EN BANC

November 7, 2017
G.R. No. 224162

JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), Respondent

DECISION

REYES, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which sought to nullify
and set aside the Resolutions dated October 16, 20151 and March 2, 20162 of the Sandiganbayan in SB-
14-CRM-0238. These Resolutions denied Janet Lim Napoles' (Napoles) application for bail because the
evidence of her guilt for the crime of Plunder is strong.

Factual Antecedents

On September 16, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman received the report of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), regarding its investigation on several persons, including Napoles, former Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile (Enrile) and his former Chief of Staff, Atty. Jessica Lucila Reyes (Reyes). In its report, the NBI
recommended to prosecute Napoles, former Senator Enrile, Reyes, and several other named individuals
for the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7080, as amended,
for essentially misappropriating former Senator Enrile's Priority Development Assistant Fund (PDAF)
through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were selected without the required bidding
procedure.3 This case was docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0318.4

Soon after, or on November 18, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman received a Complaint from its Field
Investigation Office (FIO), criminally charging former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Napoles, and fifty-two (52)
other individuals with violations of RA No. 7080 and Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.5 Said complaint was
docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0396.6

In a Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014, the Ombudsman Special Panel of Investigators found probable
cause to indict Napoles, among others, with one (1) count of Plunder and fifteen (15) counts of violating
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. They likewise recommended to immediately file the necessary Informations
against all the named accused.7

Some of the named accused, including Napoles, filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The
Special Panel of Investigators denied these motions in its Joint Order dated June 4, 2014, but dropped
Ruby Chan Tuason as a respondent, in light of her admission as a State witness and her corresponding
immunity from criminal prosecution.8
Thus, in an Information dated June 5, 2014, Napoles, together with former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Ronald
John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, were charged with Plunder in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238
filed with the Sandiganbayan.9 The pertinent portions of the Information state:

In 2004 to 2010, or thereabout (sic), in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court's jurisdiction,
above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then
Chief of Staff of Senator Emile's Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and
JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate,
and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php 172,834,500.00) through a combination
or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:

a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification,
NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from
ENRILE's Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE's endorsement, directly
or through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES' non-government organizations
which became the recipients and/or target implementors (sic) of ENRILE's PDAF projects, which duly-
funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF
proceeds for her personal gain;

b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority, relationships,
connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice,
of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10 (Emphasis Ours)

On July 7, 2014, Napoles filed her Petition for Bail, arguing that the evidence of the prosecution is
insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly assailed the credibility of the
State witnesses (otherwise referred to as whistle blowers) as these are allegedly mere hearsay, tainted
with bias, and baseless. Citing the res inter alias acta rule, Napoles submitted that the testimonies of these
whistleblowers are inadmissible against her.11

In view of Napoles' application for bail, the Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings. The prosecution
presented the following witnesses: (a) Carmencita N. Delantar, then Director in the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM); (b) Susan P. Garcia, an Assistant Commissioner in the Commission on Audit
(COA), and the former Director of the Special Audit Office; (c) Ryan P. Medrano, the Graft Investigation
and Prosecution Officer from the PIO, Office of the Ombudsman; (d) Marina Cortez Sula, former employee
of Napoles; (e) Mary Arlene Joyce Baltazar, former bookkeeper for JLN Corporation; (t) Merlina P. Sufias,
fonner employee of Napoles; (g) Benhur K. Luy, former finance officer of Napoles; and (h) Ruby Chan
Tuason, fonner Social Secretary of former President Joseph E. Estrada.12
The prosecution likewise presented the following supposed beneficiaries of former Senator Enrile's PDAF
projects, all of whom identified their respective sworn statements before the Sandiganbayan: (a) Eldred
P. Tumbocon, Municipal Mayor of Umingan, Pangasinan; (b) Francisco 0. Collado, Jr., Municipal
Agriculturist of Umingan, Pangasinan; (c) Bartolome Ramos, Municipal Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan; (d)
Ricardo V. Revita, Municipal Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan; (e) Rodolfo A. Mendoza, Municipal
Agriculturist of San Miguel, Bulacan; and (t) Imelda Alvarado Eudenio, Municipal Agriculturist of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan. The defense also stipulated that: (a) the witnesses occupied their respective positions at the time
material to the case; (b) they were unaware that their respective municipalities were recipients of
livelihood projects from former Senator Enrile's PDAF; (c) they did not receive any agricultural package or
livelihood training from former Senator Enrile, the implementing agencies of his PDAF, or from any NGO;
and (d) they did not sign or prepare any acknowledgment receipt or liquidation documents pertaining to
the transactions.13

Furthermore, the prosecution presented another group of beneficiaries, whose testimonies were subject
of the same stipulations: (a) Shiela May Cebedo, Municipal Mayor of Bacuag, Surigao del Norte; (b) Elyzer
C. Chavez, City Mayor of Passi, Iloilo; (c) Benito D. Siadto, Municipal Mayor of Kibungan, Benguet; (d)
Florencio Bentrez, Municipal Mayor of Tuba, Benguet; and (e) Jose C. Ginez, Municipal Mayor of Sta. Maria,
Pangasinan. The defense cross-examined this group of beneficiaries.14

After the conclusion of the prosecution's presentation of evidence, Napoles manifested that she is not
presenting any evidence for her bail application.15

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In the first assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution dated October 16, 2015, the Petition for Bail of Napoles
was denied for lack of merit.16 The relevant portions of this Resolution reads:

