THELMA CASE (Quiz No.

3, 1st question)
The registration must fail.

In the case of Republic of the Philippines and Director of Lands vs. Hon. Abraham P.
Vera (G.R. No. L-35778, January 27, 1983, 205 Phil. 164), the Supreme Court ruled that a mere
casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under
claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land however long the period thereof
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, UNLESS the occupant
can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA
177, 195).

In the instant case, the evidence shows that only portions of the entire area applied for were
cultivated. Thus, the applicants have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and
adverse possession in the concept of owners of the entire area in question during the period
required by law.

GETRUDES CASE (Quiz no. 4, 1st Question)

The Supreme Court ruled that there was no merit to the petition.

In the case of Spouses Cruz vs. Leis, et al. (G.R. No. 125233, March 9, 2000, 205 Phil.
164), the Supreme Court cited the case of Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals [215 SCRA 866
(1992)], where one of the petitioners claimed ownership of the entire property subject of the case
by virtue of her redemption thereof after the same was forfeited in favour of the provincial
government for non-payment of taxes. It ruled that the redemption of the land did “not terminate
the co-ownership and did not give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership.

Incidentally, there is no merit in petitioners’ contention that Gertrudes redemption of the

property from the Daily Savings Bank vested in her ownership over the same to the exclusion of
her co-owners.

The Supreme Court also cited Adille vs. Court of Appeals [157 SCRA 455 (1988)]:

The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone
(CIVL CODE, Art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), Art. 1514.). While the records show that
petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not
make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-
ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary
expense. Under the Civil Code:

Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to
the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by
renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the
expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-
ownership.

The property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under

Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the
redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him
ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro
to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the
provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not
provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only dispose of her
share in the property owned in common. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.

Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was registered in TCT No.
43100 solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a parcel of land, forming part of
the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to
a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the
name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the
deceased spouse. The rationale for this rule is that "a person dealing with registered land is not
required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged
with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the
certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the
Torrens system." [Ibarra vs. Ibarra, Sr., 156 SCRA 616 (1987), citing Paraiso vs. Camon 106
Phil. 187 (1959). Ibarra was wrongly cited in p.4 of the Petition (Rollo, p.6) as "Vda. de
Carcallas v. Judge Yancha, G.R. 46401, 18 Dec. 87," at 156 SCRA 608 (1987)].

Despite the Court of Appeals finding and conclusion that Gertrudes as well as private
respondents failed to repurchase the property within the period stipulated and has lost all their
rights to it, it still ruled against petitioners by affirming the Regional Trial Court's decision on the
premise that there was no compliance with Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial
hearing before registration of the property in the name of petitioners. This provision states:

ART. 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee
by virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with the provisions of article 1616 shall
not be recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has
been duly heard.

Article 1607 is intended to minimize the evils which the pacto de retro sale has
caused in the hands of usurers. A judicial order is necessary in order to determine the true
nature of the transaction and to prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while the
determination is being made.

It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of
Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to
the transfer of ownership. Petitioners are the owners of the subject property since neither
Gertrudes nor her co-owners redeemed the same within the one-year period stipulated in the
"Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold
are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by
the vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said
resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over
the property sold. As title is already vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his
title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership for the method
prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering the consolidated title.

Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners are deemed owners of the property by reason
of the failure of the vendor, Gertrudes Isidro, to repurchase the same within the period stipulated.
However, Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Alexander M. Cruz, which was issued
without judicial order, was ordered CANCELLED, and Transfer Certificate of Title in the name
of Gertrudes Isidro is ordered REINSTATED, without prejudice to compliance by petitioners
with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code.

PROBLEM ni “I” H J & K (based on Quiz No. 5, Question nos. 9 & 10)
a) No annotations should be carried over to the title of “I”.

There should be no annotations to be carried over to the title of I since the adverse claims
of G and H involves different lots. Furthermore, the notice of lis pendes by “G” covering Lot 5
and the notice of adverse claim over Lot 1 by H were both registered prior to I’s adverse claim
and are entitled to precedence over the latter. The rule is that between two involuntary
documents, the earlier entry prevails. However, if such prior registration cannot affect the
subsequent registration, it need not be carried over to the new title.
 b) The adverse claim of I is not registrable.

