VI.

CANON 6 CANONS APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.
PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney Fernando T.
Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente
C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application
of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The
present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within
reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual
issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of
obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transaction
before him.
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds
of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was
no action from the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of
absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment
and to clarify certain details about the transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the
documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them, which was that V &
G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per
trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163 registrable
documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket
for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed additional
registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on
May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24)
hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on
the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject
matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a
sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual
Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same documents of the
same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July
27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of the
NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative
charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing
why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondent was further asked whether he
would submit his case on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or
material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges
against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both parties submitted the case for
resolution based on the pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing
undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross
ignorance of the law and procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated requests
and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on the registration of the documents involved, in
order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct
unbecoming of a public official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in
connection with pending official transactions before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22,
1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple
neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration; and (3) be
warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports the
Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration and,
notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious action on the said documents, he
continued with his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the documents
involved; that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator
Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof, that the Administrator then resolved in favor of
the registrability of the said documents in question; and that, such resolution of the Administrator
notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties
interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.
xxx xxx xxx
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that he neither touched nor
received the money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de
la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the original
denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to
countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he
never did so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his liability.
His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws, rules and regulations and
should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service,
with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government
service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165 dated May
3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in
this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be
disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public
official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every
lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its
violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo,
1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave
responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an
officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion
he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige,
 its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of
truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility— all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as
moral character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order.1âwphi1 A
lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of
law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he
has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis
supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and
employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from
directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office,
and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional
Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
(Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of
law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of
his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142
SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in
the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6788 August 23, 2007
(Formerly, CBD 382)
DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension 1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
The Complaint
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and
criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.2 She gave respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's
fees but the latter issued a receipt for ₱5,000 only.3
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent
never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several
hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. 4 This happened six times and for each
"appearance" in court, respondent charged her ₱350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the
status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent
never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO).5
Respondent's Defense
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very start. In fact,
he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office
(predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.6
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the Jovellanoses. 7 Because
he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he declined. 8 Nevertheless, he advised
the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner. 9 Atty. Ungson, however, did
not accept the complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed
upon.10 Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on
suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep
the ₱5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee. 11
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her daughters
asked her to account for the ₱5,000 she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping.12 Because the
complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992. 13
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO. 14 A few months later or in September 1994, the complainant
again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner,
respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the
complainant.15
Recommendation of the IBP
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its
report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. 16
The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the PAO. 18 It also
noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that respondent was a
seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would
respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a
friend's request.19 It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting
private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries.20 The CBD concluded that respondent violated
the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to
render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered him to
immediately return to the complainant the amount of ₱5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt. 21
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01,
16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's recommendation with
regard to the restitution of ₱5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of
respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of six months. 22
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. 23 More specifically, lawyers in government
service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are
not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. 24
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the
private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency
shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict with their official function.25
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-
time to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he
was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship.26 Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed
the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed
that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the
prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of
providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.27 Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons
in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.28
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was
inconsistent with the office's mission.29 Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than
his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.30 This undertaking includes the observance of the above-mentioned
prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's
fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach
of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of
profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent
also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses
(which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really
filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the
complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a
violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.31
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially
one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of
public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private
practice.321avvphi1
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his
attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff
in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client) 33 nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such
as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return the ₱5,000 as he, a
government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.35
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
of law and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the
amount of ₱5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
1. PRIMARY DUTY: THAT JUSTICE IS DONE – RULE 6.01
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995

EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment1 affirming his conviction for violation of the "Trust
Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated February 9,
1994,2 petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL"3 setting forth, in relation to the motion for new trial:
6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered evidence and excusible (sic)
negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits of:
(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will exculpate petitioner;
(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the owner of Ultra
Corporation (the Corporation that employed petitioner), which actually exercised
control over the affairs of Ultra; and
(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first time and explain
why he was unable to do so earlier.
The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution,4 among other things, granted the substitution but denied the
motion for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been already denied on February 9, 1994."
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL",5 and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994.6 The Court thereafter
required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion and manifestation within ten (10) days from notice, in a
Resolution dated September 7, 1994.7
In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the Court, 8 the Solicitor General himself
recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same impression that a certain Rodolfo
Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement is an admission against interest which may ultimately exonerate
petitioner from criminal liability. The full text of Mr. Rodolfo Cuenca's "Affidavit" 9 reads:
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of legal age, with the residence at Urdaneta Village, Makati,
Metro Manila, after being duly sworn and (sic) state that:
1. During the years 1967 until February 1983, I was the President and Chief Executive Officer of
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).
2. During that period, I controlled an effective majority of the voting shares of stock of CDCP.
3. Sometime in 1974, upon my initiative, CDCP together with its affiliated companies, organized a
number of wholly-owned service corporations. One of these was Ultra International Trading
Corporation, whose purpose was to serve and supply the needs of CDCP and its other subsidiaries
with lower value goods and using Ultra's financial resources.
4. The directors in Ultra Corporation were nominees of CDCP, and received the instructions
directly from me and or Mr. Pedro Valdez, Chairman of CDCP.
5. From Ultra's inception, my brother, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca was appointed President and Chief
Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I instructed Ultra through my brother, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca to
purchase for CDCP various steel materials. These materials were received by CDCP and are
covered by the trust receipts which are the subject of this case.
6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems, and consciously omitted payment to Ultra for the
delivery of the said steel materials. As a nominee of CDCP, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca merely acted
as agent for CDCP. As such, CDCP provided him with the guarantees needed to persuade China
Bank to issue the said trust receipts. On the basis of such guarantees, along with informal
assurances issued by CDCP to China Bank that the transactions of Ultra were undertaken for and
on behalf of CDCP and CDCP Mining Corporation, Ultra was able to obtain credit facilities, among
which included the trust receipts subject of this case.
7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca had no power to cause the payment of said trust receipts
because the common Treasurer and controller of both CDCP and Ultra, Ms. Nora Vinluan, acted
under my control and I did not allow her to make the appropriate payments.
8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not paid Ultra the amounts corresponding to the materials covered
by the trust receipts subject of this case.
9. By the time final demand to pay on the trust receipts were (sic) served in 1984, Mr. Edilberto
Cuenca was no longer president of Ultra Corporation and could not have possibly cause (sic) Ultra
Corporation to pay.
10. I have executed this affidavit in order to accept personal responsibility for the trust receipts
subject of this case and to exculpate Mr. Edilberto Cuenca of the criminal charges which he has
asked this Honorable Court to review.
11. Accordingly, I also undertake to pay the civil obligations arising from the subject trust receipts.
(Sgd.)
RODOLFO M. CUENCA
Affiant
 And the Solicitor General had this to say:
Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.
However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own interests under
Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the culpability of his brother
Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard look
by the Court.
The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of his
brother's affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.
Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who represent
the People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek conviction of the
accused but to see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:
Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks.
Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to
convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment
of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a sovereign "whose obligation to govern
impartially is compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the
Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce Fein, published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994).
(Emphasis supplied.)10
Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled that it is
not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly discovered
evidence the rationale of which being:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has no
jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, for only
questions of fact are involved therein.
the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v.
People"11 and "People v. Amparado".12
In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the Solicitor General,
granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons
which the Court considered as newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of
conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein petitioner should be denied the
same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances considering that the "People" does not
raise any objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially commended for
displaying once again such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the case be RE-OPENED and
REMANDED to the court of origin for reception of petitioner's evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

2. NOT TO USE PUBLC POSITION FOR PRIVATE INTEREST – RULE 6.02

EN BANC
A.C. No. 4018 March 8, 2005
OMAR P. ALI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition for disbarment1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave
misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant
against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu,
Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji
Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali
Datus are relatives of respondent.3
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique Basa,
absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that he has no
case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that the complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence. 4
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08 September 1992,
then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in
the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of
TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji
Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended
respondent's dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the
conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent's dismissal from government service. Respondent
subsequently questioned said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition5 claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him
from office. He also insisted that respondents6 in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that
respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when
he abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for failure on the part of petitioner to
sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
order."7 Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of
15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the disbarment of
respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had "proven himself unfit to be further
entrusted with the duties of an attorney"8 and that he poses a "serious threat to the integrity of the legal
profession."9
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the
name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law10 and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his
ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis
only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they
presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latter's co-defendants. Respondent explains
that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating
prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the
dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the
parties. Complainant's allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,11 this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation
of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order relative
to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides:
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.
The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of evidence vis-à-vis
this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties
agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate
action.12
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner Fernandez's
recommendation for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region
governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and
recommendation.13 The IBP Resolution states:
Resolution No. XII-96-153
Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of
Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to
designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23
October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to
receive the evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP
Board of Governors.14
In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter 15 informed the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel16 had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a series of
hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the records of this
case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as
Commissioner Fernandez's Order dated 23 February 1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to comment on
respondent's motion.17 Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondent's motion for
the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City.18 On 25 September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez
ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondent's evidence. 19 This order of
referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4
December 1998. Said resolution provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case
records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation
submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the Board of Governors.20
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion praying that the
recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the records. 21 Respondent insists that the
investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this
case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner Fernandez's Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested
IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any
hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
Complainant opposed22 this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to complainant, the report
and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the
hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also
claims that respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as
respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of
respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a
duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23 Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs
that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position
paper were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato
Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panel's order dated 4 August
1997.24 Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion
of the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading "Atty. Mosib A. Bubong."
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the Commission on Bar
Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This
directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30
June 2001, to wit:
RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue
of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report
and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice. 25
Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this
case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic
brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case. 26
Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of the
Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter
to conduct an investigation of this case.27 This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order
dated 19 July 2002.28 According to Atty. Castillo –
After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report of the IBP
Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees no
need for any further investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of
the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby
denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office
within ten (10) days from date hereof.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato
Chapter ratiocinating as follows:
 The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President in
Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found guilty of Grave
Misconduct in:
a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,
b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.
And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed
by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-
2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting
law, which by the way, was filed against respondent's relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the
President in Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into
account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave
Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as
such carries a very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present
case.
In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.29
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification,
the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the period of
suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on respondent – whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in
the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found
a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied as by that
time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.30
The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct
committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of
lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a
lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show
moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. 31 Although the general
rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he
committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a
violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.32
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,33 we ordered the disbarment of respondent on the
ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro, we declared –
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave
responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an
officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion
be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its
prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those
qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility – all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously
described as moral character.34
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,35 this Court found sufficient basis to disbar
respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the
Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case –
… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently
affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of
Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his
relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but
also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this
matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to occupy and
cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the
law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case,
we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by
reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same."37 As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A.
Rayos:38
… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to
the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice. 39
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the
Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (respondent)
filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02, 1 Rule 6.032 and Rule
1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.
Factual Background
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower
Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was
segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, 4 issued on January 7, 1986, and
Proclamation No. 172,5 issued on October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on
the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the
Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the
Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent’s district includes the areas covered by
the proclamations.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a
member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales application because
of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure
and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales
application and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon
Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject
land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land
between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales application was denied. The
conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given due course by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the
complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to
convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent’s promptings, the rights
to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying
the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent
wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig.
The respondent in this regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award.
Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of
Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of
law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against him
by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was nominated as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman,
for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent events.
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed these
rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights
over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on
the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and
his application over the subject land was given due course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is
now final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the
Supreme Court.
The respondent also advanced the following defenses:
(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the respondent
had been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this allegation was without
corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s
sister.
(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the complainant ₱50,000.00 for the subject land
and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights
over the subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the subject land.
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit where the
latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth.
(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over the
subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca
Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he extended to them was a form of loan.
(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.
(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000,
regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca
Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his
father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his
agreement to the transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his father’s application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s
application.
 (7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the
subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision was
clear that the complainant had no rights over the subject land.
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He alleged that
during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel
Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards.
Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional
Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became
the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR.
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since the
provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in private law practice
and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and
relatives who are in the active practice of law.8 In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term
in Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24,
1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the complainant and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was
still a member.
The Court’s Ruling
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
in the discharge of his duties as a government official.9 He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar
only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. 10
The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s actions constitute a breach of the
standard ethical conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the
Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented
a client before the office he was previously connected with.
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve
to dismiss the administrative complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to be
observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of conduct laid
down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe
the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more
exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant
public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their
private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of
their official functions.11
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the
following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2)
advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We previously held
that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private
interests.12
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her
office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to
advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the
respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives. 15
In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education) of
extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we
found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the
complainant who had a pending application for visas before his office.18
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded and received
money from the complainant who had a pending case before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the
respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner
defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought before the Committee
on Awards. By the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before the
Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainant’s sales application was pending before the Office of the
Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director,
NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondent’s elective public office and membership
to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private interests
in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought before the Committee
on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position
to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the complainant’s sales application over the
subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject land does not
specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the uncorroborated
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically stating that the respondent had no
interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land.
In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the respondent’s
alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondent’s favor.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his claim that the
respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the
DENR Regional Director-NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996; 22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated July 17, 199623), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent
over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots
(covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in
the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one
relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to
contest the complainant’s sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo
states on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of
the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating evidence - of the
nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the
year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 200324 and July 21, 2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the
respondent’s claim that the sums of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical
treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money
borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s involvement
was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject
land.26
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when the sums
of money were extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995,
and the date when the Deed of Conveyance 27 over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed
that the sums of money were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of
evidence are consistent with the respondent’s allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the
subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical
treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from the
government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and
the document entitled "Assurance" where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a
violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private
practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation
from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot
practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-
year prohibition shall likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency.29 By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under
the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7
provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered
under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the
government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the
term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the
proceedings.31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had
previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.1avvphi1
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales
application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face
value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document. In
Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32 we specifically described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession
of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of
evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or that
the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we
cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the respondent’s favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion,
we already struck down the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law
when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the respondent violated paragraph
4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his
knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to
apply for a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the
Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales
application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court of
Appeals35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our
Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others,
that no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision. 36
All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers.37 The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense, 38 until the burden
shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven,
nothing has to be rebutted in defense.39
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the complainant’s failure
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise
of the Court’s disciplinary power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante
O. Tinga, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