It is true that none of the prosecution witnesses testified that Senator Enrile directly received the
kickbacks/commissions/rebates from accused Napoles. Based on the DDRs of Luy, accused Napoles
repeatedly gave kickbacks/commissions/rebates to Senator Emile's middlepersons. Also, prosecution
witnesses Suñas and Luy categorically testified that they were the ones who prepared the documents and
money in paying the kickbacks/commissions/rebates for Senator Enrile. These
kickbacks/commissions/rebates were given by them or by accused Napoles to Ruby Tuason and other
middlepersons for Senator Enrile.

xxxx

A FINAL WORD

The Court stresses, however, that in resolving this petition for bail of accused Napoles, it is not passing
judgment on the culpability or non-culpability of Senator Enrile, Atty. Reyes, accused Napoles, Lim[,] and
de Asis. Again, in a petition for bail, the Court is only mandated to determine whether based on the pieces
of evidence presented by the prosecution, proof evident exists or the presumption of guilt is strong. As
above discussed, the prosecution had presented clear and strong evidence which leads to a well-guarded
dispassionate judgment that the offense of plunder has been committed as charged; that accused Napoles
is guilty thereof, and that she will probably be punished capitally if the law were administered at this stage
of the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, accused Janet Lim Napoles's (sic) Petition for Bail dated July 7, 2014, is DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.17

On November 4, 2015, Napoles moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution denying
her Petition for Bail.18 This motion was likewise deemed unmeritorious and the Sandiganbayan denied it
in its Resolution dated March 2, 2016,19 viz.:

WHEREFORE, accused Janet Lim Napoles's (sic) Motion for Reconsideration dated November 4, 2015 is
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.20

Napoles thus filed the present petition before this Court, alleging that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in denying her bail application. She insists in the
present petition that the prosecution was unable to discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of
her guilt is strong.21

Ruling of this Court

Preliminarily, it should be emphasized that since this is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, this Court's review is limited to whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Resolutions denying Napoles' application
for bail. The Court's certiorari jurisdiction covers only errors of jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan. It should be borne in mind that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Errors in the appreciation of the parties'
evidence, including the conclusions anchored on these findings, are not correctible by the writ of
certiorari.22

In this regard, Napoles bears the burden of showing that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her bail application
was capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic, so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. This Court
is not a trier of facts. As such, it must be established that there was a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law.23

It is within this framework that the Court reviewed the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolutions.

The prosecution bears the burden of

proving that the evidence of Napoles'
guilt for the crime of Plunder is
strong.

Despite the arrest of the accused, or his/her voluntary surrender as the case may be, the accused may be
granted provisional liberty under certain conditions. This right to bail is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
except when the accused is charged with a capital offense,24 viz.:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.25

While· bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior to the conviction of the accused,26 those
charged with a capital offense is granted bail only when the evidence of guilt is not strong:

Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution. (7a)27

The trial court is thus granted the discretion to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the
part of the accused. The trial court may also deny the application for bail when the accused is a flight risk,
notwithstanding the prosecution's evidence on the guilt of the accused.28

In exercising this discretion, the trial court should receive the parties' evidence at a hearing duly scheduled
for this purpose. The prosecution and the accused are granted reasonable opportunity to prove their
respective positions: on the part of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong,
and on the part of the defense, the opposite.29 The hearing is summary and limited to the determination
of the weight of evidence for purposes of granting or denying bail. The denial or refusal must be supported
by a summary of the prosecution's evidence.30

In Cortes v. Catral,31 this Court laid down the following duties of the trial court in cases of an application
for bail:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Sections 7 and 8, supra).

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.32

Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua,33she cannot be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong. This was the burden
that the prosecution assumed in the subsequent hearings that followed the filing of Napoles' Petition for
Bail before the Sandiganbayan. As a trial court, the Sandiganbayan, in turn, possessed the jurisdiction to
hear and weigh the evidence of the prosecution and the defense.

At that stage of the proceedings, the bail hearings are limited to the determination of whether there is a
strong presumption of Napoles' guilt.34 It is merely a preliminary determination, and the Sandiganbayan
may deny admission to bail even when there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Napoles. Thus, the
prosecution can discharge its burden by proving that the evidence against Napoles shows evident proof
of guilt or a great presumption of guilt, which the Court defined in People v. Cabral35as follows:

By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong. "Proof evident" or "Evident proof' in this connection has been held to mean
clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the
offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be
punished capitally if the law is administered. "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances testified
to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to
an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. Even though there
is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption
is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused.36 (Emphasis in the original)

As a lesser quantum of proof than guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Sandiganbayan may deny the
application for bail on evidence less than that required for the conviction of Napoles. Furthermore, the
Sandiganbayan "does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought
to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or
on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted."37 It should not be forgotten that the
purpose of the bail hearing is to determine whether the accused is entitled to provisional liberty before
conviction. To require more from the prosecution, as well as from the trial court, effectively defeats the
purpose of the proceeding.38

The Sandiganbayan did not gravely

abuse its discretion in denying
Napoles' Petition for Bail.

