1.

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Case: ONG CHIA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS (328 SCRA 749)
Date: March 27, 2000
Ponente: J. Mendoza

Facts:
Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. He arrived in Manila when he was 9 years old, since then, he has
stayed in the Philippines where he found his employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipino with whom he
had 4 children.

On July 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under CA 473 a.k.a. the
Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. On Chia, after stating his qualification and the lack of disqualifications, stated that his
petition for citizenship was not acted upon by the Special Committee on Naturalization, OSG, since the same was not reconstituted
after the February 1986 revolution.

During the hearings, Ong Chia along with 3 witnesses testified as to his qualification. Since the Prosecutor was impressed
and decided not to counteract the testimonies, the trial court granted the petition and admitted Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.

However, the State, through the OSG, appealed (with annexed documents) contending that Ong Chia: (1) failed to state
all the names by which he is or had been known i.e. Loreto Chia Ong; (2) failed to state all his former places of residence in violation
of CA 473 i.e. J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in
the Philippines i.e. he cohabited with his wife 8 years prior to their marriage (annexed is the marriage contract in 1977 and Joint
Affidavit of Ong Chia and his wife); (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes has been insufficient or
misdeclared as per the annexed income tax returns; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence
i.e. marriage contract for the alleged first marriage before a judge in 1953.

The CA reversed the trial court decision. Hence, the present petition by Ong Chia contending that CA erred in considering
the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to it’s appellant’s brief. Not having been presented and formally offered
as evidence, they are mere scraps of paper devoid of any evidentiary value contrary to Rule 132, sec. 34 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence which provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

Issue: WON the Revised Rules on Evidence applies in the case

Held: No.

Ratio:
According to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court: “These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and
election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or
in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.” (Emphasis added)

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by Ong Chia is clearly not
applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or
suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented
by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decision in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Ong Chia claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial
court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due
process. The Court is not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered
is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Ong Chia cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to
the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the
brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as
a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct
case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No.
031767." Other than this, Ong Chia offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents - namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, Ong Chia's marriage contract,
the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and Ong Chia's income tax returns - are all public documents. As such, they have been
executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since Ong Chia failed to make satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast
doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is the Court’s conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

The Court additionally discussed the effect of Ong Chia's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in
accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on his Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records
as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. He admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the
Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes
substantial compliance with §7. This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such
requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent
suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or another.

It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant.

2.)
People vs. Valdez
G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000

FACTS:

Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused
was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and
cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which
dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with
assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V.
Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all
member of the police force, who testified how the information was received, the
commencement of their operation and its details under the specific instruction of Inspector
Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to
look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters away from his nipa hut.
PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the
latter admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of
appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said plants was
sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis which produced a
positive result. The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant where the growing
marijuana plants were found, was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in
the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been
issued in his favor.
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his
vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was
asked to go with the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought appellant to
the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his
nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp
plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he
denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit
ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the
marijuana. The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. At the police
headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized
by the police. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show
that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that
the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the
mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one’s person, which includes his
residence, his papers, and other possessions.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is
lawful and the seized evidence admissible.

(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.

(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

HELD:

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time
to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The
mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of
their intentions.

With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an
illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the
marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an
unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo
to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict
appellant.
In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be
convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed
against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be
credible and competent. Competent evidence is “generally admissible” evidence.
Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character that the court or judge is
bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it was
error on the trial court’s part to have admitted evidences against the accused and to have
relied upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly tainted.

In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” To justify the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence
and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the
required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

3.)
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

Ponente: J. Mendoza

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered
petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin.
On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence;

Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there
is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and
the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

