1. SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
, and/or HELD:
DANNY Z. ESCALANTE, vs. TEOFILO GONZAGA, G.R. No.
187722, June 10, 2013
FACTS:
Surigao Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) hired Gonzaga
as its lineman, he was assigned as Temporary Teller at SURNECO’s sub-
office in Gigaquit, Surigao Del Norte. Danny Escalante (Escalante),
General Manager of SURNECO, issued a Memorandum Order with
attached report of SURNECO’s Internal Auditor, Pedro Denolos (Collection
Report) and two (2) sets of summaries of collections and remittances
(Summaries), seeking an explanation from Gonzaga regarding his
remittance shortages in the total amount of P314,252.23, covering the
period from February 2000 to May 2001.
On July 16, 2001, Gonzaga asked for an extension of three (3) weeks
within which to submit his explanation since he needed to go over the
voluminous receipts of collections and remittances with the assistance of
an accountant. On the same day, he sent another letter, denying any
unremitted amount on his part and thereby, requesting that the charges
against him be lifted. SURNECO formed an Investigation Committee
(Committee) to investigate Gonzaga’s alleged remittance shortages. the
Committee sent Gonzaga an invitation to attend the investigation
proceedings, in which he participated. Pending investigation, Gonzaga was
placed under preventive suspension.
Thereafter, a notice of termination was served on Gonzaga. Gonzaga
sought reconsideration before SURNECO’s Board of Directors but the
latter denied the same after he presented his case.14 On October 25, 2001,
another notice of termination (Final Notice of Termination) was served on
Gonzaga. Consequently, he was dismissed from the service. The Labor
Arbiter found that Gonzaga was dismissed illegally, the NLRC reversed
the decision of Labor Arbiter. On Appeal, the CA, it reversed and set aside
the rulings of the NLRC, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is illegal dismissal.
YES, The Court concurs with the NLRC’s finding that petitioners’ evidence
which consists of the Collection Report, the Summaries, and the
September 15, 2003 Audit Report with attached Cash Flow Summary –
adequately supports the conclusion that Gonzaga misappropriated the
funds of the cooperative. The data indicated therein show gaping
discrepancies between Gonzaga’s collections and remittances, of which he
was accountable for. In this accord, the burden of evidence shifted to
Gonzaga to prove that the reflected shortage was not attributable to him.
However, despite being allowed to peruse the bills and receipts on record
together with the assistance of an accountant and a counsel during the
investigation proceedings, Gonzaga could not reconcile the amounts of his
collections and remittances and, instead, merely interposed bare and
general denials.
2. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPINES v. VIRGINIA PALMARES, et al.
FACTS:
Respondents inherited a 19.98 hectare agricultural land located in Iloilo. In
1995, they voluntarily offered the land for sale to the government pursuant
to the Comprehensive Agrarian Law of 1988. DAR acquired 19.107
hectares of the entire are which was valued by LBP at P440,355.92.
Respondents rejected said amount. DARAB resolved to adopt LBPs
valuation. Hence, the same amount was deposited to respondents credit as
provisional compensation. The RTC of Iloilo ordered LBP to recomputed
hence the land increased from 440,355.92 to 503,148.97. Respondents still
rejected the offer. RTC rendered a decision fixing the just compensation to
669,962.53. The trial court arrived at its own computation by getting an
average of the price per hectare as computed by LBP in accordance with
DAR guidelines and the market value of the land per hectare as shown in
the tax declaration. LBP appealed to the CA arguing that the computation
made by the RTC failed to consider the factors in determining just
compensation an enumerated under section 17 of RA 6657. The appellate
court affirmed RTC ruling as having been arrived at in consonance with
Section 17 of RA 6657. It emphasized that the determination of just
compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial
function and, in the exercise thereof, courts should be given ample
discretion and should not be delimited by mathematical formulas.
ISSUE: Is the CA's ruling correct?
HELD: The principal basis of the computation for just compensation is
Section 17 of RA 6657,which enumerates the following factors to guide the
special agrarian courts in the determination thereof :
[1] Acquisition cost of the land,[2] Current value of the properties,[3] Its
nature, actual use, and income, [4] The sworn valuation by the owner, [5]
The tax declaration, [6] The assessment made by government assessors,
[7]The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property, [8] The non payment
of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution of the
said land, if any
In the instant case, the trial court found to be unrealistically low the total
valuation by LBP and the DAR in the amount of P440,355.92, which was
computed on the basis of DAR AO No. 6 series of 1992 as amended by
DAR AO No. 11 Series of 1994. It then merely proceeded to add said
valuation to the market value of the subject land as appearing in the 1997
tax declaration, and used the average of such values to fix the just
compensation.
While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial
function vestd in the RTC acting as a special agrarian court, the judge
cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the factors
specifically identified by law and implementing rules. We agree with the
