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line
of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which
the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him
or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling
aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the
offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. 40 The
testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant violated
the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein,
without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have
appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must
modify the penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling,
the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder.41 However,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion
perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for parole.
With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed
for each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance,
the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from ten (10)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in
any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for
each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter
in detail as regards criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are three
kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and
exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate
damages in some instances.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for
the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and
apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law.42 This award stems from Article 100 of the
RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable."
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence,
it can be increased by the Court when appropriate.43 Article 2206 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to
the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to
be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction
that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil
aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in
addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is
also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent
from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of
civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus,
although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the
amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when
the present circumstance warrants it.44
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are
also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals45 expounded on
the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for
manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These
damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or
corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury
suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless,
that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must
have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 46 and Article
222047 of the Civil Code. x x x.
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as
"compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental
anguish resulting from a wrong."48 They may also be considered and allowed
"for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation
suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the
factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant
humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress."49
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v.
Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration,
within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must
be proportionate to the suffering inflicted."50
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does not
fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the
court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended
party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be
adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.52
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary
damages, thus:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil
liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines
and shall be paid to the offended party.
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective
damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as
a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured
or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are
generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is
preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for
injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly
inflicted,53 the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt
caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant – associated with
such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud54 – that intensifies the
injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those
species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.55
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having
specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission.
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party
who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that
should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230
of the Civil Code. 56
The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure57 requires aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying,
to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to trample on the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the alleged
offense that he or she has committed. A criminal complaint or information
should basically contain the elements of the crime, as well as its qualifying and
ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the
proper penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of
civil liability. In the civil aspect, the presence of an aggravating circumstance,
even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial would entitle the
victim to an award of exemplary damages.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not
only due to the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct
of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance
when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision,
lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio,58 the
Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse
tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own
daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal,59 the Court awarded exemplary
damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the
accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v.
Cañada,60 People v. Neverio61 and People v. Layco, Sr.,62 the Court awarded
exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders
who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at
₱30,000.00,63 despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance. The Court finds
it proper to increase the amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter similar conduct.
If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be
imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing
jurisprudence64 sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however,
must first consider the penalty imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to
Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that
Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under
the RPC and special penal laws were amended to impose the death penalty
under certain circumstances.65 Under the same law, the following crimes are
punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,66 mutiny on the high
seas,67 and simple rape.68 For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified piracy;69 qualified bribery under
certain circumstances;70 parricide;71 murder;72 infanticide, except when
committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor
or either of the maternal grandparents for the same purpose; 73 kidnapping and
serious illegal detention under certain circumstances; 74 robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons under certain circumstances; 75 destructive
arson, except when death results as a consequence of the commission of any
of the acts penalized under the article;76 attempted or frustrated rape, when a
homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder; 77 and
carnapping, when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof.78 Finally, RA 7659 imposes the death penalty on the following crimes:
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands
the gift or present.
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of
any of the acts penalized under Article 320, death results.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim
becomes insane or homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when
the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3)
when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4)
when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when
the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by any member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any
law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2)
indivisible penalties or single indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in
relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one
aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset
one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the
purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules,
according to the result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art.
63)
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible
penalties, the court has the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion perpetua or
death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.
But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It
provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the RPC.79
As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to
impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the
award of damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome80 and People v.
Quiachon,81 is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense
because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the
offender."82
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of
the death penalty were it not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July
9, 1998 in People v. Victor,83 that the award of civil indemnity for the crime of
rape when punishable by death should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his
is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of
the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." 84 Such
reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was
later increased to ₱100,000.00.85
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v.
Arizapa,86 ₱50,000.00 was awarded as moral damages without need of
pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's
injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape
to warrant per se the award of moral damages.87 Subsequently, the amount was
increased to ₱75,000.00 in People v. Soriano88 and P100,000.00 in People v.
Gambao.89
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because
of RA 9346, the imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as
those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for awarding damages and
not the actual penalty imposed.1avvphi1
Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the
attendance of an ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to
impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the
latest jurisprudence90 pegs the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance
and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount of
₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and
moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating
circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his is
not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the
financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the
Court over the incidence of heinous crimes x x x."91
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance,
the Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱75,000.00 exemplary damages,
regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done
by the offender caused several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a
single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will depend on
the penalty and the number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should
be properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any ordinary
aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance, but
the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the
maximum penalty shall be imposed,92 then, for every victim who dies, the heirs
shall be indemnified with ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime
under Article 48 of the RPC, the following doctrines are noteworthy:
In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,93 this Court ruled that special
complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and
special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in
his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,94 explained that
composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules
on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not
consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies
[compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to
commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex
crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a
single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although
composed of two or more offenses."95
In People v. De Leon,96 we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to
commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life.
The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the
result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes
or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be
taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of
the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the
victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more
persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation,
or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the
crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the
robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is
committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery
with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide.
The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes
murder, parricide, and infanticide.97
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries
committed by reason or on occasion of the rape.98 Hence, even if any or all of
the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with
homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v.
Macabales:99
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the
aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery
applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against property. However,
we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery as a
generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered
helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of
the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as
their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that
when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating
circumstance.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special
penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of
robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part
of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the complex
crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as generic
aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed. 100
Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is
death but it cannot be imposed due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages will be
₱100,000.00 each, and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of
the heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another
composite crime included in a special complex crime and the penalty imposed is
death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 moral
damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each
composite crime committed.
For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide101 wherein three (3) people died
as a consequence of the crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the
award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true, however, only if those who
were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders and not when
those who died were the perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime
of robbery with homicide may still be committed even if one of the robbers
dies.102 This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there is more than
one victim of rape.
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine
the stage in which the crime was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6
of the RPC provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated
felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when an offender performs all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty
imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the
civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be
₱100,000.00 and another ₱100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the
circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the
civil indemnity and moral damages should be ₱75,000.00 each, as well as
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven
is in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be
awarded will each be ₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil indemnity
and ₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its attempted
stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to
the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the same way that the
imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil
indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated or
attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute
complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder
with attempted murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and
exemplary damages is ₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the
civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each.
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide,
several victims (except the robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be
indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special complex crime, unlike in a
complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages
because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is
to rob but in the process of committing the said crime, another crime is
committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with homicide, other
victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still
robbery with homicide as the injuries become part of the crime, "Homicide", in
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic
sense and now forms part of the essential element of robbery, 103 which is the
use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and
severity of the injuries sustained by the victims must still be determined for the
purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered mortal
wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim
should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages
equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim
suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages
and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the
damages awarded in an attempted stage.
In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of
divisible penalties, like homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the
victim shall be ₱50,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary
damages being awarded. However, an award of ₱50,000.00 exemplary
damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an aggravating
circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the information.
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages
in certain cases. The award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide
or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is
presented in the trial court.104 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims
suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. 105 In this i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate
damages to ₱50,000.00. ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
committed were further made atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent,
defenseless minors – one is a mere 3½-year-old toddler, and the other a 13- 2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other
year-old girl. The increase in the amount of awards for damages is befitting to than the above-mentioned:
show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and
wastage of lives. a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