4.)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ADOR
G.R. No. 140538-39 June 14, 2004
FACTS: In its effort to secure the conviction of the accused for the murder of Abe Cuya and Rodolfo Chavez,
the prosecution presented a total of sixteen (16) witnesses.
Mercy Beria testified that she met a certain Pablito Umali who told them that Ompong Chavez
had been shot. Chavez replied tinambangan kami na Ador and requested that he be brought to the
hospital as he was dying. About eight (8) meters from where Chavez was, in a dark spot, lay Abe Cuya,
dead.
The following morning, March 11, 1997, Barangay Captain Perez accompanied the Adors, namely,
Diosdado Sr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, to SPO1 Barbosa at the PNP Central
Police Headquarters. The Adors were informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to choose
their own counsel. They were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory and was subjected to paraffin
tests. On the way to the crime laboratory, Godofredo told his police escort that he had been entrusted
with a handgun which he kept in his residence.
Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo, together with PO3 Nepomuceno, went to their
backyard, retrieved the gun from under a fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to the latter. Godofredo
allegedly told the police that he fired the said gun outside their house on the night of March 10 after he
heard several gunshots. PO3 Nepomuceno identified the gun as a caliber .38 paltik handgun. PO3
Nepomuceno then turned over the handgun to Major Idian who likewise identified it as a .38 caliber
revolver. Major Idian returned the handgun to PO3 Nepomuceno for ballistic and paraffin examination.
Also, on the same day, March 11, 1997, Dr. Joel S. Jurado conducted an autopsy on the bodies of
Chavez and Cuya. Dr. Jurado further testified that that he recovered a slug from Cuya’s head three (3)
days after he conducted the autopsy.
 Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar testified that based on the ballistic examination he conducted
on the bullets submitted to his office, the .38 caliber slug recovered from Cuyas head matched the three
(3) .38 caliber test bullets which were test-fired from the suspected firearm surrendered by Godofredo.
The paraffin casts taken from the Adors were also transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Services for
examination and yielded the presence of gunpowder nitrates.
The prosecution also presented Pablo Calsis as a witness. Calsis testified that on March 10, 1997,
at around 7:30 in the evening, he dropped by the house of Cresenciana Mendoza Kilometer 10, Pacol,
Naga City, before going home from work. After asking permission from her to go home and while about
to urinate outside her house, he heard several gunshots. He ducked by a sineguelas tree at a nearby flower
plantation. As he was about to stand up, he saw Disodado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo and another
unidentified man run away.
Based on the foregoing, accused Godofredo and Diosdado III Ador were found guilty of the crime
of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction was proper
HELD: NO. For circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there should be more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The test to determine whether or not the
circumstantial evidence on record are sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of the
circumstances proved must be consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his
innocence. Accordingly, we have set guidelines in appreciating circumstantial evidence: (1) it should be
acted upon with caution; (2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the
facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and (4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt
of the accused as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who
committed the offense. Measured against the guidelines set, we cannot uphold the conviction of the
accused based on the circumstantial evidence presented.
The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to prove is that the accused were supposedly
seen fleeing from the locus criminis, armed with their respective weapons. The testimony of Calsis, if at
all, could hardly be used against Diosdado III whom he miserably failed to positively identify during trial.
Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the charges hurled against them. But, while it is true that alibi
and denial are the weakest of the defenses as they can easily be fabricated, absent such clear and positive
identification, the doctrine that the defense of denial cannot prevail over positive identification of the
accused must yield to the constitutional presumption of innocence. Hence, while denial is concededly
fragile and unstable, the conviction of the accused cannot be based thereon.
The second circumstance is the handgun turned in by Godofredo. However, Insp. Fulgar of the
PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that the indorsement coming from the City Prosecutors Office alleged
that the .38 caliber live bullet was fired from a .38 caliber revolver. But our office found out that the
firearm was not a .38 caliber revolver but a .357 caliber revolver. Consequently, even the third
circumstance, the .38 caliber slug supposedly recovered from the head of the victim loses evidentiary
value as its source is now highly questionable. It has become uncertain whether the deformed slug was
fired from the .38 caliber revolver turned in by Godofredo or from a .357 caliber handgun as attested to
by the Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Neither can this Court rely on the dying declaration of the dying Chavez nor on the results of the
paraffin tests to convict either Diosdado III or Godofredo or both. Sad to say, no specific name was ever
mentioned by Mercy Beria. Neither was she able to tell how many (persons) Adors were involved. The
prosecution therefore was not able to establish with moral certainty as to who of the Adors were
perpetrators of the offense. Also, the fact that the accused-appellants tested positive of gunpowder
nitrates does not conclusively show that they fired the murder weapon, or a gun for that matter, for such
forensic evidence should be taken only as an indication of possibility or even of probability, but not of
infallibility, since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder.
Thus, while a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, it must identify with certainty the
assailant. Otherwise, it loses its significance. Also, while a paraffin test could establish the presence or
absence of nitrates on the hand, it cannot establish that the source of the nitrates was the discharge of
firearms a person who tests positive may have handled one or more substances with the same positive
reaction for nitrates such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, tobacco and leguminous plants.
In fine, the admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian and PO3 Nepomuceno including the
gun in question cannot be considered in evidence against him without violating his constitutional right to
counsel. Godofredo was already under custodial investigation when he made his admissions and
surrendered the gun to the police authorities. Consequently, the rights of a person under custodial
investigation, including the right to counsel, have already attached to the Adors, and pursuant to Art. III,
Sec. 12(1) and (3), 1987 Constitution, any waiver of these rights should be in writing and undertaken with
the assistance of counsel. Admissions under custodial investigation made without the assistance of
counsel are barred as evidence. The records are bare of any indication that the accused have waived their
right to counsel, hence, any of their admissions are inadmissible in evidence against them. As we have
held, a suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel
without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of such coercion, or the fact that it had
been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if such confession were gospel truth.

5.)
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA
G.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla

Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage
license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial
court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from
the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other
variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are
presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness
and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously
inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on
admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling
should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil
action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error
of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeals

Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using
a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in
any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an
adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress.

6.)
PEOPLE vs BACONGUIS
GR No. 149889
Dec. 2, 2003

FACTS:

- Appellant, Ruel Baconguis, was charged of murder for allegedly killing Roberto Mercado.
 - The only witness in the crime was Lydia Mercado-Lledo, the sister of the victim.
- Crediting Lydia’s positive identification of appellant as the man she saw leaving her house and jumping over the fence and the
results of the paraffin test, the trial court convicted appellant by the decision on review.

ISSUE:
WON the result of the paraffin test is conclusive.

RULING: No

It is well settled that nitrates are also found in substances other than gunpowder.[34]Thus, in a number of cases,32 the Court acquitted the
accused despite the finding of gunpowder nitrates on his hand, noting that:
Scientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive. While it can establish the presence of nitrates or
nitrites on the hand, it does not always indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by the discharge of firearm. The person
tested may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as
explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have
nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco. The presence of
nitrates, therefore, should be taken only as an indication of a possibility but not of infallibility that the person tested has fired a gun.33

In fact, prosecution witness Police Superintendent Liza Madeja Sabong, who conducted the paraffin test on appellant, testified that a
person who fires a gun can transfer gunpowder from his hands to someone standing very near him even if the second person did not fire
a gun himself.34

But even assuming arguendo that appellants being positive for gunpowder may be credited as circumstantial evidence indicating his
culpability, that is only one circumstance, and since no other circumstance was established by the prosecution, the first requirement for
circumstantial evidence to warrant conviction of appellant has not been met.

The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted.

Prosecution witness Lydia identified appellant, then alone in the detention cell, and in open court as the person she saw leaving the
house.

The value of the in-court identification made by Lydia, however, is largely dependent upon the out-of-court identification she made while
appellant was in the custody of the police. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[19] this Court held that corruption of out-of-court identification
contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case.

In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.[20] (Underscoring supplied)

The totality of circumstances test has been fashioned to assure fairness as well as compliance with constitutional requirements of due
process in regard to out-of-court identification.[

A showup, such as what was undertaken by the police in the identification of appellant by Lydia, has been held to be an underhanded
mode of identification for "being pointedly suggestive, generating confidence where there was none, activating visual imagination, and,
all told, subverting their reliability as an eyewitness.[29] Lydia knew that she was going to identify a suspect, whose name had priorly been
furnished by her brother-policeman, when she went to the police station. And the police pointed appellant to her, and told her that he
was the suspect, while he was behind bars, alone.[30]

The unusual, coarse and highly singular method of identification, which revolts against accepted principles of scientific crime detection,
alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands neither respect nor acceptance.