Applying these jurisprudential standards to the present case, it is readily apparent that the Sandiganbayan
did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Upon receiving Napoles'
Petition for Bail, it scheduled hearings to allow the parties to submit their respective pieces of evidence.
The prosecution submitted numerous testimonial and documentary evidence, endeavoring to establish
evident proof of Napoles' guilt. Napoles, on the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence on her
behalf and relied instead on the supposed weakness of the prosecution's evidence.39

The Sandiganbayan's first assailed Resolution dated October 16, 2015 also reveals straightaway that the
evidence of the prosecution was summarized accordingly, effectively complying with the due process
requirements.40 It even extensively discussed the available evidence in relation to the elements of
Plunder, which the prosecution intended to prove point by point for purposes of demonstrating Napoles'
great presumption of guilt.41

Napoles points out in her petition, however, that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding strong evidence of
her guilt for the crime of Plunder.42 She challenges the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly the whistleblowers Luy, Suñas, Sula, and Baltazar.43

She further claims that her bail application should have been granted because the prosecution did not
present any documentary evidence directly connecting her to the NGOs that facilitated the
misappropriation of former Senator Enrile's PDAF.44 In the same manner, she likewise argues that there
was no direct proof of any agreement with former Senator Enrile and Reyes to obtain kickbacks from the
implementation of former Senator Enrile' s PDAF projects.45 Napoles particularly repudiates the
evidentiary value of the Summary of Rebates that Luy prepared from the Daily Disbursement Reports (DD
Rs) and Disbursement Vouchers (DVs) that came into in his possession while he was an employee of
Napoles.46

At first glance, it is apparent that the arguments of Napoles before this Court are fundamentally
allegations of serious errors on the part of the Sandiganbayan in appreciating the evidence of the
prosecution. This is not within the purview of this Court's review power under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. This Court is not a trier of facts and this proceeding is limited to the detennination of whether the
Sandiganbayan patently, grossly, and arbitrarily exercised its discretion with respect to Napoles' bail
application.

In these lights, the succeeding discussion on the evidence of the prosecution against Napoles is limited
only to reviewing whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the application for
bail on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. For this purpose, it must be clearly established that
the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the alleged dearth of evidence against Napoles.

The prosecution was able to establish

with evident proof that Napoles
participated in the implied
conspiracy to misappropriate public
funds and acquire ill-gotten wealth.

The charge of Plunder against Napoles in this case alleges a conspiracy among former Senator Enrile and
Reyes, as public officers, and Napoles, Lim, and De Asis, as private individuals. On this point, this Court has
consistently ruled that the conspiracy among the accused to commit the crime of Plunder is usually an
agreement or connivance to secretly cooperate in doing the unlawful act.47 Even Congress, in its
Explanatory Note to the proposed bill criminalizing Plunder, recognized that this crime, by its very nature,
is committed through a series or combination of acts done "in stealth and secrecy over a period of
time."48

Seeing as it would be difficult to provide direct evidence establishing the conspiracy among the accused,
the Sandiganbayan may infer it "from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently
indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole."49 It was therefore unnecessary for the
Sandiganbayan to find direct proof of any agreement among Napoles, former Senator Enrile and Reyes.
The conspiracy may be implied from the intentional participation in the transaction that furthers the
common design and purpose. As long as the prosecution was able to prove that two or more persons
aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, the conspiracy may be inferred even if
no actual meeting among them was proven.50

Here, .the implied conspiracy among Napoles and her co-accused was proven through various
documentary and testimonial evidence showing that they acted towards the common goal of
misappropriating the PDAF of former Senator Enrile.

When Commissioner Susan P. Garcia (Garcia) testified regarding the results of their special audit on the
PDAF-funded projects of the government, they found that Napoles and her co-accused committed Plunder
through an elaborate scheme. It began through a letter originating from the office of former Senator Enrile
being sent to the concerned implementing agency, informing the latter that the office of former Senator
Enrile designated Jose Antonio Evangelista (Evangelista) as its representative in the implementation of the
PDAF-funded project. Evangelista, who was likewise the Deputy Chief of Staff of former Senator Enrile and
acting in representative capacity, then sends another letter to the implementing agency designating a
specific NGO to implement the PDAF-funded project. Thereafter, the NGO that was endorsed by
Evangelista submits a project proposal to the implementing agency, and proceeds to enter into a
memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the implementing agency and former Senator Enrile as the
parties.51

After the signing of the MOA, the project proposal is attached to the Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO), which allows the implementing agency to incur the expenses that are stated in it.52 These
documents are submitted to the DBM for processing, and if not lacking in requirements, the DBM issues
the Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA).53 This authorizes the payment of the allocated amount to the
implementing agency, which is done by way of crediting the same to its account. After the amount is
credited to its account, the implementing agency prepares the DV s and checks payable to the identified
NGO.54 The NGO, in turn, drafts and submits the requirements for liquidation (i.e. the accomplishment
report, the disbursement report, and the list of beneficiaries) after receiving the check.55 However, as it
turned out, the Special Audit Team found that the beneficiaries denied receiving any proceeds, whether
in terms of projects or equipment, from the PDAF of former Senator Enrile.56

Commissioner Garcia and the rest of the Special Audit Team found that the release of the PDAF to the
concerned NGOs through this system violated the following: (a) DBM National Budget Circular No. 476
dated September 20, 2001, or the guidelines on the release of the PDAF, which requires national
government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to only implement programs
that are within their functions; (b) Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) Resolution No. 12-2007,
which requires the selection of an NGO through public bidding or negotiated procurement; and (c) COA
Circular No. 2007- 001 dated October 25, 2007, or the guidelines on the grant, utilization, accounting and
auditing of funds released to NGOs.57

Remarkably, the respective testimonies of Commissioner Garcia and the supposed beneficiaries58 of
former Senator Enrile's PDAF were corroborated on material points by the whistleblowers. These
whistleblowers, who were former employees of Napoles, participated in different capacities to the
conspiracy.