In summary: b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

I. For those crimes106 like, Murder,107 Parricide,108 Serious Intentional c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
Mutilation,109 Infanticide,110 and other crimes involving death of a victim
where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties: 2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion a. Frustrated:
perpetua because of RA 9346:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
b. Attempted:
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
a. Frustrated:
ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
b. Attempted: perpetua because of RA 9346:
 a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages111 – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely
attempted:112
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than
the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely
attempted:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
where death, injuries, or sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of
violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty
consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than
the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the
crime committed. In other complex crimes where death does not
result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity,
moral and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty
and the penalty imposed, as the case may be.
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,113 Robbery
with Rape,114 Robbery with Intentional Mutilation,115 Robbery with
Arson,116 Rape with Homicide,117 Kidnapping with Murder,118 Carnapping
with Homicide119 or Carnapping with Rape,120 Highway Robbery with
Homicide,121 Qualified Piracy,122 Arson with Homicide,123 Hazing with
Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other crimes with death,
injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty
consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
 b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00 2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could
have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00 shall be awarded:

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
the same as the above if the penalty imposed is Death but
reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur. b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds125 and could c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following
shall be awarded: 2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00 c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries: In Robbery with Physical Injuries,126 the amount of damages shall
likewise be dependent on the nature/severity of the wounds
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00 sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00 The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, the robber/s or perpetrator/s are themselves killed or
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00 injured in the incident.1âwphi1

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall
the above-mentioned: likewise apply, and that for every additional rape committed,
whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 be entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of rape
are treated as separate crimes, in which case, the damages
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 awarded to simple rape/qualified rape shall apply.

