Geir Lundestad

International
Relations
since 1945
East, West, North, South
8th Edition

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 SAGE Publications Ltd  Geir Lundestad 2018
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 Contents

About the Author ix

From the Preface to the First Edition xi
Preface to the Eighth Edition xiii
Online Resources xv

  1 The New World 1

The Rise and Fall of Great Powers 1
The World in 1945 3
The New World: The Literature 7

  2 The Cold War in Europe, 1945–1949 9

Political Science and History 9
Some Old and New Theories about the Cold War 10
Some Structural Explanations for the Cold War 12
Who Acted Where? 15
US Policy 15
Soviet Policy 21
The Problem of Germany 26
Motivating Forces behind US and Soviet Policies 30
The United States 30
The Soviet Union 33
The Cold War in Europe, 1945–1949: The Literature 34

  3 The Cold War Becomes Global, 1945–1962 37

The United States, the Soviet Union, and Asia, 1945–1950 37
The Civil War in China 37
Other Countries in Asia 41
Signs of Re-evaluation in the Superpowers’ Asian Policies 43
The Korean War 45
Changes in US Policy in Asia 49
The Soviet Union Tries to Play a Global Role 54
A New Policy in Asia and the Middle East 54
A New Policy in Africa 57
The Cold War Reaches Latin America 59
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Third World: A Comparison 61
The Cold War Becomes Global, 1945–1962: The Literature 63

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 Contents

  4 Détente Between East and West, 1962–1975 65

Signs of Détente during the 1950s 65
The Policy of Détente, 1962–1975 67
Agreements and Contact between East and West 68
Reasons for Détente 70
Détente and Geographic Expansion of the East–West Conflict 75
Respect for Each Other’s Vital Regions 75
The Grey Zones between East and West 77
The Middle East, 1967–1975 78
The Vietnam War 80
Détente Between East and West, 1962–1975: The Literature 85

  5 Renewed Tension Between East and West, 1975–1984 87

The Soviet Union: A New Globalism 88
The United States: Reaction to Détente 93
Renewed Tension Between East and West, 1975–1984 : The Literature 99

  6 The End of the Cold War, 1984–1990 101

Different Theories about the End of the Cold War 101
What Happened – and Why? 103
The End of the Cold War, 1984–1990: The Literature 108

  7 Major Powers and Local Conflicts after the Cold War, 1990–2016 109
The Major Powers in the New World 109
Hopes for Peace – and the Reality of Local Conflicts 111
11 September 2001, Afghanistan and Iraq 116
Barack Obama and the Greater Middle East 121
Major Powers and Local Conflicts after the Cold War, 1990–2016:
The Literature 123

  8 The Arms Race, 1945–2016 125

Perspective and Motivating Forces 125
Hiroshima, Atomic Weapons, and Conventional Forces, 1945–1949 126
The US Turnabout, 1949–1953 129
New Directions in US and Soviet Defense Policies 131
The ‘New Look’ 131
The ‘New Look’ in the Soviet Union 133
Kennedy, McNamara, and Flexible Response 135
The Soviet Build-up 138
The US Reaction 141
The First Phase: Prior to 1973–1974 141
The Second Phase: The Years up to 1984 142
Cooperation, Disarmament, and Rearmament Once More 145
The Smaller Nuclear States 149
The Arms Race, 1945–2016: The Literature 151

vi

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 Contents

  9 The United States and Western Europe, 1945–2016 153

Expansion by Invitation, 1945–1950 153
European Integration, 1945–1973 156
Explanations for the US Stance 159
US–European Relations, 1950–1973 161
Cooperation Prior to 1962 161
Political and Military Controversy, 1962–1973 163
Economic Relations, 1962–1973 166
The United States and Western Europe after 1973: New Tensions 168
Expansion and Integration of the EC/EU 168
From the Year of Europe to German Reunification 171
The US and the EU from Clinton to Donald Trump 175
The United States and Western Europe, 1945–2016: The Literature 182

10 The Soviet Union/Russia and the (formerly) Communist Countries,

1945–2016 183
Expansion and Conformism, 1945–1953 184
The Reins are Loosened (1953–1956) and Tightened (1956–1958) 186
The Revolts in Poland and Hungary in 1956 187
The Split between the Soviet Union and China 188
From Cooperation to Armed Struggle 190
Explanations for the Split 191
Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe, 1958–1985 195
Czechoslovakia – 1968 198
Developments in Poland 199
The Soviet Union and the Communist Movement Elsewhere 201
The Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe 202
The Fall of the Soviet Union 205
Developments in Russia and Eastern Europe After the Fall of Communism 208
The Soviet Union/Russia and the (formerly) Communist Countries,
1945–2016: The Literature 212