Merlina P. Sufias (Suñas), a former employee of Napoles, testified that the office of Napoles received
copies of the SARO from the office of former Senator Enrile. Upon receipt, Napoles held meetings where
they would be given instructions to prepare an indorsement letter addressed to the implementing agency,
and a project proposal identifying the local government unit that would benefit from the PDAF-funded
project. The drafts of these documents were sent to Evangelista for review, and subsequently, the
finalized versions were returned to their office. Suñas, as the custodian of documents involving
transactions with legislators, retained a copy for their file.59

Suñas also testified that Benhur K. Luy (Luy) prepared the letters authorizing Evangelista to implement
the PDAF-funded projects on behalf of former Senator Enrile. She likewise participated in the preparation
of the MOA executed among the concerned implementing agency, former Senator Enrile, and the relevant
NGO.60

Meanwhile, Luy confirmed that Napoles asked them to prepare the documents referred to in Suñas'
testimony. He also substantiated the statement of Suñas that the office of former Senator Enrile furnished
them with copies of the PDAF requirements after its submission to the DBM.61 Luy was the first to receive
the documents because he had to verify if the entries as to the name of the NGO and the project cost
were correct.62

In their separate testimonies, both Suñas and Luy confirmed that former Senator Enrile received 40% to
50% of the project cost.63 According to Luy, they referred to the share of the legislators as rebates, which
he recorded in line with his position as the finance officer of Napoles.64 The payment of the rebates was
made in tranches starting in 2004-with the first half paid to former Senator Enrile upon the listing of the
project, and the balance paid upon the release of the SARO.65 Napoles, on the other hand, took 5% of
the project cost as her share.66 The middlepersons who received the rebates on behalf of former Senator
Enrile, such as Tuason,67 were also given 5% of the project cost.68

Another former employee of Napoles, Marina Cortez Sula (Sula), narrated that Napoles gave her
instructions to register approximately twenty (20) NGOs, including those that implemented the ghost
projects funded by former Senator Enrile's PDAf; The relevant information regarding these NGOs were
listed in a red notebook that Sula kept to assist her in the preparation of the General Information Sheets
that were regularly submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).69 This notebook was
presented to the Sandiganbayan during the bail hearing.70

Sula also stated that the NGOs were created at the instance of Napoles. According to Sula, Napoles asked
her and the other employees to come up with the names of these NGOs. Upon Napoles' approval of the
name, Sula reserved its use at the SEC. Sula also purchased forms for the articles of incorporation and by-
laws of the NGOs, which she completed under the direction of Napoles. Napoles then provided the
amount necessary for the initial deposit to open a bank account in the name of the NGO. The bank
accounts were opened at either Metrobank or Landbank because the branch managers were already
familiar with Napoles, making it easy for Sula to facilitate the process. Thereafter, Sula registered the
NGOs with the SEC.71

Sula noted that Napoles selected the incorporators and officers of the NGOs. The incorporators and
officers were usually employees of Napoles, or the relatives of these employees. Sula testified that those
chosen as presidents of the NGO were aware that their names were used because they were made to sign
the incorporation documents. In cases where the president was not an employee of Napoles, the
employee who provided the name of the NGO president was made to sign in their stead.72 Sula likewise
admitted to forging the signatures of the incorporators, or using the incorporators' names without their
knowledge.73

Suñas and Luy corroborated the testimony of Sula on the fictitious manner by which the NGOs were
incorporated. The three of them were all presidents of different NGOs, and they provided the names of
their relatives as its officers and incorporators.74 In exchange for agreeing to become presidents of the
NGOs, both Sufi.as and Sula testified that Napoles promised to provide them 1% of the project cost as
their commission.75

Similar to Suñas and Sula, Mary Arlene Joyce Baltazar (Baltazar), testified that Napoles likewise promised
to give her a commission in exchange for using her name as the president of an NGO. As the former
bookkeeper of Napoles, Baltazar further confirmed that Napoles used the names of her employees, and
that of their friends and relatives to make them appear as incorporators or officers of the concerned
NGOs.76 Once they became president of an NGO, Napoles instructed them to become voluntary members
of the Social Security System (SSS) and Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth), because
Napoles needed to terminate their employment.77 Baltazar stated that this was purposely done in order
to avoid any connection between Napoles and the NGOs.78

As to the manner by which Napoles obtained the amount allocated for the PDAF-funded projects, Sula
narrated that this was equally done through the employees of Napoles. Whenever the DBM disbursed the
allocated amount to the implementing agency, a check was issued to the Napoles-controlled NGO. Since
Sula and the other employees were designated as presidents of these NGOs, they were authorized to
receive the check for the PDAF-funded project from the implementing agency.79

Napoles had access to the bank accounts of the NGOs because as Sula, Luy, and Suñas testified during the
bail hearing, they were required to sign blank withdrawal slips, which were turned over to Napoles
together with the corresponding passbook for these accounts.80 Thus, in the ultimate scheme of things,
Napoles received the amounts allocated for the PDAF-funded projects of former Senator Enrile, which she
later on apportioned according to the agreed upon share of the legislators.

With respect to the actual delivery of the PDAF-funded projects to its intended beneficiaries, Sula, Luy,
Suñas, and Baltazar admitted that they fabricated the liquidation documents. This was done by forging
the receipts and the signatures of the beneficiaries, making it appear that the project was indeed
implemented.81 Again, this supported the findings of the COA Special Audit Team82 and the FIO83 on the
fictitious projects funded by the PDAF of former Senator Enrile.

