Art XIII, Sec 4

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively
the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention
limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Art 3 sec 9

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Association of Small Landholders of the Philippines vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (just compen)

association v sar just compen

-Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.

-there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or
color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

=Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted
to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section
16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government
to buy his land

-To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may
not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to
several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under
expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation
thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional,

-A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d)ra6657 will readily show that it does not suffer from the
arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings
are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an
opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the determination
of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any
other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.

-The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise,
the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of
what is admittedly a judicial function.

=The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.

-This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law being unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the
expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium
of payment allowed.

-It cannot be denied from cited cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is
money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that
medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This
is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken
by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.

-revolutionary kind of expropriation

-Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast
areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of
pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already
staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian
reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned
the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be
paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that
they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be
enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We
may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by
the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or
indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose that
what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law
in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in principle.

The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among
the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the
comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the
requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress"
to determine how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-
beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were
also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be
expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are
making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment
to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the
expropriator.

With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not
mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all
this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the
need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian
reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these
disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the
entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of
discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution,
and that is not what we shall decree today.

Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in
money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the
total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive
upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily
because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger
balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments
making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise
available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of
stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount
of just compensation.

Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little
inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these
countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice,
will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise,
our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.

=The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual
payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent
domain.

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and
declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except
that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a
full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full
payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they
acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged
membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly
proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the
farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just
compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before
the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.

Ra 6657

Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or
retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary
according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)
created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three
(3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications:
(1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm: provided, that landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential
Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally retained by them thereunder: provided,
further, that original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.

The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to
the landowner: provided, however, that in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is
tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in
the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features.n case the tenant chooses
to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a
beneficiary under this Act.n case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land,
he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise
this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the
area for retention.

In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to the approval of
this Act shall be respected.

Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management, contract or transfer of
possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of the Act shall be null
and void: provided, however, that those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered
with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act.
Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) within
thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.

CHAPTER V
Land Acquisition

Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — For purposes of acquisition of private
lands, the following procedures shall be followed:

(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send
its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail,
and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the
place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a
corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other
pertinent provisions hereof.

(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or
registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of
his acceptance or rejection of the offer.

(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the
Certificate of Title and other muniments of title.

(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative
proceedings to determine the compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP
and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land,
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period,
the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30)
days after it is submitted for decision.

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or
no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR
shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds
to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified
beneficiaries.
 (f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

CHAPTER VI
Compensation

Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just compensation, the cost
of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.

Ra 9700

Section 7. Section 17of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. - In determining just compensation, the cost
of acquisition of the land, the value of the standing crop, the current: value of like properties,
its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, the
assessment made by government assessors, and seventy percent (70%) of the zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), translated into a basic formula by the
DAR shall be considered, subject to the final decision of the proper court. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government
to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation."

Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner
in such amounts as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance
with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may
be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.

The compensation shall be paid on one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:

(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions;

(a) For lands above fifty (50) — Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the
hectares, insofar as the excess balance to be paid in government
hectarage is concerned. financial instruments negotiable at
any time.

(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) — Thirty percent (30%) cash, the
hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares. balance to be paid in government
 financial instruments negotiable at
any time.

(c) For lands twenty-four (24) — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the
hectares and below. balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at
any time.

(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares,

physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the
PARC; ((Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:

(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of
the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance until
the tenth (10th) year: provided, that should the landowner choose to forego the cash
portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;

(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner,
his successors in interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for any
of the following:

(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including

assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by
government financial institutions in the same province or region where the
lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;

(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or -controlled

corporations or shares of stocks owned by the government in private
corporations;

(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused
persons, or performance bonds;

(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the
proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably
in a small-and medium-scale industry, in the same province or region as the
land for which the bonds are paid;

(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government; provided, that the use
of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of
the outstanding balance of the financial instruments: provided, further, that
the PARC shall determine the percentage mentioned above;

(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original
bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other
institutions;
 (vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government hospitals; and

(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.