Section 110 of Act 496 provides that whoever claims any right or interest in registered
land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration,
may, if no other provision is made in the Land Registration Act for registering the same, make a
statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom
acquired, and a Reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered
owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. The statement shall
be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and designate a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. This shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon
the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice
and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled.

The basis of I’s adverse claim was an agreement to sell executed by ABC Realty in his
favor which requires presentation of voluntary instrument. It is a willful act of the registered
owner. Under Section 50 of Act No. 496, the act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey and affect the land and Section 55 requires the presentation of the owner's duplicate
certificate of title for the registration of any deed or voluntary instrument. The reason for
requiring the production of the owner's duplicate certificate in the registration of a voluntary
instrument is that, being a willful act of the registered owner, it is to be presumed that he is
interested in registering the instrument and would willingly surrender, present or produce his
duplicate certificate of title to the Register of Deeds in order to accomplish such registration.
However, where the owner refuses to surrender the duplicate certificate for the annotation of the
voluntary instrument, the grantee may file with the Register of Deeds a statement setting forth
his adverse claim, as provided for in Section 110 of Act No. 496. In such a case, the annotation
of the instrument upon the entry book is sufficient to affect the real estate to which it relates,
although Section 72 of Act No. 496 imposes upon the Register of Deeds the duty to require the
production by the Registered owner of his duplicate certificate for the inscription of the adverse
claim. The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a
person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not
otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to third
parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better
right than the registered owner thereof.

In the case of Leviste vs. Noblejas where Maria Villanueva failed to register his adverse
claim being a voluntary instrument arising from a contract to sell, therefore in effective for the
purpose of protecting her right or interest on the land

In the case at bar, it does not appear that “I” attempted to register the agreement to sell
under Section 52 of Act No. 496. Instead, “I” merely filed an adverse claim based on said
agreement to sell Considering that Section 62 of the Land Registration Act prescribes the
procedure for the registration of “I's” interest less than an estate in fee simple on the disputed lot
and there being no showing of her inability to produce the owner's duplicate certificate, the
remedy provided in Section 110 of Act 496, is, therefore, ineffective for the purpose of
protecting her right or interest on the disputed lot.

In the case, Register of Deeds of Quezon City vs. Nicandro, the basis of the adverse
claim was a perfected contract of sale. As the Land Registration Act specifically prescribes the
procedure for registration of the vendee's right on a registered property (Section 57), the filing of
an adverse claim was held ineffective for the purpose of protecting the vendee's right.

c) Yes, the attachments registered by “J”, “H” and “K” are to be preferred over the adverse
claim of “I”.

The adverse claim filed by “I” was not valid, therefore it did not have the effect of a
conveyance of his right or interest on the disputed lot and could not prejudice any right that may
have arisen thereafter in favor of third parties. Consequently, the attachments of “J”, “H” and
“K” covering the disputed lot are superior to that acquired by “I” and will have to be carried over
to the new title to be issued in her favor. Thus, Section of Act 496 provides that if at the time of
any transfer there appear upon the registration book encumbrances or claims adverse to the title
of the registered owner, they shall be stated in the new certificate or certificates, except so far as
they may be simultaneously released or discharged.

Therefore, their attachments should be carried over to the new transfer certificate to be
issued to “I”.

QUESTION WHERE PETITIONER FILED A PETITION ON THE

GROUND OF FRAUD ALLEGING THEY KNEW BECAUSE THEY WERE
PARTIES TO THE CASE (Quiz no. 6, 2nd question)

NO. The allegations do NOT constitute EXTRINSIC FRAUD. Fraud is considered extrinsic if
the party had ample opportunity to have his day in court and defend himself and cannot be a
ground for review. Fraud, which is extrinsic, calculated to deprive the interested party of his day
in court thus preventing him from asserting his right to the property registered in the name of the
appellant justifies reopening the decree.

Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of
the controversy. [Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad Vda. De Roxas vs. Court of Appeals
and Maguesun Management & Development Corporation (G.R. No. 118436, March 21, 1997,
270 SCRA 309, 317-319)].

As held in Sterling Investment Corporation vs. Ruiz (No. L-30694, 31 October 1969, 30
SCRA 318), extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in litigation which
is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby the defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the
case.

In the case given, the petitioner admitted that they were aware that the applicants allegedly
misrepresented themselves because they were party to the Civil Case No. 998 questioning the
validity of the title. Hence, petitioner was not deprived of his day in court and prevented from
asserting his right to the property registered in the name of appellant to justify reopening the
decree.

MARIA and JUAN QUESTION (QUIZ no. 7, 1st Question)

a) The sale of the land to Juan is NOT valid, being contrary to law. The rule should
be that a taxpayer should NOT be deprived of his property for tax delinquency
except in strict conformity with the law authorizing and regulating tax sales.

In the case given, no transfer of ownership of the land was effected from the
delinquent taxpayer to him. The original certificates of title obtained by Maria
thru a free patent grant from the Bureau of Lands under Chapter VII, CA 141 is
valid but in view of her delinquency, the said title is subject to the right of the
City Government to sell the land at public auction. The issuance of the OCT did
NOT exempt the land from the tax sales. Section 44 of P.D. No. 1529 provides
that every registered owner receiving a Certificate of Title shall hold the same
free from an encumbrances, subject to certain exemptions.

It is further provided under Section 118 of CA 141 that in case of land acquired
under free patent or homestead provision, it shall NOT be subjected to
encumbrances or alienation from date of approval of application and for a term of
5 years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, save in favour of
the Government of any of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted
banking corporations. It shall NOT be liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contract prior to the expiration of said period. This includes debts contracted
before the issuance of the patent.

Furthermore, we note that when the land was levied, the land was still
unregistered, and thus, the property object of the sheriff’s sale was not previously
 levied or, if levied, the notice of levy was not previously registered, then a levy on
real property not duly recorded in the Registry is NOT valid and is NOT an
encumbrance on the property. If it is NOT an encumbrance, then the property
cannot be sold at public auction for the purpose of enforcing an encumbrance.
(LRC Consulta No. 171, Register of Deeds of Quezon City, pet., Nov. 5, 1957)

b) NO. While it is true that the rights acquired by the purchaser in an auction sale
pursuant to an attachment retroact to the date of the attachment lien, where prior
sale thereto there have been registered other liens or encumbrances, said
purchaser is bound to abide by the final outcome in enforcement of such liens or
encumbrances. Thus, it was held that the purchaser at an execution sale should
bear in mind that the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to such sale, that the
Sheriff does not warrant the title the the real property sold by him as the
auctioneer, and that it is neither incumbent upon him to place the purchaser in
possession of the subject property (Pabico vs. Ong Pauco, No. 18105, June 22,
1922). Also the Supreme Court has ruled that the purchaser is liable on his bid
because he has offered so much for such interests are worth. “At a sheriff’s sale
they do not sell the land advertised to sell, although that is a common,
acceptation, but they simply sell what interest in the land the judgment debtor
has; and if you buy his interest, and it afterwards develops that he has none,
you are still liable on your bid, because you have offered so much for his
interest in open market, and it is for you to determine before you bid what his
interest is worth.” (Leyson vs. Tanada, Nacion, et al., GR No. L-31472,
November 10, 1981, 109 SCRA 66)

c) Jurisprudence provides the rule that the ownership will NOT revert back to Maria
in case the sale be declared void, but rather it will revert back to the State and the
latter will acquire the property. Furthermore, the land subject of the sale was
unregistered during that time. If this was the case, then the purchaser at a tax sale
gets no better title under his deed than that which was held by the person assessed.

QUESTION INVOLVING ALEX and XANDER UNDER EXPRESS TRUST

BY HIS FATHER (QUIZ NO. 8, 2nd question)

NO, we disagree with Xander’s contention. A trustee may NOT acquire title over a property held
in trust if the possession is not adverse. In order that he may acquire title by acquisitive
prescription, the following requisites must be present: (a) he must repudiate the trust; (b) he must
communicate such repudiation to the beneficiaries; (c) the evidence thereon must be clear and
conclusive; and (d) there must be adverse, open, public, and continuous possession within the
period fixed by law.