It is plain from the foregoing that Napoles and her co-accused, as well as the former employees of Napoles
who were eventually admitted as State witnesses, had a common design and objective-to divert the PDAF
of former Senator Enrile from its lawful purpose and to their own personal accounts. The individuals
involved in this case performed different criminal acts, which contributed, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Consistent with the doctrine on implied
conspiracy, these actions on the part of Napoles and her co-accused are sufficient to prove the existence
of a "concurrence in sentiment," regardless of any proof that an actual agreement took place.

Arguably, there is no documentary evidence directly linking Napoles to the NGOs used as conduits for the
PDAF-funded projects of former Senator Enrile. However, her ties to the officers of the NGOs involved in
this case reveal otherwise. Napoles' participation in the conspiracy was established through testimonial
evidence, not only from one of her former employees, but from four (4) witnesses-all of whom
corroborate each other on material points. More importantly, they testified on the minute details of the
scheme that only those privy to the conspiracy would be able to provide. Notably, Napoles did not even
refute their claims that they were her former employees, relying instead on singling out inconsequential
details in their testimonies.

Even the testimony of Ruby Chan Tuason, the middleperson who received the rebates of former Senator
Enrile on his behalf, confirmed that Napoles oversaw the implementation of the scheme to divert the
disbursements of the PDAF. She personally met with Napoles to negotiate the respective shares of the
conspirators, and received the amount on behalf of former Senator Enrile, which she subsequently turned
over to Reyes.84

Since the whistleblowers personally received instructions from Napoles to incorporate the NGOs, prepare
the requirements for the release of the PDAF, prepare and deliver the rebates to the middlepersons, and
fabricate the liquidation documents, they were competent witnesses on the subject of their respective
testimonies.85 Clearly, the prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence supply interlocking
pieces of information that when taken together, provide a complete picture of the indispensability of the
participation of Napoles in the scheme to misappropriate public funds for the benefit of select individuals,
by using the NGOs as conduits for the PDAF projects of former Senator Enrile. The directions and
instructions she gave to her former employees constitute a clear evidence of her active participation, not
mere acquiescence or presence, in the conspiracy.

The Sandiganbayan may rely on the

testimonies of the whistleblowers,
especially since these were
corroborated by other available
evidence.

Napoles nonetheless challenged the credibility of the whistleblowers, arguing that their testimonies
should have been received with "grave suspicion," coming as they were from "polluted source[s]."86
However, as this Court earlier discussed, the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses were consistent,
clear, and corroborative of each other. Other testimonial and documentary evidence also substantiated
the veracity of the whistleblowers' statements during the bail hearing.

In any case, a careful perusal of the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolutions reveals that it considered the
prosecution's other testimonial and documentary evidence, and discussed it in relation to one another.
Among the documents that the Sandiganbayan considered were the letters requesting for the release of
former Senator Enrile's PDAF, the incorporation documents of the NGOs, the liquidation documents for
the PDAF-funded projects, the SAROs itself, and the DV s issued by the implementing agencies to the NGOs
under the control of Napoles.87

In other words, the Sandiganbayan did not rely solely on the testimonies of the whistleblowers. Seeing as
there were other available evidence lending credence to their testimonies, the Sandiganbayan did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it considered the testimonies of the whistleblowers in denying Napoles'
bail application, despite their participation in the conspiracy itself. The mere fact that the whistleblowers
were conspirators themselves does not automatically render their testimonies incredible and unreliable.
The ruling in United States v. Remigio88is instructive in this regard:

The true doctrine which should govern the testimony of accomplices, or what may be variously termed
principals, confederates, or conspirators, is not in doubt. The evidence of accomplices is admissible and
competent. Yet such testimony comes from a "polluted source." Consequently, it is scrutinized with care.
It is properly subject to grave suspicion. If not corroborated, credibility is affected. Even then, however,
the defendant may be convicted upon the unsupported evidence of an accomplice. If corroborated
absolutely or even to such an extent as is indicative of trustworthiness, the testimony of the accomplice
is sufficient to warrant a conviction. This is true even if the accomplice has made previous statements
inconsistent with his testimony at the trial and such inconsistencies are satisfactorily explained.

xxxx

Where conspiracy is in issue these principles are even more certain. A conspiracy is more readily proved
by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the
conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the
confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told
the truth in other respects.89 (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)

At this point it should be emphasized that this Court is not the proper forum to weigh the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses. It is elementary that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
assessment or appreciation of the testimonies of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect.90 In
this case, it is the Sandiganbayan that had the opportunity to observe the deportment and behavior of
the witnesses during the bail hearing. It was in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of
these witnesses and the weight of their respective testimonies. At any rate, Napoles was unable to
establish any motive on the part of her former employees, which would compel them to falsely testify
against her and her co-accused.

The core issue, therefore, of whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of Napoles, was resolved
by the Sandiganbayan in accordance with the relevant laws, rules, and jurisprudence.