3. NOT TO ACCEPT EMPLOYMENT AFTER GOVERNMENT OFFICE – RULE 6.03

EN BANC
A.C. No. 6707 March 24, 2006
GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This treats of a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under
Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa applications will be
favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year which
could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was indeed required by law, complainant deposited
with respondent on six different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000.
Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the complainant but
refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her demands. After one year, complainant demanded from
respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that said amount would be returned. When respondent failed
to return the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member) sent a demand
letter to respondent for the immediate return of the money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to
release the amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to comply with his promise, the World Mission for Jesus
sent another demand letter. In response thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19 March 1999
explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed two blank checks
postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts. When complainant
deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the same were dishonored because respondent had stopped
payment on the same. Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the
reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and gave complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that
said checks would be honored. Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were
all dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by
respondent. After respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited amount, complainant
referred the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to respondent. The demand letters remained
unheeded.
Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required 3 respondent to submit his answer
within 15 days from receipt thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,4 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint claiming that having
never physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not have appropriated or pocketed the
same. He said the amount was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the
Philippines. Respondent explained thus:
a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant, the latter was
introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem concerning their stay in the
Philippines, herself and three sons, one of which is already of major age while the two others were still
minors then. Their problem was the fact that since they have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten
(10) years as holders of missionary visas (9G) they could no longer extend their said status as under the
law and related polic[i]es of the government, missionary visa holders could only remain as such for ten (10)
years after which they could no longer extend their said status and have to leave the country.
b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better secure a permanent visa
under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota Visa and thereafter, provided
them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said visa, one of which is that the applicant must have a
$40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform that her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age,
has to have the same amount of show money separate of her money as he would be issued separate visa,
 while her two minor children would be included as her dependents in her said visa application. I advised
them to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested me to refer to her to a lawyer to work for their
application, which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the
complainant and her family.
c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the same was
finished and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant and her family. Her son
Marcus Huyssen was given an independent permanent visa while the other two were made as dependents
of the complainant. In between the processing of the papers and becoming very close to the complainant, I
became the intermediary between complainant and their counsel so much that every amount that the latter
would request for whatever purpose was coursed through me which request were then transmitted to the
complainant and every amount of money given by the complainant to their counsel were coursed thru me
which is the very reason why my signature appears in the vouchers attached in the complaint-affidavit;
d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services of a lawyer that I
myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired from him
regarding the matter and the following facts were revealed to me:
1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money from the bank is not really her
money but money of World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a serious violation of the
Immigration Law as there was a misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed later when the said
entity sent their demand letter to the undersigned affiant and which is attached to the complaint-
affidavit;
2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the very same amount used by her
son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his separate permanent visa. These acts of the complainant and
her son could have been a ground for deportation and likewise constitute criminal offense under
the Immigration Law and the Revised Penal Code. These could have been the possible reason
why complainant was made to pay for quite huge amount.
e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became very close to undersigned
and my family that I was even invited to their residence several times;
f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money given and surprisingly they
want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer around, he died sometime
1997;
g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that the amount of money
is now being sought to be recovered from me;
h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences of having signed the
same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed but up to the present
my standby loan application has not been released and was informed that the same would only be
forthcoming second week of August. The same should have been released last March but was aborted due
to prevalent condition. The amount to be paid, according to the complainant has now become doubled plus
attorney’s fees of P200,000.00.
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of Evidence
on 25 August 2003.
On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondent’s evidence but the scheduled hearings (11
settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was allegedly out of the country to attend to his
client’s needs. Reception of respondent’s evidence was scheduled for the last time on 28 September 2004 and
again respondent failed to appear, despite due notice and without just cause.
On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report 5 recommending the
disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation in this manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent received the amount of US$20,000 from
complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A to F of complainant) showing
his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however claims that he did not appropriate the same for
himself but that he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is
untenable considering the documentary evidence submitted by complainant. On record is the 1 March 1999 letter
of respondent addressed to the World Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he stated thus:
"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit but I repeat, nobody really intended that
the thing would happen that way. Many events were the causes of the said delay particularly the death of then
Commissioner L. Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the needed papers for the immediate release. It was
only from compiling all on the first week of January this year, that all the said papers were recovered, hence, the
process of the release just started though some important papers were already finished as early as the last quarter
of last year. We are just going through the normal standard operating procedure and there is no day since January
that I do not make any follow – ups on the progress of the same."
and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated thus:
"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your good self in connection
with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It might take some more time before the
Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are being still compiled are being looked at the
files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure
that everything would be fine later as all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic
delay."
From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by
respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued by
the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of the money to
complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of
respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and
appropriated the same for his personal use. It should also be noted that respondent has failed to establish that the
"late Atty. Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one correspondence from Atty.
Mendoza regarding the visa application of complainant and his family, and complainant has also testified that she
never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with the Board of
Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused
damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."
On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved6 the Investigating Commissioner’s report with
modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to
return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to the
Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more
restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer
who holds a responsible public office.7
It is undisputed that respondent admitted8 having received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his
signatures in the petty cash vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false representation that that it was
needed in complainant’s application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said amount
and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in
their application for visa in the BID.11 Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the
matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate of said Atty.
Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally silenced by
fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is
not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against
him.12 He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected
of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show that even though he was given
the opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed,
without any plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set for reception of his evidence
despite due notice.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak
defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is
purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.
When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. Such
admissions were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to complainant:
1) Letter13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:
Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of which is 09
March 1999. Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the same to you out of my personal money
on said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here at the office on that day and the amount
would be given to you wether (sic) from the Bureau or from my own personal money.
2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:
I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your goodself in connection
with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.
It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are still
being compiled and are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and
who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the documents needed are
already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.
xxxx
As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and the other
one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill them up on their due dates the
peso equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the peso equivalent of your P20,000 would be well
exchanged. I have postdated them to enable me to raise some more pesos to cover the whole amount but don’t
worry as the Lord had already provided me the means.
3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:
Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done my very best for the early return of
your money but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still papers lacking. When I stopped
the payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that everything is fine, but it is not. I guess it is time for
me to accept the fact that I really have to personally return the money out of my own. The issue should stop at my
end. This is the truth that I must face. It may hurt me financially but it would set me free from worries and anxieties.
I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday the releases of which are
on the following:
May 4, 1999- 200,000
May 11, 1999 -200,000
May 20, 1999-200,000
June 4, 1999-200,000
I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.
I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you will be sufficiently funded
on their due dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last time, if any of these checks, is
returned, don’t call me anymore. Just file the necessary action against me, I just had to put an end to this matter
and look forward. x x x
4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:
The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I issued. In fact I stopped all
payments to all other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to give preference to the check I
issued to you.
This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of returning the other checks I requested for
stop payment - instead honored them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a very big surprise to me and
discouragement for I know it would really upset you.
In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to withdraw from the
Bank. However, I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring the same to your place
considering that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for you to immediately deposit today and I was
assured by the bank that it would be honored this time.
Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. As correctly
observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have issued his personal checks if said amount
were officially deposited with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.
Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s pending application for visas is
violative of Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Rule 6.0218 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interest. Promotion
of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of
his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. 19 Respondent’s conduct in office betrays the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high public office. A
lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust
and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a
keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren
in private practice.
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another by issuing
several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, 20 as the effect
"transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the
public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus,
paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties
he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice,
honesty or good morals."21
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he
or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude. 22
Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had
the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he
does not deserve to continue, being a member of the bar.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed
only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct
himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A
violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes
suspension and disbarment.23 More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege.24
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring
individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s
oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. 25 These
pronouncement gain practical significance in the case at bar considering that respondent was a former member of
the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants
owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their
professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye. 26
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high
standards of the legal profession.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this
Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral
conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority to do so.27
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC, Legal
Services, Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona, 29 we also disbarred a senior lawyer of
the National Labor Relations Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in the act of
receiving and counting money extorted from a certain person.
Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the
Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of
expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.30
WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the
amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until payment. This case
shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action. Let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout
the country.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Bank charged respondent
Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of complainant bank with
violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which respondent during his
employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging the sale of steel
sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the gate
passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the
steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction between Mrs.
Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since
left the employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by complainant bank
against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as
counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant’s Asset Management Group, he
intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant
bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the
Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer,
Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with
respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation
of the case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he never
appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is
designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that
he did not enter into a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein. They
are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners,
maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own cases
independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was previously fined by this Court
in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador
Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy
"through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated. Respondent's averment
that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the
light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda
spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his
appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during
the hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted being the
partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the client’s secrets and confidential records and information are
exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise ways and means to attract
as clients former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of
his former employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the IBP saw a
deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994, submitted to this Court its
Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of
the recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On December 12, 1994,
respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration.
In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration the aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the paramount
importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and Conscience
Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who
participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the
said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court, citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him, that even if
respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence acquired by him as counsel it
cannot be denied that he did become privy to information regarding the ownership of the parcel of
land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that
triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. This
Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated
affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the
nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might
only further prejudice the complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client information
given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have
precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. In the case
of Hilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the
yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the
dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, of
good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of
the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can
litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance
in the administration of justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to respondent in the case at
bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite
side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an employee
of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting
interests, to wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that which
duty to another client requires him to oppose.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice of
law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (respondent)
filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02, 1 Rule 6.032 and Rule
1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.
Factual Background
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower
Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was
segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, 4 issued on January 7, 1986, and
Proclamation No. 172,5 issued on October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on
the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the
Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the
Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent’s district includes the areas covered by
the proclamations.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a
member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales application because
of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure
and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales
application and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon
Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject
land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land
between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales application was denied. The
conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given due course by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the
complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to
convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent’s promptings, the rights
to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying
the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent
wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig.
The respondent in this regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award.
Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of
Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of
law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against him
by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was nominated as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman,
for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent events.
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed these
rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights
over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on
the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and
his application over the subject land was given due course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is
now final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the
Supreme Court.
The respondent also advanced the following defenses:
(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the respondent
had been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this allegation was without
corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s
sister.
(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the complainant ₱50,000.00 for the subject land
and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights
over the subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the subject land.
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit where the
latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth.
 (4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over the
subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca
Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he extended to them was a form of loan.
(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.
(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000,
regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca
Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his
father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his
agreement to the transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his father’s application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s
application.
(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the
subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision was
clear that the complainant had no rights over the subject land.
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He alleged that
during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel
Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards.
Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional
Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became
the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR.
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since the
provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in private law practice
and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and
relatives who are in the active practice of law.8 In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term
in Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24,
1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the complainant and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was
still a member.
The Court’s Ruling
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
in the discharge of his duties as a government official.9 He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar
only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. 10
The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s actions constitute a breach of the
standard ethical conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the
Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented
a client before the office he was previously connected with.
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve
to dismiss the administrative complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to be
observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of conduct laid
down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe
the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more
exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant
public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their
private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of
their official functions.11
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the
following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2)
advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We previously held
that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private
interests.12
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her
office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to
advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the
respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives. 15
In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education) of
extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we
found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the
complainant who had a pending application for visas before his office.18
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded and received
money from the complainant who had a pending case before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the
respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner
defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought before the Committee
on Awards. By the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before the
Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainant’s sales application was pending before the Office of the
Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director,
NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondent’s elective public office and membership
to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private interests
in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought before the Committee
on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position
to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the complainant’s sales application over the
subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject land does not
specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the uncorroborated
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically stating that the respondent had no
interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land.
In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the respondent’s
alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondent’s favor.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his claim that the
respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the
DENR Regional Director-NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996; 22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated July 17, 199623), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent
over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots
(covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in
the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one
relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to
contest the complainant’s sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo
states on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of
the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating evidence - of the
nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the
year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 200324 and July 21, 2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the
respondent’s claim that the sums of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical
treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money
borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s involvement
was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject
land.26
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when the sums
of money were extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995,
and the date when the Deed of Conveyance 27 over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed
that the sums of money were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of
evidence are consistent with the respondent’s allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the
subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical
treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from the
government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and
the document entitled "Assurance" where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a
violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private
practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation
from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot
practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-
year prohibition shall likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency.29 By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under
the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7
provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered
under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the
government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the
term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the
proceedings.31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had
previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.1avvphi1
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales
application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face
value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document. In
Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32 we specifically described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession
of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of
evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or that
the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we
cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the respondent’s favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion,
we already struck down the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law
when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the respondent violated paragraph
4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his
knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to
apply for a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the
Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales
application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court of
Appeals35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our
Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others,
that no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision. 36
All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers.37 The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense, 38 until the burden
shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven,
nothing has to be rebutted in defense.39
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the complainant’s failure
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise
of the Court’s disciplinary power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante
O. Tinga, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4984 April 1, 2003
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ, DR.
IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and JOSE
RABALO, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, 1 an official of the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath
for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the
CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs
Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel
Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00
for the facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation as
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student,
the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED…
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation as
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the
amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal
Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew
with full knowledge of the existence of a prior registration…
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation
as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a
considerable amount which was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00
more or less for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be
chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name. 3
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless,
groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently
dismissed.4
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to "Borela Tire Supply" and "Nova’s Lining Brake & Clutch" as
evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued,6 the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.7
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R.
Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of
the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May
14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36. 8
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and
unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors
calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an
appointment for herself.9
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the charges. 10 A copy of said
resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon
City, only to be returned to this Court with the notation "Unclaimed."11
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by registered mail to
respondent at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the Court that the said
mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of
respondent on August 27, 1999.12
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainant’s motion to refer the complaint to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to submit her
Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and the case heard ex parte.
Respondent failed to heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file her
Answer, but again she failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she had waived
her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the
documents submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of her oath as a
government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or attempted to extort
money from certain people who had pending applications/requests before her office in exchange for her
promise to act favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office
in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on
Higher Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the future will
be a ground for disbarment of respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of which reads
as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules; and considering that respondent unlawfully used her public office
in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on
Higher Education, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years. 13
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services,
CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of
the complaint, was "Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and
Standards, CHED."
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. 14 However, if said misconduct as a government
official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of
the Bar.15
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng
sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office.
The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondent’s failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court
and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondent’s misconduct as a
lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she
ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration
for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorney’s Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground
for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorney’s Oath imposes upon every member of the
bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.16 Respondent’s demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending
applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to
the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 17 of said
Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they
should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the
ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office are
violative of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Rule 6.0219 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests. Promotion
of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of
his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For
a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust
and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a
keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 120 and Rule 6.02 of Canon
6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC,
Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years’ suspension from
membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright
disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of
the Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent, as
well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. R-705-RTJ August 23, 1989
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, LEONILA FUERTES and EDGARDO SERVANDO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, RTC, Br. 51, Puerto Princess City and ANNA BELLE
CARDENAS, respondents.
A.M. No. R-698-P August 23, 1989
JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, complainant,
vs.
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 52, Puerto Princess City, respondent.
A.M. No. 2909 August 23, 1989
JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, complainant,
vs.
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 52, Puerto Princess City, respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
In a complaint under oath dated July 21, 1986, docketed as Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-
Austria, then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Puerto Princess City 1 Mrs.
Leonila Fuertes and Mr. Edgardo Servando charged Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, then Presiding Judge of RTC,
Branch 51, Puerto Princess City 2 with:
 1. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents, by verifying official hours rendered by
one employee in the person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who never reported for duty from August
1983 to May 1984 by encashing and receiving salaries of said Miss Cardenas through forgery of
payee's signature in the treasury warrants, thus deceiving the government and defrauding the
Government treasury of a big amount of money;
2. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting, demanding, receiving bribed (sic) money in
exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different litigants in Branch 52, where said
Judge was temporarily assigned from November 1984 to April 1986 and of which one of the
undersigned complainant (sic), LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk of Court;
3. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as part and
condition of his continued employment in Branch 51, where Judge Abaya is the presiding judge.,
Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment dated August 29, 1986, filed in compliance with the Court
Resolution of August 12, 1986. He asserted that these charges were concocted in retaliation against the
administrative complaint docketed as Adm. Matter No. 698-P he earlier filed on July 18,1986 against one of his
accusers, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for dishonesty and grave misconduct in having forged his signature in a
probation order in Criminal Case No. 4995 of the RTC, Branch 52, Puerto Princess, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Leonardo Cruz," for attempted murder. Adm. Matter No. 698-P was followed by a petition dated
August 5,1986 docketed as Adm. Case No. 2909 for the disbarment of Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria based on the
same alleged offense.
After Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria had filed her comment on the charges against her, the Court resolved to
consolidate these related cases.
On October 28, 1986, the Court granted the motion of the complainants in Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ to amend
their complaint by including Annabelle Cardenas as defendant in the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents. It was averred therein that the initial exclusion was due to oversight and that it was never intended to
exclude her as a co-principal.
By resolution of December 11, 1986, the cases were referred to Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera for
investigation, report and recommendation. Based on the evidence presented by the parties, Justice Herrera finds
the respondents guilty of the charges against them and thereby recommends:
1. The FORFEITURE of retirement benefits of Judge Abaya except earned leave credits;
2. The REMOVAL of Annabelle Cardenas from office as Court Stenographer;
3. A one-year SUSPENSION from office as Attorney of Atty. Ligaya G. Austria in AC-2909.4
We now consider these well-thought out recommendations.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. R-705-RTJ:
a. Estafa thru Falsification of Public or Official Documents by Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas.— The
gravamen of this charge is that Annabelle Cardenas who was appointed as Stenographic Reporter of Branch 51,
RTC, Palawan in August 1983 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya as Presiding Judge therein, was a ghost
employee from August 1983 to May 1984 as she never reported for work during said period, being then employed
at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist guide. Notwithstanding, with her knowledge and consent, Judge Abaya
verified as true and correct her daily time records as stenographic reporter purportedly showing that she rendered
service and incurred no absences or tardiness from August 9 to September 30, 1983 and rendered service for the
period from October 1, 1983 to May 31, 1984 and was granted leave of absence from March 14 to 30, 1984 and
from April 23 to 27, 1984. Thus, she was paid her salaries corresponding to the periods allegedly worked. Some of
the Treasury Warrants covering her salaries were, according to complainants, encashed by Judge Abaya by
forging Annabelle Cardenas' signature.
Both Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas vehemently denied the charges, countering that the latter worked as
stenographic reporter from August 1983 to May 31, 1984.
We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to be supported by substantial evidence.
Especially damaging to the pretensions of the respondents that Annabelle Cardenas rendered service as
stenographic reporter during the period under consideration are the school records of the Holy Trinity College,
showing that Annabelle Cardenas was attending school in the first semester of school year 1983-1984 from 2:00
P.M. to 8:15 P.M.5 While she claimed to have been permitted by her teacher to attend her typing and stenography
classes after office hours, the school records reveal that she has other subjects such as Business Organization and
Management (3 units), Ten Commandments (3 units), Sining ng Pakikipagtalastas (3 units) and Accounting for
Single Proprietorship (3 units), her attendance in which can be safely concluded from the passing grades she
received in said subjects. Equally damaging to respondents' assertion are the Daily Time Records of Princess
Tours 6 showing that Annabelle Cardenas acted as tourist guide on 43 working days when she was supposedly
rendering service as stenographic reporter. Her explanation that her name was placed on the daily time record as
team leader, although she did not actually conduct the tours reflected therein is too shallow to merit belief.
It is indeed quite intriguing that during the ten-month period under consideration, the court calendar for Branch 51
never once carried Annabelle Cardenas' name to signify her attendance at a court session. Moreover, she could
not produce any single order, transcript or official stenographic notes that had been taken by her in any case, civil
or criminal. All she presented were so-called practice notes.
Judge Abaya stated in his comment that it was Annabelle Cardenas who was collecting her salary "without
intervention from your respondent.7 It was however proved that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas'
salaries on several occasions, as in fact, said Annabelle Cardenas even executed a special power of attorney in his
favor authorizing him not only to collect the treasury warrants but to endorse and negotiate them as well. 8 Be that
as it may, we find the evidence insufficient on the one hand to overthrow the explanation of respondents that Judge
Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries in Manila so that he could bring the same to Candon, Ilocos Sur for
delivery to her mother, who is a good friend of the Judge; and on the other hand to support complainants' theory
that Judge Abaya appropriated the money for himself.
b. Charges of Gross Dishonesty and Corruption by Soliciting, Demanding and Receiving Bribe Money against
Judge Abaya. — The act complained of was allegedly committed by Judge Abaya while temporarily assigned to
Branch 52, RTC Palawan vice Judge Jose G. Genilo Jr., who was temporarily assigned to Batangas City. It must
be recalled that complainant Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria was then Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 52.
It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for bail of the accused in Criminal Case No. 5304 entitled
"People vs. Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot for murder, in consideration of the sum of P 2,000.00 given by Mrs.
Leonila Fuertes, complainant and mother of the victim in the aforesaid case.
Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, a school teacher, testified that she went to Branch 52 at about 5:00 P.M. on August 13, 1985
in response to a telephone call from court stenographer Nelly Vicente that Judge Abaya wanted to see her
personally. Nelly Vicente referred her to Carmencita P. Baloco, the officer-in-charge who then called Judge Abaya
from the other branch. Judge Abaya directed her to the adjoining courtroom where he told her, "Ang kaso ninyo ay
medyo tagilid, 50-50 dahil walang eyewitness." (Your case is shaky with only a 50-50 chance of winning because
there is no eyewitness.) She retorted that there was an eyewitness but the Judge insisted that there was none
because the supposed eyewitness had his back turned when her son was stabbed. Nonetheless, the Judge
assured her that he would be able to do something about it ("Ngunit lahat ay magagawan ko ng paraan dahil ako
ang nakakaalam sa mga decision dito").lâwphî1.ñèt When Mrs. Fuertes asked the Judge what he wanted, he told
her that he has a problem. "Kailangan ko ng pera Limang Libo at Ide-deny ko ang bail na mga acusado" (I need
Five Thousand Pesos and I will deny bail to the accused). Mrs. Fuertes expressed puzzlement on why she had to
give money when she was the aggrieved party, but the Judge cut her off by saying he needed the money badly
before he leaves for Manila. Mrs. Fuertes answered that she would have to consult her brothers-in-law about the
matter. The Judge told her to see him at his house at 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
Mrs. Fuertes consulted her brothers-in-law as well as the then prosecuting fiscal, now Judge Angel R. Miclat about
the matter. Although they were all against the Idea of her acceding to the Judge's demand, she delivered the
amount of Pl,200.00 to Judge Abaya on August 15,1985 in his chambers, telling him that was all she could afford.
Judge Abaya looked dissatisfied but said "Never mind" and that he would just contact her at the next trial for the
final judgment. 9
Roselyn Teologo, stenographic reporter of Branch 52 corroborated that portion of Mrs. Fuertes' testimony relating
to the phone call of Nelly Vicente to Mrs. Fuertes, the latter's arrival on August 13, 1985 at Branch 52 and Mrs.
Fuertes having been closeted with Judge Abaya inside the courtroom for about 20 minutes. She further testified
that Carmen Baloco who eavesdropped on the Judge and Mrs. Fuertes' conversation remarked, "Grabe ito,
nanghihingi ng pera." (This is terrible, he is asking money.) She added that when Judge Abaya emerged from the
courtroom, he instructed her not to tell anybody that Mrs. Fuertes had been there. 10
Additional corroborative evidence was given by Judge Angel R. Miclat, then acting City Fiscal for Puerto Princess
City handling Criminal Case No. 5304. He testified that Mrs. Fuertes came to him in August of 1986 to inform him
that Judge Abaya was asking P5,000.00 from her so that the bail application of the accused would be denied.
While he advised her to file a complaint against Judge Abaya, he was informed later on that Mrs. Fuertes gave
Judge Abaya not the amount being asked, but only about P1,200.00. 11
Likewise submitted in evidence by the complainants were the entries in Mrs. Fuertes' diary, thus:
August 13, 1985 called by Judge Abaya to see him after office hours. He asked me for my case
was 50-50.12
August 15, I went to town to see Baby Francisco, gave P2,000 and I brought the money to
Judge. 13
July 2, 1986 Judge Abaya with companion Rufo Gonzales and Celia Fernandez. Purpose they
convinced me to sign my name in the affidavit stating that I will deny the previous affidavit I made
stated that Judge asked from me certain amount and his request was granted. But I did not sign
and asked me to see him in town at the residence of Menchie his niece personally nakiusap kay
Baby upang mai-deny ang affidavit ko through Atty. Austria ay nakiusap pa rin. He is talking care
Nanette na idinay ko. 13-A
Judge Abaya denied the solicitation as well as the receipt of money from Mrs. Fuertes. He alleged that the bail
application of the accused in Criminal Case No. 5304 was denied, not because of any outside interference, but
because the evidence of guilt was strong. He surmised that Mrs. Fuertes and Nelly Vicente had been pressured by
Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria into testifying against him out of sheer vindictiveness and that Mrs. Fuertes might
have been blaming him for the delay in the resolution of the criminal case against her son's alleged killers.
We quote with approval Justice Herrera's perceptive reasons for giving full faith and credence to Mrs. Fuertes'
testimony:
We find no improper motive as to why Mrs. Fuertes, a school teacher, would impute such a serious
offense against a judge unless it be the truth. Mrs. Fuertes is not a disgruntled litigant. Judge
Abaya having denied the petition for bail of the suspected killer of Mrs, Fuertes' son, she should,
under normal circumstances be grateful to the Judge. Yet she charged him with a serious offense,
and travelled all the way from Palawan to Manila to testify against the Judge. Under the
circumstances, We cannot accept Judge Abaya's contention that Mrs. Fuertes perjured herself just
to accommodate the vengeanceful ire of Atty. Austria against Judge Abaya. That would be contrary
to the ordinary prompting of men.
Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mrs. Fuertes is too rich in details brought out on cross-
examination which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrications. They find support in
collateral but highly significant circumstances pointed to by Mrs. Teologo, such as (1) the visible
presence of Mrs. Fuertes in the courtroom in conference with Judge Abaya at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of August 15, (should be 13) 1985; and (2) the highly credible testimony of Judge Miclat
on the report made to him by Mrs. Fuertes, as then acting City Fiscal, on the solicitation of Judge
Abaya. It certainly cannot be said that Mrs. Fuertes merely concocted her story at the time
regarding the solicitation of Judge Abaya in connection with the pending case of the suspected
killers of her son. There was absolutely no motive for her to do So.14
c. Charge of illegal Exaction against Judge Abaya. — It is alleged that Judge Abaya exacted portions of the
salaries of two (2) employees in Branch 51 of the Palawan RTC as a condition for their continued employment.
Edgardo Servando, one of the complainants herein, and who was appointed stenographer on September 3, 1984
upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya, declared that such recommendation was made in consideration of his
agreement to give Judge Abaya Pl,000.00 from his initial salary and thereafter a monthly amount of P400.00, which
undertaking he complied with. However, in December when the Judge before leaving for Manila for the Christmas
vacation asked him for Pl,000.00 from as fringe benefits, medical allowance and year-end bonus, he was unable to
comply as he did not then have cash, the payment of said benefits having been in checks. A week later, he
received a notice of termination effective at the close of business hours on December 31, 1984 from the Supreme
Court upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya.15
Nilo Jamora, a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified that since his employment in said Branch, Judge Abaya
had been exacting from him P350.00 every payday, which exaction ceased only in March 1986 when Atty. Ligaya
Gonzales-Austria filed her charges against Judge Abaya. He further stated that when he refused to retract his
charges against Judge Abaya before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan despite the Judge's offer of money, the latter
demoted him to process server.16
Judge Abaya likewise denied this charge, labelling the same as sheer vindictiveness due to Servando's termination
and Jamora's demotion, fanned by Atty. Austria's proddings. He insists that the personnel action taken on
Servando and Jamora was due to their inefficiency.
While the investigating officer, Justice Herrera observed that both Servando and Jamora "testified in a natural and
straightforward, albeit in an angry manner without attempting to conceal their contempt for Judge Abaya, 17 he
concluded that "the evidence in this regard would be unable to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample
corroboration. It would simply be the word of one against a judge. 18
We are in accord with this observation, for indeed, the charge if true is so demeaning to an RTC judge that it
requires more than a bare allegation to sustain it. In this regard, we give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt.
In summation, we find Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting Ms integrity and
moral character which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had his resignation not been accepted.
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end — to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially. In
regarding justice as a commodity to be sold at a price, Judge Abaya betrayed the very essence of magistracy. In
complicity with Annabelle Cardenas, he likewise abused the trust and confidence of the people, shortchanging
them of services undoubtedly vital to the speedy administration of justice.
The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness
to obey the law. 19 For him then to transgress the highest ideals of justice and public service for personal gain is
indeed a demoralizing example constituting a valid cause for disenchantment and loss of confidence in the judiciary
as well as in the civil service system.
By these acts, Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and unworthiness of the honor and requisites attached
to his office. As he had previously resigned, we hereby order the forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except earned
leave credits, as recommended by the investigating officer Justice Herrera.
We further mete out to Annabelle Cardenas in consequence of her grave misconduct as above-described the
penalty of removal from office as Court Stenographer with prejudice to her re-appointment to the Judiciary.
II. A.M. No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909
The complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct in A.M. No. R-698-P and for disbarment in Adm. Case No.
2909 against Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then Clerk of Court of Branch 52, RTC Palawan, stem from her act of
having allegedly forged the signature of Judge Abaya in a probation order dated April 22, 1986 in Criminal Case
No. 4999 of said court entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cruz" for attempted homicide.
Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the probation order and of having promulgated it, but
explains that these were done with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya, who had asked her to prepare
orders and decisions in Branch 52 to ease his load of presiding over two (2) branches. She adverts to Judge
Abaya's order of November 4, 1985 which granted accused Leonardo Cruz' motion for reconsideration of the order
denying probation. This order, which carried certain conditions, set the promulgation of the probation order on
January 16, 1986 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. In the meantime, Judge Abaya requested Atty. Austria to prepare
the probation order with the day and month in blank for the signature of the Judge.
On January 16,1986, Judge Abaya was absent so the promulgation was reset to April 16, 1986. On the latter date,
the provincial warden failed to bring the accused to court, hence the promulgation of the probation order was again
reset to June 3, 1986, with Judge Abaya allegedly giving instructions before he left for Manila to promulgate said
order even in his absence should the probationer Leonardo Cruz arrive in court.
On April 21, 1986, Leonardo Cruz came and begged that the probation order be promulgated the following day,
April 22, 1986 as he had to leave for Coron in the same pumpboat that brought him to Puerto Princess and he had
no money to sustain him up to the time the Judge arrives from Manila. As requested, the promulgation was set on
April 22, 1986, only for Atty. Austria to discover that Judge Abaya had neglected to sign the probation order. In
view of the predicament of Leonardo Cruz and the authority granted to her by Judge Abaya, Atty. Austria signed
Judge Abaya's name to the probation order and promulgated it.
Atty. Austria justifies her action under the theory of agency (Art. 1881 of the Civil Code) 20 in that having been
granted full authority to promulgate the probation order, she necessarily had the authority to sign the Judge's name
if the need arose. She further maintains that as Judge Abaya never complained about the alleged forgery, he is
deemed to have ratified it and is now estopped from questioning her authority. Lastly, she compares the probation
order to a writ of execution which is usually done by the Clerk of Court. 21
Respondent's arguments are quite novel but unpersuasive. As thoroughly explained by Justice Herrera:
.....her explanation that she is the one preparing decisions and orders in Branch 52 with the
knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya during the time that the latter was acting as Presiding
Judge of said branch and that she was directed to promulgate the probation order in favor of
Leonardo Cruz only to discover that the judge overlooked to sign the order, even if true, is not a
valid justification for her to simulate the signature of Judge Abaya in the probation order. This is
patently illegal. As a lawyer and branch clerk of court, she ought to know that under no
circumstances is her act of signing the name of the judge permissible. She could have probably
released the order with the statement that it is upon orders of the judge or by authority of the judge
but she could not under any circumstance make it appear as she did in this case that the Judge
signed the order when in fact he did not. The duties of the clerk of court in the absence of any
express direction of the Judge is well defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court
which reads:
Sec. 5. Duties of the Clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. — In the absence of the
judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving applications, petitions,
inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and notices that follow as a matter of course
under these rules, and may also, when directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts of
executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or
to the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, or to guardianship, trusteeships, or
receiverships, and forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence to the judge, together
with his findings in relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and include
the same in his report.
Signing orders in the name of, and simulating the signature of the judge is not one of them.
Atty. Austria's theory of agency that she lawfully acted as agent of the Judge is wholly devoid of
merit. The judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly personal to the Judge
because of, and by reason of his highest qualification, and can never be the subject of agency.
That would not only be contrary to law, but also subversive of public order and public policy. Nor
could her void act in signing the name of the judge be validly ratified by the latter. Judge Abaya
himself is bereft of any power to authorize the clerk of court to sign his name in his official capacity
in a matter pending adjudication before him. The issuance of the order in question is strictly judicial
and is exclusively vested in the judge which is beyond his authority to delegate. 22
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. 23 However, if that misconduct as a government
official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground. 24
We find Atty. Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court to affect her qualification as a member of tile Bar, for
precisely as a lawyer, she ought to have known the illegality of the act complained of.
WHEREFORE, finding the respondents Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, Annabelle Cardenas and Atty. Ligaya
Gonzales-Austria guilty as charged, except that of illegal exaction against Judge Abaya, the Court hereby orders:
1. In Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ, the FORFEITURE of the retirement benefits of Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya,
except his earned leave credits; and the DISMISSAL from office of Annabelle Cardenas as Stenographic Reporter
with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary; and,
2. In Adm. Matter No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909, the resignation of Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria as
Branch Clerk of Court IS ACCEPTED as of December 31, 1987 and any and all benefits accruing during her
government service are declared forfeited, except her earned leave credits. Her SUSPENSION as a member of the
Bar for a period of one year from the finality of this decision is further decreed.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for the filing of appropriate criminal charges against
respondents if warranted.
Copies of this resolution shall be attached to the respondents' respective personal records.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griñ;o-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 2995 November 27, 1996