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is
the same as the above if the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty
consists of divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous
Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender,127 Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and
Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
 1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except
those crimes where there are no stages, i.e., Reckless
Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial,
even if not alleged in the Information,128 in addition to the
above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral
damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages
for consummated; ₱30,000.00 for frustrated; and
₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua and death occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of
those who died are entitled to the following:129
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00130
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course
of the rebellion and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of
burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the amount of
₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount
for awards of civil indemnity is P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling.
Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be changed, increasing the amount
awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it.131
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by
the ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered
to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each of the two children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages for each of the two victims; (3) another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each of the two victims; and (4) temperate damages in the amount
of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts of
Attempted Murder, appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each of the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages,
exemplary damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are
subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
this decision until fully paid.132
Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of
the charges against Gilberto Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been
identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of appellant on the night the
shooting occurred. Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering in
his identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two other people who fired
the gunshots at his family. More significantly, as noted by the prosecutor, the
testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were not at the crime
scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was
the basis for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause
against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said that on June 6, 2002, he
saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but
it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm and the two other people with
him had no participation in the shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the
credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and San Miguel may have
been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to
double jeopardy because the same only attaches if the following requisites are
present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second; (2) the first
jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid
plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.133 In this case, the case against Estores and San Miguel was
dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no double jeopardy
to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real participation, if
any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine
Divina.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant
Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
the crime of murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and hereby
sentences him to suffer two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs
of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina the following amounts for each
of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱100,000.00 as
moral damages; (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d)
₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant
Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of
the crime of attempted murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in
relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4) counts of
attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages of PS0,000.00 to each of the four victims, namely, Norberto
Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina.
(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this
decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral
damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.
(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of
Justice, be FURNISHED a copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General
is DIRECTED to immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the
possible criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel
regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice Footnotes
* On leave .
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice ** No part.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE 1
ARTURO D. BRION Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora T. Lantion, with Associate
CASTRO
Associate Justice Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; rollo. pp.
Associate Justice
2-21.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO 2 Record, Vol. 1, pp. 2-3.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
3 Record, Vol. II., p. 2.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice 4 Order of the Provincial Prosecutor, Record, Vol. I, pp. 12-14.
On leave
BIENVENIDO L. REYES 5 RTC Order, Record, Vol. II, pp. 66-67.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice 6 TSN, February 5, 2004, Folder of TSN's.
No part
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN 7 TSN, March 3, 2004, Folder of TSN's.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice 8 Id.

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA 9 TSN, June 28, 2004, Folder of TSN's.

Associate Justice
10TSN's, February 10, 2005, April 7, 2005, February 15, 2006, August 3,
CERTIFICATION 2006, September 6, 2006 and June 7, 2006.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the 11 Record, Vol, I, pp. 293-294.
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. 12 Record, Vol. II, p. 131.
13 Supra note 1. 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
14 Rollo, p. 27. corpse.
15 21 Supra note 11, at 287.
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
16 22468 Phil. 816, 840 (2004), citing People v. Bustamante; 445 Phil. 345,
People of the Philippines v. Renandang Mamaruncas, 680 Phil. 192,
211 (2012). 363-364 (2003); People v. Magno, 379 Phil. 531, 554 (2000).

17 23 607 Phil. 480, 505 (2009).