7.)
PEOPLE VS YATAR
Case Digest

Relevant Topics:

Credibility of witness; conviction by circumstantial evidence; DNA evidence; requirement of proof

beyond reasonable doubt;

SHORT VERSION:

FACTS:

This is an automatic review after the accused, Joel Yatar,was sentenced to Death for the special complex
crime of Rape with Homicide. Yatar, prior his separation to his wife, used to live with the latter and the
victim, Kathlyn Uba, in the house of his mother-in-law. On June 30, 1998, Yatar was found by several
witnesses acting strangely in and along the vicinity of the house of the victim. Later that day, the victim’s
lifeless body was found with stab wounds, her intestine protruding from her stomach, and bruises. The
victim’s clothes were likewise found near the cadaver. The post-mortem report of the victim’s body
revealed the presence of semen in her vagina. By DNA examination, it was found that it matches Yatar’s
DNA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judgement of conviction was meritorious.

RULING:

Yes. The Court affords much respect and credibility to the testimonies of the witnesses absent any
showing that some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has been overlooked or the significance
of which has been misinterpreted. The trial court latter is in a better and unique position of hearing first
hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.

Furthermore, the circumstantial evidence presentedby the prosecution proves beyond doubt that the
accused committed the crime. The requirements to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence
were complied with as follows: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The DNA evidence presented strengthens the conviction
by circumstantial evidence.

Lastly, the case passed the test of moral certainty which invariably proves beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused, Yatar is guilty of Rape with Homicide.
LONG VERSION:

Facts:

Appellant Yatar and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn
Uba. In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels. Appellant received
from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998.
Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the
kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar.
Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty
white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt. Appellant hurriedly left when the
husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching. Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt
coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead. The door
leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope. The victim, Kathylyn Uba,
lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the
house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery. Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina. The stained or dirty white shirt
found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood. DNA of the semen found on the victim’s
vagina, compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical and Appellant escaped two days
after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended.

Issue:

Whether or not the judgement of conviction was meritorious.

Ruling:

Yes. The testimonies of the witnesses are afforded credibility as the Supreme Court will not interfere
with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in
the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. The latter is in a better and unique position of hearing
first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.

Furthermore, the circumstantial evidence presentedby the prosecution, as presented in the facts of this
case, proves beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.Circumstantial evidence, to be
sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine
whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the use of DNA evidence, under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. In this case, the DNA evidence obtained
which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on
scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

It must be noted, however, that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether
the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.

The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the
court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.Proof beyond
reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is
that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and
judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable
doubt. This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else,
committed the offense charged. In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, the present
case passes the test of moral certainty.

8.)
People vs. Tumimpad 235 SCRA 483

FACTS:

Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and daughter of Lt. Col.
Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-year old child, who still needed to
be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was limited and most of the time she expressed herself by
motions.

Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four security men
were assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant
Moreno Tumimpad.

It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo then brought her
to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication was given to Sandra but her condition did not
improve. Sandra became irritable and moody. She felt sick and unhappy.

The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen and
told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos." 2
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr. Conol, the examining
physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist, conducted the urinalysis. The
result revealed that Sandra was pregnant. 3

During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping Test" and "Pheno
Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result
of the test conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type "O"
blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B," accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accused-appellant type "O."

ISSUE:

W/N Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto are guilty of the crime of rape?

HELD:

Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by the victim
herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged
father or any one of many others of the same blood type may have been the father of the child. As
held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19 :

Paternity ---- Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the
child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a
particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many
states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the
decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test,
made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few
cases in which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable
results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony
conflicting with the results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove
the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others
with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

9.)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JOEL SARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUÑA y LAZARTE, VICENTE
STA. ANA y GUTIERREZ and JOHN DOE, accused-appellants.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 97525. April 7, 1993.

Campos, JR., J p:

FACTS: It was the evening of July 2, 1988 while Rogelio de Belen, his two daughters and
his sister Vilma de Belen were sleeping in their house at Calamba, Laguna, when
appellant broke in and woke him up, poking a knife at him. They tied up his hands and
made him lie flat on his stomach and asked for the key to his cabinet. Fearing for his life
and that of his companions, he reluctantly told them where the key was kept. Just on the
other room was Vilma, who heard whispers (kaluskos) but simply played possum. When
the three saw her on the bed, they approached her. One covered her mouth as another
poked a knife at her neck. They threatened to kill her if she should make an outcry and
successively raped her. After the three men left, Rogelio, with his hands and feet still tied
up, tried to get up from the bed and switched the lights on and called to his neighbors for
help. Vilma, meanwhile, had lost consciousness due to shock.

The Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna convicted
all three accused-appellants in its decision. The accused-appellants fault the trial court of
ignoring the fingerprint examination report submitted by the Crime Laboratory of the
PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that none of the specimen latent fingerprints were
found to be positive. It is their contention that since their fingerprints were not found in the
objects found in the scene of the crime they cannot be held guilty of the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: WON accused are guilty in spite of the report made by the PNP Laboratory.

HELD: Yes, the accused are still guilty. Although the Court agrees with their opinion that
a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great significance, it cannot sustain their
theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in the
course of the investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded that they could not
have been at the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not at all times lead to a valid
conclusion for there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent
prints other than their not being present at the scene of the crime. Only latent fingerprints
found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of comparison in a crime laboratory
because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead of
complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in a
fingerprint examination.Noting the interplay of many circumstances involved in the
successful lifting and identification of proper latent fingerprints in a particular crime scene,
the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the possibility that the accused-
appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they had
not left any identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent
fingerprints are involved. The findings in this particular fingerprint examination are not
sufficient to case even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime
charged.

10.)
 11.)
Sañado vs Court of Appeals
356 SCRA 546
Nature of Particular Acts

FACTS: Sañado was issued by the now defunct Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering an area of 50 hectares. On
July 16, 1973, Sañado executed a contract with Nepomuceno wherein the latter agreed to develop 30 hectares of the 50 hectares covered by
Sañado's fishpond permit. Two days later, the parties modified this earlier agreement by excluding the area of 10 hectares already cultivated and
fully developed and providing that the contract is renewable on terms acceptable to both of them.

On September 28, 1979, the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources recommended to the then Ministry of Natural Resources the conversion
of Sanado’s fishpond permit into a 25-year fishpond loan agreement which covered a reduced area of 26.745 hectares. Accordingly, a Fishpond
Lease Agreement was issued.

On July 17, 1981, Sañado filed a complaint against Nepomuceno with the RTC for recovery of possession and damages, alleging that Nepomuceno
failed to deliver Sañados share of the net harvest among other things. While this case was pending, the then Minister of Agriculture and Food
canceled the Fishpond Lease Agreement, forfeiting the improvements thereon in favor of government. Later, said order was reconsidered to the
extent that Nepomuceno was given priority to apply for the area and that his improvements thereon were not considered forfeited in favor of
the government.

