GENERAL PRINCIPLES The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A.
95, as
Liban v. Gordon
FACTS: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of
Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme
Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as
Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon,
who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC
Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the
Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC,
in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically
forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position
of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1]
held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office
or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC
Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any
subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC
because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run
charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of
Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore,
respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was
elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as
a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law,
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court
thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be
a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in
a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also
declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the
Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for
Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene
and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically
questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of
some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
ISSUE: Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on
the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What
is the nature of the PNRC?
THE RULING: [The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the
dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence
thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the
constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The
PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private
corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the
parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the
Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have
reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of
constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the
very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass
upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional
or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it
is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the
court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question
will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the
PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint
on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon
which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC,
the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of
unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case,
was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly
reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more
than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times,
particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and
October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264,
and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to
the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the
constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by
law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private
corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none
like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public
service and official status accorded to it by the State and the
international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its
structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character
of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the
time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution
and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987
Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been
questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this
case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva
Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance
with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and
effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and
harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of
using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize
under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the
Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under
international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva
Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of
the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its
independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated
by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the
State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality FACTS: The Commission on Audit issued COA Resolution No. 99-011 in
of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so which the said resolution state that the BSP was created as a public
that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by
position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy
such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private Scouts of the Philippines vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the
corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was
Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he a “government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX
sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies (B)(2)(1) of the Constitution; and that “the BSP is appropriately regarded
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis. as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code.”
The BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution in a letter signed
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and
by the BSP National President Jejomar Binay. He claimed that RA 7278
auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with
eliminated the “substantial government participation” in the National
its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a
Executive Board by removing: (i) the President of the Philippines and
sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of
executive secretaries, with the exception of the Secretary of Education,
the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the
as members thereof; and (ii) the appointment and confirmation power
parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all
of the President of the Philippines, as Chief Scout, over the members of
national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a
the said Board. The BSP further claimed that the 1987 Administrative
substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its
Code itself, of which the BSP s. NLRC relied on for some terms, defines
humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its
government-owned and controlled corporations as agencies organized
existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not
as stock or non-stock corporations which the BSP, under its present
only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of
charter, is not. And finally, they claim that the Government, like in other
disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the
GOCCs, does not have funds invested in the BSP. The BSP is not an entity
image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections
administering special funds. The BSP is neither a unit of the
of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay. [Thus,
Government; a department which refers to an executive department as
R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court
created by law; nor a bureau which refers to any principal subdivision
MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second
or unit of any department.
sentence, to now read as follows: WHEREFORE, we declare that the
office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a ISSUE: Whether the BSP falls under the COA’s audit jurisdiction.
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
RULING: After considering the legislative history of the amended
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of
charter and the applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, the
the 1987 Constitution.] Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Commission on
Court found that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject
Audit
to the COA’s audit jurisdiction.
BSP v. COA
The BSP Charter created the BSP as a “public corporation” to serve the
following public interest or purpose: xxx to promote through
organization and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to
do useful things for themselves and others, to train them in scout craft,
and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic consciousness and
responsibility, courage, self-reliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and
moral values, using the method which are in common use by boy scouts.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it
was created in order to implement a State policy declared in Article II,
Section 13 of the Constitution. Evidently, the BSP, which was created by
a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional
mandate, comes within the class of “public corporations” defined by
paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which
creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private
corporations except by a general law applicable to all citizens. The
purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations
created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals,
families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.
The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or
instrumentality with juridical personality, which does not fall within the
constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the
amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not
government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered
private corporations as there exist another distinct class of corporations
or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public
corporations.” These corporations are treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the test
of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria
relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and
objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or
any of its Departments or Offices. Since BSP, under its amended charter,
continues to be a public corporation or a government instrumentality,
the Court concludes that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its
audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the
BSP Charter.
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.
Commission on Audit
FACTS: The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one
hundred years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19,
1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was
created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal
propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its
charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon
animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and
generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any way to
alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare. The
petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to
apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner
was to share one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and collected through
its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto. Subsequently,
however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a
portion of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were
recalled by virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 148. An audit team
from COA wanted to conduct an audit survey but petitioner refused
saying that it is a private corporation and not a public one.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a private corporation.
HELD: Yes. A reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject
to control or supervision by any agency of the State, unlike government-
owned and -controlled corporations. No government representative
sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private
corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily
and solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may
exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations, such
as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common
seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the
petitioner shall be managed or operated by its officers “in accordance
with its by-laws in force.” The employees of the petitioner are
registered and covered by the Social Security System at the latter’s
initiative, and not through the Government Service Insurance System,
which should be the case if the employees are considered government
employees. This is another indication of petitioner’s nature as a private
entity. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public
interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public
corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be private although its
charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for
the public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-
public corporations, which are private corporations that render public
service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives.
While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they
are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. The
true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public
or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to
the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the latter’s own
agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental
functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is
private. Applying the above test, provinces, chartered cities, and
barangays can best exemplify public corporations. They are created by
the State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts
of its own public works.
The Province Of North Cotabato, Et Al. v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy
of pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the
MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter,
convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks
were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three
(3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.)
ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to
the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last
August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to
the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the
freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation
with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government
and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be
75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent
of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as
well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including
the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance,
on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the
Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was
described as ―associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD,
petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD
violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation,
as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They
further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the
filing of the petition.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep
statutory provisions on public consultation and right to information 2. open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws. government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
HELD: The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern,
government may perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will.
involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State,
Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and
which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a
disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a
―splendid symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of Rights
public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident
is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the
in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty
Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions
to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to
Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-
further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive
quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on
peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation. One of
matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to
the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
that it ―should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values
while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information
and principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not by
even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a
the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but
concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely
by all Filipinos as one community. Included as a component of the
open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It
comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment
is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.
for peace, which includes ―continuing consultations on both national
These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression
and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and
and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the
the mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace
people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure
process. Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a
need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
plebiscite to effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to
principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖
respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient
The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
consultation. Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure
responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―conduct regular
derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-
dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace
in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on
partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as
matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative
well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the
duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is
comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment
not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus
of the NPF to be ―the principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on
point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not
Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace
advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both
national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive
peace process, as well as for government [-]civil society dialogue and
consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3
establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a
corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. In
general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the
powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers
granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under
present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before
assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in
the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that
serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD,
namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the
MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties
actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to
in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and
paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision,
however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the
envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.
The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro
juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority
and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive,
legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers
and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition
shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature
of the ―associative relationship may have been intended to be defined
more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact.
Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―association in
international law, and the MOA-AD – by its inclusion of international law
instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an international legal context,
that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding
the use of the term ―associative in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains
many provisions which are consistent with the international legal
concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to
enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the
commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s
participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized
UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central
Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to
participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of
border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues
pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the
governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the
U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These
provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties
aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate,
a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or
municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government.
Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever
granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide
for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions,
therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of
constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article
X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present
Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of
the M OA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict
with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the
Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that
only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term ―autonomous region in the
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in
conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d)
and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition,
the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the
ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar,
Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically part of the BJE without need
of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B
mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the
ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion
therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite
unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these
areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the
scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional
provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity
and development. An associative arrangement does not uphold
national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the
associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act
of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in
international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying
them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the
provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will
not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not
cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing
an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions
from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government
peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees
that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will
eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the
President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative,
for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with
that process.
PRINCIPLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITY
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.
Basco vs. PAGCOR
FACTS: Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869, because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it
constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government’s right to
impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. For the same
reason, the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose
local taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.
RULING:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no
inherent right to impose taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly
show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the municipality cannot
assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative
act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which
has the “inherent power to tax.” The Charter of Manila is subject to
control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations
are mere creatures of Congress”, which has the power to “create and
abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”.
Congress, therefore, has the power of control over the Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to
tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back
the power.
2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has
long been revoked by P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the
National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has
the power to issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling.
3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the
National Government. PAGCOR is government owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of
stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role,
to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local
taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or
subjected to control by a mere Local Government.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the
Constitution will be violated by P.D. No. 1869. Article 10, Section 5 of
the 1987 Constitution:
“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to
such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges
shall accrue exclusively to the local government.”
SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government
to “impose taxes and fees is always subject to “limitations” which
Congress may provide by law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy
under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It
does not make local governments sovereign within the
state. Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED
Lina v. Paño
FACTS: Private respondent Tony Calvento, was appointed agent by
PCSO to install a terminal for the operation of lotto, applied for a
mayor’s permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro,Laguna. It was
denied on the ground that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508,
Taon1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited
gambling in the province, including the operation of lotto. With the
denial of his application, private respondent filed an action for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing the
subject resolution.
ISSUE: Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayor’s permit based
thereon are valid
HELD: No. The questioned ordinance merely states the “objection” of
the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the
part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve
as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the
province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local
government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part
of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be
contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this freedom
to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may
actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by
Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could
not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto.
Moreover, ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal
governments are merely agents of the national government. The local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been
conferred on them by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. This being
the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. The
question of whether gambling should be permitted is for Congress to
determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since
Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks
to conduct in Laguna, pursuant toits legislative grant of authority, the
province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said
authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress.
Limbona vs. Mangelin
FACTS: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of
the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid
Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House
of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government
officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session
in November as his presence was needed in the house committee
hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly
held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was
unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was
still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the
case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling
petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner
had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of
the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the
confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that
the petition had become "moot and academic" because of its
resolution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation)
has made the case moot and academic.
2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to
the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent
of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of
Region 9 and 12?
RULING:
1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply
by reason of the expulsion resolution that was issued. If the expulsion
was done purposely to make the petition moot and academic, it will not
make it academic. On the ground of due process, the Court hold that
the expulsion is without force and effect. First, there is no showing that
the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation. It also does not appear
that the petitioner had been made aware that he was charged with graft
and corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that
he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it
stands, the charges now are leveled amount to mere accusations that
cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered reinstatement of the
petitioner.
2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in
Regions 9 and 12 by Presidential Decree No. 1618. In relation to the
central government, the Presidential Decree provides that “the
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
the Autonomous Regions...” Now, autonomy is either decentralization
of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization
of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local
governments “more responsive and accountable,” “and ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The president exercises “general supervision” over
them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according
to law.” He has not control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on
the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very
Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us to believe that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy through decentralization of power. The Presidential
Decree, in the first place, mandates that “the President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.”
In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is
made to dischage chiefly administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes
jurisdiction. Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held
on November to be invalid. Wherefore, the petition is Granted. The
petitioner is reinstated as Member and speaker of the Sanggunian.
Disomangcop vs. DPWH
FACTS: Petitioners seek the following principal reliefs: (1) to annul and
set aside D.O. 119; (2) to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from
implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public
works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions
of DPWH; and (3) to compel the Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) to release all funds for public works projects
intended for Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only; and to
compel respondent DPWH Secretary to let the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur implement all public works projects
within its jurisdictional area. R.A. 8999 ventures to reestablish the
National Government’s jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in
Lanao del Sur. D.O. 119 creates the Marawi Sub-District Engineering
Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi
City and Lanao del Sur. The department order, in effect, takes back
powers which have been previously devolved.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are unconstitutional
RULING: Yes. The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional
autonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the Organic
Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by
a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an
ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory law has
to be submitted to a plebiscite. R.A. 8999 contravenes true
decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy.
Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its
subordinates, whether geographically or functionally defined, to
exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by
subnational units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger
government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local
governments. Federalism implies some measure of decentralization,
but unitary systems may also decentralize. Decentralization differs
intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units that have been
authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right
against the central government.[Decentralization comes in two forms—
deconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration is administrative in
nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of
authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and
local offices. This mode of decentralization is also referred to as
administrative decentralization. Devolution, on the other hand,
connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of powers,
responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions
from the central government to local government units. This is a more
liberal form of decentralization since there is an actual transfer of
powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy to local
government units in cognizance of their right to self-government, to
make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and
technical capabilities.] [This Court elucidated the concept of autonomy
in Limbona v. Mangelin, thus: “Autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization
of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local
governments “more responsive and accountable,” and “ensure their
fullest development as self- reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises “general supervision” over
them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according
to law.” He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on
the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According
to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to “self-
immolation,” since in that event the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.”] The
challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by
virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM,
First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. D.O. 119 creating the Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over
infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative
of the provisions of E.O. 426. The office created under D.O. 119, having
essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH- ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426.
The department order, in effect, takes back powers which have been
previously devolved under the said executive order. D.O. 119 runs
counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWH’s order, like spring
water, cannot rise higher than its source of power—the Executive.
Batangas CATV v. CA
FACTS: Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod (R) enacted Resolution
No. 210 granting Batangas CATV (P) franchise to operate cable system
in the city. Sec. 8 of the Resolution provides that P is authorized to
charge subscribers maximum rates but increase shall be subject to R’s
review. P then increased subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per
month so R threatened it to get approval from the latter.
P: P filed with the RTC a petition for injunction alleging that R has no
authority to regulate subscriber rates charged by CATV operators
because under E.O. No. 205, the NTC has sole authority to regulate
CATV in the Philippines. Also, the LGC extends to LGUs the general
power to perform any act that would benefit constituents but doesn’t
authorize them to regulate CATV operation.
R: R argues that Resolution was enacted pursuant to Sec. 177(c) & (d)
of BP 337 (LGC of 1983) which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses
and is in the nature of a contract between P & R.
ISSUE: Whether R can regulate CATV franchise.
RULING: No. The resolution is an enactment of an LGU acting only as
agent of the national legislature. There is no law authorizing LGUs to
grant franchises to operate CATV. Whatever authority the LGUs had
before, the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued
P.D. No. 1512 terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the
operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments.
Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only persons, associations,
partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional
Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and
maintain a cable television system or render cable television service
within a service area. It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or
legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant
franchises. Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision
as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to
privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its
powers, or ultra vires.
POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OVER LGUs
Dadole v. COA
FACTS: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started
receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly
appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for
each judge.
On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which
provided that:... such additional allowances in the form... of honorarium
at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in
municipalities may be granted
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices
of disallowance to herein petitioners,... in excess of the amount
authorized by LBC 55... the additional monthly allowances of the
petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked
to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000
The petitioner judges filed... a motion for reconsideration and indorsed
the same to the COA... respondent COA rendered a decision denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Is LBC 55 null and void.
2. Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to implement?
RULING: We declare LBC 55 to be null and void.
We recognize that, although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to
local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject
to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by
the President. Section 4 of Article X of... the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. x x x
This provision... has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no
more authority than that of checking whether local governments or
their officials were performing their duties as... provided by the
fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority.
"Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of
mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not... include any
restraining authority over such body,"... the heads of... political
subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate
from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable.
By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's supervision
only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised... within the sphere
of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not
withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution
and the law.
the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local
government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over local
government units. Hence, the President or any... of his or her alter egos
cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or
her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a... law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity
because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of
powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing
municipal corporations.
Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves
as the legal basis of LBC 55,... allows the grant of additional allowances
to judges "when the finances of the city government allow." The said
provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the
additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, we need not belabor the
point that the finances of a... city government may allow the grant of
additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city
government exceed its annual expenditures.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an
inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par.
(a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision
over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not...
correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the
prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.
Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication
Principles:
Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43, reducing to 5% the
accomplishment of... an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, amount of IRA to be withheld from LGU.
in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates
ISSUES:
or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does
not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it... that the 1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in
rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of
do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are the LGU'S fiscal autonomy
not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to
2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent
conform to such rules. They may not prescribe... their own manner of
of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the
execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to
President's power of general supervision over local governments
see to it that the rules are followed.
HELD:
the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local
government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to 1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over local fiscal
government units. Hence, the President or any... of his or her alter egos
Autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government
cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.
Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or
Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the
her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a... law-conforming
economic and planning agency of the government, primarily
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity
responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated
because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of
and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the
powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing
entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and
municipal corporations.
the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to
"consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private
sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so
Pimentel vs. Aguirre
unilaterally. Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
FACTS: In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all
"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged
government departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and
public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby
LGUs to identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce
authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance,
total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget
appropriations for non-personal services items (Section 1) and (2)
and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding
ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4). On 10
officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to
make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of
local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than
thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes
of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may
interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit
of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers
of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of
the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation
of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent
(30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third
fiscal year preceding the current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these
requisites before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At
the very least, they did not even try to show that the national
government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit.
Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the
different leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the
President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally
the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the
President consistent with his power of supervision over local
governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help
maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic
difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of
noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO
372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a
mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an
exercise of the power of control.
2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal
autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The
Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of
the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule,
the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory
meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre,
G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000)
Province of Batangas vs. Romulo
FACTS: Petitioners assail the provisos of the GAAs of 1999, 200 and 2001
relating to the Local Government Service Equalization Fund, as well as
the Oversight Committee’s Resolutions issued pursuantht ereto,
because said provisos imposed conditions for the release thereof. The
petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the five-
billion-peso portion of the IRA, classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by
the LGUs with the implementing rules and regulations, including the
mechanisms and guidelines prescribed by the Oversight Committee,
contravenes the explicit directive of the Constitution that the LGUs’
share in the national taxes “shall be automatically released to them.”
The petitioner maintains that the use of the word “shall”must be given
a compulsory meaning. To further buttress this argument, the
petitioner contends that to vest the Oversight Committee with the
authority to determine the distribution and release of the LGSEF, which
is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema to the principle of local
autonomy as embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1991.
ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisos infringe the Constitution and the
LGC of 1991
RULING: Yes. Assailed provisions violate the constitutional precept of
local autonomy. To the Court’s mind, the entire process involving the
distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible.
The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national
taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the
implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and
mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from
time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not
automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory
mandate that the “just share” of the LGUs “shall be automatically
released to them.” The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the
Oversight Committee.
Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and Development, Inc.
(ACORD), VS. Zamora
FACTS: Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to
submit to Congress a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the
opening of every regular session, submitted the National Expenditures
program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of
P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, “AN ACT APPROPRIATING
FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE,
TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” also known as General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It provides under the
heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS” that the IRA
for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000”.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading “UNPROGRAMMED
FUND,” it is provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion),
apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to
fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original
revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized
based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain
committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as
Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of
IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount
to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the
GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay
officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining
Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones,
and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of
provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS)
referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV
(UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the
GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy
by unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its
release by placing the same under “Unprogrammed funds”. Although
the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall
nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present case, it
being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA
violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs
when it made its release contingent on whether revenue collections
could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President,
rather than making the release automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not
automatically releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA.
HELD:
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this
constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA contingent on
whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally
submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.
Respondents counter argue that the above constitutional provision is
addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same
does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the
release of the IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely
prevents the executive branch of the government from “unilaterally”
withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the
executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents,
“This essentially means that the President or any member of the
Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of
statute, withhold the release of the IRA.”As the Constitution lays upon
the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local
governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to
pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty.
To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional
provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute,
is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute – a
proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to
allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional
instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would
have been worded differently. Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the
Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified by the
words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain
implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to
hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to
mandatory automatic release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas: …if the
national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less
than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in
which case what should be automatically released shall be a
proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The
adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the
actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of
the current fiscal year. This Court recognizes that the passage of the
GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable intent to
“lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.” The
pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: “[T]he rule of
law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within
the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable
purposes must be carried out by legal methods.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions
1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional
insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10
Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines
FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No.
6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the
first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054
amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA
No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001.
RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for
these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No.
10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May
2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court,
the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of
elections [including the ARMM elections]?
2. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs
constitutional?
RULING:
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress
has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards
this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the
terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as
patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized
national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992
and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections,
should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a
“local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates
the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the
ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open
to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM
officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013
elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to
remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in
the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the
President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those
elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
2.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the
terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials We rule out the [hold
over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This
provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
[emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they
cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution
term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the of that power.
extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the
Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a
scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13,
way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed,
2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has
all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and
made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it
effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This
shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.
Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken. act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of
the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there
thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating.
had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No.
To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of
9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can
Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been
only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative
exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very
intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent
narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it
is evident.
is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot
No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy
be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by
decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the
putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where
than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an
2.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since express provision of the Constitution.
COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order special elections.
2.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. OICs in the interim is valid.
[N]o elections may be held on any other date for the positions of
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure
President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials,
– RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern
except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of
the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections
3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make.
This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature,
and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power
should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be
clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President
can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other
public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint; and Fourth, officers lower in rank
whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can
appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to
appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the
Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials
to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.”
This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance
in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally
defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA
No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective
and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153,
however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM
(RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA
No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the
Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May
2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is
far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA
No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for
the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is
how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and
based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding
to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

Villafuerte v. Robredo
FACTS: In 1995, the Commission on Audit found that some LGUs had
actually used 20% of their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in violation of
R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Following
this, on September 20, 2005, then DILG Sec. Angelo Reyes and DBM Sec.
Romulo Neri issued Joint Memorandum Circular No. 1, s. 2005, which
contained guidelines on the proper use of the said 20% for development
projects. On August 31, 2010, respondent incumbent DILG Sec. Jesse
Robredo issued Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83, which
mandated local chief executives to publicly post budget statements
such as the CY 2010 Annual Budget and CY 2010 20% of the IRA
Utilization. Afterward, on December 2 that same year he issued MC No.
2010-138, which provided a list of expenses for which 20% of the IRA
must not be utilized. On January 13, 2011, respondent issued MC No.
2011-08, which imposed strict compliance with Secs. 288 and 354 of the
LGC and MC No. 2010-83.
On February 21, 2011, petitioner then Camarines Sur Gov. Luis
Raymund Villafuerte, Jr. and the Provincial Government of Camarines
Sur filed a petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify MC Nos. 2010-83,
2010-138, and 2011-08.
ISSUE: Whether Memorandum Circulars Nos. 2010-83, 2010-138, and
2011-08 violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy in the
Constitution and the LGC.
HELD: NO. Petitioners assert that MC No. 2010-83 is mandatory in
nature, and by issuing it respondent has exceeded his supervisory
powers. A reading of the assailed circular reveals that it is in fact an
advisory to LGUs reminding them to observe Sec. 287 of the LGC in
utilizing 20% of their IRA. Likewise, the enumeration provided by MC
No. 2010-138 is not meant to restrict LGUs’ discretion in using their
funds. Rather, the list is meant to show what expenses are not covered
by the development fund, and LGUs remain at liberty to map out their
own development plans. Contrary to petitioners’ claims, the said
circulars also do not provide sanctions for non- compliance, but only
reminds LGUs to adhere to existing rules regarding the 20%
development fund. It must also be stressed that the state policy of LGU
autonomy outlined in Art. X of the Constitution does not totally sever
them from the national government. In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, the
Court mentioned the paradoxical dynamic where local governments are
subject to limited regulation to enhance self-government. At any rate,
MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08 are really implementations of the
constitutional mandate of transparency and accountability, as
reiterated in the LGC and R.A. No. 9184.
RESULT:
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Mandanas v. Ochoa, Jr.
FACTS: The petitioners hereby challenge the manner in which the just
share in the national taxes of the local government units (LGUs) has
been computed. This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus assailing the manner the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) for FY 2012 computed the IRA for the LGUs. Certain collections of
NIRTs by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) — specifically: excise taxes, value
added taxes (VATs) and documentary stamp taxes (DSTs) — have not
been included in the base amounts for the computation of the IRA. The
procedural issue is the propriety of the remedy of mandamus in
violation of doctrine of separation of powers. The substantive issue is
whether Section 284 of the LGC is unconstitutional for being repugnant
to Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
Sec. 6, Art. X, 1987 Constitution.
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Sec. 284, Local Government Code. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes.
Local government units shall have a share in the national internal
revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding
the current Fiscal year as follows: • x x x
Sec. 21, National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
Sources of Revenue.
The following taxes, fees and charges are deemed to be national internal
revenue taxes:
a) Income tax;
b) Estate and donor's taxes;
c) Value-added tax;
d) Other percentage taxes;
e) Excise taxes;
f) Documentary stamp taxes; and
g) Such other taxes as are or hereafter may be imposed and
collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Section 286, Local Government Code. Automatic Release of Shares.
(a) The share of each local government unit shall be released, without
need of any further action, directly to the
Provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on
a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and
which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed
by the National Government for whatever purpose. x x x
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
(1) Section 284 of the LGC deviates from the plain language of Section
6 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution
The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is
undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national taxes written in
Section 6. Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of a statute
there should be no departure).
According to Garcia v. Executive Secretary, customs duties is the
nomenclature given to taxes imposed on the importation and
exportation of commodities and merchandise to or from a foreign
country. Although customs duties have either or both the generation of
revenue and the regulation of economic or social activity as their
moving purposes, it is often difficult to say which of the two is the
principal objective in any given particular instance, for, verily, customs
duties, much like internal revenue taxes, are rarely designed to achieve
only one policy objective.
Strictly speaking, customs duties are also taxes because they are
exactions whose proceeds become public funds.
Further, Section 102 (oo) of R.A. No. 10863 (Customs Modernization
and Tariff Act) expressly includes all fees and charges imposed under
the Act under the blanket term of taxes.
(2) Congress can validly exclude taxes that will constitute the base
amount for the computation of the IRA only if a Constitutional provision
allows such exclusion
Although it has the primary discretion to determine and fix the just
share of the LGUs in the national taxes, Congress cannot disobey the
express mandate of the Constitution for the just share of the LGUs to
be derived from the national taxes.
The phrase as determined by law in Section 6 follows and qualifies the
phrase just share, and cannot be construed as qualifying the succeeding
phrase in the national taxes. The intent of the people in respect of
Section 6 is really that the base for reckoning the just share of the LGUs
should include all national taxes.
To read Section 6 differently as requiring that the just share of LGUs in
the national taxes shall be determined by law is tantamount to the
unauthorized revision of the Constitution.
The national taxes to be included in the base for computing the just
share the LGUs shall henceforth be, but shall not be limited to, the
following:
1. The NIRTs enumerated in Section 21 of the NIRC, as amended, to be
inclusive of the VATs, excise taxes, and DSTs collected by the BIR and
the BOC, and their deputized agents;
2. Tariff and customs duties collected by the BOC;
3. 50% of the VATs collected in the ARMM, and 30% of all other national
taxes collected in the ARMM; the remaining
50% of the VATs and 70% of the collections of the other national taxes
in the ARMM shall be the exclusive share of the ARMM pursuant to
Section 9 and Section 15 of R.A. No. 9054;
4. 60% of the national taxes collected from the exploitation and
development of the national wealth; the remaining 40% will exclusively
accrue to the host LGUs pursuant to Section 290 of the LGC;
5. 85% of the excise taxes collected from locally manufactured Virginia
and other tobacco products; the remaining 15% shall accrue to the
special purpose funds pursuant created in R.A. No. 7171 and R.A. No.
7227;
6. The entire 50% of the national taxes collected under Section 106,
Section 108 and Section 116 of the NIRC in excess of the increase in
collections for the immediately preceding year; and
7. 5% of the franchise taxes in favor of the national government paid by
franchise holders in accordance with Section 6 of R.A. No. 6631 and
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6632. Excluded in the base for computing the just
share
Proceeds do not come from a tax, fee or exaction imposed on the sale
and conversion:
Share of the affected LGUs in the proceeds of the sale and conversion
of the former military bases pursuant to R.A. No. 7227.
Conforms to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as money
collected on any tax levied for a special purpose:
Excise taxes imposed on: (1) locally manufactured Virginia tobacco
products; (2) the share of the affected LGUs in incremental revenues
from Burley and native tobacco products; (3) the share of the COA in
the NIRTs; and (4) the share of the host LGUs in the franchise taxes paid
by the Manila Jockey Club, Inc., and Philippine Racing Club, Inc.
Same is true for the franchise taxes paid under Section 6 of R.A. No.
6631 and Section 8 of R.A. No. 6632, inasmuch as certain percentages
of the franchise taxes go to different beneficiaries
Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution allows affected LGUs to
have an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization of the nation's
national wealth "within their respective areas.
Exclusion of the share of the different LGUs in the excise taxes imposed
on mineral products pursuant to Section 287 of the NIRC in relation to
Section 290.
Properly excluded for such taxes are intended to truly enable a
sustainable and feasible autonomous region as guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution.
NIRTs collected by the provinces and cities within the ARMM whose
portions are distributed to the ARMM's provincial, city and regional
governments.
PAYMENT OF THE ARREARS OF THE LGUS' JUST SHARE CANNOT BE
GRANTED
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be
erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or
executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the
general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF THE LGUS' JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL
TAXES
The 1987 Constitution is forthright and unequivocal in ordering that the
just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall be automatically
released to them. With Congress having established the just share
through the LGC, it seems to be beyond debate that the inclusion of the
just share of the LGUs in the annual GAAs is unnecessary, if not
superfluous. Hence, the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall
be released to them without need of yearly appropriation.
Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution commands that the just
share of the LGUs in national taxes shall be automatically released to
them. The term automatic connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory; and, in the context of this case, the LGUs
are not required to perform any act or thing in order to receive their
just share in the national taxes.
This is because Congress not only already determined the just share
through the LGC's fixing the percentage of the collections of the NIRTs
to constitute such fair share, but also explicitly authorized such just
share to be "automatically released" to the LGUs in the proportions and
regularity set under Section 285 of the LGC without need of annual
appropriation. To operationalize the automatic release without need of
appropriation, Section 286 of the LGC clearly provides that the
automatic release of the just share directly to the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, shall be "without
need of any further action.”
As compared to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on Judiciary,
Constitutional Commissions, Ombudsman, and the Commission on
Human rights which shares to aspects: The first relates to the grant of
fiscal autonomy, and the second concerns the automatic release of
funds. The common denominator of the provisions is that the automatic
release of the appropriated amounts is predicated on the approval of
the annual appropriations of the offices or agencies concerned.