In case of extraordinary inflation, the PARC shall take appropriate measures to protect the economy.

Section 19. Incentives for Voluntary Offers for Sales. — Landowners, other than banks and other
financial institutions, who voluntarily offer their lands for sale shall be entitled to an additional five
percent (5%) cash payment.

Section 20. Voluntary Land Transfer. — Landowners of agricultural lands subject to acquisition
under this Act may enter into a voluntary arrangement for direct transfer of their lands to qualified
beneficiaries subject to the following guidelines:

(a) All notices for voluntary land transfer must be submitted to the DAR within the first year of
the implementation of the CARP. Negotiations between the landowners and qualified
beneficiaries covering any voluntary land transfer which remain unresolved after one (1) year
shall not be recognized and such land shall instead be acquired by the government and
transferred pursuant to this Act.

(b) The terms and conditions of such transfer shall not be less favorable to the transferee
than those of the government's standing offer to purchase from the landowner and to resell
to the beneficiaries, if such offers have been made and are fully known to both parties.

(c) The voluntary agreement shall include sanctions for non-compliance by either party and
shall be duly recorded and its implementation monitored by the DAR.

Section 21. Payment of Compensation by Beneficiaries Under Voluntary Land Transfer. —

Direct payments in cash or in kind may be by the farmer-beneficiary to the landowner under terms to
be mutually agreed upon by both parties, which shall be binding upon them, upon registration with
the approval by the DAR. Said approval shall be considered given, unless notice of disapproval is
received by the farmer-beneficiary within thirty (30) days from the date of registration.

In the event they cannot agree on the price of land, the procedure for compulsory acquisition as
provided in Section 16 shall apply. The LBP shall extend financing to the beneficiaries for purposes
of acquiring the land.

Association case( just compensation)

LBP V YAP

F:

-Respondents here are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to
transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
-They argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of
depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land
before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657

-LBP and DAR argued that it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in
implementing the declared policies of RA 6657 and the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA
6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a
form of deposit.

i:

won the trust deposit is valid

h:

No.

"SECTION 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — . . .

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response
from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines . . ." (Emphasis supplied)

It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere
does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the
intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made
express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a
"trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded construction of the term "deposit".

-another issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in
trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their
properties, petitioners assert the negative

-The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation under
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 18 of the same
law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf
pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that
adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section

16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and intended
merely to secure possession of the property pending final valuation.
Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner
in such amounts as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance
with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may
be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land
-The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA
6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of
the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their
properties simply because they rejected the DAR’s valuation, and notwithstanding that they have
already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of
eminent domain(The irresistible expropriation of private respondents’ properties was painful enough for
them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to
private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is,
however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must
rectify.)

-Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e)
and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners’ right to appropriate
the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and
possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we
reiterate the cardinal rule that:

". . . within the context of the State’s inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment
of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered ‘just’ for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss."

a) DAR Administrative order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declared null and void insofar as it provides for the
opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;

b) Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit — not merely ‘earmark’, ‘reserve’ or

‘deposit in trust’ — with an accessible bank designated by respondent DAR in the names of the following
petitioners the following amounts in cash and in government financial instruments — within the
parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 665

c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the petitioners to withdraw the above-deposited
amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just compensation by the proper authorities;

formula LBP

time of taking

APO FRUITS V LBP

f:

-Apo was the registered owner of a 115.2179 hectare land situated in San Isidro, Tagum City, Davao del
Norte
-Apo voluntarily offered to sell the subject property to the government for purposes of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

-Said land was subjected to a valuation by DAR to determine the value for just compensation however
Apo found it to be too low and rejected the offer.

-Not satisfied with the valuation of LBP, Apo filed a complaint for determination of just compensation
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Unfortunately, the said case
remained pending for almost six (6) years without resolution.

