BARREDO V GARCIA

FACTS:

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon
and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the
Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro
Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy
Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal
action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to
two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition
that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and
Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in
the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor
of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court
of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000
plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the
Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the
time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the
cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high
speed.

Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death of Faustino Garcia caused by negligence
of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo. On May 3, 1936 in
road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision between taxi of Malate
Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing overturning of the
carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers.
Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is reserved.

Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicab
as employer of Fontanilla CFI and CA awarded damages because Fontanilla’s
negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at a high
speed and there is no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as
Barredo is careless in employing in selection and supervision on Fontanilla who had
been caught several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding.

ISSUE:

Whether parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo making
him primarily liable and directly responsible under A1903CC as employer of
Fontanilla.

RULING:

Yes. There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under the
A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages arising
from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other action
is under A1903CC it may be quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana wherein as the negligent
employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that he
exercising diligence of a good father of the family. Therefore the plaintiffs were
free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy which is
the civil code. Hence the parents were acting within their rights in doing so.
 ELCANO V HILL

77 SCRA 98

FACTS:

Defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his
father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of
which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake.”Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was
criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito Elcano who is the son of Pedro
Elcano, and was acquitted for lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.Pedro
Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father Atty
Marvin.

ISSUE:

Whether the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed

RULING:

No.The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against
him.Article 2176, where it refers to ‘fault or negligence,’ covers not only acts ‘not
punishable by law’ but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary.
 CINCO V CANONOY

90 SCRA 369

May 31, 1979

FACTS:

Cinco filed on Feb 25, 1970 a complaint for recovery of damages on account
of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo
Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal
case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident.

At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to
suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit. The City
Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner’s MFR having
been denied, he elevated the matter on Certiorari to the CFI Cebu., which in turn
dismissed the petition.

Plaintiff claims it was the fault or negligence of the driver in the operation of
the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision. Therefore damages
were sustained by petitioner because of the collision and there was a direct causal
connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private
respondents. Respondent claim they observed due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees, particularly of Romeo Hilot.

ISSUE:

Whether there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action.

RULING:
 Yes.Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as
a separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Art 2177 of
the Civil Code. The separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also
clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:

Sec 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32,
33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasi-

delict, as enunciated in Art 2176 of the Civil Code, is so broad that in includes not
only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between
damage to persons on the one hand and damage to property on the other. The word
damage is used in two concepts: the harm done and reparation for the harm done.
And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and
property since harm is not limited to personal but also to property injuries.
 BAKSH V CA

219 SCRA 115

Feb.19, 1993

FACTS:

Private respondent Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against

petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married.

Marilou Gonzles alleged that she is a 22 yr. old Filipina, single, of good moral
character and respected reputation in her community. That Baksh is an Iranian
citizen, residing in Dagupan, and is an exchange student taking up medicine at the
Lyceum in Dagupan. That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry her. Marilou
Gonzales accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. They later
agreed to get married at the end of the school semester. Petitioner had visited Marilou
Gonzales parents to secure their approval of the marriage. Baksh later forced
Marilou Gonzales to live with him. A week before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner started maltreating her even threatening to kill her and as a result of such
maltreatment, she sustained injuries. A day before the filing of the complaint, Baksh
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and
that he is already married to someone in Bacolod.

ISSUE:

Whether damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the

basis of Art.21 of the Civil Code.

RULING:
 Yes.In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction, Art. 21 may be applied. Where a man promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfillfulfil that promise becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act. The award of damages
pursuant to Art.21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willfulwilful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Therefore, it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of

love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he
would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with
him preparatory to their supposed marriage. In short, the private respondent
surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction. The petitioner could not be held
liable for criminal seduction punished under either Art.337 or Art.338 of the RPC
because the private respondent was above 18 years of age at the time of the
seduction.
 DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD, SUPERGUARD)

243 SCRA 220

April 3, 1995

FACTS:

Benigno Torzuela, , a security guard on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang,"

and Atty. Napoleon Dulay had an altercation. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. Dulay.
Maria Benita Dulay, widow of Dulay, filed an action for damages against Torzuela
and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (SAFEGUARD) and/or
Superguard Security Corp. (SUPERGUARD), alleged employers of defendant
Torzuela. That Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties,
and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with w/ deliberate intent
(dolo), the civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC and that a complaint for
damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one filed by petitioners) cannot
lie, since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Art
365 of the RPC. And that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering
that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability. That Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only
to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v CA). according to Petitioner the
incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to the concurring negligence of the
defendants. Torzuela's wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him
by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD
and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the
injury. That their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their
liability under Article 2180.That quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence
but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC. Thus,
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Art
2176.That Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Art 33 and
Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:

Whether civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action?

RULING:

Yes. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

"Sec 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is

instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused."It is well-settled
that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement
of an express reservation. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this
case.The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include
bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co; Carandang v.
Santiago). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code.
It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro). Although in the Marcia case, it was heldruled
that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused
in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas
the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this
case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
 GARCIA V FLORIDO

52 SCRA 420

FACTS:

On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis

Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester
Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a Public Utility car with
plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin,
and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to
Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government
hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health
Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City.At about 9:30 a.m., while the Public Utility car was
negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio
Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming
passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the
aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated
their medical treatment and hospitalization.Alleging that both drivers of the Public
Utility car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their
respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent
manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the
passengers aboard. the PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia,
and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against
the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the
passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.

The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et. al to in a motion to

dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20
days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala
was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that, with the
filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto
unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature,
because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until
after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of
negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art 33
applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act
or imprudence of the driver.

The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and dismissed the complaint

ISSUES:

1. Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on
the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants, the civil
aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination
of the criminal case

2. Whether the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasi-
delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted
by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the
prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and
severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages Whether or
not the dismissal of the case was proper.

RULING:

1. No.Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently

from a criminal action. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict, a
complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages
in the criminal case.

In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the
criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala,
much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or
acquittal of said accused.
 It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for
damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for
damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present
civil case. As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private
respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action.
Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a
criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his
right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by
either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.

2. Yes, Bbecause the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict. An

action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments
under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely:a) act or
omission of the private respondents;b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of
due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala
resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car;c) physical injuries and
other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision;d) existence of
direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence
of private respondents; ande) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties.
 ANDAMO V IAC (MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE,
INC)

191 SCRA 195;

NOVEMBER 6, 1990

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a

parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of
private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation.Within the land of respondent corporation, water paths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and
plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi,

Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of respondent
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised
Penal Code.On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent
corporation. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land.On
April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil
case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case. And later on dismissed the
Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead
of the civil case was still unresolved.The decision was based on Section 3 (a), Rule
III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from
the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action." Petitioners appealed from that order to the
Intermediate Appellate Court.
 On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the
trial court. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the
Appellate Court .

ISSUE:

Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage
to an adjacent land, can be heldheld civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal case

RULING:

YES.As heldheld in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, in quasi-delicts, "t(t)he civil

action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177
of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate
the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal
prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless
the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31,
that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter."

A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of
a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
 TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC

16 PHIL 8

MARCH 22, 1910

FACTS:

The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street

railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. The plaintiff, David Taylor,
was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son
of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having
considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.On the 30th of September, 1905,
plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an
employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a
miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the
boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest
which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about
the company's premises.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the
defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place
where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they
found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. They
are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
themselves a considerable explosive power. Tthey opened one of the caps with a
knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and
David heldheld the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An
explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who
when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his
hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of
the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the
necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
 No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to
prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended,
when they felt disposed so to do.

ISSUE:

Whether the defendants negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's

injuries

RULING:

No.Under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury
received by the plaintiff.

It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating
caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had
exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear
that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon
without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and
carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had
he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its
contents.Satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting
match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant
injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred. Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of
the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of
his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on
its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have
contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not agree with this
proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases
 TAYAG V ALCANTARA

98 SCRA 723

July 23, 1980

FACTS:

Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was bumped by a Philippine

Rabbit Bus, driven by Romeo Villa, which caused his instantaneous death. Pending
the criminal case against the driver, the heirs of Tayag instituted a civil action to
recover damages from the company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc.,c) and the driver. In turn,
the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial of the civil case on the ground
that the criminal case was still pending. Judge Alcantara granted this motion.In the
criminal case, the driver was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. The company and
driver then filed for dismissal of the civil case on the ground that the heirs do not
have a cause of action because of the acquittal. Judge Alcantara granted this and
dismissed the civil case.

ISSUE

Whether Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case on the ground of
no cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver

RULING:

No.The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict, the acquittal

of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for damages based
on quasi-delict.That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lineo, Inc., has failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its employees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan. Otherwise, the
accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to
his property would not have occurred.
All the essential elements for a quasi-delict action are present:(1) act or omission
constituting fault /negligence on the part of respondent (2) damage caused by the
said act or omission(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or
omission and (4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.
 PADILLA V CA

129 SCRA 558

FACTS

That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in

the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy
Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo,
Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo
Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does,
by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority
of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats,
force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located
at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other
massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further
the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public
positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the
accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident
premeditation.

On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the
appellants based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them to pay P9,600.00
as actual damages. The decision of the CA was based on the fact that the petitioners
were charged with coercion when they should have been more appropriately charged
with crime against person. Hence, the crime of grave coercion was not proved in
accordance with the law.
ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to

pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal
charge

RULING:

NO.The Supreme Court, quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court and various jurisprudence including PNB vs Catipon, De Guzman vs Alvia,
held that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the
facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist. In the case at bar, the
judgment of not guilty was based on reasonable doubt. Since the standard of proof
to be used in civil cases is preponderance of evidence, the court express a finding
that the defendants’ offenses are civil in nature.

The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to clarify
whether a separate civil action is required when the accused in a criminal prosecution
is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. The SC took the position that the said provision merely emphasizes that a
civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act.
The acquittal extinguishes the criminal liability but not the civil liability particularly
if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable ground.
 CRUZ V CA

282 SCRA 188

1997

FACTS:

Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help

Clinic and General Hospital. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the
petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy
operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the
evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy
and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for
a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. Because of the untidy state of the clinic,
Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. The
following day, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The
petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then
informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as
scheduled. Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while
Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the
operating room and instructed them to buy Tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister
immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again
this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood and the
same was brought by the attendant into the operating room.

After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation
was finished. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their
snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a
stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional
blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order
as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a
person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then
noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath.
Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the
driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen.
Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived.

At around 10pm, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50.
Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital
so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. The transfer to the
San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the
other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an
ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her
other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance. Upon Lydia's
arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room
and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing
from the abdominal incision. The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome
Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo
District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock
and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. While petitioner was
closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Her death certificate states "shock" as
the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)"
as the antecedent cause.

ISSUE:

Whether he circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction

against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

RULING:

No.The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails
to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be
without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
 For a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care
in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion.
The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its
realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most
instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Physicians are not warrantors of
cures or insurers against personal injuries or death of the patient.

Even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the
exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these
circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of
reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of
the reckless imprudence.

Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of
Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.
 PHIL. RABBIT V PEOPLE

GR. NO. 147703

April 14, 2004

FACTS:

Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of

reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and
damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years, 9 months and
11 days to 6 years, and to pay damages. But in the event the the accused becomes
insolvent, Phil. Rabbit will be held liable for the civil liabilities. But admittedly, the
accused jumped bail and remained at large.

ISSUE:

Whether an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-

employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused

RULING:

No.The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from
notice of the judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek relief from the
court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. In the case before us, the
accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities;
thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment
against him has become final and executory.

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning
party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution
of the case. In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it
participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the
employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it
was not denied its day in court. In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the
accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.On
Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment, Under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of
their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. Since the civil liability has
become final and executory by reason of Napoleon Macadangdang flight, then
Philippine Rabbit subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable.

Therefore, the decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding

and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability,
but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated
from that of the employee.
 PEOPLE V LIGON

152 SCRA 419

July 29, 1987

FACTS:

October 23, 1983 at about 6:10 p.m. Gabat, was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen
Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused, Ligon which was
coming from España Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. At the
intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the
underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, they stopped. While waiting, Gabat beckoned a
cigarette vendor, Rosales to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales approached the
Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was
occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon
suddenly moved forward. As the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales
clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the
pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General
Hospital, where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined
thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.

Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the incident
was a taxicab driven by Castillo. He was traveling on the same lane in a slightly
oblique position. The Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement
near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas
Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta
near the Rizal monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it.
He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng
tao." The two men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz
and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light
turned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind
it. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen
Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio
Ligon, and his companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was found
out that there was a third person inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who
was sleeping at the rear seat.The three were all brought by the police officers to the
Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fermin Payuan. The taxicab driver,
Prudencio Castillo, also went along with them. Payuan also prepared a Traffic
Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias
were released early morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and
turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation.

ISSUE:

Whether Gabat is civilly liable.

RULING:

Yes.In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists

sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability of Gabat arises. On the
basis of the trial court's evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense
witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we
find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission
with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for
the damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the
middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which
led to the death of Rosales. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent
the driver from moving forward while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help
Rosales while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not
enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the driver's act
of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim. These
proven facts taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the
Civil Code for the damage done to Rosales.

Therefore, he is hereby held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there
being fault or negligence, and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y
Ortiz in the amount of P15.000.00 for the latter's death, P1,733.35 for hospital and
medical expenses, and P4,100.00 for funeral expenses.
 CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO

38 Phil 768

October 14, 1918

FACTS:

Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived

in San Mateo, Rizal, located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and
in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he
worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon
the company's trains free of charge. January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning
home by rail from his work and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the
plaintiff while making his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of
the coach.

On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there
is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance
away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a
distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down
another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of the railroad company, got
off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from
the level of the ground. When Jose Cangco stepped off, one or both of his feet came
in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under
him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform
and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly
six meters before it came to a full stop.

The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and
with serious injuries. He was immediately brought to a hospital where an
examination was made and his arm was amputated. The plaintiff was then carried to
another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again
amputated higher up near the shoulder. Expenses reached the sum of P790.25 in the
form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the
process of his curation.

ISSUE:

Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

RULING:

No.The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling

these sacks on the platform. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted
from the train; and that they constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff. It follows that the defendant company is liable for the
damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.

The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage,
and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises
from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due
care in its performance.

"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of
negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or
reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the
age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted
under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be,
not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care
which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid
injury.”

The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the
spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus
reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The cement platform
also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. The
plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act
would have been in an aged or feeble person. The place was perfectly familiar to the
plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. There
could be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which
he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. It is
the Court’s conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while
the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that
therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

Therefore, Manila Railroad is liable. The contract to transport carries with it

the duty to provide safe means of entering and leaving the train. It is unnecessary for
plaintiff for breach of contract to prove the breach was due to negligence. When a
contractual relation exists, the obligor may break the contract by means of an act
which would have constituted a violation of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract exist. Even if there was no ticket there was a contract of carriage.
 PAZ FORES v. IRENEO MIRANDA

NO. L-12163

March 4, 1959

FACTS:

Respondent was one of the passengers of a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga.

While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive speed, the
driver lost control, and the jeepney swerved to the bridge wall. Serious injuries were
suffered by the defendant. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced
accordingly. Petitioner denies liability for breach of contract of carriage, contending
that a day before the accident, the jeepney was sold to a certain Carmen Sackerman.

ISSUE:

Is he entitled to damages?

RULING:

Moral damages are generally not recoverable in damage actions predicated on

a breach of contract of transportation in view of the provisions of Articles 2218 and
2220 of the new Civil Code. The exception to the basic rule of damages is a mishap
resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the common
carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, of the Civil Code that entitles the
spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."

Where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable
unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. The mere
carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference
of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier.
 FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. CA

G.R. No. 108164.

February 23, 1995

FACTS:

Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a Fareast card
issued by petitioner FEBTC. Clarita informed FEBTC that she lost her credit card.
In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of
this nature, the bank’s internal security procedures and policy would be to record the
lost card, along with the principal card, as a Hot Cars or Cancelled Card in its master
file. Luis then tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend.

Then he presented his Far East card to pay for the lunch, the card was not
honored, forcing him to pay in cash the bill. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this
incident. Private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC
the payment of damages. Adrian Fastejo, vice president of the bank, expressed the
bank’s apologies, admitting that they have failed to inform Luis about its security
policy. Private respondents then filed a complaint for damages in the RTC, which
rendered a decision order in FEBTC to pay private respondents moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Is he entitled to damages?

RULING:

In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is

shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. Bad
faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a
contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger
attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier. Article 21 of the
Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to cause harm.

Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a
breach of contract, its application can be warranted only when the defendant's
disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of
misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article
21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must,
in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code
authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach
is due to fraud or bad faith.
AIR FRANCE v. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS

No. L-21438

September 28, 1966.

FACTS:

Air France, through Philippine Airlines (PAL), issued Carrascoso a first-class

round trip ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in
first class but in Bangkok, PAL manager forced him to vacate his seat because there
was a white man who the manager alleged had a “better right” to the seat. Carrascoso
refused to vacate his seat, but was later convinced by some Filipino passengers to
give up his seat.

Carrascoso filed a case for damages against Air France. The Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila ordered Air France to pay Carrascoso moral and exemplary
damages as well as the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the
portion of the trip.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the refund of the ticket, but
otherwise affirmed the CFI decision.

Petitioner Air France now claims that the first class ticket did not represent
the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties. It asserts that Carrascoso
knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class though he had tourist
class protection. Thus, the ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class
seat since such would depend on the availability of first class seats.

ISSUE:

Is he entitled to damages?

RULING:
 Though there was no specific claim of bad faith in the complaint, inference of
bad faith may be drawn from the facts of the case. Also, during the trial, evidence of
bad faith was presented without objection from the petitioner. Thus, the deficiency
in the complaint was cured by evidence.

Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso is attended with public duty. Though

based on breach of contract, the stress of Carrascoso’s action is put on wrongful
expulsion. Moreover, an act that breaks a contract is a tort. Thus, being a violation
of public duty, it is a quasi-delict.

The wrongful expulsion is independent of the breach. Two sources of

obligations are implicated in this case— contract and quasi-delict. Petitioner is still
be liable for moral damages.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION v. COURT OF
APPEALS

G.R. NO. 84698

FEBRUARY 4,1992

FACTS:

Private respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA and its officers liable
for the death of Carlitos Bautista, a third year commerce student who was stabbed
while on the premises of PSBA by elements from outside the school. Private
respondents are suing under the law on quasi-delicts alleging the school and its
officers’ negligence, recklessness and lack of safety precautions before, during, and
after the attack on the victim. Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit but were denied
by the trial court. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Are they liable for damages?

RULING:

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes
the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited
cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of
Appeals. In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly
provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students
of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or
students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the
present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of
the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
 JUAN J. SYQUIA et al. v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC.,

FACTS:

Juan Syquia, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, entered in a contract of

Deed of Sale and Interment Order with Manila Memorial Park Cemetery Inc
(MMPCI). In the contract, there contained a provision which stated that the coffin
would be placed in a sealed concrete vault to protect the remains of the deceased
from the elements. During the preparation for the transfer of Vicente’s remains in
the newly bought lot in Manila Memorial, it was discovered that there was a hole in
the concrete vault which caused total flooding inside, damaged the coffin as well as
the body of the deceased and covered the same with filth.

Syquia filed a complaint for recovery of damages arising from breach of

contract and/or quasi-delict against the MMPCI for failure to deliver a defect-free
concrete vault to protect the remains of the deceased. In its defense, MMPCI claimed
that the boring of the hole was necessary in order to prevent the vault from floating
when water fills the grave. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that there
was no quasi-delict because the defendant is not guilty of any fault or negligence
and because there was a pre-existing contract between the parties. The CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondent is guilty of tort

RULING:

Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not

preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana: “Article 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.

In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled “Deed of Sale and Certificate of
Perpetual Care” on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the
parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been
actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would
be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual.
 VICENTE CALALAS V. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE
SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA

FACTS:

Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger jeepney owned and

operated by Petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, she was just
given an “extension seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear end of the vehicle.On the way,
the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the rear end,
she gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu Elf Truck
driven by Igclerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva, bumped to the left rear
end of the jeepney. This incident cause injury to Sunga.She filed a compliant for
damages against Calalas on the ground of breach of contract of carriage. On the other
hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Salva, the owner of the truck.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and absolved Calalas from
liability holding that it was the truck owner who is responsible for the accident based
on quasi-delict.

However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court reversed
the RTC’s decision, on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a
breach of contract of carriage and not on quasi-delict.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause of
the accident which negates petitioner’s liability?

RULING:

No. First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of carriage. In
this case, the petitioner failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination as
a common carrier in violation of Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.
Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision was the truck driver, because the doctrine
of proximate cause applies only to cases of quasi-delict.
 The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability to a person
where there is no relation between him and another party. But in the case at bar, there
is a pre-existing relation between petitioner and respondent in their contract of
carriage. Hence, upon happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose on Calalas’ part, which makes him liable.
 AMADO PICART V. FRANK SMITH, jr.,

FACTS:

On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite
direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman
on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and
after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to
him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However,
being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he
pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead
of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not
have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached,
Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine.
In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the
right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly
toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there
being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so
doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was
broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of
its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.From a judgment
of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation
to repair the damage done.

RULING:
 Yes. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved
in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result
of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions
to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of
the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence
of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent
man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding
against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think
that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse
and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances
the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
 TAYLOR VS. MANILA RAILROAD

16 PHIL 8

FACTS:

September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son
of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having
considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for
the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to
make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. After crossing the footbridge, they met
Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's home. The boys then
made a series of experiments with the caps. An explosion followed, causing more or
less serious injuries to all three

Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel
had his hand burned and wounded. David was struck in the face by several particles
of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the
necessitate its removal by the surgeons.

ISSUE:

Are they liable?

RULING:

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts,

and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence
occurs. ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. ART.
1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should
be responsible.

True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature
of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the
cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but
he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his
act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would
be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such
and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or
anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under
such circumstances.
 JARCO MARKETING VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 129792

FACTS:

While Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the counter, she felt a sudden
gust of wind and heard a loud thud. As she looked behind her, she saw Zhieneth's
body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure. Zhieneth was
crying and screaming for help. Although shocked, Criselda was quick to ask the
assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and retrieving Zhieneth from
the floor. Zhieneth was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was
operated on. Criselda filed a complaint for damages

ISSUE:

Is Jarco marketing was negligent or it was an accident?

RULING:

Accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence

attaches to the defendant a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening an event
happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by
the person to whom it happens occurs when the person concerned is exercising
ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have
been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence negligence omission
to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do the failure to observe,
for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot
exist with the other.
 JULIAN DEL ROSARIO V. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

FACTS:

August 4, 1930 2 pm: trouble developed in a wire used by Manila Electric

Company on Dimas-Alang Street for the purpose of conducting electricity used in
lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs. Jose Noguera, who had charge of a tienda
nearby, first noticed that the wire was burning and its connections smoking the wire
parted and one of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close
to the way. Noguera went to the nearby garage and asked Jose Soco, the timekeeper,
to telephone the Malabon station of the Manila Electric Company.

Soco transmitted the message and the station told him that they would send
an inspector. Neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home.
Saturnino Endrina made a motion as if it touched the wire. Jose Salvador, happened
to be the son of an electrician and his father had cautioned him never to touch a
broken electrical wire, as it might have a current. Alberto del Rosario said that "I
have for some time been in the habit of touching wires" and so feeling challenged put
out his index finger and touch the wire. He immediately fell face downwards. The
end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post. A crowd
soon collected, and someone cut the wire and disengaged the body. Upon arrival at
St. Luke's Hospital he was pronounced dead.

ISSUE:

Is the company liable?

RULING:

The lighting company was responsible for the death. The delay in leaving this
danger unguarded so long after information of the trouble was received constituted
negligence on its part. The circumstance that the boy who was killed touched the
wire after one of his companions had warned him not to do so, did not relieve the
company of responsibility, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity of
a child to do something out of the ordinary.
 YLARDE V. AQUINO

163 SCRA 697

FACTS:

Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon

Primary School in Pangasinan. Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher
therein. During that time, the school had several concrete blocks which were
remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World War II. Defendant decided to
help clear the area so he gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them to dig
beside a one ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone can be buried. It
was left unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18 students including the
Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation. Defendant left the children to level the
loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key to the school workroom where he
can get some rope. It was alleged that before leaving, he told the children “not to
touch the stone”. After he left, the children playfully jumped into the pit when
suddenly the concrete block slide down. Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned
to the wall causing serious physical injuries which as a consequence led to his death,
3 days thereafter. The parents of the victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for
damages against both Aquino and Soriano.

ISSUE:

Are Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages?

RULING:

“It is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students”. Where the school is academic
rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by
the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, this is the general
rule. However, in casea of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof,
and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where
the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable. Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held liable for the reason that the
school he heads is an academic school and he did not give any instruction regarding
the digging.

A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his tudents should make sure that the
children are protected from all harm. The excavation instructed clearly exposed the
students to risk and should not be placed under the category of Work Education such
as school gardening, planting trees etc. Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence
where instead of availing himself of adult manual laborers he instead utilized his
students. Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient to cast away all serious
danger that the concrete block adjacent to the excavation would present to the
children. He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the petitioners.
 CULION ICE V. PHILIPPINE MOTORS

G.R. NO. 32611

FACTS:

Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of the motor schooner,
Gwendoline, which it uses for its fishing trade. In order to save costs in running the
boat, Culion Ice decided to have the engine changed from gasoline consumer to a
crude oil burner. Quest, general manager of Philippine Motors, a domestic
corporation engaged in machinery engines and motors, agreed to do the job. Upon
inspection, Quest came to conclusion that a carburetor needed to be installed. In the
course of the work, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding and that the
gasoline and other fuel was trickling freely to the floor but this concern was
dismissed by Quest. During the boat’s trial run, the engine stopped and upon being
started, a back fire occurred which then instantly spread and finally engulfed
Gwendoline. The crew members safely escaped but Gwendoline was destroyed.
Culion Ice moved for the recovery of the damages against Philippine Motors. The
trial court ruled for Culion Ice. Philippine Motor asserts that the accident was not
due to the fault of Quest.

ISSUE:

Is Quest negligent?

RULING:

When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring

professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care
and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The
proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of
automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing
of similar work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form
the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an
adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort
of work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances
(risks) to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against the danger. In
other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one
ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our
opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible
harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said
to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable
accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest’s carelessness or lack of skill.
The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether
Quest was free from blame.
 US V. PINEDA

37 PHIL 456

FACTS:

Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist and the owner of a drug store.

Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription to
Pineda. On otheroccasions, Santos had given the medicine prescribed to his horses
with good results. Under the supervision of Pineda, the drugs were prepared and
given Santos.Santos, under the belief that he had purchased potassium chlorate,
placed two of the packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses.
Another package was mixedwith water for another horse, but was not used. The two
horses, who took the drugs, died afterwards. Santos took the drug packages to the
Bureau of Science for examination. It wasfound that the packages contained not
potassium chlorate but barium chlorate (a poison). When sued Pineda alleges that he
did not intentionally sold the poison and that what the law (to which he is indicted)
forbids is the sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Pineda can be held liable for the death of the horses, assuming
he did not deliberately sold poison

RULING:

Yes. In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the
careless sale of poison and medicine, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that
the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be
through negligence or mistake. The care required must be commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior
knowledge of the business which the law demands. As a pharmacist, he is made
responsible for the quality of all drugs and poison he sells. If were we to adhere to
the technical definition of fraud it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict
any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a
reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that
it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly
without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; that he made it with
the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted
in reliance upon it, and that the purchaser suffered injury. Such a construction with
a literal following of well-known principles on the subject of fraud would strip the
law of at least much of its force. It would leave the innocent purchaser of drugs, who
must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of
any unscrupulous vendor. We should not, therefore, without good reason so
devitalize the law.
 BPI v. COURT OF APPEALS

216 SCRA 51

FACTS:

Someone who identified herself to be Fernando called up

BPI, requesting for the pre-
termination of her money market placement with the bank. The person who
took the call didn't bother to verify with Fernando’s office if
whether or not she really intended to preterminate her money market
placement. Instead, he relied on the verification stated by the caller. He
proceeded with the processing of the termination. Thereafter, the caller
gave delivery instructions that instead of delivering the checks to her office, it
would be picked up by her niece and it indeed happen as such. It
was found out later on that the person impersonated Fernando and her
alleged niece in getting the checks. The dispatcher also didn't bother to get
the promissory note evincing the placement when he gave the checks
to the impersonated niece. This was aggravated by the fact that this
impersonator opened an account with the bank and deposited the subject checks. It
then withdrew the amounts.

The day of the maturity of the money market placement happened and the
real Fernando surfaced herself. She denied preterminating the money market
placements and though she was the payee of the checks in issue,
she didn't receive any of its proceeds. This prompted the bank to
surrender to CBC the checks and asking for reimbursement on alleged forgery
of payee’s endorsements.

ISSUE:

Is he liable?

RULING:
 The general rule shall apply in this case. Since the
payee’s indorsement
has been forged, the instrument is wholly inoperative. However,
underlying circumstances of the case show that the general rule on forgery isn’t
applicable. The issue as to who between the parties should bear the
loss in the payment of the forged checks necessitates the determination of
the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the controversy in relation
to the forged checks. The acts of the employees of BPI were tainted with more
negligence if not criminal than the acts of CBC. First, the act of disclosing
information about the money market placement over the phone is a violation of the
General Banking Law. Second, there was failure on the bank’s part to even
compare the signatures during the termination of the placement, opening
of a new account with the specimen signature in file of Fernando. And
third, there was failure to ask the surrender of the promissory note evidencing
the placement.

The acts of BPI employees was the proximate cause to the loss. Nevertheless,
the negligence of the employees of CBC should be taken also into
consideration. They closed their eyes to the suspicious large amount withdrawals
made over the counter as well as the opening of the account.
 WRIGHT V. MANILA ELECTRIC

28 PHIL 122

FACTS:

In August 1909, E.M. Wright was driving his calesa going home. He had
drunk more wine than he customarily does. Before he could be home, he would have
to cross the railroad tracks by Manila Electric. The tracks were left unmaintained
byManila Electric so much so that their elevation above the ground is quite high.
And while the calesa was crossing the tracks, the horse tripped and the whole calesa
fell down and Wright was thrown off it. The lower court found that Wright and
Manila Electric were both negligent and as per the ruling in Rakes vs Atlantic
Gulf the lower court apportioned the damage awarded to Wright.

ISSUE:

Is Wright’s intoxication the primary cause of his injuries?

RULING:

No. Manila Electric, and as even ruled by the lower court, argued that had
Wright been sober, he would have notbeen thrown off the calesa. This is mere
guesswork and is not given credence by the SC because it’s just a presumption thata
sober man could have avoided such accident. Intoxication is not negligence per se.
It is the general rule that it isimmaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want
of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greaterdegree of care is
required than by a sober one. If one’s conduct is characterized by a proper degree of
care and prudence, it isimmaterial whether he is drunk or sober
 US V. BAGGAY

G.R. NO. 6659

SEPTEMBER 1, 1911

FACTS:

October 14, 1909, during the holding a song service called "buni", the non-
Christian Baggay Jr. attacked a woman Bil-liingan with a bolo inflicting a serious
wound on her head causing her to die immediately. He inflicted the same to the
women named Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother,
named Dioalan.On February 15, provincial fiscal filed a complaint for murder. This
cause was instituted separately from the other for lesiones.

RTC: Baggay was suffering from mental aberration and was exempt from
criminal liability but obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman, Bil-
liingan, in the sum of P1,000, to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an
institution for the insane until further order of the court. The court declared said
appeal out of order and dismissed it.

The counsel for Baggay resorted to this court with a petition praying that a
writ be issued directing judge Chanco, to admit the appeal and forward it, at the same
time annulling all action taken for execution of the judgments rendered in the causes
for murder and for lesiones. Attorney-General: Writ inappropriate and that it should
be remedy of mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether Baggay was exempt from criminal liability making him exempt from
civil liability as well.

RULING:

No. Principles: Article 17 of the Penal Code states: ”Every person criminally liable
for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable”. Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article 8
does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced, subject to
the following: ” (1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts
committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over this age
and under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have
them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that there
was no blame or negligence on their part.”

Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or
power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall
answer with their own property, excepting that part which is exempted for their
support in accordance with the civil law. Even when they hold the accused exempt
from criminal liability, must fix the civil liability of the persons charged with
watching over and caring for him or the liability of the demented person himself
with his property for reparation of the damage and indemnification for the harm
done. Unless, he offended party or the heirs of the person murdered expressly
renounce such reparation or indemnification
 MARINDUQUE V. WORKMEN’S

G.R. NO. L-8110

JUNE 30, 1956.

FACTS:

August 23, 1951 6:00 am: In Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together
with other laborers of the Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. rode a truck driven by
its employee Procopio Macunat and on its way to the mine camp at Talantunan,
while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a
coconut tree, resulting in the death of Mamador and injury to the others.

In a criminal case, Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and

sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased but has paid nothing.

Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the order of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner confirming the referee’s award of
compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death.Marinduque
Iron Mines Agents Inc. maintains that this claim is barred by section 6 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Law because: (a) Macunat was prosecuted and required
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamador’s widow
promised “to forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and not to bring him before
the authorities for prosecution and (b) an amicable settlement was concluded
between said heirs and Macunat.

ISSUE:

Whether Mamador having violated the employer’s prohibition against

laborers riding the haulage trucks was notorious negligence thereby precluding
recovery.

RULING:
 No. Award of compensation is hereby affirmed. Under the circumstance, the
laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence since the prohibition had
nothing to do with personal safety of the riders. Getting or accepting a free ride on
the company’s haulage truck couldn’t be gross negligence - no danger or risk was
apparent “notorious” negligence = “gross” negligence; conscious indifference to
consequences pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably
result in injury utter disregard of consequences.
 RAMOS V. CA

G.R. NO. 124354

DECEMBER 29, 1999

FACTS:

June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman
underwent on an operation to the stone at her gall bladder removed after being tested
that she was fit for "cholecystectomy" operation performed by Dr. Orlino Hozaka.
Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00, which was to include the anesthesiologist's
fee and which was to be paid after the operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos,
husband that he will get a good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez.
Erlinda's hand was held by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the Dean of
the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center together with her husband went
down with her to the operating room.

Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M. Herminda noticing
what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw the nailbed of Erlinda becoming bluish
and Dr. Hosaka called for another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon. She went out of the
operating room to tell Rogelio that something is wrong.

When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m.
she was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she stayed for a month due to
bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25 and she was since then comatosed. She suffered
brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five
minutes. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal
damage".Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000. Spouses Ramos and
their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez

RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses

totalling to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000 moral
damages, P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit.CA: reversed ordering the
Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus interest
ISSUE:

Whether the Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case.

RULING:

Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence - applicable in this case. However, it can have no application in a suit
against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment.As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to
properly intubate the patient according to witness Herminda. With her clinical
background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with her testimony. Dra. Gutierrez' act
of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative
procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility. Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired
special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by
the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience.Dr.
Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated that oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic
encephalopathy was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting
barbiturate was not accepted as expert opinion.Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found
in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his
anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols.Dr. Hosaka had scheduled
another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation.
Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding
the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties
towards his patient

Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a
point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's
condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all
fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the
exception of the payment of wages.
 BATIQUIN V CA

258 SCRA 334

JULY 5, 1996

FACTS:

Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private
patient sometime before September 21,1988. In the morning of September 21, 1988
Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and nurses, performed a caesarean
operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered the latters baby. After leaving
the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being
feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the
latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines. However, the pains still
kept recurring.

She then consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho
suggested that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery.- When Dr. Kho opened the
abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian
cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the
uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus, embedded on
the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This
was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the
discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas. The piece of rubber allegedly found was not
presented in court, and Dr. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City
for examination. Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the
piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anaesthesia Record,
a Nurse's Record, and a Physician's Discharge Summary.

The trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence as mere

hearsay, "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared them are
deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated- There was also doubts as to
the whereabouts of the piece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Khos
testimony:1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr.
Kho; and (2) that Dr. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The failure of
the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to weaken their
claim against Defendant Batiquin. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants.
The CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether Dr. Batiquin is liable.

RULING:

Yes. While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari , there are exceptions, among which are when the factual
findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict, when the appealed decision
is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record, or when the appellate court
misapprehended the facts Substantive - The focal point of the appeal is Dr. Khos
testimony. There were inconsistencies within her own testimony, which led to the
different decision of the RTC and CA. The CA was correct in saying that the trial
court erred when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. Khos testimony and did not
consider it with other portions of Dr. Khos testimony. Also, the phrase relied upon
by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas' abdomen, and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu
City for examination by a pathologist. Furthermore, Dr. Kho's knowledge of the
piece of rubber could not be based on other than first-hand knowledge for, as she
asserted before the trial court.
 D.M. CONSUNJI INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA J. JUEGO
GR NO. 137873.
APRIL 20, 2001

FACTS:

Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of

D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was
immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician,
Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.Jose
Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as
carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower
Building were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform
fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the
connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Luckily,
Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy
and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint
on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to
receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000.DM Consunji seeks
reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.

RULING:

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may
be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.
It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency
which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present
in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s
negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference
or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to
establish any defense relating to the incident.
 MARCELO MACALINAO, ET AL., V. EDDIE MEDECIELO ONG

G.R. NO. 146635

DECEMBER 14, 2005

FACTS:

April 1992: Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and 2 other truck helpers to
deliver a heavy piece of machinery to Sebastian’s manufacturing plant in Angat,
Bulacan. While delivering, the Genetron’s Isuzu Elf truck driven by Ong bumped
the front portion of a private jeepney. Both vehicles incurred severe damages while
the passengers sustained physical injuries as a consequence of the collision.

Macalinao was brought to Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid treatment
then to Philippine Orthopedic Center then to Capitol Medical Center and lastly, to
Philippine General Hospital due to financial considerations. His body was paralyzed
and immobilized from the neck down. He filed against Ong and Sebastian. A
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries was
instituted but was not ensued. Macalinao died and was substituted by his parents.

RTC: Ong negligent and Sebastian failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Ong thus ordering them jointly
liable to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as civil indemnity for
Macalinao’s death. CA: reversed for lack of evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether Ong may be held liable under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.

RULING:

Yes.Photographs clearly shows that the road where the mishap occurred is
marked by a line at the center separating the right from the left lane. While ending
up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, the
position of the two vehicles gives rise to the conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck
which hit the private jeepney rather than the other way around.Based on the angle at
which it stopped, the private jeepney obviously swerved to the right in an
unsuccessful effort to avoid the Isuzu truck. Since respondents failed to refute the
contents of the police blotter, the statement therein that the Isuzu truck hit the private
jeepney and not the other way around is deemed established. While not constituting
direct proof of Ong’s negligence, the foregoing pieces of evidence justify the
application of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or
the transaction speaks for itself.

Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence
without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of
negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident,
enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or
presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving
that there was no negligence on his part. Macalinao could no longer testify as to the
cause of the accident since he is dead. Petitioners, while substituting their son as
plaintiff, have no actual knowledge about the event since they were not present at
the crucial moment. Evidence as to the true cause of the accident is, for all intents
and purposes, accessible to respondents but not to petitioner. Two truck helpers who
survived, both employees of Sebastian, and Ong, who is not only Sebastian’s
previous employee but his co-respondent in this case as well
 OSCAR DEL CARMEN JR. V GERONIMO BACOY

GR NO. 17738770

APRIL 25, 2012

FACTS:

Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a jeepney
driven by a certain Allan Maglasang. The jeepney was owned by Oscar del Carmen
Jr. Allan was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case while the
father of the late Mrs. Monsalud, Geronimo Bacou filed an independent civil action
againt the former in behalf of the minor children left by the Monsalud spouses. Del
Carmen Jr. claimed he was a victim as well as Allan stole the jeep and was not hired
as a driver by the former; he was a conductor (and had been released from
employment lately) and it was the brother of Allan, Rodrigo who was hired as a
driver. Del Carmen Jr. filed a carnapping case against Allan but was dismissed by
the court for insufficient evidence.

RTC held del Carmen Jr. subsidiary liable and held the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. The CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the
principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible
for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It
disbelieved Oscar Jr.’s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the
carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was dismissed but also
because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the
implied permission to use the subject vehicle because the brothers were assigned to
said jeep. After a day’s work, the jeepney would be parked beside the brothers house
and not returned to del Carmens residence; the jeep could easily be started even
without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was not fenced or secured
to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even without the
ignition key.

ISSUE:
 Whether owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries caused
by the operation of such.

RULING:

Del Carmen Jr. was held to be primarily liable and not merely subsidiary
liable. Del Carmen Jr.s own evidence cast doubt that Allan stole the jeepney. Given
the dismissal of the carnapping case filed by del Carmen Jr. against Allan, the former
also admitted to such dismissal in the SC.

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where the thing that caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants;
and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who
had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the
absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the
accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care. All three are
present in the case at bar.
 MANILA ELECTRIC CO. VS. REMOQUILLO, ET ALS.

GR NO. L-8328.

MAY 18, 1956

FACTS:

Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the house pf his brother-in-law.
While making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into
contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to
the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a
result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against Manila
Electric Co.

CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at fault
and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long
before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due
diligence.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether Manila Electric Co., is guilty of negligence.

RULING:

Decision of the CA reversed. A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion.
 BERNARDO V. LEGASPI

GR NO. 9308

DECEMBER 23, 1914

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila dismissing the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages
for injuries sustained by plaintiff's automobile by reason of defendant's negligence
in causing a collision between his automobile and that of plaintiff. The court in its
judgment also dismissed a cross-complaint filed by the defendant, praying for
damages against the plaintiff on the ground that the injuries sustained by the
defendant's automobile in the collision referred to, as well as those to plaintiff's
machine, were caused by the negligence of the plaintiff in handling his automobile.

ISSUE:

Whether the parties may recover.

RULING:

No.Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions collide on turning a

street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the
drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal
occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for the
damages suffered.
 BERNAL V. HOUSE AND TACLOBAN ELECTRIC

G.R. NO. L-30741

JANUARY 30, 1930

FACTS:

On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession of Holy Friday was held in
Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal came
from another municipality to attend the religious celebration. After the procession
was over, the woman and her daughter, passed along a public street named Gran
Capitan .The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother
and her friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric& Ice Plant,
Ltd., and automobile appeared from the opposite direction which so frightened the
child that she turned to run, with the result that she fell into the street gutter. At that
time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of
J.V. House. When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her
face downward in the hot water. The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. There
she was attended by the resident physician, Dr. Victoriano A. Benitez. Despite his
efforts, the child died that same night at 11:40o'clock. Dr. Benitez certified that the
cause of death was" Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes
were, “Congestion of the Brain and viscera’s of the chest & abdomen".

RESPONDENT’S DEFENSE: That the hot water was permitted to flow down
the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities
and that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the death the
plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence.

The trial judge, however, after examination of the evidence presented by the
defendants failed to sustain their theory of the case, however, he nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs.

ISSUE:
 Whether the respondent is absolved from liability because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs.

RULING:

No, the death of the child Purificacion Bernal was the result of fault and
negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to
endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it. We
are shown no good reason for the departing from the conclusion of the trial judge to
the effect that the sudden death of the child Purification Bernal was due principally
to the nervous shock and organic calefaction produced by the extensive burns from
the hot water.

On the contributory negligence, the mother and her child had a perfect right
to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious
procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along
a few paces in advance of the mother.-No one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled
with hot water. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does
not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction
of the damages.-The death of the child Purificacion Bernal was the result of fault
and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to
endanger the lives of passers- by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it.
 PLDT V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. L-57079

SEPTEMBER 29, 1989

FACTS:

Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street
where they resided [at 25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast;
if the jeep braked at that speed, the spouses would not have been thrown against the
windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from the inside lane, then it ran over a
mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by
PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice
the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of
any warning light or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria
Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent
scar on her cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep’s windshield was also
shattered.

PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses
were due to their own negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor
L.R. Barte and Co. who should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint
against Barte, alleging that under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should not be
answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence of Barte or its
employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified of the accident,
and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and
appropriate signs.

RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the
spouses’ complaint, saying that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its
earlier decision and affirmed in toto RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban.

RULING:

No.The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of
Antonio, and was not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If
the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside
lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to
climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had not exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have
run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have made
him see the accident mound in time. The mound was relatively big and visible, being
2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew of the existence and location of the
mound, having seen it many previous times.The negligence of Antonio was not only
contributory to his and his wife’s injuries but goes to the very cause of the occurrence
of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to
recover damages. The perils of the road were known to the spouses. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged
negligence on the part of PLDT.The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing
of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only
when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. As a resident
of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost every day and had knowledge of
the presence and location of the excavations there; hence, the presence of warning
signs could not have completely prevented the accident. Furthermore, Antonio had
the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he
imputes to PLDT.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of
proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his
action must fail. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent evidence. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to
prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was presented was just the self-
serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a portion of the scene
of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-submission of a medical
report from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have not even been
explained.
 GENOBIAGON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

178 SCRA 422

SEPTEMBER 22, 1957

FACTS:

Genobiagon was driving a rig along T. Padilla St. in Cebu City. The
petitioner's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of
the road, but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him. As an old
woman was crossing the street, Genobiagon’s rig bumped her and caused her to fall
in the middle of the road. Vicente Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at
Genobiagon but the latter refused to stop. Genobiagon reasoned out that he did not
bump the old woman and that it was the old woman who bumped him. The old
woman was brought tothe hospital but she died 3 days after. Petitioner was charged
and convicted with the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence.

CA affirmed the decision but increased the civil liability from 6,000 to 12,000.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the court erred in the affirmation of conviction.

(2) Whether or not the court unjustly increased the civil liability.

RULING:

(1) No. The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not
exonerate the accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in
criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the
negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence.

(2) No. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for death
in homicide or murder is 30,000 (at present 50,000, this case was decided in
1989).RAKES V. ATLANTIC
 G.R. NO. 1719

JANUARY 23, 1907

FACTS:

The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the
defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the
company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car
was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing
560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to
the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car
or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling
by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke,
the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his
leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.

ISSUE:

Whether the company is liable.

RULING:

Yes.The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after
noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute
negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff
and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way,
but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company
and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made
known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears
that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's
contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If
so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some
degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event
itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim
not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced the event
giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the
iron rails.
 PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 97626

MARCH 14, 1997

FACTS:

Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current

accounts with PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. The RMC
General Manager Lipana entrusted to his secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds
amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the same to RMC’s account
with PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts in her husband’s
account instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly statement of accounts
regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabut’s modus operandi went on for the span of
more than one year.

ISSUE:

What is the proximate cause of the loss – Lipana’s negligence in not checking
his monthly statements or the bank’s negligence through its teller in validating the
deposit slips?

RULING:

The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing
all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that
the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed
procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original
or duplicate.

The bank teller’s negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the
selection and supervision of its bank teller, is the proximate cause of the loss suffered
by the private respondent, not the latter’s entrusting cash to a dishonest employee.
Xxx Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate the funds, she
would not have been able to deposit those funds in her husband’s current account,
and then make plaintiff believe that it was in the latter’s accounts wherein she had
deposited them, had it not been for the bank teller’s aforesaid gross and reckless
negligence.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance – where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm
and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. It means that the
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for
the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another,
if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm
by exercise of due diligence. (Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA, supra)
 PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. (CARBONEL) VS. IAC (DIONISIO)

148 SCRA 353

MARCH 10, 1987

FACTS:
About 1:30 am, Leonardo Dionisio (Dionisio) was driving home from
cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had taken a shot or two of liquor.
He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Sts. He
was not far from his home and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street without
headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. (Phoenix),
which was parked on Dionisio’s lane. The dump truck was parked askew in such a
manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic.
There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set
anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening
been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel (Carbonel), its regular driver,
with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried
out early the following morning.

Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid the collision by swerving his car to the
left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the
collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial
scars, a nervous breakdown and loss of two gold bridge dentures.Dionisio argued
that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which
Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. On
the other hand, it was the contention of Phoenix and Carbonel that the proximate
cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of
the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and
without a curfew pass; if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump
truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and
that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient
cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of
Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck
was parked

2. Whether or not the driver’s negligence was merely a passive and static
condition and that Dionisio's negligence was an efficient intervening cause and that
consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate
cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel.