DISCUSSION IN THE MAIN DECISION
Local Autonomy
One of the key features of the 1987 Constitution is its push towards
decentralization of government and local autonomy.
Local autonomy has two facets, the administrative and the fiscal.
Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to
create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share
in the national taxes released by the National Government, as well as
the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own
priorities.
Such autonomy is as indispensable to the viability of the policy of
decentralization as the other.
(A) Basic Principles underlying our System of Local Government
Municipal corporations are now commonly known as local
governments. They are the bodies politic established by law partly as
agencies of the State to assist in the civil governance of the country.
Their chief purpose has been to regulate and administer the local and
internal affairs of the cities, municipalities or districts.
Municipal corporations, being the mere creatures of the State, are
subject to the will of Congress, their creator. Their continued existence
and the grant of their powers are dependent on the discretion of
Congress.
(a1) Modified Dillons Rule (Merriam v. Moody’s Executors)
A municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following
powers and no others:
(1) those granted in express words;
(2) those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers
expressly granted;
(3) those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation-not simply convenient but indispensible;
(4) any fair, reasonable, doubt as to the existence of a power is resolved
by the courts against the corporation against the existence of the
powers.
(a2) Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and
rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of
life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As
it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some
constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single
act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a
wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the
State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no
limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are
concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the
legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. True, there are
certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the
national legislature is still the principal of the local government units,
which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
(a3) Sec. 5 (a) LGC (Tempered the Application of Dillon’s Rule)
Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall
be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the local
government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of
the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit
concerned;
(B) Extent of the Autonomy granted to the LGUs by the 1987
Constitution
The 1987 Constitution limits Congress' control over the LGUs by
ordaining in Section 25 of its Article II that: "The State shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments." The autonomy of the LGUs as thereby
ensured does not contemplate the fragmentation of the Philippines into
a collection of mini-states, or the creation of imperium in imperio.
The constitutional mandate to ensure local autonomy refers to
decentralization.
Decentralization of Power involves the abdication of political power in
favor of the autonomous LGUs as to grant them the freedom to chart
their own destinies and to shape their futures with minimum
intervention from the central government. This amounts to self-
immolation because the autonomous LGUs thereby become
accountable not to the central authorities but to their constituencies.
Decentralization of Administration occurs when the central government
delegates administrative powers to the LGUs as the means of
broadening the base of governmental powers and of making the LGUs
more responsive and accountable in the process, and thereby ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities and more
effective partners in the pursuit of the goals of national development
and social progress. This form of decentralization further relieves the
central government of the burden of managing local affairs so that it
can concentrate on national concerns. Decentralization of Power in the
Philippines
The decentralization of power has been given to the regional units
(namely, the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao [ARMM] and
the constitutionally mandated Cordillera Autonomous Region [CAR]).
This aims to permit determinate groups with common traditions and
shared social-cultural characteristics to freely develop their ways of life
and heritage, to exercise their rights, and to be in charge of their own
affairs through the establishment of a special governance regime for
certain member communities who choose their own authorities from
within themselves, and exercise the jurisdictional authority legally
accorded to them to decide their internal community affairs.
Decentralization of Administration in the Philippines
LGUs (i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays) enjoy the
decentralization of administration to make governance at the local
levels more directly responsive and effective. In turn, the economic,
political and social developments of the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and development.
It is not unlimited but involves only the powers enumerated by Section
20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and by the acts of Congress.
Decentralization under Sec. 3 of the LGC
Based on the delineation of the operative principles of decentralization
under Sec. 3, decentralization can be considered as the decision by the
central government to empower its subordinates, whether
geographically or functionally constituted, to exercise authority in
certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational units, and is
typically a delegated power, whereby a larger government chooses to
delegate authority to more local governments. It is also a process, being
the set of policies, electoral or constitutional reforms that transfer
responsibilities, resources or authority from the higher to the lower
levels of government. It is often viewed as a shift of authority towards
local governments and away from the central government, with total
government authority over society and economy imagined as fixed.
As a system of transferring authority and power from the National
Government to the LGUs, decentralization in the Philippines may be
categorized into four, namely:
(1) Political decentralization or devolution;
(2) Administrative decentralization or deconcentration;
(3) Fiscal decentralization; and
(4) Policy or decision-making decentralization. Political decentralization
or devolution occurs when there is a transfer of powers, responsibilities,
and resources from the central government to the LGUs for the
performance of certain functions.
It is a more liberal form of decentralization because there is an actual
transfer of powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater
autonomy to the LGUs in cognizance of their right to selfgovernment,
to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and
technical capabilities.
Section 16 to Section 19 of the LGC characterize political
decentralization in the LGC as different LGUs empowered to address the
different needs of their constituents. In contrast, devolution in favor of
the regional units is more expansive because they are given the
authority to regulate a wider array of subjects, including personal,
family and property relations.
Administrative decentralization or deconcentration
involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and
responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices.
Consistent with this concept, the LGC has created the Local School
Boards, the Local Health Boards and the Local Development Councils,
and has transferred some of the authority from the agencies of the
National Government, like the Department of Education and the
Department of Health, to such bodies to better cope up with the needs
of particular localities.
Fiscal decentralization means that the LGUs have the power to create
their own sources of revenue in addition to their just share in the
national taxes released by the National Government.
It includes the power to allocate their resources in accordance with
their own priorities. Fiscal decentralization emanates from a specific
constitutional mandate that is expressed in several provisions of Article
X of the 1987 Constitution, specifically: Section 5; Section 6; and Section
7. Fiscal decentralization under the Constitution been formalized from
Section 128 to Section 133 of the LGC. To implement the LGUs'
entitlement to the just share in the national taxes, Congress has enacted
Section 284 to Section 288 of the LGC. Congress has further enacted
Section 289 to Section 294 of the LGC to define the share of the LGUs
in the national wealth.
This is limited by Congress in subjecting the LGUs' power to tax to the
guidelines set in Section 130 of the LGC and to the limitations stated in
Section 133 of the LGC. The concept of local fiscal autonomy does not
exclude any manner of intervention by the National Government in the
form of supervision if only to ensure that the local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with the national goals. Policy- or decision-
making decentralization exists if at least one subnational tier of
government has exclusive authority to make decisions on at least one
policy issue.
Zabal v. Duterte
Petitioners claim that they were deprived of their property right to work
and make a living in violation of the constitutional right to due process.
Are they correct?
Wrong. It is true that the right to work and make a living are property
rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally
constitutes an actionable wrong. But when the conditions so demand
as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by
due process, must yield to general welfare.
Have petitioners acquired vested rights to their sources of income in
Boracay?
No because they are part of the informal sector of the economy where
earnings are not guaranteed.
What are vested rights?
Vested rights are ‘fixed, unalterable, or irrevocable.’ more extensively,
they are depicted as follows: rights which have so completely and
definitely accrued to or settled in a person that they are not subject to
be defeated or cancelled by the act of any other private person, and
which it is right and equitable that the government should recognize
and protect, as being lawful in themselves, and settled according to the
then current rules of law, and of which the individual could not be
deprived arbitrarily without injustice, or of which he could not justly be
deprived otherwise than by the established methods of procedure and
for the public welfare.
a right is not ‘vested’ unless it is more than a mere expectancy based on
the anticipated continuance of present laws; it must be an established
interest in property, not open to doubt. x x x to be vested in its accurate
legal sense, a right must be complete and consummated, and one of
which the person to whom it belongs cannot be divested without his
consent.
What kind of right to earnings in Boracay do petitioners have?
Merely inchoate right or one that has not fully developed and therefore
cannot be claimed as one’s own. An inchoate right is a mere
expectation, which may or may not come into fruition. “it is contingent
as it only comes ‘into existence on an event or condition which may not
happen or be performed until some other event may prevent their
vesting.”‘
Petitioners claim that they were being made to suffer the consequences
of the environmental transgressions of others. Is this claim correct?
Wrong. The temporary closure of boracay as a tourist destination and
the consequent ban of tourists into the island were not meant to serve
as penalty to violators of environmental laws. The liabilities of the
violators remain and only they alone shall suffer the same. Other
government agencies are involved in the rehabilitation works.
Does this not create the inference that the powers and functions of the
LGUs are being encroached upon?
No. Because the respective roles of each government agency are
particularly defined and enumerated in executive order no. 5365 and all
are in accordance with their respective mandates.
Also, the situation in Boracay can in no wise be characterized or labelled
as a mere local issue as to leave its rehabilitation to local actors. Boracay
is a prime tourist destination which caters to both local and foreign
tourists. Any issue thereat has corresponding effects, direct or
otherwise, at a national level. This, for one, reasonably takes the issues
therein from a level that concerns only the local officials
CREATION AND ALTERATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS/LGUs
Sema v. COMELEC
FACTS: On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional
Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
(MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed
of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA
Act 201 provides:
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine
municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number
of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the
municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City,
although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of
the Province of Maguindanao.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City
passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the
status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of
Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.
Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the
COMELEC’s Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February
2007, provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that
pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain
the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the
First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of
these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the
legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City).”
ISSUE:
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article
VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative
district for such province.
In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative
district of Maguindanao (as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]”),
despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such
district (excluding Cotabato City).
HELD: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No.
9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create
provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
RATIO: The creation of any of the four local government units –
province, city, municipality or barangay – must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow
the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation
must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there
must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority
in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However,
under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject
to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create
barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However,
under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can
create provinces, cities or municipalities.
However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section
5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly,
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any
province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population
may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall
be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member x x x.”
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district
because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well
as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the
same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also
be created without a legislative district.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create
or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national
legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its
incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts
must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a
law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to
create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like
Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative
body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
In view of certiorari and mandamus
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of
discretion by “any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.” On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue
to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform
an act “which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.”
In view of mootness
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s
proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative
of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” mooted this
petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalen’s election.
Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one
way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for
representative of the district of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City” will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However,
this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the
resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Court’s ruling in these
petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all
the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the
power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future
additional provinces.
In view of the Felwa case
As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in
Felwa that “when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that
statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment,
but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.”
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No.
4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional
representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for
“creating congressional districts without the apportionment provided in
the Constitution.”
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1)
it validly created legislative districts “indirectly” through a special law
enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the
legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of
legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does
not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were
created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new
province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM
Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by
Congress does not emanate alone from Congress’ power to reapportion
legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to create provinces
which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a
province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the
Constitution because the Constitution provides that “each province
shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative
district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato
City as the lone component of the first legislative district of
Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative
district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a
population of only 163,849.
Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and
independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the
criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual
income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000
square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The following
scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail
over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly
provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited
“within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the
Constitution and national laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM
Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is
established “within the framework of the Constitution.” This follows
Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM
“shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.”
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC
Facts: During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009
amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the “mad rush” of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence.
Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills
pending in Congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during
the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the
12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution
No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the
unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and
December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress,
individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act
No. 9009.
These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July
2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also
lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will
reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set
aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution and the equal protection clause
HELD: Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the
equal protection clause
Ratio: Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must
follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in
any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government
Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally
generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if
it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less
than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
(2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income.
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million toP100 million. Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide
any exemption from the increased income requirement.
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid
classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same
class.
Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent
municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in
the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the
equal protection clause.
Navarro v. Ermita
FACTS: October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into
law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands).
December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted
the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the
province under the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite
yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the
approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del
Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to
nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the
creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate
an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of
Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They
pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of
802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing
to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section
461 of the LGC.
May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to
challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No.
9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC;
(2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended
province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from
the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the
Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and
to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said
motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing several rulings of
the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of
the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition
of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections,
their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the
proceedings in this case.
October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment,
stating that the decision in this case had become final and executory on
May 18, 2010.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 valid.
HELD: Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of
Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355,
following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with
respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express
provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative
powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted
R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local
government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot
become a province, taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of
Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible
and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and
the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which
cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must
be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting
such capacity.
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A
statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within
the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that
which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the
lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless
within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret
and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of
the law and its legislators.
Miranda v. Aguirre
FACTS: On May 5, 1994, Congress enacted RA 7720, which converted
the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component
city. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified the act in a
plebiscite
Years later, Congress again passed RA 9528, converting the city of
Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city, to a component
city.
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ
preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of RA 8528. They
argued that there is no provision for ratification by the people of
Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents assailed the standing of the petitioners, and contended
that the petition raises a political question, which the Court has no
jurisdiction over.
Solicitor General commented in favor of respondents saying that RA
8528 was a mere reclassification, and does not “involve any creation
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units” and therefore, a plebiscite is not needed.
ISSUES:
1. Do the petitioners have standing in raising the constitutionality of RA
8528? – YES.
2. Does the court has jurisdiction over the issue, or is it a political
question? – YES.
3. Is RA 8528 constitutional? – NO.
RATIO:
1. On standing: The petitioners have standing with regards to the issue,
because they sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The
mayor, Mr. Miranda, will now be under administrative supervision of
the Provincial Governor. All the mayor’s executive orders are to be
reviewed. His powers as mayor are to be limited by the act. The other
petitioners are to sustain direct injury as well. As residents and voters in
the city of Santiago, their right to be heard in the conversation of their
city is to be trampled by not holding a plebiscite with regards to the
issue.
2. On the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction: Under Sec 1 Art VIII of the 1987
Constitution, it is the duty of the court to settle controversies regarding
department’s use of discretion amounting to abuse of jurisdiction.
3. On the constitutionality of RA 8528: The changes that will result in
the downgrading of Santiago City from being an independent
component city, to a component city cannot be characterized as
insubstantial: taxes collected from the city will be shared with the
province, resolutions and ordinances will have to be reviewed by
Provincial Board, City Government’s share will be diluted since certain
portions will accrue to the Provincial Government. Downgrading it,
without the involvement of the people, will run against the spirit of Sec
10 Art X of the 1987 Constitution.
Having significant changes introduced to the political and social climate
of the province would need a plebiscite for it to push through, according
to Rule II Art 6 Par F1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Local Government Code, because that gravity of changes already
amount to a ‘conversion’. Even the principal author of the Local
Government Code of 1991 agrees that the plebiscite is absolute and
mandatory, since it promotes autonomy to the local government units.
Samson v. Aguirre
SUMMARY: Samson, a councilor in Quezon City, assailed RA 8535 which
created the City of Novaliches. According to him, the RA failed to
conform to the requirements of the LGC as to certifications in income,
population, and land area. It has not been proved that the mother city
would not suffer adverse effects from the creation of Novaliches. Court
held against him. The presence and oral declarations of the government
officials armed with records during the public deliberations and
hearings are more effective certifications than mere certificates which
are routinely signed. The representatives all declared that Novaliches
exceeded the requirements. The QC mayor was also present, and his
conformity implies that there is no damage done to QC. The non-receipt
of copies is too insubstantial to sustain invalidity of a statute. Samson
failed to overturn the presumption of constitutionality accorded
legislative acts.
FACTS: President Ramos signed into law RA 8535, creating the City of
Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Samson, incumbent
councilor of the first district of Quezon City, challenged the
constitutionality of the RA. He sought to enjoin its implementation,
holding of the plebiscite, and disbursement of funds as RA 8535 failed
to conform to the criteria in the LGC as to income, population, land area,
seat of government, having no adverse effect to its mother city, and
furnishing a copy of the barangay resolution. Also, he said the law would
amend the Constitution.