-MAY 9, 2008 Meanwhile, the DAR requested LBP to deposit the amount of Php 3,814,053.53 or 3.31per
sqm. as initial payment for the subject property (THIS IS THE PRINCIPAL ACCDNG TO CA

-Not satisfied with the valuation of LBP, Apo filed a complaint for determination of just compensation
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Unfortunately, the said case
remained pending for almost six (6) years without resolution.

-Apo determination for JC before the RTC

-RTC employed commissioners for valuation and ruled that it should be at P130 per sqm. or
P149,783,000

-DAR and LBP appealed. CA:

-The just compensation is set at P103.33 per [sq m]. There shall be 12% interest per annum on the
unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed from December 9, 1996, the date when the
Government took the land, to May 9, 2008, the time when [LBP] paid the balance on the principal
amount

-hence, petition by APO

i:

WON p103 per sqm is proper

WON 12% interest on the unpaid just compensation should be counted from December 9, 1996, the
time of the taking until full payment or only until May 9, 2008 as based by the CA in Apo Fruits
Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 164195.

h:

P103 per sqm not proper

-SC adopts commissioner finding of P130. Considered that the land is at the heart of the city. Mura na
sya because said land is ideal for conversion into residential or industrial purposes where it that happen
price per sqm would be 10-fold and that said land is planted with commercial bamboos(business).

-The commissioners and the RTC in arriving at their conclusion took into account and meticulously
considered the different factors provided for in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.

Interest should be counted from the time of taking until full payment
-As to the manner of interest, Apo claimed that the 12% legal interest due from LBP because of its delay
in paying the just compensation should be computed at the time of the taking of the subject property,
i.e., on December 9, 1996, until full payment has been made and not until May 9, 2008

-As to the 12% interest, LBP claimed that there was no delay on its part in the payment of just
compensation. LBP already paid in full the initial valuation for the subject property in the amount of Php
3,814,053.53 before TCT No. 113359 was cancelled and transferred in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. Therefore, LBP should not be held liable to pay legal interest if it already paid in full the
preliminary valuation of the subject property

-The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between
one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he
was in before the taking occurred.

-The award of interest is intended to compensate the property owner for the income it would have
made had it been properly compensated for its property at the time of the taking.

-It is doctrinal that to be considered as just, the compensation must be fair and equitable, and the
landowners must have received it without any delay. The requirement of the law is not satisfied by the
mere deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by it or by the DAR,
and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements set forth by
R.A. No. 6657.

-In the present case, LBP merely deposited the amount of Php 3,814,053.53 as initial payment of the just
compensation. The RTC's valuation in its decision58 as just compensation for the subject property is Php
149,783,000.27. There is a staggering difference between the initial payment made by the LBP and the
amount of the just compensation due to Apo. It should be noted that the subject property has already
been taken by the government on December 9, 1996. Up to this date, the just compensation has not
been fully paid. During the interim, Apo is deprived of the income it would have made had it been
properly compensated for the properties at the time of the taking. It is therefore necessary to hold LBP
liable to pay for the legal interest due to its delay in fully satisfying the payment of the just
compensation.

-Thus, LBP is liable to pay legal interest of 12% counted from December 9, 1996, the time of the taking
until June 30, 2013.59 Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013 until fully paid, the just compensation shall
earn 6% legal interest in accordance with Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013.

LBP V SORIANO

F:
-SORIANOS Domingo and Mamerto Soriano (respondents) are the registered owners of several parcels
of rice land situated in Oas, Albay. Out of the 18.9163 hectares of land owned by the respondents,
18.2820 hectares were placed under the Operations Land Transfer and the CARP pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 274 and Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.