LBP that the double take up of the market value per tax declaration as a
valuation factor completely destroys the rationale of the formula laid down
by the DAR. GRANTED.
3. EDUARDO A. ABELLA vs. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR. (June 18,
2013)
FACTS:
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals
involving a Labor Case. Complainant then filed a Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Execution before the Regional Arbitration Branch which the
respondent was the Labor Arbiter. After the lapse of five (5) months,
complainant’s motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second
Motion for Execution. However, still, there was no action until the
complainant agreed to give respondent a portion of the monetary award
thereof after the latter asked from the former how much would be his share.
Thereafter, respondent issued a writ of execution but the employer of the
complainant moved to quash the said writ. Eventually, issued a new writ of
execution wherein complainant’s monetary awards were reduced to the
effect that it modifies the DECISION of the CA. Complainant now filed the
instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), averring that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from complainant in exchange for a
favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and
advantage to PT&T, complainant’s employer.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his
violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the
Code.
HELD:
YES. The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the
Code, delineate the lawyer’s responsibility to society: Rule 1.01 engraves
the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers
from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any man’s cause for
any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed
to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one’s public
position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or
(3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. It is well to note
that a lawyer who holds a government office may be disciplined as a
member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer. The infractions of the respondent constitute gross
misconduct. Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts
that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference
to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. It
treads the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the community’s sense of decency. On the other hand, gross misconduct
constitutes "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment." In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
states that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct or gross
misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.However, the Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous
administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.,
which therefore precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same.
In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a
fine in the amount of P40,000.00 in order to penalize respondent’s
transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of
the same or similar acts in the future.
4. JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 193314 February 26,
2013RESIDENCE/ DOMICILE
FACTS:
On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)
for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections.
She indicated therein her place of birth and residence as BarangayTugas,
Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Tugas). Asserting
otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued
that she had falsely represented her place of birth and residence, because
she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally
abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City. To support this claim, they
presented as evidence the certification from the Assessor’s Office of
Baliangao that there was no tax declaration covering any real property in
the name of petitioner located at any place in the municipality and the
certification from the Civil Registrar of Baliangao that petitioner had no
record of birth in the civil registry of the municipality. The Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy remained pending as
of the day of the elections, in which petitioner garnered the highest number
of votes. On 10 May 2010, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, proclaimed her as the duly elected
municipal mayor. On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC disqualified
petitioner from running for the position of mayor in the Municipality of
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental on the ground that petitioner never acquired
a new domicile in Baliangao, because she failed to prove her bodily
presence at that place, her intention to remain there, and her intention
never to return to her domicile of origin.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is qualified to run for mayor of Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental on the ground that petitioner is a resident and a
registered voter of the said place
HELD:
The petitioner is disqualified to run as mayor because she failed to comply
with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
Petitioner’s uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The question
is whether she was able to establish, through clear and positive proof, that
she had acquired a domicile of choice in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental,
prior to the May 2010 elections.
The approval of the application for registration of petitioner as voter only