Sañado elevated the matter to the Office of the President but appeal was dimissed. Meanwhile, the trial court rendered a decision over Sañado's
complaint for recovery of possession in his favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President in cancelling petitioner's lease agreement should be given weight

RULING: Yes. The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate
of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since
it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities
determined. As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power
by the Executive Department headed by the highest officer of the land. It thus squarely falls under matters relative to the executive department
which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the
organization of the Executive Department, its principal officers, elected or appointed, such as the President, his powers and duties.

The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacañang decision is premised on the essential function of the executive department — which is to
enforce the law. In this instance, what is being enforced is Presidential Decree No. 704 which consolidated and revised all laws and decrees
affecting fishing and fisheries. Such enforcement must be true to the policy behind such laws which is "to accelerate and promote the integrated
development of the fishery industry and to keep the fishery resources of the country in optimum productive condition through proper
conservation and protection" (Section 2, P.D. No. 704).

Further, the issue of whether or not petitioner is still entitled to possession of the subject fishpond area is underpinned by an ascertainment of
facts. And such task belongs to the administrative body which has jurisdiction over the matter — the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. The policy
of the courts as regards such factual findings is not to interfere with actions of the executive branch on administrative matters addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies. This policy is specially applicable in the grant of licenses, permits, and leases, or the approval, rejection,
or revocation of applications therefor. Such respect is based on the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers and on the fact that these
bodies are considered co-equal and coordinate rank as courts. The only exception is when there is a clear showing of capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar.

The reasons given by the Office of the President in dismissing petitioner's appeal are quite clear. Transferring or subletting the fishpond granted
to a licensee without the consent or approval of the administrative body concerned, as well as the failure to develop the area required by the
fisheries rules, are definitely solid and logical grounds for the cancellation of one's license. Withal, if petitioner disagrees with the decision of the
Office of the President, he should have elevated the matter by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the latter's exercise of judicial
review. Nowhere in the record do we find such action on petitioner's part.

Understandably, to restore petitioner to the possession of the fishpond area is to totally disregard the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the
President which can hardly be described as an unrelated matter, considering its patent implications in the result of both Civil Case No. 2085 and
CA-G.R. CV No. 23165. For how could the appellate court award possession to the very same party whose license has been cancelled by the
executive or administrative officer tasked to exercise licensing power as regards the development of fishpond areas, and which cancellation has
been sustained by the Office of the President? Petitioner must remember the essence of the grant of a license. It is not a vested right given by
the government but a privilege with corresponding obligations and is subject to governmental regulation. Hence, to allow petitioner to possess
the subject area is to run counter to the execution and enforcement of the July 31, 1989 decision which would easily lose its "teeth" or force if
petitioner were restored in possession.

RATIO: The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of
public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it
is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities
determined.

12.)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ROMAN MENESES Y MARIN, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 111742 March 26, 1998 (Beverly Baluyot)
Answer to Question 3(b)

Eyewitness identification is vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the
prosecution. Subject of the Court's scrutiny in the instant criminal case is the credibility of a child's alleged
eyewitness account on which the appellant's conviction by the trial court was solely anchored.

FACTS: At around three o'clock in the early morning of December 15, 1991, thirty-three year old Cesar Victoria
was stabbed to death while sleeping by his seven-year old son Christopher in a rented makeshift room in Tondo,
Manila. Appellant Roman Meneses was charged with the murder of Cesar Victoria. The prosecution presented
the following witnesses: Christopher R. Victoria, SPO3 Jaime Mendoza, SPO3 Eduardo Gonzales and Medico-
Legal Officer Florante Baltazar.

Christopher R. Victoria testified that he witnessed the stabbing of his father. He testified that while he lived
with his Kuya Odeng on Kasipagan Street, Tondo, on the night of December 14, 1991, he went to his father's
rented makeshift room to sleep after he (Christopher) was whipped by his brother. He further testified that he
was awakened from sleep and saw his father being stabbed in the heart with a "veinte nueve."

SPO3 Jaime Mendoza, a police investigator of the Western Police District testified that when he questioned
Christopher, who was then in the house, Christopher could not identify nor describe the attacker, but that the
child said he could identify him because he knew his face. On re-direct examination however, Mendoza said
that Christopher identified the assailant as appellant. On December 26, 1991, Christopher was again brought
to the precinct where, during a confrontation with appellant, Christopher identified appellant as the person
who stabbed his father. SPO3 Eduardo C. Gonzales testified that at about two o'clock in the morning of
December 25, 1991, he arrested appellant. The arrest was based on the report of Angelina Victoria, appellant's
wife, who implicated appellant in the crime. The policemen found appellant at the place pointed to by Angelina,
which was a flower box at the corner of Tuazon and Mithi Streets. Frisked, appellant yielded a balisong. After
announcing that they were policemen and that appellant was being arrested as the suspect in the stabbing of
Cesar Victoria, Gonzales and his companions brought appellant to Police Station No. 2. Appellant was later
transferred to the Homicide Section.

The lone witness for the defense was the appellant himself, Roman Meneses. He interposed the defense of
denial and alibi. On the day of the crime, appellant alleged that he was in San Isidro, Mexico, Pampanga, and
had been there since the tenth or eleventh of that month, after he had a misunderstanding with Angelina. He
further testified that he was arrested on December 24, 1991, without a warrant after being implicated in the
crime by his wife. He was brought to the police station where he was mauled by policemen; he never admitted
though to killing Cesar Victoria, his brother-in-law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove Meneses’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING: The issue in the instant case is credibility. The judgment of appellant's conviction is anchored entirely
on the testimony of the single eyewitness, Christopher Victoria, who identified appellant as the one who he
allegedly saw stab his father. It was established that the crime took place in the wee hours of the morning,
before the crack of dawn, at around three o'clock. The court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature,"
such as in the instant case, that at around three in the morning during the Christmas season, it is still
quite dark and that daylight comes rather late in this time of year. Such judicial notice of the laws of
nature is mandatory under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Nowhere in the description of the crime
scene by witness SPO3 Mendoza in his testimony was it established that there was light or illumination of any
sort by which Christopher could see the attacker.