-LBP offered P482k : SORIANOS alleged that they are entitled to P4.5m

-Not satisfied with the valuation of LBP, SORIANO filed before RTC a judicial determination for just
compensation

-RTC ruled that it should be at P894k *** , plus increment of 6% per annum computed annually
beginning date of taking until the value is fully paid,

On to the more pertinent issue. LBP assails the imposition of 6% interest rate on the 18.0491
hectares of lot valued at ₱133,751.65. It avers that the incremental interest due to the respondents
should be computed from the date of taking on 21 October 1972, not up to full payment of just
compensation but up to the time LBP approved the payment of their just compensation claim and a
corresponding deposit of the compensation proceeds was made by the bank. LBP relies on the
provisions of DAR Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994, as amended, which substantially
provides that "the grant of 6% yearly interest compounded annually shall be reckoned from 21
October 1972 up to the time of actual payment but not later than December 2006." LBP stresses that
under said Administrative Order, time of actual payment is defined as the date when LBP approves
the payment of the land transfer claim and deposits the compensation proceeds in the name of the
landowner in cash and in bonds. In sum, LBP posits that the appellate court departed from the
express provision of DAR Administrative Order No. 13, as amended, by imposing an interest to be
reckoned from the time of taking up to the actual payment of just compensation.16

Respondents counter that the award of interest until full payment of just compensation was correctly
adhered to by the lower courts in line with the Court’s ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Imperial,17 which found it inequitable to determine just compensation based solely on the formula
provided by DAR Administrative Order No. 13, as amended. According to respondents, the award of
interest until full payment of just compensation is to ensure prompt payment. Moreover, respondents
claim that the date LBP approves the payment of the land transfer claim and deposits the proceeds
in the name of the landowner is not tantamount to actual payment because on said date, the release
of the amount is conditioned on certain requirements.18

This issue has already been raised before the Court of Appeals by LBP, first, in its petition for review
and, second, in its motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals, however, neglected to give a
definitive ruling on the issue of computation of interest and merely echoed the trial court’s ruling that
respondents are entitled to the 6% compounded interest per annum from the date of taking on 21
October 1972 until full payment of just compensation. 1avv phi 1

At any rate, we cannot subscribe to the arguments of LBP.

Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that the redistribution of agricultural lands
shall be subject to the payment of just compensation. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission on this subject reveal that just compensation should not do violence to the Bill of
Rights, but should also not make an insurmountable obstacle to a successful agrarian reform
program. Hence, the landowner's right to just compensation should be balanced with agrarian
reform.19

Administrative Order No. 13, as amended, was issued to compensate those who were effectively
deprived of their lands by expropriation. LBP relies on said Administrative Order to justify its own
computation of interest. A literal reading of this Administrative Order seems to favor LBP’s
interpretation with respect to the period covered by the interest rate. We quote the relevant portion of
the Administrative Order:

The grant of six percent (6%) yearly interest compounded annually shall be reckoned as follows:

3.1 Tenanted as of 21 October 1972 and covered under OLT

- From 21 October 1972 up to the time of actual payment but not later than December 2006

3.2 Tenanted after 21 October 1972 and covered under OLT

-From the date when the land was actually tenanted (by virtue of Regional Order of Placement
issued prior to August 18, 1987) up to the time of actual payment but not later than December 2006

Time of actual payment – is the date when the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) approves
payment of the land transfer claim and deposits the compensation proceeds in the name of the
landowner (LO) in cash and in bonds. The release of payment can be claimed by the landowner
upon compliance with the documentary requirements for release of payment.20

However, as embodied in its Prefatory Statement, the intent of the Administrative Order was
precisely to address a situation "where a number of landholdings remain unpaid in view of the non-
acceptance by the landowners of the compensation due to low valuation. Had the landowner been
paid from the time of taking his land and the money deposited in a bank, the money would have
earned the same interest rate compounded annually as authorized under banking laws, rules and
regulations."21 The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the
property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while
being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope
with his loss.22 To condition the payment upon LBP’s approval and its release upon compliance with
some documentary requirements would render nugatory the very essence of "prompt payment."
Therefore, to expedite the payment of just compensation, it is logical to conclude that the 6% interest
rate be imposed from the time of taking up to the time of full payment of just compensation.