ROMULO G. DINSAY, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. LEOPOLDO D. CIOCO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
Sometime in 1980, Planters Machinery Corporation (PLAMACO) mortgaged to Traders Royal Bank (the Bank)
certain properties as security for the payment of its loan. PLAMACO defaulted in the payment of the loan for which
reason the Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale held on March 8, 1994 and
conducted by Deputy Sheriff Renato M. Belleza, the mortgaged properties were sold to the bank, the sole bidder.
Thereafter, a Certificate of Sheriff's Sale 1 was executed by respondent Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco, then Clerk of
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, 2 which document was notarized by Judge Vivencio T. Ibrado, Sr. 3 on the same day. 4
In April of 1984, 5 records disclose that Page Four (4) of the said Certificate was surreptitiously substituted. The
new page lowered the bid price from the original amount of P3,263,182.67 6 to only P730,000.00. 7 Consequent to
such anomaly, respondent and Deputy Sheriff Renato M. Belleza, were administratively charged. In the first Dinsay
case, a per curiam resolution promulgated on December 12, 1986, we decreed their dismissal for "grave
misconduct highly prejudicial to the service". 8
In the instant complaint, respondent Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco is now sought to be disbarred on the basis of the
aforementioned incident that triggered his untimely dismissal.
Respondent, interposing res adjudicata, maintains that he may no longer be charged with disbarment as this was
deemed adjudicated in the first Dinsay case.
We find this contention to be without merit. "The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers," 9 as in this case. Neither can it be
successfully argued that the instant disbarment case has been already adjudicated in the first Dinsay case.
Therein, respondent was administratively proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the supervisory
authority of the Court. 10 Herein, respondent is sought to be disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary
authority over members of the legal profession. While respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same
misconduct, it does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature.
As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. 11 However, if that misconduct as a government
official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such
ground. 12
In this case, we agree with the findings of the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) that the participation of the
respondent in the changing of the bid price in the Certificate of Sheriff's Sale affects his fitness as a member of the
bar. As a lawyer, respondent knows that it is patently illegal to change the content of the said certificate after its
notarization, it being already a public document. 13 Respondent cannot seek refuge behind his averment that it was
purely ministerial on his part to sign the new Page Four (4) of the Certificate. 14 We struck down this argument in
the first Dinsay case and we will not adopt a different view here. At any rate, respondent cannot disclaim
knowledge of the legal consequences of his illegal act. Thus:
It should be noted that the substitution done would have left PLAMACO open to a deficiency
judgment case whereas the original bid by the BANK would totally extinguish PLAMACO's
obligation to the former. In such case, PLAMACO was effectively defrauded of the difference
between original bid and that substituted by respondent. 15
Considering the foregoing, we find the recommendation of the OBC that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as proper.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. LEOPOLDO D. CIOCO is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year from notice hereof, with a warning that repetition of similar acts and other administrative lapses will be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the personal record of the respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
CANON 7 UPHOLD THE DIGNITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989
at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of Delegates
(composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers:
NAME POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon President

Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Secretary, House of Delegates

Ronquillo

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Grapilon

Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern

Visayas
Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western
Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern

Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Governor & Vice-President for Western

Datumanong Mindanao
The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme Court en
banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had
witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some
newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists
for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C.
Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence
the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme
Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of
the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June
3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals,
was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon
himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that
characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis
Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating
Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free
Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously
critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal
candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money
and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon
allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations,
and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and
Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her.
Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho
Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala
and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions were promised to others by
the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel of the
Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to
her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly
"wined and dined continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x"
which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes
which were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP
politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of the
PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x
x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing
and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of
Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to inform the Court on the
veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate
approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-
political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of
Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The
fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would be chosen on the basis of professional
merit and willingness and ability to serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the election of
members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports
carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by
candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-
buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue,
upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand,
and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to
conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws
were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman,
and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-
Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's
Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed
light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the
Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters
and where they billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air
Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the
members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of
delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air
fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to
ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine
the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said, on
letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom
they, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing evidence given by
such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court, after
deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity tending
to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in
the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the
Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any
elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in
the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The following acts and practices
relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the
Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or
through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of the
biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing
distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the advertisement
thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or
against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of
food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any
 person; or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any
person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and
practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of
the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from
office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant
to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following violations were
established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vice-president, the
officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the country to solicit the
votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July
13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p.
123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern
Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their
candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes,
and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and requested the chapter
presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP
President. He started campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections
which determined the membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June
29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination forms
which read:
"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V.
Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor
L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius
Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg,
Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T.
Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo
B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo
Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had obtained (t.s.n.,
June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the
election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that. some of those who had committed their votes to
him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-
Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from
the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional Development) Assistant,
Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu),
Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy
Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about
the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May
1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to
the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary
Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB
plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch
a ride on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess their chances
in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and
asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled
that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional
development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in the middle of May. On the
same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR
office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant
Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys
Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group
had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the election of IBP
national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President; and for
Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni
(Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel
(Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A.
Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao
for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong Atienza
(Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia),
Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao),
Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L.
Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez,
Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and
Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He mentioned Oscar
Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back.
Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment from him because Atty.
Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms,
not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use them,
because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July
4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of
Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real,
Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh.
D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary
of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served as his
headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three
suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He
paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with
breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso
Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio
Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon
Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco
Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano
Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon,
Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan,
Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos
Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the
presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the
wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for
the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign
manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine
Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine Plaza was
made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first
came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He gave her
the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the
Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by the
Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation
with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment
of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for that down payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000

(d) Jay Castro 10,000

(e) Danny Deen 20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time the IBP embarks
on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the legal aid seminar and
the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She
allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room
where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to
Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta
Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong,
Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon
Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan,
Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro
Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina, Guerrero,
Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta,
Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for
rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July
5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of the members of his law firm are
fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being
sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon
Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma
rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who attended the legal
aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n.
July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of delegates he
knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes,
a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29
rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April
20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit manager,
and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed themselves to his
candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo
Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano
Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R.
Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo
Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II,
Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence from his office
to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some
moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When
asked about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon
being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle which included Art Tiu,
Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of
the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other groups The group had sessions as early
as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day
IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from his
room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for
Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as
the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed before and during the convention. It
was in these rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha
and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers
who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid
the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is
made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any election year. This
year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to
Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a],
IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data and copies of
a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their
tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his own printing
shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio
noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year than in previous years.
The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the
House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during the convention by
girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp.
142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP
BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy for
chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July
3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the Baguio-Benguet
IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor &
Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers
of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her
to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her
support during the chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region
(t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote to Nisce
changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce
confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was
Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989,
p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went around
saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters
informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned
Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his
disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified
that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who
offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon
invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation
(t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates had their
headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the
Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete
City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the
Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him
two PAL tickets and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the
offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy, approached
him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty.
Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the
Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar
Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra,
Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his campaign
which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some
delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang up
over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty.
Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in
the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of
the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of
the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star
hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates
billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member
House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-
ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the
procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the
reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a
PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter
presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the
case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo)
and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the
giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet
delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel
accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the
pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored
consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the
ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the
constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of
Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be
millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated
for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity
of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did
not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that
tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it
before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has
revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among
themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during
the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing
for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated
Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be
the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted
"power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections.
To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and
the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and
reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the
recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the
IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in
its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art.
XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors
(composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII,
Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the
presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July
9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the
office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who
has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after
the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall
begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and
Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional
governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-
President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board
of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and Vice-
Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-
Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and
Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed
by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in
Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region
to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of
Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before the national
convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of
which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held prior to any
election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985
(Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months,
after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of
Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president
and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held
on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single
Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that
election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of
the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of
such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

SECOND DIVISION
A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of
the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date &
place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at
least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and
1997: (originals available)
 Annex A .......- "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995
in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B .......- "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in
Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM

Annex C .......- "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File
Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-
G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member
of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10
which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports
to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for
payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the
Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some
of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on
October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM
(see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction
which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17,
1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above his
name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated
February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati,
denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art.
316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991.
Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after
which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-
memorandum,4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:5cräläwvirtualibräry
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No.
259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is
entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the
October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article
316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was
even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of
Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside
and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only
a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30
hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under
Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being
thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited
practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he
never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in
any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill
and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for
vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay
such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP
ordering respondents suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in
his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at
least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud
Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that
"being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect
in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in
the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax
Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by
using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues.
He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-
Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting
that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed.
He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is
exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and
the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default
in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll
of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it
does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption
from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the
poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit
the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues
and plea for a more temperate application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR,
or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas
personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC
B.M. No. 1222 February 4, 2004
Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman
of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the subject.
After making his own inquiries, Justice Vitug reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the
other members of the Court, recommending that the bar examination on the subject be nullified and that an
investigation be conducted forthwith. On 23 September 2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice
Vitug, and resolved to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another examination on 04 October
2003 at eight o’clock in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the De La Salle University, Taft
Avenue, Manila. The resolution was issued without prejudice to any action that the Court would further take on the
matter.
Following the issuance of the resolution, the Court received numerous petitions and motions from the Philippine
Association of Law Schools and various other groups and persons, expressing agreement to the nullification of the
bar examinations in Mercantile Law but voicing strong reservations against the holding of another examination on
the subject. Several reasons were advanced by petitioners or movants, among these reasons being the physical,
emotional and financial difficulties that would be encountered by the examinees, if another examination on the
subject were to be held anew. Alternative proposals submitted to the Court included the spreading out of the weight
of Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar subjects, i.e., to determine and gauge the results of the
examinations on the basis only of the performance of the examinees in the seven bar subjects. In a resolution,
dated 29 September 2003, the Court, finding merit in the submissions, resolved to cancel the scheduled
examination in Mercantile Law on 04 October 2003 and to allocate the fifteen percentage points among the seven
bar examination subjects. In the same resolution, the Court further resolved to create a Committee composed of
three retired members of the Court that would conduct a thorough investigation of the incident subject of the 23
September 2003 resolution.
In a resolution, dated 07 October 2003, the Court adopted the computation in the allocation of the fifteen
percentage points for Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar examination subjects, to wit:
Original Adjusted Adjusted
Relative
Subject Percentage Percentage Relative
Weight
Weight Weight Weight

Political and International Law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%

Labor and Social Legislation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%

Civil law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%

Taxation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%

Criminal law 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%

Remedial Law 20% 23.529% 4 4.71%

Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises 5% 5.882% 1 1.18%

 100% 20%
In another resolution, dated 14 October 2003, the Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to compose the Investigating Committee:
Chairman: Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino

Members: Justice Jose A.R. Melo

Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine and identify the source of leakage, the parties responsible
therefor or who might have benefited therefrom, recommend sanctions against all those found to have been
responsible for, or who would have benefited from, the incident in question and to recommend measures to the
Court to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.
On 15 January 2004, the Investigating Committee submitted its report and recommendation to the Court, herein
reproduced in full; thus -
"In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar examinations, the examination in
commercial law was held in De la Salle University on Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue of the bar examinations since
1995. The next day, the newspapers carried news of an alleged leakage in the said examination. 1
"Upon hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own, Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003
Bar Examinations Committee, reported the matter to the Chief Justice and recommended that the examination in
mercantile law be cancelled and that a formal investigation of the leakage be undertaken.
"Acting on the report and recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a resolution dated September 23, 2003,
nullified the examination in mercantile law and resolved to hold another examination in that subject on Saturday,
October 4, 2003 at eight o’clock in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the same venue.
However, because numerous petitions, protests, and motions for reconsideration were filed against the retaking of
the examination in mercantile law, the Court cancelled the holding of such examination. On the recommendation of
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court instead decided to allocate the fifteen (15) percentage points for
mercantile law among the seven (7) other bar examination subjects (Resolution dated October 7, 2003).
"In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the Supreme Court created an Investigating Committee composed of
three (3) retired Members of the Court to conduct an investigation of the leakage and to submit its findings and
recommendations on or before December 15, 2003.
"The Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the Committee:
Chairman: Justice CAROLINA GRIÑO-AQUINO

Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO

Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA
"The Investigating Committee was directed to determine and identify the source of the leakage, the parties
responsible therefor and those who benefited therefrom, and to recommend measures to safeguard the integrity of
the bar examinations.
"The investigation commenced on October 21, 2003 and continued up to November 7, 2003. The following
witnesses appeared and testified at the investigation:
1. Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee;
2. Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, law clerk in the office of Justice Vitug
3. Atty. Marcial O. T. Balgos, examiner in mercantile law;
4. Cheryl Palma, private secretary of Atty. Balgos;
5. Atty. Danilo De Guzman, assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos & Perez;
6. Atty. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner of Balgos & Perez;
7. Eduardo J. F. Abella, reviewer in commercial law at the Lex Review Center;
8. Silvestre T. Atienza, office manager of Balgos & Perez;
9. Reynita Villasis, private secretary of Atty. De Guzman;
10. Ronan Garvida, fraternity brother of Atty. De Guzman;
11. Ronald F. Collado, most illustrious brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity;
12. Jovito M. Salonga, Asst. Division Chief of Systems Development for Judicial Application, MlSO;
The Committee held nine (9) meetings - six times to conduct the investigation and three times to deliberate on its
report.
"ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE C. VITUG, chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee, testified that on Monday
morning, September 22, 2003, the day after the Bar examination in mercantile or commercial law, upon arriving in
his office in the Supreme Court, his secretary, 2 Rose Kawada, informed him that one of the law clerks, Atty. Marlo
Magdoza-Malagar, told her that a friend of hers named Ma. Cecilia Delgado-Carbajosa, a bar examinee from
Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro City, who was staying at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, confided to her that
something was wrong with the examination in mercantile law, because previous to the examination, i.e., on
Saturday afternoon, the eve of the examination, she received a copy of the test questions in that subject. She did
not pay attention to the test questions because no answers were provided, and she was hard-pressed to finish her
review of that subject, using other available bar review materials, of which there were plenty coming from various
bar review centers.
"However, upon perusing the questions after the examinations, Cecilia noticed that many of them were the same
questions that were asked in the just-concluded-examination.
"Justice Vitug requested Marlo to invite her friend to his office in the Supreme Court, but Carbajosa declined the
invitation. So, Justice Vitug suggested that Marlo and Rose invite Carbajosa to meet them at Robinson’s Place,
Ermita. She agreed to do that.
"Cecilia Carbajosa arrived at Robinson’s Place at the appointed time and showed the test questions to Rose and
Marlo. Rose obtained a xerox copy of the leaked questions and compared them with the bar questions in
mercantile law. On the back of the pages, she wrote, in her own hand, the differences she noted between the
leaked questions and the bar examination questions.
"Rose and Marlo delivered the copy of the leaked questions to Justice Vitug who compared them with the bar
examination questions in mercantile law. He found the leaked questions to be the exact same questions which the
examiner in mercantile law, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to him as chairman of the
Bar Examinations Committee. However, not all of those questions were asked in the bar examination. According to
Justice Vitug, only 75% of the final bar questions were questions prepared by Atty. Balgos; 25% prepared by
Justice Vitug himself, were included in the final bar examination. The questions prepared by Justice Vitug were not
among the leaked test questions.
"Apart from the published news stories about the leakage, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Justice Vitug
received, by telephone and mail, reports of the leakage from Dean Mariano F. Magsalin, Jr. of the Arellano Law
Foundation (Exh. H) and a certain Dale Philip R. De los Reyes (Exh. B -B-3), attaching copies of the leaked
questions and the fax transmittal sheet showing that the source of the questions was Danny De Guzman who faxed
them to Ronan Garvida on September 17, 2003, four days before the examination in mercantile law on September
21, 2003 (Exh. B-1).
"ATTORNEY MARLO MAGDOZA-MALAGAR was subpoenaed by the Committee. She identified the copy of the
leaked questions that came from Cecilia Carbajosa (Exh. A). She testified that, according to Carbajosa, the latter
received the test questions from one of her co-bar reviewees staying, like her, at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco,
and also enrolled in the review classes at the Lex Review Center at the corner of P. Faura Street and Roxas
Boulevard, Ermita. She did not pay for the hand-out because the Lex Review Center gives them away for free to its
bar reviewees.
"ATTORNEY MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS, 71 years of age, senior partner in the law firm of BALGOS AND PEREZ
with offices in Rm. 1009 West Tektite Tower, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, testified that in
November 2002, Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chair of the Committee on the 2003 Bar Examinations, invited him to be
the examiner in commercial law. He accepted the assignment and almost immediately began the preparation of
test questions on the subject. Using his personal computer in the law office, he prepared for three consecutive
days, three (3) sets of test questions which covered the entire subject of Mercantile Law (pp. 3-5, tsn, Oct. 24,
2003). As he did not know how to prepare the questionnaire in final form, he asked his private secretary, Cheryl
Palma, to format the questions (p. 13, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). And, as he did not know how to print the questionnaire,
he likewise asked Cheryl Palma to make a print-out (Id., pp. 14-15). All of this was done inside his office with only
him and his secretary there. His secretary printed only one copy (Id., p. 15). He then placed the printed copy of the
test questions, consisting of three sets, in an envelope which he sealed, and called up Justice Vitug to inform him
that he was bringing the questions to the latter’s office that afternoon. However, as Justice Vitug was leaving his
office shortly, he advised Atty. Balgos to give the sealed envelope to his confidential assistant who had been
instructed to keep it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in the office of Justice Vitug, he was met by Justice Vitug’s
confidential assistant to whom he entrusted the sealed envelope containing the test questions (pp. 19-26, tsn, Oct.
24, 2003).
"Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer except to type on it. He does not know
how to open and close his own computer which has a password for that purpose. In fact, he did not know, as he
still does, the password. It is his secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened and closed his computer for him (p. 45, tsn,
Oct. 24, 2003).
"Atty. Balgos testified that he did not devise the password himself. It was Cheryl Palma who devised it (Id., p. 71).
"His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is located inside his room which is locked when he is not in the
office. He comes to the office every other day only.
"He thought that his computer was safely insulated from third parties, and that he alone had access to it. He was
surprised to discover, when reports of the bar leakage broke out, that his computer was in fact interconnected with
the computers of his nine (9) assistant attorneys (tsn, pp. 30,45). As a matter of fact, the employees - Jovito M.
Salonga and Benjamin R. Katly - of the Court’s Management Information Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the
request of Atty. Balgos, were directed by the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in his office,
reported that there were 16, not 9, computers connected to each other via Local Area Network (LAN) and one (1)
stand-alone computer connected to the internet (Exh. M). Atty. Balgos’ law partner, former Justice Secretary
Hernando Perez, also had a computer, but Perez took it away when he became the Secretary of Justice.
"The nine (9) assistant attorneys with computers, connected to Attorney Balgos’ computer, are:
1. Zorayda Zosobrado (she resigned in July 2003)
2. Claravel Javier
3. Rolynne Torio
4. Mark Warner Rosal
5. Charlynne Subia
6. Danilo De Guzman (resigned on October 22, 2003 [Exh. D])
7. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner
8. Concepcion De los Santos
9. Pamela June Jalandoni
"Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared by him in mercantile law, Atty.
Balgos immediately called together and questioned his office staff. He interrogated all of them except Atty. Danilo
De Guzman who was absent then. All of them professed to know nothing about the bar leakage.
"He questioned Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, Atienza is only a second year law student at MLQU. But he is
an expert in installing and operating computers. It was he and/or his brother Gregorio who interconnected the
computers in the law office, including Attorney Balgos’ computer, without the latter’s knowledge and permission.
"Atienza admitted to Attorney Balgos that he participated in the bar operations or ‘bar ops’ of the Beta Sigma
Lambda law fraternity of which he is a member, but he clarified that his participation consisted only of bringing food
to the MLQU bar examinees (Tsn, pp. 46-47, Oct. 24, 2003).
"The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda
fraternity, FEU chapter. De Guzman admitted to him that he downloaded the test questions from Attorney Balgos’
computer and faxed a copy to a fraternity brother. Attorney Balgos was convinced that De Guzman was the source
of the leakage of his test questions in mercantile law (Tsn, p. 52, Oct. 24, 2003).
"Attorney Balgos prepared a COMPARISON (Exh. E) of the juxtaposed final bar questions and his proposed test
questions, with marginal markings made by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Ret.), indicating whether the questions
are similar: (S); or different: (D), together with the percentage points corresponding to each question. On the basis
of this comparative table and Atty. Balgos’ indications as to which questions were the same or different from those
given in the final questionnaire, Justice Mendoza computed the credit points contained in the proposed leaked
questions. The proposed questions constituted 82% of the final bar questions. Attached to this Report as Annex A
is the comparative table and the computation of credit points marked as Exh. E-1.
"CHERYL PALMA, 34 years old, private secretary of Attorney Balgos for the past six years, testified that she did
not type the test questions. She admitted, however, that it was she who formatted the questions and printed one
copy as directed by her employer. She confirmed Atty. Balgos’ testimony regarding her participation in the
operation of his personal computer. She disclosed that what appears in Atty. Balgos’ computer can be seen in the
neighborhood network if the other computers are open and not in use; that Silvestre Atienza of the accounting
section, can access Atty. Balgos’ computer when the latter is open and not in use.
"ATTORNEY ENRICO VELASCO, managing partner of the firm, testified that on October 16, 2003, he sent De
Guzman a memo (Exh. C) giving him ‘72 hours to explain in writing why you should not be terminated for causing
the Firm an undeserved condemnation and dishonor because of the leakage aforesaid.’
"On October 22, 2003, De Guzman handed in his resignation ‘effective immediately.’ He explained that:
‘Causing the firm, its partners and members to suffer from undeserved condemnation and humiliation is not only
farthest from, but totally out of, my mind. It is just unfortunate that the incident subject matter of your memorandum
occurred. Rest assured, though, that I have never been part of any deliberate scheme to malign the good
reputation and integrity of the firm, its partners and members.’ (Exh. D)
"DANILO DE GUZMAN testified that he joined Balgos & Perez in April 2000. He obtained his LLB degree from FEU
in 1998. As a student, he was an awardee for academic excellence. He passed the 1998 bar examinations with a
grade of 86.4%. In FEU, he joined the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity which has chapters in MLQU, UE and
MSU (Mindanao State University). As a member of the fraternity, he was active during bar examinations and
participated in the fraternity’s ‘bar ops.’
"He testified that sometime in May 2003, when he was exploring Atty. Balgos’ computer, (which he often did
without the owner’s knowledge or permission), to download materials which he thought might be useful to save for
future use, he found and downloaded the test questions in mercantile law consisting of 12 pages. He allegedly
thought they were quizzers for a book that Atty. Balgos might be preparing. He saved them in his hard disk.
"He thought of faxing the test questions to one of his fraternity ‘brods,’ a certain Ronan Garvida who, De Guzman
thought, was taking the 2003 bar examinations. Garvida is also a law graduate from FEU. He had taken the 2002
bar examinations, but did not pass.
"On September 17, 2003, four days before the mercantile law bar examination, De Guzman faxed a copy of the 12-
page-test questions (Exhs. I, I-1, I-2, I-3) to Garvida because earlier he was informed by Garvida that he was
retaking the bar examinations. He advised Garvida to share the questions with other ‘Betan’ examinees. He
allegedly did not charge anything for the test questions. Later, after the examination was over, Garvida ‘texted’
(sent a text message on his cell phone) him (De Guzman), that he did not take the bar examination.
"Besides Garvida, De Guzman faxed the mercantile law bar questions to another fraternity brother named Arlan
(surname unknown), through Reynita (Nanette) Villasis, his secretary (Tsn, pp. 20-28, Oct. 29, 2003). But he
himself faxed the questions to still another ‘brod’ named Erwin Tan who had helped him during the ‘bar ops’ in
1998 when he (De Guzman) took the bar examinations (Id., p. 28). He obtained the cell phone numbers of Arlan
and Erwin Tan from Gabby Tanpiengco whom he informed by text message, that they were ‘guide questions,’ not
tips, in the mercantile law examination.
"When he was confronted by Attorney Velasco on Wednesday after the examination, (news of the leakage was
already in all the newspapers), De Guzman admitted to Attorney Velasco that he faxed the questions to his
fraternity brothers, but he did not reveal where he got the test questions.
"De Guzman received a text message from Erwin Tan acknowledging that he received the test questions.
However, Erwin informed him that the questions were ‘kalat na kalat’ (all over the place) even if he did not share
them with others (Tsn, pp. 54-55, Oct. 29, 2003).
"De Guzman also contacted Garvida who informed him that he gave copies of the test questions to Betans Randy
Iñigo and James Bugain.
"Arlan also ‘texted’ De Guzman that almost all the questions were asked in the examination. Erwin Tan commented
that many of the leaked questions were asked in the examination, ‘pero hindi exacto; mi binago’ (they were not
exactly the same; there were some changes).
"De Guzman tried to text Garvida, but he received no response.
"De Guzman disclosed that he learned how to operate a computer from Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, and
through self-study, by asking those who are knowledgeable on computers. He has been using computers since
1997, and he bought his own computer in 2001, a Pentium 3, which he uses at home.
"REYNITA VILLASIS, the 36-year-old legal secretary of Attorney De Guzman, submitted her affidavit (Exh. F) and
orally affirmed her participation in the reproduction and transmittal by fax of the leaked test questions in mercantile
law to Ronan Garvida and Arlan, as testified by De Guzman.
"RONAN GARVIDA, appeared before the Investigating Committee in compliance with the subpoena that was
issued to him. Garvida graduated from FEU College of Law in 2000. He is about 32 years of age. While still a
student in 1998, he was afflicted with multiple sclerosis or MS, a disease of the nervous system that attacks the
nerve sheaths of the brain and spinal cord. It is a chronic disabling disease although it may have periods of
remission. It causes its victim to walk with erratic, stiff and staggering gait; the hands and fingers may tremble in
performing simple actions; the eyesight can be impaired, and speech may be slow and slurred (p. 737, Vol. 2,
Reader’s Digest Medical Encyclopedia, 1971 Ed., compiled by Benjamin F. Miller, M.D.). All these symptoms were
present when Garvida testified before the Committee on November 6, 2003 to answer its questions regarding his
involvement in the leakage of the examiner’s test questions in mercantile law.
"Garvida testified that when he was a freshman at FEU, he became a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity
where he met and was befriended by Attorney De Guzman who was his senior by one and a half years. Although
they had been out of touch since he went home to the province on account of the recurrence of his illness, De
Guzman was able [to] get this cell phone number from his compadre, Atty. Joseph Pajara. De Guzman told Garvida
that he was faxing him ‘possible questions in the bar examination in mercantile law.’ Because the test questions
had no answers, De Guzman stressed that they were not ‘tips’ but only ‘possible test questions.’
"Garvida had intended to take the 2003 bar examinations. He enrolled in the Consortium Review Center in FEU,
paying P10,000.00 as enrollment fee. However, on his way to the Supreme Court to file his application to take the
bar examination, he suffered pains in his wrist - symptoms that his MS had recurred. His physician advised him to
go to the National Orthopedic Hospital in Quezon City for treatment. This he did.
"He gave up his plan to take the 2003 bar examinations. Nevertheless, he continued to attend the review classes at
the Consortium Review Center because he did not want to waste completely the P10,000-enrollment fee that he
paid for the review course (‘Nahihinayang ako’). That was presumably why De Guzman thought that Garvida was
taking the bar exams and sent him a copy of the test questions in mercantile law.
"Upon receipt of the test questions, Garvida faxed a copy to his ‘brod’ Randy Iñigo who was reviewing at the
Consortium Review Center. Randy photocopied them for distribution to other fraternity brods. Some of the brods
doubted the usefulness of the test questions, but Randy who has a high regard for De Guzman, believed that the
questions were ‘tips.’ Garvida did not fax the questions to any other person than Randy Iñigo. He allegedly did not
sell the questions to Randy. ‘I could not do that to a brod,’ he explained.
"In view of the fact that one of the copies of the leaked test questions (Exh. H) bore on the left margin a rubber
stamp composed of the Greek initials ‘BEA-MLQU,’ indicating that the source of that copy was the Beta Sigma
Lambda chapter at MLQU, the Committee subpoenaed Ronald Collado, the Most Illustrious Brother of the Beta
Sigma Lambda fraternity of MLQU.
"RONALD COLLADO is a senior law student at the MLQU. He admitted that his fraternity conducted ‘Bar Ops’ for
the 2003 bar exams. Bar Ops are the biggest activity of the fraternity every year. They start as soon as new officers
of the fraternity are elected in June, and they continue until the bar examinations are over. The bar operations
consist of soliciting funds from alumni brods and friends to be spent in reproducing bar review materials for the use
of their ‘barristers’ (bar candidates) in the various review centers, providing meals for their ‘brod’-barristers on
examination days; and to rent a ‘bar site’ or place near De la Salle University where the examinees and the frat
members can convene and take their meals during the break time. The Betans’ bar site for the 2003 bar
examinations was located on Leon Guinto Street, Malate. On September 19 and 21, before [the] start of the
examination, Collado’s fraternity distributed bar review materials for the mercantile law examination to the
examinees who came to the bar site. The test questions (Exh. H) were received by Collado from a brod, Alan
Guiapal, who had received them from Randy Iñigo.
"Collado caused 30 copies of the test questions to be printed with the logo and initials of the fraternity (BEA-MLQU)
for distribution to the 30 MLQU examinees taking the bar exams. Because of time constraints, frat members were
unable to answer the test questions despite the clamor for answers, so, they were given out ‘as is’ - without
answers.
"DEAN EDUARDO J. F. ABELLA of the Jose Rizal University law school in Mandaluyong City, was the reviewer in
Mercantile Law and Practical Exercises at the Lex Review Center which is operated by the Lex Review & Seminars
Inc., of which Dean Abella is one of the incorporators. He learned about the leakage of test questions in mercantile
law when he was delivering the pre-week lecture on Legal Forms at the Arellano University. The leaked questions
were shown to him by his secretary, Jenylyn Domingo, after the mercantile law exam. He missed the Saturday
lecture in mercantile law because he was suffering from a touch of flu. He gave his last lecture on the subject on
Wednesday or Thursday before the exam. He denied having bought or obtained and distributed the leaked test
questions in Mercantile Law to the bar reviewees in the Lex Review Center.
"F I N D I N G S
"The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the questions which the examiner,
Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chairman of the 2003 Bar
Examinations Committee. The questions constituted 82% of the questions asked in the examination in Mercantile
Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some cases with slight changes which were not substantial
and in other cases exactly as proposed by Atty. Balgos. Hence, any bar examinee who was able to get hold of the
leaked questions before the mercantile law examination and answered them correctly, would have been assured of
passing the examination with at least a grade of 82%!
"The circumstance that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions prepared by Atty. Balgos,
proves conclusively that the leakage originated from his office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug, the Bar
Examinations Chairman.
"Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his computer. Without any doubt, the
source of the leaked test questions was Atty. Balgos’ computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from
Atty. Balgos’ computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty.
Balgos’ legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating
Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his secretary Reynita Villasis, to
his fraternity ‘brods,’ namely, Ronan Garvida, Arlan (whose surname he could not recall), and Erwin Tan.
"In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iñigo and James Bugain.
"Randy Iñigo passed a copy or copies of the same questions to another Betan, Alan Guiapal, who gave a copy to
the MLQU-Beta Sigma [Lambda’s] Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald F. Collado, who ordered the printing and
distribution of 30 copies to the MLQU’s 30 bar candidates.
"Attorney Danilo De Guzman’s act of downloading Attorney Balgos’ test questions in mercantile law from the
latter’s computer, without his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual
property; the test questions were intellectual property of Attorney Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal
knowledge.
"Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos’ right to privacy of
communication, and to security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search and seizure - rights
zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution).
"He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that ‘[a]
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.’
"By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity,
possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them undue advantage over the other examiners in the mercantile law
examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is
violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the
Bar, which provide:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
"De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the law instead of
promoting respect for it and degraded the noble profession of law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity. His
actuations impaired public respect for the Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as the final
measure of a law graduate’s academic preparedness to embark upon the practice of law.
However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman was solely responsible for the leakage of
Atty. Balgos’ proposed test questions in the mercantile law examination. The Committee does not believe that he
acted alone, or did not have the assistance and cooperation of other persons, such as:
"Cheryl Palma, Atty. Balgos’ private secretary, who, according to Atty. Balgos himself, was the only person who
knew the password, who could open and close his computer; and who had the key to his office where his computer
was kept. Since a computer may not be accessed or downloaded unless it is opened, someone must have opened
Atty. Balgos’ computer in order for De Guzman to retrieve the test questions stored therein.
"Silvestre Atienza, also a fraternity ‘brod’ of De Guzman, who was responsible for interconnecting Atty. Balgos’
computer with the other computers outside Atty. Balgos’ room or office, and who was the only other person,
besides Cheryl Palma, who knew the password of Atty. Balgos’ computer.
"The following persons who received from De Guzman, and distributed copies of the leaked test questions, appear
to have conspired with him to steal and profit from the sale of the test questions. They could not have been
motivated solely by a desire to help the fraternity, for the leakage was widespread (‘kalat na kalat’) according to
Erwin Tan. The possible co-conspirators were:
Ronan Garvida,
Arlan,
Erwin Tan,
Randy Iñigo,
Ronald Collado, and
Allan Guiapal
"The Committee does not believe that De Guzman recklessly broke the law and risked his job and future as a
lawyer, out of love for the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity. There must have been an ulterior material consideration
for his breaking the law and tearing the shroud of secrecy that, he very well knows, covers the bar examinations.
"On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions from Atty. Balgos’ computer could have
been avoided if Atty. Balgos had exercised due diligence in safeguarding the secrecy of the test questions which
he prepared. As the computer is a powerful modern machine which he admittedly is not fairly familiar with, he
should not have trusted it to deep secret the test questions that he stored in its hard disk. He admittedly did not
know the password of his computer. He relied on his secretary to use the password to open and close his
computer. He kept his computer in a room to which other persons had access. Unfamiliar with the use of the
machine whose potential for mischief he could not have been totally unaware of, he should have avoided its use for
so sensitive an undertaking as typing the questions in the bar examination. After all he knew how to use the
typewriter in the use of which he is quite proficient. Atty. Balgos should therefore have prepared the test questions
in his trusty typewriter, in the privacy of his home, (instead of his law office), where they would have been safe from
the prying eyes of secretaries and assistant attorneys. Atty. Balgos’ negligence in the preparation and safekeeping
of his proposed test questions for the bar examination in mercantile law, was not the proximate cause of the ‘bar
leakage;’ it was, in fact, the root cause. For, if he had taken those simple precautions to protect the secrecy of his
papers, nobody could have stolen them and copied and circulated them. The integrity of the bar examinations
would not have been sullied by the scandal. He admitted that ‘Mali siguro ako, but that was what happened’ (43
tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
"R E C O M M E N D A T I O N
"This Honorable court in the case of Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA 276, pronounced
the following reminder for lawyers: ‘Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty and integrity of the profession.’ In another case, it likewise
intoned: ‘We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients.’
(Reyes v. Javier, A.C. No. 5574, February 2, 2002, 375 SCRA 538). It goes without saying that a lawyer who
violates this precept of the profession by committing a gross misconduct which dishonors and diminishes the
public’s respect for the legal profession, should be disciplined.
"After careful deliberation, the Investigating Committee recommends that:
"1. Attorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is morally unfit to continue as a
member of the legal profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of integrity, and criminal behavior. In addition, he
should make a written PUBLIC APOLOGY and pay DAMAGES to the Supreme Court for involving it in
another ‘bar scandal,’ causing the cancellation of the mercantile law examination, and wreaking havoc
upon the image of this institution.
 "2. Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be REPRIMANDED by the Court and likewise be required to
make a written APOLOGY to the Court for the public scandal he brought upon it as a result of his
negligence and lack of due care in preparing and safeguarding his proposed test questions in mercantile
law. As the Court had to cancel the Mercantile Law examination on account of the ‘leakage’ of Attorney
Balgos’ test questions, which comprised 82% of the bar questions in that examination, Atty. Balgos is not
entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject.
"3. FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida,
Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iñigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal by the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Philippine National Police, with a view to their criminal prosecution as probable co-
conspirators in the theft and leakage of the test questions in mercantile law.
"With regard to recommending measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations and prevent a repetition
of future leakage in the said examinations, inasmuch as this matter is at present under study by the Court’s
Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, as an aspect of proposals for bar reforms, the Investigating
Committee believes it would be well-advised to refrain from including in this report what may turn out to be
duplicative, if not contrary, recommendations on the matter."3
The Court adopts the report, including with some modifications the recommendation, of the Investigating
Committee. The Court, certainly will not countenance any act or conduct that can impair not only the integrity of the
Bar Examinations but the trust reposed on the Court.
The Court also takes note that Mr. Jovito M. Salonga and Mr. Benjamin R. Katly, two of its employees assigned to
the Management Information Systems Office (MISO), who were tasked by the Investigating Committee to inspect
the computer system in the office of Atty. Balgos, found that the Court’s Computer-Assisted Legal Research
(CALR) database4 was installed in the computer used by Atty. Balgos. Mr. Salonga and Mr. Katly reported that the
system, which was developed by the MISO, was intended for the exclusive use of the Court. The installation
thereof to any external computer would be unauthorized without the permission of the Court. Atty. Velasco
informed the two Court employees that the CALR database was installed by Atty. De Guzman on the computer
being used by Atty. Balgos. The matter would also need further investigation to determine how Atty. De Guzman
was able to obtain a copy of the Court’s CALR database.
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to -
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this
RESOLUTION;
(2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O.T. BALGOS and DISENTITLE him from receiving any honorarium as
an Examiner in Mercantile Law;
(3) Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake further investigation of Danilo De Guzman,
Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Erwin Tan, Randy Iñigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado
and Allan Guiapal with a view to determining their participation and respective accountabilities in the bar
examination leakage and to conduct an investigation on how Danilo De Guzman was able to secure a copy
of the Supreme Court’s CALR database.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the records of Danilo De Guzman in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by
the Office of the Court Administrator to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.
Tinga, J., No part. Close to family of one of the parties involved in bar scandal.