In answer, the respondents claimed Samson failed to substantiate said
allegations with convincing proof. He had the burden of proof to
overcome the legal presumption that Congress considered all the legal
requirements under the Local Government Code of 1991 in passing R.A.
8535. Further, there is no document supporting the unconstitutionality
claim.
ISSUE: Was RA 8535 unconstitutional? NO.
There is a presumption of constitutionality in favor of a statute. One
who attacks a statute must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable
doubt. Samson has failed to discharge the burden.
Samson did not present any proof, only allegations that no certifications
were submitted to the House Committee on Local Government—as
such certifications attesting compliance with the LGC and its IRR is
required. Allegations cannot substitute for proof. The presumption
stands that the law passed by Congress complied with all the requisites.
a. The representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance
estimated the combined average annual income of the 13 barangays for
2 years to be around P27M. Under the Local Government Code, a
proposed city must have an average annual income of only at least
P20,000,000.00 for the immediately preceding two years.
b. The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the
barangays that would comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be
around 350,000. This figure is more than the 150,000 required by the
Implementing Rules.
c. There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since
under the Local Government Code, the proposed city must comply with
requirements as regards income and population or land area. Other
than the income requirement, the proposed city must have the
requisite number of inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either
requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial notice may
also be taken that Novaliches is now highly urbanized.
2. Samson averred that oral manifestations are not enough certification.
But in the hearings, the DBM, DILG, and Finance Officials were present
along with other officers armed with official statistics and reference
materials. In their official capacity, they spoke and shed light on
population, land area and income of the proposed city. Their official
statements could serve the same purpose contemplated by law
requiring certificates. Their affirmation as well as their oath as
witnesses in open session of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives give even greater solemnity than a certification
submitted to either chamber routinely.
3. Samson failed to show that the representatives did not also submit
written certifications. Under the IRR, written certifications are required
to be attached to the petition for the creation of a city, to be submitted
by interested municipalities or barangays to Congress in the form of a
resolution. Samson did not present a copy to prove that it was without
the written certifications attached as required by law. It is presumed
that these requirements were met appropriately in the passage of the
assailed legislative act.
Samson argued that the RA failed to specify the seat of government of
the proposed City of Novaliches as required. However, this omission is
not as fatal to the validity. Under Section 12 of the Local Government
Code, the City of Novaliches can still establish a seat of government
after its creation. While Section 12 speaks of the site of government
centers, such site can very well also be the seat of government, “from
where governmental and corporate service shall be delivered.”
Samson failed to present any concrete evidence on the adverse effect
to Quezon City. Quezon City Mayor Mathay was present during the
deliberations and made no mention of anything concerning such. As
chief executive, he would be the first person to protest any
development that might prove detrimental to Quezon City. This is
indicative of the non-existence of such negative issues. Moreover, in
the plebiscite, all persons concerned will obviously have the opportunity
to raise those issues even before they vote on the principal question of
the cityhood of Novaliches.
That the Quezon City Council was not furnished a copy of the petition
of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of
Novaliches, if true, will also not render invalid the RA. The evident
purpose of this requirement, found in the Implementing Rules, is to
inform the City Council of the move to create another city and to enable
it to formulate its comments and recommendations on said petition.
The Quezon City Council members are obviously aware of the petition.
The matter has been widely publicized in the mass media. Surely
members of the Council could not now be heard to claim they have not
known of the contents of the barangays’ petition to create the City of
Novaliches.
The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in
a prohibited amendment of the Constitution. The ordinance appended
to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country.
Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed
of only 17 cities and municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal
a reading of the ordinance in or appendix of the Constitution will only
result in its erroneous interpretation.
Alvarez v. Guingona
FACTS: On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be
known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of
Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill
No. 1243, was filed in the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of
Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate,
approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
ISSUE: Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB
No. 8817, into Republic Act No. 7720 be said to have originated in the
House of Representatives as required?
HELD: Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that
Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was
passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB
No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No.
1243 was filed in the Senate.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House
of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon
until it receives the House bill.
Mariano v. COMELEC
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay,
Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina
Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are
residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers,
they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to
challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A.
No. 7854.
HELD: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be
an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must
be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e.,
that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that
he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they
hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has no jurisdiction.
Cawaling Jr. v. COMELEC
FACTS: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of
Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law
R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating the City of Sorsogon By Merging The
Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for
ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having
been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite.
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the
present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite
on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the
required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of
Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of
twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806
unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city"; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of
the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule
prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a
component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a
cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A.
No. 8806 has done.
ISSUE: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging two
municipalities.
(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of
Sorsogon
(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violate the "one subject-one bill" rule
enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional
HELD: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code
is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of
the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a
province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. the creation of an entirely new local
government unit through a division or a merger of existing local
government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that
such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed
by the Code.
(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which
we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this
Court, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial
power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," and "may not
annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is
unwise or impractical.”
3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is,
the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the
corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to
their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of
Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and
inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied
with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences
of the proposed law and its operation.
(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate
departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's
acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature
and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in
accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a
law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds for nullity
must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold
that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat
the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.
Aquino v. COMELEC
FACTS: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was
addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled
“An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.”
Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by
President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the
existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall form additional
district where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383
population count.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the
creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if
population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be
stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum population
requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.
Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal
technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the
Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 9716.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and
therefore null and void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an
indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
HELD: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear
distinction between a city and a province was explained under the
second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a
province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was mentioned
about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000
must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821
making the province entitled to two additional districts from the
present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than
population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly,
other factors were mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No.
4264.
Tan v. COMELEC
FACTS: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be
known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985.
(Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava,
Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and
Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled
a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for
Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not
in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than
those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte,
were not included in the plebiscite.
The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte
would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum
area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
ISSUE: WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the
constitutional requisites of the Constitution, which states that — “Sec.
3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in
the unit or units affected”? NO.
HELD: Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the approval of a majority of
votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be
obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del
Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing
boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be
affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental
because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other
affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from
the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a
doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice
Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means
all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided
such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities
if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area
affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent
province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer,
eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebiscite has no legal effect for being a patent
nullity.
POLICE POWER/ GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
Dela Cruz v. Paras
FACTS: Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They
assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition
and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the
said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the
said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls
they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with
customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against
Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it
is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR
CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES
OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of
police power to promote general welfare. Dela Cruz then appealed
citing that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can,
prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and
the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then
regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would
pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant
with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as
well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said
that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public
morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that
does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face
is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved
could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue
should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
Binay v. Domingo
FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved
Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved
families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a
month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available
funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission
approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program.
However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the
disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following
reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety,
general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2)
government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3)
it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few
individuals.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power
under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
HELD:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded
largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus
populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations.
Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be
a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare
clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out
and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as
shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort
and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals,
promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies
of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said
to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for
the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to
all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation
and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide
scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the
community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with
conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare
of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity,
and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the
inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to
attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the
limits of police power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally
benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the
Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare
legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social
services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as
human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is
generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long
been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the
common good.
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment.
Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is
the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving
rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer
from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution
No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government
towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of
pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a
painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially
burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of
the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should
have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a
precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to
embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives
political or otherwise.
Tano v. Socrates
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted
ordinance no. 15-92 banning the shipment of live fish and lobster
outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the same light,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that
prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling and possessing and
shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of
5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitiones Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged
for violating the above ordinance and resolution by the city and
provincial governments. The petitioners now allege that they have the
preferential rights as marginal fishermen granted with privileges
provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code, invoking the
invalidity of the above-stated enactments as violative of their
preferential rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the
local government units violative of the preferential rights of the
marginal fishermen?
HELD: No, the enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were not
violative of their preferential rights. The enactment of these laws was a
valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to protect public interests
and the public right to a balanced and healthier ecology. The rights and
privileges invoked by the petitioners are not absolute. The general
welfare clause of the local government code mandates for the liberal
interpretation in giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic
development and to upgrade the life of the people in the community.
The LGUs are endowed with the power to enact fishery laws in its
municipal waters which necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances in order to effectively carry out the enforcement of fishery
laws in their local community.
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila
FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law
Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting
Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The
ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the
admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the
renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation
(TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who
own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention
on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as
operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to
needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic
enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships
the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated
by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the
Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter,
they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity
and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to
fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since
it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did
not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit
individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of
police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained
through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful
method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
of the State.
HELD: No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise
of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of
Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at
bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the
respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view
of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient
lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case,
wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services
offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its
core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can
intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions
including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more
than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police
power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government
Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has
been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the
use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly
fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability
of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an
ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed
by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to
property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the
capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of
their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short
time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to
liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized
and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with
another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a
police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing
laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more
effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of
existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that
the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole
day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates”
from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for
motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be
restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments
as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
Social Justice Society v. Atienza
FACTS: Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Manila reclassified the area from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the
date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in
the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil
companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU,
the oil companies were required to remove 28 tanks starting with the
LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of safety buffer
and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the
City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously
operate within the limited area resulting from joint operations and the
scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU
in Resolution No. 97.
Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the
terminals of the oil companies.
ISSUE: Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
RULING: Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local Government Code imposes upon
respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to
perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question
the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon
them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.
SJS officers v. Lim
FACTS: On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement was of manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in
entered into by oil companies (Chevron, Petron and Shell) and case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
Department of Energy for the creation of a Master Plan to address and
The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on the 7
minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity of
March 2007 Decision. The SC later resolved that Ordinance No. 8027 is
communities, business and offices to Pandacan oil terminals without
constitutional and that it was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No.
affecting security and reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum
8119 as there is no irreconcilable conflict between them.
products.
SC later on denied with finality the second MR of the oil companies.
On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted
Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta. On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor
Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial I. Lim), the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under
Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No.
Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the reclassification
8187 appended to the list a Medium and a Heavy Industrial Zone where
were given six (6) months from the date of effectivity to stop the
petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly allowed.
operation of their businesses. It was later extended until 30 April 2003.
Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a
On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance
Supreme Court (SC) to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
No. 8187. Their contentions are as follows:
Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the Regional Trial
It is an invalid exercise of police power because it does not promote the
Court of Manila an action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application
general welfare of the people
for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction. The same was issued in favor of Chevron and It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution as
Shell. Petron, on the other hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August well as health and environment related municipal laws and
2004. international conventions and treaties, such as: Clean Air Act;
Environment Code; Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil Code
On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119
provisions on nuisance and human relations; Universal Declaration of
entitled “An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use
Human Rights; and Convention on the Rights of the Child
Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the
Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto”. This The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance
designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit No. 8119 when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Development/Overlay Zone.
On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al. and the
On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and intervenors oil companies contend that:
directed Mayor Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It
The petitioners have no legal standing to sue whether as citizens,
declared that the objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents
taxpayers or legislators. They further failed to show that they have
suffered any injury or threat of injury as a result of the act complained
of
The petition should be dismissed outright for failure to properly apply
the related provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate
remedy available
The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC only
exercises appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality
or validity of an ordinance under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution
It is the function of the SP to enact zoning ordinance without prior
referral to the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals; thus, it
may repeal all or part of zoning ordinance sought to be modified
There is a valid exercise of police power
On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8283 which
essentially amended the assailed Ordinance to exclude the area where
petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from the Industrial
Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor Lim.
ISSUES: WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the
Pandacan Terminals
RULING: Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed
Ordinance relative to the continued stay of the oil depots, the SC
followed the same line of reasoning used in its 7 March 2007 decision,
to wit
“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting a sound
urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of
the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures
to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case
of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective,
the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from
industrial to commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila which
recommended the approval of the ordinance:
(1) The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly
flammable and highly volatile products which include petroleum gas,
liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and
fuel oil among others;
(2) The depot is open to attack through land, water and air;
(3) It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang
Palace; and
(4) In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire
could spread to the neighboring communities.
The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class.
The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of
western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as
there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe.
It therefore becomes necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate
the threat.”
The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The
Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have
been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade the
Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are
no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, the SC holds that
the Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid
and unconstitutional.
For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one
point or another, no matter how remote it is as perceived by one or
some, the SC cannot allow the right to life be dependent on the
unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of probability have no
place in situations where the very life of not just an individual but of
residents of big neighborhoods is at stake.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
1. Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unconstitutional and invalid
with respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
2. The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is ordered to cease
and desist from enforcing Ordinance No. 8187 and to oversee the
relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of the Pandacan area
3. The oil companies shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-
five (45) days, submit to the RTC Manila, Branch 39 an updated
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which relocation shall be
completed not later than six (6) months from the date the required
document is submitted.
TAXING POWER
MIAA v. Court of Appeals
Facts: The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City
under Executive Order No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as amended. As such
operator, it administers the land, improvements and equipment within
the NAIA Complex. In March 1997, the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the
Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the exemption from
real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of its Charter.
Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June
2001, it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the
City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer
subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport
lands and buildings.
At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147
clarifying Opinion No. 061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC
requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof of
exemption. According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the
proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA, thus, filed a
petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to restrain the City of
Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and
auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings, but this was
dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is
exempt from real estate tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of
the LGC. It invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself
as a justification for exemption, since the airport lands and buildings,
being devoted to public use and public service, are owned by the
Republic of the Philippines. On the other hand, the City of Parañaque
invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, which expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC.
It asserts that an international airport is not among the
exceptions mentioned in the said law. Meanwhile, the City of Parañaque
posted and published notices announcing the public auction sale of the
airport lands and buildings. In the afternoon before the scheduled
public auction, MIAA applied with the Court for the issuance of a TRO
to restrain the auction sale. The Court issued a TRO on the day of the
auction sale, however, the same was received only by the City of
Parañaque three hours after the sale.
Issue: Whether or not the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are
exempt from real estate tax?
Held: The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real
estate tax imposed by local governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC
exempts from real estate tax any real property owned by the Republic
of the Philippines. This exemption should be read in relation with Sec.
133(o) of the LGC, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers
of local governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or
charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities.
These provisions recognize the basic principle that local
governments cannot tax the national government, which historically
merely delegated to local governments the power to tax.
The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear
language in the law imposing the tax. This rule applies with greater force
when local governments seek to tax national government
instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally in
favor of national government instrumentalities.
MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the government.
The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties.
MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. At any time, the President
can transfer back to the Republic title to the airport lands and buildings
without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. As long as the
airport lands and buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership
remains with the State. Unless the President issues a proclamation
withdrawing these properties from public use, they remain properties
of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable, hence, they are not
subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt
from real estate tax.
However, portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA
leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a
case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such portions for a
consideration to a taxable person.
MCIAA vs. MARCOS
FACTS: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was
created by virtue of Republic Act 6958. Since the time of its creation,
MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes
in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter. However on 11 October
1994, the Office of the Treasurer of Cebu, demanded for the payment
of realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner.
Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and
unjustified and asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government
performing governmental functions, which puts limitations on the
taxing powers of local government units.