In the case given, Xander never repudiated the trust when Alex transferred the
property to him as the trustee. He cannot also alleged that the right of Alex to recover the
property has prescribed since more than five years have passed since the property was
placed in his name.

In case of an implied trust, it can either be (1) a resulting trust, or (2) a

constructive trust. A resulting trust is presumed to have been contemplated by the parties,
the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction but not expressed
in the deed itself. It is based on equitable doctrine that valuable consideration, not legal
title, determines the equitable title or interests. (Emilia O’Laco and Hugo Luna vs.
Valentin Co Cho Chit, O Lay Kia, and Court of Appeals, GR No. 58010, March 31,
1993 220 SCRA 656; Spouses Bejos vs. Cabreros, GR No. 145849, July 22, 2005, 464
SCRA 78)

In case of an implied trust, the action to recover must be brought within 10 years
from the issuance of the title to the property. Thereafter the action shall prescribe. In the
case of Bejoc vs. Cabreros (supra.), the Supreme Court held that an action for
reconveyance based on implied trust or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years,
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer
certificate of title.

It is a well-settled rule that possession of a trustee is, in law, possession of the cestui que trust
and, therefore, it CANNOT be a good ground for title by prescription. The only instance in
which the possession of a trustee may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust is when the
former makes an open repudiation of the trust by unequivocal acts made known to the latter. It
has been held that the trustee may claim title by prescription founded on adverse possession,
where it appears that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the cestui que trust. A mere silent possession of the trustee unaccompanied with acts amounting
to an ouster of the cestui que trust CANNOT be construed as an adverse possession.

JASON, SHIRLEY, and FRENZ CASE (QUIZ NO. 9, 2nd question)

a) Lis pendens literally means a pending suit, while a notice of lis pendens,
inscribed in the certificate of title, is an announcement to the whole world that the
covered property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires
interest in the property does so at his own risk and subject to the results of the
litigation (Republic vs. Ravelo, GR No. 165114, August 6, 2008 citing Heirs of
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA
173; Legarda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94457, October 16, 1997, 280 SCRA
642). This is embodied in Section 76 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529
which provides that no action to recover possession of real estate, or to quiet title
thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition, or other
proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or
occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding
to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as
against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice
stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the court wherein the
same is pending, as well as the date of the institution thereof, together with a
reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of
the land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and
registered. The notice that this provision speaks of the notice of lis pendens is not
a lien or encumbrance on the property, but simply a notice to prospective buyers
or to those dealing with the property that it is under litigation.

In other cases, the Court explained that Lis pendens, which literally means
pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires
over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended
(1) to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the
litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation; and (2) to announce to the whole world that a particular
property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest
over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the
litigation over said property. [Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142406, 16
May 2005, 458 SCRA 483, 492; Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, G.R.
No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173, 186; Yared v. Ilarde, 391 Phil.
722, 730 (2000)]

A notice of lis pendens, once duly registered, may be cancelled by the trial
court before which the action involving the property is pending.

A trial court has, however, the inherent power to cancel a notice of lis
pendens, under the express provisions of law [Fernandez v. Court of Appeals,
397 Phil. 205, 216 (2000)]. As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1)
if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party; or
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who
caused it to be recorded.
 b) I will rule to GRANT the petition to annotate on Jason’s title the notice of lis
pendens.

Notice of lis pendens is proper when the subject matter of litigation

concerns the title or the right of possession, petition of the land and/or its
improvements. When the litigation has a direct hearing to the property, or any
right or interests thereon, the precautionary notice of lis pendens is in order
(Section 76 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529). The registration of a notice
of lis pendens binds all third persons as to the final result of the action (Section
76, ibid.) A registered notice of lis pendens constitutes a legal lien so that any
purchaser of a property so charged may not be considered a purchaser in good
faith.