The prosecution failed to paint a crystal-clear picture of the environment by which Christopher could have
made an accurate and reliable identification of the attacker. Christopher's testimony being improbable, is not
credible. Evidence is credible when it is "such as the common experience of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation, and experience."

In Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that an identification of the accused during a "show-up" or where
the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, is seriously flawed. We stated thus:

. . . the mode of identification other than an identification parade is a show-up, the presentation of a
single suspect to a witness for purposes of identification. Together with its aggravated forms, it
constitutes the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the police.

From Mendoza's testimony we can gather that appellant was presented as the suspect in the crime to
Christopher inside Mendoza's office in the Homicide Section of the police station, or later in the detention cell
the boy was made to approach. While Mendoza did not literally point to appellant as in the Tuazon case, equally
pervasive in the "confrontation" in the instant case is what Wigmore calls "the suggestion of guilty identity."
Even applying the totality of circumstances test set in People v. Teehankee, Jr., formulated and used by courts
in resolving the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, we must hold the identification of
appellant by Christopher to be seriously flawed. The test lists three factors to consider:

. . . (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree
of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the
crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification process.

Indeed, we cannot discount the angle that young Christopher was influenced by prior prompting or
manipulation by an adult, his aunt Angelina. Rather than reinforce the identification, the circumstances pointed
out by the trial court plants in mind the plausibility that appellant's wife Angelina could have coached the young
impressionable Christopher. These circumstances are:

First, was the insistence of [appellant's] wife as testified by the accused himself, that he was the one
who killed the victim, and was pointed to by her as the assailant, thus, he was arrested. Another was
the resentment of the accused against his brother-in-law-victim brought about by the latter's
intervention in that serious quarrel between him and his wife. Thirdly, that the accused no doubt
disliked the financial support and subsistence being given by his wife to the victim.

Quite revealingly, Angelina was the one who went to the police to implicate appellant in the crime and who
directed the police to where he could be found. She later herded Christopher to the police station for the boy to
give his statement. She was also with the boy when he was made to identify appellant during the
"confrontation." We see Angelina's actuations as suspect, especially when we consider that per SPO3 Mendoza's
testimony, when he questioned Christopher immediately after the crime, the boy could not simply name the
attacker.

It is conceded that appellant's defense of alibi is weak. The settled rule however is that conviction should rest
on the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The onus is on the prosecution to
prove the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, in view of the constitutional presumption of the innocence
of the accused. We must rule that the prosecution failed to so discharge its burden.

Appellant acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.

13.)
SIENA REALTY CORPORATION and LILIBETH MANLUGON v. HON. LOLITA GALANG, ANITA CO
NG and COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 145169, 13 May 2004, THIRD DIVISION

Petitioners Siena Realty Corporation and Lilibeth Manlugon (Siena) filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA) concerning the Regional Trial Court of Manila‘s (RTC) Order dismissing Siena‘s complaint. Upon CA‘s
dismissal of the petition, Siena filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Pending resolution of the motion, the Supreme Court
issued a resolution approving the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The said
resolution provided that in case of the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, the 60-day period “shall be counted
from the denial of the said motion”. CA then dismissed Siena‘s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the said
amendment applies to Siena‘s motion. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion for applying the amendment retroactively

HELD:

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence states that judicial departments are mandated to take judicial notice even
without the introduction of evidence, hence, even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in their motion
for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, it should have taken mandatory judicial notice. The resolution did not
have to specify that it had retroactive effect as it pertains to a procedural matter.

The amendatory rule in their favor notwithstanding, Siena‘s petition fails. At the time Siena filed before
the appellate court their Petition for Certiorari on the 60th day following their receipt of the Order of RTC, the said
Order had become final and executory after the 15th day following Siena‘s receipt thereof.

14.)
25. Republic v. Court of Appeals 277 SCRA 633

Topic: Judicial Notice

Facts: The Regional Trial Court, after hearing, adjudicated a parcel of land in favor
of Josefa Gacot. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),
contending that the land was previously declared to be the property of the
Republic in a decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos following an order of
general default. A rehearing of the case was conducted. However, the
Government failed to present the said order of Judge Garlitos in evidence. Thus,
the CA ruled in favor of Gacot because the order of Judge Garlitos not having
been offered as evidence, it cannot take judicial notice of such.

Issue: Whether or not the CA should take judicial notice of the order of Judge
Garlitos.

Ruling: Yes. Firstly, that the rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction
the grant of evidentiary value in ordinary trials of evidence which is not formally
offered, and secondly, that adjective law is not to be taken lightly for without it,
the enforcement of substantive law may not remain assured. The Court must add,
nevertheless, that technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but
primarily devised and designed to help in the proper and expedient dispensation
of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may have to be so construed
liberally as to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice.
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case of the authenticity of its own
records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in
the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial
notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another
court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as
of the record of another case between different parties in the same court.
Judicial notice will also be taken of court personnel.

15.)
DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 142295, PARDO, J

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilty of violation of P. D. No. 1866 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. Allegedly,
sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms
without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, the PNP Criminal Investigation Group inquired from the PNP Firearms and
Explosive Division whether or not the report was true. The PNP Firearms and Explosives Division issued a certification stating that
per records in his office, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with the said
certificationthe police applied for a search warrant to enable them to search the house of appellant.

Upon the issuance of the warrant, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant. Before proceeding to
the residence of the appellant, the police officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio
Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers
introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search
warrant and that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search
of the house. The search yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45
(Exhibits B and H) found at the master's bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4) found in
the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition
(Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the appellant failed to produce
any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject firearms.

For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom and that the other items
seized during the search including the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise assails the
manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just barged into his house without asking permission.
Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials arrived only after the police already had finished the search. However, after trial
the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.

HELD:

The Supreme Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals and ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the
charge of violation of P. D. No. 1866.

Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded
for being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding
In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen
of petitioner's house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure is illegal.

True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter,
inadvertently found in plain view. However, "[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object."52 Specifically, seizure of
evidence in "plain view" is justified when there is:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are.

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

16.)
PEOPLE VS. ESTOMACA

On May 24, 1994, consequent to five separate complaints, Criminal Cases Nos. 43567,43568,43569,43570
and 43571 were filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Iloilo City charging herein appellant, an illiterate laborer,
with rape committed on five separate occasions against his own daughter, complainant EstelitaEstomaca.

Here’s what happened:

Melita, the eldest daughter of the accused claims that she was raped by the accused.