3. Whether or not Phoenix has successfully proven that they exercised due
care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.

RULING:

1. Yes. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump track was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. Private respondent
Dionisio's negligence was only contributory. The immediate and proximate cause of
the injury remained the truck driver's lack of due care and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts.

2. No. Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck
driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause. The petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private
respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very
risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent
and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between
the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris
vinculum of liability.

3. No. Phoenix’s failure to show any effort to supervise the manner in which
the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative
showing of culpa in vigilando on its part.
 PILIPINAS BANK V CA

234 SCRA 435

JULY 25, 1994

FACTS:

Florencio Reyes issued two postdated checks to Winner Industrial

Corporation for Php 20, 927 and Vicente Tui, for P11.419.50, with due dates October
11 and 12, 1979.

To cover the face value of the checks, he requested PCIB Money Shop's
manager to effect the withdrawal of P32, 000 from his savings account and have it
deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Pilipinas Bank’s Current
Account Bookkeeper made an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for
a certain Florencio Amador. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not
noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was Reyes.

On October 11, the October 10 check in favor of Winner Industrial was

presented for payment. Since the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated that his
account had only a balance of Php 4,078.43, it was dishonored and the payee was
advised to try it for next clearing. It was redeposited but was again dishonored. The
same thing happened to the October 12 check. The payee then demanded a cash
payment of the check’s face value which REYES did if only to save his name.
Furious, he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification
of his account. That was only when they noticed the error.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 2179 of NCC is applicable.

RULING:

No. For it to apply, it must be established that private respondent's own

negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.
 Proximate Cause is any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and
without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been
foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury
complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and
probable consequence.

The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee

in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another
depositor who had a similar first name. The bank employee is deemed to have failed
to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties.

Petition denied.
 QUEZON CITY V. DACARA

G.R. NO. 150304

JUNE 15, 2005

FACTS:

On February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., owner of 87
Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan, while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of
earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being
repaired by the Quezon City government.

As a result, Dacara, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle
suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
Indemnification was sought from the city government, which however, yielded
negative results.

Fulgencio P. Dacara, for and in behalf of his minor son, filed a Complaint for
damages against Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon.

Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject
diggings was provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic
paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident.
Defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the
diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident, and that the reason why Fulgencio
Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latter’s negligence and
failure to exercise due care.

RTC ruled in favor of Dacara, ordering the defendants to indemnify the

plaintiff. Upon appeal, CA agreed with the RTC’s finding that petitioner’s
negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent. Hence,
this Petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of the
incident.

RULING:

Yes.Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a

natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is the existence of
a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik
Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which
could have served as an adequate warning to motorists especially during the
thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. Contrary to the testimony of
the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried
so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was
ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary
signs were placed. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be
explained that according to the report even of the policeman, none was found
at the scene of the accident.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with the modification

that the award of moral damages is deleted.
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS V. JUANITA REYES, WILFI EDO REYES,
MICHAEL ROY REYES, SIXTA LAPUZ, AND SAMPAGUITA TRAVEL
CORP.,

G.R. NO. 185891

JUNE 26, 2013

FACTS:

Wilfredo made a travel reservation with Sampaguita Travel for his family’s
trip to Adelaide, Australia. Upon confirmation of their flight schedule, Wilfredo paid
for the airfare and was issued 4 Cathay Pacific roundtrip airplane tickets for Manila-
Hong Kong-Adelaide-Hong Kong-Manila. One week before they were scheduled to
fly back home, Wilfredo re-confirmed his family’s return flight with the Cathay
Pacific office in Adelaide. They were advised that the reservation was still okay as
scheduled. On the day of their scheduled departure from Adelaide, Wilfredo and his
family arrived at the airport on time. When the airport check-in opened, Wilfredo
was informed by a staff from Cathay Pacific that Wilfredo’s family did not have
confirmed reservations, and only Sixta’s flight booking was confirmed.

Although, they were allowed to board the flight to Hong Kong, not all of them
were allowed to board the flight to Manila as it was fully booked. Only Wilfredo’s
mother-in-law, Sixta, was allowed to proceed to Manila from Hong Kong.

On the following day, the Reyeses were finally allowed to board the next
flightbound for Manila. Upon arriving in the Philippines, Wilfredo went Sampaguita
Travel to report theincident. He was informed by Sampaguita Travel that it was
actually Cathay Pacific which cancelled their bookings.

ISSUES:

Whether Sampaguita breached its contract of services with Wilfredo’s

family? Yes
RULING:

Yes.Cathay Pacific breached its contract of carriage with the Reyeses when it
disallowed them to board the plane in Hong Kong going to Manila on the date
reflectedon their tickets. Thus, Cathay Pacific opened itself to claims for
compensatory,actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
suit.In contrast, the contractual relation between Sampaguita Travel and
respondentsis a contract for services. The object of the contract is arranging and
facilitating the latter’s booking and ticketing. It was even Sampaguita Travel which
issued the tickets.Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for
services, the standard of care required of respondent is that of a good father of a
family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. This connotes reasonable care
consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when
confronted with asimilar situation. The test to determine whether negligence
attended the performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

There was indeed failure on the part of Sampaguita Travel to exercise due
diligence in performing its obligations under the contract of services. It was
established by Cathay Pacific, through the generation of the PNRs, that Sampaguita
Travel failed to input the correct ticket number for Wilfredo’s ticket. Cathay
Pacificeven asserted that Sampaguita Travel made two fictitious bookings for
Juanita and Michael.

The negligence of Sampaguita Travel renders it also liable for damages

SPOUSE LATONIO VS. MCGEORGE FOOD INDUSTRIES INC., ET. AL.

G.R. NO. 206184

DECEMBER 6, 2017
FACTS:
On September 17, 2000, the petitioners, spouses Ed and Mary Ann Latonio
accompanied their eight-month-old child Ed Christianto a birthday party at the
McDonald’s Restaurant, Ayala Center, Cebu City.During the party and as part of the
birthday package, McDonald’s presented two mascots – “Birdie” and “Grimace” –
to entertain and dance for the guests. Respondent Tyke Philip Lomibao was the
person inside the “Birdie” mascot suit.
After the mascots danced, guests had their pictures taken with them. Intending
to have her child’s photo taken with the mascots, Mary Ann placed Ed Christian on
a chair in front of the mascot “Birdie.” The mascot positioned itself behind the child
and extended its “wings” to give a good pose for the camera.As photos were about
to be taken, Mary Ann released her hold of Ed Christian. Seconds later, the child fell
head first from the chair onto the floor. Several guests attended to Ed Christian.
Meanwhile, the employees of respondent Cebu Golden Food assisted petitioners in
giving first aid treatment to Ed Christian. Petitioners, nevertheless, remained and
continued with the party and left only after the party was over.Respondent
corporation assured the Latonios that they were ready to assist in whatever medical
attention would be required of Ed Christian. However, instead of giving respondent
Cebu Golden Food copies of the medical records of Ed Christian, the Latonios
demanded compensation in the amount of P15 million.
RTC found respondents Cebu Golden Foods and Lomibao to be liable of
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. CA reversed RTC’s
decision.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Mary Ann Latonio’s negligence was the proximate cause of
Ed Christian’s fall.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with CA that despite Mary Ann’s insistence
that she made sure that her baby was safe and secured before she released her grasp
on Ed Christian, her own testimony revealed that she had, in fact, acted negligently
and carelessly. The Court likewise agreed with the pronouncement of CA that
indeed, it is irresponsible for a mother to entrust the safety, even momentarily, of
her eight-month-old child to a mascot, not to mention a bird mascot in thick leather
suit that had no arms to hold the child and whose diminished ability to see, hear,
feel, and move freely was readily apparent. Releasing her grasp of the baby without
waiting for any indication that the mascot heard and understood her is just plain
negligence on the part of Mary Ann.
The Court added that the cause of Ed Christian’s fall is traceable to the
negligent act of Mary Ann of leaving him in the “hands” of Lomibao who was
wearing the Birdie mascot suit. The Court noted that “hands” and “wings” were used
interchangeably during the testimonies of the witnesses, thus, causing confusion. In
the absence of negligence on the part of respondents Cebu Golden Foods and
Lomibao, as well as their management and staff, they cannot be made liable to pay
for the damages prayed for by the petitioners.
 GABETO V. ARANETA

42 PHIL 252.

OCTOBER 17, 1921

FACTS:

Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay, in the
City of Iloilo, with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City.
When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction
indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street, and laying his
hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that
he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied to
the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta, and that he had taken up
the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who had offered employment.
At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse
from the control of Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing,
however, to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the
material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became
necessary for the driver to get out, which he did, in order to fix the bridle. The horse
was then pulled over to near the curb.

While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free from the control of the bit,
became disturbed and moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of the wheels
of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After going a
few yards further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was
fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box came down with a crash and
frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street.

Basilio Ilano had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the
sidewalk; but the other, Proceso Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and
after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission
Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and received injuries from
which he soon died.
 This action was brought by Consolacion Gabeto, in her own right as widow
of Proceso Gayetano, and as guardian ad litem of the three children, Conchita
Gayetano, Rosita Gayetano, and Fermin Gayetano, for the purpose of recovering
damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso
Gayetano, supposedly caused by the wrongful act of the defendant Agaton Araneta.

Judge awarded damages to the widow to which decision Araneta appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the
street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the
legal or proximate cause thereof.

RULING:

No. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it
was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. it was Julio who jerked the
rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and Julio, after
alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in
so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free
from control, started to go away.
 URBANO V IAC (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

157 SCRA 1

JANUARY 7, 1988

FACTS:

When Filomeno Urbano found the place where he stored his palay flooded
with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed he went
to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier admitted that he was the one
responsible for what happened. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay
for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano hacked Javier hitting
him on the right palm of his hand . Javier who was then unarmed ran away from
Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the
left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg.

On November 14,1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital

in a very serious condition. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr.
Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound
in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 Javier died in the hospital. The appellant claim that
there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was
wounded to the time of his death. The proximate cause of the victim's death was due
to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly
healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week
of November, 1980. Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he
returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the
wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier
was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death

RULING:

Yes. The medical findings lead the Court to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between
the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. The
evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was
infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely
confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the
symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to
when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.The rule is that the death
of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra)
 FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA

297 SCRA 30

OCTOBER 1, 1998

FACTS :

On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the
USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived
at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its
berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port
Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was
assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking
maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.

Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself
in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a
briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the
vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila
International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.

When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North
Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the
vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor
dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left
anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as
expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the
crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew
members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov
assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.

After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines
half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was
approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take
hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron
of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage
too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot
who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise
submitted his report of the incident.The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the
Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25.

ISSUE:

Whether or not both the pilot and the master were negligent.

RULING:

Yes. In a collision between a stationary object and a moving object, there is a

presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic).
The master’s negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn
means negligence on the part of FESC.

As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not
be the sole cause of an injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce
injuries, person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one
of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is
an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an
extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the
negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is
liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more

persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the
whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a
third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting
damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
 SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V. CUSTODIO, ET AL

17 SCRA 1088

AUGUST 31, 1966

FACTS:

In Barrio Halang, two trucks, one driven by Mudales and belonging to

Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Lagunda and owned by
Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve.
Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board as truck was full
of passengers, was sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda. As a result, Custodio
was injured and died.

To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales.
However, Makabuhay, widoy of Custodio, testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running
fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the
mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never
collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the road, the 6 x 6
truck could have avoided hitting Custodio.

The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on
broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus with
full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding
downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or
passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn.
308-309, Mendoza). LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo
truck was running at a fast rate of speed. Driver Lagunda admitted that three
passengers rode on the running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a
distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. Despite the presence of a shallow canal on
the right side of the road which he could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not avert
the accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a passage of
trucks.
 Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court
of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. — hereinafter referred to as
the carrier — and its driver Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had violated the
contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners Sabido and
Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of them were held
solidarity liable.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners were guilty of negligence.

2. Whether or not petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier
and its driver.

RULING:

1. Yes. Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in
its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of
negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the
negligence of the first two would not have produced this result without the
negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence was the last,
in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime
before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense,
petitioners' truck had the last clear chance.

2. Yes. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of contributory
negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the bus,
and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of contributory negligence,
because that vehicle was running at a considerable speed despite the fact that it was
negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of the road, it
was driven on its middle portion thereof and so near the passenger bus coming from
the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger on its running board, the owners of the two
vehicles are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger, although the liability of
one arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the other springs from a quasi-
delict. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more
persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct
and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for
the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury,
or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor.
 VDA. DE BATACLAN VS. MEDINA

102 PHIL 181

OCTOBER 22, 1957

FACTS:

Shortly after midnight, a bus of the Medina Transportation, operated by its

owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the
town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur,
Conrado Saylon. There were about 18 passengers, including the driver and
conductor. At about 2am, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a
canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. The three passengers
Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus.

Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans
and moans from inside the bus. Calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in
the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a
lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including
the 4 passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank.

That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the
bus were removed and duly identified that of Bataclan. His widow, Salud Villanueva
brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through
his agent, the driver Saylon, thus making him liable.

2. Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus.

RULING:

1. No. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was
speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that
according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the
point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after
zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-
out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity
at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of
150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.

2. Yes. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom. The proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on
its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably,
by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30
in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did
from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend
the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. Neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to
bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC v. IAC & CASIANO PASCUA, ET
AL.,

189 SCRA 158

AUGUST 30, 1990

FACTS:

This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney passengers who died
as a result of the collision between the Phil. Rabbit’s bus driven by Tomas delos
Reyes and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo. Other passengers of the
jeepney sustained physical injuries. It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio,
the jeepney’s right rear wheel detached which caused it to run in an unbalanced
position.

Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was then
running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually
stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front
faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it
was going). The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the
western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north, among
which was Bus No. 753 of Rabbit. Almost at the time when the jeepney made a
sudden U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway, or after stopping
for a couple of minutes, the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the
jeepney which resulted in the said deaths and injuries. At the time and in the vicinity
of the accident, there were no vehicles following the jeepney, neither were there
oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of that day was fair. A
criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. Manalo was
eventually convicted and was imprisoned. The case against delos Reyes was
dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.

As regards the damages, three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses (owners
of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon, (jeepney driver)Manalo, Rabbit and (Rabbit’s
driver) delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants.
 The trial court found the couple and Manalo (jeepney driver) to be negligent
and held that there was a breach of the contract of carriage with their passengers.
The trial court ordered them to pay the damages. Filriters was jointly and severally
liable as it was the jeepney’s insurer. Rabbit was to be paid by the jeepney for actual
damages.
IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found delos Reyes to be negligent;
ordered to pay jointly and severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs; Applied primarily (1)
the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear
of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other
evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test to conclude that delos Reyes was
negligent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the jeepney owners and its driver are liable for the injuries and
death suffered by the passengers of the jeepney.

RULING:

Yes, but only the spouses and Filriters are liable.The trial court was correct in
appreciating Manalo’s negligence. The principle about "the last clear" chance would
call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier
to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the
negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver
was likewise guilty of negligence. (Anuran, et al. v. Buño et al.)

On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty
and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence: would have
been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney
was abrupt. Delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by
Manalo.
With regard to the substantial factor test, it is a rule that if the actor's conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither
foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it
occurred does not prevent him from being liable. The speed of the bus was even
calculated by the IAC. But the SC was not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus
was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to
90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the
speed limit allowed in highways. Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not having
avoided the collision because as was shown, the jeepney left a skid mark of about
45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point
of collision.
The trial court’s decision was reinstated and affirmed but with the
modification that only the couple and the Filtriters Guaranty Assurance Corp. Inc.,
were liable. Indemnity for loss of life was also modified.
 PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC V IAC (DIONISIO)

148 SCRA 353

MAR 10, 1987

FACTS:

At about 1:30 am on November 15 1975, Leonardo Dionisio was on his way

home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. Dionisio had taken a shot
or two of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an
intersection when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched
his headlights on bright and saw a Ford dump truck about 21/2meters away from his
car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction
Inc. (Phoenix), was parked on the right hand side of the street facing the oncoming
traffic. It was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly
blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights or any early warning
reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck
had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its
regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work
scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. Dionisio claimed that he
tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck.

As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including

some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge
dentures. Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. IAC affirmed the lower court’s
ruling, with modification on award of damages.

Petitioners argued that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of
liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass; that if there was
negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was
merely a passive and static condition and that private respondent Dionisio's
recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident
and the injuries he sustained.
 The private respondents argued that the legal and proximate cause of his
injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck
entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident was Dionisio’s negligence
(driving faster than he should have, and without headlights) or the negligence of the
driver in parking the truck.

RULING:

It is the driver’s negligence. On Cause v. Condition petitioners' arguments are

drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United
States. These arguments, however, do not have any validity in this jurisdiction.

Even in the United States, the distinctions between cause and condition have
already been almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must
refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come
to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in
such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is
important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause." The
truck driver's negligence, far from being a "passive and static condition", was an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision would not have occurred had the
dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices.
The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for
anyone driving down that street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver
must be held responsible.

Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's
negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was only
a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck driver’s negligence
 MANILA ELECTRIC V REMOQUILLO

99 PHIL 117

MAY 18, 1956

FACTS:

Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to fix a leaking media
agua,” (downspout). He climbed up to the media agua which was just below the 3rd
floor window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron sheet through the said
window. After grabbing hold of the sheet, he turned around and a portion of the iron
sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric wire of Manila Electric
Company (the Company) strung 2.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua,
electrocuting him and killing him.

His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company and
the TC rendered judgment in their favor. The Company appealed to the CA, which
affirmed the judgment. It is this CA decision the Company now seeks to appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Company’s negligence in the installation and maintenance

of its wires was the proximate cause of the death.

RULING:

No. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the
stage for the cause of the injury to occur).

A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to the
occasion by which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an action if
a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury intervenes between
such prior and remote cause and the injury.
 If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause,
such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause.

The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of
Magno himself. It was to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was
qualified to do so. He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and
the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and
experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-ft iron
sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing
all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with
the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.
RODRIGUEZA V. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

NOVEMBER 19, 1921

FACTS:

Rodrigueza et al seek damages from fire kindled by sparks from a locomotive

engine. The fire was communicated to four houses nearby. All of these houses were
of light construction, except that of Rodrigueza which was of strong materials.
Plaintiffs say that the company failed to supervise their employees properly and was
negligent in allowing locomotive to operate without smokestack protection for
arresting sparks. They also say that the sparks were produced by an inferior fuel
used by the company – Bataan coal.
Defense said Rodigueza’s house stood partly within limits of land owned by
company. Rodrigueza did not mind the warnings from the company. His house
materials included nipa and cogon, this indicates contributory negligence on his part.
Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad, which appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not damage was caused by Rodrigueza’s contributory negligence.

RULING:

Yes.Manila Railroad’s defense is not a bar to recovery by the other plaintiffs.

There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon company’s property.
His house was there before the railroad company’s property. He may be at risk for
fire, but should not bear loss if the fire resulted from the company’s negligence.

The Proximate and Only Cause of the damage was the negligent act of the
company. That Rodrigueza’s house was near was an antecedent condition that can’t
be imputed to him as Contributory Negligence because that condition was not
created by himself and because his house remained by the toleration and consent of
company and because even if the house was improperly there, company had no right
to negligently destroy it. The company could have removed the house through its
power of eminent domain.
 MCKEE V IAC, TAYAG

211 SCRA 517

JULY 16, 1992

FACTS:

A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private

respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh.
The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida
Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and
Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.

When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the
southern approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the
road and into the lane of the car. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the
left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car,
applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do
so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck,
which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. Two civil cases were filed on Jan
31, 1977.

On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of

"Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court. He was found guilty before the
trial court and was ordered to pay damages. Galang appealed to IAC. IAC affirmed
decision.

The civil cases were dismissed. Petitioners appealed to IAC. In its

consolidated decision of the civil cases, it reversed the ruling of the trial court and
ordered the defendants to pay damages. The decision is based on the findings that it
was Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The
appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the
defendants, as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it
was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense
of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
supervising the said employee.

In a Motion for Reconsideration, the decision for the consolidated civil cases
was reversed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not negligence was proven.

RULING:

No. The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded
the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the
presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this
presumed negligence, IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence
that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted
deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved
into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two
boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided

by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not
do.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. Furthermore, under
what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence.

The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that
his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. Under Article 2185 of
the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds
application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that
the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages
if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In
such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. The doctrine is
that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence
of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care
and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence.

Petition granted. Assailed decision set aside while its original is

REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased
from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee.
 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. SOTERO REMOQUILLO

G.R. No. L-8328

May 18, 1956

FACTS:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio
Peñaloza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a
“media agua” said to be in a leaking condition. The “media agua” was just below the
window of the third story. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his
son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion,
turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with
the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to as the Company)
strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his
death by electrocution. His widow and children fled suit to recover damages from
the company. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their favor —
P10,000 as compensatory damages; P784 as actual damages; cP2,000 as moral and
exemplary damageband P3,000 as attorney’s fees, with costs. On appeal to the Court
of Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment with slight modification by reducing the
attorney’s fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with costs. The electric company has appealed
said decision to us.
The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are conclusive are
stated in the following portions of its decision which we reproduce below:c“The
electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched
between poles on the street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It was installed
there some two years before Peñaloza’s house was constructed. The record shows
that during the construction of said house a similar incident took place, although
fortunate]y with much less tragic consequences. A piece of wood which a carpenter
was holding happened to come in contact with the same wire, producing some
sparks. The owner of the house forthwith complained to Defendant about the danger
which the wire presented, and as a result Defendant moved one end of the wire
farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Manila Electric is guilty of negligence.

RULING:
The decision of Court of Appeals was reversed. The principal and proximate
cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but
rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the
galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward
the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latter’s length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and
proximate cause with respect to injuries.“A prior and remote cause cannot be made
the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation
the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.”
 TEAGUE V. FERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. L-29745
JUNE 4, 1973

FACTS:
The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building,
a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and
Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila was owned and operated by Teague. The said second
floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square meters, and although it
had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of
which was provided with two fire-escape ladders and the presence of each of said
fire-exits was indicated on the wall.

October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials
located about ten meters away from the institute (across the street). Upon seeing the
fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted ‘Fire! Fire!’ and
thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of the
Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down the
students, who numbered about 180 at the time. The panic, however, could not be
subdued and the students, with the exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes
kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede
therein. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over,
four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were
found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede. The deceased’s
five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as
owner and operator of Realistic Institute.

CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the case. This was however,
reversed by the CA. The CA held that petitioner was negligent and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding
of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection
with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. The alleged violation of the
ordinance consisted in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had
only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each,
although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under
construction.
 The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes
Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3)
shouts of “Fire!, Fire!”; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and
death. As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a
remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a
number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of. According
to the petitioner “the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes
with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance.”

ISSUE:
Whether a violation of a statute constitutes negligence.

RULING:
It is true that the petitioner’s non-compliance with the ordinance in question
was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was
coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a continuing
one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific
situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That situation
was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the
building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under
emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available.
“The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if
the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very
thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.” To consider the
violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the
situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the
overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what
the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of
only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of
proximate cause applies to such violation.
 URBANO V. IAC

157 SCRA 1

FACTS:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his
ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from
the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and
there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he
was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the
right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October
27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the
medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the
hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to
be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died
the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by
the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new
trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the
deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion
was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of
the latter’s death.

RULING:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural

and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by

tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared
on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction
of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from theonset time. The more credible conclusion
is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have
been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or
a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to
the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may
have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion
by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition
or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent
act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause."
 PICART VS. SMITH, JR.

G.R. NO. L-12219

MARCH 15, 1918

FACTS:
On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite
direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman
on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and
after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to
him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled
the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going
to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith
guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so
doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing
that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly
toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there
being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so
doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was
broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result
of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

ISSUE:
Whether Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation
to repair the damage done.

RULING:
The judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here
rendered that the Picart recover of Smith damages.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would
constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result
of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions
to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of
the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence
of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent
man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding
against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think
that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse
and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances
the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the
problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible.
It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO DEL
PILAR AND EDILBERTO MONTESIANO

G.R. NO. 89880

FEBRUARY 6, 1991

FACTS:

At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between
a gravel and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda passenger bus with
Motor No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT 259 along the national road at Calibuyo,
Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck
sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the
driver’s seat to the last rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus
were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained.

The trial court held that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or
combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of
the passengers. It could not be determined from the evidence that it was only the
negligent act of one of them which was the proximate cause of the collision. In view
of this, the liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary. The
Court of Appealsruled on the contrary, it held that the bus driver had the last clear
chance to avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake
the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.

RULING:

The principle of “last clear chance” applies “in a suit between the owners
and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the
ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” Furthermore, as
between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint
tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured
person by reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril, and it cannot be invoked as
between defendantsconcurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent
actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action
which could have avoided the injury.The Court is convinced that the respondent
Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as
between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners
and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased
passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the
respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from
liability.
 PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION V. IAC

FACTS:

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo

Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He
was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked
askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning
reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular
driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it
was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision
filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners
countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own negligence in
driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The
trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or
by respondent’s own negligence

RULING:

The Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal
and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence
of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would
have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has
created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the
defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in
the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing
the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive
situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other
active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during
which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now
almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type
of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases,
it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the
nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

The court believes, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being
a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The
improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone
driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck
driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later
in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident,
was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
 GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER AND HARDWARE ET AL VS. IAC ET AL

G.R. NO. 70493

MAY 18, 1989

FACTS:
Engineer Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep, with Calibo at the
wheel, as it approached a bridge going towards the direction of Davao City. At about
that time, the cargo truck, Zacarias coming from the opposite direction of Davao
City had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the
cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died
while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result
of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of
the jeep,\ was extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its
right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck
stopped on its wheels on the road.
A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late
Engineer Calibo against the driver and owners of the cargo truck with the CFI of
Bohol. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint “for insufficiency of
evidence”. The Court of Appeals saw things differently. It rendered judgment 9 on
the plaintiffs’ appeal, reversing the decision of the Trial Court. It found Zacarias to
be negligent and his negligence “gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the
part of his employer, and their liability is both primary and solidary.” It therefore
ordered “the defendants jointly and solidarily to indemnify the plaintiffs

ISSUE:

Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case.

RULING:

Yes. Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence on the part
of Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in
failing to keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was, the
physical facts would still absolve the latter of any actionable responsibility for the
accident under the rule of the last clear chance.
 Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each other’s
vehicle from a distance of 150 meters. The truck had been brought to a stop while
the jeep was still thirty meters away. From these facts the logical conclusion emerges
that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last
clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from
the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of
which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers
per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance,
not merely rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him a
clear path.
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense
to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case
of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar state of facts.
Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his employer
(and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the evidence supports
the latter’s additional defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
said driver is no longer necessary and wig not be undertaken. The fact is that there
is such evidence in the record which has not been controverted.
 PHILIIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V. CA

269 SCRA 695

FACTS:

May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC
funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the
purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with Philippine
Bank of Commerce (PBC). They were not credited to RMC's account but were
instead deposited to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas.
Romeo Lipana never checked their monthly statements of account reposing
complete trust and confidence on PBC. Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish
2 copies of deposit slip upon and both are always validated and stamped by the
teller Azucena Mabayad. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor
and his current account number - retained by the bank. The duplicate copy was
written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was
left blank. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space
left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number to RMC's account
number. This went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's
knowledge. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the
return of its money and later on filed in the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to avoid
the injury by not exercising the proper validation procedure.

RULING:

Yes. The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank
in accepting deposits should not relieve the PBC of responsibility. The odd
circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information (Name of
the account holder) should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Negligence here
lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its
lack in selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then
Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to
the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to
know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's
validation procedures until 7 years later. The last clear chance/supervening
negligence/discovered peril. Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof Antecedent negligence of a person does
not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a
defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance,
could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here,
assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, yet it
cannot be denied that PBC bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert
the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed
validation procedure.Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is
to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a
family shall be required. In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence
required is more than that of a good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary
nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the
accounts of their client.
 SPOUSES ONG VS. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT

G.R. NO. L-7664

AUGUST 29, 1958

FACTS:

Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara
filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for which a nominal
fee is charged . 14 year old Dominador Ong drowned while swimming in one of
those pools.Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs’ son was drowned in one of its
swimming pools but avers that his death was caused by his own negligence or by
unavoidable accident. Defendant also avers that it had exercised due diligence in the
selection of, and supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the
diligence required by law under the circumstances.After trial, the lower court found
that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the complaint without
pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to this Court
because the amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.

ISSUE:

Whether the doctrine of last clear chance could be used against the respondent

RULING:

No. There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary
precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may
cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are
provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid
medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure
clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain
rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards
who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued
certificates of proficiency. …There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a
clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are
available always in case of emergency.
 The court do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record
does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the
record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to
the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew
what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear
chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to
claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Or, “As the doctrine usually is stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person
which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.”
 ANURAN V. BUNO

GR NO. L-21353

MAY 20, 1966

FACTS:

January 12, 1958 noon: passenger jeepney owned by Pedro Gahol and Luisa
Alcantara and driven by Pepito Buño overloaded with (14-16 passengers) was
parked on the road to Taal, Batangas when a speeding motor truck owned
by Anselmo Maligaya and Ceferina Aro driven by Guillermo Razon negligently
bumped it from behind, with such violence that three passengers died and two others
suffered injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many
days. Jeepney was parked to let a passanger alight in such a way that 1/2 of its width
(the left wheels) was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half, on
the right shoulder of the road. Suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead
and of the injured, to recover consequently damages against the driver and the
owners of the truck and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance can apply so that truck driver
guilty of greater negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision will be
solely liable

RULING:

No. The three defendants last mentioned are required to pay solidarily with
the other defendants-respondents the amounts fixed by the appealed decision.New
Civil Code requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are
"presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they have observed extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756)Principle about the "last
clear chance" would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of
the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility
from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the
other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
 RAYNERA V HICETA

G.R. No. 120027.

APRIL 21, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioners herein are heirs of Reynaldo Raynera who was killed by an

accident on his way home at about 2:00 A.M. Respondents, Freddie Hiceta and
Jimmy Orpilla were owner and driver, respectively, of an Isuzu truck trailer which
was involved in the said accident. On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning,
Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on
the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck
was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. 4 The truck was loaded
with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three
(3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on
both sides of the metal plates. 5 The asphalt road was not well lighted. At some point
on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of
the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo
sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo 6 rushed him to the
Parañaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending physician, Dr.
Marivic Aguirre, 7 pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival.
At time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering Department,
Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation. The heirs of the deceased demanded from
respondents' payment of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo as a result of
the vehicular accident. The respondents refused to pay the claims. Petitioners, hence,
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila a complaint for damages against
respondents' owner and driver of the Isuzu truck. Petitioners sought recovery of the
damages caused by the negligent operation of the truck- trailer at nighttime on the
highway, without tail the lights.

ISSUE:

Whether the trick is responsible for the accident

RULING:

Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents' truck was
visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30
kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the
cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the
Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136)" 25 respondents
installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicle's cargo load
extended beyond the bed or body thereof.

It has been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another vehicle"
are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other
evidence." The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle
has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front
of him. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the
collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently,
no other person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who
bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance
of avoiding the accident.

CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORP. V. CA

GR NO. 169457

OCTOBER 19, 2015

FACTS:

LC Diaz professional partnership engaged in accounting opened a savings

account with Solidbank. LC Diaz's cashier, Macaraya, filled up two savings deposit
slips, and she gave them passbook to messenger Calapre and instructed him to
deposit the money with Solidbank. Calapre presented the deposit slips and passbook
to the teller. He left the passbook with Solidbank first as he had to make another
deposit at Allied Bank, but when he returned, he was informed that somebody got
the passbook. Calapre reported this to Macaraya. Calapre went back to Solidbank
with a deposit slip (P200k check). When Macaraya asked about the passbook, the
teller said that someone shorter than Calapre got it. Macaraya reported this matter.
The following day, CEO Diaz called Solidbank to stop any transaction using the
passbook until the company could open a new account. It was found out that learned
that P300k was withdrawn from the account the previous day. The withdrawal slip
bore the signatures of two authorized signatories of LC Diaz but they denied signing
it. Noel Tamayo received this sum of money.

An information for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document

was filed against one of their messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola (first
time they appeared in the case discussion), but the RTC dismissed the criminal
case. LC Diaz demanded the return of their money from Solidbank, but the latter
refused and a complaint for recovery of a sum of money was filed against them.
However, Solidbank was absolved.

RTC applied rules on savings account written on the passbook ["Possession

of this book shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or payments
made by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein of
the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the depositor personally."]
RTC said that the burden of proof shifted to LC Diaz to prove that the signatures are
not forged. Also, they applied the rule that the holder of the passport is presumed to
be the owner. It was also held that Solidbank did not have any participation in the
custody and care of the passbook and as such, their act of allowing the withdrawal
was not the proximate cause of the loss. The proximate cause was LC Diaz’
negligence. As regards the contention that LC Diaz and Solidbank had precautionary
procedures (like a secret handshake of sorts) whenever the former withdrew a large
sum, RTC pointed out that LC Diaz disregarded this in the past withdrawal.

CA, on the other hand, said that the proximate cause of the unauthorized
withdrawal is Solidbank's negligence, applying NCC 2176. CA said the 3 elements
of QD are present [damages; fault or negligence; connection of cause and
effect]. The teller could have called up LC Diaz since the amount being drawn was
significant. Proximate cause is teller's failure to call LC Diaz. CA ruled that
while LC Diaz was negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its
messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller, Solidbank could not
escape liability because of the doctrine of “last clear chance.” Solidbank could have
averted the injury had it called up LC Diaz to verify the withdrawal.
 CANLAS V. CA

GR NO. 112160

FEBRUARY 28, 2000

FACTS:
August, 1982: Osmundo S. Canlas executed a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing Vicente Mañosca to mortgage 2 parcels of land situated in BF Homes
Paranaque in the name of his wife Angelina Canlas. Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas
agreed to sell the lands to Mañosca for P850K, P500K payable within 1 week, and
the balance serves as his investment in the business. Mañosca issued 2 checks P40K
and P460K. The P460K lacked sufficient funds. September 3, 1982:
Mañosca mortgage to Atty. Manuel Magno the parcels of lands for P100K with the
help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the Spouses Canlas. September
29, 1982: Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB)
for P500K with the parcels of land as security and with the help of the same
impostors. The loan was left unpaid resulting in a extrajudicially foreclosure on the
lots. January 15, 1983: Canlas wrote a letter informing ASB that the mortgage was
without their authority. He also requested the sheriff Contreras to hold or cancel the
auction. Both parties refused. The spouses Canlas filed a case for annulment of deed
of real estate mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The RTC ruled to restrain the sheriff from issuing a Certificate of
Sheriff’s Sale and annulled the mortgage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ASB had was negligent due to the doctrine of last clear
chance

RULING:
Yes.Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply. The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that
of a good father of a family. Not even a single identification card was exhibited by
the said impostors to show their true identity. It acted simply on the basis of the
residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures
affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to Atty. Magno. Previous deed of
mortgage did not bear the tax account number of the spouses as well as the
Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas. The doctrine of last clear
chance provides where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to
do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom The antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence Antecedent Negligence: Osmundo
Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente Mañosca the opportunity to perpetrate the
fraud, by entrusting him the owner's copy of the transfer certificates of title of subject
parcels of land. Supervening Negligence: Failing to perform the simple expedient of
faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of the
persons transacting with them - ASB bears the loss. Canlas went to ASB
with Mañosca and he was introduced as Leonardo Rey. He didn't
correct Mañosca. However, he did not know that the lots were being used as a
security for he was there to make sure that Mañosca pays his debt so he cannot be
estopped from assailing the validity of the mortgage.
 PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL AND AGUSTIN VESTIL V.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. NO. 74431

NOVEMBER 6, 1989

FACTS:

On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a
child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita
Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General
Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead" and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was
discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of
saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death
was certified as broncho-pneumonia.

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable
to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their
daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one
had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:

In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of
the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned
and there are other heirs to the property.

RULING:

Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be
held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs.
However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the
dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership
of the dog or of the house.

Article 2183 reads as follows:The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use
of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape
or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come
from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to

death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The
complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the
carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.

While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of
Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its
possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in
Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only
six kilometers from her own house. Moreover, there is evidence showing that she
and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at
least one witness, and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own
daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the
dog. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda
in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy
that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses
 DINGCONG VS. KANAAN

72 PHIL. 14; G.R. NO. L-47033

APRIL 25, 1941

FACTS:
The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the house of Emilia Saenz (in
Jose Ma. Basa Street of the City of Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel. Among
the hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria, paying P30 a month, and occupying room
no. 10 of said hotel. Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies the ground floor of the
hotel and established his "American Bazaar" dedicated to the purchase and sale of
articles and merchandise. Around 11pm of 19 September 1933, Echevarria, when
retiring to bed, carelessly left the faucet open that with only an ordinary basin
without drainage. That time, the pipes of the hotel were under repair; the water run
off the pipes and spilled to the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise of the
"American Bazaar," causing a loss which the CFI sets at P1,089.61. The Kanaans
(Halim, Nasri and Michael), representing the establishment "American Bazaar,"
thereafter filed this complaint for damages against Loreto Dingcong, Jose Dingcong
and Francisco Echevarria. CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable, and acquitted Jose
Dingcong. CA reversed and declared Jose Dingcong responsible, sentencing him to
pay the plaintiffs damages.

ISSUE

Whether or not Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for
damages.
RULING:
Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the one who directly,
by his negligence in leaving open the faucet, caused the water to spill to the ground
and wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs. Jose Dingcong, being a co-
renter and manager of the hotel, with complete possession of the house, must also
be responsible for the damages caused. He failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family to prevent these damages, despite his power and authority to
cause the repair of the pipes. Appealed decision is affirmed, with the costs against
apellant.
 AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY

58 PHIL 14

MARCH 6, 1933

FACTS:

Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine

Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City
of Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records
of the company. One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a
bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran
streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. It appears that
Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso St. in Manila without notifying the
company, and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some
collections in San Francisco del Monte. According to the practice of the company,
if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount
collected to the company the next morning. The widow and children of Leopoldo
Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant corporation under
Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12
for compensation. Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought
to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208
weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses. Defendant as special defenses
alleged that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries
resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which
prohibits work on Sunday; and that Act No. 3428, as amended, is unconstitutional
and void because it denies the defendant the equal protection of the law, and impairs
the obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan,
and deprives the Courts of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate
of deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII,
and XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the employer is liable to pay the employee’s heirs.

RULING:

As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16, 1930

and Act No. 3812 was not approved until December 8, 1930, it is apparent that the
law which is applicable is Act No. 3428, section 23 of which reads as follows:When
any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance
of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or
the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in
the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.

The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in
pursuance of his employment. At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo
Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant
corporation, but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and
had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant.
The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen
to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an
employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident
that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because
such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. The phrase
"due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in
Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of".

If the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San
Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would
undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover. In the case at bar the deceased
was going from work in his own conveyance. Furthermore, it appears that the
deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San
Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the company did not know that he was
living in Manila on the day of the accident; that the defendant company did not
require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use
bicycles. These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to
and pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to change
his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle
in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant company did
not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if he made collections on
Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not
liable for any injury sustained by him.The decision appealed from was affirmed,
with the costs against the appellants.
 COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS V CA (GERONIMO)
227 SCRA 292

OCTOBER 18, 1993

FACTS:

Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling food and drinks to
children in the Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan. On August
12, 1989, a group of parents complained that they found fibrous material in the
bottles of Coke and Sprite that their children bought from Geronimo’s store.
Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found that there were indeed fibrous
materials in the unopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the Department
of Health office in their region and was informed that the soda samples she sent were
adulterated. Because of this, Geronimo’s sales plummeted with her regular sales of
10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3 cases. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300
a day which later on forced her to close down her business on December 12, 1989.
She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff Coca-Cola but the latter did not
accede to her demands. The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola, stating that the
complaint was based on a contract and not a quasi-delict because of pre-existing
relation between the parties. Thus the complaint should have been filed within 6
months from the delivery of the thing sold. The trial court however annulled the
questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in the
civil case. According to the CA: “the allegations in the complaint plainly show that
it is an action for damages arising from respondent’s act of recklessly and negligently
manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sol for public consumption.” It
also noted that the availability of an action for breach of warranty does not bar an
action for torts in a sale of defective goods.

Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. Since the complaint is for breach
of warranty (under Article 1561, CC), it should have been brought within 6 months
from the delivery of the goods. Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for
damages which does not involve an administrative action. Her cause of action is
based on an injury to plaintiff’s right which can be brought within 4 years (based on
Article 1146, CC).

ISSUE

Whether the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and pursuant to Article

1146(12), CC,

HELD

The action prescribes in 4 years.The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with

respect to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances upon the thing sold
are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567. The vendee may also ask for the
annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary
rule on obligations shall be applicable. Under American law, the liabilities of the
manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence,
breach of warranty, tort or other grounds.The instant petition is denied for lack of
merit.
 GILCHRIST V CUDDY

29 PHIL 542

FEBRUARY 18, 1915

FACTS:

Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. Gilchrist was the owner of a
theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the
Zigomar” for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125. Cuddy returned the
money already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery date so that he can lease
the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same
period. Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo and
Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for
interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.

ISSUE

Whether Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the contract
between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of the parties

HELD

Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing
its breach. This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual
obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. Article 1902 of
the Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or omission causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage
done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the
liability of the tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he
causes damage. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may
recover for the damages suffered. Judgment affirmed
 SO PING BUN VS CA (TEK HUA)
GR NO. 120554

SEPTEMBER 21, 1999

FACTS:

In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing Director So Pek Giok,
entered into a lease agreement with D.C. Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. The
contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of the same, they continued on
a month to month basis. In 1976, Tek Hua was dissolved with the original members
forming a new corporation, Tek Hua Enterprises with Manuel Tiong as one of the
incorporators. So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, occupied
the same stalls under the business name, Trendsetter Marketing. In 1989, the lessor,
DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective
September 1, 1989. A further rent increase of 30% effective January 1, 1990 was
implemented. Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts for signing. While
the letters contained a statement that the leases will be terminated if the contracts
were not signed, the same were not rescinded. In 1991, Tiong wrote a letter to So
Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to be used by
them. Instead of vacating the stalls, So was able to secure lease agreements from DC
Chuan. Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for nullification of the contracts
between Trendsetter and DC Chuan. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua.
The CA, on appeal, upheld the trial court. Both the trial court and the CA awarded
legal fees only.

ISSUE:

Whether So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract.

RULING:

A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of
others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful
interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. In
the case at bar, petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in
its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latter’s property right.
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damges are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable
in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the
private use and enjoyment of asset if a) the other has property rights and privileges
with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is substantial;
c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; d) the invasion is either
intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the general
negligence rules. On the other hand, the elemts of tort interference are a) existence
of a valid contract; b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence; c)
interference of the third party is without legal justification or excuse. Since there
were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had
property rights over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan
to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference. The SC handled the
question of whether the interference may be justified considering that So acted solely
for the purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. It stated that it
is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather
than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. Nothing
on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. Hence
the lack of malice precludes the award of damages. The provision in the Civil Code
with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314 which states that “ any third party
who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party”. The Court ratiocinated that the recovery of legal fees is in the
concept of actual or compensatory damages as provided in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code. In this casse, due to defendant’s action of interference, plaintiff was forced to
seek relief through the Court snd thereby incur expenses to protect his interests. The
Court, however, found the award exorbitant. It was reduced to Pesos 100,000.00.
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed subject to the modified award of attorney’s
fees.
 GUILATCO V CITY OF DAGUPAN

171 SCRA 382

MAR 21, 1989

FACTS:

On July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, accidentally fell

into a manhole while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk at
Perez Blvd. Her right leg was fractured, due to which she was hospitalized, operated
on, and confined. She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain, and that
she has difficulty in locomotion. She has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter
(at the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income. She also lost weight, and
she is no longer her former jovial self. Moreover, she has been unable to perform her
religious, social, and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident. Police
confirmed existence of the manhole, which was partially covered by a concrete
flower pot by leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½ feet wide or 42 cm wide
by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep. City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted
that the manhole is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which
they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. He
said that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are
properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates. Trial court
ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus
attorney’s fees. CA reversed the lower court’s ruling on the ground that no evidence
was presented to prove that City of Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez
Blvd. City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that is not under the control
or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city.
ISSUE:

Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of

Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with
article 2189 CC.

RULING:

The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered
by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code
as follows: Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.

It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province,
city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control
or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In this case, control or
supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the
City Engineer.The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of
the city. On the other hand, article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising
from “defective streets, public buildings and other public works.”

Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven expenses of P8053.65. The trial

court should not have rounded off the amount. The court can not rely on
“speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the amount. Moral damages of P150000
is excessive and is reduced to P20000. Guilatco’s handicap was not permanent and
disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. Exemplary
damages of P50000 reduced to P10000. Award of P7420 as lost income for one year,
plus P450 bonus remain the same. P3000 as attorney’s fees remain the same. Petition
granted. CA decision reversed and set aside, decision of trial court reinstated with
modification.
 WORCESTER V OCAMPO
22 PHIL 42

FEB. 27, 1912

FACTS:

Plaintiff Dean Worcester, member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines

and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government commenced an action against
defendants Ocampo, Kalaw, Santos, Reyes, Aguilar, Liquete, Palma, Arellano, Jose,
Lichauco, Barretto and Cansipit (owners, directors, writers, editors and
administrators of a certain newspaper known as “El Renacimiento” or “Muling
Pagsilang”) for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous
publication. The editorial “Birds of Prey” was alleged to have incited the Filipino
people into believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy
of the position which he held. The said editorial alluded to him as an eagle that
surprises and devours, a vulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten meat, an owl
that affects a petulant omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim
until he leaves it bloodless. After hearing the evidence adduced during trial, the judge
of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, holding all the defendants
(except for Reyes, Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but in a
subordinate position and found to have merely acted under the direction of their
superiors) liable jointly and severally for sustained damages on account of
petitioner’s wounded feelings, mental suffering and injuries to his standing and
reputation in the sum of P35,000 as well as P25,000 as punitive damages. This
judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the SC, claiming that the CFI committed
several errors in rendering said judgment among which was that the lower court
committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the
defendants.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants, regardless of their participation in the

commission of the actual tort, may be held jointly and severally liable as joint
tortfeasors.

RULING:

Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort,
or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Joint tortfeasors are
jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. They are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the
wrongful act themselves. ***If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or
person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of
them separately, because tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual.
Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort. They fail to
recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only individually
liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his
tortfeasors. The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of
the tort. They might have sued jointly and severally, as they were. It is not necessary
that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. **note: Ponente used examples
of torts as held under common law** (In a case of assault and battery committed by
various persons, under the common law, all are principals). So also is the person
who counsels, aids, or assists in any way the commission of a wrong. Under the
common law, he who aided, assisted or counseled, in any way the commission of a
crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort. Joint
tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person
injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole
damage caused by all, and altogether jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no
defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are
not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation
in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others. The courts during
the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others
are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning
others of the alleged tort. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and
severally. However, in this case, the lower court, committed no error in rendering a
joint and several judgment against the defendants. As recognized by Section 6 of
Act 277 of the Philippine Commission: “Every author, editor, or proprietor * * * is
chargeable with the publication of any words in any part * * * or number of each
newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same. Judgment of the lower court
modified. Ocampo, Kalaw, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit
held jointly and severally liable for the sum of P25, 000 with interest at 6%. Santos
absolved from any liability.
 CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD
27 PHIL 374

MARCH 28, 1914

FACTS:

The plaintiff-appellant, Chapman, desired to board a certain "San Marcelino"

car coming from Sta. Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by his friend that the
car was approaching, he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed into the street
for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed one, the
entrance being from the front or the rear platform. Plaintiff attempted to board the
front platform but, seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion, stopped
beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come abreast of
him in order to board. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over
by the defendant's (Underwood) automobile. The defendant entered Calle Herran at
Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur, a competent driver. A
street car bound from Manila to Sta. Ana being immediately in front of him, he
followed along behind it. Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street car
which was following took the switch (there was a single-track street-car line running
along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each
other)- that is, went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of
the main track. Thereupon the defendant either kept straight ahead on the main
street-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was
on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant
was going. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car was almost in front of the
defendant's automobile, defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and
ran over the plaintiff. The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver.