The City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty tax account,
insisting that the MCIAA is a government controlled corporation whose
tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193
and 234 of the Local Government Code (LGC), and not an
instrumentality of the government but merely a government owned
corporation performing proprietary functions. MCIAA paid its tax
account “under protest” when City is about to issue a warrant of levy
against the MCIAA’s properties.
MCIAA filed a Petition of Declaratory Relief with the RTC contending
that the taxing power of local government units do not extend to the
levy of taxes or fees on an instrumentality of the national government.
It contends that by the nature of its powers and functions, it has the
footing of an agency or instrumentality of the national government;
which claim the City rejects. The trial court dismissed the petition, citing
that close reading of the LGC provides the express cancellation and
withdrawal of tax exemptions of Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations.
ISSUE: Whether the MCIAA is exempted from realty taxes.
RULING: Tax statutes are construed strictly against the government and
liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But since taxes are paid for civilized
society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against
exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are
thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority.
A claim of exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and
based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. Taxation is the
rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. However, if the grantee of
the exemption is a political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule
of construction does not apply because the practical effect of the
exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be
handled by the government in the course of its operations.
Further, since taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the
exception, the exemption may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the
taxing authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption
was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a
mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered by
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
MCIAA is a “taxable person” under its Charter (RA 6958), and was only
exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the
privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative
intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real
property tax.
Since Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC) expressly
provides that “All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees
[sic], executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or
part of parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions
of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.”
With that repealing clause in the LGC, the tax exemption provided for
in RA 6958 had been expressly repealed by the provisions of the LGC.
Therefore, MCIAA has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties
effective after January 1, 1992 until the present.
City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc.
FACTS: Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. (Bayantel) is a
legislative franchise holder under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3259 (1961) to
establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications,
radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting. Section 14 (a) of R.A. No.
3259 states: “The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its
real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of the franchise,
xxx”. In 1992, R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local
Government Code of 1991” (LGC) took effect. Section 232 of the Code
grants local government units within the Metro Manila Area the power
to levy tax on real properties. Barely few months after the LGC took
effect, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7633, amending Bayantel’s original
franchise. The Section 11 of the amendatory contained the following tax
provision: “The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay
the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property,
exclusive of this franchise, xxx“. In 1993, the government of Quezon City
enacted an ordinance otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue
Code withdrawing tax exemption privileges.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayantel’s real properties in Quezon City are
exempt from real property taxes under its franchise.
RULING: YES. A clash between the inherent taxing power of the
legislature, which necessarily includes the power to exempt, and the
local government’s delegated power to tax under the aegis of the 1987
Constitution must be ruled in favor of the former. The grant of taxing
powers to LGUs under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the
power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to
a declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to
local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory
provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor
of municipal corporations.
The legislative intent expressed in the phrase “exclusive of this
franchise” cannot be construed other than distinguishing between two
(2) sets of properties, be they real or personal, owned by the franchisee,
namely, (a) those actually, directly and exclusively used in its radio or
telecommunications business, and (b) those properties which are not
so used. It is worthy to note that the properties subject of the present
controversy are only those which are admittedly falling under the first
category.
Since R. A. No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC, perfectly
aware that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel’s former exemption
from realty taxes, the Congress using, Section 11 thereof with exactly
the same defining phrase “exclusive of this franchise” is the basis for
Bayantel’s exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain
language, the Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an
express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove
from the LGC’s delegated taxing power, all of the franchisee’s
(Bayantel’s) properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in
the pursuit of its franchise.
Drilon v. Lim
FACTS: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section
187 of the Local Government Code . The Secretary of Justice (on appeal
to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No.
7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy.
The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the
ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it
vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the
policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary
argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the
procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as
specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed.
(Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit
certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
ISSUE: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
HELD: Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all
civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests
in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and
orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with
the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a
declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than
on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that
every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a
purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the
theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and
the legislative departments and determined by them to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To
doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an
infraction of the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional
HELD: Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only
the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted,
to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or
modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to
substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government
that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what
the Code should be.. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he
did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant
of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code.
As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-
done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion
to modify or replace them.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local
Autonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to
suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee
levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination
of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and
not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or
limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of
control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned
before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given
the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is
ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without
the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive
or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary
Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with,
the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These
grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the
tax measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations:
No written notices of public hearing, no publication of the ordinance,
no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into Tagalog)
Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had
been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that
the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before
the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which
to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits)
later submitted to the trial court. We agree with the trial court that the
procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the
public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced. The
minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3.
Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in
the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993,
respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4,
5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of
Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but
this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication
in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will
satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the
ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement
applies to the approval of local development plans and public
investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax
ordinances.
BATANGAS CITY v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP.
FACTS: Respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation operates an
oil refinery and depot in Tabagao, Batangas City, which manufactures
and produces petroleum products that are distributed nationwide.
In 2002, respondent was only paying the amount of P98,964.71 for fees
and other charges which include the amount of P1,180.34 as Mayor's
Permit... on February 20, 2001, petitioner Batangas City, through its City
Legal Officer, sent a notice of assessment to respondent... demanding
the payment of P92,373,720.50 and P312,656,253.04 as business taxes
for its manufacture and distribution of petroleum products...
respondent was also required and assessed to pay the amount of
P4,299,851.00 as Mayor's Permit Fee based on the gross sales of... its
Tabagao Refinery.
Pursuant of Section 134 of the LGC of 1991 and Section 23 of its
Batangas City Tax Code of 2002.
Respondent filed a protest on April 17, 2002 contending among others
that it is not liable for the payment of the local business tax either as a
manufacturer or distributor of petroleum products
Mayor's Permit Fees are exorbitant,... confiscatory, arbitrary,
unreasonable and not commensurable with the cost of issuing a license.
petitioners denied respondent's protest and declared that under
Section 14 of the Batangas City Tax Code of 2002, they are empowered
to withhold the issuance of the Mayor's Permit for failure of respondent
to pay the business taxes on its manufacture and... Distribution of
petroleum products.
Respondent filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Section 195 of the
LGC of 1991 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City.
Respondent maintained that petitioners have no authority to impose
the said taxes and fees, and argued that the levy of local business taxes
on the business of manufacturing and distributing gasoline and other
petroleum products is contrary to law and against... national policy. It
further contended that the Mayor's Permit Fee levied by petitioners
were unreasonable and confiscatory.
Petitioners contended that the City of Batangas can legally impose taxes
on the business of manufacturing and distribution of petroleum
products, including the Mayor's Permit Fees upon respondent.
Respondent paid under protest the Mayor's Permit Fees for the year
2003 amounting to P774,840.50 as manufacturer and P3,525,010.50 as
distributor.
Offered the amount of PI50,000.00 as... compromise Mayor's Permit
Fee without prejudice to the outcome of the case... rejected
RTC of Batangas City rendered a Decisionsustaining the imposition of
business taxes by petitioners upon the manufacture and distribution of
petroleum products by respondent... the RTC withheld the imposition
of Mayor's
Permit Fee in deference to the provisions of Section 147 of the LGC, in
relation to Section 143(h) of the same Code, which imposed a limit to
the power of petitioners to collect the said business taxes.
Taxes on the privilege of engaging in the business of manufacturing,
distribution or dealing in petroleum products... imposed by Batangas
City on Pilipinas Shell, is VALID
Mayor's Permit Fee... based on gross receipts/sales as grossly excessive
and unreasonable
CTA Second Division granted the said application and ordered
petitioners to hold in abeyance the collection of the questioned
manufacturer and... Distributor’s taxes, conditioned upon the filing of
respondent of a surety bond in the amount of P500,000,000.00.
The CTA Second Division granted respondent's petition.
It held that respondent is not subject to the business taxes on the
manufacture and distribution of petroleum products because of the
express limitation provided under Section 133(h) of the LGC.
Respondent filed a "Motion for Clarification" on the exact amount to be
refunded by petitioners as regards the Mayor's Permit Fees.
Since [petitioners] failed to modify the computation of the mayor's
permit fee and based on justice and equity, [respondent] should be
refunded with the mayor's permit fees ordered revoked by the court a
quo
The amount to be refunded is not the full amount of P4,299,851.00 but
the excessive mayor's permit for manufacturing and distributing in the
amount of P704,305.00 and P3,166,555.00, respectively, or in the total
amount of P3,870,860.00.
the CTA En Banc promulgated a Decision affirming in toto the Amended
Decision of the CTA Second Division.
ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE POWER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS TO TAX BUSINESS IS SOLELY GOVERNED BY SEC. 143 AND 143(h)
OF THE LOCAL GOVENRMENT CODE
ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE WORD "TAXES" IN SEC. 133(h) DOES
NOT INCLUDE BUSINESS TAXES.
ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TAXES ON
ARTICLES AND TAXES ON BUSINESS
INCORRECTLY CONSTRUED A CLEAR PROVISION OF LAW, SPECIFICALLY
SECTION 133(h) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, AS AN
EXPRESS LIMITATION ON THE POWER OF LOCAL GOVENRMENT UNITS
TO IMPOSE TAXES ON THE BUSINESS OF
MANUFACTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS.
ISSUES: whether a LGU is empowered under the LGC to impose business
taxes on persons or entities engaged in the business of manufacturing
and distribution of petroleum products.
petitioners assert that any activity that involves the production or
manufacture and the distribution or selling of any kind or nature as a
means of livelihood or with a view to profit can be taxed by the LGUs.
They posit that the authority granted to them by
Section 143(h) of the LGC is so broad that it practically covers any
business that the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax, even
including businesses which are already subject to excise, value-added
or percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC) provided that the same shall not exceed two percent of the
gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year.
RULING: We do not agree.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that although the power to tax is
inherent in the State, the same is not true for LGUs because although
the mandate to impose taxes granted to LGUs is categorical and long
established in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the same is not all...
encompassing as it is subject to limitations as explicitly stated in Section
5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
Principles:
SECTION 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create
its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject
to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such... taxes, fees,
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
The LGUs' power to tax is... subject to the limitations set forth under
Section 133 of the LGC.
It is already well-settled that although the power to tax is inherent in
the State, the same is not true for the LGUs to whom the power must
be delegated by Congress and must be exercised within the guidelines
and limitations that Congress may provide.
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is
clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute must
plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality, cannot
assume it. And the power when granted is to be... construed in
strictissimi juris.
Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the power to tax is no
longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now
given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges."
Nevertheless, such authority is "subject to such guidelines and...
limitations as the Congress may provide."
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the local
Government Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and
fiscal matters.
First, Section 130 provides for the following fundamental principles
governing the taxing powers of LGUs:
Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU.
Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:... be equitable and
based as far as practicable on the taxpayer's ability to pay;... be levied
and collected only for public purposes;... not be unjust, excessive,
oppressive orconfiscatory;... not be contrary to law, public policy,
national economic policy, or in the restraint of trade.
The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall
in no case be left to any private person.
The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the LGC shall inure
solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the LGU
levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise
specifically provided by the LGC.
Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
Second, Section 133 provides for the common limitations on the taxing
powers of LGUs.
SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local
Government Units. - Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of
taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall
not extend to the levy of the following:
XXXX
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum
products
From the foregoing, Section 133(h) clearly specifies the two kinds of
taxes which cannot be imposed by LGUs: (1) excise taxes on articles
enumerated under the NIRC, as amended; and (2) taxes, fees or charges
on petroleum products.
explicit... statutory impediment provided for under Section 133(h) of
the same Code which prohibits LGUs from imposing "taxes, fees or
charges on petroleum products." It can, therefore, be deduced that
although petroleum products are subject to excise tax, the same is
specifically excluded... from the broad power granted to LGUs under
Section 143(h) of the LGC to impose business taxes.
Additionally, Section 133(h) of the LGC makes plain that the prohibition
with respect to petroleum products extends not only to excise taxes
thereon, but all "taxes, fees or charges."
While LGUs are authorized to burden all such other class of goods with
"taxes, fees... and charges," excepting excise taxes, a specific prohibition
is imposed barring the levying of any other type of taxes with respect to
petroleum products
It is likewise irrefutable that the specific exemption provided under
Section 133 of the LGC prevails over Section 143 of the same Code.
Section 133 of the LGC is a specific provision that explicitly withhold
from LGUs the power to impose taxes, fees and charges on petroleum
products.
as long as the subject matter of the taxing powers of the LGUs is the
petroleum products per se or even the activity or privilege related to
the petroleum products, such as manufacturing and distribution of said
products, it is covered by the said... limitation and thus, no levy can be
imposed
On the contrary, Section 143 of the LGC defines the general power of
LGUs to tax businesses within its jurisdiction. Thus, the omnibus grant
of power to LGUs under Section 143(h) of the LGC cannot overcome the
specific exception or exemption in Section 133(h) of the same Code.
Second, Article 232(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of the LGC of 1991 states:
ARTICLE 232. Tax on Business. - The Municipality may impose taxes on
the following businesses:... that in line with existing national policy, any
business engaged in the production, manufacture, refining, distribution
or sale of oil, gasoline, and other petroleum... products shall not be
subject to any local tax imposed in this Article.
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU v. PEZA
FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the
City of Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan separately filed against
the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).
In G.R. No. 184203, the City of Lapu-Lapu (the City) assails the Court of
Appeals’ decision dated January 11, 2008 and resolution dated August
6, 2008, dismissing the City’s appeal for being the wrong mode of
appeal. The City appealed the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay
City’s decision finding the PEZA exempt from payment of real property
taxes.
In G.R. No. 187583, the Province of Bataan (the Province) assails the
Court of Appeals’ decision dated August 27, 2008 and resolution dated
April 16, 2009, granting the PEZA’s petition for certiorari. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City
gravely abused its discretion in finding the PEZA liable for real property
taxes to the Province of Bataan.
ISSUE: Whether the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property
taxes?
RULING: The PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes.
The PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government
An instrumentality is “any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter.
With the PEZA as an attached agency to the Department of Trade and
Industry, the 13-person PEZA Board is chaired by the Department
Secretary. Among the powers and functions of the PEZA is its ability to
coordinate with the Department of Trade and Industry for policy and
program formulation and implementation. In strategizing and
prioritizing the development of special economic zones, the PEZA
coordinates with the Department of Trade and Industry.
The PEZA also administers its own funds and operates autonomously,
with the PEZA Board formulating and approving the PEZA’s annual
budget. Appointments and other personnel actions in the PEZA are also
free from departmental interference, with the PEZA Board having the
exclusive and final authority to promote, transfer, assign and reassign
officers of the PEZA.
As an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA is vested
with special functions or jurisdiction by law. Congress created the PEZA
to operate, administer, manage and develop special economic zones in
the Philippines. Special economic zones are areas with highly developed
or which have the potential to be developed into agro-industrial,
industrial tourist/recreational, commercial, banking, investment and
financial centers.
Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA cannot
be taxed by local government units.
Although a body corporate vested with some corporate powers, the
PEZA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation taxable for
real property taxes.
The law created the PEZA’s charter. Under the Special Economic Zone
Act of 1995, the PEZA was established primarily to perform the
governmental function of operating, administering, managing, and
developing special economic zones to attract investments and provide
opportunities for preferential use of Filipino labor.