There is some inconsistency in the statements on record as to what actually took place on June 14, 1994
during the arraignment of appellant, assisted by his government counsel deoficio, Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera. The
decision of the court below,dated July 15, 1994, declares that he entered a plea of guilty to Criminal Cases Nos.
43568 and 43571, and a plea of not guilty to Criminal Cases Nos. 43567,43569 and 43570. Obviously engendered by
the insufficiency of the proceedings conducted and the imprecision of the notes taken at this stage, this matter will
be further discussed hereafter.

The two criminal complaints, both subscribed by the offended party on April29, 1994 and which are the
subject of the joint judgment of the lower court challenged in this appellate review.

Proceeding upon the capital nature of the offenses involved, the trial court, after appellant ostensibly
waived the presentation of evidence for his defense, required the prosecution to adduce evidence purportedly to
establish appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, on June 29, 1994, the complainant herself,
MelitaEstomaca, appeared in court and testified that she was raped by her father once in December, 1993 and,
again, on March 6, 1994.

On the authority of Republic Act No. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993, the lower court
imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the sexual assault supposedly perpetrated in
December, 1993, and the supreme penalty of death with respect to the rape allegedly committed on March 6, 1994.
In each of the said cases, he was further ordered to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P50,000.00 and
to pay the costs.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONVICTED THE APPELLANT AND IMPOSED THE PENALTY OF
DEATH

HELD: No.

Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open court by the judge himself or by the
clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein,
then reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge.
The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and knows is a
mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law
affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an
accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for
him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause
under the Constitution.

At threshold, what strikes this Court as peculiar is that the arraignment appears to have consisted merely of the bare
reading of the five complaints, synthetically and cryptically reported in the transcript, thus: “(Reading the
information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect).”

Since what was supposed to have been read was stated in the singular, but there were five criminal complaints
against appellant, this Court is then left to speculate on whether all five criminal complaints were actually read,
translated or explained to appellant on a level within his comprehension, considering his limited education.
There is no showing whether or not appellant or his counsel de oficio was furnished a copy of each complaint with
the list of witnesses against him, in order that the latter may duly prepare and comply with his responsibilities. Of
more troublous concern is the fact that appellant was not specifically warned that on his plea of guilty, he would
definitely and in any event be given thedeath penalty under the “New Law,” as the trial court calls

Republic Act No. 7659. He was also not categorically advised that his plea of guilty would not under any circumstance
affect or reduce the death sentence as he may have believed or may havebeen erroneously advised.

The significance of this distinction is found right in the provisions of Section 1(a) of Rule 116 which, cognizant of the
aforestated linguistic variations, deliberately required that the complaint or information be read to the accused in
the language or the dialect known to him, to ensure his comprehension of the charges. The Court takes judicial
notice, because it is either of public knowledge or readily capable of unquestionable demonstration, that in the
central and northwestern part of Iloilo province and all the way up to and throughout Antique, including necessarily
San Joaquin where the offenses were committed and of which appellant and his family are natives, the local dialect
is known as“kinaray-a.”

Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of extended social or commercial intercourse, “kinaray-a” is not
readily understandable to nor spoken by those born to the Hiligaynon regional language or who have lived in the
areas under its sway for an appreciable period of time. The converse is true for those whose native tongue is the
dialect of “kinaray-a,” since they are generally not well-versed in Ilonggo, or Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints are
not only in English but in technical legal language, we are again at sea as to whether and how the indictments were
translated to Ilonggo and/or to “kinaray-a, “or that the appellant was truly and honestly made of the charges and,
especially, the consequences of his guilty plea thereto. The records are silent and do not reveal anything on this
point, nor how the dialogue between the presiding judge and appellant was translated. Yet a man’s life is at stake
while this Court wrestles with that dilemma created by an omission of official duty.

The trial court should also be convinced that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress
either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters and this it can do, such as by
ascertaining from the accused himself the manner in which he was subsequently brought into the custody of the
law; or whether he had the assistance of competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations;
and, ascertaining from him the conditions under which he was detained and interrogated during the aforestated
investigations. Likewise, a series of questions directed at defense counsel as to whether or not said counsel had
conferred with, and completely explained to the accused the meaning of a plea and its consequences, would be a
well-taken step along those lines.

Questions of these nature are undoubtedly crucial and no truer is this than in the case of appellant for, again, the
original records and rollo of this case now under review are completely bereft ofany document or record concerning
his apprehension, detention and prior investigation, whether custodial or preliminary. Theforegoing circumstances
must be taken in addition to the appropriate forewarnings of the consequences of a plea of guilty, as well as the
questions by the court regarding the age, educational attainment and socio-economic status of the accused which
may reveal contributory insights for a proper verdict in the case.

The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of
the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant’s full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea. The records do not reveal any information about the personality profile of the appellant
which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-
economic status, and educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the courta quoin Criminal CasesNos. 43568 and 43571 convicting accused-appellant
MelchorEstomaca y Garque of two crimes of rape is hereby SET ASIDE. Said cases are REMANDED to the trial court
for further and appropriate proceedings, with instructions that the same be given appropriate priority and the
proceedings therein be conducted with deliberate dispatch and circumspection.

17.) Asf
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA DE
JESUS VDA. DE DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS DIMAANO,
CONSOLACION DIMAANO and MILAGROS DIMAANO, respondents; PURISIMA, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay while petitioner
owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road. That on October 11,
1989, a powerful typhoon hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of the
petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying
portions of the roofing of private respondents’ house.
When the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed building was
conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official. In their report, they
imputed negligence to the petitioner for the structural defect of the building and improper
anchorage of trusses to the roof beams to cause for the roof be ripped off the building,
thereby causing damage to the property of respondent.
Respondents filed an action before the RTC for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana. Petitioner interposed denial of negligence and claimed that the typhoon as an
Act of God is the sole cause of the damage.
RTC ruled in their favor relying on the testimony of the City Engineer and the report made
after the ocular inspection. Petitioners appeal before the CA which affirmed the decision
of the RTC. Hence this present appeal.
ISSUES:A
(1) Whether the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from
the impact of the falling portions of the school building’s roof ripped off by the strong winds
of typhoon “Saling”, was, within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event?
(2) Whether or not an ocular inspection is sufficient evidence to prove negligence?