11 The Rise of East Asia 213

The United States and Japan, 1945–2016 214
1945–1960: Occupation and US Dominance 214
1960–1990: Economic Strength and Greater Political Independence 215
1990–2016: Economic Problems and Political Uncertainty 218
The Sino–Soviet–US Triangle Since 1972 219
East Asia in the New World System 223
The Rise of East Asia: The Literature 227

12 Decolonization 229
Changes on the International Level 229
The National Level: Changes within the Colonial Powers 231
British Policies 232

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 Contents

French Policies 235

Belgium and Portugal 238
Why Different Attitudes? 238
The Local Level: Independence Movements Grow Stronger 240
The Three Stages 241
Economic and Cultural Development 241
The Influence of International Events 243
The Nonaligned States in World Politics 244
Decolonization: The Literature 247

13 Economic Relations Between North and South, 1945–2016 249

Aid and Trade, 1945–2013 249
1945–1955 250
1955–1964 251
1964–1981 252
1981–2000 254
2000–2016 255
The Soviet Union and North–South Issues 257
Economic Relations Between North and South, 1945–2016: The Literature 258

14 Two Theories on Development and Under-Development 259

The Liberalist and the Structuralist Schools 259
Discussion of Some Issues Central to Economic Development 261
The North’s Development – The South’s Under-development? 262
The Multinational Corporations 266
Raw Materials and Processed Goods 273
The Question of Dependence 273
Population, Gender, Environment 274
Production of Crude Oil 276
Why Poverty? 279
Two Theories on Development and Under-development: The Literature 282

15 Globalization and Fragmentation 283

Globalization 283
Regionalism 284
Fragmentation 285
Why both Globalization and Fragmentation? 286
East, West, North, South 288
Superpowers, States, and Individuals 291
Globalization and Fragmentation: The Literature 293

16 Conclusion: The Future 295

Old and New Superpowers 295
What will Happen to the International System? 300
Conclusion: The Literature 303

Index 305

viii

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 1 The New World

The Rise and Fall of Great Powers

Whether we call them superpowers, Great Powers, empires or hegemons, one thing
seems certain: they come and go, they rise and fall. No state has managed to remain
permanently Number One; although few, if any, historical laws exist, it is most unlikely
that any state will in the future be able to remain permanently on top. As we learned
from our Eurocentric history books, the Roman Empire rose and fell; so did the
Carolingian Empire (732–814), the Habsburg Empire, and, allegedly, three German
Reichs; so did the British and the French colonial empires; and by 1991 the Soviet
empire had not only collapsed, but the Soviet Union itself was dissolved into its 15
constituent parts.
In a wider geographical context, after the fall of the Roman Empire the vast Muslim
expansion started with Mohammed in the 620s, and ended with the fall of Baghdad to
the Mongols in 1258. The conquered territory stretched from the initial base in Saudi
Arabia, to Spain in the west, and Uzbekistan in the east. The Mongols under Genghis
Khan (1162–1227) and Tamerlane (1336–1405) established one of the biggest empires
ever, combining ruthlessness with surprising ethnic and religious tolerance. As John
Darwin has argued, Tamerlane’s ‘empire was the last attempt to challenge the partition
of Eurasia between the states of the Far West, Islamic Middle Eurasia and Confucian East
Asia.’ Yet that vast empire was soon divided into several different parts. Empires in
Byzantium (395–1453), and various versions in different centuries in Iran, rose and fell.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922) threat-
ened even Vienna, until it started its protracted decline that ended with modern Turkey.
The Mogul Empire in India flourished for a few centuries until even its last formal
remnants were abolished in 1857. China remained dominant much longer. Centuries
earlier its position had been quite similar to that of the Roman Empire. The two
empires were broadly comparable in terms of size and population, and for a certain
period even somewhat alike in chronological terms, although the Chinese empire lasted
well beyond the fall of Rome in 395.
It has been estimated that as late as 1800 China’s share of world manufacturing
output was still 33.3 per cent, and India’s 19.7, while Europe as a whole produced