EN BANC
B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner
Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of
P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to,
and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be
assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law
prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the
years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based
on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues
to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined
by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as
necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no
exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to
help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of
payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and
reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the
IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his
obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process
of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of
Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of
Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether
or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the
due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would
indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived
from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-
member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to
the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the
time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was
working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member.5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the
lawyers.7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar 8 -
which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is,
indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar, 9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to
levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a
revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it
may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar
program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it
the power to impose such exaction.
 The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs
the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as
correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay
abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to
pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing
the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the
meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, 11 one of
which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the
gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his
suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8392 June 29, 2010
[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175 ]
ROSARIO T. MECARAL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD)1 with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct which
she detailed in her Position Paper2 as follows:
After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover and common-law wife. In October 2007,
respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a religious
group known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of which he was the leader. Although he visited
her daily, his visits became scarce in November to December 2007, prompting her to return home to Naval, Biliran.
Furious, respondent brought her back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed
and injected her with drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007, the members of the group tied her
spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a
day by the women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.
Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received information that she was weak, pale and
walking barefoot along the streets in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial Social
Welfare Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers to rescue her. The religious group
refused to release her, however, without the instruction of respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and
PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her mother.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint against respondent. Additionally, complainant charges respondent with
bigamy for contracting a second marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996, despite the subsistence of his
marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.
In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including the following: Affidavit 3 of Delia dated
February 5, 2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee and PO1 Robedillo4 dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the Certificate
of Marriage5 between respondent and Leny H. Azur; photocopy of the Marriage Contract6 between respondent and
Shirley G. Yunzal; National Statistics Office Certification7 dated April 23, 2008 showing the marriage of Ma. Shirley
G. Yunzal to respondent on April 27, 1990 in Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H. Azur to respondent on
August 2, 1996 in Mandaue City, Cebu; and certified machine copy of the Resolution 8 of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran and the Information9 lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval, Biliran, for
Serious Illegal Detention against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on complaint of herein complainant.
Despite respondent’s receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order 10 of the Director for Bar Discipline for him to submit
his Answer within 15 days from receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to "properly make [his] defense in a
verified pleading,"11 he did not file any Answer.1avvphi1
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of which the parties were duly notified, only
complainant’s counsel was present. Respondent and his counsel failed to appear.
Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report and Recommendation 12 dated
September 29, 2008, found that:
[respondent’s] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting two marriages with Shirley and Leny, are
grossly immoral which no civilized society in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of
the complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast may be able to do. Certainly, the respondent had violated
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
xxxx
In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently imposed severe penalty for grossly immoral conduct
of a lawyer like the case at bar. In the celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Manuel Eala, the
[Court] ordered the disbarment of the respondent for maintaining extra-marital relations with a married woman, and
having a child with her. In the instant case, not only did the respondent commit bigamy for contracting marriages
with Shirley Yunzal in 1990 and Leny Azur in 1996, but the respondent also made his secretary (complainant) his
mistress and subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All these circumstances showed the moral fiber
respondent is made of, which [leave] the undersigned with no choice but to recommend the disbarment of Atty.
Danilo S. Velasquez.13 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by Resolution14 dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED the Investigating
Commissioner’s findings and APPROVED the recommendation for the disbarment of respondent.
As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioner’s evaluation and recommendation well
taken.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.15 When a lawyer’s
moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue
practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present
evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the
Roll of Attorneys.16
Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the hearings before the IBP to rebut the charges
brought against him, suggesting that they are true. 17 Despite his letter dated March 28, 2008 manifesting that he
would come up with his defense "in a verified pleading," he never did.
Aside then from the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he
also violated the Lawyer’s Oath reading:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I
recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according
to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God, (underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The April 30, 2008 Resolution18 of the Provincial Prosecutor on complainant’s charge against respondent and
Bernardita Tadeo for Serious Illegal Detention bears special noting, viz:
[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in the complaint) has the effect of strengthening
the allegations against Atty. Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was really physical restraint
employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the person of Rosario Mecaral. Even as he claimed that on the day private
complainant was fetched by the two women and police officers, complainant was already freely roaming around the
place and thus, could not have been physically detained. However, it is not really necessary that Rosario be
physically kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In fact, she was always accompanied
wherever she would wander, that it could be impossible for her to escape especially considering the remoteness
and the distance between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran where she is a resident. The
people from the Faith Healers Association had the express and implied orders coming from respondent Atty. Danilo
Velasquez to keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and not to let her go freely. That can be gleaned from the affidavit of
co-respondent Bernardita Tadeo. The latter being reprimanded whenever Atty. Velasquez would learn that
complainant had untangled the cloth tied on her wrists and feet.19 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the criminal complaint against respondent, his therein
co-respondent corroborated the testimonies of complainant’s witnesses, and that the allegations against him
remain unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges against him by clearly preponderant evidence, the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.20
In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct,
respondent has ceased to possess the qualifications of a lawyer.21
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be part of the records of respondent in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5338 February 23, 2009
EUGENIA MENDOZA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be
tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred
ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.1
Before the Court is the Petition filed by Eugenia Mendoza (complainant) dated September 19, 2000, seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre (respondent) for his acts of fraudulently filling up blank postdated checks
without her authority and using the same for filing unfounded criminal suits against her.
Complainant, a mail sorter at the Central Post Office Manila, averred that: On October 13, 1998, she borrowed from
Rodela Loans, Inc., through respondent, the amount of ₱20,000.00 payable in six months at 20% interest, secured
by 12 blank checks, with numbers 47253, 47256 to 47266, drawn against the Postal Bank. Although she was
unable to faithfully pay her obligations on their due dates, she made remittances, however, to respondent's
Metrobank account from November 11, 1998 to March 15, 1999 in the total sum of ₱12,910.00. 2 Claiming that the
amounts remitted were not enough to cover the penalties, interests and other charges, respondent warned
complainant that he would deposit Postal Check No. 47253 filled up by him on March 30, 1999 in the amount of
₱16,000.00. Afraid that respondent might sue her in court, complainant made good said check and respondent was
able to encash the same on March 30, 1999. Thereafter, complainant made subsequent payments to the
Metrobank account of respondent from April 13, 1999 to October 15, 1999,3 thereby paying respondent the total
sum of ₱35,690.00.4
Complainant further claimed that, later, respondent filled up two of the postal checks she issued in blank, Check
Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the amount of ₱50,000.00 each and with the dates January 15, 2000 and January 20,
2000 respectively, which respondent claims was in exchange for the ₱100,000.00 cash that complainant received
on November 15, 1999. Complainant insisted however that she never borrowed ₱100,000.00 from respondent and
that it was unlikely that respondent would lend her, a mail sorter with a basic monthly salary of less than ₱6,000.00,
such amount. Complainant also claimed that respondent victimized other employees of the Postal Office by filling
up, without authorization, blank checks issued to him as condition for loans. 5
In his Comment dated January 18, 2000, respondent averred that his dealings with complainant were done in his
private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.
Blg.) 22 against complainant, he was only vindicating his rights as a private citizen. He alleged further that: it was
complainant who deliberately deceived him by not honoring her commitment to their November 15, 1999
transaction involving ₱100,000.00 and covered by two checks which bounced for the reason "account closed"; the
October 13, 1999 transaction was a separate and distinct transaction; complainant filed the disbarment case
against him to get even with him for filing the estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant's claim
that respondent filled up the blank checks issued by complainant is a complete lie; the truth was that the checks
referred to were already filled up when complainant affixed her signature thereto; it was unbelievable that
complainant would issue blank checks, and that she was a mere low-salaried employee, since she was able to
maintain several checking accounts; and if he really intended to defraud complainant, he would have written a
higher amount on the checks instead of only ₱50,000.00.6
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 7 (IBP), and the parties were required to file their
position papers.8
In her Position Paper, complainant, apart from reiterating her earlier claims, alleged that respondent, after the
hearing on the disbarment case before the IBP on September 5, 2001, again filled up three of her blank checks,
Check Nos. 47263, 47264 and 47265, totaling ₱100,000.00, to serve as basis for another criminal complaint, since
the earlier estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case filed by respondent against her before the Office of the Prosecutor of Pasig
City was dismissed on August 14, 2000.9
Respondent insisted in his Position Paper, however, that complainant borrowed ₱100,000.00 in exchange for two
postdated checks, and that since he had known complainant for quite some time, he accepted said checks on
complainant's assurance that they were good as cash. 10
Investigating Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes submitted his Report dated September 6, 2002, finding
respondent guilty of dishonesty and recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
year.11 The Report was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution dated October 19,
2002.12 Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied, however, by the IBP Board of Governors
on January 25, 2003 on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction on the matter, as the same was already
endorsed to the Supreme Court.13
On June 9, 2003 this Court's Second Division issued a Resolution remanding the case to the IBP for the conduct of
formal investigation, as the Report of Commissioner Reyes was based merely on the pleadings submitted. 14
After hearings were conducted,15 Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report dated
December 5, 2006 finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended respondent's suspension for three years. 16
Commissioner Funa held that while it was difficult at first to determine who between complainant and respondent
was telling the truth, in the end, respondent himself, with his own contradicting allegations, showed that
complainant's version should be given more credence.17
Commissioner Funa noted that although complainant's total obligation to respondent was only ₱24,000.00, since
the loan obtained by complainant on October 13, 1998 was ₱20,000.00 at 20% interest payable in six months, by
April 13, 1999, however, complainant had actually paid respondent the total amount of ₱30,240.00. Thus, even
though the payment was irregularly given, respondent actually earned more than the agreed upon 20% interest.
Moreover, the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as well as the name of the payee in the subject checks were all typewritten 18
Commissioner Funa also gave credence to complainant's claim that it was respondent's modus operandi to
demand a certain amount as "settlement" for the dropping of estafa complaints against his borrowers. As
Commissioner Funa explains:
[A] complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22 was filed against [complainant] before the Prosecutor's Office in Pasig
City on June 21, 2000. On August 14, 2000, the Prosecutor's Office dismissed the complaint. On October 2, 2000,
Complainant filed this disbarment case. About one year later, or on September 5, 2001, Complainant was surprised
to receive a demand letter demanding payment once again for another ₱100,000.00 corresponding to another
three checks, Check Nos. 0047263, 0047264 and 0047265.
Furthermore, Respondent filed another criminal complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22 dated October 17, 2001, this
time before the QC Prosecutor's Office. The prosecutor's office recommended the filing of the criminal case for one
of the checks.
xxxx
Respondent's version, on the other hand, is that Check Nos. 0047261 and 0047262 were given to him for loans
(rediscounting) contacted on November 15, 1999 and not for a loan contracted on October 13, 1998. x x x He
claims that the October 13, 1998 transaction is an earlier and different transaction. x x x On the very next day, or
on November 16, 1999, Complainant again allegedly contracted another loan for another ₱100,000.00 for which
Complainant allegedly issued the following Postal Bank checks [Check No. 0047263 dated May 16, 2001 for
₱20,000.00; Check No. 0047264 dated May 30, 2001 for ₱30,000.00 and Check No. 0047265 dated June 15, 2001
for ₱50,000.00].
xxxx
Oddly though, Respondent never narrated that Complainant obtained a second loan on November 16, 1999 in his
Answer [dated January 18, 2000] and in his Position Paper [dated October 8, 2001]. He did not even discuss it in
his Motion for Reconsideration dated December 20, 2002, although he attached the Resolution of the QC
Prosecutor's Office. Clearly, the November 16, 1999 transaction was a mere concoction that did not actually
occur. It was a mere afterthought. Respondent once again filled-up three of the other checks in his possession
(checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001) so that he can again file another estafa/BP 22 case
against Complainant (October 17, 2001) AFTER the earlier complaint he had filed before the Pasig City
Prosecutor's Office had been dismissed (August 14, 2000) and AFTER herein Complainant had filed this
disbarment case (October 2, 2000).
More telling, and this is where Respondent gets caught, are the circumstances attending this second loan of
November 16, 1999. In addition to not mentioning it at all in his Answer, his Position Paper, and his Motion for
Reconsideration, which makes it very strange, is that fact that he alleges that the loan was contracted on
November 16, 1999 for which Complainant supposedly issued checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June
15, 2001. Note that May 16, 2001 is eighteen (18 months), or 1 year and 6 months, from November 16, 1999. This
is strangely a long period for loans of this nature. This loan was supposedly not made in writing, only verbally. With
no collaterals and no guarantors. Clearly, this is a non-existent transaction. It was merely concocted by
Respondent.
More importantly, and this is where Respondent commits his fatal blunder thus exposing his illegal
machinations, Complainant allegedly received ₱100,000.00 in cash on November 16, 1999 for which Complainant
gave Respondent, in return, checks also amounting to ₱100,000.00. The checks were supposedly dated May 16,
2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 x x x.
Now then, would not Respondent suffer a financial loss if he gave away ₱100,000.00 on November 16, 1999 and
then also receive ₱100,000.00 on May 16, 2001 or 1 year and 6 months later? A person engaged in lending
business would want to earn interest. The same also with a person re-discounting checks. In this instance, in his
haste to concoct a story, Respondent forgot to factor in the interest. At 20% interest, assuming that it is per
annum, for 1½ years, Respondent should have collected from Complainant at least ₱130,000.00. And yet the
checks he filled up totaled only ₱100,000.00. The same is true in re-discounting a check. If Complainant gave
Respondent ₱100,000.00 in checks, Respondent should be giving Complainant an amount less than
₱100,000.00. This exposes his story as a fabrication.
The same observations can be made of the first loan of ₱100,000.00 secured by Check Nos. 0047261 and
0047262.
More strangely, during the course of the entire investigation, Respondent never touched on what transpired on the
dates of November 15 and 16, 1999. Consider that Complainant's position is that no such transaction took place on
November 15 and 16. And yet, Respondent never made any effort to establish that Complainant borrowed
₱100,000.00 on November 15 and then another ₱100,000.00 again on November 16. Respondent merely focused
on establishing that Complainant's checks bounced --- a fact already admitted several times by the Complainant ---
and the reasons for which were already explained by Complainant. This only shows the lack of candor of
Respondent.19
xxxx
We take note further that Complainant is a mere mail sorter earning less than ₱6,000.00 per month. Who would
lend ₱200,000.00 to an employee earning such a salary, nowadays, and not even secure such a loan with a written
document or a collateral? It defies realities of finance, economy and business. It even defies common sense. 20
Commissioner Funa also took note that the instant case had practically the same set of facts as in Olbes v.
Deciembre21 and Acosta v. Deciembre.22 In Olbes, complainants therein, who were also postal employees, averred
that respondent without authority filled up a total of four checks to represent a total of ₱200,000.00. In Acosta, the
complainant therein, another postal employee, averred that respondent filled up two blank checks for a total of
₱100,000.00. Acosta, however, was dismissed by Commissioner Lydia Navarro on the ground that it did not
involve any lawyer-client relationship, which ground, Commissioner Funa believes, is erroneous.23
On May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution adopting and approving Commissoner Funa's
Report, but modifying the penalty, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-219
Adm. Case No. 5338
Eugenia Mendoza vs.
Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's gross misconduct and for practically found guilty of
committing the same set of facts alleged in AC 5365, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law to be served successively after the lifting of Respondent's Indefinite
Suspension.24
Although no motion for reconsideration was filed before the IBP Board of Governors, nor a petition for review
before this Court as reported by IBP and Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court considers the IBP Resolution
merely recommendatory and therefore would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court. The IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate action.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, but finds that disbarment and not just indefinite suspension is in
order.
The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 25 A high
sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the bar.26 They must conduct
themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.27
The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the transactions entered into by respondent
were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as a lawyer, from liability.
A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on
the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. 28 Indeed, there is no distinction as to
whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not
divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. 29
In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to live up to the standards required of members of the
legal profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
to wit:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the integrated bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As correctly observed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Funa, respondent failed to mention in his Comment
dated January 18, 2000, in his Position Paper dated October 8, 2001 and in his Motion for Reconsideration dated
December 20, 2002, the ₱100,000.00 loan which complainant supposedly contracted on November 16, 1999. It is
also questionable why the checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 which were supposedly
issued to secure a loan contracted about 18 months earlier, i.e. November 16, 1999, were made without any
interest. The same is true with the checks dated January 15 and 20, 2000 in the total sum of ₱100,000.00, which
were supposed to secure a loan contracted on November 15, 1999, for the same amount. Considering these
circumstances and the sequence of dates when respondent filed his criminal cases against complainant, and
complainant her disbarment case against respondent, what truly appears more believable is complainant's claim
that respondent was merely utilizing the blank checks, filling them up, and using them as bases for criminal cases
in order to harass complainant.
The Court also notes that the checks being refuted by complainant, dated January 15 and 20, 2000, May 16, 2001,
May 30, 2001 and June 15, 200130 had its dates, amounts and payee's name all typewritten, while the blanks on
the check for ₱16,000.00 dated March 30, 1999 which complainant used to pay part of her original loan, were all
filled up in her handwriting.31
It is also observed that the present case was not the only instance when respondent committed his wrongful acts.
In Olbes,32 complainants therein contracted a loan from respondent in the amount of ₱10,000.00 on July 1, 1999,
for which they issued five blank checks as collateral. Notwithstanding their full payment of the loan, respondent
filled up four of the blank checks with the amount of ₱50,000.00 each with different dates of maturity and used the
same in filing estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 cases against complainants. The Court, in imposing the penalty of indefinite
suspension on respondent, found his propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation as reprehensible and
his misuse of the filled up checks, loathsome.33
In Acosta,34 complainant therein also averred that on August 1, 1998, she borrowed ₱20,000.00 from respondent
with an interest of 20% payable in six months and guaranteed by twelve blank checks. Although she had already
paid the total amount of ₱33,300.00, respondent still demanded payments from her, and for her failure to comply
therewith, respondent filed a case against her before the City Prosecutor of Marikina City, using two of her blank
checks which respondent filled up with the total amount of ₱100,000.00. Unfortunately, the complaint was
dismissed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Navarro on October 2, 2001 on the ground that the said transaction
did not involve any lawyer-client relationship.35 As correctly observed by Commissioner Funa, such conclusion is
erroneous, for a lawyer may be disciplined even for acts not involving any attorney-client relationship.
As manifested by these cases, respondent's offenses are manifold. First, he demands excessive payments from
his borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank checks with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents
for his material gain; and then he uses said checks as bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his
borrowers in order to harass them. Such acts manifest respondent's perversity of character, meriting his severance
from the legal profession.
While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and is withheld whenever a lesser penalty could
accomplish the end desired,36 the seriousness of respondent's offense compels the Court to wield its supreme
power of disbarment. Indeed, the Court will not hestitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. 37 This is because in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 38
As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession, the severance of his privilege to
practice law for life is in order.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant which shall forthwith record it in the
personal files of respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall
disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of
the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