TSN, July 14, 2004, pp. 6-8.
18 24 "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon."
People v. Nazareno, 698 Phil. 187, 193 (2012).
19 25 Supra note 12, at 128-129.
People v. Adviento, et al., 684 Phil. 507, 519 (2012)
20Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions 26 682 Phil. 164 (2012).
of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
27 People v. Cabtalan, supra, at 168.
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
28 G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 311.
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the
aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or 29 Medina, Jr. v. People, supra, at 320.
of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
30 G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
31People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division,
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, Mindanao Station, et al., supra.
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or
locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with 32 694 Phil. 529, 581 (2012).
the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
33Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes – When a single act constitutes
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity. serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
5. With evident premeditation.
34 People v. Nelmida, supra note 32, at 569-570. (Emphasis omitted)
35 Supra note 32. (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
36 People v. Nelmida, supra, at 570. (6) Illegal search;
37 Supra note 2. (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
38 Supra note 3. (8) Malicious prosecution;
39 674 Phil. 626, 635 (2011).1 (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
40 People v. Evangelio, 672 Phil. 229, 248-249 (2011). (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34, and 35.
41Revised Penal Code, Art. 63, par. (1), provides, in part, that when the
penalty consists of two (2) indivisible penalties and is attended by one or The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped or abused,
more aggravating circumstances, the greater penalty shall be applied, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral
and in this case, the death penalty shall be imposed. damages.
42People v. Combate, 653 Phil. 487, 504 (2010), citing People v. Victor, The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brother and sisters
354 Phil. 195, 209 (1998). may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order
named.
43Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014,
724 SCRA 1, 57. 47Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances,
44 Id. at 58-59. such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
45 G.R. No. 104576, January 20, 1995, 240 SCRA 348, 356-357.
48Bagumbayan Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-66274,
46Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and September 30, 1984, 132 SCRA 441, 446.
analogous cases:
49 6A C.J.S. Assault § 68.
(1)A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
50 G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 296.
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
51Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts; moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances,
such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
(4) Adultery or concubinage; contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
52 Lito Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, supra note 43, at 59.
53People v. Dalisay, 620 Phil. 831, 844 (2009), citing People v. Catubig,
416 Phil. 102, 119 (2001), citing American Cent. Corp. v. Stevens Van
Lines, Inc., 103 Mich App 507, 303 NW2d 234; Morris v. Duncan, 126 Ga
467, 54 SE 1045; Faircloth v. Greiner, 174 Ga app 845, 332 SE 2d 905;
§731, 22 Am Jur 2d, p. 784; American Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F 2d 523,
20 ALR 3d 335; Erwin v. Michigan, 188 Ark 658, 67 SW 2d 592.
54 §762, 22 Am Jur 2d pp. 817-818.
55§733, 22 Am Jur 2d, p. 785; Symposium: Punitive Damages, 56 So
Cal LR 1, November 1982.
56 People v. Catubig, supra note 53, at 119-120.
57 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver
the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section
or subsection of the statute punishing it. (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. - The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)
58 G.R. Nos. 82223-24, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 613, 634.
59 322 Phil. 551 (1996).
60 617 Phil. 587 (2009).
61 613 Phil. 507 (2009).
62 605 Phil. 877 (2009).
63 People v. Abellera, 553 Phil. 307 (2007).
64People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA
508, 533-534.
65 People v. Combate, supra note 41, at 509.
66Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine
waters. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any
person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or
seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a
passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
equipment or passengers. The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of
mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters.
67 Id.
68 Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion temporal. x x x
69Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in
the preceding article, under any of the following circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon
the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without
means of saving themselves or;
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide,
physical injuries or rape.
70Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law
enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender
who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or
death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall
suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted. x x x
71Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
72 Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the
aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or
of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of
an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any
other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse.
73Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246
and for murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who
shall kill any child less than three days of age.
74Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three
days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall
have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except
when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
xxxx
75Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons -
Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against
or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or
on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
x x x x.
76Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single
act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed
on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the
public in general or where people usually gather or congregate for
a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental
function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade,
workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a
definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient
dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said
building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of
whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane,
devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use,
entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any
appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of public
utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of
concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of law, or
for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors
or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed
by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of
whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or
the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or
another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or
fireworks factory, ordnance, storehouse, archives or
general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of
inflammable or explosive materials.
xxxx
77Republic Act No. 7080 (1991), Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of
Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series
of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare
any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
78Republic Act No. 6539 (1972), Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in period.
Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle
taken, be punished by x x x the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death 93 674 Phil. 444 (2011).
shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the 94 315 Phil. 314 (1995).
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
95 Id. at 338.
79 RA 9346, Sec. 2.
96 608 Phil. 701 (2009).
80 532 Phil. 368, 385 (2006).
97 People v. De Leon, supra, at 716-717, citing People v. Salazar, 342
81 532 Phil. 414, 428 (2006). Phil. 745, 765 (1997); People v. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4,
1992, 213 SCRA 569, 582; People v. Ponciano, G.R. No. 86453,
82 See People v. Sarcia, 615 Phil. 97 (2009). December 5, 1991, 204 SCRA 627, 639 and People v. Mangulabnan, et
al., 99 Phil. 992, 999 (1956).
83 Supra note 41.
98People v. Nanas, 415 Phil. 683 (2001), citing People v. Penillos, G.R.
84 People v. Victor, supra, at 210. No. 65673, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 546, 564 and People v.
Sequiño, 332 Phil. 90 (1996).
85 People v. Gambao, supra note 64, at 533.
99 400 Phil. 1221 (2000).
86 384 Phil. 766 (2000).
100
People v. Macabales, supra, at 1236-1237, citing People v. Vivas,
87 People v. Arizapa, supra. G.R. No. 100914, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 238, 242.