Under its charter, the PEZA was created a body corporate endowed with
some corporate powers. However, it was not organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation. Nothing in the PEZA’s charter provides that the
PEZA’s capital is divided into shares. The PEZA also has no members who
shall share in the PEZA’s profits.
The PEZA does not compete with other economic zone authorities in
the country. The government may even subsidize the PEZA’s
operations. Under Section 47 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995,
“any sum necessary to augment [the PEZA’s] capital outlay shall be
included in the General Appropriations Act to be treated as an equity of
the national government.”
The PEZA, therefore, need not be economically viable. It is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation liable for real property
taxes.
The PEZA’s predecessor, the EPZA, was declared non-profit in character
with all its revenues devoted for its development, improvement, and
maintenance. Consistent with this non-profit character, the EPZA was
explicitly declared exempt from real property taxes under its charter.
Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66.
The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, on the other hand, does not
specifically exempt the PEZA from payment of real property taxes.
Nevertheless, we rule that the PEZA is exempt from real property taxes
by virtue of its charter. A provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of
1995 explicitly exempting the PEZA is unnecessary. The PEZA assumed
the real property exemption of the EPZA under Presidential Decree No.
66.
Section 11 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 mandated the
EPZA “to evolve into the PEZA in accordance with the guidelines and
regulations set forth in an executive order issued for this purpose.”
President Ramos then issued Executive Order No. 282 in 1995, ordering
the PEZA to assume the EPZA’s powers, functions, and responsibilities
under Presidential Decree No. 66 not inconsistent with the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995.
The non-profit character of the EPZA under Presidential Decree No. 66
is not inconsistent with any of the powers, functions, and
responsibilities of the PEZA. The EPZA’s non-profit character, including
the EPZA’s exemption from real property taxes, must be deemed
assumed by the PEZA.
In addition, the Local Government Code exempting instrumentalities of
the national government from real property taxes was already in force
when the PEZA’s charter was enacted in 1995. It would have been
redundant to provide for the PEZA’s exemption in its charter
considering that the PEZA is already exempt by virtue of Section 133(o)
of the Local Government Code.
As for the EPZA, Commonwealth Act No. 470 or the Assessment Law
was in force when the EPZA’s charter was enacted. Unlike the Local
Government Code, Commonwealth Act No. 470 does not contain a
provision specifically exempting instrumentalities of the national
government from payment of real property taxes. It was necessary to
put an exempting provision in the EPZA’s charter.
Real properties under the PEZA’s title are owned by the Republic of the
Philippines
Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, real properties
owned by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt from real property
taxes.
Even the PEZA’s lands and buildings whose beneficial use have been
granted to other persons may not be taxed with real property taxes. The
PEZA may only lease its lands and buildings to PEZA-registered
economic zone enterprises and entities. These PEZA-registered
enterprises and entities, which operate within economic zones, are not
subject to real property taxes. Under Section 24 of the Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995, no taxes, whether local or national, shall be imposed
on all business establishments operating within the economic zones.
EMINENT DOMAIN
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC v. ERICTA
FACTS: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved
the regulation of establishment of private cemeteries in the said city.
According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial
park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are
paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private
memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property
restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police
power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are
destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid
taking of private property
RULING: No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of
taking private property. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintain a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power
of expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the
ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just
compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real
property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for
the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will
come forward and not the police power of the state.
CITY OF CEBU v. SPOUSES APOLONIO
FACTS: On 17 September 1993, Petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint
for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa
Dedamo. The petitioner alleged that they needed the parcels of land
owned by the respondents for public purpose because they are
planning to construct a public road which will serve as an access or relief
road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and
the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City.
However, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
because the purpose of expropriation was not for public purpose but
for the benefit of the Cebu Holdings, Inc. They alleged that the
petitioner could simply buy directly the property from them at its fair
market value just like what they did with the neighboring lots and the
price offered was very low. They also alleged that they have no other
land in Cebu City.
From this, a pre-trial was conducted. On 23 August 1994, the petitioner
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The motion was granted by the trial court
on 21 September 1994. The parties executed an agreement and
submitted to the trial wherein they declared that they have partially
settled the case in consideration of the stipulations in the agreement.
Pursuant to the said agreement, the trial court appointed Palermo M.
Lugo, Alfredo Cisneros and Herbert E. Buot to be the commissioners to
determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated.
The commissioner’s report contained that the plaintiff is directed to pay
a just compensation costs P24,865.930.00 to the respondents.
But the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that
the commissioner’s report was inaccurate since it included an area
which was not subject to expropriation. Then the commissioners submit
an amendment which made the just compensation costs
P20,826,339.50 which was later approved by the trial court.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals alleging that the
lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at
P20,826,339.50. They also alleged that just compensation should be
based on the prevailing market price of the property at the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. However, the Court
of Appeals was not convinced and affirmed the lower court’s decision.
The petitioner filed with a petition for review to the SC. They asserted
that just compensation should be determined on September 17, 1993,
as of the date of the filing of the complaint and not at the time the
property was actually taken in 1994.
ISSUE: Whether just compensation should be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint.
HELD: No. Just compensation should not be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint.
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is the Governments right to appropriate, in the nature of
a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose. However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just
compensation as consideration therefor.
In this case, the applicable law as to the point of determining the just
compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides
that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual
taking. The SC justifies that although the general rule in determining just
compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the
date of the filing of the complaint, the rule admits of an exception:
where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was
taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings.
Moreover, both of the parties agreed to be bound by the report of the
commission so they need to comply on the agreement in good faith.
Also, the petitioner was too late to question the valuation without
violating the principle of equitable estoppel. And lastly, Section 4, Rule
67 of the Rules of Court cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a
substantive law.
Therefore, the petition was denied.
REPUBLIC v. CA (GR 146587)
FACTS: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19
September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan,
covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated
along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the
continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for
the "Voice of the Philippines" project.
Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency ("PIA"), took over
the premises after the previous lessee, the "Voice of America," had
ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of
P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value
of the property.
On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of
the expropriation proceedings – condemning the properties of the
defendants and that plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants the just
compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the
land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square
meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully
paid
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square
meter property previously owned by Luis Santos which forms part of the
expropriated area.
It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein
respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision,
On 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion
seeking payment for the expropriated property.
On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs
remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution
served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for
the implementation thereof.
When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed a
motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of
Bulacan to release to them the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the
sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation
proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The
trial court, in its order of 10 July 1984, granted the motion.
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation
No. 22, 2 transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the
Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5
hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine
carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA.
This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the Santos
heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16
September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to
permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of
just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos
subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court.
This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion,
submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per
square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal
valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative,
to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March
2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the
assailed order, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 and declaring
it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription —
Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the
petition was outrightly denied. It would appear that the denial was
based on Section 4, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
provided that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in due time after
filing of the judgment, order or resolution interrupted the running of
the sixty-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari; and that
if a motion for reconsideration was denied, the aggrieved party could
file the petition only within the remaining period, but which should not
be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of such
denial.
Thus this instant petition.
ISSUE/S: WON defendants can expropriate unpaid lands from the
government?
RULING: The expropriated property has been shown to be for the
continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being
ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University
and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line
with the requirements of public purpose.
Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner
of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs
from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional
proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any
a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the
condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and
alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest
it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is. in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right
to compensation for the taking.
In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents
would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Limitation of Right to eminent Domain:
Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya 14where the unpaid landowners were
1. First, the taking must be for public use; and
allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in
question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal a. In determining "public use," two approaches are utilized
government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not
i. The first is public employment the actual use by the
inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application.
public, and
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under
ii. The second is public advantage or benefit.
Republic Act No. 7160 15 cannot be understood as being the pervasive
and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of 2. Second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner
government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it of the property.
must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but
These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the
even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly
necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one
speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as
hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining
broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.
the former and affording protection to the latter
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued
right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its
utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the
territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the
expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the
independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the
propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the
Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory
requirements of public purpose.
of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of
the power. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation.
Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property,
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature
is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the
of the expropriation proceedings.
only limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the
expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment of just
compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the
property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well
as their privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all
intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the property pursuant
to the judgment.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing
interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the
time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the
property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount
found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking
computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum 28 should
help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the
value of the currency over time. 29 Article 1250 of the Civil Code,
providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value
of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall
be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is
stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations. 30In
other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of
extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the
currency.
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March
2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its
lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its
execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the
return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the
yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment
of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with
legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of
"taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount
shall have been fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July
2000, of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari, as
well as its resolution of 04 January 2001 denying the motion for
reconsideration, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
dated 01 March 2000, are SET ASIDE. Let the case be forthwith
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the proper
execution of its decision promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is
hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
RECLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
DAR VS SARANGANI
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel, Sarangani passed Resolution
No. 97-08 adopting a 10 year comprehensive development plan of the
municipality and its land use. On January 30, 1998, pursuant to
Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series of 1997, and to accelerate
the development and urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that were located
within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of the
municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses.
Later, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved Resolution
No. 98-018 or the “Resolution Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal
Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2205) and the Land
Use Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of
Alabel, Sarangani Per Resolution No. 97-08 and Municipal Ordinance
No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel.” A portion of
the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the
CARP commercial farms deferment scheme.
The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal
Planning and Development Council (MPDC) showed that respondents’
properties located at Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those
reclassified from agricultural and pasture land to residential,
commercial institutional, light industrial and open space in the 1995-
2005 land use plan of Alabel.
The respondent then field an application for land use conversion
of certain parcels of land. Meanwhile, members of the Sarangani
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-
petition to the DAR Secretary oppposing the application for land use
conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged that its members were merely
forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering that the commercial
farm deferment period ended on June 15, 1998. Later, the PLUTC
agreed to recommend the disapproval of a portion of a property which
was still viable for agriculture. The conversion was deferred subject to
the submission of certain requirements.
Later, the DAR Secretary denied SACI’s application for land use
conversion.
On November 9, 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr.
denied SACI’s application for land use conversion. SACI appealed to the
Office of the President. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal
and affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents’ motion
for reconsideration was denied, so they filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for review raising substantially the same issues.
The CA granted the petition and ordred DAR to issue a
conversion order. As to the deferred portion, DAR was directed to
expedite the processing and evaluation of petitioner’s application.
ISSUE: WON a notice of coverage is an indispensable requirement for
the acquisition of land
HELD: No, Under the circumstances, a notice of coverage is not an
indispensable requirement before DAR can acquire the subject lots or
commercial farms, which are covered by a deferment period under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or R.A. No 6657 upon its
effectivity on June 15, 1998
ISSUE: WON the DAR should use the comprehensive land use plans and
ordinance of the local sanggunian as primary reference
HELD: Yes, Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, empowers the local government
units to reclassify agricultural lands. Memorandum Circular No. 54
“Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160
Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991 Authorizing
Cities and Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into Non-
Agricultural Uses” issued by President Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified
the scope and limitations on the power of the cities and municipalities
to reclassify agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all
ordinances authorizing reclassification of agricultural lands shall be
subject to the review and approval of the province in the case of
component cities or municipalities, or by the HLURB for highly
urbanized or independent component cities in accordance with
Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1993.
Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for
non-agricultural uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is
correct in declaring that DAR should refer to the comprehensive land
use plans and the ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use
conversion applications, thus:
Construing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the subsequent
administrative issuances implementing the same, we are of the opinion
that while the DAR retains the responsibility for approving or
disapproving applications for land use conversion filed by individual
landowners on their landholdings, the exercise of such authority should
be confined to compliance with the requirements and limitations under
existing laws and regulations, such as the allowable percentage of
agricultural [area] to be reclassified, ensuring sufficient food
production, areas non-negotiable for conversion and those falling under
environmentally critical areas or highly restricted for conversion under
the NIPAS law. Definitely, the DAR’s power in such cases may not be
exercised in such a manner as to defeat the very purpose of the LGU
concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve social and economic
benefits in pursuit of its mandate towards the general welfare.
Precisely, therefore, the DAR is required to use the comprehensive land
use plans and accompanying ordinances of the local Sanggunian as
primary references in evaluating applications for land use conversion
filed by individual landowners. In this case, petitioners have already
complied with the standard requirements laid down under the
applicable rules and regulations of the DAR....
The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses
shall be strictly regulated and may be allowed only when the conditions
prescribed under R.A. No. 6657 are present. In this regard, the Court
agrees with the ratiocination of the CA that DAR’s scope of authority in
assessing land use conversion applications is limited to examining
whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and
regulations have been complied with. This holds true in the present case
where, because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view
of its thrust to urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is the
Municipality of Alabel, the local government has reclassified certain
portions of its land area from agricultural to non-agricultural. Thus, to
reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and subject to
the limitations prescribed by law, DAR should utilize the comprehensive
land use plans in evaluating the land use conversion application of
respondents whose lands have already been reclassified by the local
government for non-agricultural uses.
This is not to say, however, that every property of respondents
which is included in the comprehensive land use plan of the
Municipality of Alabel shall be automatically granted non-coverage. As
mentioned earlier, said application is subject to the limitations and
conditions prescribed by law. One such limitation that is present here is
that a portion of respondents’ property of 376.5424 hectares, a portion
totaling 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares which are planted to bananas
and coconuts, are covered by CARL’s ten-year deferment scheme,
which has expired on June 15, 1998. By law, these lands are subject to
redistribution to CARP beneficiaries upon the lapse of the ten-year
period, counted from the date of the effectivity of the CARL or R.A. No.
6657 on June 15, 1988, which was way before the creation of the
Province of Sarangani and the eventual reclassification of the
agricultural lands into non-agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel
where respondents’ properties are located.
In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the
reclassification that was effected by the Municipality of Alabel did not
operate to supersede the applicable provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification
of lands explicitly states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed
as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of
R.A. No. 6657.” Thus, where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for
application.
CLOSURE AND OPENING OF ROADS
SANGALANG vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: Jose Sangalang and wife, herein petitioners are residents of
Jupiter Street, Makati Metro Manila. Sangalang and the other
petitioners who are also residents of Jupiter Street initially filed a case
against Ayala to enforce by specific performance restrictive easement
upon property pursuant to stipulations embodied in the deeds of sale
covering the subdivision, and for damages. The other petitions were
also for the enforcement of the aforesaid restrictions stipulated in the
deeds of sale executed by the Ayala Corporation.
The lots which were acquired by the petitioners, were all sold by MDC
subject to certain conditions and easements contained in Deed
Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of sale. When MDC sold
the above-mentioned lots to appellees' predecessors-in-interest, the
whole stretch of the commercial block between Buendia Avenue and
Jupiter Street, from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac Street in the
east, was still undeveloped. Altough it was not part of the original plan,
MDC constructed a fence or wall on the commercial block along Jupiter.
In 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance No. 81,
providing for the zonification of Makati (Exh. 18). Under this Ordinance,
Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A Residential Zone, with its
boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street.
Under the zoning classifications, Jupiter Street, therefore, is a common
boundary of Bel-Air Village and the commercial zone.