HELD:
1. Yes, petitioner should be exonerated from liability arising from the damage caused by
the typhoon. Under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, Except in cases expressly specified by
the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. In order that a
fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from
any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been
occasioned. 12 An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has
been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse
consequences.
When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to
another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or
proximate cause of the damages or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is found
to be partly the result of the participation of man — whether it be from active intervention,
or neglect, or failure to act — the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed
from the rules applicable to acts of God. In the case at bar, the lower court accorded full
credence to the finding of the investigating team that subject school building’s roofing had
“no sufficient anchorage to hold it in position especially when battered by strong winds.”
Based on such finding, the trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and adjudged it
liable for damages to private respondents. There is no question that a typhoon or storm
is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable
despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from liability
arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no
human participation amounting to a negligent act. In other words; the person seeking
exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly
understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to
others. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justify demand, or the omission to do something which a prudent
and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do.
2. It bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another
has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or
loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent
evidence, 19 not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact. Private
respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the
aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of
petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is
one by means of actual sight or viewing. What is visual to the eye through, is not always
reflective of the real cause behind. In the present case, other than the said ocular
inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial
unroofing of petitioner’s school building.

18.)
COCA COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., petitioner, vs. NLRC and RAMON
CANONICATO, respondents.
G.R. No. 120466

This case is a petition for certiorari (Rule 65) which assails the decision of the
NLRC holding that private respondent Canonicato is a regular employee of
petitioner COCA COLA entitled to reinstatement and back wages. The NLRC
reversed the decision of the LA, which declared that no employer-employee
relationship existed between COCA COLA and Canonicato.
COCA COLA entered into a contract of Bacolod Janitorial Services (BJS).
Every year thereafter a service contract was entered into between the parties under
similar terms and conditions until about May 1994.
On 26 October 1989 COCA COLA hired private respondent Canonicato as a
casual employee and assigned him to the bottling crew as a substitute for absent
employees. In April 1990 COCA COLA terminated Canonicato's casual
employment. Later that year COCA COLA availed of Canonicato's services, this
time as a painter in contractual projects which lasted from fifteen (15) to thirty (30)
days.
On 1 April 1991 Canonicato was hired as a janitor by BJS which assigned him
to COCA COLA considering his familiarity with its premises. On 5 and 7 March
1992 Canonicato started painting the facilities of COCA COLA and continued doing
so several months thereafter or so for a few days every time until 6 to 25 June 1993.[7]
Goaded by information that COCA COLA employed previous BJS employees
who filed a complaint against the company for regularization pursuant to a
compromise agreement, Canonicato submitted a similar complaint against COCA
COLA to the LA ,
Canonicato amended his complaint against COCA COLA by citing instead as
grounds therefor illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages. He included BJS
therein as a co-respondent. BJS sent him a letter advising him to report for work
within three (3) days from receipt, otherwise, he would be considered to have
abandoned his job.
LA ruled that: (a) there was no employer-employee relationship between COCA
COLA and Canonicato because BJS was Canonicato's real employer; (b) BJS was a
legitimate job contractor, hence, any liability of COCA COLA as to Canonicato's
salary or wage differentials was solidary with BJS in accordance with pars. 1 and 2
of Art. 106, Labor Code.
The NLRC rejected on appeal the decision of the LA on the ground that the
janitorial services of Canonicato were found to be necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of COCA COLA. The NLRC accepted Canonicato's proposition
that his work with the BJS was the same as what he did while still a casual employee
of COCA COLA. In so holding the NLRC applied Art. 280 of the Labor Code and
declared that Canonicato was a regular employee of COCA COLA. Hence, the
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between petitioner

and respondent.

Held: No, there is not employer-employee relationship between petitioner

COCA COLA and respondent Canonicato.

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship it is

necessary to determine whether the following factors are present: (a) the selection
and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power to
dismiss; and, (d) the power to control the employee's conduct. Notably, these are all
found in the relationship between BJS and Canonicato and not between Canonicato
and petitioner COCA COLA. As the Solicitor-General manifested

In the instant case, the selection and engagement of the janitors for petitioner were
done by BJS. The application form and letter submitted by private respondent
(Canonicato) to BJS show that he acknowledged the fact that it was BJS who did the
hiring and not petitioner x x x x
BJS paid the wages of private respondent, as evidenced by the fact that on July 15,
1993, private respondent sent his sister to BJS with a note authorizing her to receive
his pay.

Power of dismissal is also exercised by BJS and not petitioner. BJS is the one that
assigns the janitors to its clients and transfers them when it sees fit. Since BJS is the
one who engages their services, then it only follows that it also has the power to
dismiss them when justified under the circumstances.

19.)
VERGARA VS PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 128720. January 23, 2002]

DOCTRINE:
Sec 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.
A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence:

- of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political 


history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, 

- the law of nations, 


- the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, 

- the political constitution and history of the RP, 

- the official acts of legislative, 


- executive and judicial departments of the RP, 


- the laws of nature, 

- the measure of time, and 


- the geographical divisions. (1a) 


FACTS:
On March 19, 1991, an information charging S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara, PC, C1C Nicasio
Custodio y Abrera, PC and Leonido Losanes y Vasquez of robbery in band was filed by the Rizal
Provincial Prosecutors Office with the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila. The information reads:

That on or about the 19th day of October, 1990, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with John Doe, whose
true identity and present whereabout is still unknown, and mutually helping and
aiding one another, armed with high powered handguns, with intent of gain, by means
of violence and intimidation employed upon the person of one Catherine F. Manalo,
an employee of J & E Manalo Construction Co., Inc., who was then aboard a private
car, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and divest from
Catherine F. Manalo the payroll money amounting to P89,000.00 belonging to J & E
Manalo Construction Company, Inc. and a gold necklace with two (2) pendants, 18K
valued at P17,000 belonging to Catherine F. Manalo, to the damage and prejudice of J
& E Manalo Construction Company, Inc. and Catherine F. Manalo in the
aforementioned amounts of P89,000.00 and P17, 000.00 respectively.

Although all the suspects were brought into police custody, petitioners co-accused managed
to extricate themselves from police control and remain at large. Only petitioner was left to face
the charges. On May 21, 1993, he was arraigned. With the assistance of counsel de oficio, he
pleaded not guilty to the charges. Following the pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, trial on
the merits ensued.
The prosecution relied on the positive identification made by private complainant who testified
in court.
Petitioner claimed an alibi, while denying any participation in the offense.