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 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945

28.1 per cent. With the exception of Britain, even at this late stage production was
still primarily a reflection of population. The greater the population, the greater was
generally the production. As a matter of course China viewed itself as the leader of
the world, as could be witnessed in Emperor Qianlong’s reply to Lord Macartney in
1793 when the latter, on behalf of King George III, asked for the establishment of
trade and diplomatic relations between Britain and China:

We have never valued ingenious articles, nor do we have the slightest need for your
country’s manufactures. Therefore, O king, as regards your request to send someone
to remain at the capital, while it is not in harmony with the regulations of the
Celestial Empire we also feel very much that it is of no advantage to your country.

With the financial and industrial revolutions throughout the nineteenth century, this
situation changed rapidly, so that in 1900 China’s and India’s percentages had been
reduced to 6.2 and 1.7 per cent respectively, while Britain’s share alone was 18.5 and
that of the United States 23.6 (see Table 1.1).
Thus, the Eastern expansion was replaced by a huge Western wave that, to sim-
plify matters vastly, could be said to have started in 1492 when Columbus discovered
America and the Reconquista in Spain was completed with the fall of Granada, revers-
ing the wave of Muslim expansion. First Spain and Portugal, then Britain and
France, and even smaller European countries, established their vast colonial
empires. From its small base, Britain came to control about 20–25 per cent of the
world’s territory and population. North and South America, Australia, much of Asia,
and even more of Africa, came under European control. Colonial control appeared
to last forever, but of course it did not. The United States was the first colony to
establish its independence.
Europe’s supremacy rested on several pillars. European powers took the lead in tech-
nology and finance. Weapons technology was certainly an important part of this. Small
Western forces could defeat large non-European ones. The development of relatively
effective nation states was also important. They were able to use the available resources
more effectively than other units. Finally, most non-European systems of government
were in various stages of decline from the sixteenth–seventeenth century onwards. This
was the case in China, in India and in several parts of Africa.
In many ways Europe still dominated the world during the years between the two
world wars. The European empires still ruled much of the world, with the British
Empire reaching its maximum extent in the interwar years. International politics to a
large extent still focused on relations between the European Great Powers. Many of the
dominant issues were resolved by the leading European powers. Thus, in the summit at
Munich in September 1938, Germany, Britain, France and Italy participated to decide
the future of Czechoslovakia – and about war and peace, at least in Europe. In Asia,
Japan had become the preeminent power.
After its intervention in the First World War, the United States had chosen to revert to
‘isolationism’ in security matters vis-à-vis Europe. After the revolution in 1917 that turned
Russia into the Soviet Union it too had become largely an outsider in international politics.
The Kremlin concentrated on building ‘socialism in one country.’

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 The New World

Table 1.1  Relative Shares of World Manufacturing Output, 1750–1900

1750 1800 1830 1860 1880 1900

(Europe as a whole) 23.2 28.1 34.2 53.2 61.3 62.0

United Kingdom 1.9 4.3 9.5 19.9 22.9 18.5
Habsburg Empire 2.9 3.2 3.2 4.2 4.4 4.7
France 4.0 4.2 5.2 7.9 7.8 6.8
German States/ 2.9 3.5 3.5 4.9 8.5 13.2
Germany
Italian States/Italy 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5
Russia 5.0 5.6 5.6 7.0 7.6 8.8
United States 0.1 0.8 2.4 7.2 14.7 23.6
Japan 3.8 3.5 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.4
Third World 73.0 67.7 60.5 36.6 20.9 11.0
China 32.8 33.3 29.8 19.7 12.5 6.2
India/Pakistan 24.5 19.7 17.6 8.6 2.8 1.7