Gates had been installed by BAVA (Bell-Arat strategic locations across
Jupiter Street which were manned and operated by its own security
guards who were employed to maintain, supervise and enforce traffic
regulations in the roads and streets of the village. Then, on January 17,
1977, the Office of the Mayor of Makati directed that, in the interest of
public welfare and for the purpose of easing traffic congestion, the
streets in Bel-Air Village should be opened for public use. The other
streets in Bel-Air Village were voluntarily opened except Jupiter Street.
The Municipal Engineer of Makati in a letter addressed to BAVA advised
the latter to open for vehicular and pedestrian traffic the entire portion
of Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street. Finally, the
municipal officials of Makati concerned allegedly opened, destroyed
and removed the gates constructed/located at the corner of Reposo
Street and Jupiter Street as well as the gates/fences
located/constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly, and
then opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic.
Petitioners brought the present action for damages against the
defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation predicated on both breach of
contract and on tort or quasi-delict. After trial on the merits, the then
Court of First Instance favored the petitioners and awarded damages.
Defendant is further ordered to restore/reconstruct the perimeter wall
at its original position in 1966 from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac
Street in the east, at its own expense,
On appeal, CA reversed the lower court, finding the decision appealed
from as not supported by the facts and the law on the matter, it was
set aside and another one entered dismissing the case for lack of a cause
of action.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Ayala Corporation is liable for damages as a result of
the destruction of the perimeter wall.
2. Whether or not the exercise of police power is valid.
Held:
1. NO. Jupiter Street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and
Ayala Corporation's commercial section, it had been considered as a
boundary not as a part of either the residential or commercial zones of
Ayala Corporation's real estate development projects, hence it cannot
be said to have been "for the exclusive benefit" of Bel-Air Village
residents.
Jupiter Street lies as a mere boundary, a fact acknowledged by the
authorities of Makati and the National Government and, as a scrutiny of
the records themselves reveals, by the petitioners themselves, as the
articles of incorporation of Bel-Air Village Association itself would
confirm. As a consequence, Jupiter Street was intended for the use by
both -the commercial and residential blocks. It was not originally
constructed, therefore, for the exclusive use of either block, least of all
the residents of Bel-Air Village, but, we repeat, in favor of both, as
distinguished from the general public. When the wall was erected in
1966 and rebuilt twice, in 1970 and 1972, it was not for the purpose of
physically separating the two blocks. According to Ayala Corporation, it
was put up to enable the Bel-Air Village Association "better control of
the security in the area, and as the Ayala Corporation's "show of
goodwill". That maintaining the wall was a matter of a contractual
obligation on the part of Ayala, to be pure conjecture. In fine, we cannot
hold the Ayala Corporation liable for damages for a commitment it did
not make, much less for alleged resort to machinations in evading it.
2. Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with
the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people.' Invariably described
as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a
sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the
exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only
if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been
a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. Resolution No. 27, 1960 declaring the
western part of High way 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for
short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and
commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of
the people in the locality.
MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION INC.
FACTS: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in
Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune
Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through
its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent
to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2,
1996.
Actions Filed:
1. BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary
restraining order but after due hearing, trial court denied the issuance
of a preliminary injunction.
2. BAVA – appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and
later ruled that MMDA has no authority to order the opening of
Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of
its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council
of Makati by ordinance.
3. MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA;
hence the current recourse.
ISSUES
1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public
traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers?
2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the
MMDA may order the opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?
HELD: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development
authority." All its functions are administrative in nature.
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the local government units, acting through their
respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police
power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City
did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is
illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan ISSUE: Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang
transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary
charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for and not duly oppressive upon individuals.
public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal
HELD: With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the
warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the
city to a single location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation
preservation of the rule of law.
of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already
Dispositive existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located
outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to Lucena.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution
The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus
of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL INC. v. JAC LINER INC. of Lucena. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium
between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the
Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to
Lucena with the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to
rights. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a
have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals
more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems. From the
within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena
memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the
Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance, establish, operate
Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion
and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of
to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses
Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the
on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the
temporary terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate which as
terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on
a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The
the city streets. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help
Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid
impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the
excercise of police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null
existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be
and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal,
considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, the
Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then
Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such
elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court. The
that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the
Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it
streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications
has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed
for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the
the challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration
same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications. In the
having been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via
subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be
able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred
from operating at all. The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of
various barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a
common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private
sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand
Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be
balanced with that of an individual‘s rights.
LEGISLATIVE POWER
CITY OF MANILA v. LAGUIO JR.
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars,
karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District
which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill
seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the
ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration
of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that
they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for
entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only
regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates
that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well
in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is
to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC
noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching,
is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject
to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable a nd for the public
good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid
exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
general laws.
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN v. QC
FACTS: Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to
implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments
in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances
on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part
of "Oplan Rody."
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances
were respondents:
Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of young adults and minors that aims
to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the
rights and welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present petition,
arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they:
(a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall
under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by
proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel
without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due
process.
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are
unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process; and (b) fail to pass the
strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing
means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.
ISSUES: The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is
whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
RULING: The petition is partly granted.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for
not containing sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the
enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their
provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these
issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo,
even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the
enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders
based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily.
Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance
requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that
nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for
proof or identification of the child to show his age.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."[48]
They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject
ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack
of enforcement guidelines
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous
standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather,
lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be
determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal provision,
the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for
vagueness doctrine.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these
parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the
prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing
ordinances.
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew
Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals
all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law. Pursuant to Section 57-A
of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630, minors caught in violation of
curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its
provisions.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children. Petitioners submit that the
Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents
of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without
substantive due process.
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's
policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising
their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise
this authority conscientiously.
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be
stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a relation to the
public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [S]tate may act to
promote these legitimate interests."[66] Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm
to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace,
order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their
children."
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid
parents in the moral development of their children, and, thus, assumes
a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations.
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances
apply only when the minors are not - whether actually or constructively
(as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents.
This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the
primary nature of parental authority and the importance of parents'
role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority
over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to
supervise them.
In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of
discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to
abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors' activities.
As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit
reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her
child.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances
based on the minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel
is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of
the strict scrutiny
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed
any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of
speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (Southern Hemisphere), this
Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of
a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases," viz.:
In Virginia v. Hicks,[84] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not
specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on
overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression."'... transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression."'
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an
overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of
free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to
examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right
under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: Section 6.
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely
from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.[89] It
is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and
exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free
expression, assembly, association, and religion
As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose limitations
on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by
law.
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the
promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime,
inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the
minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences
and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to
reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement,
i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete
with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to
children,... Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603,
which explicitly authorizes local government units, through their city or
municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to
minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this
Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional
rights,[108] but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those
of adults.
In Bellotti,[117] the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications
for the differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These
are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third,
the importance of the parental role in child rearing:[118]
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the
primary use of highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for
them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other
things, this difference may be magnified.[12... i) interferes with the
exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial
scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications. The strict
scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the
exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. The intermediate
scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect
classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as
in classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Lastly, the rational
basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal
system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is
the applicable test.
Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification
(i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is
narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest a. Compelling State
Interest.
This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to
protect and care for them as parens patriae constitute compelling
interests to justify regulations by the State.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate
objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors
during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce -
if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate
them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include
themselves.
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments
of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical data in their respective
pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving
juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective
localities.[139] Based on these findings, their city councils found it
necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power
under the general welfare clause.[140] In this light, the Court thus finds
that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact,
attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare,
especially with respect to minors. A... b. Least Restrictive Means/
Narrowly Drawn.
When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly
drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so
narrowly drawn.
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions,
this Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-
discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do
not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage
of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family
members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands
such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for
emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those
who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or
outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at
night.[146] For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more
exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at
night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in
coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards
home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the
supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having
authority over them; (f) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the
like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific
occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's
day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints'
and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and
Easter Sunday
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn
in that their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of
overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms.
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities,
it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or non-church
activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their
freedom of association is effectively curtailed.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew
during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors
from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at
night without accompanying adults,... Third, the Navotas Ordinance
does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies
or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with
their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely
stricken down since their exceptions, which are essentially
determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are
inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental
rights.
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under
the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently
protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel,
to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions
guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items
uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both official
and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also
of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and
of free expression are also covered by these items given that the minors'
attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are
allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the
right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the
Quezon City Ordinance
Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the
minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit: SEC. 4.
Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this
ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows: (a) If the offender is
Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's
parent, guardian or person exercising parental authority. (b) If the
offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of
age, the sanction/penalty shall be: For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand
and Admonition; For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and
Admonition, and a warning about the legal impostitions in case of a
third and subsequent violation; and For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT
OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the
Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by the Punong
Barangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.[156] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly
impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community service; (b)
reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently,
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition
of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations,
viz.:... what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for
violations of these regulations.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a
valid form of intervention program that a local government (such as
Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to
promote the welfare of minors.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise
consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal
way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's
misdemeanor.
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based
programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not
punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and
conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform
and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions
must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute
penalties - as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws
and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently
prohibits.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have
passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State
has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety
and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon
City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test,
as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the least
restrictive means to achieve this interest.
In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate
exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental
rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly
drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has
also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive
form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the
curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the
discretion of the local government unit. In fine, the Manila and Navotas
Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while
the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid
in accordance with this Decision.
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ELECTIVE AND APPOINTIVE LOCAL
OFFICIALS (Practice of Profession)
REPUBLIC v. RAMBUYONG
Factual Antecedents
Alfredo Y. Chu (Chu) filed a case for collection of a sum of money and/or
damages against the National Power Corporation (NPC) docketed as
Civil Case No. I-197 which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, Branch 24. Appearing as counsel for Chu is
Atty. Richard B. Rambuyong (Atty. Rambuyong) who was then the
incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Thereafter, NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition 3 of Atty. Rambuyong
arguing that under Section 90 (b), (1) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, sanggunian members
are prohibited "to appear as counsel before any court wherein . . . any
office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the adverse
party." NPC contended that being a government-owned or controlled
corporation, it is embraced within the term "instrumentality."
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In an Order 4 dated January 4, 2002, the RTC ruled that government-
owned or controlled corporations are expressly excluded from Section
90 (b), (1) of the Local Government Code. Citing other provisions of the
Local Government Code wherein the phrase "including government-
owned or controlled corporations" is explicitly included, the trial court
held that if it was the intention of the framers of RA 7160 to impose
obligations or give rights and privileges to local government units,
agencies, instrumentalities or corporate entities, then they would have
explicitly stated so. The RTC further held that "to insistently maintain
that 'government-owned or controlled corporations' are included in the
signification of 'agency and instrumentality of the government' . . .
would be leaving behind what is apparent in favor of opening the door
to the realm of presumption, baseless conjecture and even absurdity."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in ruling that the
statutory prohibition pertaining to the private practice of law by
sanggunian members does not apply to cases where the adverse party
is a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On May 20, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The
CA pointed out that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power. It held that there was no
showing that the trial judge exercised his power of judgment
capriciously, arbitrarily and whimsically. Neither did it find proof that
the trial judge, in making the rulings, was motivated by passion or
personal hostility towards the petitioner.
It ruled that if ever there has been an erroneous interpretation of the
law, the same may be attributed to a mere error of judgment which is
definitely not the same as "grave abuse of discretion."
Issues
Petitioner raises the following arguments:
I Petitioner alleges that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it
failed to recognize that the 1987 Administrative Code and the Local
BOTH THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND THE 1987 ADMINISTRATIVE
Government Code are in pari materia in defining the terms used in the
[CODE] ESSENTIALLY REQUIRE ATTY. RAMBUYONG TO INHIBIT HIMSELF
latter, such as "office, agency or instrumentality." It argues that the RTC
FROM ACTING AS COUNSEL AGAINST NPC IN THE PROCEEDINGS
acted beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it constricted the
BELOW.
definition of "instrumentality" in Section 90 (b), (1) of RA 7160 to
II exclude government-owned and controlled corporations.

NPC IS INCLUDED IN THE TERM "INSTRUMENTALITY" OF GOVERNMENT.
III
THE PROHIBITION IN SECTION 90(b), (1) OF RA 7160 INTENDS TO
PREVENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS FROM REPRESENTING INTEREST ADVERSE
TO THE GOVERNMENT.
IV
Petitioner argues that NPC is an instrumentality of government and that
there is no cogent reason to exclude government-owned and controlled
corporations from the operation of Section 90 (b), (1) of RA 7160.
Finally, petitioner claims that the government's challenge against Atty.
Rambuyong's appearance is directed against him alone to the exclusion
of his client whose right to prosecute his claim as party litigant is beyond
question.

BACANI CASE IS NO LONGER THE PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE ON THE Respondent's Arguments

REAL MEANING OF GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITIES.
On the other hand, respondent contends that the party who would be
V benefited or injured by the compulsory inhibition of plaintiff's counsel
is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. I-197. Thus, he insists that the plaintiff is
ATTY. RICHARD RAMBUYONG IS THE REAL-PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THE
the real party in interest and his (Atty. Rambuyong) inclusion as
SUBJECT PETITION.
respondent in the present petition is erroneous.
In the main the issue is whether NPC is an instrumentality of
Our Ruling
government such that Atty. Rambuyong, as a sanggunian member,
should not appear as counsel against it. The petition has merit.

Petitioner's Arguments Instrumentality of the Government

Petitioner contends that the trial court refused to apply the law, The provisions of law relevant to the present case state:
specifically Section 90 (b), (1) of RA 7160, which clearly states that
Sec. 90. 10 Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and
lawyer-sanggunian members cannot appear as counsel in any case
municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or
where the adverse party is a local government unit, office, agency or
engaging in any occupation, other than the exercise of their functions
instrumentality. It argues that courts are not authorized to distinguish
as local chief executives.
where the law makes no distinction.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. 11 Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this Code where no
legal provision or jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to the
customs and traditions in the place where the controversies take place.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 2. 12 General Terms Defined. — Unless the specific words of the
text, or the context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a
different meaning:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) "Agency of the Government" refers to any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality,
or government-owned or controlled corporations, or a local
government or a distinct unit therein.
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Instrumentality — refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested
with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 13 the Court instructs:
It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrases of a
statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of
the legislature must be determined from the language employed, and,
where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
construction. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of
the legislature apart from the words. The reason for the rule is that the
legislature must be presumed to know the meaning of words, to have
used words advisedly and to have expressed its intent by use of such
words as are found in the statute.
Section 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987 is clear and unambiguous.
It categorically provides that the term "instrumentality" includes
government-owned or controlled corporations. Hence there is no room
for construction. All that has to be done is to apply the law as called for
by the circumstances of the case. It is not disputed that the NPC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation. Therefore following
Section 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987, the NPC is clearly an
instrumentality of the government.
It is also significant to point out that in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr. 14 the
Court stated that "[t]he NPC is a government instrumentality with the
enormous task of undertaking development of hydroelectric generation
of power and production of electricity from other sources, as well as the
transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis, to improve the
quality of life of the people pursuant to the State policy embodied in
Section [9], Article II of the 1987 Constitution."