QUESTION INVOLVING A HOMESTEAD GRANT SOLD THREE YEARS

LATER (Quiz no. 10, Question no. 2)
1. The action to recover the homestead to B is hereby GRANTED. The law provides that
from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and
after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, lands acquired under free patent or
homestead cannot be subject to encumbrances or alienation, nor shall they become liable
to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, except in
favour of the government or any of its branches, units or institutions. But the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons,
associations, or corporations (CA 141, Section 118, as amended by CA 456).

In the case of Philippine National Bank vs. Espinosa (66 Phil. 716), the Supreme Court
ruled that where a homestead was illegally sold in violation of the homestead law, the
principle of in pari delicto is NOT applicable. The reason for the rule is that the policy of
the law is to give land to a family for home and cultivation and the law allows the
homesteader to reacquire the land even if it has been sold; hence, the right may NOT be
waived. The sale being void, the action to recover the homestead does NOT prescribe
because mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null and void and
inexistent. Consequently, a grantee-vendor never lost his title or ownership over the
homestead, and there is no need for him to repurchase. He has to return, however, what
he received as price before recovering his homestead under the equitable principle that he
cannot enrich himself at the expense of another. The case stands for mutual restitution
incident to the nullity of the conveyance (Felices vs. Iriola, 103 Phil. 826).

In the case given, the sale of homestead by the deceased homesteader B within the five
years from the issuance of the patent, which in this case was done three years after the
 issuance of the same, was null and void and his heirs have the right to recover the
homestead illegally disposed.

ROMMEL AND ROCHELLE’S CASE (QUIZ NO. 11, QUESTION NO. 4)

1. Rachelle’s action for reconveyance will prosper.

First, Rommel’s assertion that Rochelle’s action has already elapse is without merit. An
action for reconveyance is a remedy is available anytime unless prescription sets,
provided that the land still remains registered in the name of that person, that is, the land
has not been acquired by the purchaser for value and in good faith (Castillo vs. Valdez,
53 Phil. 120, 123; Quiñiano vs. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 221). The requisites of an
action for reconveyance include the following:

a) The action must be brought in the name of the person claiming ownership or
dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant;
b) That the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was procured
through fraud or other illegal means;
c) That the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value;
d) That the action is filed after the certificate has become final and incontrovertible
but within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud or not later than 10 years in the
case of an implied trust. (New Regents vs. Tanjuanco, G.R. No. 168800, 16 April
2009)

Second, under Section 77 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled even
before final judgment upon proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting
or harassing the adverse party or that the notice of lis pendens is not necessary to protect
the right of the party who caused it to be registered.

In this case, it is given that Rachelle is the legitimate owner of the land in question. Thus,
it can be said that when she filed her notice of lis pendens, her purpose was to protect her
interest in the land and not just to molest Rommel. It is necessary to record the Lis
pendens to protect her interest because if she did not do so, there is a possibility that the
land will fall into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. In that event, the court
loses control over the land making any favourable judgment thereon moot and academic.
WHEN JUST COMPENSATION IS NOT YET PAID (QUIZ No. 12, 1st
question)
1. A. Generally, the owner whose property was expropriated may NOT recover his
property. In the case of FORFOM Development Corporation vs. Philippine National
Railways (GR No. 124795, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 350), the Supreme Court
rejected the claim of the petitioners in this case and held that it is settled that non-
payment of just compensation does NOT entitle the private landowners to recover
possession of their expropriated lot. However, the rule admits to an exception. In an
earlier case decided by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Lim (GR No. 161656, June
29, 2005, 462 SCRA 265), the Court enunciated the rule that “where the government
failed to pay just compensation within five years from the finality of the judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property.”

B. NO. It has been held that when private land is expropriated for a particular public use,
the same does NOT return to its former owner upon an abandonment of the particular
use for which the land was expropriated. When land has been acquired for public use in
fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of the right of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains NO right in the land, and the public use may be
abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the
estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. (Fery vs. Municipality of
Cabanatuan, GR No. 17540, July 23, 1921, 42 Phil. 28)