CASE DIGEST: MA. MERCEDITAS C. GUTIERREZ v.
THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, ET AL. G.R. No. 193459; March
8, 2011.
FACTS: For resolution is petitioners "Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision
dated 15 February 2011)" dated February 25, 2011 (Motion). However, upon
examination of the averments in the Motion, the Court finds neither substantial nor
cogent reason to reconsider its Decision.A plain reading of the Decision could very
well dispose of petitioner's previous contentions, raised anew in the Motion, but the
Court finds it proper, in writing finis to the issue, to draw petitioners attention to certain
markers in the Decision.
V2: – 22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first session,
private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestaño
(Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez upon
endorsement of Party-List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao
– 27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker
Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the
Order of Business
– 3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John
Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon
(Reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed by
Representatives Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus
– HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment
Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to
House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to
include it in the Order of Business
– 11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House
Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)
– After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both
complaints sufficient in form
– 2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the
15th Congress was published
– After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the two
complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, sufficient in substance
– Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging Resolutions
of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and that these
violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings
ISSUES: [1] Did the Court deviate from Francisco v. House of Representatives
regarding the proper initiation of an impeachment complaint?
[2] Does publication similarly mean promulgation in the context of the
impeachment rules?
HELD: FIRST ISSUE: Petitioner urges that the word "initiate" must be read in its
plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for it is contrary to reason, logic and common
sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or
conclusion.
Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been
worded as "no initiation process of the impeachment proceedings shall be
commenced against the same official more than once within a period of one year," in
which case the reckoning would literally point to the "start of the beginning."
The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between
those who want to stretch and those who want to shrink the term "initiate," either of
which could disrupt the provisions congruency to the rationale of the constitutional
provision.
Petitioners imputation that the Courts Decision presents a sharp deviation
fromFranciscoas it defers the operability of the one-year bar rule rings hollow.In re-
affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated" means,
the Court closely applied
Francisco on what comprises or completes the initiation phase. Nothing can be more
unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation of filing-and-referral in Francisco.
Contrary to petitioner's position that the Court left in the hands of the House the
question as to when an impeachment proceeding is initiated, the Court merely
underscored the Houses conscious role in the initiation of an impeachment
proceeding.The Court added nothing new in pinpointing the obvious reckoning point
of initiation in light of the Francisco doctrine.
SECOND ISSUE: Petitioner reiterates her argument that promulgation means
publication.She again cites her thesis that Commonwealth Act No. 638, Article 2 of
the Civil Code, and the two Tada v. Tuvera Cases mandate that the Impeachment
Rules be published for effectivity. When the Constitution uses the word "promulgate,"
it does not necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation.Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI of the
Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of "to make known" as it should be generally
understood.
the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and
providing that there must be a “verified complaint or resolution”, and that the
substance requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee”

The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively
promulgate its Impeachment Rules.It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of
government on how to do so when such prerogative is lodged exclusively with
it. DENIED.

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