Given the categorical words of both the law and jurisprudence, to still
go to extra-ordinary lengths to interpret the intention of the lawmakers
and come out with the construction that a government-owned or
controlled corporation like the NPC is not included within the term Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and
"instrumentality of the government" is grave abuse of discretion. Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this,
"By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical
petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." "Grave
respondent on the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as
abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
caprice, whim and despotism."
In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he
The strained and contrary interpretation of clearly worded provisions of
performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s
law, which therefore should be merely applied and not interpreted, is
request to handle the case for free as she was financially distressed.
an earmark of despotism and grave abuse of discretion.
The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Finally, Section 446 of the Local Government Code provides that "[t]he
(IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline
sangguniang bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, shall be
respondent. According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the
composed of the municipal vice mayor as the presiding officer . . . ."
Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the
Thus, pursuant to Sec. 90 (b), (1) of the Local Government Code, Atty.
prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA6713. Consequently, for the
Rambuyong, as sanggunian member, cannot appear as counsel of a
violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of
party adverse to the NPC, which is an instrumentality of government.
Canon 1. Respondent was then recommended for suspension from the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 20, 2004 Decision and practice of law.
April 13, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional
72800 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty. Richard B. Rambuyong is
Responsibility.
disqualified from appearing in Civil Case No. I-197.
RULING: Yes.
CATU v. RELLOSA
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require
FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and
his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the
Antonio Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in
private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of
Malate which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in
the department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District
the Revised Civil Service Rules.
of Manila where Respondent was the punong barangay. The parties,
having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing to Notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a
arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. required by civil service regulations. For this failure, responded violated
his oath as a lawyer, that is, to obey the laws, Rule 1.01, CPR and, for
not complying with the ethical standards of the legal profession, Canon
7, CPR.
Respondent was found GUILTY of professional misconduct, SUSPENDED
from the practice of law and was strongly advised to look up and take
to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
PROHIBITION AGAINST APPOINTMENT
FLORES v. DRILON
FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1
otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo
City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in a petition for
prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to
prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way
of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office . . . ."
2 Paragraph (d) reads —
(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a
compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval
of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the
Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall
be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority (emphasis supplied).
Said provision allegedly infringes on the following constitutional and
statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution,
which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment
or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his
tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official
and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the
Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned
proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject
posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, for the
reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts
made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the
prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227
violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
RULING: Yes. Said provision of law is unconstitutional.
The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several
public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may
serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of
public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job.
Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an executive
department should be allowed to attend to his duties and
responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or
employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts,
attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which
may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. The basic idea really is to
prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his
appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect
his constituents.
The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official,
i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this
is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, the
proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here,
the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial
to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.
While the second paragraph of said Constitutional provision authorizes
holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears
to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to the government
post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g.,
the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-
President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a
member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council.
The prohibition is more strict with respect to elective officials, because
in the case of appointive officials, there may be a law that will allow
them to hold other positions. The distinction being clear, the exemption
allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be
extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph.
As long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.
When Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an
officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the
President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is
conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the
discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the
qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to
divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to
pick his own choice. When the qualifications prescribed by Congress can
only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates
the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an
irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled
with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing
authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo
City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President
is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint.
Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of
choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of
appointment.
It is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. While the
conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid
legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an
encroachment on his prerogative.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a
legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained.
He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA
official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de
facto officer.
The proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227 is declared unconstitutional;
consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of
Olongapo City, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL
and VOID. However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments
received by respondent Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer may be retained by him, and all acts otherwise
legitimate done by him in the exercise of his authority as officer de facto
of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS
JALOSJOS v. COMELEC (2012)
FACTS: Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973.
He migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old and there
acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he
decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, hence, he was issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of
Immigration. On September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian
citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same in compliance
with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225. From the time of his return, Jalosjos
acquired a residential property in the same village where he lived. He
applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but
respondent Erasmo, the Barangay Captain, opposed the said act.
Election Registration Board approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in
the COMELEC voters list. Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for the
exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the official voters list. MTC denied
Erasmo’s petition. He appealed to RTC but RTC ruled same as MTC’s. On
November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010
elections. Erasmo filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel
Jalosjos’ COC on the ground that Jalosjos made material
misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the
requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement
of the Local Government Code. COMELEC ruled against Jalosjos,
because it failed to comply with the 1-year residency ruequirement.
Jalosjos won the elections
ISSUE: w/n Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency
requirement
HELD: Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’
domicile of origin, the place of his birth. His domicile was changed from
Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight,
acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years.
Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. But,
when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his
brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with
intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In
addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of
Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
JALOSJOS v. COMELEC (2013)
FACTS: On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Baliangao, MisamisOccidental for the 10
May 2010 elections. She indicated therein her place of birth and
residence as BarangayTugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental (Brgy. Tugas).
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy,
in which they argued t hat she had falsely represented her place of birth
and residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila,
and had not totally abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City.
On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had established her
residence in the said barangay since December 2008 when she
purchased two parcels of land there, and that she had been staying in
the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Yap) while the former was
overseeing the construction of her house. Furthermore, petitioner
asserted that the error in her place of birth was committed by her
secretary. Nevertheless, in aCoC, an error in the declaration of the place
of birth is not a material misrepresentation that would lead to
disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications provided by
law.
The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy remained pending as of the day of the elections, in which
petitioner garnered the highest number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental,
proclaimed her as the duly elected municipal mayor.
On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent
was DISQUALIFIED for the position of mayor.
The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution on 19 August 2010
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit
and affirming the Resolution of the Second Division denying due course
to or cancelling her CoC.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that petitioner had failed to prove compliance with the one-
year residency requirement for local elective officials.
HELD: Petitioner failed to comply with theone-year residency
requirement forlocal elective officials.
Petitioner uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The
question is whether she was able to establish, through clear and
positive proof, that she had acquired a domicile of choice in Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental, prior to the May 2010 elections.
When it comes to the qualifications for running for public office,
residence is synonymous with domicile. Accordingly, Nuval v. Gurayheld
as follows:
The term esidenceas so used, is synonymous with omicilewhich imports
not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence
in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by
choice. First, residence or bodily presence in the new locality. Second,
an intention to remain there. Third, an intention to abandon the old
domicile.
These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof, as
held in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELECand subsequently in Dumpit-
Michelena v. Boado:
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires
an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time.
Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive
proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical
date, must also be established to be within at least one year prior to the
elections using the same standard of evidence.
In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by clear
and positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections.
There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of Acas-Yap, Yap III,
Villanueva, Duhaylungsod, Estrellada,Jumawan, Medija, Bagundol,
Colaljo, Tenorio, Analasan, Bation, Maghilum and Javier.
First, they stated that they personally knew petitioner to be an actual
and physical resident of Brgy. Tugassince 2008. However, they declared
in the same Affidavits that she stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray while her
house was being constructed in Brgy. Tugas.
Second, construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod and
Estrellada asserted that in December 2009, construction was still
ongoing. By their assertion, they were implying that six months before
the 10 May 2010 elections, petitioner had not yet moved into her house
at Brgy. Tugas.
Third, the same construction workers admitted that petitioner only
visited Baliangao occasionally when they stated that "at times when she
(petitioner) was in Baliangao, she used to stay at the house of Lourdes
Yap while her residential house was being constructed."
These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials
that petitioner was not and never had been a resident of their barangay.
At most, the Affidavits of all the witnesses only show that petitioner was
building and developing a beach resort and a house in Brgy. Tugas, and
that she only stayed in Brgy. PuntaMiray whenever she wanted to
oversee the construction of the resort and the house.
Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true,
Fernandez v. COMELEChas established that the ownership of a house or
some other property does not establish domicile. This principle is
especially true in this case as petitioner has failed to establish her bodily
presence in the locality and her intent to stay there at least a year
before the elections.
Finally, the approval of the application for registration of petitioner as a
voter only shows, at most, that she had met the minimum residency
requirement as a voter. This minimum requirement is different from
that for acquiring a new domicile of choice for the purpose of running
for public office.
The Petition is DENIED.
ARATEA v. COMELEC
FACTS: Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
in 2010. Rodolfo filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or
to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that
Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms.
The COMELEC Second Division cancelled Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy.
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc
remained pending during said elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered
the highest number of votes and were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-
Mayor, respectively.
Vice-Mayor elect Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor.
Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc disqualified Lonzanida from
running for Mayor based on two grounds: (1), Lonzanida had served as
Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and
(2) Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten counts of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right to be
proclaimed as Mayor because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when
the COMELEC Division ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official
candidates.
Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed as the winning
candidate. He reasoned that since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not
yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be
declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a
permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-
elected Vice-Mayor was mandated to succeed as Mayor.
ISSUE: Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the OEC,
or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the OEC
that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio.
Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor elect should succeed as
Mayor in this case.
RULING: The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78
of the OEC. It also held that Antipolo, the "second placer," should be
proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was
void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes
for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo actually garnered the
highest number of votes for the position.
Qualifications and Disqualifications
The qualifications and disqualifications are laid by Sections 39 and 40 of
the Local Government Code. Section 40 expressly provides, among
others:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
xxx
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense
for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
xxx
False Material Representation
Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be
denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the
contents of the certificate of candidacy.
Section 74 of the OEC details the contents of the certificate of
candidacy. This included among others a statement that the person
filing it is eligible for said office.
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of
prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public
office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual
disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of
conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation
of law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification
and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the RPC,
temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation
of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to
be elected to such office.” The duration of temporary absolute
disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisión
mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the RPC, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold
any public office during the period of his disqualification,” which is
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual
special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public
office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for
elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he
states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
Lonzanida became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any
elective public office from the time the judgment of conviction against
him became final. The judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20
July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed
his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 .
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the OEC because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility,
which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office,
contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under
oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v.
Commission on Elections, the false material representation may refer
to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers from perpetual special
disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering
from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy
stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as
expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false
material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule
as a disqualification under Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a
status, circumstance or condition which bars him from running for
public office despite the possession of all the qualifications under
Section 39 of the LGC." In so holding the dissenting opinions write in the
law what is not found in the law.
Legal Duty of COMELEC to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification
Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the
COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public
office.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a
valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the
constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, he is known to
have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of
Falsification. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida’s
disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since
respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position, the votes
cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor
Antipolo should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor.
JAPZON v. COMELEC
FACTS: Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private
respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local
elections held on 14 May 2007.
Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a
Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition
that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9
October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar
(now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses
Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and
became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last
25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007,
he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14
May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any
foreign country.
While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately
preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued
to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October
2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.
Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
he continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by
his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship
as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.
Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the
disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the cancellation
of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to
work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty
claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1)
with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship
to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General
in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of
his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz,
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles,
California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his
application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St.,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's
application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a
Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and
signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of
General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at Barangay
6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17
July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another
CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay
6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty
executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship.
He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his
American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the
14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's
Petition in SPA No. 07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.
The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the
requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and
reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is
none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance
to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof.
Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before
Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance
with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or
occupying public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he
was naturalized citizen
Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his
Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the
elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty has lost his
domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in
1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts
thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the
elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of
candidacy.
The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant
failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon
proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the COMELEC
had committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of discretion for
dismissing the petition.
Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated
31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and
en banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to
or canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the
duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar.
Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the
COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a
resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one
year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot evaluate
again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-
entrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the
Court.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position
that Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to
qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local
elections.The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already
effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his
Philippine citizenship.
The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and
the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as
Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that
respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a
green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident
or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of
his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988,
respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881)
ISSUE: Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency
requirement for elective positions.
RULING: Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements
for elective position.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in
which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine
citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his
rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said
statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of
residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions.
Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention
any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on
the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly,
Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.
This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to
allow for dual citizenship.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave
at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full
one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he
could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has
previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. The Court
also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually
present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May
2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not
necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does
strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the
instant case to establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006
only to comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could
run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v.
COMELEC, the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as
he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a
change of residence for election law purposes for the period required
by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven
by substantial evidence that he had established residence/domicile in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006,
a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he
ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered
the most number of votes.
To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly
demonstrate that Ty's ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately
create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is
ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition for
Certiorari is dismiss.
SOBEJANA-CONDON v. COMELEC
Key Doctrine: Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance
with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective
public office.
FACTS: The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born
of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she
became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a
certain Kevin Thomas Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an
application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003.” The application was approved and the petitioner took her
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5,
2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of
Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn
issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen. The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union
in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office
during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-
Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed
as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office. Soon thereafter,
private respondents all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s
eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s
disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is
a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a “personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath” as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since
September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed
that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No.
9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment
of her Australian citizenship.
Trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 5(2)
of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As
admitted by the petitioner herself during trial, the personal declaration
of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath.
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC. The COMELEC en banc
concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the
COMELEC en banc.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen
on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was
only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early
as the 2007 elections. Hence, the “personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship” imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual
citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her. She further argues
that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory
requirement.
ISSUE: For purposes of determining the petitioner’s eligibility to run for
public office, is the “sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” in
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 mere pro-forma requirement?
HELD: No.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. Natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s
Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations
concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in
Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
xxx (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;xxx
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has
validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At
that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
In Jacot v. Dal, the Court held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining
their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce
their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the
Philippines, thus:
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office,
who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired
it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath
simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural- born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but
who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the
oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for
those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections.
[T]he intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or
retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to
take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also
to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for
elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine
elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine
citizenship.
The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit
duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to
complement Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution on public officers’
primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which provides:
Sec. 18. – Public officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by
law.
The solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath
ensures truthfulness to the prospective public officer’s abandonment of
his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma
requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would
also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from
government officers when the Constitution and the legislature clearly
demand otherwise.
The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve
as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this
Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual
citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a
renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged
superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003
which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who
re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections. The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their
Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they
are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise
of the right to run for public office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office
specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right
to run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in
accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on
September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to
seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her
Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective
office in the Philippines.
Petition was DISMISSED
CORODORA v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner alleges that private respondent Tambunting is not
eligible to run for public office because he lacked citizenship
requirements and residency requirements necessary for said office.
Petitioner claims that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen but a
naturalized American citizen. Tambunting on the other hand says that
he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father therefore making
him a dual citizen and not a naturalized American citizen. Private
respondent also stated that he took an oath of allegiance by virtue of
R.A. 9225 (Citizen Retention and Reacquisition act of 2003) and he
resided in the Philippines since birth.
The COMELEC dismissed the complaint because petitioner failed to
substantiate his claim but commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that
Tambunting can be considered a person with dual citizenship but he
effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed the
certificate of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Tambunting is eligible for
public office?
DESICION: Yes he is eligible for public office.
HELD: The fact that he had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office. In a previous case decided by the Supreme
Court it was held that dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification
from running for any elective local position. In cases of dual citizenship,
where it is most of the time involuntary to be one, when they run for
public office they just have to elect their Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The problem
posits when it is an issue of dual allegiance, which may be a ground for
disqualification, because it is a result of one’s volition. One simply
cannot govern a place where their allegiance is not fully dedicated to
the place where they ought to serve.