shows, at most, that she had met the minimum residency requirement as a
voter. This minimum requirement is different from that for acquiring a new
domicile of choice for the purpose of running for public office. When it
comes to the qualifications for running for public office, residence is
synonymous with domicile. Accordingly,Nuval v. Guray held as follows:
The term ‘residence’ as so used, is synonymous with ‘domicile’ which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by
choice. First, residence or bodily presence in the new locality. Second, an
intention to remain there. Third, an intention to abandon the old domicile.
These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof. In
the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. Moreover, even if these requisites are
established by clear and positive proof, the date of acquisition of the
domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also be established to be within
at least one year prior to the elections using the same standard of
evidence. In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by
clear and positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections.
5. Bases Conversion and Development Authority v Rosa Reyes,
Cenando et.al Commission of Audit, GR 178160 February 26, 2009
TOPIC: State Immunity: Estoppel, SC not estopped from correcting
mistake of public official regardless of how long it has been practiced.
SUMMARY:
BCDA petitions CA ruling disallowing YEB to Board and Consultants and
asking them to pay said amount back to government.
Facts:
On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 72273
creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA).
Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that the BCDA Board of Directors (Board)
shall exercise the powers and functions of the
BCDA...(including)...adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at
least equivalent to that of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
Accordingly, the Board...adopted a compensation and benefit scheme for
its officials and employees. On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a
new compensation...scheme which included a P10,000 year-end benefit
(approved by President Ramos)...In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-
end benefit to its officials and employees. In 2000, the BSP increased the
year-end benefit from P30,000 to P35,000...Pursuant to Section 10 of RA
No. 7227 which states that the compensation and benefit scheme of the
BCDA shall be at least equivalent to that of the BSP, the Board increased
the year-end benefit of BCDA officials and employees from P10,000 to
P30,000. On 20 February 2003, State Auditor IV Corazon V. Españo of the
COA issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-0047 stating
that the grant of year-end benefit to Board members was contrary to DBM
Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2 January 2002 (disallowing YEB to Board
Members/consultants). In a letter dated 20 February 2004, BCDA President
and Chief Executive Officer Rufo Colayco requested the reconsideration of
Decision No. 2004-013. In a Resolution dated 22 June 2004, Director
Tablang denied the request. The BCDA filed a notice of appeal dated 8
September 2004 and an appeal memorandum dated 23 December 2004
with the COA. COA ruled and
affirmed disallowance of YEB. Presumption of good faith does not apply
because DBM issued clarificatory memo and Board still proceeded to grant
YEB after.
ISSUE:
1. Whether board members and consultants of BCDA entitled to YEB
2. Whether denial of YEB for Board and consultants by CA is against
Article III section 1 of Constitution (RA 7227)
3. Whether SC is estopped from correcting the decision of Pres. Ramos
who approved of the YEB that has been received by the Board and
Consultants since 1997
HELD:
1. No. Board Members and consultants are not entitled to YEB as per DBM
circulars:
DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that, "Members of the Board of
Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the government. As non-
salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB and
retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law.
DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that, "YEB and retirement benefits,
are personnel benefits granted in addition to salaries. As fringe benefits,
these shall be paid only when the basic salary is also paid." Consultants do
not receive salaries.

2. No. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the

constitutionality of RA No. 7227 and the burden of proof is on the BCDA to
show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.A law
enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and unequivocal one. BCDA fails to provide
sufficient prove of unconstitutionality of RA 7227 (which limits BCDA's
power to give compensation).

3. No. The State is not estopped from correcting a public officer’s

erroneous application of a statute, and an unlawful practice, no matter how
long, cannot give rise to any vested right. However, petitioners relied on
Section 1 of RA 7227 which allows Board to adopt compensation schemes
and on the authorization of President Ramos. They cannot be presumed to
have faulted and denied good faith upon their receipt of the YEBs over the
years.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Commission on

Audit Decision No. 2007-020 dated 12 April 2007 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the Board members and full-time consultants of the
Bases Conversion and Development Authority are not required to refund
the year-end benefits they have already received.