Source: Kennedy, 1987, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers

The World in 1945

The world that emerged after the destruction of the Second World War was rather
different from this previously Euro-centric one. The United States and the Soviet Union
now emerged as the two leading powers. For more than a century observers had specu-
lated that inevitably this was bound to happen. Only the United States and Russia, it was
argued, had the resources and the population required to dominate great parts of the
world. So powerful were these two powers that they now dominated even Europe itself.
The United States came to take overall charge in Western Europe while the Soviet
Union ruled with a firmer hand in the East. Outside Europe, the Second World War led
to huge changes in the colonies, particularly in Asia. With India in the lead, the colonies
were to become independent, although it took time before the world understood how
truly momentous these changes were to be.
The most striking new feature of the world following the Second World War was the
role of the United States. Even during ‘isolationism,’ US influence had been great in
certain geographic areas, such as Latin America and the Pacific. Economically in terms
of production, trade, and investments, the United States had long been a superpower.
Economic relations with other countries increased after the Second World War, but not
more than the overall growth of the national product.
What was new was first and foremost the military and political role the United States
would play, not only in certain parts of the world, but virtually throughout the globe. In
1938 the US defense budget totaled slightly more than one billion dollars. The United
States was not a part of any military alliance and had no troops stationed outside
US-controlled areas. During the first years after the war the defense budget stabilized at
around 12–13 billion dollars. The Rio Treaty and NATO were established, with the

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 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945

United States as the dominant member in each of them. US forces participated in

the occupation of Germany, Japan, Italy, and Austria. Bases were established in many
different parts of the world.
The next major development in the role of the United States evolved from 1950
onwards, primarily due to the outbreak of the Korean War. The defense budget was
tripled. Numerous treaties were established with countries around the world, especially
in Asia. The United States took the initiative for the establishment of the South-East Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO) and was more loosely associated with the Baghdad Pact.
In 1955 the United States had approximately 450 bases in 36 countries. Complementing
these military commitments was its cultural influence, which was not easily quantifiable,
but which was nevertheless highly significant.
The spread of US influence was due to the fact that it was the strongest country in the
world. While all the other major powers had suffered heavy material losses during the war,
the US economy had prospered. The gross national product increased (in 1958 prices)
from 209.4 billion dollars in 1939 to 355.2 billion dollars in 1945, representing almost
half of the total world production of goods and services. With 6 per cent of the world’s
population, the United States had 46 per cent of the world’s electricity supply, 48 per cent
of the radios, and 54 per cent of the telephones, and US companies controlled 59 per
cent of the world’s known oil reserves.
Until 1949 the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, and after 1949
the country continued to have a considerable technological lead over the Soviet Union
in both the military and nonmilitary spheres. The United States had the world’s strong-
est air force and the world’s leading navy. The United States and the Soviet Union each
had about 12 million men under arms at the end of the Second World War.
Although US interests were not equally great in all parts of the world, and although
remnants of isolationism persisted after 1945, the United States became a global power
during this period. The United States had influence in more and larger parts of the
world than the Soviet Union did. This influence often went deeper in the societies
affected, economically and culturally as well as politically. The US expansion was thus
more comprehensive than that of the Soviet Union. Several decades would pass before
the Soviet Union was able to play a global role.
The power base of the Soviet Union was not comparable to that of the United
States. The USSR had suffered enormous losses during the war. Its population was
reduced by approximately 25 million. Whereas steel production in the United States
had increased by 50 per cent during the war, Soviet steel production had been cut in
half. Similar conditions existed in agriculture. In some areas they were two different
worlds. The Soviet Union produced 65,000 cars a year, the United States seven million.
According to extremely rough estimates, the Soviet national product in 1950 was less
than one-fourth as large as that of the United States.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviet Union was now second-ranking among world
powers represented something new. It was a superpower primarily in terms of military
strength, especially the number of men under arms. After demobilization the Soviet
Union had more troops than the United States, although Soviet demobilization was
more extensive than was assumed at the time. Soviet strength was also ideological. The
leaders in the Kremlin were convinced that history worked in their favor and that ‘the
contradictions among the capitalist powers’ would greatly benefit the Communist