88 101Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons;

436 Phil. 719 (2002).
Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence
89 Supra note 64. against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

90 People v. Gambao, supra note 64. 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or
on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
91 People v. Victor, supra note 42, at 210. committed.

92 ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act 2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense to reclusion perpetua when the robbery shall have been
is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or
on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized
 in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been inflicted; Provided, 107 Article 248, RTC.
however, that when the robbery accompanied with rape is
committed with a use of a deadly weapon or by two or more 108 Article 246, RTC.
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death (As
amended by PD No. 767). 109 Article 262, RTC.

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on 110 Note that if the crime penalized in Article 255 [Infanticide] was
occasion of the robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her
subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and
paragraph, shall have been inflicted. maximum periods, and if said crime was committed for the same purpose
by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion be reclusion temporal. (As amended by R.A. 7659). Hence, the damages
temporal in its medium period, if the violence or intimidation to be awarded should be the same as in Roman Numeral Number Five
employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been (V) of the summary, i.e., In other crimes that result in the death of the
carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the victim and the penalty consists of divisible, because the prescribed
crime, or when the course of its execution, the offender shall have penalties are divisible.
inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of
the physical injuries covered by sub-divisions 3 and 4 of said 111Exemplary damages in rape cases are awarded for the inherent
Article 263. (As amended by R.A. 18) bestiality of the act committed even if no aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of the crime.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases. (As amended 112 There is no frustrated stage in the crime of rape.
by R. A. 18).
113 Art. 294 (1), RPC.
102People v. De Leon, supra note 96; People v. Ebet, 649 Phil. 181
(2010). 114 Id.
103Revised Penal Code, Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. - Any 115 Id.
person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property
belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any 116 Id.
person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.
117 Art. 266-A, RPC as amended by RA 8353.
104
People v. Tagudar, 600 Phil. 565, 590 (2009), citing People v. Dacillo,
471 Phil. 497, 510 (2004). 118 Art. 267, RPC.
105 Id., citing People v. Surongon, 554 Phil. 448, 458 (2007). 119 RA No. 6539.
106 Article 255, RTC. 120 Id.
121 P.D. 532.
122 Art. 123, RPC.
123 Art. 320, RPC.
124 RA No. 8049.
125This is so because there are no stages of the component crime in
special complex crimes but the victims must be compensated as if the
component crimes were separately committed.
126 Art. 294 (3), RPC.
127If the crime of infanticide in Art. 255 of the RPC was committed by the
mother of the child or by the maternal grandparent/s in order to conceal
her dishonor, the penalties against them are divisible, i.e., prision
mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and reclusion
temporal, respectively.
128 See People v. Catubig, supra note 53.
129
Although the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion perpetua, the
damages awarded should be the same as those where the penalty is
death due to the gravity of the offense and the manner of committing the
same.
130In order to deter the commission of the crime of rebellion and serve as
an example, exemplary damages should be awarded.
131 Supra note 38.
132
See Dario Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., G.R.
No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 459.
133
Quiambao v. People, G.R. No. 185267, September 17, 2014, 735
SCRA 345, 356-357.