1. NO FALSE STATEMENT – RULE 7.01

2. NO TO SUPPORT UNQUALIFIED BAR APPLICANT – RULE 7.02
3. NO CONDUCT ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE PROFESSION – RULE 7.03

EN BANC
A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against Atty. Alfredo Castillo on the
ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).1 Respondent courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself to be
single.2 Soon they had an intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997. 3 During their
affair, respondent was preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as
a member of the Philippine Bar.4 It was only around the first week of May 1997 that complainant first learned that
respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted her about her relationship with
respondent.5 On September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his
relationship with the complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his.6 On December 09,
1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa.7 By this time however, respondent had started to refuse
recognizing the child and giving her any form of support.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between them was nothing but mutual
lust and desire; he never represented himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was already married
and with children;9 complainant is almost 10 years older than him and knew beforehand that he is already
married;10 the child borne by complainant is not his, because the complainant was seeing other men at the time
they were having an affair.11 He admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but explains that he
only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that complainant was
seeing other men.12cräläwvirtualibräry
After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of gross immoral
conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Immoral conduct has been defined as:
xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.
That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency.13cräläwvirtualibräry
In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a notary public, he declared explicitly:
1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;
2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with my child;
3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her womb to be my own;
4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including his/her personal and medical needs, education,
housing, food, clothing and other necessities for living, which I will give through his/her mother, Carmelita Zaguirre,
until he/she becomes of legal age and capable to live on his/her own;
5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof that he/she is my child; however, my failure to
sign does not negate the recognition and acknowledgement already done herein;
6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and being a lawyer, I have full knowledge of the
consequence of such acknowledgment and recognition.14cräläwvirtualibräry
More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which states in part:
Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging, Glo, Guy and others (say) that I
am the look like(sic) of your daughter.
Heres my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot promise fix amount for monthly support
of your daughter. However it shall not be less than P500 but not more than P1,000. 15cräläwvirtualibräry
In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in castigating a judge stated that:
...even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict standard of conduct demanded of members
of the profession. Certainly, fathering children by a woman other than his lawful wife fails to meet these
standards.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every
lawyer.17cräläwvirtualibräry
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support
his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable,
unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.18cräläwvirtualibräry
This Court has repeatedly held:
as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships
or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards.19cräläwvirtualibräry
While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks understanding from the
Court, pointing out that men by nature are polygamous,20 and that what happened between them was nothing but
mutual lust and desire.21 The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of
the respondent.
Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection. Granting arguendo that complainant
entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his marital status, still it does not absolve him of gross
immorality for what is in question in a case like this is respondents fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It
is not dependent whether or not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.
We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The Court held in Mortel vs. Aspiras:
In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto because this is not a proceeding
to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the public
and the courts.22cräläwvirtualibräry
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take the bar examinations.
Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an applicant for admission to membership in the bar must
show that he is possessed of good moral character, a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar.23 This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession,
but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession;24 it is a continuing
requirement to the practice of law25 and therefore admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial
inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a
lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer.
The Court held:
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. We must stress that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during
good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court
after giving him the opportunity to be heard.26cräläwvirtualibräry
and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law.27cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now refuses to recognize and
support a child whom he previously recognized and promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent violated the
standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment could be
given.28 Records show that from the time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and
now lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not perceive this fact as an indication of
respondents effort to mend his ways or that he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law.
Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite suspension should be
meted out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show, to the full
satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and
uprightness required of every member of the profession.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.29cräläwvirtualibräry
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and
ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillos personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a
copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ., on leave.

Endnotes:
1 Rollo, p. 11.

2 Id., p. 2.

3 Id., p. 12.

4 Annex A, Rollo, p. 5.

5 Rollo, p. 2.

6 Id., p. 7.

7 Annex B, Rollo, p. 6.

8 Rollo, p. 2.

9 Id., at p. 11.

10 Id., at p. 13.

11 Id., at p.12.

12 Id., at p. 13.

13 Narag v. Narag, 291 SCRA 451, 464 (1998).

14 Annex C, Rollo, p. 7.

15 Id., p. 39.

16 A.M. No. RTJ-99-1509, August 8, 2002.

17 Paras v. Paras, 343 SCRA 414, 426 (2000).

18 Marcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 466, 469 (1983).

19 Narag v. Narag, supra, footnote 13.

20 Rollo, p. 14.
21 Id.,at p.11.
22 100 Phil. 586, 592 (1956).

23 Cordova v. Cordova, 179 SCRA 680, 683 (1989); Vda. de Mijares v. Villalluz, 274 SCRA 1, 8 (1997).

24 Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93, 100 (1998); Igual v. Javier, 254 SCRA 416 (1996); Villanueva v. Sta.

Ana, 245 SCRA 707 (1995); People v. Tunada, 18 SCRA 692 (1990); Melendrez v. Decena, 176 SCRA 662
(1989).
25 Nakpil v. Valdes, 286 SCRA 758, 774 (1998).

26 Sebastian v. Calis, 344 SCRA 1, 8 (1999).

27 334 SCRA 513, 521 (2000).