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 The New World

cause. In most countries in the world significant groups supported the Soviet Union
and communism. Yet, whereas the United States could choose from a broad arsenal of
instruments, economic and cultural as well as political and military, the Soviet Union
had to depend primarily on its military and, less so, ideological strength.
Soviet expansion was geographically less comprehensive than US expansion. On the
other hand, it was more firmly established in the areas which were most important for
the Soviet Union. The country increased its territory considerably: the Baltic countries,
Eastern Karelia and Petsamo, the eastern parts of prewar Poland and the northern part
of East Prussia, Carpathian Ukraine, Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, southern
Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands.
The Soviet role in countries beyond its neighboring areas was limited. But with its
size and geographical location, this still meant that several central areas of the world
almost automatically became significant for the leaders in Moscow. Moscow insisted on
virtually complete control over large parts of Eastern Europe. Europe was most impor-
tant for the Kremlin, as it was for the White House, but the position of the Soviet Union
was strengthened in Asia as well, where it was dominant in North Korea and would gain
significant influence in North Vietnam.
In 1948–49 the Communists, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, were victorious
in China, the most populous country in the world. This was a victory won with little sup-
port from Moscow. However, Mao’s assertion in 1958 that ‘the Chinese revolution was
victorious against the wishes of Stalin,’ was an exaggeration. In 1950 China and the
Soviet Union entered into a 30-year alliance. The leadership of Stalin and the Soviet
Union within the Communist movement was indisputable, although the first cracks
appeared with the break between Stalin and the Yugoslavian leader Tito in 1948.
After 1945, world politics was characterized by the conflict between the two new
superpowers. Of course, unfriendly relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union were nothing new. The rapport between these two countries had not been good
after 1917. Diplomatic relations were not established until 1933. Previously, however, the
temperature of such relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had had
little significance for the overall international climate. Both the United States and the
Soviet Union were outsiders in international politics. Both countries isolated themselves,
and the Soviet Union was also isolated by the other major powers.
After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union faced each
other directly in various parts of the world. They were the two main actors in the inter-
national arena; the geographic distance separating them was gone, but the political
distance would soon be greater than it had ever been. During the first years after the
war, the Cold War between these two countries and their allies, between East and West,
was concentrated on Europe, where both sides had their most important interests. The
front lines froze quickly here. Outside Europe major changes could still take place with-
out the superpowers being involved to any great extent. The civil war in China was the
most obvious example of this. The Soviet Union gave some support to the Communists;
the United States gave more support to its side, but compared with later events the
restraint of the superpowers is striking.
The war had weakened the old major powers. Much of Germany and Japan lay in
ruins. Germany was divided into zones controlled by the United States, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, and France, respectively. The intention was that these four

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 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945

should cooperate in governing the country until the Germans at some time in the
future were capable of doing so themselves. However, the split between East and West
resulted in a division into a large Western part and a smaller Eastern part. This division
helped solve the traditional German problem in European politics, a problem which
had been an important factor in the outbreak of both the First and Second World Wars.
Germany should never again be allowed to become strong enough to dominate Europe.
For some time it was accepted that Germany should remain demilitarized. But with the
rapid escalation in superpower rivalry, East and West began to compete for German
support. Thus even this aspect of occupation policy was subject to pressure.
In Japan the United States had things its own way, despite the formal apparatus that
was established to give the other allies a certain degree of influence. The war in the East
had been ended with the two atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A new era
had begun. Here, too, occupation policy was based on the premise that the occupied
country should never again be given the opportunity to start a war. The United States
was so firmly decided in this matter that a provision prohibiting military forces was
included in the constitution. The war, and not least the two atomic bombs, had also
caused fundamental changes in the attitudes of the Japanese.
In 1945 the United Kingdom was considered the third major power. Britain’s con-
tribution to the war had been considerable; no other country had so persistently
fought against Hitler’s Germany. Prime Minister Winston Churchill played an impor-
tant role in wartime diplomacy. The United Kingdom was the head of a global
empire, of the Commonwealth, as it was now called. The country also held a leading
role among the other Western European countries and had the advantage of close
relations with the United States.
However, in July 1945 Prime Minister Churchill was replaced by Clement Attlee, the
leader of the Labour party. This change symbolized a new direction, with less emphasis
on world politics and a greater focus on domestic affairs. Britain’s position was clearly
weakened compared to the period between the wars. A major reason for this decline
was the cost of the war. War destruction totalled about £3 billion. Assets worth more
than £1 billion had been sold overseas to finance the war. Revenue from investments
abroad was halved. In 1945 the UK spent more than £2 billion abroad, while revenues
were only £350 million. In order to rectify this imbalance, London had to ask other
governments for help. In practice that meant Washington.
The United Kingdom was not the only country in Western Europe to pursue such
policies. Almost without exception, they all asked the United States for support, both
economic and political. In 1948–49 the European countries also exerted pressure on
the United States to play a more active role in the military sphere.
Western Europe feared that the United States would return to isolationism. A new
isolationism would be extremely harmful, most Europeans felt, much more so now than
after the First World War. Destruction had been great in many areas. The need for eco-
nomic assistance was correspondingly great. It became increasingly evident that Europe
needed a counterpart to the local Soviet dominance. Only the United States could
provide such a counterweight.
France had suffered a humiliating defeat in 1940. Despite the efforts of General
Charles de Gaulle, the country could never regain the position it had formerly enjoyed.
If Paris were to play a central role in international politics once more, it would have to