Accused Elmer Vergara lays a serious doubt on his identity as one of the perpetrators
of the robbery hold-up in question Claiming innocence, he presented evidence
showing that he was at some other place during the occurrence of the robbery. His
alleged presence at the Pacita Complex at San Pedro, Laguna, being a member of the
narcotic operatives engaged in a surveillance of a suspected drug pusher, was
corroborated by no less than the team leader Captain, now Major Christopher
Laxa. Major Christopher Laxa was definite in declaring that S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara was
physically present inside the Pizza Hut restaurant at Pacita Complex, San Pedro
Laguna, at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of October 19, 1990 and, that he did not
leave the area from the time of their arrival at around 1:00 oclock in the morning until
11:30 oclock in the evening. [4]

The trial court chose to believe the prosecution and disregarded petitioners alibi. On March
29, 1995, it convicted Vergara not of robbery in band as charged in the information, however, but
of robbery as defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
Aggrieved by his conviction, Vergara elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 18318,
Finding no reversible error in the findings and conclusions of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals affirmed Vergaras conviction.
Petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate court in
its resolution of March 26, 1997.

ISSUE:

WETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED

IN GIVING MORE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT
CATHERINE MANALO THAN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED AND
HIS WITNESS AND CONSEQUENTLY FURTHER ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. [8]

HELD: NO.

The issue of whether or not the guilt of the accused had been proven beyond reasonable
doubt hinges, in our view, on the credibility of witnesses presented by the prosecution and the
defense. Crucial in this regard is the identification made by the complaining witness, Catherine
Manalo, of the petitioner, Sgt. Elmer T. Vergara, as one of the malefactors.
Petitioner vehemently insists that the contradictions in Catherine Manalos testimony are not
mere minor inconsistencies. According to petitioner, while private complainant below described
him as around 56-57 tall, weighing about 160-165 lbs., and sporting a military haircut; in truth, he
is only 53-1/2 tall, tips the scale at less than 150 lbs., and had long hair at the time of the incident.
Given these discrepancies, petitioner insists that private complainant below must have been
referring to another person and not to him.
Basically, petitioners contention raises questions of facts, which traditionally fall within the
province of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. After reviewing the records of this case, we
find no reason to disturb the assessment of the trial court of all the pieces of evidence submitted
before it, particularly as its findings and conclusions had been affirmed by the appellate court.
 In this case, petitioner has been convicted on the basis of the positive identification made by
private complainant below. As the Court of Appeals stressed, petitioner was categorically
identified by the private complainant not just once, but twice, as one of the armed men who robbed
her. The first time was during the police line-up of nine (9) persons on October 27, 1990 and the
second time was during her testimony in open court. The records show that private complainant
had no motive to falsely testify against petitioner.
Petitioner also argues that the prosecution failed to contradict his alibi. He submits that the
prosecution failed to prove that he had a car available to him, or that he drove one from San
Pedro, Laguna to Pasig, Metro Manila. Petitioner further insists that the trial courts finding that
the place where the crime was committed is less than an hours drive by car and can easily be
reached by one who, like petitioner, had a car available to him, is erroneous and unsupported by
the evidence on record.
Judicial notice could be taken of the travel time by car from San Pedro, Laguna to Pasig City,
Metro Manila, because it is capable of unquestionable demonstration, and nowadays is already
of public knowledge, especially to commuters.[11] We find no error in the trial courts finding that it
was not impossible for petitioner to be at the scene of the crime, despite his alibi that he was
engaged in intelligence work in San Pablo Laguna that same afternoon of October 19, 1990.
There were far too many glaring lapses in the testimony of petitioners corroborative witness
for petitioners alibi to be given much weight
In the case of alibi, it is elementary that the requirements of time and place be strictly complied
with by the defense, meaning that the accused must not only show that he was somewhere else
but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time it was committed.[17]
In the light of private complainants positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the
crime, the latters defense of bare denial and alibi must necessarily fail, as her positive testimony
overrides his negative testimony.[18] Alibi is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face
of positive identification of the accused.[19] Further, an alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the petitioner by a credible witness who has no motive to testify falsely.[20]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. CR 18318 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

20.)
---

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO

367 SCRA 108 (2001)

Doctrine: The ban on hearsay does not cover independently relevant statements, which consist of
statements that are independently relevant of the truth asserted therein. They belong to two classes: 1.
Those statements which are the very facts in issue, 2. Those statements which are circumstantial
evidence of the facts in issue.

The second class includes the following: Statement of a person showing his state of mind; Statement of
a person showing his physical condtion; Statement of a person to infer a state of mind of another
person; Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; Statements to show a
lack of credibility of a witness.

FACTS: The case at bar stemmed from the events that transpired during EDSA II. President Joseph
Estrada pursuant to the calls for resignation, left Malacanang, and pursuant to this, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, then the Vice President under Estrada’s reign took his place. Estrada now goes to the court to
contest the legitimacy of Macapagal-Arroyo’s presidency, arguing that he never resigned as President,
and hence, claims to still be the lawful President of the Philippines. Among the pieces of evidence
offered to prove that Estrada had indeed resigned from the presidency is the Angara Diary, chronicling
the last moments of Estrada in Malacanang.

ISSUE: 1. Whether the Angara Diary is inadmissible as hearsay evidence? - NO.

RATIO: The Supreme Court held that the Angara diary is not an out0of0court statement but is a part of
the pleadings of the case. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Angara diaries contained direct
statements of Estrada with respect to his proposal for the holding of a snap election, his intent to leave
his post by Monday and his exasperation over the bureaucracy, controversy and red tape. An ANALYSIS
of the same leads to the conclusion that the contents of the diary may be more accurately classified as
admissions of a party. Pursuant to the Rules of Evidence, “the act, declaration or omission of a party as
to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

Moreover, the statements cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence because the same can be properly
categorized as independently relevant statements. Independently relevant statements are those which
are “independent” from the truth of the statements. Independently relevant statements may be
classified into statements which consist of the very facts in issue and those which are circumstantial
evidence of the facts in issue, such as the statements of a person showing his state of mind or
statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another.
Pursuant to this, it may well be said that the entries in the Angara diary may be regarded as containing
statements regarding the state of mind of Estrada, hence constituting circumstantial evidence of his
intent to resign.