RULING:

An owner who sits in his automobile or other vehicle, and permits his driver
to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he
has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease
therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. On the other hand, if the
driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present herein at5 the time the
act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefore. The act
complained of must be continued in the presence or the owner for such a length of
time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes his driver’s act his own. Defendant's
driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was
passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff needed only to watch
for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted
to pass upon that side of the street car. In the case of Johnson vs. David, the driver
does not fall within the list of persons in Art.1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts
the defendant would be responsible. Although in the David case the owner of the
vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the
driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent act of
the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. It appears
with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the
street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to
charge defendant with the negligence of the driver. The judgment appealed from is
affirmed.
 CAEDO v. YU KHE THAI

GR No. L-20392

DECEMBER 18, 1968

FACTS:

Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon
City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro.
With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the
opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo
at the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack. The two
cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road
and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the
Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56 kilometers. Their headlights were mutually
noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was
a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another
horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side
and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista. Rafael Bernardo testified
that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters
away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided
with two lights, one on each side, and they should have given him sufficient warning
to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as he
claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have been visible to him
from afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights
for a considerable while. In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane
from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping
altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in order to
pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward
rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded
obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part
Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the
distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait
behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the
point where it would be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them
in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite
obvious. It was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela
only eight meters in front of him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the
presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo
gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught
the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the
unexpected situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther
to the right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene show that the
right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of
impact.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not, defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the accident.

2. If yes, whether his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, is solidarily liable
with him.

RULING:

1. There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael
Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by
the plaintiffs.

2. If the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle
who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the
exercise of due diligence. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not
respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that
ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of
timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order
to prevent injury or damage. The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of
the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held
to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The law
does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency
either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may
own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184,
is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should
do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger
to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were
the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional
drivers by car owners who, by -their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers'
services, would be effectively proscribed. Rafael Bernardo had no record of
violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at
all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must
be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his
failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear
notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such
negligence may be imputed. The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. The
road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no
reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on
the skill and experience of his driver. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the
driver accordingly. Judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring
defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with
respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.
 RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA)
135 SCRA 242

FEBRUARY 28, 1985

FACTS:

Roberto Luna, a businessman, was killed in a vehicular collision (between

Luna, driving a gokart, and Luis dela Rosa, 13 years old, driving a Toyota car
without a license) at a gokart practice area. Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages
against Luis and his father, which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas, awarding
P1,650,000 as unearned net earnings of Luna, P12,000 compensatory damages, and
P50,000 for loss of his companionship (come on!!), with legal interest from date of
the decision, and attorney’s fees of P50,000 (no interest mentioned). (Note: father
and son solidarily liable for damages.) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA, which
affirmed in toto the RTC. In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas, the CA modified the
decision, this time reducing the unearned income to P450,000. Both parties filed
separate petitions for review in the SC. Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for
lack of merit. The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas, contending that the CA
erred in reducing the award for unearned income, and that the award for atty’s fees
should include legal interest. Pending the decision, the SC came out with a resolution
ordering the Dela Rosas, in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970,
and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over), to pay the Lunas
P450,000 for unearned net earnings, P12,000 compensatory damages, P50,000 for
loss of companionship, all with legal interest, and atty’s fees of P50,000, within 30
days. The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts, saying that they had no cash money.
The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis is
already of age, married, with 2 kids, and living in Spain but only causally employed
(“His compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no assets of his
own as yet”).
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in reducing the unearned income.

RULING:

The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis, thus is void.
The RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors: life
expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years, and an annual net income of P55,000
(P75,000 gross income less P20,000 personal expenses). In coming out with the life
expectancy, RTC considered the age and health of the deceased. However, the CA
modified this by factoring in the “engagement of Luna in car racing,” thus lowering
the life expectancy to only 10 years. WRT to the gross income, RTC considered the
various positions the deceased held at the time of his death, and the trend of his
earnings over the span of his last few years, thus coming up with a potential gross
income of P75,000. However, the CA increased the annual personal expenses to
P30,000, due to the escalating gasoline expenses, thus lowering the net annual
unearned income to P45,000. CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing
reduced the life expectancy. There is nothing on record that supports the claim that
the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life
expectancy. “That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but
then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are
extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedaled
four wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the
determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmed.”Also, it was an error to
increase the expenses without increasing the gross income. “It stands to reason that
if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the ‘escalating price of
gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing’ [a statement
which lacks complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income
would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof”
 LIBI V. IAC

G.R NO. 70890

SEPTEMBER 18, 1992

FACTS:

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until Julie Ann broke
up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and
irresponsible. Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but
the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against
her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend. Julie Ann
and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm,
a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi.Due
to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death
of both minors, their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their
respective theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence,
available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts. As a result of the
tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Are the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious liability?

RULING:

Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their minor
children is imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which covers obligations
arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The parents' liability as being
primary and not subsidiary and liability shall ceased if the parents can prove that
they observe all the diligence of a good father to prevent damage.
In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in supervising the activities
of their son. It was only at the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered
that he was drug informant of CANU and that the gun used in the shooting incident
was missing from the safety deposit box. Having been grossly negligent in
preventing Wendell from having access to said gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable
for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their
company.
 TAMARGO V. CA

G.R NO. 85044

JUNE 3, 1992

FACTS:

Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo

with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Vigan, Ilocos Sur
by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses
Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses
Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at
the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto
Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on
the ground that he bad acted without discernment. the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc This petition for
adoption was grunted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent
spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents claimed that not they, but rather the
adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from
the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners in their Reply
contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural
parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing
and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners'
complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action. In the present Petition for Review, petitioners
once again contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to
the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc.

ISSUE:

Will the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be

given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties
in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter,
when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents?
RULING:

No. The principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently

designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under
Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by
himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain
relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural
or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental
authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living
with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil
Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child
living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in
their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the
duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only
presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle
occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the
natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents
who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to
the suit for damages.Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental
authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the
adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In
the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been
completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of
Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
 CUADRA V. MONFORT

G.R. NO. L-24101

SEPTEMBER 30, 1970

FACTS:

Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates.
Their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass
in the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic
headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair.
Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten
the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter turned
around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain,
she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye
became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who
thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice.
Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight
of her right eye. The parents instituted a case in behalf of their minor daughter
against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father.

ISSUE:

Is Alfonso Monfort liable for an act of his minor child which causes damage
to another?

RULING:

No. The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault
or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or
intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for
whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article
2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the
mother. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176,
fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative
act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be
rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last
paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this
Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant
could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in
any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such
damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where
it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to
be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused
the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at
play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or
indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her
upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
 MERCADO V. CA

G.R. NO. L-14342

MAY 30, 1960

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co-plaintiff-

appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the
son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto
Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City.
A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may be described as an empty
nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado
and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto
wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor. The facts of record
clearly show that it was Augusto Mercado who started the aggression. Undeniably,
the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in
turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the "pitogo"
belonged to Augusto, because right after Benedicto gave it to him, Benedicto ran
away to get a basket ball with which they could play. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was
likewise unaware that the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto. He thought it was the
"pitogo" of Benedicto P. Lim, so that when Augusto attempted to get the "pitogo"
from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting
the chain into the holes of the "pitogo". However, Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.'s
remark and he aggresively pushed the latter. The fight started then. After Augusto
gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr., and the latter was clutching his stomach which
bore the brunt of Augusto's anger, Augusto seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless
position, cut him on the right check with a piece of razor.

ISSUE:

Should the School be held responsible for the incident?

RULING:

No. ART. 2180. . . .Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and

trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody,"
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that
the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In
these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil
would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility
for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils
appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their
parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of
Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father
or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. The claim of
petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be
without merit.

PALISOC V. BRILLANTES

G.R. NO. L-29025

OCTOBER 4, 1971

FACTS:

The deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were
classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock,
they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room
located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz
and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was
merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was
acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the
face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was
followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid
the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc
stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc
became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived,
so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally
he died. The foregoing is the substance of the testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone
witness to the incident." The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi
delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, however, absolved from liability the
three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute. There is no
evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendant officials of the school. These defendants cannot therefore be made
responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.

ISSUE:

Did the the trial court err in absolving the defendants-school officials instead
of holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with defendant Daffon,
for the damages awarded them as a result of their son's death?

RULING:

Yes. The Court holds that under Article 2180, defendants head and teacher of
the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are
liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the
latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room.
No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board
of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been
properly impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by
impleading improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower
court found that it had been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and therefore the
school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant.
Plaintiffs failed to do so, notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants in
their reply to plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly manifested and made of
record that "defendant Antonio C. Brillantes is not the registered owner/head of the
"Manila Technical Institute" which is now a corporation and is not owned by any
individual person."
The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious
acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they
stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are
called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child."This
is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. In the law
of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads
and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes
their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of
the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the
students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be
anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or
through negligence on their fellow students.
As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in
Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is
some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred
in the exercise of their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the child under
the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one
answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that
the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction." The
school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head
and teachers under the same cited article.
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on
the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the
student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and
boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school.
 AMADORA V. CA

G.R. NO. L-47745

APRIL 15,1988

FACTS:

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the
commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of
his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were
scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny
him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium
of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired
a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The
victim was only seventeen years old. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil
action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics
teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. On appeal to the
respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were
completely absolved, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not
applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades
but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the
custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended,
that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the
defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.

ISSUE:

Should Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos be held liable?

RULING:

No. The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities
of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident
happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On
the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held
liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the
provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not
direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular
classes.In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held
liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student
and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter
to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was
shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision
because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible
for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the
respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his
death.
 PASCO V. CFI

G.R. NO. L-54357

APRIL 25, 1988

FACTS:

Petitioner, together with two companions, while walking inside the campus of
the private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in said university,
was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim
Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were also students of the Araneta
University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he
was hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he
underwent surgery to save his life. Petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco,
filed a complaint for damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private
respondent Gregorio Araneta University. Said school was impleaded as a party
defendant based Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Is Article 2180 of the Civil Code equally applicable to academic institutions?

RULING:

No. We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to

educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) for the issue in this
petition is actually whether or not, under the article, the school or the university itself
(as distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable. We find the answer in the
negative, for surely the provision concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads."
 YLARDE V. AQUINO

G.R NO. L-33722

JULY 29, 1988

FACTS:

Soriano is the school principal; Aquino and Banez were teachers in this
school. Novelito Ylarde is a student [deceased] & Federico is his father. Gabaldon
Primary School, an academic school, was littered with several huge concrete blocks
[around one ton each] which were remnants of an old school shop which was
destroyed in WWII. Banez [teacher] realized that these stones were huge hazards so
he started burying them, and he was able to bury 10 blocks by himself. A fellow
teacher Aquino decided to help, so he gathered 18 students and ordered them to dig
a hole where a 1-ton stone could be buried. The following day, he called 4 of these
students to continue digging. When the hole was 1m 40cm deep, Aquino alone
continued digging while the students remained inside the pit, throwing out loose soil.
They got out of the hole when the depth was right. Aquino left the children to level
the loose soil around the hole because he went to see Banez (who was 30 meters
away) to get a key to the school workroom to get rope. He allegedly told the children
not to touch the stone. After Aquino left, 3/4 kids jumped inside the pit, Ylarde
included. The remaining kid jumped on top of the block, causing it to slide
downwards. 2 were able to get out but Ylarde wasn’t able to do so, and so the block
pinned him to the wall in a standing position. He sustained injuries and three days
later, Ylarde died. His parents filed a suit for damages against Aquino and Soriano
[principal], but the RTC dismissed the complaint for the following reasons:a.)
Digging done is in line with Work Education subject; b) Aquino exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person; c) Ylarde’s death was due to his own reckless
imprudence.
CA affirmed RTC. Petitioners base their action against Aquino [teacher] on
NCC 2176 for his alleged negligence that caused Ylarde’s death, while the action
against the principal was based on NCC 2180.

ISSUE:
Can both Aquino and Soriano be held liable?

RULING:
No. Only Aquino (Teacher) can be held liable.
The principal cannot be held liable because he is a head of an academic school, not
a school of arts and trade. SC cited Amadora v. CA wherein it was held NCC 2180
says that in an academic school, it is only the teacher who should be answerable for
torts committed by their students, and in a school of arts and trades, it is only the
school head who can be held liable. [LegMeth lesson: reddendo singula singulis
— “refers only to the last”]. Also, as admitted by Aquino himself, the principal did
not give any instruction regarding the digging. Now, here’s the twist: Aquino can be
held liable under NCC 2180 as the teacher-in-charge. HOWEVER, petitioners base
Aquino’s alleged liability on NCC 2176. Therefore, the question is WON there were
acts and omissions on Aquino’s part amounting to fault or negligence which have
direct causal relation to Ylarde’s death, and the answer is YES. Ylarde would not
have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by Aquino. He acted with fault
and gross negligence when he: a) Failed to avail himself of services of adult manual
laborers and instead utilized his pupils to make an excavation near a 1 ton concrete
stone which he knew to be a hazardous task;b) Required the children to remain inside
the pit even after they finished digging, knowing that the block was nearby;
c)Ordered them to level the soil when it was apparent that the stone was on the brink
of falling; d)Went to a place where he would not be able to check on the students’
safety; e) Left the children close to the excavation, an attractive nuisance.
It’s totally ridiculous how the lower court found Aquino to have exercised utmost
diligence of a very cautious person. The simple warning “not to touch the stone” is
of no use, considering the age of these children. He should have made sure that the
children are protected from all harm while they are in his company, since he stands in
loco parentis to his students. Also ridiculous is the claim that the digging work is
part of Work Education. For one, Aquino himself said that the principal made no
instructions requiring what students were to do. Also, it’s not in the lesson plan,
since Aquino decided all by himself to help Banez. Also, this activity should not be
placed alongside relatively lighter activities such as school gardening, tree planting
which could be legitimately part of the Work Education subject because these do not
expose the children to such risk.
Supreme Court does not agree with lower court that the injuries which led to
Ylarde’s death were caused by his own reckless imprudence. The degree of care
required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to
care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult,
but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons his
age and experience. (Left by themselves and tired from the strenuous digging, it was
natural that they would play around. Also note that it was not only Ylarde who
jumped into the hole.) Hence, Ylarde cannot be charged with reckless imprudence.
 SALVOSA V. IAC
G.R. NO. L-70458
OCTOBER 5, 1988

FACTS:

Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. However, it is also an

institution of arts and trade because BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational
department offering Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as
well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses.
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio Colleges Foundation
ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the
ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an
employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as well as orders
from Captain Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student of
the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy
B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the
BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for,
and convicted of the crime of Homicide. Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro
sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon and the BCF .

ISSUE:

Is Baguio Colleges Foundation subsidiarily liable?

RULING:

No. Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers
or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for “damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.” The
rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a
teacher, the latter “stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is
called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student.”
Likewise, “the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — ‘so long as (the students) remain in their
custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads
and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time.” Jimmy B. Abon cannot be
considered to have been “at attendance in the school,” or in the custody of BCF,
when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art.
2180 of the Civil Code be held solidary liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages
resulting from his acts.
 ST. FRANCIS V. CA

G.R NO. 82465

FEBRUARY 25, 1991

FACTS:

Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted
to join a school picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and
Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but
merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive
that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the
teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the
female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including
Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who
drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against petitioner and some
of their teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaint against
the school.

ISSUE:
Are petitioner school and teachers liable?

RULING:

No. Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee,
the act or omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee
was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the
teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. What
was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which did not have permit from the
school since it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge by
petitioner/principal of the planning of the picnic does not in any way consent to the
holding of the same.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the
award of damages to the respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where
Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the
picnic.
 PSBA V. CA

G.R. NO. 8469X

FEBRUARY 4, 1992

FACTS:

Carlitos Bautista is a junior college student enrolled in the Philippine School of

Business Administration (PSBA). Unfortunately, he was killed in a stabbing incident
that occurred inside the school premises. The assailant is an outsider to the
school.The present case was brought by the parents of the deceased before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila against the school and its officers for damages for
the death of their son. The suit impleaded the school and various school officials.
The parents of Carlitos Bautista alleged that the defendants were negligent and did
not provide adequate security measures to protect their students. Defendants argued,
however, that they are not covered by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, under
which they are sued. They asserted that the cause of action is hinged on quasi-delict,
which requires that there be no contract between the parties. However, their son’s
enrollment in the school evinces the existence of a contract. Therefore, they sought
to dismiss the petition, which was denied by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
(CA).Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is PSBA civilly liable under Art. 2180?

RULING:

No. The present case cannot be tried under Art. 2180.

Art. 2180 governs quasi-delicts. Quasi-delicts are extra-contractual; that is, it only
arises when there is no prior contract between the parties of the case. The Court
explained that the deceased, upon enrolling the academic institution, entered into a
contract with them: “When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which
both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide
the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other
hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations. Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit
or “built-in” obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes
or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no
student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the
realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in
the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and
limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.”
Thus, the CA was correct in dismissing PSBA’s petition, but it erred by grounding
its decision on this article.
 SOLIMAN V. TUAZON

G.R NO. 66207

MAY 18, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against private
respondent Republic Central Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc.
and one Jimmy Solomon, a security guard, as defendants. The complaint alleged that
Jimmy Solomon a duly appointed security guard under the employment, supervision
and control of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY, INC., headed
by Mr. Benjamin Serrano shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber
Revolver. The plaintiff was treated and confined at Angeles Medical Center,
Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff may not be able to attend to
his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for
a duration of from three to four months before his wounds would be completely
healed.
Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the
complaint stated no cause of action against it. Private respondent argued that it is
free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason
that private respondent school was not the employer of the security guard charged,
Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon.
Private respondent school further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the
Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of
establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil,
student or apprentice of the school.

ISSUE:

Can Republic Central Colleges be held liable for the acts or omissions of
Jimmy Solomon?

RULING:

No. The employer of Jimmy Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc.,
while the school was the client or customer of the R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is
settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work
of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or
watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards
attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency.
As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting
who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall
be assigned to it, the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from
the client whose premises or property are protected by the security guards. The fact
that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards
assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the
security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those
instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged
in the contract for services entered into with the security agency. There being no
employer-employee relationship between the Colleges and Jimmy Solomon,
petitioner student cannot impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of
security guard Solomon.
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or an
apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency
Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly
not available for imposing liability upon the Republic Central Colleges for the acts
or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.
 ST. MARY’S ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS

G.R NO. 143363,

FEBRUARY 6, 2002

FACTS:

February 13 to 20, 1995, defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog

City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees
were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of
the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other
high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The
jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same
school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the
jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained
from the accident. Spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case
against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the
vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the Regional
Trial Court. St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. St.
Marys Academy filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos?

RULING:

No. The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code,
pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not
having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. Under Article 218 of the
Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other
affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized
by the school or its teachers. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person
under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally
and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In this case, the
respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause
of the death of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that
the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the
reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James
Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched
Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and
control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a
minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor
driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be
pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys
Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and
the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
 PHILIPPINE RABBIT V. PHIL AMERICAN

G.R. NO. L-25142

MARCH 25, 1975

FACTS:

Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American Forwarders]

along the national highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the PRBL bus driven
by Pangalangan. As a result, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged
and could not be used for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of earnings amounting to
P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders.
PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American
Forwarders, Balingit, and Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not Pineda’s
employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground
that PRBL and Pangalangan had no cause of action against him. CFI dismissed the
complaint against Balingit, on the ground that he is not the manager of an
establishment as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Are the terms “employers” and “owners and managers of an establishment or

enterprise” embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless
operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the
damage arose?

RULING:

No. Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be

gathered from the context of Article 2180 of the Civil code that the term “manager”
(“director” in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of “employer”. Hence, no
tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be imposed on Balingit as manager of Phil-
American Forwarders, in connection with the vehicular accident in question, because
he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of Phil-American
Forwarders.
 PHILTRANCO V. CA

G.R NO. 120553,

JUNE 17, 1997

FACTS:

Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street
of Calbayog City. Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. driven by defendant
Rogasiones Manilhig y Dolira was being pushed by some persons in order to start
its engine. Some of the persons who were pushing the bus were on its back, while
the others were on the sides. As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the
bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A.
Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. As
the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly, its running motion
was also enhanced by the said functioning engine, thereby the subject bus bumped
on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell and, thereafter, was run
over by the said bus.

ISSUE:
Is Philtranco’s liability solidary (jointly & severally) with Manilhig?

RULING:
Yes. It had been consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of
a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the
tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with
the driver. As to solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides: Art. 2194. The
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Since the employer’s liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the
judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its
employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based
on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 2181. Whoever pays
for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter
what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
 CASTILEX V. VASQUEZ

G.R. NO. 132266

DECEMBER 21, 1999

FACTS:

Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña

Rotunda. He was traveling without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also
only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin
Abad, manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of a
Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but
instead of going around the Osmeña Rotunda he made a short cut against the flow
of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St. In
the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each
other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought
Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital.
Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an
acknowledgment of Responsible Party wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital
bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed
for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages was commenced by
Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So
Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. The trial
court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez. CASTILEX
and ABAD separately appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the
liability of the latter is only vicarious and not solidary with the former. Hence,
CASTILEX filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:

May an employer be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the
negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle?

RULING:

No. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees
within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-
employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the
employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task
when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may
find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee. It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager
of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence.
 FILAMER V. IAC

G.R NO. 75112

1992

FACTS:

Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. He is also employed as a janitor. The president

of FCI is Agustin Masa. Agustin has a son, Allan, who is the school bus (bus na
jeepney) driver. Allan lives with his dad. Funtecha also lives in the president’s house
free of charge while a student at FCI. It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after
classes to bring the kids home, then go back to the school, then go home in the school
jeep. He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning he’s supposed to
fetch the kids and bring them to school. One night, Funtecha wanted to drive home.
He has a student license. After a dangerous curb, and seeing that the road was clear,
Allan let Funtecha drive. Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction)
with glaring lights. Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan. Kapunan
was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung
tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). The jeep had only one functioning
headlight that night. TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan. SC reversed, saying that
FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter
was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and
primarily answerable.

ISSUE:

Can the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep be held liable?

RULING:

Yes. Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where
both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the
petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can
use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. It is indubitable under
the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was
routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the
school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's
license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in
his classrooms. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the
direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not, having a joy ride Funtecha
was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school.
The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf
of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility
by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause
"within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of
liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the
infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving the
vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of
the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant
was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's
business. Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. He need not have an official
appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held
responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at
the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that
Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial
duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris
tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or
employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of
its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its
employees Funtecha and Allan. There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the
use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver. There was thus no supervision
on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep. The
petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the
unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence
that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts
or omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180,
primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the
negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
 NPC V. CA

G.R. NO. 119121

FACTS:

On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power
Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City. Unfortunately, enroute
to its destination, one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-
collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three persons
riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other
passengers. The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and
PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC with the main duty of
supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects, but in this case it was
alleged that they own the dump trucks). The trial court rendered a decision absolving
NPC of any liability. PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
trial court's judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages.

ISSUE:

Should NPC, the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dump truck be solidarily
liable for the damages to the victims?

RULING:

Yes. In the provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into

by PHESCO and NPC, we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only"
contracting. In a "labor only" contract, the person acting as contractor is considered
merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers
in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by
him. Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding
that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal
contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor, including the latter's workers. Article
2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: "Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry." In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with
PHESCO and the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied
by it, shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the
negligence which gave rise to the action.
 LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT V. NAVIDAD

G.R. NO. 145804

FACTS:
14 Oct 1993, about 730pm, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA
LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While
Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the
security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an
altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence,
however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact
moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed
instantaneously. Marjorie Navidad (Nicanor’s widow), along with their children,
filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA,
the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of
her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-
claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and
averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
security guards. The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and
Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad
had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. TC: Rendered in
favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered
the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following: "a) 1) Actual
damages of P44,830.00; 2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; 3) Indemnity
for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; b) Moral damages of
P50,000.00; c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000; d) Costs of suit. TC: dismissed complaint
against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit. Prudent appealed
to the Court of Appeals. CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of
Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally
liable for the following amounts: a) P44,830.00 as actual damages; b) P50,000.00 as
nominal damages; c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for
the death of the deceased; and e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees. CA
ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a
contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place
where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the
corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed
that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that
Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the
evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having
been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by
Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert
evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not
have stopped the train. CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its
resolution of 10 October 2000.

ISSUE:

1. Is LRTA liable for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr.

2. Is Rodolfo Roman, Employee of LRTA Liable for the death of Navidad?

RULING:

1. No. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason
of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the
discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose
to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. PRUDENT could also
be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related
provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,13 of the Civil Code. (But there wasn’t
any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC)
The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part
of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable
on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The
liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. A
contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission
causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana,
Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise
even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between
the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing
the rules on tort to apply.
 2. Yes. There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability as Prudent is.
Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a
juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable
only for his own fault or negligence. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common
carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is
burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers. The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of
or injury to its passengers, provides "Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances. "Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and
1755." "Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers. "This liability of the common carriers
does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees." "Article 1763. A
common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission." The law requires common carriers
to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with
due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety
to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long
as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to
the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for
death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its
employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury,
a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of
injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence
of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that
the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which LRTA
and Roman, according to the CA, have failed to show, the presumption would be
that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be
proved.
 CASTILEX VS. VASQUEZ

G.R. NO. 132266

DECEMBER 21, 1999
FACTS:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Benjamin Abad
(Abad) was driving a company-issued car when he collided with the vehicle driven
by Romeo So Vasquez (Vasquez) which caused the latter’s death. Abad was a
manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation (Castilex.) Abad was then
leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after
having done overtime work for the petitioner when the incident happened.
The trial court held that Abad and Castilex are jointly and solidarily liable. The
Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court and held that Castilex is
only vicariously liable and not solidarily liable with Abad.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving
by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks
regardless of the time and circumstances.

ISSUE:
Is the employer, Castilex, liable for the negligent acts of its employee, Abad,
who was then driving the company-issued car?

RULING:
No. The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the
negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle
within the course or scope of his employment.
To the mind of this Court, Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a
vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the
normal working hours. Abad’s working day had ended; his overtime work had
already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known
as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had no connection
to petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather,
using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit
or one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that Abad was acting within the scope of the
functions entrusted to him, petitioner Castilex had no duty to show that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in providing Abad with a service
vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious
liability for the consequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle.
 FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE VS. IAC

G.R. NO. 75112

AUGUST 17, 1992

FACTS:
Kapunan, Sr. an 82-year-old retired teacher, was struck by a jeepney owned
by Filamer Christian Institute and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha.
Kapunan was hospitalized for 20 days. He thus instituted a criminal case against
Funtecha alone, who was convicted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence.
Thereafter, pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan instituted a civil case for
damages against Funtecha and Filamer and its president. The RTC and the CA found
Filamer, the school, liable for damages. Hence, this petition.
Filamer contends that it is not civilly liable because Funtecha was not its
employee, as he was only a working scholar assigned to clean the school premises
for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day. Filamer anchors its
contention on Section 14, Rule X of Book III of the Labor Code, which excludes
working scholars from the employment coverage as far as substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned.

ISSUE: Is Funtecha an employee of Filamer?

RULING:
YES. It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time
janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an
employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours
in the morning of each school day.
 In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of
Allan’s house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not
driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a “frolic of his own” but ultimately,
for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. Therefore,
the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the
steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the
petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond
the scope of his janitorial duties.
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on
which the petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions
of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III
provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall
be exercised; on what records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll;
and on the exclusion of working scholars from, and inclusion of resident physicians
in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive
law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14,
Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student
of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a
claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of
a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the
implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot
be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions
of the Civil Code.
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 119121;

AUGUST 14, 1998

FACTS:

In 1979, a dump truck owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) and
driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota
Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three (3) persons riding in the Toyota
Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.

On June 10, 1980, the heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages
against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO) before the CFI of Lanao del
Norte, Marawi City. When defendant PHESCO filed its answer to the complaint it
contended that it was not the owner of the dump truck which collided with the Toyota
Tamaraw but NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC
with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects. On
the other hand, NPC denied any liability and countered that the driver of the dump
truck was the employee of PHESCO. Granting, however, that NPC is the employer
of Ilumba, it claims that its liability shall only be limited to violations of the Labor
Code and not quasi-delicts.

The trial court absolved NPC of any liability. On appeal, the CA reversed the
trial court’s decision and held that Phesco is not liable for the tort of driver Ilumba,
as there was no employment relationship between Phesco and driver Ilumba. Under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to hold the employer liable for torts committed by
his employees within the scope of their assigned task, there must exist an employer-
employee relationship.

ISSUES:
1.) What is the relationship of NPC and PHESCO?
2.) Who between NPC and PHESCO is the employer of Ilumba and should then
be liable for damages to the victims?
RULING:
1.) PHESCO was engaged in "labor-only" contracting vis-à-vis NPC and as
such, it is considered merely an agent of the latter. In labor-only contracting, an
employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and the employees
of the "labor-only" contractor is created. Accordingly, the principal employer is
responsible to the employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if such employees had
been directly employed by the principal employer.
2.) Since PHESCO is only a "labor-only" contractor, the workers it supplied
to NPC, including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be considered as employees
of NPC. After all, it is axiomatic that any person (the principal employer) who enters
into an agreement with a job contractor, either for the performance of a specified
work or for the supply of manpower, assumes responsibility over the employees of
the latter.
With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article 2180 of
the Civil Code explicitly provides that: “[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO
and the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall
have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which
gave rise to the action.
 LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT V. NAVIDAD

G.R. NO. 145804,

FEBRUARY 6, 2003

FACTS:

Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He
got into an altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell
onto the tracks and was killed when a train came and ran over him.The Heirs of
Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver (Roman),
the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent).
The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages
to the heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train
driver Roan jointly and severally liable as well as removing the award for
compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal damages.
The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed
between Navidad and LRTA (by virtue of his having purchased train tickets and the
liability was caused by the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train
being managed by the LRTA and operated by Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA
for not having presented expert evidence showing that the emergency brakes could
not have stopped the train on time.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
2. Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
3. Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.
RULING:
1. Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason
of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of a common carrier. A common
carrier is required by the Civil Code to use utmost diligence in carrying passengers
with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only during the
course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where they
ought to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.Art. 1763 renders a common
carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or willful
acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise
of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such
death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by
simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault
or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier
to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.
2. Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art.
2176 of the New Civil Code. If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort
under Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee
Escartin is established, the employer, Prudent, would be held liable on the
presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of its employees. How then must the liability of the
common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand,
be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort
and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa
contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well
apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a
breach of ontract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability
had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been
breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
3. No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages. The award of nominal damages in addition to actual
damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.
MCKEE VS. IAC
G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
FACTS:

Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong
Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando,
Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck,
Loadstar, owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford
Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim
Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee,
Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two
hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward
from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford
Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When
the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the
bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane
of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the
way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the
left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car,
applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do
so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck,
which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.

The trial court found that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless
imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the law
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents), as
employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was further
asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the
said employee.
ISSUE:
Are the respondents as employers of the negligent driver, also liable for the
resulting damages?
RULING:

Yes. it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to
avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As
employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption
that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That
presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage. The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees. The answers of the private respondents in
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they
attempt to prove it.
 VALENZUELA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 115024
FEBRUARY 7, 1996
FACTS:

On June 24, 1990 at 2 am while driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue
towards the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat
tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away. She placed her
emergency lights and sought help. While she was pointing her tools to the man who
will help her fix the tires, she was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven
by Richard Li who was intoxicated and she slammed across his windshield and fell
to the ground. She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days while her leg
was amputated and was replaced with an artificial one.
The RTC found Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code while Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s
employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180.The CA
ruled that there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved
Li's employer.
ISSUE:

Should Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer, be held liable?

RULING:

Yes. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the
damage caused by the accident. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated
that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its
company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took
the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of
Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able
to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for
entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries
sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
 MERRITT VS. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R. NO. L-11154
MARCH 21, 1916

FACTS:
Plaintiff E. Meritt, a contractor, had a collision with the General Hospital
Ambulance which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any
whistle or horn. Merrit was severely injured. His condition had undergone
depreciation and his efficiency as a contractor was affected. The plaintiff is seeking
a certain amount for permanent injuries and the loss of wages during he was
incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. In order for Merritt to recover damages,
he sought to sue the government which later authorized the plaintiff to bring suit
against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said suit.

ISSUE:
Is the Government liable for the negligence of the ambulance driver?
RULING:
No. Art. 1903, Par. 5 of the Civil Code reads that “[t]he state is liable in this
sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in
which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.’ The
responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent,
duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged
with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim.

It is, therefore, evident that the State is only liable, for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of
paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent.
 INOCENCIO ROSETE, VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL,

G.R. NO. L-1120

AUGUST 31, 1948

FACTS:

Appellant Rosete, is claiming that his building were destroyed by fire that
came from the contiguous warehouse of the Emergency Control Administration,
ECA, located at No. 2262 Azcarraga, due to the negligence of a certain Jose Frayno
y Panlilio in igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter near a five gallon drum into
which gasoline was being drained, and of the officers of the said ECA, which is an
office or agency of the Government, in storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary
to the provisions of Ordinances of the City of Manila.

The claimant contends that the Auditor General erred in not finding that the
government agency or instrumentality known as the Emergency Control
Administration or the officers thereof, were guilty of negligence in storing a highly
combustible and inflammable substance in its warehouse on bodega in Manila in
violation of City Ordinances, and therefore the government is liable for the damages
sustained by the claimant under article 1903 of the Civil Code

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Government is liable for the damages sustained by

claimant.

RULING:

The Government is not liable. The responsibility of the state is limited by

article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent. a special agent, in the
sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of
law, is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in consequence
of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to
their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part
of the state in the organization of branches of the public service and the appointment
of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on
its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and that of private
persons interested in its operation
 MARCOS MENDOZA, VS. FRANCISCO DE LEON, ET AL.,

G.R. NO. L-9596

FEBRUARY 11, 1916

FACTS:
Action for damages is filed against the individual members of the municipal
council of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of
an exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of Act
No. 1643 of the Philippine Commission. After use of a little more than one year, the
plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted by the
herein defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the municipal council personally liable.

RULING:
The defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by
the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in
question.A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance
of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its
patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far
as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its contracts, validly
entered into, may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts of
its officers or agents within the scope of their employment in precisely the same
manner and to the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to
such matters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes
that the municipality is made liable to suits in the courts. Municipal corporations are
subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort.

The superior or employer must answer civilly of the negligence or want of

skill of his agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by which
another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations,
under the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and
are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of
liability coexist. To create such liability, it is fundamentally necessary that the act
done which is injurious to others must be within the scope of the corporate powers
as prescribed by charter or positive enactment; in other words, it must not be ultra
vires in the sense that it is not within the power or authority of the corporation to act
in reference to it under any circumstances.
 FONTANILLA VS. MALIAMAN

G.R. NO. L-55963

DECEMBER 1, 1989

FACTS:
A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven
officially by its regular driver, Hugo Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco
Fontanilla, which resulted in the latter's death. The parents of Francisco filed a suit
for damages against Garcia and the NIA, as Garcia's employer. After trial, the court
awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages to Spouses Fontanilla. NIA appealed.
The Solicitor General contends that the NIA does not perform solely and primarily
proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental
functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia,
who was not its special agent.
ISSUE:
May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages caused by the
negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent?

RULING:
Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a
corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable
for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special
agent.Section 1 of RA No. 3601 tells us that NIA is a government agency invested
with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is
governed by the Corporation Law. Section 2, subsection f of PD 552 provides that
NIA also has its own assets and liabilities and has corporate powers to be exercised
by a Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection b of PD 552 provides that NIA may
sue and be sued in court..Of equal importance is the case of National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA
766, which propounds the thesis that "the NAWASA is not an agency performing
governmental functions; rather it performs proprietary functions . . . ." The functions
of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional
functions of government even though the service rendered caters to the community
as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society.
 Like the NAWASA, the National Irrigation Administration was not created
for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially
a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public
welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-
function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving,
rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines,
including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the
community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but
these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the
irrigation of lands.
 CITY OF MANILA VS. TEOTICO

G.R. NO. L-23052

JANUARY 29, 1968

FACTS:

In 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and
P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a
jeepney. When a jeepney came along to a stop, he stepped down from the curb to
board the jeepney but he fell inside an uncovered manhole. Due to the fall, his head
hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof
to pierce his left eyelid. Several persons pulled him out of the manhole and one of
them brought him to the hospital, where his injuries were treated. Thereafter, he sued
for damages, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, the City of Manila, the mayor,
the city engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer, and the chief of police.
CFI Manila ruled against him but the CA, on appeal, ruled that the City of Manila
should pay damages. The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the
ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall not be liable for damages caused
by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a
special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the
accident happened in national highway.

ISSUE:

Is the City of Manila liable?

RULING:

Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law
and that the charter of Manila is a special law while the Civil Code is a general law.
However, looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the charter of
Manila establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for:
"damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers
"to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing
or attempting to enforce said provisions." There is no particular exemption but
merely a general exemption. Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
provides a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . .
liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" —
specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said
section 4 of the charter of Manila refers to liability arising from negligence, in
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due
to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged
defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only
raised for the first time in the City’s motion for reconsideration in the Court of
Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a national
highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the road is national,
provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the City’s control and
supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the defective conditions
thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have control and supervision over
the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been doing constant and
regular inspection of the city’s roads, P. Burgos included.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. HON. PERFECTO R. PALACIO,
ET AL.

G.R. NO. L-20322

MAY 29, 1968

FACTS:

Ildefnso Ortiz instituted a civil action against the Handog Irrigation

Association, Inc., a corporation, and the irrigation Service Unit, an office under the
Department of Public Works and Communications to reover possession, with
damages, a 958 sqm lot which the Irrigation Association allegedly entered and
occupied. For failure to answer, the defendants were declared in default.

The Republic through the Solicitor General, moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the Irrigation Service Unit has no juridical entity to sue
and be sued. The motion was denied on the gorund that defendant is engaged in the
business of selling irrigation pumps on installment plan. A writ of execution was
issued and later on a writ of garnishment was issued against the deposit/trust fund of
the Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine National Bank. The Solicitor General
moved for the lifting of the order on the ground that the trust fund is a public fund
exempt from garnishment. On appeal, the CA sustained the validity of the writ.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Irrigation Service Unit may be sued and the trust fund be
the subject of garnishment.

RULING:

The Court ruled that the Irrigation Service Unit is a government engaged in
the administration of irrigation system to promote an economic policy of sustaining
development and growth in agriculture. Aside from being an agency of the
government pursuing a governmental function, the fact that is collecting payment
for irrigation pumps will not make the Irrigation Service Unit one engaged in
business. The installment payment being collected is not for profit but merely for the
purpose of financing the cost of the pump and its maintenance and administration.

In addition, although the State allowed its self to be sued, the trust fund may
not be automatically the subject of garnishment due to the fact that it is a public fund.
Being a public fund, it may only be appropriated by law and may not be use for
garnishment at the expense of the public.
 ARANETA VS. JOYA
G.R. NO. L-25172
MAY 24, 1974
FACTS:

Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, then general manager of the Ace
Advertising, proposed to the board of directors that an employee, Ricardo Taylor,
be sent to the United States to take up special studies in television but the board
failed to act on the proposal. Still, respondent sent Taylor abroad, on September
1953, and assured J. Antonio Araneta, company director, that the trip will be funded
by other parties, as respondent later confirmed in a memorandum. From September
1, 1953 to March 15, 1954, Taylor continued receiving his salaries while abroad. His
salaries were ordered and approved by the respondent and were included in the semi-
monthly payroll checks of the corporation employees. Three of the checks were
signed by the company treasurer, who also put up part of the bill connected with
Taylor’s trip and handed him letters for delivery in the US. A total of P5,043.20 was
disbursed by Ace Advertising for Taylor’s travel and studies. The company filed a
complaint for recovery of sum, with the court of first instance in Manila, alleging
they had no knowledge of the engagement neither they authorized nor ratified it. The
respondent denied all charges, also alleging that it was for the company’s benefit. A
3rd-party complaint was filed against Vicente Araneta, company treasurer, for
signing the checks, and Ricardo Taylor. Vicente Araneta and respondent claimed
they signed the documents in good faith.

The trial court ordered the respondent to pay the sum disbursed by Ace
Advertising, P5,043.20, and dismissed the third-party complaint. The respondent
appealed and the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision but reversed the judgment
on the 3rd-party case stating that Vicente Araneta and Taylor were complicit in the
unauthorized disbursement of corporate moneys jointly with the appellant.

ISSUE:

Is Antonio De Joya guilty of a quasi-delict?

RULING:

Yes. The Court upheld the decision of the CA. The Court agrees that the
respondent neglected to perform his duties properly, to the damage of the firm of
which he was an officer and affirmed that the acts of the respondent, Vicente
Araneta, and Ricardo Taylor affirm their guilt of unauthorized disbursement of
corporate moneys, without evidence to prove otherwise. And as it was an
unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds, and it was these three without
whose acts the same could not have happened, the juridical situation was a simple
quasi-delict by them committed upon the corporation, for which solidary liability
should have been imposed upon all in the first place, Art. 2194, New Civil Code;
and only De Joya having been sued and made liable by the corporation, it was the
right of the latter to ask that his two joint tortfeasors be made to shoulder their
proportional responsibility.
 FELIX LANUZO VS. SY BON PING AND SALVADOR MENDOZA

G.R. NO. L-53064

SEPTEMBER 25, 1980

FACTS:

A Complaint for damages was instituted in the Court of First Instance of

Camarines Sur by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping, the owner and
operator of a freight truck and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. The complaint averred
that at about five o'clock in the afternoon of July 24, 1969, while Salvador Mendoza
was driving the truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua,
Camarines Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, he rammed into the
residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and store were
completely razed to the ground causing damage to plaintiff in the total amount of
P13,000.00. Plaintiff averred that by reason thereof he became destitute as he lost
his means of livelihood from the store which used to give him a monthly income of
P300.00. The RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff and ordered the defendants to pay
jointly and severally the amount of damages awarded by the court. On appeal, the
CA certified the case to to this instance on pure questions of law.

ISSUE:

Is the employer, Sy Bon Ping, solidarily liable with Salvador Mendoza, his
driver?

RULING:

Yes. For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and
operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the liability of his employer, Sy
Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the same Code, which
explicitly provides that: [e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his
negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, 8 he is likewise
responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver)
Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary.
 But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for damages,
the employer may demand reimbursement from his employee (driver) for whatever
amount the employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim.
 VILUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NOS. L-21477-81

APRIL 29, 1966

FACTS:

Seven persons were killed and thirteen others were injured in Bangar, La
Union, on February 16, 1958, when a passenger bus on which they were riding
caught fire after hitting a post and crashing against a tree. The bus, owned by
petitioner Viluan and driven by Hermenegildo Aquino, came from San Fernando,
La Union and was on its way to Candon, Ilocos Sur. As the bus neared the gate of
the Gabaldon school building in the municipality of Bangar, another passenger bus
owned by Patricio Hufana and driven by Gregorio Hufana tried to overtake it but
that instead of giving way, Aquino increased the speed of his bus and raced with the
overtaking bus. Aquino lost control of his bus as a result of which it hit a post,
crashed against a tree and then burst into flames.

After trial, the court found that the accident was due to the concurrent
negligence of the drivers of the two buses and held both, together with their
respective employers, jointly and severally liable for damages. The CA held that
only petitioner Francisca Viluan, as operator of the bus, is liable for breach of
contract of carriage. The driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, cannot be made jointly and
severally liable with petitioner because he is merely the latter's employee and is in
no way a party to the contract of carriage. Neither may respondents Patricio Hufana
and Gregorio Hufana be held liable in the opinion of the appellate court because the
plaintiffs did not amend complaints in the main action so as to assert a claim against
the respondents as third party defendants.

ISSUE:

Should the respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana be held liable
although the plaintiffs did not amend complaints in the main action so as to assert a
claim against the respondents as third party defendants?
RULING:

Yes. In this case the third-party complaints filed by petitioner and her driver
charged respondents with direct liability to the plaintiffs. It was contended that the
accident was due "to the fault, negligence, carelessness and imprudence of the third
party defendant Gregorio Hufana" and, in petitioner's motion for leave to file a third
party complaint, it was stated that "Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana were not
made parties to this action, although the defendants are entitled to indemnity and/or
subrogation against them in respect of plaintiff's claim."

It should make no difference therefore whether the respondents were brought in as

principal defendants or as third-party defendants. As Chief Justice Moran points out,
since the liability of the third-party defendant is already asserted in the third-party
complaint, the amendment of the complaint to assert such liability is merely a matter
of form, to insist on which would not be in keeping with the liberal spirit of the Rules
of Court.

Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner springs from contract
while that of respondents arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled
in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to
the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of
another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and
severally liable for damages.
 LIM V. DE LEON

G.R. NO. L-22554

AUGUST 29, 1975

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor

launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto
Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan
alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, in his
capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation
upon Persons against Jikil Taha. June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon,
upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the
Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment
commander in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.

Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to

impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party,
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the
same. Upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando
Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch
"SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. Plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but
the latter refused. Likewise, Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations
with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin
Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the same was the subject
of a criminal offense.
ISSUES:

1. WON defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the
seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even
if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime

2. WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for

damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch
was unlawful

RULING:

1. NO. Defendant-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered the

premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a
search warrant; that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and
without the consent of Delfin Lim. There can be no question that without the proper
search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the premises of another
without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. And since in the present
case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have
violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search
and seizure.

2. YES. Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32

and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows: "ART. 32. Any
public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been
violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer
or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be
awarded. Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered
declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce
de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3,000.00 as actual
damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in addition, P750.00 for attorney's
fees.
 ABERCA V. VER

G.R. NO. L-69866

APRIL 15, 1988

FACTS:

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations
of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by
General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-
terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to
sow disturbances in Metro Manila,"
Plaintiffs’ allegations: That complying with said order of Ver, elements of
the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial
search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party
confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs
were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who
interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in
order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them;
that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and
deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from
plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously
known to and sanctioned by defendants. Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory
damages of P39,030; moral damages of at least P150K each or a total of P3M;
exemplary damages of at least P150K each or a total of P3M; and attorney's fees not
less than P200K.
Respondents’ contentions: A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants,
through their counsel, then Sol-Gen. Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs
may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise
of a damage suit because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2)
assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune
from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the
complaint states no cause of action against the defendants.
ISSUES:

1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a
civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and
other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.
2. WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be
answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person
whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.
3. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to (dome
of the) plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR of
the court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to dismiss

HELD:
1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not
render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the
right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas
corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. [a] The purpose Art. 32 CC is to
provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the
Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights
with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the
temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is
necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable
and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling
power. [b] The invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally
misplaced. It cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission
untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights
and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution.
The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or
low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times. [c] Art. 32 of CC
which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another does not
exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability
under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation
of the RPC or other penal statute. [d] Even assuming that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights
and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of
their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel
and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against
torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

2. NO. Although the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case,

as contended by respondents, the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art.
32 CC. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly"
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the
damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. [a] The doctrine of respondent
superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to
master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship
exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. But in this
case, Art. 32 governs. [b] By this provision, the principle of accountability of public
officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and acquires a larger
dimension. A superior have to answer for the transgressions of his subordinates
against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Hence, Art.
32 of CC makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for
the transgression joint tortfeasors. [c] To determine the sufficiency of the cause of
action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered.
For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint. [d] So, under the above principles, it is difficult to
justify the TC’s dismissal for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the
defendants, except Maj.Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba. The complaint contained
allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be
sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Art. 32 of
CC.