28 Saburnido v. Madrono, A.C. No. 4497, September 26, 2001.

29 Nakpil v. Valdes, supra.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232 April 10, 2012
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, Presiding Judge and Acting, and Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Cotabato City and Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, respectively, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader P. Indar,
Al Haj (Judge Indar), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Cotabato City and Acting
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao.
This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on
annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.
To verify the allegations against Judge Indar, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15,
where the Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon
City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15.
Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14. The Audit Team further
observed that the case numbers in the list submitted by the Local Civil Registrars are not within the series of case
numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato.
At the same time, the Audit Team followed-up Judge Indar’s compliance with Deputy Court Administrator (DCA)
Jesus Edwin A. Villasor’s 1st Indorsement, dated 15 February 2010, relative to the letter 1 of Ms. Miren Galloway,
Manager-Permanent Entry Unit, Australian Embassy, Manila (Australian Embassy letter), asking confirmation on
the authenticity of Judge Indar’s decision, dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, entitled "Chona Chanco
Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling," for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As regards this case, the Audit Team found that
Spec. Proc. No. 06-584 does not exist in the records of cases filed, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak.
Subsequently, the Audit Team made the following conclusions:
1. The list in Annexes A; A-1; A-2 and A-3 are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak [Maguindanao] which is based in Cotabato City, nor in the
records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City;
2. There are apparently decisions of cases which are spurious, as these did not pass through the regular
process such as filing, payment of docket fees, trial, etc. which are now circulating and being registered in
Local Civil Registrars throughout the country, the extent of which is any body’s guess;
3. The authenticity of the signatures appearing thereon could only be validated by handwriting experts of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
4. The participation of any lower court officials and/or employees could not be ascertained except probably
through a more thorough discreet investigation and or entrapment; [and]
5. There is a possibility that more of this (sic) spurious documents may appear and cause damage to the
Court’s Integrity.2
Meanwhile, in compliance with DCA Villasor’s Indorsement and in response to the Australian Embassy letter,
Judge Indar explained, in a Letter dated 10 March 2010, that "this court is a Court of General Jurisdiction and can
therefore act even on cases involving Family Relations. Hence, the subject decision rendered by this Court
annulling the marriage of your client is VALID and she is free to marry."3
In a Memorandum dated 26 April 2010, the OCA recommended that (1) the matter be docketed as a regular
administrative matter; (2) the matter be assigned to a Court of Appeals Justice for Investigation, Report, and
Recommendation; and (3) Judge Indar be preventively suspended, pending investigation.
In a Resolution dated 4 May 2010, the Court En Banc (1) docketed this administrative matter as A.M. No. RTJ-10-
2232,4 and (2) preventively suspended Judge Indar pending investigation of this case.
The case was initially raffled to Justice Rodil V. Zalameda of the Court of Appeals, Manila for investigation. The
case was re-raffled to Justice Angelita A. Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro due
to its proximity to the Regional Trial Courts involved.
Justice Gacutan set the case for hearing on several dates and sent the corresponding notices of hearing to Judge
Indar at his known addresses, namely, his official stations in RTC-Cotabato and RTC-Shariff Aguak and residence
address.
The first notice of hearing dated 21 June 2010, which was sent via registered mail and private courier LBC,
scheduled the hearings on 14, 15, and 16 July 2010 and directed Judge Indar to submit in affidavit form his
explanation. The LBC records show that this notice, which was delivered to Judge Indar’s official stations, was
received by one Mustapha Randang on 28 June 2010.
The scheduled hearing was postponed and reset to 20, 21 and 22 July 2010. The notice of postponement was sent
to Judge Indar via registered mail on 6 July 2010 to his official stations and was received again by Mustapha
Randang on 8 July 2010.
Judge Indar failed to attend the hearing as rescheduled and to submit the affidavit as required. Thus, in an Order of
23 July 2010, Justice Gacutan directed Judge Indar to explain his non-appearance, and reset the hearing to 10 and
11 August 2010. The Order was sent to his residence address in M. Tan Subdivision, Gonzalo Javier St., Rosary
Heights, Cotabato City. The LBC report indicated that the Order was received by a certain Mrs. Asok.
Justice Gacutan also sent a letter dated 23 July 2010 addressed to Atty. Umaima L. Silongan (Atty. Silongan),
Acting Clerk of Court of RTC-Cotabato, directing her to serve the notice of hearing scheduled on 10 and 11 August
2010 to Judge Indar and to report the steps taken to effect service of the same. Atty. Silongan submitted a Return
of Service, informing that the notices sent to Judge Indar had remained unserved, as the latter left Cotabato City in
April 2010 and his location since then was unknown.
In a Resolution of 28 September 2010, this Court directed Justice Gacutan to conduct further investigation to
determine the authenticity of the questioned decisions allegedly rendered by Judge Indar annulling certain
marriages. The Court required Justice Gacutan to ascertain whether the cases were properly filed in court, and
who are the parties responsible for the issuance of the questioned decisions, and to submit a report thereon within
60 days from receipt of the Resolution.
In compliance with the Court’s Resolution, Justice Gacutan directed the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and
Quezon City and Atty. Silongan to submit certified true copies of the questioned decisions and to testify thereon.
Only the Civil Registrars were present during the hearings on 4 and 5 November 2010. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
"Testimonies of Ma. Josefina Encarnacion A. Ocampo, City Civil Registrar of Manila
TSN, November 4, 2010
As City Civil Registrar, she is mandated to receive all registered documents that will affect the status of the person
like the birth, death and marriage contract, court decrees regarding annulment, adoption, legitimization, the affidavit
using the surname of the father, naturalization, the selection of citizenship, etc. The documents are forwarded to
their office after they are being registered by the concerned parties.
In the case of annulment of marriage, a copy of the decision is submitted to the Civil Registrar by the one who had
his marriage annulled. Per administrative order, it is the duty of the Clerk of Court to furnish them a copy of the
Decision. After the copies of decisions are submitted to them, they are mandated to verify the authenticity of the
decision by writing a verification letter to the Clerk of Court before making the annotation or changing the parties’
status.
She identified the list of cases of annulment of marriages and petitions changing status of persons (annexes "A-1"
and "A-2") which all came from a court in Cotabato. All the cases listed in A-2 have already been confirmed or
annotated in the records of the Manila Civil Registry. She affirmed that the said cases in the list were certified true
by the clerk of court. As their duty to annotate the said decrees to their records are merely ministerial, they do not
question the decrees however peculiar they may seem.
The cases listed in the document marked as Annex A-2 were also cases that came from Cotabato City for their
annotation. Although these cases have been certified true by the Clerk of Court, their annotation and confirmation
were held in abeyance due to the on-going investigation of Judge Indar."
"Testimony of Salvador Cariño,
Chief of Records Division, City Civil Registrar of Quezon City
TSN, November 4, 2010
He generally supervises the retrieval of all the records or documents in their office. He also signs certified true
copies of birth, marriage contract, death certificate and certified true copies of Court’s decisions furnished to them
by different courts.
With regards the decisions issued by the Court in provinces, once the Judge issued the decision regarding the
annulment, the parties concern should first register the decision to the Local Civil Registrar where the court is
situated. After they receive the decision from the Administrative Division, they would call or write the concerned
Local Civil Registrar to authenticate or verify the records. He identified the cases coming from a Cotabato court that
were submitted to them for annotation.
The subject decisions listed in the annexes which were decided by a court in Cotabato City were already annotated
and verified. However he could not ascertain who from the court verified the authenticity or existence of such
decisions as he was not the one who personally called to verify and authenticate them from the court where the
listed Decisions/Orders originate."5
The Civil Registrar of Manila submitted copies of Decisions, Orders and Resolutions, all signed by Judge Indar, in
forty three (43) cases for annulment of marriage, correction of entry and other similar cases from RTC-Cotabato
City, Branch 15. All the decisions were accompanied by the corresponding Letter of Atty. Silongan, affirming each
of the decisions as true and authentic based on the records, while thirty six (36) of such decisions are accompanied
by Atty. Silongan’s certification affirming the genuineness of Judge Indar’s signature affixed on the Decisions. 6
On the other hand, the Civil Registrar of Quezon City submitted twenty five (25) Decisions, Orders, and Resolutions
issued by RTC-Cotabato City, Branch 15, which were transmitted to the Registrar’s office for annotation and
recording. All the Decisions were signed by Judge Indar, and accompanied by Certificates of Finality affirming the
genuineness of Judge Indar’s signature appearing above the name of Judge Cader P. Indar. The Certificates of
Finality were issued by Atty. Silongan and in one case, by Abie Amilil, the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court.7
Meanwhile, Atty. Silongan, despite notice, failed to attend the hearing. She explained in a Manifestation of 8
November 2010 that she received the Notice only on 8 November 2010 because she was on leave from 1 October
1 to 30 November 2010. Thus, the hearing was reset to 11 and 12 January 2011. However, on the scheduled
hearing, Atty. Silongan still failed to appear.
Justice Gacutan sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to locate the whereabouts of
Judge Indar, as well as of Atty. Silongan. After several exchanges of correspondence, the NBI, in a Letter dated 22
March 2011, provided the residence addresses of both Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan.
Meanwhile, Judge George C. Jabido (Judge Jabido), Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15,
was directed to verify the authenticity of the records of the subject Decisions and to appear at the hearing on 29
March 2011. The hearing was canceled due to the judicial reorganization in the Court of Appeals.
This administrative matter was re-raffled to Justice Abraham B. Borreta (Justice Borreta) since Justice Gacutan
was reassigned to Manila effective 11 April 2011. Justice Borreta set the hearing on 27 to 29 June 2011. Notices of
hearing were sent to Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan at the addresses provided by the NBI and at their previous
mailing addresses. The registered mails addressed to Judge Indar were returned for the following reasons: (1)
"addressee out of town, move to another place" and (2) addressee "unknown." The Notice sent to Atty. Silongan
was also returned and per LBC report, the consignee has moved to an unknown address.
Judge Jabido, who was notified of the hearing, testified that:
In compliance with the directive of the Investigating Justice to verify the authenticity of the records of the listed
decisions, judgments and orders, he issued memos to the officers of the Court, the Branch Clerk of Court, the
docket clerk, directing them to produce and secure copies of the minutes and other documents related therein. He
personally checked the records of the RTC. The Records of the RTC are bereft of evidence to show that regular
and true proceedings were had on these cases. There is no showing that a docket fee has been paid for each
corresponding cases. There is also no showing that the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared.
There is also no record that a hearing was conducted. No stenographic notes of the actual proceedings were also
made. He could not also determine when the said cases were submitted for decision as it was not calendared for
that purpose.8
Judge Jabido also submitted a report, portions of which read:
The undersigned took extra efforts to locate any record of the cases involving the parties as enumerated in the list.
The undersigned even issued Memorandum to the Branch Clerk of Court, the docket clerk and other responsible
officers of the Court to produce and secure copies of any pleading/documents related to these cases enumerated
in the list but his efforts proved futile, hence:
a) to this Court, there is no record on file of all the enumerated cases contained in the list.
b) to this Court, it is bereft of any evidence on whether the Hon. Judge Indar conducted a hearing in these
cases.
xxxx
There is absence of any record showing compliance of the same. It is hereby submitted that the manner upon
which the questioned annulment and correction cases, as contained herein in the attached list, allegedly decided
by the Hon. Judge Indar were commenced are clearly doubtful.
Firstly, there is no showing of compliance on the rules prescribed.
xxxx
There is no showing that a verified Petition was officially filed in writing and giving (sic) an opportunity for the
Respondents to be heard by himself or by counsel. x x x9
To support his findings, Judge Jabido submitted: (1) copies of the Letters and Memoranda mentioned in the report;
(2) the Calendar of Cases in RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15, on various dates from the period starting April 2007 to 20
October 2009; and (3) the Docket Inventory in Civil Cases, Criminal Cases and Other Cases for the period of
January to December 2009 in RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15.
Subpoenas were sent to some of the parties in the questioned decisions, namely: Grace Elizarde Reyes (Special
Case No. 1049), Buenaventura Mojica (Apl. Proc. No. 08-1931), Marie Christine N. Florendo (Civil Case No. 519),
Jesse Yamson Faune, Jr. (Special Civil Case 08-2366), Rosemarie Tongson Ramos (Special Case No. 08-1871)
and Melissa Sangan-Demafelis (Spl. Proc. 07-2262) to determine whether they filed the petitions for annulment of
marriage and whether proceedings were actually had before Judge Indar’s sala in relation to their cases. All the
subpoenas were returned to the Court of Appeals.
In his Report dated 2 September 2011, Justice Borreta first determined whether the requirements of due process
had been complied with since there was no proof that Judge Indar personally and actually received any of the
notices sent to him in the course of the investigation.
Justice Borreta differentiated administrative due process with judicial due process. He stated that "while a day in
court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon
different principles."
Justice Borreta noted that all possible means to locate Judge Indar and to personally serve the court notices to him
were resorted to. The notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indar’s known addresses, namely, his sala in RTC-
Cotabato Branch 14 and RTC-Shariff Aguak Branch 15, and at his residence address. However, none of the
notices appeared to have been personally received by Judge Indar.
Notwithstanding, Justice Borreta concluded that the requirements of due process have been complied with. Justice
Borreta stated that Judge Indar was aware of a pending administrative case against him. The notice of this Court’s
Resolution of 4 May 2010, preventively suspending Judge Indar, was mailed and sent to him at his sala in RTC-
Shariff Aguak, Branch 15.
Justice Borreta proceeded to determine Judge Indar’s administrative liability, and found the latter guilty of serious
misconduct and dishonesty.
According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indar’s act of issuing decisions on annulment of marriage cases without
complying with the stringent procedural and substantive requirements of the Rules of Court for such cases clearly
violates the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Indar made it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial, when
the records show no judicial proceedings occurred.
Moreover, Judge Indar’s act of "affirming in writing before the Australian Embassy the validity of a decision he
allegedly rendered," when in fact that case does not appear in the court’s records, constitutes dishonesty.
Justice Borreta recommended the dismissal of Judge Indar from service, and the investigation of Atty. Silongan,
who is not included as respondent in this case, on her participation in the certification of the authenticity of the
spurious Decisions.
The sole issue in this case is whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.
We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice.
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which govern the conduct of disciplinary and non-
disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, clearly provide that technical rules of procedure and evidence do
not strictly apply to administrative proceedings. Section 3, Rule I of the Uniform Rules states:
Section 3. Technical Rules in Administrative Investigations. –Administrative investigations shall be conducted
without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings.
In Cornejo v. Gabriel,10 the Court held that notice and hearing are not indispensable in administrative investigations,
thus:
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial
proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law
is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the
order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is
judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative
proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of
an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and
hearing are not essential to due process of law. x x x11 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
It is settled that "technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings.
Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense." 12 It is enough
that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. 13 Otherwise stated, in the
application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the
denial of the opportunity to be heard.14
The Court emphasized in Cornejo15 the Constitutional precept that public office is a public trust,16 which is the
underlying principle for the relaxation of the requirements of due process of law in administrative proceedings, thus:
Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office
as "property." It is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public office is not property within the
sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency.17 (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While there is no
proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two
notices of hearing were received by one Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the
notices was received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and capable to receive notices on
behalf of Judge Indar.
Further, Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against him because aside from the
fact that the Court’s Resolution suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive suspension was reported in
major national newspapers.18 Moreover, Judge Indar was repeatedly sent notices of hearings to his known
addresses. Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of the charges against him. However, Judge Indar still failed
to file his explanation and appear at the scheduled hearings. Consequently, the investigation proceeded ex parte in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.19
Public office is a public trust.20 This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and more
so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and
integrity.21 As the visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at
all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.22
Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting standards.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez,23 the Court explained the difference between simple misconduct and
grave misconduct, thus:
The Court defines misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.
In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the
records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato
City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been
paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been conducted; or (5)
the cases were submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team, the list of case titles submitted by the Local
Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in RTC,
Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato
City. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned
annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory
and jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.
The Court condemns Judge Indar’s reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided marital unions, without
conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing
consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. Not only that, Judge
Indar’s gross misconduct greatly undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary and betrays public trust and
confidence in the courts. Judge Indar’s utter lack of moral fitness has no place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar
deserves nothing less than dismissal from the service.
The Court defines dishonesty as:
x x x a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." 24
In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not
conduct any judicial proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it
appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court
and the strict statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge "perform official duties honestly."
As found by the Audit Team, the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do
not appear in the records of cases received, pending, or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, which Judge
Indar presided. The cases do not likewise exist in the docket books of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC-
Cotabato. The Audit Team also noted that the case numbers in the list are not within the series of case numbers
recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato.
Moreover, Judge Jabido, Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, verified the records of the trial
court and found nothing to show that proceedings were had on the questioned annulment cases. There was
nothing in the records to show that (1) petitions were filed; (2) docket fees were paid; (3) the parties were notified of
hearings; (4) hearings were calendared and actually held; (5) stenographic notes of the proceedings were taken;
and (6) the cases were submitted for decision.
Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indar’s Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-
581, entitled "Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling." Despite the fact that no proceedings were conducted in
the case, Judge Indar declared categorically, in response to the Australian Embassy letter, that the Decision
annulling the marriage is valid and that petitioner is free to marry. In effect, Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of
the contents of the annulment decree, highlighting Judge Indar’s appalling dishonesty.
The Court notes that this is not Judge Indar’s first offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953,25 the Court imposed on him a
fine of ₱10,000 for violating Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, when he issued a preliminary injunction
without any hearing and prior notice to the parties. In another case, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069,26 the Court found him
guilty of gross misconduct for committing violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly fined him
₱25,000.
Since this is Judge Indar’s third offense, showing the depravity of his character and aggravating 27 the serious
offenses of gross misconduct and dishonesty,28 the Court imposes on Judge Indar the ultimate penalty of dismissal
from the service, with its accessory penalties, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. 29
This administrative case against Judge Indar shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a
member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC.30 This Resolution entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion
of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular
and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such
Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar," provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular
and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds
for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action
against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may
forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, Judge Indar’s gross misconduct and dishonesty likewise constitute a breach of the following Canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION.
In addition, Judge Indar’s dishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that the annulment cases underwent
trial and complied with the Rules of Court, laws, and established jurisprudence violates the lawyer’s oath to "do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court." Such violation is also a ground for disbarment. Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In Samson v. Caballero,31 where the Court automatically disbarred the respondent judge, pursuant to the provisions
of AM. No. 02-9-02-SC, the Court held:
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." The rule
does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as a member of the bar, that respondent be
required to comment on and show cause why he should not be disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from
the order for him to comment on why he should not be held administratively liable as a member of the bench. In
other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held
administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and
reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary
proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the
duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of
the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a
disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case
against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-
level court.
It cannot be denied that respondent’s dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral
character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral
character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.
If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The
requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty, constituting violations of the Lawyer’s
Oath, and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Judge Indar deserves
disbarment.
In so far as Atty. Silongan, is concerned, we adopt Justice Borreta’s recommendation to conduct an investigation
on her alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned Decisions.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 14,
Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, guilty of Gross
Misconduct and Dishonesty for which he is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits due him,
except accrued leave benefits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.1âwphi1
Judge Indar is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into Judge Indar’s record as a member of the bar and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to investigate Atty. Umaima L. Silongan, Acting Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City, on her alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned
Decisions on the annulment of marriage cases issued by Judge Indar.
Let copies of this Decision be forwarded to the Local Civil Registrars of the City of Manila and Quezon City, the
same to form part of the records of Decisions of Judge Indar on the annulment of marriages filed with their offices.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.