Certainly, the trend of recent rulings bolsters this interpretation. In Forform Development Corporation
v. Philippine National Railways,23 the Philippine National Railways was directed to file the
appropriate expropriation action over the land in question, so that just compensation due to its owner
may be determined in accordance with the Rules of Court, with interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the time of taking until full payment is made. The Court in Manila International Airport
Authority v. Rodriguez24 ordered just compensation for the portion of respondent’s lot actually
occupied by the runway, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the time of
taking until full payment is made.
ten.li hpw al
 EUDOSIA DAEZ AND/OR HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO D. DAEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MACARIO SORIENTES, APOLONIO MEDIANA, ROGELIO MACATULAD and
MANUEL UMALI, respondents.
G.R. No. 133507. February 17, 2000

FACTS:
 Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan,
Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel
Umali under a system of sharetenancy. The said land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 as amended by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474. Thus, the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform acquired the subject land and issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) on December 9, 1980 to private
respondents as beneficiaries.
 In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared ownership over 41.8064
hectares of agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) hectares
of forestland, ten (10) hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included
in their 41.8064hectare landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685hectare riceland in Meycauayan.
 On July 27, 1987, DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying Eudosia Daezs application for
exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid
agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares.
 On June 29, 1989, Eudosia Daez wrote a letter to DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong requesting for
reconsideration of Undersecretary Medinas order. But on January 16, 1992, Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed order
upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the subject land.
 Undaunted, Eudosia Daez brought her case on February 20, 1992 to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari. The Court of Appeals, however, sustained the order of Secretary Leong.
 Eudosia pursued her petition before this court but we denied it and also denied her motion for reconsideration.
 On August 6 and 12, 1992, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to private respondents. Thereafter, the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).
 Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez
next filed an application for retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657.
 In an order dated March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OICDirector Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to
retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for their
failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by law. Aggrieved, they appealed to the
DAR.
 On August 26, 1994, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, set aside the order of Regional Director Bernardo in
a Resolution.
 Eudosia Daez filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied on January 19, 1995.
 She appealed Secretary Garilaos decision to the Office of the President which ruled in her favor. The dispositive
portion of the Decision of then Executive Secretary reads:

"WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby SET ASIDE and
judgment is rendered authorizing the retention by Eudosia Daez or her heirs of the
4.1685 hectare landholding subject thereof.

SO ORDERED."

 Aggrieved, private respondents sought from the Court of Appeals, a review of the decision of the Office of the
President. On January 28, 1999, the said Decision of the Office of the President was reversed.

ISSUE(S):
1. W/N the finality of judgment in exemption (PD27) does preclude the subsequent institution of
application for retention (RA 6657).

2. W/N the heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject 4.1685 riceland.
3. W/N the land awards made pursuant to the governments agrarian reform program are subject to the
exercise by a landowner of his right of retention.
HELD:
1. NO
Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts. P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are
the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of sharecrop or
leasetenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these
requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where his
ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.

Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is
tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.

On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention are the following: (1) the land
must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of sharecrop or leasetenancy obtaining therein; and (3)
the size of the landholding must not exceed twentyfour (24) hectares, or it could be more than twentyfour (24) hectares
provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of
"other agricultural lands".

Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT an those for the grant of an
application for the exercise of a landowners right of retention, are different.

Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and the same
thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There
was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject
4.1865hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final
and executory.

2. YES.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to
mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by
implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.

In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that
landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights
under R.A. No. 6657.

Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even the issuance of Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) to farmerbeneficiaries. What must be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on
the land chosen to be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or comparable
features.

3. YES.
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered
thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later
found to be part of the landowners retained area.

A certificate of title accumulates in one document a comprehensive statement of the status of the fee held by the owner of
a parcel of land. As such, it is a mere evidence of ownership and it does not constitute the title to the land itself. It cannot
confer title where no title has been acquired by any of the means provided by law.