3. NO. The body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was
filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding
of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he
furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the
lawyers of plaintiffs In filing the motion to set aside the resolution, the signing
attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to
do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be
assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party
concerned, which was never done in this case. Petition granted. Case remanded to
the respondent court for further proceedings.
 MHP GARMENTS, INC. V. CA

22 SEPTEMBER 1994

FACTS:

MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the
exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was
given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court
of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." Sometime in
October 1983, MHP received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz,
Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia without any authority. De Guzman, an employee of petitioner
corporation, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report
of the Philippine Constabulary (PC).

De Guzman, Peñafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction
Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market.
Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on
display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed
private respondents. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to
petitioner corporation for safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfair competition
was then filed against private respondents. After a preliminary investigation, the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private
respondents. He also ordered the return of the seized items which was not
immediately returned despite demands. Private respondents had to go personally to
petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized
items were turned. The other items returned were of inferior quality. Private
respondent then filed a Civil Case against the petitioners for sums of money and
damages. The trial court ruled for the private respondents. The decision was
appealed to the respondent court. It affirmed the decision with modification. MHP
filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:

WON the search and seizure was legal

RULING:

No. The evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private
respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation received information that private
respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October
1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the
parties. De Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents.
They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was
made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized.
The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the
stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the
PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they
did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so,
they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate
the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. The search
and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure.
Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched." These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown
by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a
preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint
for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods.
 MARCIA V. CA (PAJE)

205 PHIL 147

JANUARY 27, 1983

FACTS:

Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus. His bus collided with the jeep driven
by Clemente Marcia, causing the latter’s death and physical injuries to herein
petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Paje was charged with homicide and
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. A civil case was also instituted
against him by herein petitioners for reckless imprudence and negligence in driving
the passenger bus. He was convicted in the criminal case in the RTC. However, he
was acquitted in the CA. The CA ruled that criminal negligence is wanting and that
Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence, for the case was of pure accident. The
defendants presented the copy of said criminal case to the court handling the civil
case against them. The civil case was dismissed.

ISSUE:

WON the acquittal in the criminal case would result to a dismissal in the civil
case

RULING:

YES. The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not
necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Petitioner also
relies on Art 33 CC. However, the said article speaks only of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the
result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no
independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.
Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be
non-existent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will not
carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
 MADEJA V. CARO

211 PHIL 469

DECEMBER 21, 1983

FACTS:

Dr. Eva A. Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for

the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the
widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The
offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action
for damages." The criminal case still pending, Madeja sued Dr. Japzon for damages
in the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence
of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which
invoked Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: "Sec. 3. Other
civil actions arising from offenses. - In all cases not included in the preceding section
the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the
same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action.". . .

ISSUE:

WON an independent civil action may be filed during the pendency of the
criminal case

RULING:

YES. Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the
Civil Code is the applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted herein below:
"Sec, 2. Independent civil action. - … an independent civil action entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence". "Art. 33. In cases
of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence."
 ARAFILES V. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC

MARCH 25, 2004

FACTS:

Respondent Morales wrote an article for People’s Journal Tonight based on

the sworn statement in the police blotter and interview of Emelita Despuig where
Despuig alleged that Arafiles raped her the month before then attempted to rape her
the night she filed a complaint. Morales attempted to contact Arafiles but since the
latter’s office was still closed at that time (past 12mn – he works for NIAS-
PAGASA), he was not able to do so. About a year following the published article,
Arafiles filed action for damages based on the alleged “grossly malicious and overly
sensationalized” report by Morales which cast aspersions on his character, being the
object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and
serial rapist. RTC: in favor of Arafiles CA: in favor of Morales, et. al. based on
doctrine of fair comment

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not
attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages

RULING:

NO. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation,
but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case,
had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should
be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively
perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press
reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently
with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point
of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. First
discussed applicable provisions (A33, 19, 21 NCC): Article 33 contemplates a civil
action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal
aspect of the case.A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately
from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal
action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the
Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability
arising therefrom.

Then discussed how to determine if a published work is libelous: In actions

for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.Then discussed the
petitioner’s allegation that the news item as a “malicious sensationalization” failed:
even though the police blotter only shows 1 count of abduction and rape, respondent
was present when Emelita executed her sworn-statement where she reported an
abduction with rape and an abduction incident (where no rape occurred, but was
about to happen) – so respondent’s article was not maliciously sensationalized. The
presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a
sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. Respondents could of course have
been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven
paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS
actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita.

The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and complainant Emelita

were eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the
narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police
headquarters. Then mentioned doctrine: The newspapers should be given such
leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their
important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and
[editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith
and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression,
for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
 DISINI JR. ET. AL, V. SEC. OF JUSTICE

G.R. NO. 203335

FEBRUARY 14, 2004

FACTS:

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.
Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that
links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:

1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that
he needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for
the general public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or
friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and
payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies,
banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities,
hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail
address or telephone.

This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of

simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The
cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information
and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not
filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace
technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of
the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting
defamatory statements against him that people can read.

And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from
others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into
or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him
through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit
trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access
to the internet. For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the
use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.

Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause
havoc to the computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly useful
institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of innocent
individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites
that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs, and memories. The
government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from
happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.But
petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The
government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into
cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the
system.

Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on

February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining
order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent
government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged provision in Cybrecrime Law are constitutional.

RULING:

The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime Prevention Act of

2012 for the purpose of regulating access to and use of cyberspace. Several sections
of the law define relevant cyber crimes and enable the government to track down
and penalize violators.
Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and
19 of the Act as unconstitutional. Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of
unsolicited commercial electronic communications, commonly known as spams,
that seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale of products and services unless the
recipient affirmatively consents, or when the purpose of the communication is for
service or administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users, or
“when the following conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic
communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject
receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same
source; (bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise
the source of the electronic message; and (cc) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the
message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.”
The government argued that unsolicited commercial communications amount
to both nuisance and trespass because they tend to interfere with the enjoyment of
using online services and that they enter the recipient’s domain without prior
permission.The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial speech,
which does not receive the same level of protection as other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression ,”but is nonetheless entitled to protection.” It ruled
that the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited communications “would deny a
person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to
him.” Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional. Section
12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant “to collect or
record traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted
by means of a computer system.” Traffic data under this Section includes the origin,
destination, route, size, date, and duration of the communication, but not its content
nor the identity of users.The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority
curtails their civil liberties and set the stage for abuse of discretion by the
government. They also claimed that this provision violates the right to privacy and
protection from the government’s intrusion into online communications.According
to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of private communications, it
must survive the rational basis standard of whether it is narrowly tailored towards
serving a government’s compelling interest. The Court found that the government
did have a compelling interest in preventing cyber crimes by monitoring real-time
traffic data.

As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first

recognized that the right at stake concerned informational privacy, defined as “the
right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without
surveillance and intrusion.” In determining whether a communication is entitled to
the right of privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether the person
claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy over the communication,
and (2) whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively reasonable
in the society.

The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of
privacy over their communications transmitted online. However, it did not find the
expectation as objectively reasonable because traffic data sent through internet
“does not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender
and the recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.”Even though the
Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not enjoy the objective
reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data may reveal the
personal information of its sender or recipient, against which the Section fails to
provide sufficient safeguard. The Court viewed the law as “virtually limitless,
enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing
whatever specified communication they want.”

Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and
definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to privacy.Section 19 authorizes the
Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a computer data found to be in
violation of the Act. The Petitioners argued that this section also violated the right
to freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.The Court first recognized that computer data
constitutes a personal property, entitled to protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Also, the Philippines’ Constitution requires the government to secure
a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal property or to block a form
of expression. Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court
found it unconstitutional.
 MVRS v. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL

G.R. No. 135306,

JANUARY 28, 2003

FACTS:

The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL (IDCP), a local

federation of more than 70 Muslim religious orgs, and some individual Muslims
filed in the RTC Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class
suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS,
et.al. Complaint alleged that what was published in BULGAR was insulting and
damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the
Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the
feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam; that on account of these
libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Phil but the entire
Muslim world, esp. every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries. MVRS
claimed it was merely an expression of belief/opinion and was published without
malice. Also, it did not mention respondents as object of the article, hence, were not
entitled to damages. RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of
action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically
identified. CA reversed: it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation
was directed to all adherents of Islamic faith.”

ISSUES:

1. WON elements of libel exist

2. WON the cause of action should rise from an intentional tortuous act
causing mental distress

RULING:

1. NO. Defamation means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame

or reputation through false and malicious statements. Words which are merely
insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general
abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do
not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for
special damages.

2. NO. The cause of action is libel. Action arising from an intentional tortuous
act causing mental distress cannot be sustained in this case, for such action is
personal in nature, and since no particular individual was identified in the disputed
article, such cause of action cannot be sustained.

Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION An "emotional distress"

tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage
the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. The
purported damage caused by the published article falls under principle of relational
harm - which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of
defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm - which includes
injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional
distress. The present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle
of tort actions for defamation. To recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a)
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of plaintiff; (b)
conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) causal connection between defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) the plaintiff's mental distress was
extreme and severe.
 SALTA V. DE VEYRA

202 PHIL 527

SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

FACTS:

Two cases involving the same issue disposed of by two judges in a manner
directly in opposition of each other. For a uniform ruling that would authoritatively
settle this regrettable conflict of opinion, the two cases have been consolidated for a
single decision. Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the
Malolos' branch. His duty was to grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of
loans, depending on the amount of the loan applied for. In disregard of the pertinent
rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank, Salta indiscriminately granted
certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in manner characterized by
negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with
the amount of the loans. PNB filed two civil actions to recover losses the bank
suffered (Civil Case No. 79583, Civil Case No. 88343). With this the bank filed a
criminal action against Salta, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Salta was acquitted in the criminal case, and filed Motions to Dismiss in each
of the two civil cases. It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de
Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took diametrically opposing views, the
former denying the motion, the latter granting it.

ISSUE:

WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate

civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
RULING:

NO. The civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the
result of the latter." Acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil
case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even
civilly, the accused would not be liable. ART 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence.

The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is
fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The
criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud,
one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. Based on the same
acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly alleged
fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the
complaints. The offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other
offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action
because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of
action. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling, a specie of an offense
committed by means of fraud, where the civil case may be filed separately and
proceed independently of the criminal case, regardless of the result of the latter. That
there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans which
rendered him liable for his acts, which fraud is positively and easily identifiable in
the manner and scheme aforementioned.
 CAPUNO V. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. L-26737

APRIL 30, 1965

FACTS:

The case arose from a vehicular collision. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery
truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved
fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and
Rizalina Paras. Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless
imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. The information was subsequently amended to
include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. While the criminal case
was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil
action, also for damages, in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. Included in the complaint was a claim
for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of
Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the criminal case both the heirs
of Capuno and the Estate of were represented by their respective counsel as private
prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and
Augusto M. Ilagan. In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi
moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case.
Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned, they no
longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed
and received compensation for the death of their decedent; and (2) that on the part
of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil
action.
The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was
disallowed by the Court and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an
amending order. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders. The parties in
the civil case entered into a "Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the
Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement
of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the
Workmen's Compensation Act." The Court approved the compromise and
accordingly dismissed the case. At that time the criminal case was still pending;
judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges
against him. Prior thereto, herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages
against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This is
the action which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its
order of February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has been taken. The
grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court
found to be "well taken" were; (1) that the action had already prescribed; and (2) that
appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the
payment to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum, in turn, was sought to be recovered by
the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled by them in
their compromise.

ISSUE:

Whether the action had already prescribed.

RULING:

YES. There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of
damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4)
years (Article 1146, Civil Code). Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim
ex-delicto, that is, under the provisions of the Penal Code, when they intervened in
the criminal case against Jon Elordi. The information therein, it may be recalled, was
amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs
of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. But appellants'
intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's
order to the effect. And when they commenced the civil action on September 26,
1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then chose to
pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would have
been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent
judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. In filing the civil action as they did
appellants correctly considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action,
pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which read: ART. 31. When the
civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained
of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. ART. 33. In cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
 CORPUS V. PAJE

28 SCRA 1062

JULY 31, 1969

FACTS:

December 23, 1956 – Felardo Paje was driving a Victory Liner bus. It collided
with a jeepney driven by Clemente Marcia in Lubao, Pampanga. As a result of the
collision, Marcia died while two other people were physically injured. An
information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed against Paje. Marcia’s heirs reserved their right to institute a
separate civil action against Paje. Paje was later found guilty on November 7, 1960.
November 21, 1961 – Pending Paje’s appeal, the window and children of Marcia
instituted the separate civil action for damages arising from the accident against Paje
and Victory Liner, praying that the defendants be jointly and severally liable.
November 9, 1962 – Paje was acquitted by the appellate court, saying that the
collision was purely an accident. December 29, 1962 – Paje filed a motion to dismiss
the civil action on the ground that his acquittal barred the said action but the motion
was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the civil action against Paje can still prosper despite his acquittal.

RULING:

No. Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of
an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and
shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. The article mentions only the
crimes of defamation, fraud, (estafa) and physical injuries. Although in the case of
Dyogi vs. Yatco this Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33
of the Civil Code includes homicide, it is to be borne in mind that the charge against
Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for
homicide and physical injuries. In People vs. Buan, the Court ruled that the “offense
of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof.” Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence
comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action
is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that
the injured party reserved. With regard to the issue of prescription, the Court ruled
that the action had indeed prescribed because the prescription period was pegged at
4 years (A1146, CC) and began to run on the day the quasi-delict was committed.
 MADEJA V. CARO

211 PHIL 469

DECEMBER 21, 1983

FACTS:

DR. EVA A. JAPZON was accused of homicide through reckless imprudence

for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. In the information, the
offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action for
damages. The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon
for damages, alleging that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr.
Japzon. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the respondent judge granted
on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

WON a civil action for damages may be instituted pending the resolution of a
criminal case

RULING:

YES. Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the
Civil Code is the applicable provision. Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the
cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.) Art. 33. In
cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)
 DULAY V. CA (SAFEGUARD, SUPERGUARD)

243 SCRA 220

APRIL 3, 1995

FACTS:

Benigno Torzuela, a security guard on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang,"

and Atty. Napoleon Dulay had an altercation. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. Dulay.
Maria Benita Dulay, widow of Dulay, filed an action for damages against Torzuela
and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (SAFEGUARD) and/or
Superguard Security Corp. (SUPERGUARD), alleged employers of defendant
Torzuela.

Respondent: That Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of
his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed w/ deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC. That a complaint
for damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one filed by petitioners) cannot
lie, since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Art
365 of the RPC. That petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering
that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability. That Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only
to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v CA)

Petitioner: The incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants. Torzuela's wanton and reckless discharge
of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD
was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of
its employee to avoid the injury. That their cause of action against the private
respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180. That quasi-delicts are not
limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary,
citing Andamo v. IAC. Thus, Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-
delict actionable under Art 2176. That Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also
actionable under Art 33 and Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action

RULING:

YES. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: "Sec 1.

Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute
it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil
action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission of the accused." It is well-settled that the filing of an
independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents
evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express
reservation. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. The term
"physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries
causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co; Carandang v. Santiago). It is not
the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja
v. Caro). Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action
may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it
must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with
homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was
charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on
Article 33 lies.
 VELAYO V. SHELL CO OF THE PHILS

100 PHIL 186

OCTOBER 31, 1956

FACTS:

Since the start of Commercial Air Line, Inc’s (CALI) operations, its fuel needs
were all supplied by Shell Company of the P.I., Ltd, (Shell). Desmond Fitzgerald,
Shell’s Credit Manager was in charge of collecting payment. Any extensions of term
of payment, however, had to be decided by Stephen Crawford and later by Wildred
Wooding. As of August 1948, Shell’s books showed a balance of P170,162.58 in its
favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI. Shell had reasons to believe that the
financial condition of Shell was far from being satisfactory. Alfonso Sycip, CALI”s
President of Board of Directors, offered to Fitzgerald CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane,
which was then in California. The offer was declined by Crawford. Aug 6, 1948,
management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors in a luncheon, and
informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation.
Alexander Sycip, Secretary of the Board of Directors of CALI, explained the
memorandum agreement executed by CALI with Phil Air Lines Inc on Aug 4,
regarding the proposed sale to PAL of the aviation equipment of CALI. Alfredo
Velayo, Auditor of CALI, discussed the balance sheets of CALI.

The balance sheet made mention of the Douglas C-54 plane. There was a
general understanding among all creditors present on the desirability of
consummating the sale in favor of PAL. Then followed a discussion on the payment
of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for the accounts due to employees,
the Government, and the National Airports Corp. The other creditors disputed such
contention of preference. No understanding was reached on the matter of preference
of payment and it was then generally agreed that the matter be further studied by a
working committee to be formed. Mr. Fitzgerald of Shell, Atty. Agcaoili of National
Airports Corp., and Atty. Alexander Sycip were appointed to the working
committee. Those present in the meeting were of the unanimous opinion that it
would be advantageous not to present suits against CALI but to strive for a fair pro-
rata division of its assets. The management of CALI announced that in case of non-
agreement of the creditors, it would file insolvency proceedings. Aug 9, 1948,
working committee discussed methods of achieving objectives, which were to
preserve the assets of CALI and to study the way of making a fair division of all the
assets among the creditors. However, negotiation on the division of assets was left
pending. On the same day (Aug 9), Shell effected a telegraphic transfer of all its
credit against CALI to the American Corporation Shell Oil Co., Inc., assigning its
credit amounting to $79,440. This was followed on Aug 10 by a deed of assignment
of credit amounting to $85,081.29.

Aug 12, 1948 American Shell Oil Co filed a complaint against CALI in the
Superior Court of the State of California, USA, for the collection of assigned credit
of $79,440, and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued against a C-54 plane.
Sept 17, 1948 an amended complaint was filed to recover assigned credit of
$85,081.29 and a supplemental attachment for a higher sum against the C-54 plane,
plus miscellaneous personal properties. Unaware of Shell’s assignment of credit,
CALI on Aug 12, 1948 approved the memorandum agreement of sale to PAL, and
noted that “the Board had been trying to reach an agreement with creditors… to
prevent insolvency proceedings, but so far no definite agreement had been reached.”
First week of Sept 1948, National Airports Corp learned of Shell’s action in the US
and hastened to file its own complaint with attachment against CALI in the CFI of
Manila.

Oct 7, 1948 CALI filed a petition for voluntary insolvency. An order of

insolvency was issued by the court on the same day. Mr. Alfredo Velayo was
appointed Assignee in the proceedings. Velayo instituted case against Shell for the
purpose of securing writ of injunction restraining Shell from prosecuting against
CALI, and as an alternative, that Shell be ordered to pay damages double the value
of the plane if the case in the US will defeat the procurement of CALI of its plane.
Dec 22, 1948, Court denied petition because whether the conveyance of Shell’s
credit was fraudulent or not, the Phil court would not be in a position to enforce its
orders as against the American corporation Shell Oil Co., Inc., which is outside the
jurisdiction of the Phils. Plaintiff confined his action to the recovery of damages
against Shell. Lower court dismissed the case.
Defendant’s Comments: Assignment of credit in favor of American Shell was for
valuable consideration and made in accordance with established commercial
practices. It has no interest in the case instituted by American Shell, as they are
separate and distinct corporations. Fitzgerald was merely invited to the luncheon-
meeting, without knowing the purpose for which it was called. Fitzgerald could not
have officially represented Shell because authority resides on Crawford.

ISSUES:

1. WON Shell Co., of the P.I. Ltd, taking advantage of its knowledge of the
existence of CALI’s airplane C-54 at California, USA, acted in bad faith and
betrayed the confidence and trust of other creditors of CALI present in said meeting
by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation
Shell Oil Company, Inc., thus defeating the purpose of the informal meetings of
CALI’s principal creditors and depriving the plaintiff of the means of obtaining the
plane, or its value, to the detriment and prejudice of other CALI creditors who were
consequently deprived of their share in the distribution of said value

2. WON by reason of said betrayal of confidence and trust, Shell may be

made to answer for the damages, and if so, the amount of such damages

RULING:

1. YES, Shell acted in bad faith. It is evident that Shell, upon learning the
precarious economic situation of CALI and that will all probability, it could not get
much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred claims of other creditors,
entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets. The telegraphic transfer made
without knowledge and at the back of other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and
surprise move that enabled Shell to collect almost all if not the entire amount of its
credit, but the Court of Justice (SC) cannot countenance such attitude at all, and
much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of Philippine Government and
local business. Shell’s transfer of credit would have been justified only if Fitzgerald
had declined to take part in the working committee and frankly and honestly
informed the other creditors present that he had no authority to bind his principal
and that the latter was to be left free to collect its credit from CALI by whatever
means his principal deemed wise and were available to it. But then, such information
would have dissolved all attempts to come to an amicable conciliation and would
have precipitated the filing of CALI’s voluntary insolvency proceedings and
nullified the intended transfer of Shell’s credit to American Shell.

2. YES, Shell must answer for damages. Section 37 of the Insolvency Law
states, Sec 37. If any person, before the assignment is made, having notice of the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, or having reason to believe that
insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced, embezzles or disposes of ay
money, goods, chattels, or effects of the insolvent, he is chargeable therewith, and
liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought to be
embezzled or disposed of, to be received for the benefit of the insolvent estate. There
are doubts, however, as to the applicability of this provision, as it is contented that
what Shell really disposed of was its own credit and not CALI’s property, although
this was practically the effect and result of the scheme. The same result, however,
may be achieved in applying the provisions of the Civil Code.
 SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA

297 SCRA 469

OCTOBER 8, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight attendant of Petitioner

Company. During a stop-over in Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow
crew members Thamer and Allah and had breakfast in their hotel room. While there,
Allah left and Thamer attempted to rape her. She was saved by hotel security
personnel who heard her cries for help. She later filed a case against them. The two
were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. When Morada returned to Jeddah (the
base of operations of petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for the
release of the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to cooperate. She
was eventually allowed to return to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights. The
Indonesian authorities eventually deported the 2 men, through the intercession of the
Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of detention. They were put back in service while
respondent Morada was transferred to Manila.

2 years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief
Legal Officer of Saudi Air, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police
station where her passport was taken and she was questioned about the Jakarta
incident. Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case
against the two men. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport
and allowed her to catch a later flight out of Jeddah. A year and a half later, she was
again asked to go to Jeddah to see Miniewy. When she did, a certain Khalid of Saudi
Air brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in
Arabic. She was told that it was necessary to close the case against Thamer and
Allah. As it turned out, she signed a document to appear before the court a week
later. When the date of appearance came, she complied but only after being assured
by Saudi Air Manila manager that the investigation was routinely and posed no
danger to her. She was brought before the court and was interrogated by a Saudi
judge and let go, however, just as she was about to board a plane home, she was told
that she had been forbidden to take flight. She was later told to remain in Jeddah and
her passport was again confiscated.

A few days later, she was again brought before the same court where the Saudi
judge, to her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months imprisonment and
286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with
Thamer and Allah for what happened in Jakarta. The court found her guilty of
adultery; going to a disco, dancing and listening to music in violation of Islamic
laws; and socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner Saudi Air but she
was denied assistance of any kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy to help her. Because
she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her
and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was
terminated from the service by Saudi Air without being informed of the cause. She
then filed a complaint for damages against Saudi Air and Mr. Al-Balawi, its country
manager. Saudi Air filed a motion to dismiss raising the issues of lack of cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether or not Philippine Law or Saudi Arabia Law should govern

RULING:

Philippine Law: Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one
involving torts, the connecting factor or point of contact could be the place or places
where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts
principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of
the tort. This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived
private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had
honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and
good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or
parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our
view, what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of
the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged according to the private respondent. All told, it is not
without basis to identify the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort.
 GLOBE MACKAY V CA

176 SCRA 778

AUGUST 25, 1989

FACTS:

Respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay

Cable and Radio Corporation as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to
the engineering operations manager. GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of
pesos. According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the
anomalies and reported them to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to
petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive VP and General Manager
of GLOBE MACKAY. The Manila police investigators cleared Tobias of
participation in the anomalies. Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired
a private investigator who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty.

This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be
conducted. Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending Tobias from work
preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him. The Police Chief Document
Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous
transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report reiterating his previous
finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and
other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias.
The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which
were for estafa while the fifth was for of Art.290 of' RPC which is Discovering
Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence. All of the 6 criminal complaints were
dismissed by the fiscal. In the meantime, Tobias received a notice from petitioners
that his employment has been terminated. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal. Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC
ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision and dismissed the complaint. Tobias
appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company.
However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to
the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to
dishonesty. Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming
illness, did not testify during the hearings.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent

RULING:

Yes. Art.19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle

of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards
are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must
be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. One of the more notable innovations of the
New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed
for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social
order." Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which
provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
 ALBENSON V CA

JANUARY 11, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc.

the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson
was given a check in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L.
Woodworks. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason
"Account Closed." From the records of the SEC, Albenson discovered that the
president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one
"Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry
of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was
registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao".

In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Albenson was advised
that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao."
After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson made an extrajudicial demand
upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao to replace and/or make good the
dishonored check. However, private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio
Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, with the very
same business address as Guaranteed. Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an
information against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of BP 22. In filing said
information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao
opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and
therefore, was deemed to have waived his right. Baltao, claiming ignorance of the
complaint against him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a
motion for reinvestigation. He found that the signature on the check is not the
signature of Eugenio S. Baltao.

Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him, respondent
Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against herein petitioners
Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.
In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account
of "E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be
President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a
corporation since 1975.The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio
Baltao III, a son of plaintiff, that the defendants may have been dealing with . . ."

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious
prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the CC.

RULING:

No.The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision
of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. The elements of an abuse of right
under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not
especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or
negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall
indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra
bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2)
but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and
it is done with intent to injure. There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21,
and that is, the act must be intentional.
 AMONOY V GUTIERREZ

351 SCRA 731

2001

FACTS:

Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos,

Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. He won the case for them and charged
P27600 as attorney’s fees. As they were not able to pay, his clients executed real
estate mortgages on their lands and the house thereon. Asuncion Pasamba died on
24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on 2 July 1969. Among the
heirs of the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. Because his
attorney’s fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid, on 21 January 1970
Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal. The heirs
opposed, contending that the attorney’s fees charged were unconscionable and that
the agreed sum was only P11,695.92. But on 28 September 1972 judgment was
rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the
P27,600.00 secured by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the harvests, and
P9,645.00 as another round of attorney’s fees. Failing in that, the two (2) lots would
be sold at public auction.

They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots were foreclosed.
Amonoy was the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale. The heirs sought the
annulment of the auction sale. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November
1977, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981. Thereafter,
the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice
to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. On Amonoy’s motion of 24 April 1986, the
Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures
in the said lots, including the house of the Gutierrez spouses. The Gutierrez spouses
sought a restraining order from the Supreme Court, which was granted by the same.
Upon a judgment on merits later on, Amonoy was ordered to return said properties
to the rightful owners. But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-
mentioned Decision, respondents house had already been destroyed, supposedly in
accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court. Thus, a Complaint
for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by
respondents against petitioner before the RTC on December 15, 1989. In its January
27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed respondents’ suit. On appeal, the CA set
aside the lower court’s ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as
actual damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Amonoy may properly invoke damnum absque injuria in this
case since at the time of the demolition he had color of authority over said properties

RULING:

No. Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by a person who claims to
exercise a right but does so in an abusive manner violative of Article 19 of the Civil
Code. Indeed, in the availment of one’s rights. Petitioner invokes this legal precept
in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents’ house. He
maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition
ordered by the RTC.

Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case. Yes, petitioner

commenced the demolition of respondent’s house on May 30, 1986 under the
authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondent’s
house, was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based
on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the
TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.
 UE V JADER

325 SCRA 804

FEBRUARY 17, 2000

FACTS:

Jader was enrolled in the UE College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. He failed
to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an
incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student.
He filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade but got a grade of
five (5). In the meantime, his name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for
graduation with an annotation regarding his deficiencies. His name also appeared in
the invitation for the graduation as one of the candidates for graduation. At the foot
of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared however an annotation
saying that it was a tentative list and that degrees will be conferred upon these
candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University
Bulletin. Jader attended the graduation and brought his family with him. He
thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence
without pay from his job and enrolled at the pre-bar review class. Jader later learned
of the deficiency and he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar
examination.

Consequently, he sued UE for damages. UE denied liability arguing that it

never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor
of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating
students.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an educational institution may be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements
for graduation when such is not the case
RULING:

YES. UE had a contractual obligation to inform his students as to whether or

not they have met all the requirements for the conferment of a degree. Thus, UE in
belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly
at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be
said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently
established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of
right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to
abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of
facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. Considering that the institution
of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education, it
should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the
principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence
that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent
parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. The
modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of
right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can
make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should
abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts
in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good
faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
 GARCIANO V CA

212 SCRA 436

AUGUST 10, 1992

FACTS:

The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. On January 13, 1982, or
before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because
her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter was employed. The
application was recommended for approval by the school principal, Emerito O.
Labajo, and approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors. On June
1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her husband,
Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad), informing her of the decision of Fr. Joseph
Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the president of the Parent-Teachers
Association and the school faculty, to terminate her services as a member of the
teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written contract of employment
between her and the school due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of
getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position
without a written contract. Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June,
1982, she received the letter informing her that her services at the Immaculate
Concepcion Institute had been terminated. She made inquiries from the school about
the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the members of the Board of Directors of the school,
with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a letter notifying her that she was
"reinstated to report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher effective July 5,
1982," and that "any letter or notice of termination received by you before this date
has no sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore it
is declared null and void." On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary,
and three members of the Board of Directors, out of a membership of nine (9),
resigned their positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has
reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria F.
Garciano, thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's decision".

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants prevented the petitioner from reporting to the
school and thus making them liable for damages.

RULING:

No. The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's

discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. While the respondents admittedly
wanted her service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her
from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. That the
school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her, and
some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even if true, did not make
them liable to her for damages. They were simply exercising their right of free
speech or their right to dissent from the Board's decision. Their acts were not
contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. They did not "illegally
dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. She was ordered to
report for work on July 5, 1982, but she did not comply with that order.
Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was
self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.
 BARONS MARKETING V CA

286 SCRA 96

FEBRUARY 9, 1998

FACTS:

Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of electrical

wires and cables. As such dealer, Barons was given 60 days credit for its purchases
of Phelps’s products. From Dec1986 to Aug1987, Barons purchased on credit wires
and cables worth P4.1m, which it in turn supplied to MERALCO. In the sales
invoice, it was stipulated that an interest of 12% would be imposed, plus 25% for
attorney’s fees and collection. On Sept1987, Barons paid P300k (thereby leaving an
unpaid account of P3.8m). Phelps sent several demands, but Barons still did not pay.
It instead wrote Phelps requesting if it could pay the outstanding account in monthly
installments of P500k plus 1% interest. Phelps, instead of responding to the request
of Barons, filed a complaint for recovery of the P3.8m plus interest, and prayed for
atty’s fees of 25% of the amt, and exemplary damages amounting to P100k. Barons
admitted the purchase of the wires and cables, but disputed the amt claimed by
Phelps. The RTC rendered decision in favor of Phelps, ordering Barons to pay the
debt and interest of 12% and awarding 25% as atty’s fees.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there was creditors’ abuse of rights in this case.

RULING:

NO, there is no abuse of rights when there is no bad faith nor intent to
prejudice another. Also, the mere exercise of a right cannot be said to be an abuse of
right. the law prescribes a "primordial limitation on all rights" by setting certain
standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. Thus, the inclusion of Art.19
in the CC: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. To constitute abuse of rights, there must be bad faith or intent to prejudice the
plaintiff.
 BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA

296 SCRA 260

SEPTEMBER 25, 1998

FACTS:

Atty. Ricardo J. Marasigan’s credit card was dishonored, the bill amounting
to P735.32, by Cafe Adriatico when the he entertained some guests. One of his
guests, Mary Ellen Ringler, paid the bill by using her own credit card a Unibank
card. Marasigan was a complimentary member of BECC from February 1988 to
February 1989 and was issued Credit Card with a credit limit of P3,000.00 and with
a monthly billing every 27th of the month His membership was renewed for another
year or until February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to P5,000.00.
Marasigan oftentimes exceeded his credit limits but this was never taken against him
by BPI and even his mode of paying his monthly bills in check was tolerated. A
statement amounting to P8,987.84 was not paid in due time. Marasigan admitted
having failed to pay his account because he was in Quezon attending to some
professional and personal commitments. He was informed that bpi was demanding
immediate payment of his outstanding account, was requiring him to issue a check
for P15,000.00 which would include his future bills, and was threatening to suspend
his credit card. Marasigan issued Far East Bank Check of P15,000.00, postdated
December 15, 1989 which was received on November 23, 1989 by Tess Lorenzo, an
employee of the defendant who in turn gave to Jeng Angeles, a co-employee who
handles the account of the plaintiff. The check remained in the custody of Jeng
Angeles. Mr. Roberto Maniquiz, head of the collection department of defendant was
formally informed of the postdated check about a week later. November 28, 2989 -
BPI served Marasigan a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary
suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account
number in their Caution List. He was also told to refrain from further use of his credit
card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his
outstanding account with the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter, his
membership will be permanently cancelled. On March 12, 1990, Marasigan sent
another letter reminding the manager of FEBTC that he had long rescinded and
cancelled whatever arrangement he entered into with BPI and requesting for his
correct billing, less the improper charges and penalties, and for an explanation within
five (5) days from receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8, 1989
despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge, otherwise the
necessary court action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for the humiliation
and embarrassment suffered by him.

ISSUE:

Whether BPI abused its right to suspend the credit card.

RULING:

NO. The agreement was for the immediate payment of the outstanding
account. A check is not considered as cash especially when it is postdated sent to
BPI. Thus, the issuance of the postdated check was not effective payment. BPI was
therefore justified in suspending his credit card. BPI did not capriciously and
arbitrarily cancel the use of the card. Under the terms and conditions of the credit
card, signed by MARASIGAN, any card with outstanding balances after thirty days
from original billing/statement shall automatically be suspended. Any card with
outstanding balances unpaid after thirty days from original billing/statement date
shall automatically be suspended and those with accounts unpaid after sixty (60)
days from said original billing/statement date shall automatically be cancelled
without prejudice to BECC's right to suspend or cancel any CARD any time and for
whatever reason. By his own admission Marasigan made no payment within 30 days
for his billing/statement dated 27 September 1989. Neither did he make payment for
his original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. Consequently, as early as 28
October 1989 thirty days from the non-payment of his billing dated 27 September
1989, BPI could automatically suspend his credit card.
 NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN V. ROBERTO REYES, A.K.A.
"AMAY BISAYA,"

G.R. NO. 154259

FEBRUARY 28, 2005

FACTS:

The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under
the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Respondent Reyes’ Version:
Mrs. Filart invited and assured that she can vouched for him in the birthday party of
the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu at the penthouse. When the buffet dinner was
ready, Reyes lined up but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was
stopped by Lim (Exec. Sec. of Nikko Hotel), and in a loud voice w/in the presence
and hearing of the other guests, told him to leave the party. Reyes tried to explain
that he was invited by Dr. Filart, but the latter completely ignored him adding to his
shame and humiliation. Not long after, policemen approached him and asked him to
step out of the hotel. He now claims P1M for actual damages, P1M moral and/or
exemplary damages and P200k for atty’s freesia’s version: At the party she noticed
Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink. Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep
the party intimate, she approached the captain waiter to inquire as to the presence of
Reyes who was uninvited. The waiter said that he saw Reyes came in w/ the group
of Dr. Filart. Lim inquired Dr Filart’s sister about Reyes and the sister said the latter
was not invited by Dr. Filart. Lim requested the sister to tell Reyes to leave but the
latter just lingered. The same happened when one Capt. Batung asked Reyes to leave.
When Lim spotted Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as
there were no guest in the immediate vicinity. However, as Reyes was already
helping himself to the food, she decided to wait.When Reyes went to a corner and
started to eat, Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayodapat
nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at
pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalisna kayo."

She then turned around trusting that Reyes would show enough decency to
leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even
threatened to dump food on herd. Filart’s version: According to her, it was Reyes
who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was
likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. When
they reached the penthouse, she reminded Reyes to go down as he was not properly
dressed and was not invitedAll the while, she thought that Reyes already left the
place. Then there was a commotion and she saw Reyes shouting.

On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier

decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and passed
upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend
that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not applying the Doctrine of Volenti
Non-Fit Injuria considering that by its own findings, Reyes was a great crasher.

ISSUE:

Whether the Doctrine of Volenti Non-Fit Injuria is applicable in the case at bar.

RULING:

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in
the process) as he was a "gate-crasher." The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria "to
which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury" refers to self-inflicted injury
or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in
doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find
application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of
being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil
Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to
unnecessary ridicule and shame.
 RUIZ V SECRETARY

1963

FACTS:

Enrique Ruiz and Jose Herrera, both shareholders of Allied Technilogists, Inc.
filed an action against the Secretary of National Defense and also against their own
company (together with Pablo Panlilio who is also a shareholder of the company) in
connection with the 15% retention fund withheld by the DND relating to the
construction of the Veterans Hospital. It turned out that said retention was already
released by the DND to the Company. The Court then proceeded with the other cause
of action which was deemed to be the controversy between Ruiz and Panlilio over
the said 15%. As it turned out, the real issue was the credit as to the architects of the
building were. Under the contract and all other documents relating to the
construction of the Veterans Hospital, the named architect was only Panlilio. Ruiz
and Herrera want to be recognized as architects of the building also citing Article 21
of the Civil Code as their base for the cause of action. The amended complaint of
appellants claimed that the non-inclusion of their names as architects resulted in their
professional prestige and standing being seriously impaired. Hence, they claim that
even if the retention fund was in act released, their pleas for recognition as architects
should have been heard by the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the case

RULING:

NO. The sole object of the appellants was to secure for themselves recognition
that they were co-architects of the Veterans Hospital, together with Panlilio, so as to
enhance their standing and prestige. If this is so, there is no need or necessity for a
judicial declaration. Prestige and recognition are bestowed on the deserving even if
there is no judicial declaration. On the other hand, no amount of declaration will help
an incompetent person achieve prestige and recognition. While the word injury may
also refer to honor or credit, the article envisions a situation where a person has a
legal right which was violated by another in a manner contrary to morals, good
custom, or public policy. Hence it presupposes losses or injuries which are suffered
as a result of said violation. The pleadings in this case do not show damages were
ever asked or alleged. - And under the facts and circumstances obtaining, one cannot
sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to extend recognition was an act
contrary to morals, good custom, or public policy.
 BEATRIZ P. WASSMER V. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ,.

FACTS:

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise

of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. But 2 days
before the wedding, Francisco left. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard
from again.Beatriz sued Francisco for damages, Velez filed no answer and was
declared in default. The Judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees; and the costs. The defendant filed a “petition for relief
from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and
reconsideration.” Plaintiff moved to strike it cut.

The court ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August
23, 1955 for an amicable settlement. It added that should any of them fail to appear
the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for
resolution. The defendant failed to appear three times for amicable settlement. The
forth chance for amicable settlement however, defendant’s counsel informed the
court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.The defendant petitioned in
the court that he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff’s cause of action, his
failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or
circumstances beyond his control.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the breach of promise to marry is contrary to morals, good

customs or public policy.
RULING:

A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally

set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of
it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
 CONRADO BUNAG, JR, V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and ZENAIDA
B. CIRILO

FACTS:

Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, he invited her to take
their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila, to which plaintiff obliged. But
instead to Aristocrat he brought plaintiff to a motel or hotel where he raped her. Later
that evening, defendant brought plaintiff to the house of his grandmother Juana de
Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband
and wife for 21 days.

Defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective

applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Bacoor, Cavite. October 1, 1973 Defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit
withdrawing his application for a marriage license.Defendant Bunag, Jr. left and
never returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her parents.
Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of
the deception done against her by defendants-appellants. Petitioner filed a complaint
for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry.The trial court ruled in favor of
the plaintiff and against petitioner, but absolved his father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure to comply with the promise of marriage of the
defendant considered contrary to morals, good custom or public policy.

RULING:

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an

action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable,
except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the
necessary incidents thereof.
 AMELITA CONSTANTINO AND MICHAEL CONSTANTINO

VS.

IVAN MENDEZ AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 57227

MAY 14, 1992

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Court
of Appeals which dismissed petitioner’s complaint and set aside the resolution of the
then Court of First Instance of Davao, ordering private respondent: (1) to
acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate child; (2) to give a
monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to pay complainant Amelita
Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral damages; and (4) to pay
attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.

Petitioner filed with the then CFI of Davao an action for acknowledgment,
support and damages against private respondent in June 1975. Petitioner alleges, that
sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met respondent at Tony’s Restaurant,
where she worked as a waitress; the following day respondent invited petitioner to
dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; on the pretext of getting
something, respondent brought petitioner inside his hotel room and through a
promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter and
repeated whenever respondent is in Manila even after respondent confessed that he
is a married man after their first sexual contact. In respondent’s answer in August
1975, Ivan admitted that he met petitioner at Tony’s Cocktail Lounge but denied
having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court rendered a decision, in favor of petitioner. Respondent is to pay

for actual and moral damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit. Both parties
filed their separate motion for reconsideration. Respondent anchored his motion on
the ground that the award of damages was not supported by evidence. Petitioner
sought the recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate
son of Ivan Mendez.

The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. On appeal the
amended decision was set aside and the complaint was dismissed. Hence, this
petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to claim for damages based on articles 19 and
21

RULING:

No, petitioner cannot claim for damages based on articles 19 and 21.
According to Article 19, “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.”

In the case at bar petitioner was already 28 years old and she admitted that she
was attracted to respondent. Petitioner’s attraction to respondent is the reason why
she surrendered her womanhood. Had petitioner been induced or deceived because
of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately ended her relation with
respondent when she knew that respondent was a married man after their first sexual
contact. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and November,
1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the
alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to
respondent. The Supreme Court said “Damages could only be awarded if sexual
intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire” therefore petitioner
is not entitled to claim for damages based on articles 19 & 21

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.

 QUIMIGUING VS ICAO

34 SCRA 132

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were
neighbors in Dapitan City. Despite the defendant being married, he had carnal
intercourse with the plaintiff. Quimging became pregnant and claimed for support
and damages but the case was dismissed. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint
that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that
“no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of
action.”

ISSUE:

Does the plaintiff have a right to claim damages?

RULING:

YES. As provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “A

conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of
its own for all purposes favorable to it. The conceive child may also receive
donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they
were already born.”

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man
forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation
of Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage
caused.
 PE vs PE
5 SCRA 200

FACTS:

The defendant, Alfonso Pe, was a married man. He was treated like a son by
Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and
was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single,
daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually
they fell in love with each other.

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove that
Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection. The case on
moral damages was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral,

good custom and public policy due to their illicit affair.

RULING:

YES. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to

morals, good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code.
The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of
rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
 LAO VS CA

325 SCRA 694

FACTS:

The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation entered into a

“Contract of Sales Agent “ with Andres Lao. Under the contract, Lao agrees to sell
cigarettes manufactured and shipped by the corporation and would in turn remit the
sales. Esteban Co, the Vice president and general manager of the Corporation
summoned Lao for accounting. It was then established that there was Lao’s liability.
Lao encountered difficulties in complying with these obligations. The corporation
sent Ngo Kheng to supervise Lao’s sales operation. Ngo Kheng discovered that
contrary to Lao’s allegation that he still had huge collectibles from his customers,
nothing was due the Corporation from Lao’s clients.

From then on, Lao no longer received shipments. Lao brought a complaint for
accounting and damages against the corporation. During the pendency of the said
civil case, Esteban co, representing the corporation as its new vice-president filed an
estafa case against Lao. Without awaiting the termination of the criminal case, Lao
lodged a complaint for malicious prosecution. The court ruled in favor of Lao
declaring that the estafa case was filed without probable cause and with malice and
orders the corporation and Esteban Co to jointly and severally pay the Lao’s.

ISSUE:

Can petitioner Co be held solidarily liable with the Corporation for whatever
damages would be imposed upon them?

RULING:

NO. A perusal of Lao’s affidavit-complaint reveals that at the time he filed

the same petitioner Co was the vice-president of the Corporation. As a corporate
officer, his power to bind the Corporation as its agent must be sought from statute,
charter, by-laws, a delegation of authority to a corporate officer, or from the acts of
the board of directors formally expressed or implied from a habit or custom of doing
business. In this case, no such sources of petitioner’s authority from which to deduce
whether or not he was acting beyond the scope of his responsibilities as corporate
vice-president are mentioned, much less proven.

Also, failure of the corporation to interpose petitioner Co’s lack of authority to bind
the corporation in a contract could only mean that the filing of the affidavit-
complaint by petitioner Co was with the consent and authority of the Corporation.
Thus, it is logical to conclude that the board of directors or by-laws of the corporation
vested petitioner Co with certain executive duties one of which is a case for the
Corporation.
 MAGTANGGOL QUE vs IAC and ANTONIO NICOLAS

169 SCRA 137

FACTS:

Antonio Nicolas ordered from Magtanggol Que canvass strollers, and Nicolas
issued to Que 5 post-dated checks with a total face value of P7,600.00. Nicolas
ordered a "stop payment" because of defects in the articles sold which Que had not
corrected, so Que was unable to encash the checks. Que filed a complaint for estafa
against Nicolas but it was dismissed for lack of merit.

In 1976, Nicolas filed his own complaint for damages against Que for
malicious prosecution. Que averred that Nicolas had maliciously filed the complaint
in Bulacan although he was a resident of Caloocan City, and Nicolas was indebted
to him and that it was he, Que, who suffered damages due to the unwarranted suit.

Judge Puno held in favor of Nicolas, finding that Que acted maliciously in
filing the estafa charge and in alleging that Nicolas issued the dishonored checks
with deceit. Que’s motion for reconsideration was denied. A 2nd motion for
reconsideration was filed, and Que averred the mere dismissal of the charge in the
fiscal's office was not a ground for damages nor did it constitute an actionable wrong.
The trial court reversed the original decision, so Que won. IAC reinstated the original
decision of Judge Puno, so Nicolas won.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Que is guilty of malicious prosecution

RULING:

NO. To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the

prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it
was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does
not make one liable for malicious prosecution.

One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution

where he acted with probable cause. The presence of probable cause signifies as a
legal consequence the absence of malice. Considering that the checks could not be
encashed and the supposedly defective goods had not been returned, Que had reason
to believe that Nicolas intended to deceive him. Que was not motivated by ill feeling
but only by an anxiety to protect his rights.

However, SC denied both parties their respective claims for damages because
of insufficient rebuttable evidence. Therefore, neither of them is guilty of malice.
 FRANKLIN M. DRILON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107019

FACTS:

In a letter-complaint to then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, General

Renato de Villa, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, requested the Department of Justice to order the investigation of several
individuals named therein, including herein private respondent Homobono Adaza,
for their alleged participation in the failed December 1989 coup d'etat.

The letter-complaint was referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special

Composite Team of Prosecutors. Petitioner then Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
Aurelio Trampe, the Team Leader, finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry,
issued a subpoena to the individuals named in the letter-complaint, Adaza included,
and assigned the case for preliminary investigation to a panel of investigators.

Based on the findings, an information was filed charging private respondent

with the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder. Feeling aggrieved,
private respondent Adaza filed a complaint for damages, charging petitioners with
engaging in a deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him
a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners,
according to Adaza, were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the
statute books.

ISSUE:

Is there malicious prosecution in this case?

RULING:

The Court ruled in the negative. To constitute malicious prosecution, there

must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting
a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. Thus, in order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff
must prove three (3) elements: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that
the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with
an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable
cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is
by improper or sinister motive. All these requisites must concur.

Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza against the herein
petitioners, none of the foregoing requisites have been alleged therein, thus
rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
under Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In the case under consideration, the decision of the Special Team of

Prosecutors to file the information cannot be dismissed as the mere product of whim
or caprice on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the preliminary
investigation. Said decision was fully justified in an eighteen-page Resolution.
While it is true that the petitioners were fully aware of the prevailing jurisprudence
enunciated in People v. Hernandez, which proscribes the complexing of murder and
other common crimes with rebellion, petitioners were of the honest conviction that
the Hernandez Case can be differentiated from the present case.
 RAFAEL PATRICIO vs HON. OSCAR LEVISTE

G.R. No. L-51832

FACTS:

During a benefit dance in celebration of the town fiesta Rafael Patricio, an

ordained Catholic priest together with 2 policemen were posted near the gate of the
public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate. Bienvenido
Bacalocos, President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan who was in the state of drunkenness was also at
the same gate struck a bottle of beer on the table which injured and caused his own
hand to bleed.

Bacalocos then approached Patricio and asked him if he has seen his wounded
hand and before Patricio could respond he hit Patricio's face with his bloodied hand.
Patricio filed a criminal case charging Bacalocos for Slander by Deed but it was
dismissed so he filed for damages in the court a quo. Court reconsidered moral and
exemplary damages, in order to merit, the plaintiff ought to have proven actual or
compensatory damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Patricio should be entitled to moral damages.

RULING:

YES. Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code, "Any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” Patricio, being slapped in
public causing him physical suffering and social humiliation, entitles him to moral
damages. Actual and compensatory damages need not be proven.
 GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC vs ESPINO

G.R. L-48250

FACTS:

Espino, his wife and their two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket
owned by Grand Union in Makati. While his wife was shopping for groceries, he
went around the store and found a cylindrical “rat tail” file that he had wanted to buy
for his hobby. Because it was small, he didn’t put it in the grocery cart because it
might fall and get lost. He instead held it in his hand. While still shopping, he and
his wife ran into his aunt’s maid. While they were talking he stuck the file in his
breast pocket, with a good part of the merchandise exposed.

He paid for the items in his wife’s cart, but he forgot about the file in his
pocket. On their way out, the guard stopped him and told him he hadn’t paid for the
file. He apologized and said he had forgotten. He started towards the cashier to pay;
but the guard stopped him and said they were to go to the back of the supermarket.
There, a report was made. He was then brought to the front of the grocery, near the
cashiers to a Mrs. Fandino. Fandino read the report and remarked: “Ano, nakaw na
naman ito.”With other customers and onlookers staring at him, he was directed to
get in line at the cashier to pay for the file. He was totally embarrassed. After paying,
he and his wife walked out quickly. CA awarded him damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Espino is entitled to damages for the humiliation he

experienced at the supermarket

RULING:

YES. The false accusation charged against the private respondent after
detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner
in which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening
to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket
which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered
the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219
of the Civil Code.

However, the whole incident that befell respondent had arisen in such a
manner that was created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to pay for the file.
It was his forgetfulness in checking out the item and paying for it that started the
chain of events which led to his embarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing
him mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety. Yet, private respondent’s
act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such
contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private
respondent may recover.
 SINGAPORE AIRLINES VS HON. ERNANI CRUZ PANO

G.R. NO. L-47739

FACTS:

Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment by Singapore Airlines Limited for 5

years. Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on leave
without approval of the application during the second year, Singapore Airlines filed
suit for damages against Cruz and his surety, Villanueva, for violation of the terms
and conditions

The RTC dismissed the complaint, counterclaim and cross-claim for lack of
jurisdiction

ISSUE:

Whether or not case is cognizable by Courts of justice and not by the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission.

RULING:

YES. Records are hereby ordered to the proper Branch of the Regional Trial
Court. Jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to the civil
Courts . Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg. 130 provides
that all other claims arising from employer-employee relationship are cognizable by
Labor Arbiters petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and
refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite
repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of
absence without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously
and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the conversion training
course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present controversy from
the coverage of the Labor Code.
 ERNESTO MEDINA, et. al vs HON. FLORELIANA CASTRO-
BARTOLOME

G.R. L-59825

FACTS:

Ernesto Medina and Jose G. Ong filed a civil case against Cosme de Aboitiz
and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines,Inc. The defendant corporation,
acting through its President, Cosme de Aboitiz, dismissed and slandered the
plaintiffs in the presence of their subordinate employees although this could have
been done in private. Because of the anti-social manner by which the plaintiffs were
dismissed from their employment and the embarrassment and degradation they
experienced in the hands of the defendants, the plaintiffs have suffered and will
continue to suffer wounded feelings, sleepless nights, mental torture, besmirched
reputation and other similar injuries. A motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed by the defendants. The trial court denied the
motion. The defendants filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint because of
amendments to the Labor Code immediately prior thereto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the
plaintiffs.

RULING:

NO. It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any
unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly
committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil
Code and not the Labor Code.
 CORNELIO AMARO, et al vs. AMBROSIO SUMANGUIT

G.R. No. L-14986

FACTS:
Appellants filed suit for damages in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental against the chief of police of the City of Silay. Although not specifically
alleged in the complaint, it is admitted by both parties, as shown in their respective
briefs, that the action is predicated on Articles 21 and/or 27 of the Civil Code.

Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of
Silay; that the following day he, together with his father (Cornelio Amaro) and his
witnesses, "went to the office of the defendant but instead of obtaining assistance to
their complaint they were harassed and terrorized;" that in view thereof they "gave
up and renounced their right and interest in the prosecution of the crime . . . .;" that
upon advice of the City Mayor given to appellee an investigation (of said crime) was
conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was about to file or had already
filed an information for illegal discharge of firearm against the assailant; and that
"having finished the investigation of the crime complained of, the defendant chief
of police is now harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work, ordering them thru his
police to appear in his office when he is absent, and he is about to order the arrest of
the plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared affidavits exempting the police from
any dereliction of duty in their case against the perpetrator of the crime."

ISSUE:
Is there dereliction of duty in this case?

RULING:

The Court is of the opinion that the facts set out constitute an actionable
dereliction on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code. That
appellants were "harassed and terrorized" may be a conclusion of law and hence
improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of
harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them assistance, which
was his duty to do as an officer of the law. The requirement under the aforesaid
provision that such refusal must be "without just cause" is implicit in the context of
the allegation. The statement of appellee's dereliction is repeated in a subsequent
paragraph of the complaint, where it is alleged that "he is about to order the arrest of
the plaintiffs" to make them sign affidavits of exculpation in favor of the policemen.
 ST. LOUIS REALTY CORP. vs CA

133 SCRA 179

FACTS:

Dr. Conrado Aramil seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in

the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr.
Arcadio. St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where
the heart is” which was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the
house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company
asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed
the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation but no
rectification or apology was published. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to
demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis
published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or
explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29.
During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.

ISSUE:

Whether or not St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.

RULING:

YES. St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely

circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification.”
 RODRIGO CONCEPCION vs COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR
NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS

G.R. No. 120706

FACTS:

Spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at Pasig City, in an

apartment leased to them by the owner Florence “Bing” Concepcion, who also
resided in the same compound where the apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas was
then engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities
with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures. Florence Concepcion joined
this venture. Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence,
angrily accosted Nestor at the latter’s apartment and accused him of conducting an
adulterous relationship with Florence.

Rodrigo threatened Florence over the telephone that should something happen
to his sick mother; in case the latter learned about the affair, he would kill Florence.
As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame
to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Consequently, he was forced
to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo
pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit
against him for damages. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Nestor Nicolas,
hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting damages to Nestor Nicolas and his
spouse.

RULING:

YES. There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered

mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as
a proximate result of petitioner’s abusive, scandalous and insulting language.
According to petitioner, private respondents’ evidence is inconsistent as to time,
place and persons who heard the alleged defamatory statement. The Court finds this
to be a gratuitous observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for the
respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident happened in the afternoon
at the front door of the apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the presence of some
friends and neighbors, and later on, with the accusation being repeated in the
presence of Florence, at the terrace of her house.

All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages
by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents.
 STI DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, et al. VS CA

G.R. 143196

FACTS:
The petitioner drivers formed STI Drivers Association filed a petition for
certification election. On June 13, 1994, Med-arbiter Brigada Fadrigon issued an
order dismissing the petition. On appeal to the DOLE, Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma affirmed the said order.

Pending resolution of the appeal to the DOLE, however, petitioner drivers

Salvador Caranza, Mariano Tan, Amado Evangelista, Manuel Rudolfo, Johnny
Bumatay and Eusebio Tabulod, Jr. were dismissed by respondent STI for violation
of the "Union Security Clause" provided for in respondent’s Collective Bargaining
Agreement with the Federation of Democratic Trade Unions- STI Workers Union
Chapter. Subsequently, the concerned petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, unfair labor practice and payment of damages against the respondents
before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. On the same day, the petitioner
drivers also filed a complaint for underpayment of their vacation leave, sick leave
and 13th month pay against the respondents.

The petitioners pray that the case be remanded to the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC on the ground that they were denied due process for being
represented by an impostor lawyer who was negligent in attending to their case from
the moment it was filed up to its dismissal by the appellate court.

ISSUE:
Is there legal malpractice in this case?

RULING:
The court ruled in the negative. The SC held that the petitioners were duly
represented by a bona-fide lawyer and the latter’s failure to file the required position
papers before the Labor Arbiter or to appeal on time to the NLRC is not a ground to
declare the proceedings a quo null and void. We have ruled time and again that any
act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of
petitioners’ counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against
them. Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by this Court in cases where
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or
when its application "results in the outright deprivation of one’s property through a
technicality." None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the instant
case.
 REYES vs SISTERS OF MERCY

G.R. 130547

FACTS:
Jorge Reyes has been suffering from recurring fever with chills for around
days.
Home medication afforded him no relief so he went to Mercy Community Clinic.
He was then attended by Dr. Marlyn Rico. A Widal test was performed and he was
found positive for typhoid. Dr. Marlyn Rico endorsed Jorge Reyes to Dr. Marvie
Blanes. Who ordered that Jorge be tested for compatibility with chloromycetin, an
antibiotic. Such test was conducted by Nurse Pagente.

As there was no adverse reaction, Dr. Blanes administered 500 mg of the

antibiotic. Another dose was given 3 hours later. Subsequently, Jorge Reyes
developed high fever and experienced vomiting and convulsions. He then turned
blue due to deficiency in oxygen – cyanosis – and died. The cause of death was
stated to be “ventricular arrhythmia secondary to hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.”
The heirs of Reyes filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against Sisters of
Mercy, Sister Rose Palacio, Dr. Blanes, Dr. Rico and Mercy Community Clinic
contending that the death of Jorge was due to the wrongful administration of
chloromycetin.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was medical malpractice.

RULING:

NO. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the
physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent
physician or surgeon would have done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure
or action caused injury to the patient.
There is nothing unusual about the death of Jorge Reyes. In this case, while it is true
that the patient died just a few hours after professional medical assistance was
rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death. Prior to
his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers and chills for five days
unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given him by his wife. This
shows that he had been suffering from a serious illness and professional medical
help came too late for him.
 GARCIA-RUEDA VS. PASCASIO

G.R. NO. 118141

SEPTEMBER 5, 1997

FACTS:

Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent

surgical operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter.
He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr.
Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery,
however, Florencio died of complications of "unknown cause," according to officials
of the UST Hospital. Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner
requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an autopsy on her
husband's body. Consequently, the NBI ruled that Florencio's death was due to lack
of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia. Pursuant to its
findings, the NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-
Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of
the City Prosecutor. During the preliminary investigation, what transpired was a
confounding series of events which we shall try to disentangle. The case was initially
assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who had to inhibit himself because he was
related to the counsel of one of the doctors. As a result, the case was re-raffled to
Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono who was, however, disqualified on motion of the
petitioner since he disregarded prevailing laws and jurisprudence regarding
preliminary investigation. The case was then referred to Prosecutor Ramon O.
Carisma, who issued a resolution recommending that only Dr. Reyes be held
criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr. Antonio be dismissed. The case
took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Santos Sioson,
in the "interest of justice and peace of mind of the parties," recommended that the
case be re-raffled on the ground that Prosecutor Carisma was partial to the petitioner.
Thus, the case was transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, where a volte
face occurred again with the endorsement that the complaint against Dr. Reyes be
dismissed and instead, a corresponding information be filed against Dr. Antonio.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the findings of Prosecutor
Dimagiba. Pending the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration
regarding Prosecutor Dimagiba's resolution, the investigative "pingpong"
continued when the case was again assigned to another prosecutor, Eudoxia T.
Gualberto, who recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the criminal information
of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of
Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case was transferred to Senior State
Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any
wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G.
Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero. Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft
charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against
Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr.
Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman. However, on July 11, 1994, the
Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of
evidence. In fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the
Ombudsman to review the recommendations of the
government prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same. Petitioner faults
the Ombudsman for, allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, refusing to find that there
exists probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE:

Whether or not expert testimony is necessary to prove the negligent act of the
respondent.

RULING:

In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed

training and skill possessed by physicians
and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and
skill in the treatment of his patients.
He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is
in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish
not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's conduct
in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes
of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of
scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually
necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. Immediately apparent from a
review of the records of this case is the absence of any expert testimony on the matter
of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct
of similar operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of Dr.
Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate
the court on the matter of the standard of care that
petitioner should have exercised. The better and more logical remedy under the
circumstances would have been to appeal the resolution of the City Prosecutors
dismissing the criminal complaint to the Secretary of Justice under the Department
of Justice's Order No. 223, otherwise known as the "1993 Revised Rules on Appeals
From Resolutions In Preliminary Investigations/Reinvestigations," as amended by
Department Order No. 359, Section 1 of which provides: Sec. 1. What May Be
Appealed. — Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional
State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may
be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided
in Section 4 hereof.

What action may the Secretary of Justice take on the appeal? Section 9 of
Order No. 223 states: "The Secretary of Justice may reverse, affirm or modify the
appealed resolution." On the other hand, "He may motu proprio or on motion of the
appellee, dismiss outright the appeal on specified grounds." In exercising his
discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman acted within his power and
authority in dismissing the complaint against the Prosecutors and this Court will not
interfere with the same.
Petition is dismissed.
 LI VS SPOUSES SOLIMAN

GR NO. 165279

JUNE 7, 2011

FACTS:

On July 7, 1993, respondents 11 year old daughter, Angelica Soliman

underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes
Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that Angelica was suffering from
osteosaucoma, ostiobiostic type, a high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the bone
which usually affects teenage children. Following this diagnosis, Angelica’s right
leg was amputated by Dr. Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. As a adjuvant
treatment to eliminate any remaining cancer cells, and hence minimizing the chances
of recurrence and prevent the decease from spreading to other parts of the patient’s
body, chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo and referred Angelica to another
doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.

On July 23, 1993, petitioner saw the respondents at the hospital after
Angelica’s surgery and discussed with them Angelica’s condition. Petitioner told
respondents that Angelica should be given 2-3 weeks to recover from the operation
before starting the chemotherapy. Respondents were apprehensive due to financial
constraints as Reynaldo earns only from P70,000-150,000 a year from his jewelry
and watching repair business. Petitioner, however, assured them not to worry about
her professional fee and told them to just save up for medicines to be used.

As the chemotherapy session started, day by day, Angelica experience

worsening condition and other physical effect on the body such as discoloration,
nausea, and vomiting.

Petitioner claimed, that she explained to respondents that even when a tumor
is removed, there are still small lesions undetectable to the naked eye and that
adjuvant chemotherapy is needed to clean out the small lesions in order to lessen the
chance of cancer to recur. She did not give the respondents any assurance that
chemotherapy will cure Angelica’s cancer. During these consultations with
respondents, she explained the following side effects of chemotherapy treatment to
respondents: 1.) Falling hair; 2.) nausea and vomiting; 3.) loss of appetite; 4.) low
count of WBC, RBC, and platelets; 5.) possible sterility due to the effects on
Angelica’s ovary; 6.) Damage to kidney and heart; 7.) darkening of the skin
especially when exposed to sunlight. She actually talked to the respondents four
times, once at the hospital after the surgery, twice at her clinic and fourth when
Angelica’s mother called her through long distance. This was disputed by
respondents who countered that petitioner gave them assurance that there is 95%
chance of healing for Angelica if she undergoes chemotherapy and that the only side
effects were nausea, vomiting and hair loss. Those were the only side effects of
chemotherapy mentioned by petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner committed medical malpractice.

RULING:

No. The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or more
appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available
to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has
caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such claim, a patient must prove
that a health care provider in most cases a physician, either failed to do something
which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done or that he or she
did something that a reasonably health care provider would not have done; and that
failure or action caused injury to the patient.

Medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging
in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as
defendant physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of
qualified physicians stems from the former’s realization that the latter possess
unusual technical skills which layman in most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating, hence the indispensability of expert testimonies.

The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient

relationships goes as far back into english common law. As early as 1767, doctors
were charged with the tort of battery if they have not gained the consent of their
patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure. In the United States, the seminal
case was Schoendorff vs Society of New York Hospital which involved unwanted
treatment performed by a doctor. Justice Bejamin Cardozo oft-quoted opinion
upheld the basic right of a patient to give consent to any medical procedure or
treatment; every human being of adult year and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.
From a purely ethical norm, informed consent evolved into a general principle of
law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in
the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his
patient as to whatever grave risk of injury might be incurred from a proposed course
of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for her own welfare and faced
with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, as alternative treatment, or none
at all, may intelligently exercise his judgement by reasonably balancing the probable
risk against the probable benefits.

There are four essential elements a plaintiff must proved in a malpractice action
based upon the doctrine of informed consent: 1.) the physician had a duty to disclose
material risks; 2.) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; 3.) as a
direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to
treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and 4.) plaintiff was injured
by the proposed treatment. The gravamen in an informed consent requires the
plaintiff to point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment
which could have altered her decision to undergo it.

Examining the evidence, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks
inherent in chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica’s
parents. Respondents could not have been unaware in the course of initial treatment
and amputation of Angelica’s lower extremity that her immune system was already
weak on account of the malignant tumor in her knee. When petitioner informed the
respondents beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered
counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or
heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the
doctor that the respondents understood very well that the severity of these side
effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the procedure. In other words,
by the nature of the disease itself, each patients reaction to the chemical agents even
with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the physician.
That death can possibly result from complications of the treatment or the underlying
cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the administration of chemotherapy
drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical procedures,
but such conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of
chemotherapy already disclosed.
 RAMOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 124354.

DECEMBER 29, 1999.

FACTS:

Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall
bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery
at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would
find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka
arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched”
the administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer
brain damage. The botched operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law
of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.

The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the
anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that
Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable
care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying “Ang
hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo
surgery.The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in
intubating the patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a “good
anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for the
negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the surgeon failed
to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly
and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the
Trial Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the
comatose condition of Ramos.
RULING:

Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the
damages. Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the
thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of
the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit
an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima
facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation,
where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party must present
expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was negligent.This doctrine
finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already
surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive
control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound
and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa
loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself!

Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption

of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate cause of her condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell
whether or not the intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The
Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first
time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and
which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was
also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority as the “captain of the ship”
in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols. Also, because
he was late, he did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the
anesthesia delivery.The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors
(Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring
and firing of their “consultants”. While these consultants are not employees,
hospitals still exert significant controls on the selection and termination of doctors
who work there which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship.
Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability
NOEL CASUMPANG v. NELSON CORTEJO,
GR No. 171127, 2015-03-11
Facts:
Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11-year old son, Edmer Cortejo (Edmer), to the
Emergency Room of the San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) because of difficulty in
breathing, chest pain, stomach pain, and... fever.
Dr. Ramoncito Livelo (Dr. Livelo) initially attended to and examined Edmer.
Based on these initial examinations and the chest x-ray test that followed, Dr. Livelo
diagnosed Edmer with "bronchopneumonia."[7] Edmer's blood was also taken for
testing, typing, and for purposes of administering antibiotics. Afterwards, Dr. Livelo
gave Edmer an antibiotic medication to lessen his fever and to loosen his phlegm.
Mrs. Cortejo did not know any doctor at SJDH..She used her Fortune Care cardShe
was thereafter assigned to Dr. Noel Casumpang (Dr. Casumpang), a pediatrician also
accredited with Fortune Care. At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Dr.
Casumpang for the first time examined Edmer in his room. Using only a stethoscope,
he confirmed the initial diagnosis of "Bronchopneumonia."
Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the doctor's diagnosis. She immediately
advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds or cough[10]
but Dr. Casumpang merely told her that her son's "bloodpressure is just... being
active,"[11] and remarked that "that's the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no
phlegm."
Dr. Casumpang next visited and examined Edmer at 9:00 in the morning the
following day.
Mrs. Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the traces of blood in Edmer's
sputum. Despite these pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang simply
nodded, inquired if Edmer has an asthma, and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer's
illness is... bronchopneumonia.
At around 11:30 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer vomited "phlegm with
blood streak"[15] prompting the respondent (Edmer's father) to request for a doctor
at the nurses' station.
Forty-five minutes later, Dr. Ruby Sanga-Miranda (Dr. Miranda), one of the resident
physicians of SJDH, arrived. She claimed that although aware that Edmer had
vomited "phlegm with blood streak," she failed to examine the blood specimen
because the respondent washed it... away. She then advised the respondent to
preserve the specimen for examination.
Dr. Miranda conducted a physical check-up covering Edmer's head, eyes, nose,
throat, lungs, skin and abdomen; and found that Edmer had a low-grade non-
continuing fever, and rashes that were not typical of dengue fever.
At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again vomited blood. Upon seeing Dr.
Miranda, the respondent showed her Edmer's blood specimen, and reported that
Edmer had complained of severe stomach pain and difficulty in moving his right leg.
Dr. Miranda then examined Edmer's "sputum with blood" and noted that he was
bleeding. Suspecting that he could be afflicted with dengue, she inserted a plastic
tube in his nose, drained the liquid from his stomach with ice cold normal saline
solution, and gave an... instruction not to pull out the tube, or give the patient any
oral medication.
thereafter conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out to be negative... ordered the
monitoring of the patient's blood pressure and some blood tests. Edmer's blood
pressure was later found to be normal.
At 4:40 in the afternoon, Dr. Miranda called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and told
him about Edmer's condition.
Dr. Casumpang ordered several procedures done including: hematocrit, hemoglobin,
blood typing, blood transfusion... and tourniquet tests.
The blood test results came at about 6:00 in the evening.
Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's parents that the blood test results showed that Edmer
was suffering from "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever."
Dr. Casumpang arrived at Edmer's room and he recommended his transfer to the
Intensive Care Unit (ICU), to which the respondent... consented. Since the ICU was
then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to the respondent that they hire a private nurse.
The respondent, however, insisted on transferring his son to Makati Medical Center.
After the respondent had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the last time,
checked Edmer's condition, found that his blood pressure was stable, and noted that
he was "comfortable."
The respondent requested for an ambulance but he was informed that the driver was
nowhere to be... found. This prompted him to hire a private ambulance that cost him
P600.00.
At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr. Casumpang, was
transferred to Makati Medical Center.
Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the patient's clinical
history and laboratory exam results. Upon examination, the attending physician
diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that was already in its irreversible stage.
Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988.[24] His Death Certificate
indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic Shock/hemorrhagic shock;" "Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV."... the respondent instituted an action for damages
against SJDH, and its attending physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Miranda
(collectively referred to as the "petitioners")... before the RTC of Makati City.
the RTC ruled in favor of the respondent... the RTC found untenable the petitioning
doctors' contention that Edmer's initial symptoms did not indicate dengue fever. It
faulted them for heavily relying on the chest x-ray result and for not considering the
other... manifestations that Edmer's parents had relayed.
held SJDH solidarity liable with the petitioning doctors... as consultant, is an
ostensible agent of SJDH
Dr. Miranda, as resident physician, is an employee of SJDH... the CA affirmed en
toto the RTC's ruling
The CA found the petitioning doctors' failure to read even the most basic signs of
"dengue fever" expected of an ordinary doctor as medical negligence.
On SJDH's solidary liability, the CA ruled that the hospital's liability is based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in diagnosing and in treating the patient
Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in diagnosing and in treating the patient;
Whether or not the petitioner hospital is solidarity liable with the petitioning doctors
Whether or not there is a causal connection between the petitioners' negligent
act/omission and the patient's resulting death
Whether or not the lower courts erred in considering Dr. Rodolfo Tabangcora
Jaudian as an expert witness.
Ruling:
In the present case, the physician-patient relationship between Dr. Casumpang and
Edmer was created when the latter's parents sought the medical services of Dr.
Casumpang, and the latter knowingly accepted Edmer as a patient.
implied from his... affirmative examination, diagnosis and treatment of Edmer.
Edmer's parents, on their son's behalf, manifested their consent by availing of the
benefits of their health care plan, and by accepting the hospital's assigned doctor
without objections.
Dr. Miranda, her professional relationship with Edmer arose when she assumed the
obligation to provide resident supervision over the latter.
second year resident doctor tasked to do rounds and assist other physicians, Dr.
Miranda is deemed to have agreed to... the creation of physician-patient relationship
with the hospital's patients when she participated in the diagnosis and prescribed a
course of treatment for Edmer.
Her affirmative acts amounted... to her acceptance of the physician-patient
relationship, and incidentally, the legal duty of care that went with it.
the doctors who merely passed by and were requested to attend to the patient, liable
for medical malpractice.
a breach of duty is to be measured by the yardstick of professional standards
observed by the other members of the medical profession in good standing under
similar circumstances.
expert testimony is essential to establish not only the professional standards
observed in the medical community, but also that the physician's conduct in the
treatment of care falls below such standard.
expert testimony is crucial in determining first, the standard medical examinations,
tests, and procedures that the attending physicians should have undertaken in the
diagnosis and treatment of dengue fever; and... second, the dengue fever signs and
symptoms that the attending physicians should have noticed and considered.
if the patient was admitted for chest pain, abdominal pain, and difficulty in breathing
coupled with... fever, dengue fever should definitely be considered... if the patient
spits coffee ground with the presence of blood, and the patient's platelet count drops
to 47,000, it becomes a clear case of dengue fever, and bronchopneumonia can be
reasonably ruled... out.
the standard of care according to Dr. Jaudian is to administer oxygen inhalation,
analgesic, and fluid infusion or dextrose.
We find that Dr. Casumpang, as Edmer's attending physician, did not act according
to these standards and, hence, was guilty of breach of duty. We do not find Dr.
Miranda liable for the reasons discussed below.
Dr. Casumpang's Negligence
Negligence in the Diagnosis
It will be recalled that during Dr. Casumpang's first and second visits to Edmer, he
already had knowledge of Edmer's laboratory test result (CBC), medical history, and
symptoms (i.e., fever, rashes, rapid breathing, chest and stomach pain, throat
irritation, difficulty in... breathing, and traces of blood in the sputum). However,
these information did not lead Dr. Casumpang to the possibility that Edmer could be
suffering from either dengue fever, or dengue hemorrhagic fever, as he clung to his
diagnosis of broncho pneumonia.
To our mind, Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated some, and not all of the
symptoms; worse, he casually ignored the pieces of information that could have been
material in detecting dengue fever.
We also find it strange why Dr. Casumpang did not even bother to check Edmer's
throat despite knowing
Edmer had blood streaks in his sputum.
Dr. Casumpang only used a stethoscope in coming up with the diagnosis that Edmer
was suffering from... bronchopneumonia; he never confirmed this finding with the
use of a bronchoscope. Furthermore, Dr. Casumpang based his diagnosis largely on
the chest x-ray result that is generally inconclusive.
it was only at around 5:00 in the afternoon of April 23, 1988 (after Edmer's third
episode of bleeding) that Dr. Casumpang ordered the conduct of hematocrit,
hemoglobin, blood typing, blood transfusion and tourniquet tests. These tests came
too late
Even assuming that Edmer's symptoms completely coincided with the diagnosis of
bronchopneumonia (so that this diagnosis could not be considered "wrong"), we still
find Dr. Casumpang guilty of negligence.
In the present case, evidence on record established that in confirming the diagnosis
of bronchopneumonia, Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated some and not all of
the symptoms presented, and failed to promptly conduct the appropriate tests to
confirm his findings.
Dr.
Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue fever, which failure, especially when
reasonable prudence would have shown that indications of dengue were evident
and/or foreseeable, constitutes negligence.
Dr. Casumpang also failed to promptly undertake the proper medical management
needed for this disease.
the standard medical procedure once the patient had exhibited the classic symptoms
of dengue fever should have been: oxygen inhalation, use of analgesic, and infusion
of fluids or dextrose;[67] and once the patient had twice... vomited fresh blood, the
doctor should have ordered: blood transfusion, monitoring of the patient every 30
minutes, hemostatic to stop bleeding, and oxygen if there is difficulty in breathing
The evidence strongly suggests that he ordered a transfusion of platelet concentrate
instead of blood transfusion. The tourniquet test was only conducted after Edmer's
second episode of bleeding, and the medical management
(as reflected in the records) did not include antibiotic therapy and complete physical
examination.
Although Dr. Casumpang presented the testimonies
We cannot consider them expert witnesses either for the sole reason that they did not
testify on the standard of care in dengue cases.
Aside from being self-serving, his claim is not supported by... competent evidence.
We find that Dr. Miranda was not independently negligent.
we believe that a finding of negligence should also depend on several competing
factors,... among them, her authority to make her own diagnosis, the degree of
supervision of the attending physician over her, and the shared responsibility
between her and the attending physicians.
In her testimony, Dr. Miranda admitted that she had been briefed about Edmer's
condition, his medical history, and initial diagnosis;[79] and based on these pieces
of information, she confirmed the, finding of bronchopneumonia.
Dr. Miranda likewise duly reported to Dr. Casumpang, who admitted receiving
updates regarding Edmer's condition.
evidence supporting Dr. Miranda's claim that she extended diligent care to Edmer.
when she suspected - during
Edmer's second episode of bleeding - that Edmer could be suffering from dengue
fever, she wasted no time in conducting the necessary tests, and promptly notified
Dr. Casumpang about the incident. Indubitably, her medical assistance led to the
finding of dengue fever.
We note however, that during Edmer's second episode of bleeding,[81] Dr. Miranda
failed to immediately examine and note the cause of the blood specimen. Like Dr.
Casumpang, she merely assumed that the blood in Edmer's phlegm was caused by
bronchopneumonia.
Based on her statements we find that Dr. Miranda was not entirely faultless.
Nevertheless, her failure to discern the import of Edmer's second bleeding does not
necessarily amount to negligence as the respondent himself admitted that Dr.
Miranda failed to examine the... blood specimen because he washed it away.
Dr. Miranda's... error was merely an honest mistake of judgment influenced in no
small measure by her status in the hospital hierarchy; hence, she should not be held
liable for medical negligence.
Dr. Jaudian, the expert witness was admittedly not a pediatrician but a practicing
physician who specializes in pathology.[87] He likewise does not possess any formal
residency training in pediatrics. Nonetheless, both the lower... courts found his
knowledge acquired through study and practical experience sufficient to advance an
expert opinion on dengue-related cases.
We agree with the lower courts.
Ramos and Cereno reveals that the Court primarily based the witnesses'
disqualification to testify as an expert on their incapacity to shed light on the standard
of care that must be observed by the defendant-physicians.
That the expert... witnesses' specialties do not match the physicians' practice area
only constituted, at most, one of the considerations that should not be taken out of
context.
In the case and the facts before us, we find that Dr. Jaudian is competent to testify
on the standard of care in dengue fever cases.
Although he specializes in pathology, it was established during trial that he had
attended not less than 30 seminars held by the Pediatric Society, had exposure in
pediatrics, had been practicing medicine for 16 years, and had handled not less than
50 dengue related cases.
due to Dr. Casumpang's failure to timely diagnose Edmer with dengue, the latter was
not immediately given the proper treatment. In fact, even after Dr. Casumpang had
discovered Edmer's real illness, he still failed to promptly... perform the standard
medical procedure. We agree with these findings.
Had he immediately conducted confirmatory tests,... (i.e., tourniquet tests and series
of blood tests) and promptly administered the proper care and management needed
for dengue fever, the risk of complications or even death, could have been
substantially reduced.
medical literature on dengue shows that early diagnosis and management of dengue
is critical in reducing the risk of complications and avoiding further spread of the
virus.
we rule that the respondent successfully proved the element of causation.
Liability of SJDH
We affirm the hospital's liability not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
but on the basis of the doctrine of apparent authority or agency by estoppel.
There is No Employer-Employee Relationship Between SJDH and the Petitioning
Doctors
Based on the records, no evidence exists showing that SJDH exercised any degree
of control over the means, methods of procedure and manner by which the
petitioning doctors conducted and performed their medical profession. SJDH did not
control their diagnosis and treatment.
no evidence was presented to show that SJDH monitored, supervised, or directed the
petitioning doctors in the treatment and management of Edmer's case.
the petitioning doctors were not employees of SJDH, but were mere independent
contractors.
SJDH is Solidarity Liable Based on The Principle of Agency or Doctrine of
Apparent Authority
SJDH impliedly held out and clothed Dr. Casumpang with apparent authority
leading the respondent to believe that he is an employee or agent of the hospital.
the respondent relied on SJDH rather than upon Dr. Casumpang, to care and treat
his son Edmer.
he and his wife did not know any doctors at SJDH; they also did not know that Dr.
Casumpang was an independent... contractor.
the respondent had relied on SJDH's representation of Dr. Casumpang's authority.
By referring Dr. Casumpang to care and treat for Edmer, SJDH impliedly held out
Dr. Casumpang, not only as an accredited member... of Fortune Care, but also as a
member of its medical staff.
We also stress that Mrs. Cortejo's use of health care plan (Fortune Care) did not
affect SJDH's liability. The only effect of the availment of her Fortune Care card
benefits is that her choice of physician is limited only to physicians who are
accredited with Fortune
Care.
her use of health care plan in this case only limited the choice of doctors (or coverage
of services, amount etc.) and not the liability of doctors or the hospital.
Principles:
It is a medical malpractice suit, an action available to victims to redress a wrong
committed by medical professionals... who caused bodily harm to, or the death of, a
patient.[33] As the term is used, the suit is brought whenever a medical practitioner
or health care provider fails to meet the standards demanded by his profession, or
deviates from this standard, and causes... injury to the patient.
To successfully pursue a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff (in this case, the
deceased patient's heir) must prove that the doctor either failed to do what a
reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or did what a reasonably prudent doctor
would not have done; and... the act or omission had caused injury to the patient.[34]
The patient's heir/s bears the burden of proving his/her cause of action.
The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation.
Duty refers to the standard of behavior that imposes restrictions on one's conduct.
It requires proof of professional relationship between the physician and the patient.
Without the professional relationship, a physician owes no duty to the patient, and...
cannot therefore incur any liability.
A physician-patient relationship is created when a patient engages the services of a
physician,[36] and the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient...
establishment of this relationship is consensual,[38] and the acceptance by the
physician essential.
mere fact that an individual approaches a physician and seeks diagnosis, advice or
treatment does not create the duty of care unless the physician agrees
The consent needed to create the relationship does not always need to be express.
may be implied from the physician's affirmative action to diagnose and/or treat a
patient, or in... his participation in such diagnosis and/or treatment.
Breach of duty occurs when the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly performs
his duties under professional standards. This determination is both factual and legal,
and is specific to each individual case.
If the patient, as a result of the breach of duty, is injured in body or in health,
actionable malpractice is committed, entitling the patient to damages.
To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the causal relation
between the negligence and the injury.
must be direct, natural, and should be unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.
the negligence must be the proximate... cause of the injury.
when it appears, based on the evidence and the expert testimony, that the negligence
played an integral part in causing the injury or damage, and that the... injury or
damage was either a direct result, or a reasonably probable consequence of the
physician's negligence.
A determination of whether or not the petitioning doctors met the required standard
of care involves a question of mixed fact and law... factual as medical negligence
cases are highly technical in nature, requiring the presentation of expert witnesses...
and legal, insofar as the Court, after evaluating the expert testimonies, and guided
by medical literature, learned treatises, and its fund of common knowledge,
ultimately determines... whether breach of duty took place.
First, we emphasize that we do not decide the correctness of a doctor's diagnosis, or
the accuracy of the medical findings and treatment. Our duty in medical malpractice
cases is to decide - based on the evidence adduced and expert opinion presented -
whether a... breach of duty took place.
Second, we clarify that a wrong diagnosis is not by itself medical malpractice.[65]
Physicians are generally not liable for damages resulting from a bona fide error of
judgment. Nonetheless, when the physician's erroneous diagnosis was the... result of
negligent conduct (e.g., neglect of medical history, failure to order the appropriate
tests, failure to recognize symptoms), it becomes an evidence of medical
malpractice.
Third, we also note that medicine is not an exact science;[66] and doctors, or even
specialists, are not expected to give a 100% accurate diagnosis in treating patients
who come to their clinic for consultations. Error is possible as the exercise of...
judgment is called for in considering and reading the exhibited symptoms, the results
of tests, and in arriving at definitive conclusions. But in doing all these, the doctor
must have acted according to acceptable medical practice standards.
resident applicants are generally doctors of medicine licensed to practice in the
Philippines and who would like to pursue a particular specialty.[70] They are usually
the front line doctors responsible for the... first contact with the patient. During the
scope of the residency program,[71] resident physicians (or "residents")[72] function
under the supervision of attending physicians[73] or of the hospital's teaching... staff.
Under this arrangement, residents operate merely as subordinates who usually defer
to the attending physician on the decision to be made and on the action to be taken.
The attending physician, on the other hand, is primarily responsible for managing
the resident's exercise of duties. While attending and resident physicians share the
collective responsibility to deliver safe and appropriate care to the patients,[74] it
is... the attending physician who assumes the principal responsibility of patient care.
the standards applicable to... and the liability of the resident for medical malpractice
is theoretically less than that of the attending physician. These relative burdens and
distinctions, however, do not translate to immunity from the legal duty of care for
residents,[76] or from the... responsibility arising from their own negligent act.
The competence of an expert witness is a matter for the trial court to decide upon in
the exercise of its discretion. The test of qualification is necessarily a relative one,
depending upon the subject matter of the investigation, and the fitness of the expert...
witness.[84] In our jurisdiction, the criterion remains to be the expert witness' special
knowledge experience and practical training that qualify him/her to explain highly
technical medical matters to the Court.
it is the specialist's knowledge of the requisite subject matter, rather than his/her
specialty that determines his/her qualification to testify.
guideline in qualifying an expert witness:
(1) has the required professional knowledge, learning and skill of the subject under
inquiry sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on the subject; and (2) is
familiar with the... standard required of a physician under similar circumstances
Nor is it critical whether a medical expert is a general practitioner or a specialist so
long as he exhibits knowledge of the subject.
as to which he has an opinion based on education, experience, observation, or
association wit that specialty, his opinion is competent.
As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent contractors.
However, it may be found liable if the physician or independent contractor acts as
an ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of
apparent... authority."... under the doctrine of apparent authority,... hospitals could
be found vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor... unless
the patient... knows, or should have known, that the physician is an independent
contractor.
For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent
was an employee... or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the
appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had
knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the
conduct of the hospital or its agent,... consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
In sum, a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician
(or an independent contractor) providing care at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove
these two factors: first, the hospital's manifestations; and... second, the patient's
reliance.
Hospital's manifestations... involves an inquiry on whether the hospital acted in a
manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual alleged
to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital.
the hospital need not make express... representations to the patient that the physician
or independent contractor is an employee of the hospital; representation may be
general and implied.
the court considered the act of the hospital of holding itself out as provider of
complete medical care, and considered the hospital to have impliedly created the
appearance of authority.
Patient's reliance
It involves an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance on the conduct of the
hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
whether the plaintiff is seeking care from the hospital itself or whether the plaintiff
is looking to the hospital merely as a place for his/her personal physician to... provide
medical care.
this requirement is deemed satisfied if the plaintiff can prove that he/she relied upon
the hospital to provide care and treatment, rather than upon a specific physician

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES v. CA and NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE

AGANA,

GR No. 126297, 2008-02-11

Facts:

Natividad Agana was admitted at the Medical City General Hospital (Medical City)
because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge

Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid."

Dr. Ampil,... assisted by the medical staff[1] of Medical City, performed an anterior
resection surgery upon her.

he found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary,
necessitating the removal of certain portions of it.
obtained the consent of Atty. Enrique Agana, Natividad's husband, to permit Dr.
Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to perform hysterectomy upon
Natividad

Dr. Fuentes performed and completed the hysterectomy. Afterwards, Dr. Ampil took
over, completed the operation and closed the incision. However, the operation
appeared to be flawed.

sponge count lacking 2

After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region.
She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain
was the natural consequence of the surgical operation performed upon her. Dr.
Ampil recommended that Natividad... consult an oncologist

Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to seek further
treatment. After four (4) months of consultations and laboratory examinations,
Natividad was told that she was free of cancer.

Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two (2) weeks
thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina.

Dr. Ampil was immediately informed. He proceeded to Natividad's house where he

managed to extract by... hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width.

the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic

General Hospital. While confined thereat, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the
presence of a foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5
inches in... width. The gauze had badly infected her vaginal vault... forced stool to
excrete through the vagina.

Natividad underwent another... surgery.

Natividad and her husband filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon
City a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil and
Dr. Fuentes.

On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above case, Natividad died.
the trial court rendered judgment in favor of spouses Agana... the Court of Appeals,
in its Decision dated September 6, 1996, affirmed the assailed judgment... the
complaint against Dr. Fuentes was dismissed.

petitions for review on certiorari.

the Court, through its First Division, rendered a Decision holding that PSI is jointly
and severally liable with Dr. Ampil... employer-employee relationship between
Medical City and Dr. Ampil.

PSI's act of publicly displaying in the lobby of the Medical City the names and
specializations of its accredited... physicians, including Dr. Ampil, estopped it from
denying the existence of an employer-employee relationship between them under
the doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel

PSI's failure to supervise Dr. Ampil and its resident... physicians and nurses and to
take an active step in order to remedy their negligence rendered it directly liable
under the doctrine of corporate negligence.

motion for reconsideration, PSI contends that the Court erred in finding it liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, there being no employer-employee
relationship

Issues:

"an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their

attending and visiting physicians for the purpose of apportioning responsibility"...
the doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel cannot apply because
spouses Agana failed to establish one requisite of the doctrine, i.e., that Natividad
relied on the representation of the hospital in engaging the services of Dr. Ampil.

that the doctrine of corporate negligence is misplaced because the proximate cause
of Natividad's injury was Dr. Ampil's negligence... whether or not respondent
hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner's condition.

Ruling:

an employer-employee relationship "in effect" exists between the Medical City and
Dr. Ampil. Consequently, both are jointly and severally liable to the Aganas.
The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with
attending and visiting "consultants," who are allegedly not hospital employees,
presents problems in... apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical
malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only more apparent than real.

hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in
the conduct of their work within the hospital premises

Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, visiting or attending, are required to submit
proof of... completion of residency, their educational qualifications

These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital

administration or... by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept
or reject the application. This is particularly true with respondent hospital.

In other words, private hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their
attending and visiting "consultant" staff.

he is normally required to attend clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside

rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand rounds and patient audits
and perform other tasks and... responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to
maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into
the hospital... the physician's performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a
peer review... committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and
feedback from patients, nurses, interns and residents... remiss in his duties, or a
consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the
hospital or its peer review committee,... is normally politely terminated.

The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its
employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person
accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the
former's responsibility under a... relationship of partia ptetas.

"consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital

asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's... condition, the control
exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment
of wages... the control test is... determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the
foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
the Court did not reverse its ruling in Ramos. What it clarified was that the De Los
Santos Medical Clinic did not exercise control over its consultant, hence, there is no
employer-employee relationship between them.

the doctrine in Ramos stays, i.e., for the purpose of allocating responsibility in
medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship exists between
hospitals and their... consultants.

Even assuming that Dr. Ampil is not an employee of Medical City, but an...
independent contractor, still the said hospital is liable to the Aganas.

Atty. Agana categorically testified that one of the reasons why he chose Dr. Ampil
was that he knew him to be a staff member of Medical City, a prominent and known
hospital.

Clearly, PSI is estopped from passing the blame solely to Dr. Ampil. Its act of
displaying his name and those of the other physicians in the public directory at the
lobby of the hospital amounts to holding out to the public that it offers quality
medical service through the... listed physicians. This justifies Atty. Agana's belief
that Dr. Ampil was a member of the hospital's staff.

Unfortunately, PSI had been remiss in its duty. It did not conduct an immediate
investigation on the reported missing gauzes to the great prejudice and agony of its
patient.

Dr. Jocson's lack of concern for the patients. Such conduct is reflective of the
hospital's manner of supervision. Not only did PSI breach its duty to oversee or
supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls,... it also failed to take
an active step in fixing the negligence committed.

there is merit in the trial court's finding that the failure of PSI to conduct an
investigation "established PSI's part in the dark conspiracy of silence and
concealment about the gauzes."

Principles:

under the doctrine of apparent authority, the question in every case is whether the
principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in... such a situation that a person
of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature of the
particular business, is justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform
the particular act in question... the doctrine of corporate responsibility.[7] The duty
of providing quality medical service is no longer the sole prerogative and
responsibility of the physician. This is because the modern... hospital now tends to
organize a highly-professional medical staff whose competence and performance
need also to be monitored by the hospital commensurate with its inherent
responsibility to provide quality medical care.[8] Such... responsibility includes the
proper supervision of the members of its medical staff. Accordingly, the hospital has
the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment prescribed
and administered by the physicians practicing in its premises.

ROGELIO NOGALES vs. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER et al.

G.R. No. 142625

Facts: Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales ("Corazon"), who was then
37 years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada ("Dr.
Estrada") beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as December 1975.
Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains
prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales ("Spouses Nogales") to see Dr. Estrada at
his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission
to the Capitol Medical Center ("CMC"). t 6:13 a.m., Corazon started to experience
convulsionsAt 6:22 a.m., Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied low forceps
to extract Corazon's baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical tissue was
allegedly torn.At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding
which rapidly became profuse. Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was
"hemorrhage, post partum.

Issue: Whether or not CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.

Ruling: Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting "consultant" staff. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible
for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others
based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.

In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-

physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be
liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. This exception is also
known as the "doctrine of apparent authority”.

For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent
was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the
appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had
knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the
conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. In
the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical
staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority
thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an employee or
agent of CMC.
Cantre vs Go
GR No. 160889 April 27, 2007

Facts: Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology

at the Dr. Jesus Delgado memorial Hospital. She was the attending physician of
respondent Nora Go, who was admitted at the said hospital on April 19, 1992. At
1:30am of April 20, 1992, Nora gave birth to her fourth child, a baby boy. However,
at around 3:30am Nora suffered profuse bleeding insider her womb due to some
parts of the placenta were not completely expelled from her womb after delivery
consequently, Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her blood
pressure to 40/0. Petitioner said the assisting resident physician performed various
medical procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Nora’s blood pressure. Her
blood pressure was frequently monitored with the use of a sphygmamometer. While
petitioner was massaging Nora’s uterus for it to contract and stop bleeding, she
ordered a drop light to warm Nora and her baby. Nora remained unconscious until
she recovered. While in the recovery room, her husband, respondent John David Z.
Go noticed a fresh gasping wound 2 1/2″ x 3 1/2″ in the inner portion of her left arm,
close to the armpit. He asked the nurses what caused the injury. He was informed, it
was a burn. An investigation was filed by Nora’s husband and found out from the
petitioner that it was caused by the blood pressure cuff, however, this was contrary
to the findings from a medico-legal report which stated that it was indeed a burn and
that a drop light when placed near a skin for about 10mins could cause such burn.
Nora was referred to a plastic surgeon from the hospital and skin grafting was done
on her and scar revision but both still left a mark on Nora’s arm compelling the
respondent spouse to file a complaint for damages against petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the injury referred by Nora.

Held: Yes. The Hippocratic oath mandates physicians to give primordial

consideration to the well-being of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to his
precept, he is accountable for his acts. This is notwithstanding, courts face a unique
restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are not
guardians of care and they never set out to intentionally cause injury to their patients.
However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exist
and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the damage
caused.

In cases, involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor allows the
mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the following
requisites concur:

1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone’s negligence;

2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant

or defendants;

3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff

responsible is eliminated.

All of these three requisites were present in the case at bar.

Under the the captain of the ship doctrine, the surgeon in charge of the operation is
liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those are under the
surgeons control.