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 The New World

do so as a spokesman for a concordant Western Europe. But despite the foundation the
war had laid for such cooperation, there were many barriers: France itself was divided
in its attitudes; the role of Germany was problematic; Britain was only mildly interested
when all was said and done.
In one area the old European major powers could apparently still bask in the glory
of the past. They had their colonies. The war was bound to mean changes for the better
for the colonial subjects. But with the exception of India, where Britain had promised
independence when the war was over, the colonial powers did not have the intention of
freeing their colonies – at least not in the near future. Reforms were one thing, inde-
pendence something quite different. In 1942 Churchill had pronounced the memorable
words, ‘I have not become the King’s First Minister to preside over the liquidation of
the British Empire.’ Many British politicians and people were willing to go further than
Churchill in terms of reforms. On the other hand, the other colonial powers were even
more determined to regain control over their colonies than the United Kingdom was.
In fact, France and Portugal claimed that the ties were to last forever. Colonies and
mother country should merge and become one.
Surprisingly quickly, however, all this was to prove an illusion. The war had destroyed
the old colonial magic, both for those ruling and for those ruled. What happened in
India was soon to have dramatic consequences in Africa too. How Britain responded to
her colonies was bound to affect the other colonial powers as well. The Euro-centric
world of previous centuries was about to disintegrate.

The New World: The Literature

The bibliography and recommended literature supplied at the end of the various
chapters has a limited objective. In the first place, it shows what works have
been most important for this book, chapter by chapter. An exhaustive list of all
the literature that has been used would have been much longer than the present
one. In the second place, the aim is to give the interested reader ideas for further
reading. Experience has told me that if the number of titles recommended or sup-
plied is too great, it merely tends to discourage the reader. Those who may desire
further suggestions will find many more in the books mentioned in the individual
chapter bibliographies.

General Surveys
For the most recent example of the broad sweep of history, see John Darwin, After
Tamerlane – The Global History of Empire Since 1405 (London, 2007).
For a stimulating survey of the ‘short’ twentieth century, see Eric Hobsbawm,
Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991 (London, 1994). Peter
Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 (London, 2009) contains a wealth of
information. More focused on the Cold War is P. M. H. Bell, The World Since 1945:
An International History (London, 2001).
Among the abundance of surveys on US foreign policy after 1945, I recommend:
Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign
(Continued)

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 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945

(Continued)
Policy from Truman to Clinton (New York, 1995). For many years the standard work on
Soviet foreign policy was Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign
Policy, 1917–73 (New York, 1974). A useful version of history from the perspec-
tive that long prevailed in Moscow is Soviet Foreign Policy: Volume II: 1945–1980
(Moscow, 1981). We lack an updated standard work on Soviet foreign policy from
1945 until the present based on all the new material that has been made accessi-
ble in recent years. Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold
War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007) comes the closest.
Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations (New York,
1981 and subsequent editions) has been most useful, as it deals with economic
relations between East and West, within the West and between North and South.
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 1987) aroused debate in the late
1980s. A response to Kennedy may be found in Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead:
The Changing Nature of American Power (New York, 1990). My own interpretation
of the US role after 1945 in a comparative perspective has been presented in
The American ‘Empire’ and Other Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative
Perspective (Oxford–Oslo, 1990). The debate on the rise and fall of Great Powers
is pursued further in Geir Lundestad (ed.), The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability,
and Legitimacy (Oslo–Oxford, 1994) and in Charles S. Maier, Among Empires:
American Ascendancy and its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA, 2006); Stephen G.
Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance. International Relations
and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton, NJ, 2008); Fareed Zakaria, The
Post-American World (London, 2008) and in my own The Rise and Decline of the
American ‘Empire’: Power and its Limits in Comparative Perspective (Oxford, 2012).
Much of the statistical material in this book has been derived from the World
Bank, World Development Report (New York, 1983 and subsequent annual
editions); the US Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United
States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC, 1975); the annual Statistical
Abstract of the United States (Washington, DC, 1985 and subsequent editions),
and from Herbert Block, The Planetary Product in 1980: A Creative Pause?
(Washington, DC, 1981).

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