Plunder is a deplorable crime that unfairly exploits the trust that the public reposed in its officials. It is
inherently immoral not only because it involves the corruption of public funds, but also because its
essence proceeds from a rapacious intent. This Court's ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan91is a constant
reminder of the magnitude of this offense:

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which
requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion

xxxx

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been
resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight
penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly
dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen
in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death
of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of
other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and can1apping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their
very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the
subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state
finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from
decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty,
greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the
psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic
services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to
an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs
over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified
bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees
or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to
society.92 (Emphasis in the original)

It is precisely the enormous gravity of this offense that capital punishment is imposed on those who are
found guilty of Plunder. As a necessary consequence, provisional liberty is not easily granted to those
accused of this offense, especially when the prosecution more than amply established that the evidence
of guilt is strong. This is a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the trial court, which this Court may
nullify only when the exercise of this discretion is tainted with arbitrariness and capriciousness that the
trial court failed to act within the contemplation of law.

Unfortunately for Napoles, there is nothing in the records showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It has discharged its judicial duty in Napoles' bail
application in a manner consistent with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, and the evidence on record.
Thus, all things considered, the Court finds no reason to nullify the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolutions.
The Petition for Bail of Napoles was correctly denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated October 16, 2015
and March 2, 2016 of the Sandiganbayan in SB-14-CRM-0238 are AFFIRMED, there being no grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.

SO ORDERED.
N BANC

November 7, 2017

G.R. No. 181796

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR/HEAD OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

AND DETECTION GROUP (CIDG), PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), Petitioner
vs.
REGINA N. CA YANAN AND SPOl ROLANDO V. PASCUA, Respondents

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings involving petitions for the writ of amparo. The respondent
must show in the return on the writ of amparo the observance of extraordinary diligence. Once an
enforced disappearance is established by substantial evidence, the relevant State agencies should be
tasked to assiduously investigate and determine the disappearance, and, if warranted, to bring to the bar
of justice whoever may be responsible for the disappearance.

The Case

The Government, represented by the Director/Head of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), appeals the resolution issued on December 13, 2007 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, in Quezon City (RTC) maintaining the writ of amparo; ordering the CIDG
to continue its investigation into the disappearance of Pablo A. Cayanan (Pablo); directing respondent
SPO1 Rolando V. Pascua (Pascua) to appear before the proper forum; making the temporary protection
order permanent; and upholding the enrollment of Regina N. Cayanan (Regina) in the Witness Protection
Program of the Department of Justice.1

Also under appeal is the resolution of January 31, 2008, whereby the RTC denied the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.2

Antecedents

On August 16, 2007, Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the R TC alleging that Pablo, her husband,
was being illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG;3 that on July 9, 2007 a group of armed men
identifying themselves as operatives of the CIDG, led by Pascua, had forcibly arrested Pablo on Magalang
Street, East A venue, Diliman, Quezon City without any warrant of arrest, and had then detained him at
the office of the CIDG in Camp Crame, Quezon City; that Pablo had not been found or heard from since
then; and that despite repeated demands by her and her relatives, the CIDG operatives had not produced
the body of Pablo.4
On August 21, 2007, the CIDG received the petition for habeas corpus brought in behalf of Pablo. On
August 28, 2007, the CIDG filed its return on the writ wherein it denied having the custody of Pablo or
having detained him. It prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus.5

On September 7, 2007, the R TC directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.6

On October 24, 2007, Regina, albeit reiterating the allegations of the petition for habeas corpus, amended
her petition to now seek instead the issuance of a writ of amparo.7

On October 24, 2007, the RTC issued the writ of amparo.8

On November 5, 2007, the CIDG and Pascua submitted their respective comments vis-a-vis the writ of
amparo.9

On November 5, 2007, Regina moved ex parte for the issuance of a temporary protection order and
witness protection order. The RTC granted her motion on November 6, 2007.10

Pascua did not appear in the proceedings in the RTC. He tendered explanations for his non-appearance,
specifically: for the initial hearing, he was then suffering acute gastroenteritis; and for the later hearings,
he wanted to protect his identity as part of his defenses in the criminal case of kidnapping brought against
him in the Department of Justice.11

On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued the first assailed resolution,12 disposing thusly:

Foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:

1) The Court hereby maintains the Writ of Amparo earlier issued;

2) For respondent CIDG Chief/Director to continue the investigation it earlier conducted;

3) For SP02 Rolando V. Pascua to appear to the proper forum;

4) The Temporary Protection Order is hereby made permanent;

5) And the Granting of the Witness Protection Program availed of by the petitioner is hereby retained
until the finality of the case/cases related thereto.

It is so ordered.13

The CIDG forthwith moved for reconsideration;14 however, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration on January 31, 2008 through the second assailed resolution.15

Hence, the CIDG has directly appealed to the Court.

Issues

The CIDG urges the following grounds for review and reversal of the assailed resolutions, namely:16

I.

The trial court gravely erred in granting the writ of amparo, there being no sufficient evidence to
support the same.

A.

The Rule on the writ of amparo did not change the rules on burden of proof.

B.

A mere accusation accompanied by inherently hearsay evidence is not sufficient ground for the court
to issue a writ of amparo or allow its continued effectivity.

II.

Petitioner discharged its functions as required in its mandate and exhausted all remedies available
under the law.

On his part, Pascua submits in his comment to the petition that:17

I.

Complainant failed to establish by the required burden of proof that respondent SP02 Pascua, in his
personal capacity or as police officer, caused the "forced disappearance" of Pablo Cayanan within the
ambit protected by the rule on the writ of amparo.

A.

Following Mexico's Amparo, it is [an] essential requirement for the supposed victim to establish where
he is being held. Moreover, Philippine rule on amparo specifically covers "public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity'', which evidently precludes a government institution/instrumentality,
such as CIDG-PNP.

B.

Enforced or forced disappearance means that it must be established that agents of the state
perpetrated its commission.