Dr. Fernando P. Solidum vs. People of the Philippines

GR No. 19212; March 10, 2014

Facts:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus.
Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring
one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete
through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. When Gerald was three
years old, he was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation.
Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Luceño,
Dr. Valeña and Dr. Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Abella, Dr. Razon and
petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). During the operation, Gerald
experienced bradycardia , and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks, but
he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.

A complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries was filed
by Gerald’s parents against the team of doctors. Upon a finding of probable cause,
the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely against Dr. Solidum.

The RTC rendered Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries and ordering her to indemnify,
jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo,
for damages. The CA affirmed the ruling of RTC and applied the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in the case.

Issues:
1. Whetherthe doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in the case.
2. Whether Dr. Solidum is liable for criminal negligence.

Held:
1. No, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not apply in this case. The doctrine of res
ipsaloquitor means that where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by defendant that the accident
arose from want of care.
The doctrine is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman
is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised.

For the doctrine to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) the accident
was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent’ (2) the
instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged; (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution of the person injured.

In this case, the application of the doctrine is inappropriate. Although the second and
third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the
instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient,
being then unconscious during the operation has no contributory negligence, the first
element is wanting. Indeed, the patient experienced bradycardia during the
operation, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his
attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact,
the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that
the lack of oxygen could have been trigerred by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting
them to administer atropine to the patient.

2. No, Dr. Solidum is not liable for criminal negligence. Negligence is defined as the
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. The negligence must be the proximate cause of the
injury.

An action upon medical negligence calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent
evidence the following elements: (a) the duty owed by the physician to the patient,
as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific
norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the
physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care; (c) the
causation, i.e, there must be a reasonably close and casual connection between the
negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and d.) the damages suffered by
the patient.

In the medical profession, specific norms on standard of care to protect the patient
against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of
the physician in respect of the patient. In attempting to fix a standard by which a
court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite
duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense
experts is required.
In this case, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical
qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard
of care was applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to
determine whether the first three elements of a negligence and malpractice action
were attendant.

Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for “failing to monitor and regulate properly
the levels of anesthesia administered to Gerald and using 100% halothane and other
anesthetic medications.” However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did
not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent
in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did
not preclude the probability that other factors related to Gerald’s major operation,
which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the administration of the
anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience
bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that “although
the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still
hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur.”

The Supreme Court stated that “the existence of the probability about other factors
causing the hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as
to Dr. Solidum’s guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries.”

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;

REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20, 2010;
ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit.

Additional Notes: The Supreme Court also addressed in this case the error
committed by the RTC and CA in holding the Ospital ng Maynila jointly and
severally liable with Dr. Solidum with regard to indemnification for damages.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is
deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense
charged. The Supreme Court, in this case, stated, “ It is puzzling, how the RTC and
the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr.
Solidum despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity,
had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum”.
The Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its
fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. No person can be
prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made
a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of
law. The proof of negligence. The exception may be availed of if
the followingrequisites concur:

1. The accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent

2. The instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the personcharged

3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
of the person injured

In this case, the essential requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur are present. The first element was sufficiently established when Rosit
proved that one of the screws installed by Dr.Gestuvo struck his molar. An average
man of common intelligence would know that striking a tooth with any foreign
object much less a screw would cause severe pain. Anent the second element, it is
sufficient that the operation which resulted in the screw hitting Rosit’s molar was,
indeed, performed by Dr. Gestuvo. Lastly, the third element, it was not shown that
Rosit’s lung disease could have contributed to the pain. Whatis clear is that he
suffered because one of the screws that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit Rosit’s molar.
Clearly then, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine finds application in the instant case and
no expert testimony is required to establish the negligence of defendant Dr. Gestuvo.
Borromeo vs. Family care hospital. And Dr. Inso

G. R. 191018 Jan. 25, 2016

Facts:

Borromeo brought his wife to the family care hospital becaus eof acute pain at the
lower stomach area and fever for 2 days, he was admitted in said hospital and placed
under the care of Dr. Inso. Dr. Inso conducted the surgery and by then he confirmed
his hypothesis that Lillian has an acute appendicitis. The operation was succesfully
done however after 16 hours, Lilian was returned to her room where she start to
become restless and dropped her blood pressure, she was not even responded to
blood transfusion hence the tube connected to oxygen tank was inserted by dr. Inso
into Lilian and order her to put into in an Intensive care unit. Though being a
secondary hospotal, it does not. Have. An icu, dr. Inso arranged with other hospital
with icu and transfer there lililan. Unfortunately lilian passed away there despite of
trying to resuscitate her. In his autopsy report, dr. Reyes concluded thay lilia died
due to hemorrhage and concluded that the internal bleeding was caused by .5 x .5
cm opening in tge repair site. Further, he opined that it could be avoided if the site
was repaired with double suturing instead of the single continuing suture repair that
he found.

Hence the petitioner filed a complaint against family care hospital and dr. Inso for.
Medical malpractice basing it to the autopsy report made by reyes and pursue the
case with having reyes as the winess. Rtc ruled in favor of the petitioner, believing
in the theory of Dr. Reyes on the. 5x. 5cm. And applied the docyrine of resipsa
loquitor. And ordered the respondents to pay for damages, death indemnity, moral
and exemplary, loss of earning payment, Atty.’s Fees, cost of suit When the
respondents appealed, Ca reversed.

Hence this petition for certitorari of carlos boromeo

ISSUE:

Whether respondents are guilty of medical malpractice and that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor can be

applied in the case.

Held:

No. The basic legal principle that equally applies to both civil and criminal cases
that whiever alleges the fact has the burden of proof. Petitiiner's failure to present
expert witnesses resulted in his failure to prove petitioners' negligence. During the
investigation ryes found to be not an expert in the subject matter having no training
residency in pathology or in surgery after he passed the medical board exam. On the
other hand the repondent shows as a witness Dr. Ramos. Dr. Ramos graduated from
the Far Eastern University, Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation, in 1975. He took up
his post-graduate internship at the Quezon Memorial Hospital in Lucena City, before
taking the board exams. After obtaining his professional license, he underwent
residency training in pathology at the Jose R. Reyes Memorial Center from 1977 to
1980. He passed the examination in Anatomic, Clinical, and Physical Pathology in
1980 and was inducted in 1981. He also took the examination in anatomic pathology
in 1981 and was inducted in 1982.At the time of his testimony, Dr. Ramos is a
practicing pathologist with over 20 years of experience. He is an associate professor
at the Department of Surgery of the Fatima Medical Center, the Manila Central
University, and the Perpetual Help Medical Center. He is a Fellow of the Philippine
College of Surgeons, a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Surgery, and a Fellow
of the Philippine Society of General Surgeons. He also headed the Perpetual Help
General Hospital Pathology department as well as the Batangas General Hospital. In
deed becoming an expert in the subject matter, the testimony of Dr. Ramos carry
greater than od Dr. Reyes. Dr. Ramos discredited Dr. Reyes' theory that the 0.5 x 0.5
cm opening at the repair site caused Lilian's internal bleeding. According to Dr.
Ramos, appendical vessels measure only 0.1 to 0.15 cm, a claim that was not refuted
by the petitioner. If the 0.5 x 0.5 cm opening had caused Lilian's hemorrhage, she
would not have survived for over 16 hours; she would have died immediately, within
20 to 30 minutes, after surgery. Dr. Ramos submitted that the cause of Lilian's death
was hemorrhage due to DIC, a blood disorder that leads to the failure of the blood
to clot; Dr. Ramos considered the abundant petechial hemorrhage in the myocardic
sections and the hemorrhagic right lung; the multiple bleeding points indicate that
Lilian was afflicted with DIC.

The court deny the petition for lack of merit

MENDOZA vs. CASUMPANG

G.R. No. 197987 (March 19, 2012)

Facts:

Josephine Casumpang, who died before the trial could end, was substituted by
herrespondent, husband, Adriano and their children Jennifer and John, filed an action
fordamages against petitioner Dr. Mendoza in 1993 before the Regional Trial Court
of IloiloCity. Josephine underwent hysterectomy and myomectomy that Dr.
Mendoza performed and after operation, Josephine experienced recurring fever,
nausea and vomiting. Three months after the operation when she noticed something
protruding from her genital while taking a bath and she went to see Dr. Jamandre-
Guban since Dr. Mendoza was unavailable. Dr.Jamandre-Guban extracted a foul
smelling, partially expelled rolled gauze from her cervix. The RTC rendered
judgment, finding Dr. Mendoza guilty of neglect and reinstated by the Court of
Appeals, thus, prompted her to file the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not there was a gross negligence on the part of the petitioner, Dr.
MariterMendoza.
Ruling: Yes, the petitioner is guilty of gross negligence.D.

Reasoning:

Gross negligence is a flagrant failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent
person would exercise. A surgical operation is the responsibility
of surgeon performing it.He must personally ascertain that the counts of instruments
and materials used before thesurgery and prior to the sewing the patient up has been
correctly done.

Policy In this kind of jurisprudence, it will provide an example to the medical

profession and to stress the need for constant vigilance in attending to patient’s
health.

PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS

285 SCRA 438

ROMERO; January 29, 1998

NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged under
Article 248 of the RPC.

FACTS

- The information alleged that the accused with the use of firearms caused the death
of Eduardo Tolentino Sr. and Jerry Agliam and inflicted gunshot wounds to Vidal
Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino.

- The Supreme Court upheld the RTC’s decision as to the guilt of the three accused,
FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO and ALVIN BULUSAN. This digest will
focus on the RTC’s award of damages which is relevant to our recitation.

- As to damages, the RTC further sentenced them to pay jointly and solidarily:

1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000, moral
damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual damages in the amount of P35,755,
with interest;

2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the
amount of P50,000, moral damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual damages
in the total amount of P61,785, with interest;

3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of P2,003.40, and moral damages
in the amount of P10,000, with interest;

4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in the
amount of P5,000 each, with interest.

5. The costs.

ISSUE

WON the trial court erred in the award of damages to the victims’ heirs
HELD

1. NO

Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or

satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of
some right. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of,
or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be
invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety,
physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these
were the proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or omission.

Reasoning
- In granting actual or compensatory damages, the party making a claim for such
must present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, as
corroborated by his testimony. Here, the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the
victims is not controverted, the same having been fully substantiated by receipts
accumulated by them and presented to the court. Therefore, the award of actual
damages is proper.

- However, the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam
and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this
Court, the amount of P50,000 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of
indemnity, and not as compensatory damages.

- As regards moral damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury
caused to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable, may be determined by the
trial court in its discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this
matter.

Disposition Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH

MODIFICATION. No pronouncement as to cost.

CUSTODIO V CA
ALGARRA V SANDEJAS

27 Phil 284

TRENT; March 24, 1914

NATURE

Civil action for personal injuries received from a collision with the defendant’s
automobile due to the negligence of the defendant, who was driving the car. The
negligence is not questioned and this case involves only the amount of damages
which should be allowed.

FACTS

- The accident occurred on July 9, 1912.

- Because of injuries, plaintiff spent 10 days in the hospital. The first 4-5 days he
couldn’t leave his bed. After being discharged, he received medical attention
from a private practitioner for several days.

- Plaintiff testified that he had down no work since the accident, that his earning
capacity was P50/month

- He described himself as being well at the end of July; the trial took place September
19

- Plaintiff sold distillery products and had about 20 regular customers who purchased
in small quantities, necessitating regular, frequent deliveries

- It took him about 4 years to build up the business he had at the time of the accident,
and since the accident, he only kept 4 of his regular customers.

- The lower court refused to allow him any compensation for injury to his business
due to his enforced absence therefrom.
ISSUE

How to determine the amount of damages to award plaintiff

HELD

Reasoning

- Actions for damages such as the case at bar are based upon article 1902 of the Civil
Code: "A person who, by act or omission, causes damage to another where there is
fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done." Of this article,
the supreme court of Spain, in considering the indemnity imposed by it, said: "It is
undisputed that said reparation, to be efficacious and substantial, must rationally
include the generic idea of complete indemnity, such as is defined and explained in
article 1106 of the said (Civil) Code."

- Art 1106. Indemnity for losses and damages includes not only the amount of the
loss which may have been suffered, but also that of the profit which the creditor may
have failed to realize, reserving the provisions contained in the following articles.

- Art 1107. The losses and damages for which a debtor in good faith is liable, are
those foreseen or which may have been foreseen, at the time of constituting the
obligation, and which may be a necessary consequence of its nonfulfillment.

- The rules for the measure of damages, once that liability is determined: The Civil
Code requires that the defendant repair the damage caused by his fault or negligence.
No distinction is made therein between damage caused maliciously and intentionally
and damages caused through mere negligence in so far as the civil liability of the
wrongdoer in concerned. Nor is the defendant required to do more than repair the
damage done, or, in other words, to put the plaintiff in the same position, so far as
pecuniary compensation can do so, that he would have been in had the damage not
been inflicted. In this respect there is a notable difference between the two systems.
Under the Anglo-SAxon law, when malicious or willful intention to cause the
damage is an element of the defendant's act, it is quite generally regarded as an
aggravating circumstance for which the plaintiff is entitled to more than mere
compensation for the injury inflicted. These are called exemplary or punitive
damages, and no provision is made for them in article 1902 of the Civil Code.

- article 1902 of the Civil Code requires that the defendant repair the damage done.
There is, however, a world of difficulty in carrying out the legislative will in this
particular. The measure of damages is an ultimate fact, to be determined from the
evidence submitted to the court. The complexity of human affairs is such that two
cases are seldom exactly alike, a thorough discussion of each case may permit of
their more or less definite classification, and develop leading principles which will
be of great assistance to a court in determining the question, not only of damages,
but of the prior one of negligence. As the Code is so indefinite (even though from
necessity) on the subject of damages arising from fault or negligence, the bench and
bar should have access to and avail themselves of those great, underlying principles
which have been gradually and conservatively developed and thoroughly tested in
Anglo-Saxon courts. A careful and intelligent application of these principles should
have a tendency to prevent mistakes in the rulings of the court on the evidence
offered, and should assist in determining damages, generally, with some degree of
uniformity

- The case at bar involves actual incapacity of the plaintiff for two months, and loss
of the greater portion of his business. As to the damages resulting from the actual
incapacity of the plaintiff to attend to his business there is no question. They are, of
course, to be allowed on the basis of his earning capacity, which in this case, is P50
per month. the difficult question in the present case is to determine the damage which
has results to his business through his enforced absence. In Sanz vs. Lavin Bros. (6
Phil. Rep., 299), this court, citing numerous decisions of the supreme court of Spain,
held that evidence of damages "must rest upon satisfactory proof of the existence in
reality of the damages alleged to have been suffered." But, while certainty is an
essential element of an award of damages, it need not be a mathematical certainty.
That this is true is adduced not only from the personal injury cases from the supreme
court of Spain which we have discussed above, but by many cases decided by this
court, reference to which has already been made. As stated in Joyce on Damages,
section 75, "But to deny the injured party the right to recover any actual damages in
cases f torts because they are of such a nature a cannot be thus certainly measured,
would be to enable parties to profit by and speculate upon their own wrongs; such is
not the law."
- As to the elements to be considered in estimating the damage done to plaintiff's
business by reason of his accident, this same author, citing numerous authorities, has
the following to say: It is proper to consider the business the plaintiff is engaged in,
the nature and extent of such business, the importance of his personal oversight and
superintendence in conducting it, and the consequent loss arising from his inability
to prosecure it.

- The business of the present plaintiff required his immediate supervision. All the
profits derived therefrom were wholly due to his own exertions. Nor are his damages
confined to the actual time during which he was physically incapacitated for work,
as is the case of a person working for a stipulated daily or monthly or yearly salary.
As to persons whose labor is thus compensated and who completely recover from
their injuries, the rule may be said to be that their damages are confined to the
duration of their enforced absence from their occupation. But the present plaintiff
could not resume his work at the same profit he was making when the accident
occurred. He had built up an establishing business which included some twenty
regular customers. These customers represented to him a regular income. In addition
to this he made sales to other people who were not so regular in their purchases. -
But he could figure on making at least some sales each month to others besides his
regular customers. Taken as a whole his average monthly income from his business
was about P50. As a result of the accident, he lost all but four of his regular customers
and his receipts dwindled down to practically nothing. Other agents had invaded his
territory, and upon becoming physically able to attend to his business, he found that
would be necessary to start with practically no regular trade, and either win back his
old customers from his competitors or else secure others. During this process of
reestablishing his patronage his income would necessarily be less than he was
making at the time of the accident and would continue to be so for some time. Of
course, if it could be mathematically determined how much less he will earn during
this rebuilding process than he would have earned if the accident had not occurred,
that would be the amount he would be entitled to in this action. But manifestly this
ideal compensation cannot be ascertained. The question therefore resolves itself into
whether this damage to his business can be so nearly ascertained as to justify a court
in awarding any amount whatever.

- When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going concern with a fairly steady
average profit on the investment, it may be assumed that had the interruption to the
business through defendant's wrongful act not occurred, it would have continued
producing this average income "so long as is usual with things of that nature." When
in addition to the previous average income of the business it is further shown what
the reduced receipts of the business are immediately after the cause of the
interruption has been removed, there can be no manner of doubt that a loss of profits
has resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant. In the present case, we not only
have the value of plaintiff's business to him just prior to the accident, but we also
have its value to him after the accident. At the trial, he testified that his wife had
earned about fifteen pesos during the two months that he was disabled. That this
almost total destruction of his business was directly chargeable to defendant's
wrongful act, there can be no manner of doubt; and the mere fact that the loss can
not be ascertained with absolute accuracy, is no reason for denying plaintiff's claim
altogether. As stated in one case, it would be a reproach to the law if he could not
recover damages at all. (Baldwin vs. Marquez, 91 Ga., 404)

- We are of the opinion that the lower court had before it sufficient evidence of the
damage to plaintiff's business in the way of prospective loss of profits to justify it in
calculating his damages as to his item. That evidence has been properly elevated to
this court of review. Under section 496 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we are
authorized to enter final judgment or direct a new trial, as may best subserve the ends
of justice. We are of the opinion that the evidence presented as to the damage done
to plaintiff's business is credible and that it is sufficient and clear enough upon which
to base a judgment for damages. Plaintiff having had four years' experience in selling
goods on commission, it must be presumed that he will be able to rebuild his business
to its former proportions; so that at some time in the future his commissions will
equal those he was receiving when the accident occurred. Aided by his experience,
he should be able to rebuild this business to its former proportions in much less time
than it took to establish it as it stood just prior to the accident. One year should be
sufficient time in which to do this. The profits which plaintiff will receive from the
business in the course of its reconstruction will gradually increase. The injury to
plaintiff's business begins where these profits leave off, and, as a corollary, there is
where defendant's liability begins. Upon this basis, we fix the damages to plaintiff's
business at P250.

Disposition The judgment of the lower court is set aside, and the plaintiff is awarded
the following damages; ten pesos for medical expenses; one hundred pesos for the
two months of his enforced absence from his business; and two hundred and fifty
pesos for the damage done to his business in the way of loss of profits, or a total of
three hundred and sixty pesos. No costs will be allowed in this instance.

HEIRS OF BORLADO V. VDA. DE BULAN

G.R. 114118
August 28, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioners are the heirs of Simeon whose parents were Serapio and Balbina Borlado,
the original owners of lots in question. Serapio sold the subject land to Francisco
Bacero. After the latter’s death, his widow sold the lot to Sps. Bienvenido Bulan and
Salvacion Borbon. Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale, actual possession of the
lot. Salvacion and herCo-defendants-appellees’ possession of the lot was
continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive until November4,
1972, when petitioners forcibly entered and wrested physical possession thereof
from them.

Respondents filed with the Municipal Court of Maayon, Capiz a complaint for
ejectment against petitioners. The ejectment case was decided in favor of the
respondents whereby the petitioners, their agents, tenants, privies and members of
their families were ordered to vacate Lot No. 2079 and deliver possession to the
respondents together with all improvements and standing crops; to pay said
respondents One Hundred (100) cavans of palay annually from 1972 to the present
or in the total amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay; and
to pay the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as reimbursement for the
amount respondents had paid their lawyer to protect their rights; and the costs of
suit.

Subsequently, instead of appealing to the RTC, petitioners filed a civil action which
was subsequently dismissed due to lack ofcause of action. RTC ordered petitioners
to vacate. Upon appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Was the award to respondents of cavan of palay as a form of damages proper?

HELD:
No, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding
petitioners liable to pay respondents one hundred(100) cavans of palay every year
from 1972 until they vacate the premises of the land in question.

The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. We cannot
sustain the award. “Palay” is not legal tender currency in the Philippines.

FRANCISCO L. LAZATIN vs. TWAÑO

G.R. No. L-12736
July 31, 1961

FACTS:

Angel C. Twaño and Gregorio T. Castro filed for the recovery of P35,000
plus interest against F. L. Lazatin, et al. for their purchase from the U.S. government
of 225 auto-trucks. After trial, the CFI of Manila dismissed the complaint as well as
the intervention. The order of dismissal was taken to the Court of Appeals which
rendered judgment reversing the said order and declaring that Twaño and Castro are
co-owners in the business of buying and selling surplus auto-trucks, andordered the
Lazatin to pay P10K so it was levied on his properties and was subsequently sold at
the publicauction where Twaño and Castro were the purchasers.

Before the expiration of the redemption period, Lazatin deposited the redemption
price. Lazatin filed to recover from Twaño and Castro the balance of
P19,676.09 representing the proceeds of auto-trucks sold directly to the purchasers
by Twaño and Castro. Petitioners also secured a writ of attachment alleging that
there was no security whatsoever for the payment claimed in the complaint and that
they are removing or are about to remove or dispose of their property with intent to
defraud their creditors and that the sheriff refused to deliver the amount deposited.
On May 9, 1953, plaintiff Lazatin died and on March 10, 1954, Gil Gotiangco was
appointed and qualified as administrator of plaintiff's estate. On October 28, 1955,
the trial court rendered judgment, ordering the estate of Lazatin to pay the defendants
therein the following sums:
(1) P3,000.00 for the fees of Attorney Manuel O. Chan;
(2) P,500.00 for moral damages to each of the defendants;
(3) Six percent (6%) interest on the amount of P13,849.88 from August 6,
1952 until said amount is actually delivered to and receipted by the
defendants; and
(4) To pay the costs.
Judgment is also rendered against the Central Surety and Insurance Co., which
is solidarily liable with the Estate of the deceased plaintiff Francisco L.
Lazatin on its bond for the sum of P20,000.00, filed by said Company for the
issuance on the writ of attachment for the amounts mentioned in Nos. (2) and
(3) of the dispositive part of this decision.

ISSUE:

Is Lazatin liable for the damages?

HELD:

Yes.

The law on damages is found on Title XVII of the Civil Code (Arts. 2195 to 2235).
The rules governing damages laid down in other laws, and the principles of the
general law on damages are adopted in so far as they are not inconsistent with the
Code (Arts. 2196 and 2198). Article 2197 mentions the kind of damages recoverable,
among which are (1) actual or compensatory; and (2) moral Article 2219 provides
that moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases . . . (3)
malicious prosecution

There is an abundance of case holding that the action to recover damages from the
attachment plaintiff, for the wrongful issuance and levy of an attachment (malicious
attachment) is identical or is analogous to the ordinary action for malicious
prosecution. Based on jurisprudence, it may logically be inferred that in order that
moral damages may be recovered in connection with the writ of attachment under
consideration, malice is an essential ingredient thereof. Here, the court did not
make any finding that the said petition was maliciously sued out therefore not
entitled to moral damages
 BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS vs. HEIRS OF KALAW
G.R. No. L-18805
August 14, 1967

FACTS:

The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) was chartered as a non-profit

governmental organization on avowedly for the protection, preservation and
development of the coconut industry in the Philippines. On August 1, 1946,
NACOCO's charter was amended [Republic Act 5] to grant that corporation the
express power to buy and sell copra. The charter amendment was enacted to
stabilize copra prices, to serve coconut producers by securing advantageous prices
for them, to cut down to a minimum, if not altogether eliminate, the margin of
middlemen, mostly aliens. General manager and board chairman was Maximo M.
Kalaw; defendants Juan Bocar and Casimiro Garcia were members of the Board;
defendant Leonor Moll became director only on December 22, 1947. NACOCO,
after the passage of Republic Act 5, embarked on copra trading activities.

An unhappy chain of events conspired to deter NACOCO from fulfilling the

contracts it entered into. Nature supervened. Four devastating typhoons visited the
Philippines in 1947. When it became clear that the contracts would be unprofitable,
Kalaw submitted them to the board for approval. It was not until December 22,
1947 when the membership was completed. Defendant Moll took her oath on that
date. A meeting was then held. Kalaw made a full disclosure of the situation,
apprised the board of the impending heavy losses. No action was first taken on the
contracts but not long thereafter, that is, on January 30, 1948, the board met again
with Kalaw, Bocar, Garcia and Moll in attendance. They unanimously approved
the contracts hereinbefore enumerated.

As was to be expected, NACOCO but partially performed the contracts. The

buyers threatened damage suits, some of which were settled. But one buyer, Louis
Dreyfus & Go. (Overseas) Ltd., did in fact sue before the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The cases culminated in an out-of- court amicable settlement when the
Kalaw management was already out.
With particular reference to the Dreyfus claims, NACOCO put up the defenses
that: (1) the contracts were void because Louis Dreyfus & Co. (Overseas) Ltd. did
not have license to do business here; and (2) failure to deliver was due to force
majeure, the typhoons. All the settlements sum up to P1,343,274.52.

In this suit started in February, 1949, NACOCO seeks to recover the above sum of
P1,343,274.52 from general manager and board chairman Maximo M. Kalaw, and
directors Juan Bocar, Casimiro Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges Kalaw with
negligence under Article 1902 of the old Civil Code (now Article 2176, new Civil
Code); and defendant board members, including Kalaw, with bad faith and/or
breach of trust for having approved the contracts. By Executive Order 372, dated
November 24, 1950, NACOCO, together with other government-owned
corporations, was abolished, and the Board of Liquidators was entrusted with the
function of settling and closing its affairs.

The CFI-Manila dismissed the complaint and ordered the plaintiff to pay the heirs
of Maximo Kalaw the sum of P2,601.94 for unpaid salaries and cash deposit due
the deceased Kalaw from NACOCO.

ISSUE:
Should damages be awarded?

RULING:
No.
This is a case of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is
here absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is
wanting. Of course, Kalaw could not have been an insurer of profits. He could not
be expected to predict the coming of unpredictable typhoons. And even as
typhoons supervened Kalaw was not remissed in his duty. He exerted efforts to
stave off losses. That Kalaw cannot be tagged with crassa negligentia or as much
as simple negligence, would seem to be supported by the fact that even as the
contracts were being questioned in Congress and in the NACOCO board itself,
President Roxas defended the actuations of Kalaw.

It is a well known rule of law that questions of policy of management are left
solely to the honest decision of officers and directors of a corporation, and the
court is without authority to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the board
of directors; the board is the business manager of the corporation, and so long as it
acts in good faith its orders are not reviewable by the courts."
 CUSTODIO vs COURT OF APPEALS
253 SCRA 483

FACTS:

The respondent (Pacifico Mabasa) owns a parcel of land with a two-door

apartment erected there on situated at Interior P. Burgos St.,
Palingon, Tipas,Tagig, Metro Manila. Said property may be describedto be
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to respondents herein.

As an access to P. Burgos Street from respondent’s property, there are two

possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter
wide a n d i s a b o u t 2 0 me t e r s d i s t a nt f r o m M a b a s a ' s residence to P.
Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of
houses of the petitioners. The second passageway is about 3meters in width and
length from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In
passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path t h r o u g h t h e
s e p t i c t a n k a n d w i t h 5 - 6 me t e r s i n length, has to be traversed.

When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the
premises and who were acknowledged by Mabasa as tenant.

However, one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when Mabasa went to see
the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first
passageway making it narrower in with. Said adobe fence was first constructed by
the Petitioners Santoses along their property which is also along the first passage
way. Petitioner Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence
in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. And it was then that the
remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Petitioner Ma. Cristina
Santos testified that she constructed said fence because of some other
inconveniences of having at the front of her house pathway such as when
some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows.
The Trial Court rendered a decision ordering the petitioners Custodios and
Santoses to give Respondent Mabasa permanent access ingress and egress, to the
public street and Mabasa to pay the former the sum of P8,000 as indemnity for the
permanent use of the passageway.

Respondent Mabasa went to the CA raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower
court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. The CA rendered its
decision affirming the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Was the award for damages proper?

HELD:
No. A reading of the decision of the CA will show that the award of damages was
based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Mabasa, incurred losses in the
form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason
of the closure of the passageway. However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered
losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right while damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
the injury. Also damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damaged suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty (damnum
asbsque injuria).
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which
the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of the injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it.

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. The act of
petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right
as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. At the
time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes.
There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by
law or by contract.
 ALGARRA V. SANDEJAS
G.R. NO. L-8385
March 24, 1914
FACTS:

Lucio Algarra filed a civil action for personal injuries received from a car
collision due to the negligence of Sixto Sandejas causing him to be hospitalized for
10 days, four of five days of which he could not leave his bed. After being
discharged, he still continued to receive medical treatment and that he had done no
work since he was not yet entirely recovered. He also spent to pay the doctor P8 and
medicine P2, the expense totalling to P110.

Algarra sells the products of a distillery and earns 10% commission which averages
to P50/month. He had around 20 regular customers which took him 4 years to build
who order in small quantities and require regular and frequent deliveries. Since his
accident, his wife tried to keep up with the business but only 4 regular customers
remained.

The lower court refused to allow him anything for his injury on the ground that the
doctrine of Marcelo vs. Velasco is opposed to such allowance and Viada which does
not pertain to personal injuries.

ISSUE:
Can damage to the business be awarded by the court?

HELD:

Actual damages is given to repair the wrong that has been done to compensate or the
injury inflicted and not to impose penalty. They are compensatory only which simply
make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong.

Compensatory damages are awarded to compensate the injured party for injury
caused by the wrong and must be only such as make just and fair compensation and
are due when the wrong is established, whether it was committed maliciously or not.

The case at bar involves actual incapacity of the plaintiff for two months, and loss
of the greater portion of his business. As to the damages resulting from the actual
incapacity of the plaintiff to attend to his business, there is no question.
 PNOC V. CA
G.R. NO. 107518
October 8, 1998

FACTS:

In the early morning on September 21, 1977, M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned
by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation was on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila and
collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
(LSC). Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N.
Alejandro found Petroparcel to be at fault. Maria Efigenia sued the LSC and the
Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo praying for an award of P692,680.00
representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria
Efigenia XV with interest at the legal rate plus 25% as attorney’s fees and later on
amended to add the lost value of the hull less the P200K insurance and unrealized
profits and lost business opportunities. During the pendency of the case, PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it
acquired Petroparcel. The Lower Court ruled against PNOC ordering it to
pay P6,438,048 value of the fishing boat with interest plus P50K attorney's fees and
cost of suit.

ISSUE:
Was the damage adequately proven?

HELD:
No. The Court affirmed the decision with modification of the actual damages
of P6,438,048.00 to P2M nominal damages for lack of evidentiary bases therefor.

INTEGRATED PACKING vs. CA

333 SCRA 402

FACTS:
On May 5, 1978, the Integrated Packaging Corp agreed to deliver to Fil-Anchor
Paper Co., Inc. 3,450 reams of printing paper. Materials were to be paid within 30-
90 days. On June 7, 1978, the Integrated entered into a contract with Philippine
Appliance Corporation (Philacor) to print three volumes of "Philacor Cultural
Books". On July 30, 1979, only 1,097 out of the 3,450 had been delivered so it
wrote to Fil-anchor that delay will prejudice them. July 23, 1981: Fil-anchor
delivered amounting to P766,101.70 of printing paper. Integrated
paid P97,200.00 which was applied to its back accounts covered by delivery
invoices dated September 29-30, 1980 and October 1-2, 1980.

Integrated entered into an additional printing contract with Philacor but it failed to
comply so Philacor demanded compensation for the delay and damage it suffered
on account of Integrated's failure. Fil-anchor filed a collection suit
of P766,101.70 against Integrated representing unpaid purchase price of printing
paper bought on credit. By way of counterclaim, Fil-anchor alleged the delivery
was short of 2,875 reams so it suffered actual damages and failed to realize
expected profits and that complaint was prematurely filed.

Th RTC ordered Integrated to pay Fil-anchor P27,222.60 as compensatory and

actual damages after deducting P763,101.70 for the value of materials
received, P100K as moral damages, P30K for attorney's fees and cost of
suit. However, the counterclaim is also meritorious - Integrated could have sold
books to Philacor and realized profit of P790,324.30 for which the award of moral
damages was justified.

The CA reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial court ordered to pay Fil-
anchor P763,101.70 for unpaid printing paper and deleted the award of
P790,324.30 as compensatory damages as well as the award of moral damages and
attorney's fees, for lack of factual and legal basis.

ISSUE:
Should Integrated be awarded compensatory and moral damages?

HELD:
Yes.
Suspension of its deliveries to Integrated whenever the latter failed to pay on time,
as in this case, is legally justified under the second paragraph of Article 1583 of the
Civil Code hence the Fil-anchor did not violate the order agreement.
Indemnification for damages comprehends not only the loss suffered, that is to say
actual damages (damnum emergens), but also profits which the obligee failed to
obtain, referred to as compensatory damages (lucrum cessans). However, to justify
a grant of actual or compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of loss.

Deletion of the award of moral damages is proper, since private respondent could
not be held liable for breach of contract. Moral damages may be awarded when in
a breach of contract the defendant acted in bad faith, or was guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligation. Finally, since the award of moral damages is eliminated, so must the
award for attorney's fees be also deleted.

DBP V. CA
G.R. No. 118367
January 5, 1998

FACTS:

Lydia P. Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease Agreement from the Government.

Cuba obtained loans from DBP stated under promissory notes dated September 6,
1974; August 11, 1975; and April 4, 1977 executing 2 Deeds of Assignment of her
Leasehold Rights as security. Upon failure to pay, without foreclosure proceedings
it was appropriated and DBP executed in turn a Deed of Conditional Sale of the
Leasehold Rights in her favor. Her offer to repurchase was accepted and a new
Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food in
her favor alone excluding her husband. Failing to pay her amortizations, she
entered into a temporary agreement with DBP. Soon, she was sent a Notice of
Rescission and DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights of the fishpond. After
the public bidding, DBP executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of defendant
Agripina Caperal. Cuba filed against DBP since no foreclosure proceedings were
done thus, contrary to Article 2088 of the Civil Code. The RTC favored Cuba, it
being a pactum commissorium ordered the return leasehold rights to Cuba and
entitling him P1,067,500 actual damages, P100,000 moral and P50,000 exemplary
damages and P100,000 attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Should Cuba be awarded with actual and compensatory damages?
HELD:

No.
The CA reversed the lower court’s decision except the P50,000 as moral damages,
remanded to the trial court for the reception of the income statement of DBP, as
well as the statement of the account of Lydia P. Cuba, and for the determination of
each party’s financial obligation to one another. Alleged loss of personal
belongings and equipment was not proved by clear evidence. Other than the
testimony of CUBA and her caretaker, there was no proof as to the existence of
those items before DBP took over the fishpond in question. Neither was a single
receipt or record of acquisition presented. The award of actual damages should,
therefore, be struck down for lack of sufficient basis.

The exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P25,000 should likewise be

awarded by way of example or correction for the public good. There being an
award of exemplary damages, attorney’s fees are also recoverable

FUENTES vs. CA
323 Phil 508
February 9, 1996

FACTS:

During a benefit dance at Dump Site, Alejandro Fuentes Jr. was witnessed by Toling
and Osok who knew him for quite some time to have stabbed Malaspina in the
abdomen with a hunting knife. Alejandro and his uncle Felicisimo contends that it
was Zoilo Funetes who did it and fled but it was dismissed. The RTC found
Alejandro guilty of murder qualified by treachery and imposed him an indeterminate
prison term of 10 years and 1 day of prison mayor as minimum to 17 years and four
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of Malaspina the
amount of P50,000 and to pay P8,300 as actual damages plus costs. The CA affirmed
the lower court’s decision.

ISSUE:
Should the heirs of Malaspina be awarded actual damages?

HELD:
No.
Affirmed with modification that the penalty imposed should be as it is corrected to
reclusion perpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted. The Court can only
give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been
genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual
amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be granted.

RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 124354
December 29, 1999

FACTS:

Erlinda Ramos, 47- year old robust woman underwent on an operation to the stone
at her gall bladder removed after being tested that she was fit for “cholecystectomy”
operation performed by Dr. Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00, which
was to include the anesthesiologist’s fee and which was to be paid after the operation.
He assured that he will get a good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Gutierez. On the
day of operation, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15pm instead of 9:30 am.
Herminda, Erlinda’s sister-in-law, noticing what Dra. Gutierez was doing, saw the
nail bed of Erlinda becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for another
anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon. Later, Erlinda was taken to the ICU where she stayed
there for a month due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25 and she was then
comatosed. Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000.

Spouses Ramons and their minors filed a case against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Gutierez.
The RTC favored the Ramos’ awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses totaling
to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100 attorney’s fees, P800,000 moral damages,
P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit. The CA reversed the decision
ordering the Ramos’ to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus interest.

ISSUE:
Are the Ramos’ entitled to damages?

HELD:
Yes.
The Court favored the petitioners and held the private respondents solidarily liable
for the following: 1) P1,352,000 actual damages computed as of the date of
promulgation plus monthly payment of P8,000 up to the time that Erlinda expires or
miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000 moral damages; 3) P1,500,000 temperate
damages; 4) P100,000 attorney’s fees; 5) and the cost of suit.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence. As borne by the records, Dra. Gutierez failed to properly intubate the
patient according to witness Herminda whose testimony was accepted by the Court
considering her clinical background as a nurse. Also, Dra. Gutierez’s act of seeing
her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure
was an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility.

GATCHALIAN vs. DELIM

203 SCRA126
October 21,1991

FACTS:

Reynalda Gatchalian boarded Thames mini bus at Aringay, La Union bound for
Bauang, at the same province. The bus bumped a cement flower pot on the side of
the round, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Gatchalian got injured
with physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead. Mrs. Adela Delim visited the
passenger and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also
gave transportation expense of P12 in going home from the hospital and they were
made to sign joint affidavit stating that ther are no longer interested to file a
complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames.
Gatchalian filed in the CFI an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and
moral damages stating that the mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scare
measuring 1 by ½ inches on the forhead, generating mental suffering and an
inferiority complex on her part. Delim averred that it was a fortuitous event. The CFI
dismissed the complaint because of the joint affidavit to which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Is Gatchalian entitled to damages?

HELD:
Yes.

The Court reversed the decisions of the CFI and the CA. A waiver to be valid and
effective must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. While reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that
seeing the other passengers who had also suffered signed the document, she too
signed without bothering to read the Affidavit in its entirely.

To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or physical injuries to

passengers upon the ground of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only
that the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely independent of the human will,
but also that it was impossible to avoid. The driver did not stop to check if anything
had gone wrong with the bus

QUIRANTE vs. IAC

G.R. NO. 73886
January 31, 1989

FACTS:

Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney’s fees.
According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr.
Casasola with regard his attorney’s fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed
in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. De Casasola, and the two daughters of the
deceased, namely Mely C. Garcia and Virginia C Nazareno. Petitioner avers that
pursuant to said agreement, the attorney’s fees would be computed as follows: a) in
case of recovery of the P120,000 surety bond, the attorney’s fees of the undersigned
counsel shall be P30,000; and b) in case the Honarable Court awards damages in
excess of the P120,000 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I.
Casasola, Atty. John Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.

ISSUE:

Can Quirante claim for attorney’s fees?

HELD:
No.
An attorney’s fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been
decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over
the attorney’s fee only arises when something has been recovered from which the
fee is to be paid. Since the main case from which the petitioner’s claims for their
fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said
fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added
validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an
incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the
client. The decision of the CA is affirmed.

POSEIDON INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

vs. TITO TAMALA, et. al.
G.R. NO. 186475
June 26, 2013

FACTS:

Poseidon hired Tomala, Saurin, Bo-oc and Fernandez to man the fishing vessel of
Van Doorn and its partners. Two months after they were hired and started to work,
the operations abruptly stopped and did not resume. After six months, before
disembarking, the respondent’s immediate employer and the respondents executed
an agreement regarding the respondent’s salaries provided that the respondents
would get the full or 100% of their unpaid salaries for the unexpired portion of their
pre-terminated contract in accordance with Philippine Laws. However, they entered
into another agreement reducing the previously agreed amount to 50% of the
respondent’s unpaid salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. And they
later on received the amount last agreed upon, signed a waiver and quitclaim.
Poseidon maintains that it did not illegally dismiss the respondents and simply
ceased its fishing operations as a business decision in the exercise of its management
prerogative.

ISSUE:
Are the respondents entitled to damages?

HELD:
Yes.

While Van Doorn has a just and valid cause to terminate the respondent’s
employment, it failed to meet the requisite procedural safeguards provided under the
Labor Code. While this omission does not affect the validity of the termination of
the employment, it subjects the employer to the payment of indemnity in the form
of nominal damages. P30,000 as indemnity for the violation of the required statutory
procedures is awarded. Poseidon shall be solidarily liable to the respondents for the
payment of these damages.

Crismina Garments v. CA
G.R. No. 128721, March 9, 1999, 304 SCRA 356
Lessons Applicable: Innterest (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Article 2209-2213 CC

FACTS:
During the period from February 1979 to April 1979, Crismina Garments, Inc.
contracted the services of D’Wilmar Garments, for the sewing of 20,762 pieces of
assorted girls denims for P76,410. At first, the respondent was told that the sewing
of some of the pants were defective. She offered to take them back, but then she was
later told by the petitioner’s representative that it was good already and asked her to
return for her check of P76,410. However, the petitioner failed to pay her the
aforesaid amount. This prompted her to hire the services of counsel who, on
November 12, 1979, wrote a letter to the petitioner demanding payment of the
aforesaid amount within ten days from receipt thereof.
On February 7, 1990, the petitioner’s vice-president-comptroller, wrote a letter to
respondent’s counsel, averring, inter alia, that the pairs of jeans sewn by her,
numbering 6,164 pairs, were defective and that she was liable to the petitioner for
the amount of P49,925.51 which was the value of the damaged pairs of denim pants
and demanded refund of the aforesaid amount.
On January 8, 1981, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner with the
trial court. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent, ordering the
petitioner to pay the sum of P76,140 with 12% interest per annum. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to impose 12% interest rate per annum for
an obligation that does not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of
stipulation of the parties.

RULING:

No.
The amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work, not from a
loan or forbearance of money. Hence, the legal rate of interest shall be 6% per
annum, computed from the time of the filing of the Complaint in the trial court until
the finality of the judgment. If the adjudged principal and the interest (or any part
thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum computed
from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied.
Cerrano vs. Tan
38 Phil. 392
Lessons Applicable: Mitigation of Liability (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Article 1106, Article 1107 and Article 1581 of the Civil Code
FACTS:
On January, 1916: Tan Chuco owner of casco No. 1033 rented it to Vivencio
Cerrano for P70/month payable at the end of each month. No duration was
stipulated.Sometime in May, 1916, Tan notified Cerrano that it was necessary to
repair it at Malabon. Cerrano was interested to rent it after the repair but Tan told
him that it was already for P80/month.A week before the end of the repair, Tan sold
it to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Siy Cong Bieng & Co. induced Santos to refuse to take
orders from the new owners. Siy Cong Bieng & Co. were obliged to bring an action
of replevin against Santos for the recovery of the possession of their casco. The
sheriff took possession of the casco under a writ of replevin, but redelivered it to
Santos upon a delivery bond and his wife as sureties.After the casco had been in
possession of Santos for some three months, the replevin suit held that casco was
the property of Siy Cong Bieng & Co. at the time of the suit was commenced, and
that the "illegal detention" of the casco by Santos had caused damages of P457.98 to
Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Cerrano paid the judgment in favor of Siy Cong Bieng & Co.
and the attorney's fees of Santos which shows that Santos was only a nominal
defendant in the replevin suit,which was entirely controlled by Cerrano.
The CFI ruled tha casco was rented 10 months at the rate of P60, P457.98 for
damages and P500 for attorney's fees.