In the instant case, the CLTs of private respondents over the subject 4.1685hectare riceland were issued without Eudosia
Daez having been accorded her right of choice as to what to retain among her landholdings. The transfer certificates of title
thus issued on the basis of those CLTs cannot operate to defeat the right of the heirs of deceased Eudosia Daez to retain
the said 4.1685 hectares of riceland.
Pnb v Nepomuceno

pnb v nepomuceno
f:

-PNB granted a loan in favor of Nepomucen prod. secured by mortgage on neps properties

-nep defaulted. pnb sought foreclosure. auction sale was re-scheduled several times without need of
republication of the notice of sale, as stipulated in their Agreement, until finally, the auction sale
proceeded, with PNB as the highest bidder

-NEP filed an action for annulment because the foreclosure sale is null and void for lack of publication

-rtc and ca ruled that it is null and v

i:

whether the parties to the mortgage can validly waive the posting and publication requirements
mandated by Act No. 3135.

h:

no. Act. No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages on real property is
specific with regard to the posting and publication requirements of the notice of sale, to wit:

"Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three
public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth
more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city."

On this score, it is well settled that what Act No. 3135 requires is: (1) the posting of notices of sale in
three public places; and, (2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation.17 Failure
to publish the notice of sale constitutes a jurisdictional defect, which invalidates the sale.

Petitioner, however, insists that the posting and publication requirements can be dispensed with since
the parties agreed in writing that the auction sale may proceed without need of re-publication and re-
posting of the notice of sale

=the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word 'waiver'
covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects
his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to
which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit,
do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not
forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone
has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or role made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large

=Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will
be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals
and the public interest may be waived.

"While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect
property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty
are subjects of waive

The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the
mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and
of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of
the property.

Pp v donato

Salas aka NPA’s “Ka Bilog”• was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was charged together with
the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the Writ of Habeas
Corpus. A conference was held thereafter to hear each party’s side. It was later agreed upon by both
parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in custody for the
continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of
the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas filed to be admitted
for bail and Judge Donato approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the
side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail because he has
waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he
will be held in custody.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.

HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for the issuance
of the WoHC. The contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in custody and that the
same does not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not tenable. His waiver to such right is justified
by his act of withdrawing his petition for WoHC.
Constitution
 Art XIII, Sec 4
 Art III, Sec 9
 Cases:
 Association of Small Landholders of the Philippines vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform (G.R. No. 78742)

R.A. 6657, as amended

 Secs 17-19

RA 9700
 Sec 7

Executive Order No. 228

Not Trust Deposit

LBP vs Yap (GR 118712, 6 Oct. 1995)

Formula
 Cases:
 LBP vs Rufino (G.R. No. 175644)
 LBP vs Banal (G.R. No. 143276)
 LBP vs Celada (G.R. No. 164876)
 LBP vs Soriano (G.R. No. 180772 and 180776)
 LBP vs Wycoco (G.R. 140160, 13 January 2004)
 LBP vs Rivera (G.R. No. 182431, 27 February 2013)

Time of taking
 Cases:
 Apo Fruits vs LBP (G.R. No. 164195, 12 October 2010)
 LBP vs Soriano (G.R. No. 180772 and 180776)

Retention- SEPTEMBER 14
Daez vs CA (G.R. No. 133507, February 17, 2000)
Archbishop of Caceres vs DAR (G.R. No. 139285, December 21, 2007)

Constitution
 Article XIII, Sec 4

R.A. 6657, as amended

 Sec 6
LOI 474
Cases:
 Daez vs CA (G.R. No. 133507)
 Heirs of Griño vs CA (G.R. No. 165073)
 Estribillo vs DAR (G.R. No. 159674)
 Read Daez in consonance with the following cases:
  People vs Donato (G.R. No. 79269)
 PNB vs Nepopucemo Productions, Inc. (G.R. No. 139489)
A.O. 7, Series 2011