II.
 Respondent-Accused Pascua is entitled to presumption of innocence, which cannot be diminished by
the rule on writ of amparo.

The issues for consideration and resolution in this appeal are follows: (1) whether or not sufficient
evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo by the RTC; (2) whether or not the CIDG already
discharged its duty as required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; (3) whether or not the petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo was defective; and (4) whether or not the issuance of the writ of amparo
by the RTC impaired Pascua's right to the presumption of his innocence.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

We have to indicate as a preliminary observation that although this mode of appeal is usually limited to
the determination of questions of law, Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly allows the
review by the Court of questions of fact or of law or of both. Accordingly, we shall also determine herein
the sufficiency of the evidence presented in support of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

I.

Substantial evidence existed to warrant

the issuance of the writ of amparo

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the nature of the writ of amparo as a remedy against
enforced disappearances or threats to life, liberty and personal security, viz.:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies the degree of proof required from the petitioner
as a respondent named in the petition for the writ of amparo, to wit:

Section 1 7. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.

xxxx

Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence to establish the allegations of
the petition for the writ of amparo and to warrant granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, to wit:
 Section 18. Judgment. - x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied.

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.18 This standard was applied in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,19 the first ruling
by the Court relating to the remedy of the writ of amparo.

In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,20 a case involving the propriety of the trial court's issuance of the writ of amparo,
the Court expounded on the need for substantial evidence to support the petition for the writ of amparo,
viz.:

We see no merit in the petitioners' submitted position that no sufficient evidence exists to support the
conclusion that the Kasim evidence unequivocally points to some government complicity in the
disappearance x x x. We painstakingly ruled:

To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we
should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece
of evidence - even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence - taking
into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum
admissibility requirement x x x.

xxxx

Likewise, we see no merit in the petitioners' claim that the Kasim evidence does not amount to
substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is not a new issue; we extensively
and thoroughly considered and resolved it in our December 3, 2009 Decision. At this point, we need not
go into another full discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary standard specific to the Writ
of Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the evidence presented.
When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense
with the substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence,
maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation.
This, we did, by considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay
evidence with the other available evidence in the case.

Thus viewed, common threads that plainly run in the three cited cases are applicable to the present
case. There is the evidence of ineffective investigation in Manalo and Velasquez Rodriguez, while in all
three was the recognition that the burden of proof must be lowered or relaxed (either through the use of
circumstantial or indirect evidence or even by logical inference); the requirement for direct evidence to
establish that an enforced disappearance occurred -- as the petitioners effectively suggest -- would render
it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an individual has been made to disappear. In these
lights, we emphasized in our December 3, 2009 Decision that while the need for substantial evidence
remains the rule, flexibility must be observed where appropriate (as the Courts in Velasquez Rodriguez
and Timurtas did) for the protection of the precious rights to life, liberty and security. This flexibility, we
noted, requires that 'we should take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import
of every piece of evidence - even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence - taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as
basic minimum admissibility requirement.' From these perspectives, we see no error that we should
rectify or reconsider.21 (Emphases supplied)

The CIDG contends that Regina did not discharge her burden of proof because she did not present
substantial evidence to support her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

The contention of the CIDG is without merit.

We declare that Regina fully discharged her duty to present substantial evidence in support of her petition
for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Firstly, the sinumpaang salaysay executed on July 30, 2007 before Special Investigator Cesar S. Rivera of
the Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking and Armed Robbery Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
whereby affiant Ronaldo F. Perez (Perez), an eyewitness no less, detailed the events of the abduction of
Pablo in mid-afternoon of July 9, 2007, was consistent and credible in itself. Perez's statements therein
definitely recounted how the abductors perpetrated the abduction by blocking the path of Pablo's Isuzu
Sportivo (plate numbered ZCW 283) with their whitecolored Kia 2-door Sedan bearing plate numbered
YBA 255 and their greencolored Toyota Lite Ace with plate numbered "___-488." Perez identified one of
the perpetrators of the abduction by name ("SP02 Rolando Pascua") and supplied another identifying
circumstance for Pascua ("Siya po nagpapagawa din sa akin ng araw na yon ng International Drivers
License, police po siya, dating naka-destino sa Firearms and Explosives Division (FED), Camp Crame"). He
thereby revealed having last seen Pablo on the day of the abduction as being inside the Isuzu Sportivo
that the abductors parked in front of the main office of the CIDG in Camp Crame.

The relevant portions of the sinumpaang salaysay of Perez are quoted for ready reference as follows:

4. T. Sino ba si PABLO CAYANAN?

S. Kliyente ko po si PABLO, nagpapagawa ng mga rehistro ng mga sasakyan. May pwesto po siya sa
Dagupan at namimili at nagbebenta ng mga second hand car. Mga isang taon mahigit ko na po siyang
kilala.

5. T. Kailan at papano siya nawala o dinukot? [When and how did he disappear or was abducted]

S. Noon pong ika-9 ng Hulyo 2007, nag-text si PABLO sa akin, tinatanong kung ok na yung papel ng
Transfer of Ownership ng sasakyan, at sabi ko po "ok na". Sabi niya "Sige punta ako diyan." Mga alas-tres
(3:00) ng hapon dumating siya sa harap ng opisina naming sa Cres Eden building sa 8A Magalang St.,
Pinyahan, Quezon City. Dala ni PABLO yung Isuzu Sportivo (Plate ZCW-283) na kulay orange. Hindi na siya
bumaba ng sasakyan at tinawag na lang ako para sumakay sa kanya. Pag-sakay ko po ay may humarang
na dalawang sasakyan, isang Kia 2 door Sedan, puti, na may plate number YBA 255, at isang Toyota Lite
Ace, green, plate number ___-488. Tinutukan kami ng Calibre .45 pistol ng 2 lalaking tumabi sa amin ni
PABLO. Lumapit si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA sa amin at pinalipat ako sa Pajero niya (kulay navy blue). May
ibang nag-maneho ng sasakyan ni PABLO na kasama siya doon. Kasama po ni PASCUA yung driver niya.