ISSUE: Wheter or not the contract of rent is broken by Tan Chuco's act as
proximate cause making him liable to Cerrano for damages
HELD:

No.
Article 1581 of the Civil Code provides that when no definite agreement has been
made regarding its duration, the lease of a house is deemed to have been made from
day to day, from month to month, or from year to year, according to whether a daily,
monthly, or yearly rent is to be paid.There is reasonable presumption that one who
agrees to pay a monthly rent intends that his tenancy is to endure for a like period,
subject to indefinite tacit renewals at the end of each month as long as the
arrangement is agreeable to both parties
Article 1106 of the Civil Code establishes the rule that prospective profits may be
recovered as damages. Article 1107 of the same Code provides that the damages
recoverable for the breach of obligations not originating in fraud (dolo) are those
which were or might have been foreseen at the time the contract was entered into. It
is unquestionable that defendant must be deemed to have foreseen at the time he
made contract that in the event of his failure perform it, the plaintiff would be
damaged by the loss of the profit he might reasonably have expected to derive from
its use.
The general rule is that plaintiff may recover compensation for any gain which he
can make it appear with reasonable certainty the defendant's wrongful act prevented
him from acquiring. Plaintiff would have earned a net profit of P50 from the use of
the casco in the month during which he was entitled to its possession. Damages
resulting from avoidable consequences of the breach of a contract or other legal duty
are not recoverable. It is the duty of one injured by the unlawful act of another to
take such measures as prudent men usually take under such circumstances to reduce
the damages as much as possible.The burden of proof rests upon the defendant to
show that the plaintiff might have reduced the damages - none in this case
The contract of lease or hiring does not create a right in rem in favor of the lessee,
except in the case of a recorded lease of real estate. Santos' attempt to retain
possession of it against the lawful owners by whom he had been placed in charge of
it, was unlawful. If Cerrano is unable to recover from Santos the money paid by him
will not justify us in imposing the burden of repaying this money to him.
Damages suffered by reason of his voluntary assumption of the liability incurred by
Santos by reason of his unlawful attempt to withhold possession of the casco from
its owners, by whom he was put in charge of it, are not attributable to Cerrano and
he is not responsible for them -NOT proximate cause (proximate cause is Cerrano's
own imprudence)
Kierulf vs. CA
269 SCRA 433
Lessons Applicable: Concept of Moral Damages (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
On February 28, 1987, the Pantranco bus driven by Jose Malanum lost control
and swerved to the left flying over the center island occupying the east-bound lane
of EDSA. The front of the bus hit the front of the Isuzu pickup driven by
Legaspi smashed to pieces and inflicting physical injury to Legaspi and his
passenger Lucila Kierulf. Both were treated at the Quezon City General Hospital.
The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA.Despite the
impact, the bus continued to move forward and its front portion rammed against a
Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building and gasoline dispensing equipment
The RTC ruled that the proximate cause was the negligence of the defendant's
driver. It likewise ruled that Pantranco North Express Incorporated to
pay Lucila Kierulf, Victor Kierulf for the damages of the Isuzu pick-up and Porfirio
Legaspi
The CA Affirmed with modification by adding P25,000 attorney's fees and to pay
costs

ISSUE: Whether or not both Lucila should be awarded moral damages

HELD:
YES.
The Rodriguez case ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is
no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her
spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss. The loss is
immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to
the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person. Victor's claim
for deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued before Respondent Court,
is not supported by the evidence on record.
The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding moral
damages. There is no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no
"supercilious manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful reference" was
given to her. It will only be awarded if he or she was subjected to contemptuous
conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial standing.
It is therefore proper to award moral damages to Lucila for her physical sufferings,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings. She sustained multiple
injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo
several corrective operations and treatments. Despite treatment and surgery, her
chin was still numb and thick. She felt that she has not fully recovered from her
injuries. She even had to undergo a second operation on her gums for her dentures
to fit. She suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular
accident.
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of
moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of pecuniary
loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court it is nevertheless essential that the
claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of damages and
its causal connection to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though
incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer.
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone,
by reason of the defendant's culpable action.
Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante;
thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case must be
governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in
determining the proper amount. The yardstick should be that the amount awarded
should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the
result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge. Neither
should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already inflicted on
plaintiffs.
Miranda-Ribaya vs. Carbonell
95 SCRA 58
Lessons Applicable: Proof and Proximate Cause (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
On April 23, 1968, Mrs. Josefina Roco-Robles, agent of Mrs. Ribaya, told her
that Marino Bautista, a millionaire logger was interested to buy diamonds. Mrs.
Ribaya went to the spouses Bautista's home to sell 10 pieces of jewelry for P224,000
which was haggled down to P222,000. As a consequence, a receipt was signed by
Marino Bautista and he issued in exchange of 2 Equitable Banking Corporation
checks of P112,000 and P110,000. Mrs. Ribaya then issued a voucher evidencing
the check payment
Sometime in April 24, 1968, Mrs. Ribaya accompanied by Ms. Narcisa Gosioco
requested the check of P110,000 to be divided since some were owned by her. 4
checks of Bank of America with amounts of P64,000 to Mrs. Ribaya and P34,000 to
Gosioco postdated on June 23, 1968. Mrs. Ribaya also sold 4 more pieces of jewelry
for P94,000 in exchange for four checks by Bank of America. This was transacted
at the office of Mr. Bautista at Bank of Philippine Islands Building. Thereafter, Mrs.
Ribaya wanted to replace the 3 pieces sold by her because the owners want them
back. She left it at the Bautista's residence but instead of returning the 3 pieces, Mr.
Bautista issued her a check of P45,000 by Bank of America since the 3 pieces were
already given as gifts to bank officers.
When the maturity dates came, she tried to contact Mr. Bautista but failed because
he was on a logging concession so she deposited the checks to her account and it
was dishonored due to closed accounts. She also discovered that her jewelries were
pawned to different pawnshops in Manila in the name of the driver, secretary of the
daughter of Bautista and a certain Balagot. Some of which were pawned the same
day it was bought.
Mrs. Ribaya was able to retrieve one-by-one the pawn tickets of the jewelries she
sold and other 3 tickets of jewelries not owned by her. In order to retrieve them, she
had to close down her shop. But there is still a balance of P125,460.79 excluding
those of Ms. Gosioco. Mrs. Ribaya also promised her attorney 25% of the unpaid
obligation.
The RTC ruled in favour of Mrs. Ribaya for P125,460.79 plus 25% attorney's fees
but did not grant moral and exemplary damages. This was later on affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Wheter or not Mrs. Ribaya should be entitled to moral and exemplary
damages

HELD:
YES.
In awarding moral damages, there should be pleading and proof of moral suffering,
mental anguish, fright.It does not need to be the precise legal terms or "sacramental
phrases" of "mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings or moral
shock" and the like
Niceta vividly portrayed in simple terms the moral shock and suffering she
underwent as a result of respondents' wanton abuse of her good faith and
confidence.Petitioners' testimonial evidence to the effect that petitioner Niceta
suffered "extremely" and that for three months she could not sleep was a clear
demonstration of her physical suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety and
similar injury, resulting from respondents' malevolent acts that show her to be clearly
entitled to moral damages.
Del Rosario vs. CA
267 SCRA 58
Lessons Applicable: Proof and Proximate Cause (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Article 2229 of the Civil Code, Article 2208 of the Civil Code

FACTS:
Metal Forming Corp.(MFC) advertised there metal shingles as "STRUCTURALLY
SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL TILE structure acts as a
single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the strong hook action on its
overlaps." The Spouses Del Rosario through their contractor Engineer Puno
purchased believing their representation. The proper installation procedure
expressly specified in the former's brochures and advertisements for installation, i.e.,
the metal tile attached to the roof panels should be by 2 self-drilling screws for 1
metal cleat but instead what was attached was metal cleats with only 1-inch ordinary
nail each and others were fastened with only 1 wood screw each so the roof was
blown by Typhoon Ruping 2 months later.
On this instance, MFC replaced the roof free of charge, in acknowledgment of its
one-year warranty on the materials and their installation. Esteban Adjusters and
Valuers, Inc. hired by the Spouses Del Rosario determined that only with a single
wood screw or a combination of a single wood screw and a 1-inch nail was used.
The Department of Trade and Industry charged MFC administrative fine of P10,000
otherwise its registration will be deemed suspended and its establishment closed
until the fine was fully paid which was also affirmed by the office of the President.
However, MFC is declining to concede to liability for the other damages to
its electrical wiring, ceiling, furtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and
furniture, the Spouses Del Rosario filed in the RTC for total damage of P1,008,003
also praying for moral and exemplary damages
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Del Rosario. However, the CA reversed holding
there is no privity between the Spouses Del Rosario and MFC

ISSUE: Whether or not the Spouses Del Rosario should be awarded damages.

HELD:
YES.
Since MFC, in bad faith and with gross negligence, infringed the express warranty
made by it to the general public in connection with the "Banawe" tiles brought to
and set up in the house of the Del Rosarios who had relied on the warranty, and
thereby caused them considerable injury. The identity of the individual who actually
dealt with MFC and asked the latter to make such delivery and installation is of little
moment.
Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved and
proved with reasonable degree of certainty. They relied only on the report of the
Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc. which contains no statement whatever of the
amount of the damage therefore no evidentiary foundation upon which to lay an
award of actual damages.
The law explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages "in breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." There being, moreover,
satisfactory evidence of the psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by
the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is warranted
Raagas vs. Traya
22 SCRA 839
Lessons Applicable: Proof and Proximate Cause (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
On April 9, 1958, Octavio Traya recklessly driving a truck owned by Canciller ran
over the 3-year old son of the spouses Melquiades Raagas and Adela Laudiano
Raagas causing his instantaneous death. As a consequence, Spouses Raagas prayed
for actual damages of P10,000, moral, nominal and corrective damages, P1,000 as
attorney's fees, P1,000 for expenses of litigation, plus costs.
The RTC held Traya and Bienvenido Canciller jointly and severally liable P10,000
for the death of their child Regino Laudiano Raagas, P2,000 for moral damages,
P1,000 actual damages, P1,000 for attorney's fees, and the costs
Hence, Traya and Canciller appealed to CA, which certified the case to the SC
because the issues raised are purely of law

ISSUE: Whether or not the damages should be proven.

HELD:
YES.
It is hereby remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits. Even if the
allegations regarding the amount of damages in the complaint are not specifically
denied in the answer, such damages are not deemed admitted. An allegation is not
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, but it is, nevertheless,
essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of
the damage and its causal relation to defendant's acts. The preceding disquisition
points up the inescapable need of a full-blown trial on the merits at which the parties
will be afforded every opportunity to present evidence in support of their respective
contentions and defences.

Enervida vs. Dela Torre

55 SCRA 339
Lessons Applicable: Proof and Proximate Cause (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Article 2208

FACTS:
Roque Enervida filed a complaint against spouses Lauro de la Torre and Rosa de la
Torre praying that the deed of sale executed by his deceased father, Ciriaco
Enervida, over a parcel of land covered by a Homestead Patent be declared null and
void for having been executed within the prohibited period of five years, in violation
of the provision, of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Law. He further prayed that he be allowed to repurchase said parcel of
land for being the legitimate son and sole heir of his deceased father.
The RTC dismissed the case.
The CA affirmed the dismissal saying that the sale had been made in 1948, 7 yrs
after therefore beyond the 5-year phobitive period is valid

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Lauro de la Torre and Rosa de la Torre are
entitled moral and exemplary damages.

HELD:
NO.
The dismissal order is hereby affirmed with the modification that only attorney's fees
in the amount of P1,500 are hereby awarded to the respondents

Article 2208 — In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of

litigation, other than judicial costs, can not be recovered, except:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff
The case at bar is clearly an unfounded civil action, the respondents may recover
attorney's fees. It is clearly unfounded suit, which is expressly mentioned in Art.
2208 (par. 4), as justifying an award of attorney's fees, but is not included in the
enumeration of Art. 2219 in respect to moral damages

People vs. Bagayong

G.R. No. 126518, December 2, 1998
Lessons Applicable: Proof and Proximate Cause (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
Alberto Cauan and Leticia Yu Cauan got married. They begot 3 children
namely Albert, Honeylet and Arlene. On 1983, Alberto and Leticia separated, Albert
and Arlene stayed with Leticia while Honeylet stayed with her grandmother Anita
Yu.Thereafter, Leticia cohabited with Rodelio Bugayong a.k.a. “BOY” which bore
a child Catherine Bugayong.
On October 15, 1994, Boy asked Arlene , 11-years old, to hold his penis and when
it was already hard and stiff placed it inside the mouth of Arlene and a white
substance came out. This was in the presence of Catherine who was 6 years old who
was the one who told Leticia. Leticia filed complained with the NBI. Arlene
testified that Boy had been doing the same since she was 9 years old. They were
times when Boy would insert his penis and when the white substance came out, he
would pull it out.
The RTC held Boy guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness committed on
October 15, 1994 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6
months of arresto mayor as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional
as maximum, and of the crime of Rape he committed in 1993 for which he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages may be awarded in a criminal proceeding without
the need for pleading or proof

HELD:
YES.
Moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal
proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading
or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice
Francisco vs. GSIS
7 SCRA 557
Lessons Applicable: Cases where Moral damages are allowed (Torts and
Damages)
Laws Applicable: Article 2208,Article 2220

FACTS:
Trinidad J. Francisco, in consideration of a loan in the amount of P400,000 out of
which the sum of P336,100 was released to her, mortgaged in favor of
the Government Service Insurance System a parcel of land containing an area of
18,232 square meters within 10 years in monthly installments of P3,902.41, and with
interest of 7% per annum compounded monthly.On January 6, 1959,
GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. Thereafter Trinidad's father Atty.
Vicente J. Francisco, sent a letter to the general manager of GSIS propsing to pay
P30,000 and pay the balance from the P5,000 monthly rentals less P350 for the
necessary expenses which the GSIS Board approved the request. On February 28,
1959, Atty. Francisco remitted a check for P30,000 and an official receipt was
issued. Later on, Trinidad remitted P44,121.29 and soon, P24,604.81. All were
issued a receipt.Then the System sent 3 letters asking for a proposal for the payment
of her indebtedness since the 1-year redemption period has expired.Atty. Francisco
sent a letter of protest requesting the proper corrections since their proposal have
already commenced.
GSIS contends that for the foreclosure done, Francisco should pay attorney's fees of
P35,644.14, publication expenses, filing fee of P301.00, and surcharge of P23.64 so
remittances were not enoughGSIS filed for specific performance
The RTC ruled that Atty. Francisco's offer was unqualifiedly accepted, and was
binding which called attention to the unconscionability of defendant's charging the
attorney's fees, totalling over P35,000.00; and this point appears well-taken,
considering that the foreclosure was merely extra-judicial, and the attorneys' work
was limited to requiring the sheriff to effectuate the foreclosure

ISSUE: Whether or not Francisco should be awarded moral damages where

there is breach of contract regarding the redemption proposal but no malicious intent.

HELD:
NO.
Affirmed.There was no error in the appealed decision in denying moral damages,
not only on account of the plaintiff's failure to take the witness stand and testify to
her social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., as the decision holds, but
primarily because a breach of contract like that of defendant, not being malicious or
fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the
Civil Code. There is no basis for awarding exemplary damages either, because this
species of damages is only allowed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or
compensatory damages, none of which have been allowed in this case, for reasons
herein before discussed.
As to attorneys' fees, we agree with the trial court's stand that in view of the absence
of gross and evident bad faith in defendant's refusal to satisfy the plaintiff's claim,
and there being none of the other grounds enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code, such absence precludes a recovery. The award of attorneys' fees is essentially
discretionary in the trial court, and no abuse of discretion has been shown.
Expert Travel vs. CA
G.R. No. 130030 June 25, 1999
Lessons Applicable: Cases where Moral Damage is allowed (Torts and
damages)
Laws Applicable: Article 2219, Article 1764, Article 2206

FACTS:
On 1987, Expert travel & Tours, Inc. issued to Ricardo Lo 4 round-trip plane tickets
for Hongkong with hotel accommodations and transfers for P39,677.20.Failing to
pay the amount due, Expert filed a complaint for recovery plus damages.
The CA affirmed the ruling of RTC saying that Lo remitted the Monte de Piedad
Check for P42,175.20 to Expert's chairperson Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega who in turn
issued City Trust Check of P50,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages for negligence or quasi-delict that did not
result to physical injury be awarded to Lo.

HELD:
NO.

An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met; to wit: (1)
First, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly
sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be a culpable act or omission
factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219

o in culpa contractual or breach of contract:

 moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in
bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad
faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and,
exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is
constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries
o By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil
Code
 moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a
passenger results from a breach of carriage
o In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict and contracts when breached by tort
  (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where
the defendant is guilty of intentional tort
o In culpa criminal
 moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is found
guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or
concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal
search, or defamation
o Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral damages
o The term "analogous cases," referred to in Article 2219, following the
ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar to those expressly
enumerated by the law
o Excludes clearly unfounded civil suit
Mijares vs. CA
G.R. No.113558, April 18, 1997
Lessons Applicable: Unfounded Suits (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
Spouses Editha Mijares and Glicerio T.Mijares under the business name Aklan
Drug purchased various products of P32,034.42 from Metro Drug, Inc. Editha
Mijares, aside from being the operator of Aklan Drug, was also an officer of the
Ospital Ng Maynila Consumers Cooperative, Inc. The Cooperative was
subsequently dissolved and operations stopped. Solomon Silverio was the new
lessee of the store at Ospital ng Maynila who and received delivery through Luz
Espares and Hilda Rodrigona totalling P32,034.42 from Metro through Dioscoro
Lamenta. Solomon Silverio, Jr. draw a check for Metro but it was dishonored for
insufficient fund. Metro demanded payment from Aklan Drug but Editha referred
Lamenta to Silverio who manages the store at Ospital ng Maynila. Lamenta never
checked the owner of the store he was delivering to and always perceived Editha as
the owner. Metro Drug, Inc. filed with the RTC for P32,034.42, 25% attorney's fees
and cost of suit.

The RTC ruled Metro Drug, Inc. to pay P30,000 for moral damages, P10,000 as
attorney's fees and cost of suit since not delivered to Mijares which the CA reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC made an error in awarding moral damages to Mijares

HELD:
YES.
It failed to show that it was motivated by bad faith when it instituted the action for
collection. In malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the
presence of two elements, to wit: a) malice; and b) absence of probable cause.
Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design
to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the
charge was false and baseless. For the same reasons, the award for attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation must likewise be deleted
De la Pena vs. CA
G.R. No. L-81827 March 28, 1994
Lessons Applicable: Unfounded Suits (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel of land in Sulongvale, Sulop,
Davao del Norte for which he filed Homestead Application with the Bureau of
Lands.On the other hand, Potenciano Nazaret also filed the same over the same lot.
Ciriaco transferred his possessory rights over 6 lots to Pantaleon de la Peña .
Thereafter, the Director of Lands directed Potenciano to apply for the portion
himself w/in 60 days but he did not. Ciriaco transferred his rights over another 1 1/2-
hectare to Michael Doble who sold it to Ricardo Tan . Upon a survey by the Bureau
of Lands, it was found that Tan's lot was smaller than what he had bought while De
la Peña's lot was bigger than what he had bought. Tan built a fence on his reclaimed
portion but Dela Peña keeps on destroying it.
Subsequently, Ricardo Tan then transferred the lot to Herotido Tan. Hence, Dela
Peña filed a complaint for forcible entry against Ricardo Tan amended to Herotido
Tan. The RTC and MTC favored Dela Peña. Dela Peña instituted action for
reconveyance with damages with the RTC.
The RTC rejected and a counterclaim was granted and Dela Peña was ordered to pay
P6,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, P15,000 for moral damages and
the costs of the proceedings. On appeal the CA affirmed stating that fraud and
misrepresentation was not substantiated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dela Peña should be liable for moral damages,
attorney's fees and cost of proceedings.

HELD:
NO.
The award for attorney's fees and moral damages is unfounded in the absence of a
deliberate intent to cause prejudice to the other party. The right to litigate is so
precious that a Penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it
erroneously
“J” Marketing vs. Sia
G.R. No. 127823 January 29, 1998
Lessons Applicable:Unfounded Suits (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
On 1983, J. Marketing Corporation received from Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) brand
new Kawasaki motorcycle.Unfortunately in 1987, the motorcycle went missing and
was reported to the police.J. Marketing was alleged that the motorcycle was found
to be with Felicidad Sia, Jr. who allegedly bought from Renato Pelande, Jr. who
bought from J. Marketing but with a different model.J. Marketing filed with the RTC
against Felicidad C. Sia Jr. who filed a third party complaint against Renato Pelante
Jr.
The RTC dismissed the case but awarded damages and attorney’s fees to Sia which
the CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not J. Marketing should be penalized for damages and attorney's
fees for litigating an unfounded suit

HELD:
NO.
It cannot be said that the institution of the replevin suit was tainted with gross and
evident bad faith or was done maliciously to harass, embarrass, annoy or ridicule
private respondent.No damages can be charged on those who may exercise such
precious right in good faith, even if done erroneously. There being no bad faith
reflected in petitioner’s persistence in pursuing its case, other than an erroneous
conviction of the righteousness of its cause, attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as
cost.
Cometa vs. CA
G.R. No. 124062, January 21, 1999
Lessons Applicable: Unfounded Suits (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
On 1979, the State Investment Trust, Inc (SITI), formerly State Investment House,
Inc. (SIHI) extended loans in various amounts to Guevent Industrial Development
Corp. (GIDC) which failed to pay when due.A rehabilitation plan where
GIDC mortgaged its property but it still defaulted resulting in a foreclosure sale
where SITI is the highest bidder. GIDC filed in the RTC alleging irregularities in the
foreclosure of the mortgages and the sale of properties to petitioner SITI which
ended with a compromise agreement wherein HBI offered to purchasea and SITI
agreed.The RTC AND CA compelled SITI to accept HBI's offer to purchase.
Thereafter, HBI applied to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for a permit
to develop the property submitting an affidavit by SITI president Cometa releasing
the mortgage. Unfortunately, Cometa denied executing an affidavit as supported by
the NBI's finding that it is forged. Cometa filed a complaint for falsification of
public document against HBI president Guevara which the RTC dismissed.
HBI filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against petitioners Cometa and SITI
alleging that it was filed with the sole intent of harassing and pressuring Guevara, in
his capacity as chairman of GIDC, to give in to their illicit and malicious desire to
appropriate the remaining unsold properties of GIDC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cometa and SITI should be penalized for malicious
prosecution

HELD:
NO.
It is hardly necessary to say that to allow the present action to proceed is not to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate. For trial is still to be conducted and liability
is not automatic.
Just as it is bad to encourage the indiscriminate filing of actions for damages by
accused persons after they have been acquitted, whether correctly or incorrectly, a
blanket clearance of all who may be minded to charge others with offenses, fancied
or otherwise, without any chance of the aggrieved parties in the appropriate cases of
false accusation to obtain relief, is in Our Opinion short of being good law
TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC V NLRC

299 SCRA 608 December 3, 1998

ROMERO, J;

FACTS

Osdana, a Filipino citizen, was recruited by Triple Eight for employment with
the latter’s principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia. The employment contract (originally as “food server” but later
changed to “waitress”) was executed in the Philippines but was to be performed in
Riyadh. Once in Riyadh, however, Osdana was made to perform strenuous tasks
(washing dishes, janitorial work), which were not included in her designation as a
waitress. Because of the long hours and strenuous nature of her work, she suffered
from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, for which she had to undergo surgery. But during
her weeks of confinement at the hospital for her recovery, she was not given any
salary. And after she was discharged from the hospital, GCC suddenly dismissed her
from work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not given any separation pay
nor was she paid her salaries for the periods when she was not allowed to work.
Thus, upon her return to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Triple Eight,
praying for unpaid and underpaid salaries, among others.

The Local Arbiter ruled in her favor, which ruling NLRC affirmed. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.

ISSUES
 Whether Osdana was illegally dismissed.

If so, whether or not she is entitled to award for salaries for the unexpired
portion of the contract.

HELD

The petition must fail.

Disease as a Ground for Dismissal

Under Article 284 of the Labor Code and the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code, for disease to be a valid ground for termination, the following
requisites must be present:

1. The disease must be such that employee’s continued employment is

prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health
of his co-employees

2. There must be a certification by competent public authority that the

disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured
within a period of 6 months with proper medical treatment

In the first place, Osdana’s continued employment despite her illness was
not prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co
employees. In fact, the medical report issued after her second operation stated that
“she had very good improvement of the symptoms.” Besides, “Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome” is not a contagious disease.
 On the medical certificate requirement, petitioner erroneously argues that
“private respondent was employed in Saudi Arabia and not here in the Philippines.
Hence, there was a physical impossibility to secure from a Philippine public health
authority the alluded medical certificate that public respondent’s illness will not be
cured within a period of six months.”

Petitioner entirely misses the point, as counsel for private respondent states in
the Comment. The rule simply prescribes a “certification by a competent public
health authority” and not a “Philippine public health authority.”

If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her employment, her
employer could have easily obtained a certification to that effect from a competent
public health authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for illegal
dismissal.

The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code
cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary
determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and
thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. As the Court observed in
Prieto v. NLRC, “The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our
overseas workers in the foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy
hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape,
insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of
debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by their
foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their country.
While these workers may indeed have relatively little defense against exploitation
while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them when
they return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no reason
why, in their own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them
in full measure for the redress of their grievances.”

Which law should apply: Lex Loci Contractus

Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by

contending that since Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was
subject to the laws of the host country. Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it
appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any certification by a
competent public health authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.

Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.

First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where
the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the
contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore,
the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting
labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum
will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Here in
the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The
Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the special protection of
workers.

This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow
foreign employers to determine for and by themselves whether an overseas contract
worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness would encourage illegal or
arbitrary pre-termination of employment contracts.

Award of Salaries granted but reduced

In the case at bar, while it would appear that the employment contract
approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelve months, Osdana’s actual stint
with the foreign principal lasted for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It may
be inferred, therefore, that the employer renewed her employment contract for
another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of the contract should have
been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 ½ months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not
US$2,499 as adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.

As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting to US$1,076
representing seven months’ unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the
same is proper because, as correctly pointed out by Osdana, the “no work, no pay”
rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. In the first place, the fact
that she had not worked from June 18 to August 22, 1993 and then from January 24
to April 29, 1994, was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. Second,
from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as food server and cook
for seven days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any
salary for the said period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was
confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason at all.

Moral Damages granted but reduced

Now, with respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is
likewise proper but should be reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral
damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad
faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages
may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent
manner.

According to the facts of the case as stated by public respondent, Osdana was
made to perform such menial chores, as dishwashing and janitorial work, among
others, contrary to her job designation as waitress. She was also made to work long
hours without overtime pay. Because of such arduous working conditions, she
developed Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Her illness was such that she had to undergo
surgery twice. Since her employer determined for itself that she was no longer fit to
continue working, they sent her home posthaste without as much as separation pay
or compensation for the months when she was unable to work because of her
illness. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award for
attorney’s fees is likewise upheld.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V FLORENCIO PIRAME

G.R. No. 121998 March 9, 2000

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS

On March 18, 1993, Cipriano Supero saw Pedro Torrenueva being held
by Florencio Perame was struck with an iron pipe by Epifanio Cleopas
and Teodorico Cleopas with a piece of wood hitting him in the forehead so he fell
on the ground dead. He was then buried in the well near the house of Demetrio
Cleopas, father of the accused.

Upon arraignment, Florencio Pirame and Teodorico Cleopas entered a plea of

not guilty. Epifanio Cleopas was not arraigned, being at large. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.

The RTC held Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame guilty of the crime of
murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced each
one of them to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the
accessories of the law and to pay the cost. Ordering them to indemnify surviving
spouse P50,000 each and 23,214 for burial and incidental expenses and P50,000
each for moral and exemplary damages and in all instances without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Deducting time for preventive imprisonment.

ISSUE

Whether the surviving spouse should be awarded moral and exemplary

damages.
HELD

NO. the award of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages was deleted.

The widow of the victim did not testify on any mental anguish or emotional
distress, which she suffered as a result of her husband's death. The absence of any
generic aggravating circumstance attending the crime likewise precludes the award
of exemplary damages.
CARLOS ARCONA V COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 134784 December 9, 2002

YNARES-SANTIAGO;

FACTS
 Carlos Arcona pleaded not guilty to a murder using the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. The element of unlawful aggression by the victim was
not proven. He was convicted of murder with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. In this petition, the Court affirmed CA decision but modified
the damages.

Petitioner Carlos Arcona y Moban and his brother Benito Arcona y Moban
were charged with Murder and Frustrated Murder in separate informations. Both
pleaded not guilty.

At around 7:30 in the evening of June 27, 1986, Napoleon Ong and Edgardo
Talanquines were walking on their way home after coming from a birthday party.
When they were near the house of Jerry Boston, Edgardo heard a loud thud. He
turned around saw Napoleon slump to the ground. Suddenly, someone hit Edgardo
from behind with a piece of bamboo, causing him to fall. He saw no one in the
immediate premises except petitioner. Edgardo then stood up and ran towards the
house of Cesar Umapas to ask for help.

Prosecution witness Leo Zaragoza testified that he was standing in front of

Jerry Boston’ house, about 7 meters away, when he saw petitioner stab Napoleon.
Napoleon died on the way to the hospital. The doctor certified that the cause of death
was the stab wound sustained at the stomach area just above the waistline.

Carlos voluntarily surrendered go the police. In his defense, Carlos alleged

that he was walking alone when he met Napoleon and Edgardo . Without any
provocation, Napoleon suddenly drew his bolo and shouted, "Caloy, I will kill you!"
Napoleon swung the bolo at him twice but missed him. Petitioner then drew out his
knife and stabbed Napoleon. When he saw Edgardo rushing towards him, he grabbed
a piece of bamboo from the newly constructed culvert and hit the former on the left
arm. Edgardo ran away. Carlos also left the premises and went home. On the way,
he met his brother, Benito, and together they proceeded to their house.

The trial court convicted the Carlos Arcona of homicide, with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, and acquitted him of attempted homicide. He
was ordered to pay indemnity of 30k for Napoleon’s death, 10K for actual damages,
and 10K as moral damages.

On the other hand, Benito Arcona was acquitted of homicide and convicted
of attempted homicide. He was made to indemnify Edgardo the sum of 10K as actual
damages. Only Carlos appealed. CA affirmed the TC findings but increased civil
liability to 50K. Hence, this petition. He maintains that it was self-defense.

ISSUES

1. WON all elements of self-defense were present

2. What are the proper damages to be rendered?

HELD

1. NO.

Unlawful aggression was not proven.

 When self-defense is invoked, the defendant has the burden of proving that
the killing was justified. Even if the prosecution is weak, the case cannot be
dismissed because of the open admission of the killing.

To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing
evidence that:

(1) he is not the unlawful aggressor;

(2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and

(3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression.

Self-defense is a question of fact. He failed to prove that there was unlawful

aggression of the part of the victim. Although the bolo of Napoleon was unsheathed,
it does not conclude that there was unlawful aggression. When Jerry Boston testified
to hearing someone say, “ Caloy, I will kill you”, he did not categorically say it was
Napoleon; and iIt was still possible that he said it while being assaulted by Carlos.
It was not possible that Carlos escaped his alleged ambush with out a scratch.

2. The CA was correct in increasing civil indemnity to 50K in line with existing
jurisprudence. In cases of murder, homicide, parricide and rape, civil indemnity in
the amount of 50K is automatically granted to the offended party or his heirs in case
of his death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission
of the crime.

On the other hand, the award of moral damages (10K) must be increased to
50K. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s
family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved
one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal
killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives
them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the
gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral
damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the
heirs’ emotional suffering.

The award of actual damages in the amount of 10K was not substantiated.
Only those expenses which are duly proven, or those that appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim, will
be recognized in court. It was deleted.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V COURT OF APPEALS (FLORES)

266 SCRA 136 Jan 6, 1977

KAPUNAN;

FACTS

Flores is a prominent businessman, licensed and engaged in the real estate

business, buying and selling houses and lots. Flores filed a complaint against PNB
when the appellant bank refused to honor his Manager's Checks worth P1 Million
because of the alleged shortage in appellee's payment to the effect that he had to go
back and forth the bank to encash said checks and that he lost a deal of a house for
sale in Baguio City worth P1 Million as he could not produce said amount withheld
by the appellant bank. Appellee Flores further testified as to the effect of the incident
on his integrity as a businessman.
 Flores won in the suit and the LC awarded him P1M moral damages andt
P100,000.00 exemplary damages, but was later reduced by the CA to P100,000.00
and P25,000.00 respectively.

PNB appealed from the decision, believing that no or lower amount of

damages should be awarded to Flores. As a defense, PNB even attacked Flores’
character by alluding to his alleged reputation as a “gambler and big time casino
player”. PNB asserted that “Flores used the proceeds of the manager’s check on the
gaming table and not for purchase of a house.

ISSUE

Whether the moral and exemplary damages should be reduced.

HELD

NO

The SC even increased the moral and exemplary damages awarded by CA by

50% (P200,000.00 and P50,000.00 respectively).

There is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair
amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar
circumstances.
 Article 2217 of the Civil Code recognizes that moral damages which include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury, are incapable
of pecuniary estimation.

As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.
While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be
proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded.
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE V CA (CRUZ, BELARMINO)

286 SCRA 698 March 23, 1998

ROMERO;

FACTS

Fule, a corporate secretary of the Rural Bank of Alaminos (the Bank) by

profession and jeweler on the side, acquired a 10-hectare property in Rizal. The
former owner, Jacobe, had mortgaged it to the Bank for a loan of 10k but it was later
foreclosed and offered for public auction upon his default.

Petitioner asked Dichoso and Mendoza (the Agents) to look for an interested
buyer, and found one in private respondent Dr. Cruz. At the time, petitioner had
shown interest in buying a pair of emerald-cut diamond earrings from Dr. Cruz but
never came to an agreed price. Subsequently, negotiations for the barter of the
jewelry and the property ensued; upon the request of Dr. Cruz, it was found by Atty.
Belarmino that no barter was feasible because the 1-year period of redemption had
not expired. To get over this legal impediment, petitioner executed a deed of
redemption on behalf of Jacobe.

Petitioner arrived at Belarmino’s residence with the agents to execute a deed

of absolute sale while Cruz held on to the earrings. Petitioner issued a certification
stating the actual consideration of the sale was Php200k and not Php80k as indicated
in the deed. Since the earrings were appraised at only Php160k, the remaining 40k
was to be paid later in cash. This was done apparently to minimize the capital gains
tax that petitioner would have to shoulder. Petitioner headed for the bank to meet up
with Cruz and pick up the earrings. When asked if the jewelry was ok, petitioner
nodded to express his satisfaction. Petitioner paid the agents $300 and some pieces
of jewelry, but not half of the pair of earrings in question as previously promised.

Later that evening, petitioner arrived at Belarmino’s residence complaining

the earrings were fake as confirmed by a tester. Petitioner accused the agents of
deceiving him, which they denied. He nonetheless took back the $300 and jewelry
given them. After another failed testing, the petitioner reported the matter to the
police where the agents also executed their sworn statements.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC to declare the contract of sale over
the property null and void on the ground of fraud and deceit. The lower court denied
the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction over the deed as they found that the
genuine pair of earrings had been delivered by Cruz. The 2 hours before petitioner’s
complaint was considered unreasonable delay, placing petitioner in estoppel. The
Court furthered that all elements of a valid contract were present, namely a meeting
of the minds, determinate subject matter, and price certain. As the earrings had been
delivered and the contract of absolute sale executed, the contract of barter or sale
had been consummated.
 The Court also finds that the plaintiff acted in bad, awarding Cruz P300k as
moral damages and P100k as exemplary damages; Atty. Belarmino P250k as moral
damages and P150k as exemplary damages; and granting both P25k each as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. A petition with the CA yielded the same
result, hence this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding damages

HELD

NO

In the instant case, the TC awarded damages analogous to malicious

prosecution under Article 2219(8) of the NCC for the following reasons:

The malice with which petitioner filed the case is apparent. As an experienced
jeweler who thoroughly examined the earrings himself and went so far as to sketch
them earlier, it is illogical that he would fail to exert extra effort to check its
genuineness at the precise moment of the exchange. His acts thus failed to accord
with what an ordinary prudent man would have done in the same situation.

As an experienced businessman and banker, he was shrewd enough to bloat

the property’s price from 25k to 75k only a few days after he had purchased it for a
far lower cost, the value of which still fell short of the diamond earrings’ price.
 Also, it took him 2 hours of unexplained delay before complaining the
earrings were counterfeit—a period in which anything could have happened while
petitioner was in possession of the jewelry.

Given this, it would appear that the cause of action in the instant case was
contrived by the petitioner himself in hopes of obtaining a favorable outcome in his
complaint to take the real jewelry, return a fake, and get back the property. This is
plain and simple, unjust enrichment. All that considered, the damages prayed for
were reasonably proportionate to the sufferings they underwent.

Petitioner filed a malicious and unfounded case all the while dragging down
private respondents, whose reputations had been soiled by petitioner’s coming to
court with unclean hands. Because of the falsity, malice and baseless nature of the
complaint, defendants were compelled to litigate and are thus also entitled to the
awarding of attorney’s fees under Article 2208.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC V COURT OF APPELAS (PANTEJO)

275 SCRA 621 July 17, 1997

REGALADO;

FACTS

On October 23, 1988, private respondent Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao
City, boarded a PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was
supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City. However, due to typhoon
Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled.

To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out
cash assistance of P100.00 and, the next day, P200.00, for their expected stay of two
days in Cebu. Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL's
expense because he did not have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. Thus,
respondent Pantejo was forced to seek and accept the generosity of a co-passenger,
an Engr. Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a room with the latter at Sky View Hotel
with the promise to pay his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao.

When the flight for Surigao was resumed, Pantejo came to know that the hotel
expenses of his co-passengers were reimbursed by PAL. At this point, Pantejo
informed Oscar Jereza, PAL's Manager for Departure Services at Mactan Airport
and who was in charge of cancelled flights, that he was going to sue the airline for
discriminating against him. It was only then that Jereza offered to pay respondent
Pantejo P300 which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone, the latter
decline. Thereafter, PAntejo filed an action for damages against PAL.

The RTC of Surigao City, rendered judgment against PAL, ordering the latter
to pay Pantejo P300 for actual damages, P150,000 as moral damages, P100,000 as
exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and 6% interest from the time of
the filing of the complaint until said amounts shall have been fully paid, plus costs
of suit.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo, but with the
exclusion of the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

ISSUE

Whether the lower courts erred in awarding damages in favor of plaintiff

HELD

NO

It must be emphasized that a contract to transport passengers is quite different

in kind and degree from any other contractual relation, and this is because of the
relation which an air carrier sustain with the public. Its business is mainly with the
travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees naturally could give ground
for an action for damages.

In ruling for Pantejo, both the RTC and the CA found that PAL acted in bad
faith in refusing to provide hotel accommodations for Pantejo or to reimburse him
for hotel expenses incurred despite and in contrast to the fact that other passengers
were so favored.

Factors considered in computing damages

PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its
passengers and in discriminating against Pantejo. It was even oblivious to the fact
that PAntejo was exposed to humiliation and embarrassment especially because of
his government position and social prominence, which altogether necessarily
subjected him to ridicule, shame and anguish. It remains uncontroverted that at the
time of the incident, herein respondent was then the City Prosecutor of Surigao City,
and that he is a member of the Philippine Jaycee Senate, past Lt. Governor of the
Kiwanis Club of Surigao, a past Master of the Mount Diwata Lodge of Free Masons
of the Philippines, member of the Philippine National Red Cross, Surigao Chapter,
and past Chairman of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, Surigao del Norte Chapter.

It is likewise claimed that the moral and exemplary damages awarded to

respondent Pantejo are excessive and unwarranted on the ground that respondent is
not totally blameless because of his refusal to accept the P100 cash assistance which
was inceptively offered to him. It bears emphasis that respondent Pantejo had every
right to make such refusal since it evidently could not meet his needs and that was
all that PAL claimed it could offer.
 His refusal to accept the P300 proffered as an afterthought when he threatened
suit was justified by his resentment when he belatedly found out that his co-
passengers were reimbursed for hotel expenses and he was not. Worse, he would not
even have known about it were it not for a co-passenger who verbally told him that
she was reimbursed by the airline for hotel and meal expenses. It may even be said
that the amounts, the time and the circumstances under which those amounts were
offered could not salve the moral wounds inflicted by PAL on private respondent
but even approximated insult added to injury.

The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent ineludibly makes the

former liable for moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of
the Civil Code. Such inattention to and lack of care by petitioner airline for the
interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as
to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award
of moral damages.

Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the

expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to allow the former to obtain
means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he
has undergone due to the defendant's culpable action and must, perforce, be
proportional to the suffering inflicted. However, substantial damages do not translate
into excessive damages. Except for attorney's fees and costs of suit, it will be noted
that the Court of Appeals affirmed point by point the factual findings of the lower
court upon which the award of damages had been based. We, therefore, see no
reason to modify the award of damages made by the trial court.

Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are convinced that the
awards for actual, moral and exemplary damages granted in the judgment of
respondent court, for the reasons meticulously analyzed and thoroughly explained in
its decision, are just and equitable. It is high time that the travelling public is afforded
protection and that the duties of common carriers, long detailed in our previous laws
and jurisprudence and thereafter collated and specifically catalogued in our Civil
Code in 1950, be enforced through appropriate sanctions.
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA V COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996

KAPUNAN, J.:
Facts:

At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her
home. While travelling along Aurora Blvd., she noticed something wrong with her
tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she
had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present
that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car’s
condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, put on her emergency
lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk.

She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man
who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi
Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant
Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the
ground. She was pulled out from under defendant’s car. Plaintiff’s left leg was
severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to
the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where
she was found to have a “traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above
knee).” She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually
fitted with an artificial leg.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not Li was negligent.

2.) Whether or not Valenzuela was contributory negligent.

3.) Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li’s employer is liable.

Held:

1.) Yes. A witness testified that Li’s car was being driven at a “very fast” speed,
racing towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue. He also saw the car hit
Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant’s Mitsubishi
Lancer, from where she eventually fell under the defendant’s car. Moreover the
witness declared that he observed Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near the
sidewalk, contrary to Li’s allegation that Valenzuela’s car was close to the center of
the right lane.

2.) No. The Court held that Valenzuela was not negligent applying the emergency
rule.

Under the “emergency rule,” an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation
of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails
to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.

Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and
could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which
eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency
which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own
making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. Obviously,
the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident.

3.) Yes. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to the Court’s
satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in
entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the
company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency
and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not
having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved
of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle
of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for
the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. He admitted that his

functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal
office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the office,
visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. These
meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a
managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its
clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions. The
service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li
– as well as the corporation – to put up the front of a highly successful entity,
increasing the latter’s goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting
between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.
AURELIO SUMALPONG V COURT OF APPEALS (PEOPLE)

268 SCRA 764 February 26, 1997

FRANCISCO;
FACTS

Sumalpong shot the victim Ramos after the former slapped the latter’s wife.
Before this, Sumalpong called upon the spouses then inquired regarding the identity
of those who stoned his house, then accused Ramos of stoning his house. Ramos’
wife, Leonarda, remarked that he should first confirm the information he received
before accusing anyone, then after this Sumalpong shot Leonarda at the back of her
head (though apparently, Leonarda was not harmed) then Ramos rushed towards
Sumalpong who then shot Ramos twice but missed. They wrestled and in the act,
Sumalpong bit on Ramos’ ear, causing its mutilation.

The trial court convicted Sumalpong of attempted homicide. Ramos was

awarded with P16,800.00 for the loss of his crops due to his failure to attend to his
farmwork because of the injuries inflicted upon him by the petitioner, P2,000.00 for
hospitalization expenses, and P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.

The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, removed award for loss of crops
and hospitalization expenses, increased moral damages to P10,000.00, and awarding
nominal damages in the same amount.

ISSUE

Whether the increase in moral damages is warranted

HELD

YES
 Anent the increase in the amount of moral damages awarded, suffice it to state
that the nature of the injuries and the degree of physical suffering endured by the
complainant warrants the same. The tragic incident caused a mutilation of
complainant's left ear and a permanent scar on his right forearm. These injuries have
left indelible marks on the complainant's body and will serve as a constant reminder
of this traumatic experience. (more discussion on the modification of amount of
nominal damages and moral damages when it was not the issue appealed,
rationalization for deletion of actual and compensatory damages)
FERNANDO LOPEZ V PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS

16 SCRA 431 March 30, 1966

BENGZON;

FACTS

Sen Fernando Lopez, his wife, his son-in-law, and his daughter made
reservations, through their agency, for first class accommodations in the Tokyo –
San Francisco flight of PAN-AM. PAN-AM's SF head office confirmed the
reservations. First class tickets were subsequently issued, with the total fare having
been fully paid before this.

As scheduled, they left Manila and as soon as they arrived in Tokyo, they
contacted PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding their accommodations. For the given
reason that the first class seats were all booked up, PAN-AM's Tokyo office
informed them that they could not go in that flight unless they took the tourist class.
Due to pressing engagements in the US, they were constrained to take PAN-AM's
flight as tourist passengers.

Sen Lopez filed suit for damages alleging breach of contracts in bad faith by
defendant out of racial prejudice against Orientals. He asked for P500T actual and
moral damages, P100T exemplary damages, P25T attorney's fees plus costs.

PAN-AM asserted that its failure to provide first class accommodations to

plaintiffs was due to honest error of its employees. It interposed a counterclaim for
atty's fees of P25T.

CFI Rizal decision: in favor of plaintiff and granted (a) P100T, moral
damages; (b) P20T, exemplary damages; (c) P25T, atty's fees, and costs of the
action.

Plaintiffs filed MFR asking that moral damages be increased to P400T and for
6% interest per annum on amount to be granted.

CFI modified decision: (a) P150T, moral damages; (b) P25T, exemplary
damages; with legal interest on both from date of filing of complaint until paid; (c)
P25T, atty's fees; and costs of the action.

Both appealed: PAN-AM contended that there was NO bad faith; Lopez et al
wanted a total of P650T as award for damages.

ISSUES

1. Whether there was bad faith on the part of PAN-AM

2. Whether the amount of damages should be increased

HELD

1. YES

Defendant through its agents first cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by mistake

and thereafter deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel
agent such information. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets
in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations, when in fact they had none,
defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to breach
its contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute cancellation by other
passengers before flight time, as it turned out in this case. Bad faith means a breach
of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will.
- At any rate, granting all the mistakes advanced by the defendant, there would at
least be negligence so gross and reckless as to amount to malice or bad faith.

2. YES

Moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant

acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220). Exemplary or corrective damages may
be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in breach of
contract where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner (Art. 2229, 2232). A written contract for an attorney's services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule 138, ROC).

Factors in determining Amount for Moral Damages: The amount of

damages awarded in this appeal has been determined by adequately considering the
official, political, social, and financial standing of the offended parties on one hand,
and the business and financial position of the offender on the other. The present rate
of exchange and the terms at which the amount of damages awarded would
approximately be in U.S. dollars has also been considered.
(a) MORAL DAMAGES

As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with

plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety
and mental anguish. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is
humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be
expected from the contractual undertaking.

Sen Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. International carriers like
defendant know the prestige of such an office. For the Senate is not only the Upper
Chamber of the Philippine Congress, but the nation's treaty-ratifying body. He was
also former Vice-President of the Philippines. (MD = P100T)

Mrs. Maria Lopez, as wife of the Senator, shared his prestige and therefore
his humiliation. In addition she suffered physical discomfort during the 13-hour trip;
her reason for going to the US was actually for medical check-up and relaxation.
The fact that the seating spaces in the tourist class are quite narrower than in first
class will suffice to show that she indeed experienced physical suffering during the
trip. (MD = P50T)

Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling as immediate members
of the family of Sen Lopez. Even if they initially wanted to change their seat
reservations from first class to tourist class, they eventually paid for first class seats.
Hence, they also suffered social humiliation. (MD = P25T each)

(b) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to effectively

deter similar breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines. (ED =
P75T)

(c) ATTORNEY’S FEES

Record shows a written contract of services wherein plaintiffs engaged the

services of their counsel. Atty. Francisco and agreed to pay the sum of P25T upon
the termination of the case in the CFI, and another P25T if case is appealed to the
SC. This is reasonable considering the subject matter of the present controversy, the
professional standing of the attorney for plaintiffs-appellants, and the extent of the
service rendered by him.

PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V COURT OF APPEALS (SPS CHUA)

G.R. No. 111584 September 17, 2001

MELO;
FACTS

Sometime in April, 1982, respondent Salvador Chua was offered by Mr.

Jimmy Rojas, manager of Producers Bank of the Philippines, to transfer his account
from Pacific Banking Corporation to herein petitioner bank.

Spouses Slavador and Emilia Chua opened and maintained substantial savings
and current deposits with, and likewise obtained various loans from petitioner bank,
one of which was a loan for P2,000,000.00 which was secured by a real estate
mortgage and payable within a period of three (3) years or from 1982 to 1985.

On January 20, 1984, private respondents deposited with petitioner bank the
total sum of P960,000.00, which was duly entered in private respondents' savings
account passbook.

Petitioner bank failed to credit this deposit due to the fact that its Branch
Manager absconded with the money of the bank's depositors. Consequently,
petitioner bank dishonored the checks drawn out by private respondents in favor of
their various creditors on the ground of insufficient funds, despite the fact that at that
time, the balance of private respondents' deposit was in the amount of
P1,051,051.19.

Private respondents requested for copies of their ledgers covering their

savings and current accounts, but petitioner bank refused. Private respondents
instituted on January 30, 1984 an action for damages against petitioner bank
 On the other hand, petitioner bank filed with the City Sheriff of Bacolod a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate. Private respondents filed a
complaint for injunction and damages, alleging that the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure was without basis and was instituted maliciously in order to harass
private respondents.

On April 26, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision on the latter case, in
favor of the spouses Chua, awarding the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages,
and the sum of P250,000.00 as exemplary damages, among others.

On October 31, 1991, upon appeal by petitioner bank, the Court of Appeals
modified the decision—one of the changes was the award of the sum of P500,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages.

Petitioner moved for a consideration but the same was denied, hence, this
petition

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner bank is liable for moral damages

HELD

YES
 Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary
loss. In awarding such damages, the court shall take into account the circumstances
obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its discretion.

As borne out by the record of this case, private respondents are engaged in
several businesses, such as rice and corn trading, cement dealership, and gasoline
proprietorship. The dishonor of private respondents' checks and the foreclosure
initiated by petitioner adversely affected the credit standing as well as the business
dealings of private respondents as their suppliers discontinued credit lines resulting
in the collapse of their businesses.

In the case of Leopoldo Araneta vs. Bank of America, it was held that: "The
financial credit of a businessman is a prized and valuable asset, it being a significant
part of the foundation of his business. Any adverse reflection thereon constitutes
some financial loss to him."

The damage to private respondents' reputation and social standing entitles

them to moral damages. Article 2217, in relation to Article 2220, of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that "moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury."

Obviously, petitioner bank's wrongful act caused serious anxiety,

embarrassment, and humiliation to private respondents for which they are entitled
to recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00 which we deem to be
reasonable.
EMILIO STREBEL V JOSE FIGUERAS

96 PHIL 321 December 29, 1954

CONCEPCION;

FACTS

Strebel’s side: As a lessee of a lot situated in Santa Mesa, Manila, plaintiff

Strebel subleased part thereof to the Standard Vacuum Oil Company; that the latter
constructed thereon a Mobilgas Station which was operated by Eustaquio & Co., a
partnership organized by said plaintiff and one Primo Eustaquio, that, "out of spite
and with a view to the eventual acquisition of the said property for himself and his
men," defendant Jose Figueras "tried all he could to built a drainage through" the
aforementioned property; that, in order to accomplish this purpose, and, using his
official and political influence, defendant Figueras, then Under-Secretary of Labor,
caused. his co-defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, to
prepare an opinion which was signed by the City Fiscal, holding that the City of
Manila has a right to construct said drainage, and, to this effect, make the necessary
excavations at the boundary line of said lot leased to Strebel and the lot belonging
to Figueras

Plaintiff Strebel also claims that defendant Figueras "by making use of his
official and political connections," was able to induce the Secretary of Justice to
transfer temporarily, from the Bureau of Immigration to the Bureau of Prisons, one
Dr. Manuel Hernandez, the husband of plaintiff's step daughter. Plaintiff asked
Secretary Nepomuceno to mediate between them and Under-Secretary of Labor to
forget about past family problems.

Plaintiff later on claims that Figueras still didn’t forget about the past and
"making use of his official and political influence," and with the cooperation of his
former secretary, defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila,
as well as "in connivance with the Director of Labor" which office was then held by
defendant Felipe E. Jose, "and other employees in the Department and Bureau of
Labor," defendant Figueras succeeded in securing the institution, against plaintiff
Strebel, and his partner, Primo Eustaquio, of Criminal Case No. 11005 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, for allegedly compelling several employees to work
more than eight (8) hours a day, in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 444, in
relation to Commonwealth Act No. 303, although before the filing of the information
"the defendants collectively and singly knew that the allegations therein are false;"
that said criminal case was subsequently dismissed by the Court of First Instance of
Manila for failure of the prosecution "to establish even a prima facie case against the
accused";

Through the foregoing series of acts, the defendants have "caused moral and
mental suffering to the . . . plaintiff, his wife, and his entire family, and damage to
his business in the amount of P15,000.00 besides actual damages in the amount of
P1,500.00 paid to his attorney in defending himself from the malicious charge,"

ISSUE

Whether Plaintiff may recover damages for moral and mental suffering

HELD

NO.

The plan to built said drainage was seemingly abandoned before plaintiff's
property rights could be violated. There was nothing wrong, either legally or
morally, in the desire of Figueras to seek an outlet for the water coming from his
property. On the contrary, it is required by the elementary principles of health and
sanitation. Besides, there is no allegation that any lot other than that of plaintiff
Strebel was better suited for the purpose.

Neither could he have any arising from the assignment of his wife's son-in-
law from the Bureau of Prisons - to which he had been previously assigned
temporarily to the Bureau of Immigration, for
 1.The authority of the Secretary of Justice to make the assignment in question
and the validity thereof, under said legal provision, are submitted. Hence, it is
not claimed that said officer may be held civilly liable for the aforementioned
assignment. This being the case, how can such responsibility be exacted from
Figueras who, it is urged, merely instigated said assignment?

2.Even if we assumed the act complained of to be wrong or to have caused

injury, the right of action hypotethically resulting therefrom, if any — on
which we need not, and do not, express any opinion — would have accrued
in favor of Dr. Hernandez — who is not a party in the present action — not
plaintiff herein.

As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental suffering resulting from bodily
injuries is restricted to the person who has suffered the bodily hurt, and there can be
no recovery for distress caused by sympathy for another's suffering, or for fright due
to a wrong against a third person. So the anguish of mind arising as to the safety of
others who may be in personal peril from the same cause cannot be taken into
consideration.

'. . . damages are not recoverable for fright or shock even when sustained as result
of wilful act, unless such act was directed toward person or property or person
seeking recovery; hence plaintiff is not entitled to recover against administratrix of
sister's murderer for fright or shock caused by viewing mutilated body of murdered
sister. The rule on this point, as stated in the American Jurisprudence, is: "Injury
or Wrong to Another. — In law mental anguish is restricted as a rule, to such
mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person
himself, as distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the
accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering or which arises
from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another. Pursuant
to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused
by his or her sympathy for the other's suffering." It should be noted that plaintiff
is not even related to Dr. Hernandez. The latter's wife is a daughter of Mrs. Strebel
by a previous marriage. Hence Dr. Hernandez is merely related by affinity, not to
Strebel, but to a relative by affinity of said plaintiff.

Another allegation made by plaintiffs in arguing their cause of action to recover

damages, they said that "with a view to further injuring" him "and besmirching his
good name in the community and waging a cleavage in the harmonious relation
between Eustaquio & Co. and its laborers," defendants Felipe E. Jose and Cornelio
S. Ruperto issued a press statement to the effect that plaintiff Strebel and his partner,
Eustaquio had flagrantly violated the provisions of the Eight-Hour Law and that said
Criminal Case had been dismissed by the court on a flimsy ground; and that this
statement had "caused moral and mental suffering to the herein plaintiff and damage
to his business in the amount of P5,000.00," The Supreme Court said that this news
item mentions, neither the number of the case referred to, nor the names of the
persons accused therein. Moreover, it merely contains a criticism of the action taken
by the court. The reference, therein imputed to the Director of Labor, to the flagrant
violation of the eight-hour labor law by the accused, was a mere reiteration of the
theory of the Bureau of Labor, which the prosecution had adopted by filing the
information in said case. Being a matter of court record, which had been taken up at
the hearing held publicly, and settled in a decision already promulgated, said theory
was open for public consumption, and, hence, an allusion thereto or statement
thereof, in order to justify said criticism, is not actionable.

As regards the malicious prosecution point raised by Strebel, by specific mandate of

Article 2219 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, however, moral damages may
not be recovered in cases of crime or tort, unless either results or causes
"physical injuries," which are lacking in the case at bar. Although the same
article permits recovery of said damages in cases of malicious prosecution, this
feature of said provision may not be availed of by the plaintiff herein, inasmuch as
the acts set forth in the complaint took place in 1949, or before said Code became
effective (laws shouldn’t have retroactive effect).
ABS-CBN V COURT OF APPEALS (REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORP,
VIVA FILMS)

G.R. No. 128690 January 21, 1999

DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:

FACTS

ABS-CBN, by virtue of contract with VIVA, had an exclusive right to exhibit

some Viva films. ABS-CBN had a right of first refusal. VIVA gave ABS-CBN 3
packages (36 titles) to choose from. VP for ABS Charo Santos-Concio wrote VIVA
that they are not accepting the list because there were only 10 titles there that they
could potentially purchase. ABS asked for another list, saying they had quite an
attractive offer to make.

VIVA gave ABS a new list: 52 original movie titles (never before aired on
TV) and 104 reruns. VIVA’s proposal was P60M (P30M cash, P30M TV spots) for
52 originals and 52 reruns.

Del Rosario (VIVA’s rep) and Eugenio Lopez III had a mtg re this in Tamarind Grill
Restaurant. Accdg to ABSCBN, the mtg culminated in Del Rosario accepting
ABSCBN’s offer of P35M for 52 of the films VIVA was selling for P60M plus
“Maging Sino Ka Man.”
 VIVA said this wasn’t their agreement and that they refuse to sell anything
less the 104-movie package for P60M. In the meantime, RBS bought the 104-film
package (which included “Maging Sino Ka Man”) for P60M. There were ads in the
newspapers for the airing of the movie on Channel 7.

ABSCBN filed a case in RTC to enjoin RBS from airing 14 VIVA films,
including Maging Sino Ka Man. RTC granted a preliminary injunction; but lifted
the same after RBS put up a counterbond. ABSCBN filed a petition in the CA to
challenge the RTC decision. CA granted TRO, but eventually dismissed ABSCBN’s
petition and made them pay for actual, moral and exemplary damages and atty’s fees
to RBS, and atty’s fees to VIVA.

ISSUE

Whether RBS may recover damages from ABSCBN

HELD

NO

ACTUAL DAMAGES. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is

entitled to compensation for actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered
by him as he has duly proved. The indemnification shall comprehend not only the
value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits that the obligee failed to obtain.
In contracts and quasi-contracts the damages which may be awarded are dependent
on whether the obligor acted with good faith or otherwise. In case of good faith, the
damages recoverable are those which are the natural and probable consequences of
the breach of the obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time of the constitution of the obligation. If the obligor
acted with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude, he shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained
of, whether or not such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant.

Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss or impairment of earning

capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the
plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.

RBS claims actual damages based on Arts 19-21 for the injunction for having
to put up a counterbond. The SC said that since ABS had not posted a bond and was
in fact still challenging it, RBS didn’t have to put up the counterbond. RBS also
claims actual damages for the advertisements for the airing of “Maging Sino Ka
Man.” The SC said that ABS is not liable for lack of sufficient basis. The prelim
injunction was lifted by RTC upon RBS paying the counterbond, and not on any
legal and factual basis.

ATTYORNEY’S FEES. As regards attorney's fees, the law is clear that in

the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees may be recovered as actual or
compensatory damages under any of the circumstances provided for in Article 2208
of the Civil Code.

The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They
are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award
attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification.
Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses
to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient
showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case other than
an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.

MORAL DAMAGES. Moral damages are in the category of an award

designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the
expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion,
or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It is
aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.

The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation

because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation,
it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses. It cannot, therefore, experience physical
suffering and mental anguish which can be experienced only by one having a
nervous system. The award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a
corporation.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. These are imposed by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or
compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil
liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances; in quasi-delicts, if the defendant acted with gross negligence; and in
contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

The claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-contract,

delict, or quasi-delict. The claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be
based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
Arts 19-21 have at their very core the common element of malice or bad faith.
Such intentional design to do a wrongful act must be proved by evidence.
Here, ABSCBN was honestly convinced of the merits of its cause after it had
undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a draft
contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per se
make the action wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for the law could
not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result
from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC

369 SCRA 629 November 20, 2001

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ;
FACTS

The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for

the supply and delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas
Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic,
Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders.
After the public bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was accepted. NAPOCOR's
acceptance was conveyed in a letter. PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR that
industrial disputes might soon plague Australia, the shipment's point of origin, which
could seriously hamper PHIBRO's ability to supply the needed coal. PHIBRO again
apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia, particularly informing the latter
that the ship owners therein are not willing to load cargo unless a "strike-free" clause
is incorporated in the charter party or the contract of carriage. In order to hasten the
transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR that they equally share the burden
of a "strike-free" clause. NAPOCOR refused.

Subsequently, PHIBRO received from NAPOCOR a confirmed and workable

letter of credit. Instead of delivering the coal on or before the thirtieth day after
receipt of the Letter of Credit, as agreed upon by the parties in the July contract,
PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on November 17, 1987.

Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once more advertised for the

delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this
subsequent bidding. On November 24, 1987, NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's
application for pre-qualification to bid for not meeting the minimum requirements.
Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO found that the real reason for the disapproval was its
purported failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for damages due to the delay in the
delivery of the first coal shipment.
 This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages with application for
injunction against NAPOCOR with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati
City. In its complaint, PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's act of disqualifying it in
the October 1987 bidding and in all subsequent biddings was tainted with malice and
bad faith. PHIBRO prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.

In its answer, NAPOCOR averred that the strikes in Australia could not be
invoked as reason for the delay in the delivery of coal because PHIBRO itself
admitted that as of July 28, 1987 those strikes had already ceased. And, even
assuming that the strikes were still ongoing, PHIBRO should have shouldered the
burden of a "strike-free" clause because their contract was "C and F Calaca,
Batangas, Philippines," meaning, the cost and freight from the point of origin until
the point of destination would be for the account of PHIBRO. Furthermore,
NAPOCOR claimed that due to PHIBRO's failure to deliver the coal on time, it was
compelled to purchase coal from ASEA at a higher price. NAPOCOR claimed for
actual damages in the amount of P12,436,185.73, representing the increase in the
price of coal, and a claim of P500,000.00 as litigation expenses.

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court decided in favor of
PHIBRO. Unsatisfied, NAPOCOR elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court.

ISSUE

Whether PHIBRO is entitled to damages

HELD
 NO

NAPOCOR was not bound under any contract to approve PHIBRO's pre-
qualification requirements. In fact, NAPOCOR had expressly reserved its right to
reject bids. And where the government as advertiser, availing itself of that right,
makes its choice in rejecting any or all bids, the losing bidder has no cause to
complain nor right to dispute that choice unless an unfairness or injustice is shown.

Owing to the discretionary character of the right involved in this case, the
propriety of NAPOCOR's act should therefore be judged on the basis of the general
principles regulating human relations, the forefront provision of which is Article 19
of the Civil Code which provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith." Accordingly, a person will be protected only
when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. 3

NAPOCOR's act of disapproving PHIBRO's application for pre-qualification

to bid was without any intent to injure or a purposive motive to perpetrate damage.
Apparently, NAPOCOR acted on the strong conviction that PHIBRO had a
"seriously-impaired" track record. NAPOCOR cannot be faulted from believing so.
We cannot fault NAPOCOR if it mistook PHIBRO's unexpected offer a mere
attempt on the latter's part to undercut ASEA or an indication of PHIBRO's
inconsistency. The circumstances warrant such contemplation.

One who acted pursuant to the sincere belief that another willfully committed
an act prejudicial to the interest of the government cannot be considered to have
acted in bad faith. Bad faith has always been a question of intention. It is that corrupt
motive that operates in the mind. As understood in law, it contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest
or ill-will or for ulterior purpose. While confined in the realm of thought, its presence
may be ascertained through the party's actuation or through circumstantial evidence.
The circumstances under which NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's pre-
qualification to bid do not show an intention to cause damage to the latter. The
measure it adopted was one of self-protection. Consequently, we cannot penalize
NAPOCOR for the course of action it took. NAPOCOR cannot be made liable for
actual, moral and exemplary damages.

Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not
only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual
amount thereof. A court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or
guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages. Thus, while indemnification for
damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of
the profits which the obligee failed to obtain, it is imperative that the basis of the
alleged unearned profits is not too speculative and conjectural as to show the actual
damages which may be suffered on a future period.

The award of moral damages is likewise improper. To reiterate, NAPOCOR

did not act in bad faith. Moreover, moral damages are not, as a general rule, granted
to a corporation. While it is true that besmirched reputation is included in moral
damages, it cannot cause mental anguish to a corporation, unlike in the case of a
natural person, for a corporation has no reputation in the sense that an individual has,
and besides, it is inherently impossible for a corporation to suffer mental anguish.

Neither can we award exemplary damages under Article 2234 of the Civil
Code. Before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate, or compensatory damages.
 This Court has also laid down the rule that in the absence of stipulation, a
winning party may be awarded attorney's fees only in case plaintiff's action or
defendant's stand is so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. This
cannot be said of the case at bar. NAPOCOR is justified in resisting PHIBRO's claim
for damages.

OSCAR VENTANILLA V GREGORIO CENTENO

G.R. No. L-14333 January 28, 1961

NATURE PADILLA, J.:

FACTS
 Ventanilla instituted this action to recover damages against his lawyer, Atty.
Centeno for neglecting to perfect within the reglementary period his (V) appeal from
an adverse judgment rendered by the CFI of Manila.

Trial Court facts showed that the required appeal bond was not filed by Atty.
Centeno. The fact that the record on appeal was admitted for filing is the best
evidence that Atty. Centeno had not in fact filed any appeal bond. The record on
appeal was disapproved because it was filed out of time and no appeal bond had
been filed by the plaintiff.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ventanilla and ordered Centeno
to pay the sum of P200 as nominal damages and the costs.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in not ordering the Centeno to pay him actual or
compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate, and exemplary or corrective damages;
in ordering that only the sum of P200 be paid to him, and not P2,000 as nominal
damages; and in not ordering that the sum of P500 as attorney's fee be paid as well.

HELD

NO

AS REGARDS ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES:

V is not entitled to such damages as his basis is highly speculative.

ARTICLE 2199 NCC provides:

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate

compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

Malonzo vs. Galang: He who claims actual or compensatory damages must

establish and prove by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss.

Ventanilla’s allegation that by Centeno’s negligence in not paying the appeal

bond of P60, V lost his chance to recover from the defendants therein the sum of
P4,000 and moral and actual damages, which V could have recovered if the appeal
had duly been perfected, indicates that his claim for actual or compensatory damages
is highly speculative.

AS REGARDS MORAL DAMAGES:

Since the VENTANILLA’S cause of action for recovery of moral damages is

not predicated upon any of those specifically enumerated (under A2219, Arts. 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art.
2219) TC did not err in declining to award moral damages to him

Ventanilla claims that he suffered mental anguish upon learning that his appeal
had not been perfected within the reglementary period due to the Centeno's
negligence; serious anxiety upon learning that his adversary had won by a mere
technicality; besmirched reputation for losing the opportunity to substantiate his
claim made while testifying in open court that he was entitled to collect the sum of
P4,000 and damages from the defendants in civil No. 18833; and wounded feelings
for the Centeno’s failure to remain faithful to his client and worthy of his trust and
confidence. (SEE A2217, 2219 AND 2220 NCC)
Malonzo vs. Galang:
“. . .Art. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing physical injuries," as an
instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other
quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras,
G.R. L-4722, Dec. 29, 1954), excepting, of course, the special torts referred to in
Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the
chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).

CONCERNING TEMPERATE OR MODERATE DAMAGES:

Considering that he is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages but has

been awarded nominal damages by the TC, such award precludes the recovery of
temperate or moderate damages, and so TC did not err in refusing to award temperate
or moderate damages to the Ventanilla

AS REGARDS EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES:

It cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the court will decide whether
or not they should be adjudicated, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. TC didn’t err in not giving any.
NOMINAL DAMAGES
 Considering the circumstances and the degree of negligence committed by
ATTY CENTENO in not depositing on time the appeal bond and filing the record
on appeal within the extension period granted by the court, which brought about the
refusal by the TCto allow the record on appeal, the amount of P200 awarded by
the TC to VENTANILLA as nominal damages may seem exiguous.

Nevertheless, considering that nominal damages are not for indemnification

of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded;
and that even if the appeal in civil case No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it was
not an assurance that the appellant would succeed in recovering the amount he had
claimed in his complaint, the amount of P2,000 the appellant seeks to recover as
nominal damages is excessive.

A2221 of NCC provides:

Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.
ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY V COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE AND
MILLAN

G.R. No. L-41093 October 30, 1978

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

FACTS

Robes-Francisco Realty sold to Millan a parcel of land. Millan complied and paid.
She made repeated demands to execute final deed of sale and for issuance to her of
TCT over the lot. Parties executed deed of absolute sale. But corp failed to cause
issuance of TCT because title was included among properties of corp mortgaged to
GSIS to secure an obligation. Hence, a complaint for specific performance and
damages.

ISSUE

Whether Robes-Francisco is liable for damages

HELD

YES

Robes-Francisco is guilty of delay, amounting to non-performance. It is liable for

damages under Art 1170 of CC. But Robes-Francisco contends that Millan is bound
by terms of provision and can’t recover more than what is agreed upon. This
argument is devoid of merit. We would agree if the clause were to be a penal clause.
But this clause doesn’t convey any penalty.

Unfortunately, vendee submitted her case below without presenting evidence on

actual damages suffered by her. But it is obvious that right of vendee was violated
by petitioner and this entitles her at least to NOMINAL DAMAGES.

NOMINAL DAMAGES are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for
vindication or recognition of a right. NOMINAL DAMAGES are damages in name
only and not in fact, and are allowed simply in recognition of a technical injury.

The P20,000.00 is excessive. The admitted fact that petitioner corporation failed to
convey a transfer certificate of title to respondent Milian because the subdivision
property was mortgaged to the GSIS does not in itself show that there was bad faith
or fraud. Bad faith is not to be presumed. Moreover, there was the expectation of
the vendor that arrangements were possible for the GSIS to make partial releases of
the subdivision lots.
PEOPLE V. GOPIO
346 SCRA 408

FACTS:
The offense charged was committed by Agustin Gopio, in Brgy. San Pascual,
Obando, Bulacan sometime between the months of May and June 1995. At that time,
the barangay was celebrating its fiesta. The victim stepped out of their house around
10:00 a.m. to buy cooking oil from accused-appellant’s store. However, it was
closed. As she was about to leave the store, accused-appellant called her. When she
came near him, he suddenly seized her and brought her inside the house. There was
nobody inside the house when the victim was taken by accused-appellant to the
bedroom. The victim resisted and screamed but accused-appellant threatened to hurt
her and her family. Accused-appellant laid the victim on the bed in such a way that
her feet were dangling on the floor. Then, he removed her underwear, bent over the
victim, and started licking her vagina. Later on, accused-appellant removed his
briefs, knelt on the floor, and placed his penis in the victim’s vagina. The victim
cried in pain as accused-appellant penetrated her. As the victim would not stop
crying, accused-appellant let her go. The victim immediately went outside accused-
appellant’s house and rushed home.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the victim should be entitled to nominal damages.

RULING:
To be entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there must be competent
proof constituting evidence of the actual amount thereof, such as receipts showing
the expenses incurred on account of the rape incident. In this case, only the
laboratory fee issued by Our Lady of Salambao Hospital in Bulacan amounting
to P350.00 was duly receipted. The rest of the documents, which the prosecution
presented to prove the actual expenses incurred by the victim, were merely a doctor’s
prescription and a handwritten list of food expenses.

Nevertheless, under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that the right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded
by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. As has been held, whenever
there has been a violation of an ascertained legal right, although no actual damages
resulted or none are shown, the award of nominal damages is proper. In this case,
the victim’s family clearly incurred medical expenses due to the rape committed by
accused-appellant. The victim suffered from pains in her navel which required her
physical examination. An award of ₱2,000.00 as nominal damages is thus
appropriate under the circumstances.

ARMOVIT V. CA
184 SCRA 476

FACTS:
In October 1981, the petitioners decided to spend their Christmas holidays
with relatives and friends in the Philippines, so they purchased from private
respondent, (Northwest Airlines, Inc.) three (3) round trip airline tickets from the
U.S. to Manila and back, plus three (3) tickets for the rest of the children, though not
involved in the suit. Each ticket of the petitioners which was in the handwriting of
private respondent's tickets sales agent contains the following entry on the Manila to
Tokyo portion of the return flight:

from Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002, date 17 January, time 10:30 A.M.
Status, OK.

On their return trip from Manila to the U.S. scheduled on January 17, 1982,
petitioner arrived at the check-in counter of private respondent at the Manila
International Airport at 9:15 in the morning, which is a good one (1) hour and fifteen
(15) minutes ahead of the 10:30 A.M. scheduled flight time recited in their tickets.
Petitioners were rudely informed that they cannot be accommodated inasmuch as
Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 a.m. was already taking off and the 10:30 A.M. flight
time entered in their plane tickets was erroneous.

Previous to the said date of departure petitioners re-confirmed their

reservations through their representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally
presented the three (3) tickets at the private respondent's Roxas Boulevard
office. The departure time in the three (3) tickets of petitioners was not changed
when re-confirmed. The names of petitioners appeared in the passenger manifest and
confirmed as Passenger Nos. 306, 307, and 308, Flight 002. Herein petitioner Dr.
Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because of the bump-off he will not be
able to keep his appointments with his patients in the U.S. Petitioners suffered
anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day and night of January 17th until
the morning of January 18th when they were finally informed that seats will be
available for them on the flight that day.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to moral, exemplary and nominal
damages.

RULING:

They are entitled to moral and exemplary damages, but not nominal damages. The
gross negligence committed by private respondent in the issuance of the tickets with
entries as to the time of the flight, the failure to correct such erroneous entries and
the manner by which petitioners were rudely informed that they were bumped off
are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith and establish that private respondent
committed a breach of contract which entitles petitioners to moral damages. By the
same token to provide an example for the public good, an award of exemplary
damages is also proper. Nevertheless, the deletion of the nominal damages by the
appellate court is well-taken since there is an award of actual damages. Nominal
damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages Petitioners had to
spend for lunch, dinner, and breakfast in the sum of P1,300.00 while waiting to be
flown out of Manila. The P1,300.00 in this case serves as actual damages that was
never rebutted by the respondent..
PLENO V. CA
G.R. NO. 56505 (1988)

FACTS:
The incident which is the basis of this complaint involves a three vehicle
collision which happened about past noon of December 21,1971 at the South Super
Highway in the portion of Taguig, Rizal. At about 12:45 in the afternoon of said
date, a snub-nosed volkswagen kombi was cruising towards Manila along the asphalt
pavement of the service road of the South Super Highway. The kombi had two
passengers, Maximo Pleno who was at the wheel, and, a New Zealander, James
Arthur Langley, who was sitting beside Mr. Pleno on the front seat. The volkswagen
was suddenly and without warning hit on its left rear corner by a red colored cargo
truck. Due to the impact, the volkswagen moved faster veering to the right and
smashing unto the right rear portion of a truck parked along the shoulder of the road
in front of the National Manpower Building. The parked truck was also moved
forward when it was hit on its back by the Volkswagen and the driver of the parked
truck, Ruben Rivera who was at that time standing in front of his parked truck
urinating was bumped by his own truck.

Having been hit from behind by the red colored cargo truck and having
smashed into the rear portion of the parked truck, the right front portion of the
volkswagen on the driver's side was reduced to a pulp. At impact, the front door on
the right side burst open and Langley, who was seated on that side, was thrown out
of the vehicle and landed on a ditch. Pleno, the driver of the volkswagen was crushed
in the driver's seat since the kombi's front portion offered no protection, being the
snub-nosed type, with the motor at the back. His legs were trapped in the wreckage.
The red cargo truck, being driven by Florante de Luna, stopped for a while and then
spead away.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Florante de Luna should pay actual, moral, temperate and
exemplary damages.

RULING:
Yes. To justify these awards, the Court considered the established fact that it is
beyond dispute, despite de Luna’s protestation that he did not hit the Kombi delivery
panel at the left rear corner; that he did not attempt to evade responsibility; even
knowingly realizing that he caused the accident, he merely stopped a while and, upon
seeing the extensiveness of the resulting damage and the seriousness of the injury,
left the scene of the accident and kept quiet all about it until discovered thru police
investigation — thus making it a hit and run case, pure and simple.

The medical expenses, hospital bills and doctor's fees were properly exhibited
and not rebutted by defendants. This being the case, actual expenses of P48,244.08
may be awarded.

As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt that Pleno

is an enterpreneur and the founder of his own corporation, the Mayon Ceramics
Corporation. It appears also that he is an industrious and resourceful person with
several projects in line and were it not for the incident, might have pushed them
through. On the day of the incident, Pleno was driving homeward with geologist
Langley after an ocular inspection of the site of the Mayon Ceramics
Corporation. His actual income however has not been sufficiently established so that
this Court cannot award actual damages, but, an award of temperate or moderate
damages may still be made on loss or impairment of earning capacity. That Pleno
sustained a permanent deformity due to a shortened left leg and that he also suffers
from double vision in his left eye is also established. Because of this, he suffers from
some inferiority complex and is no longer active in business as well as in social life.

Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory

damages. In arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages to be awarded, trial
courts are guided by our ruling that:

... There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof
of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced
that there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial
credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show
certainty in terms of money. Should damages be denied for that
reason? The judge should be empowered to calculate moderate
damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer,
without redress from the defendant's wrongful act.

PEOPLE V. SINGH
360 SCRA 404
FACTS:
Dilbag Singh, private complainant for frustrated murder, recounts that on
November 26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning while he was cleaning his
motorbike in front of the Mendiola Apartment in Barangay Canlalay, Biñan, Laguna,
Dalvir, Balwinder, Gurmok, Jarnail, Amarjit, Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip- all surnamed
Singh-Johander Singh Dhillon, and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived, shouting foul
remarks in their native language and demanding Surinder Singh to come out of the
apartment.

When Surinder Singh came out of his apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to stab
him but Surinder Singh was able to move away. Dalvir Singh told his companions
to hold Surinder Singh as he will kill him. Thereafter, Dial Singh and Johinder Singh
each held the right and left arms of Surinder Singh, with Kuldip Singh pushing
Surinder Singh on his back. Dalvir Singh then stabbed Surinder Singh, hitting him
on the right side of his stomach, and causing him to fall on the ground. Dial Singh
remarked that Surinder Singh failed to give money and if others will likewise refuse,
the same fate will befall them. As Surinder Singh tried to get up, Malkit Singh
Dhillon and Jarnail Singh started hitting him with lead pipes all over his body, while
Johinder Singh and Dial Singh punched and kicked Surinder. Amarjit Singh, who
was holding a gun, warned everyone not to help Surinder Singh or else he will shoot.
Thereat, when all these things were going on, private complainant Dilbag Singh tried
to stop them but Balwinder Singh stabbed him on the left side of his back. Gurmok
Singh likewise stabbed him with a bolo, but he was not hit as he was able to move
to one side. After that, the ten (10) accused Indians left.

Dilbag Singh and Surinder Singh, both injured, were brought to the Perpetual
Help Hospital, Biñan, Laguna, by Jaswinder Singh, Johinder Singh Gill, Balwinder
Singh Gill and Alwan Singh, for treatment. There, Surinder Singh was pronounced
dead on arrival.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Surinder Singh are entitled to awards for loss of earning
capacity.

RULING:
No, the heirs of Surinder Singh are not entitled to awards for loss of earning capacity,
however, they should be awarded temperate damages.
 Awards for loss of earning capacity partake of damages which must be proven
not only by credible and satisfactory evidence, but also by unbiased proof. The best
evidence to substantiate income earned by foreigners while in the Philippines is the
payment of taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Absent such proof, bare
allegation is insufficient. Nevertheless, considering that the definite proof of
pecuniary loss cannot be offered, and the fact of loss has been established, appellants
shall pay the heirs of Surinder Singh temperate damages in the amount of
P200,000.00.

PEOPLE V. PLAZO
350 SCRA 433

FACTS:
On August 8, 1989, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, Leonor Fabula went out
of her house in May-anao, Tigaon, Camarines Sur to buy sugar at a nearby store.
When she reached the store, she saw appellant boxing her son Romeo Fabula and
banging his head on the post of the store, while asking him why he told the police
about his brother and the location of appellant's house. When Leonor sought to
intervene, appellant got angry at her. She became afraid and asked for help but
nobody went near them. Romeo freed himself from the hold of appellant and ran
away. Appellant chased Romeo with a small bolo known locally as "gatab." Leonor
shouted at appellant to stop but the latter did not heed her pleas. Appellant caught
up with Romeo and stabbed him at the back causing Romeo to fall on the ground.
Appellant continued to stab Romeo in the upper and lower chest area. Leonor
continued shouting for help and eventually someone came to help. However, when
she saw her son no longer moving, she told the people not to touch or move him
because she was going to the Poblacion of Tigaon to get a policeman.

When Patrolmen Virgilio Azucena and Jose Madera arrived at the scene of
the crime, they saw the fallen body of Romeo with a small bolo imbedded on his
chest and the detached handle of the bolo on the ground near his body. The
policemen brought the body to the Municipal Building where the Municipal Health
Officer, Dr. Constancio Tam, conducted an autopsy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the family of the deceased Romeo Fabula is entitled to nominal
damages in lieu of actual damages.

RULING:
Yes. Since the award of actual damages in the amount of P15,712.00 was based
solely on the bare assertions of the mother of the victim, the Court can only grant
such amount for expenses if they are supported by receipts. In the absence thereof,
no actual damages can be awarded. However, in lieu of actual damages, temperate
damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered where it has been
shown that the victim's family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof
cannot be proved with certainty. The Court fins the award of P15,000.00 as
temperate damages reasonable. Moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of
any evidence to support its award.

PNB V. CA
256 SCRA 44

FACTS:
On 11 July 1989, private respondent Carmelo H. Flores (Flores) purchased
from petitioner at its Manila Pavilion Hotel unit, two (2) manager's checks worth
P500,000.00 each, paying a total of P1,000,040.00, including the service charge. A
receipt for said amount was issued by the petitioner.

On 12 July 1989, Flores presented these checks at the Baguio Hyatt Casino
unit of petitioner. Petitioner refused to encash the checks but after a lengthy
discussion, it agreed to encash one (1) of the checks. However, it deferred the
payment of the other check until after Flores agreed that it be broken down to five
(5) manager's checks of P100,000.00 each. Furthermore, petitioner refused to encash
one of the five checks until after it is cleared by the Manila Pavilion Hotel
unit. Having no other option, Flores agreed to such an arrangement. However, upon
his return to Manila, he made representations to petitioner through its Malate Branch
so that the check may be encashed but to no avail. Flores, thereafter, wrote a letter
to his counsel informing the latter of the aforementioned events. A Formal Demand
was made by private respondent's counsel but petitioner persisted in its refusal to
honor the check.
 Left with no other choice, Flores filed a case with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. After trial, the court rendered its decision in favor of Flores, ordering
PNB to pay the sum of P100,000.00 representing the amount of the check dishonored
with interest thereon; as well as ordering PNB to pay Flores P1,000,000.00 moral
damages, P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs of
the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Is the award of P1,000,000.00 moral and exemplary damages inordinately
disproportionate and unconscionable?

RULING:
Yes. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bench, we rule that the award
of moral and exemplary damages is patently excessive and should be reduced to a
reasonable amount. The award of moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 is
obviously not proportionate to the actual losses of P100,000.00 sustained by
Flores. Moral damages awarded must be commensurate with the loss or injury
suffered. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at
the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering
he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed
at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante,
and it must be proportional to the suffering inflicted.

As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.
While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be
proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded.

The award of P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages in this case is far too

excessive and should likewise be reduced to an equitable level. Exemplary damages
are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent
against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. Therefore,
based on the foregoing discussion, the award of moral damages is reduced to
P100,000.00 and the exemplary damages is likewise reduced to P25,000.00.
DEL ROSARIO V. CA
267 SCRA 158

FACTS:
Metal Forming Corp. (MFC) advertised there metal shingles
as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL
TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the strong
hook action on its overlaps." The Spouses Del Rosario through their contractor
Engineer Puno purchased the same believing their representation.
 The proper installation procedure expressly specified in the former's brochures
and advertisements for installation, i.e., the metal tile attached to the roof panels
should be by 2 self-drilling screws for 1 metal cleat but instead what was attached
was metal cleats with only 1-inch ordinary nail each and others were fastened with
only 1 wood screw each so the roof was blown by Typhoon Ruping 2 months later

MFC replaced the roof free of charge, in acknowledgment of its one-year

warranty on the materials and their installation. Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc.
hired by the Spouses Del Rosario determined that only with a single wood screw or
a combination of a single wood screw and a 1-inch nail was used. MFC however
declined to concede liability for the other damages claimed by the Del Rosario
Spouses to have been caused to the interior of their home. This prompted the Spouses
Del Rosario to commence a civil action against MFC in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether the Spouses Del Rosario are entitled to exemplary damages.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court holds that exemplary damages are properly exigible of
MFC. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be imposed
by way of example or correction for the public good, While exemplary damages
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before
the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded." Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish
another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions.

From the evidence presented, plaintiffs' sufferings have been duly and
substantially proven by the defendant's fraudulent actuation and breach of warranty,
and thereby entitled for the claim of damages and litigation costs as enunciated by
the testimony of the plaintiff... that the damages to his house caused sufferings and
feelings of shock. helplessness, fears, embarrassment and anger.

INIEGO V. HONORABLE JUDGE PURGANAN

G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006

FACTS:
Private respondent Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and damages
against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic
accident, and against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner of the said truck and
employer of Pinion. The complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident when a
freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private respondent’s jitney which
private respondent was driving at the time of the accident. Santos filed a Motion to
Declare defendant in Default allegedly for failure of the latter to file his answer
within the final extended period. Petitioner Iniego filed a Motion to Admit and a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground, among other things, that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the cause of action of the case. Public respondent J. Purganan
issued the assailed Omnibus Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the petitioner
and the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default of the private respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are capable
of pecuniary estimation.

RULING:
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively
actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the
defendant’s alleged tortious acts, and are therefore capable of pecuniary estimation.
It is crystal clear from B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, that
what must be determined to be capableor incapable of pecuniary estimation is not
the cause of action, but the subject matter of the action. A cause of action is
"the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of
the primary rights of the plaintiff." On the other hand, the "subject matter of the
action" is "the physical facts, the thing real or personal, the money, lands, chattels,
and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong
committed by the defendant." In Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc., et al., JBL Reyes said that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which

is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of
 first instance [now Regional Trial Courts] would depend on
the amount of the claim.

Fault or negligence, which the Court of Appeals claims is not capable of

pecuniary estimation, is not actionable by itself. For such fault or negligence to be
actionable, there must be a resulting damage to a third person. The relief available
to the offended party in such cases is for the reparation, restitution, or payment of
such damage, without which any alleged offended party has no cause of action or
relief. The fault or negligence of the defendant, therefore, is inextricably intertwined
with the claim for damages, and there can be no action based on quasi-delict without
a claim for damages.
DEL ROSARIO V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 118325, JANUARY 29, 1997

FACTS:
Metal Forming Corp. (MFC) advertised there metal shingles
as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL
TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the strong
hook action on its overlaps." The Spouses Del Rosario through their contractor
Engineer Puno purchased the same believing their representation.

The proper installation procedure expressly specified in the former's brochures

and advertisements for installation, i.e., the metal tile attached to the roof panels
should be by 2 self-drilling screws for 1 metal cleat but instead what was attached
was metal cleats with only 1-inch ordinary nail each and others were fastened with
only 1 wood screw each so the roof was blown by Typhoon Ruping 2 months later

MFC replaced the roof free of charge, in acknowledgment of its one-year

warranty on the materials and their installation. Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc.
hired by the Spouses Del Rosario determined that only with a single wood screw or
a combination of a single wood screw and a 1-inch nail was used. MFC however
declined to concede liability for the other damages claimed by the Del Rosario
Spouses to have been caused to the interior of their home. This prompted the Spouses
Del Rosario to commence a civil action against MFC in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent MFC is guilty for breach of contract.

RULING:
Yes. MFA is guilty of breach of contact. There was privity of contract between
the Del Rosarios and MFC; Engineer Puno acted as MFC's agent in the signing of
the contracts for the supply and installation of the "Banawe'' shingles; hence, the
contract was really between the Del Rosarios and that company. That MFC did in
truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties made to the
general public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who relied
on those warranties, is adequately demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law
explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory
evidence of the psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by the Del
Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is warranted. Over a period of about a
month. they experienced "feelings of shock, helplessness, fear, embarrassment and
anger."

As reflected in the records of the case, the findings of both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court show that petitioners suffered anguish, embarrassment
and mental sufferings due to the failure of private respondent to perform its
obligation to petitioners. According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent
acted in wanton disregard of the rights of petitioners. These pronouncements lay the
basis and justification for the Court to award petitioners moral and exemplary
damages.
INHELDER CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-52358, MAY 30, 1983

FACTS:
What commenced the instant proceedings is a case for damages instituted by
private respondent, the Panganiban’s who were residents of Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, against petitioner Inhelder Corportaion, domiciled in Mandaluyong, Rizal,
before the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro. The complaint alleged that
petitioner Inhelder had filed a collection case against the Panganiban’s before the
Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, which was subsequently dismissed. The
collection case instituted by petitioner Inhelder was allegedly unfounded, and that
the respondents were entitled, as against petitioner Inhelder, to quantified damages
totalling P169,550.00. The complaint of the Panganiban’s was essentially for actual
and compensatory damages, moral damages and exemplary damages, based on the
alleged unfounded collection case initiated by Inhelder Corporation.

ISSUE:
Was the collection suit that was instituted by petitioner Inhelder Corporation
malicious?

RULING:
No. The collection case was not malicious. Malicious prosecution, to be the
basis of a suit, requires the elements of malice and want of probable cause. There
must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was
false and groundless. In the present case, there is no evidence on record, clearly
establishing these two elements. Although there may be want of probable cause,
there is no proof that petitioner deliberately initiated the collection case knowing that
the same was false and groundless.

To support an action for malicious prosecution under American law the

plaintiff must prove, in the first place, the fact of the p petition and the fact that the
defendant was himself the prosecutor, or that he instigated its commencement, and
that it finally terminated in his acquittal that, in bringing it, the prosecutor had acted
without probable cause, and that he was actuated by legal malice, i.e., by improper
or sinister motives. These three elements must concur; and there is no distinction
between actions for criminal prosecutions and civil suits. Both classes require
substantially the same essentials. Malice is essential to the maintenance of an action
for malicious prosecution and not merely to the recovery of exemplary damages. But
malice alone does not make one liable for malicious prosecution where probable
cause is shown, even where it appears that the suit was brought, for the mere purpose
of vexing harrassing and injuring his adversary. In other words, malice and want of
probable cause must both exist in order to justify the action.

It should also be stressed that the mere filing of a suit does 'not render a person
liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful. The law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. Sound principles of justice and
public policy demand that persons shall have free resort to Courts of law for redress
of wrongs and vindication of their rights without fear of later on standing trial for
damages should their actions lose ground.
PEOPLE V. CATUBIG
G.R. NO. 137842, AUGUST 23, 2001

FACTS:
On November 27, 1997, at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, private
complainant Dannilyn Catubig, who was born on August 9, 1985, and her four (4)
younger siblings were watching television in the sala of their house located at Sunlife
Subdivision, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

After an hour, Dannilyn's father, herein appellant Danilo Catubig, arrived and
told Dannilyn's siblings to proceed, as in fact they did proceed, to her aunt's house
which is just located nearby. Thereafter, appellant told Dannilyn to go inside a room
and to lie down on the bed. After Dannilyn had complied, appellant removed
Dannilyn's shorts and panty, while appellant, after removing his brief and t-shirt,
[laid] on top of Dannilyn. Afraid of appellant who beat and raped her in the past,
Dannilyn was not able to resist appellant who succeeded in inserting his penis into
Dannilyn's vagina.

However, Dannilyn's aunt, who got suspicious of what appellant was doing to
Dannilyn, informed the latter's mother, Jocelyn Catubig, about the said suspicion.
Thus, when confronted by her mother, Dannilyn was forced to reveal that she was
indeed raped by appellant. The sexual assault was reported to the San Jose del Monte
Police Station where Dannilyn's sworn statement was subsequently taken on
December 3, 1997. Upon the request of the police authorities, Dannilyn was
examined on December 1, 1997 by Dr. Wilfredo E. Tiera, Medico-Legal Officer of
the National Bureau of Investigation, who found out that Dannilyn's healed
laceration in the hymen was caused by sexual intercourse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not complainant Dannilyn Catubig is entitled to exemplary damages.

RULING:

Yes. Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or

corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings and
as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured
or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. The terms punitive or
vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case,
these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like
him from similar conduct in the future.

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches
the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment
for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase
of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense
by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code.

Relevantly, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, made effective on 01

December 2000, requires aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. A court would thus be
precluded from considering in its judgment the attendance of "qualifying or
aggravating circumstances" if the complaint or information is bereft of any
allegation on the presence of such circumstances.

The retroactive application of procedural rules, nevertheless, cannot adversely

affect the rights of the private offended party that have become vested prior to the
effectivity of said rules. Thus, in the case at bar, although relationship, the
aggravating circumstance present in this case, has not been alleged in the
information, the offense having been committed, however, prior to the effectivity of
the new rules, the civil liability already incurred by appellant remains unaffected
thereby.
ABERCA V. CER, ET. AL.
G.R. NO. L-69866, APRIL 15, 1988

FACTS:
General Fabian Ver ordered Task Force Makabansa, an intelligent unit of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to conduct pre-emptive strikes against know communist-
terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to
sow disturbances in Metro Manila. Such order caused the alleged illegal searches
and seizures on petitioners and other violations of their rights and liberties.

The said searches were done with defectively issued search warrants. Personal
items of petitioners were taken. Petitioners were arrested without the proper arrest
warrants issued by the court. During their arrest, they were not allowed visitation
by their relatives and attorneys. Petitioners were interrogated in violation of their
rights to silence and counsel. Military men who interrogated them threatened them,
and different means of torture and forms of violence were imposed on them while
trying to ask incriminating questions or confessions. Petitioners filed a suit for
damages in the Regional Trial Court, but was denied the same on the grounds that
the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of writ of
habeas corpus is suspended and that defendants are immune from liability for acts
done in the performance of their official duties. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel
and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.

RULING:
No. The suspension of writ of habeas corpus is not a bar for civil action for
damages. The respondents’ pursuit of preventing or suppressing lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion, and subversion cannot be construed as a blanket license to
transgress upon the constitutional rights and liberties of the individual. The
Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, civil or
military, owe obedience to and allegiance at all times.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and
other violations of their constitutional rights. What is suspended is merely the right
of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as
a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION V.

MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORP.
G.R. NO. 175773, JUNE 17, 2013

FACTS:
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of Mitsubishi Motors Philippines
Salaried Employees Union (MMPSEU) and Mitsubishi Motors Philippines
Corporation (MMPC) provides that the company shoulders the hospitalizations
expenses of the dependents of covered employees subject to certain limitations and
restrictions. Accordingly, covered employees pay part of the hospitalization
insurance premium through monthly salary deduction, while MMPC pays the
expenses incurred for the hospitalization of the covered employee’s dependents. The
conflict arose when MMPC refused to pay the hospitalization expenses that were
paid by the dependent’s own health insurance. MMPSEU now insists that the
covered employees are entitled to the whole and undiminished amount of said
hospital expenses.
 Sought for comment, the Insurance Commission claims that the covered
employees can claim insurance benefits for a loss that had already paid by another
insurance company. The Insurance Company opined that in cases of claims for
reimbursement of medical expenses where there are two contracts providing benefits
for such, recovery may be made on both simultaneously without regard to the
amount of total benefits provided by other insurance. This, it said, is consistent with
public policy underlying the collateral source rule – that the courts have usually
concluded that the liability of a health or accident insurer is not reduced by other
possible sources of indemnification or compensation.

As a result, the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) held that the covered employees may
demand simultaneous payment from both the CBA and their dependents’ separate
health insurance without resulting in double insurance, since separate premiums
were paid for each contract. The Court of Appeals, however ruled otherwise because
both had the same subject matter, interest insured, and risk or peril insured against.
Hence, the employee will benefit twice for the same loos resulting in double
insurance.

ISSUE:
Is MMPSEU liable to pay the whole and undiminished amount of its employees’
hospitalization expense notwithstanding the amount paid?

RULING:
No. MMPC’s liability is only to the extent of the expenses actually incurred by their
dependents which excludes the amounts shouldered by other health insurance
companies. The employees are not entitled to the whole and undiminished amount
of their hospitalization expense.

The VA based his ruling on the opinion of Atty. Richard David C. Funk II of the
Claims Adjudication Division, applying the collateral source rule, that the
employees may recover benefits from different insurance providers without regard
to the amount of benefits paid by each. As part of American personal injury law, the
collateral source rule was originally applied to tort cases wherein the defendant is
prevented form benefitting from the plaintiff’s receipt of money from other sources.
Under this rule, if an injured person receives compensation for his injuries from a
source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted
from the damages which he would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor. In a recent
Decision by the Illinois Supreme Court, the rules has been described as “an
established exception to the general rule that damages in negligence actions must be
compensatory.” The Court went to explain that although the rule appears to allow a
double recovery, the collateral source will have a lien or subrogation right to prevent
such double recovery.

As seen, the collateral source rule applies in order to place responsibility for losses
on the party causing them. Its application is justified so that “the wrongdoer should
not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party or take advantage of
contracts or other relations that may exist between the injured party and third
person.” Thus, it finds no application to cases involving no-fault insurances under
which the insured is indemnified for losses by insurance companies, regardless of
who was at fault in the incident generating the losses. Here, it is clear that MMPC is
a no-fault insurer. Hence, it cannot be obliged to pay the hospitalization expenses of
the dependents of its employees which had already been paid by separate health
insurance providers of said dependents.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. IRENEO JUGUETA

G.R. NO. 202124, APRIL 5, 2016

FACTS:
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant Ireneo Jugueta was charged with
Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Jugueta allegedly shot Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old and Claudine
Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age. The crime was committed in the dwelling of the
offended party.

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger
San Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder. The crime was
predicated on the appellants attempt to shoot using firearms the house occupied by
the family of Norberto Divina.

Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigationof the case against them. At
said proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on
June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain “Hapon” and Gilbert Estores at the
crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other
two had no participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger
San Miguel was not present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of
Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel. Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case for
Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed,
and trial proceeded only as to appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not civil indemnity, moral, exemplary and temperate damages were
properly awarded in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Criminal Case No. 7702-G

RULING:
Yes. Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter
in detail as regards criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are three kinds
of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary
damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some
instances.

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal

law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy
and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law. This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC
which states, “Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.” It is
to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it
can be increased by the Court when appropriate. In our jurisdiction, civil
indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution
or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the
latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it
is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim
a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law
only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00.
The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the
award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be
validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are
also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals expounded on the
nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate

one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept
of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to
compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable
of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left
to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1)
injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury
must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 and
Article 2220 of the Civil Code. x x x.

The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v.
Heirs of Rey Castillon: “The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration,
within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.”

Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does
not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court,
depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The
amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as
it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

Also known as “punitive” or “vindictive” damages, exemplary or corrective

damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but
not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the
sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that
has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the
defendant – associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice,
gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud – that
intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to
refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish
him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the
future. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded,
not only due to the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of
the offender.