6. T. Sino si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA?

S: Siya po nagpapagawa din sa akin ng araw na yon ng International Drivers License, police po siya,
dating naka-destino sa Firearms and Explosives Division (FED), Camp Crame.

xxxx

11. T. Saan kayo dinala ni PABLO?

S. Inikut-ikot kami sa labas ng Crame mga kalahating oras (3:00- 3:30 nh), tapos po ay pumasok kami sa
loob ng Crame sa tapat ng CIDG Building, parking area. Nasa labas lang kami ng CIDG Building nakapark
mga isa't kalahating oras (3:30-5:00 nh), nasa loob lang ako ng Pajero ni PASCUA. Si PABLO ay kinakausap
nila SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA sa loob ng Sportivo. Pinaalis na po ako mga bandang alas singko (5:00) ng
hapon, tumuloy na ako sa upisina sa Pinyahan. Naiwan po doon si PABLO CAYANAN Jr. bantay siya ng mga
dumukot sa kanya, kasama si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA.

12. T. Paano mo nasabing nasa CIDG Crame kayo?

S. Madalas po ako doon, makikita po sa labas ng building na may malaking nakasulat na Criminal
Investigation and Detention (sic) Group (CIDG).22

Given that no ill-motive was imputed to Perez for firmly identifying Pascua as the person leading the
abduction of Pablo, the credibility of the identification of Pascua was unassailable. Indeed, Perez was not
likely to falsely incriminate a police officer like Pascua in the commission of a crime as serious as abduction
unless the incrimination was the truth.

Secondly, Pascua himself expressly admitted the abduction of Pablo, albeit asserting himself as another
victim of the same abduction. Pascua's version on the abduction, as culled from his counter-affidavit,
follows:

a) On July 9, 2007, I was at the vicinity of Magalang Street near the Land Transportation Office (LTO)
along East Avenue, Quezon City. I was then processing the application for International Driver's License of
a relative which was coursed and requested through me;

b) To facilitate the processing of the said application for International Driver's License, I met a friend
named Ronaldo F. Perez, who incidentally was [a] known "fixer" in the area to help him (sic) facilitate the
application;
 c) At around 3:00 in the afternoon and while I am seated in a "turo turo" (cafeteria) talking to Ronaldo
Perez regarding the license detail, a group of men (referred to herein as "Malefactor" for brevity) more or
less ten (10) brandishing long and short firearms arrived and in a "Gestapo" like manner hauled several
persons including me and Ronaldo Perez. The incident transpired in no less than a minute. The Malefactor
seem to be trained and have prepared for the incident;

d) At that precise moment, [I] could not identify myself as a police officer yet to the Malefactors for fear
that I would be shot at by the Malefactors. At that time I did not bear with me my service fire arm - caliber
9mm pistol;

e) We were ordered to board in a vehicle, which vehicle I cannot identify nor their license plate number.
There were Seven persons in the vehicle, four (4) members of the Malefactors and three (3) person who
were hauled including me and Ronaldo Perez;

f) All three (3) of us who were taken by the malefactors were ordered, at gun point, to bow our head
while the vehicle is moving. We were directed not to look anywhere;

g) Same vehicle, together with two more vehicle apparently taking the lead, drove all the way to EDSA
southbound passing by the street near the building where the Department of Interior and Local
Government is located;

h) It was along Kamuning or a few minutes after their (sic) hauling when I had the opportunity to identify
myself to one of the Malefactors that I am a bonafide member of the police force. I was asked if I am is
(sic) sure that I am a police officer, to which I answered "Opo";

i) A few minutes after and upon learning that I am a police officer, the vehicle stopped and I was required
to get off, which I immediately did. I was however directed by one of the Malefactor not to look back or I
would be shot which I complied;

j) Fearing that what I experienced may be [a] violation of the law, I boarded a taxi cab and immediately
proceeded to the Central Metro Manila Criminal Investigation and Detection Team located at Camp
Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City to report the incident. This is the station that I am quite familiar,
hence, I decided to proceed to the same station x x x.

k) I tried to locate Ronaldo Perez that night but to no avail and so I decided to wait for any news that
may come there after;

l) The next day, July 10, 2007 (Tuesday), I was surprised to learn from Ronaldo Perez through telephone
call, that he was likewise released and that he is now ready to process the requested International Driver's
License of his relative Rizalino Pascua Gani, Jr. x x x.23

Asserting himself as another victim of the same abduction was Pascua's way of denying his participation
in the abduction of Pablo. Yet, he did not furnish details of the abduction that would have given to the
investigators firm leads to quickly comer the perpetrators as well as to determine and locate the
whereabouts of Pablo. His omission as fatal to his credibility. He could not simply belie his part in the
abduction by issuing a blanket denial. He was expected to furnish details because he was a police officer
sworn to uphold and enforce the law. It is significant that his denial was already doubtful in light of Perez's
sinumpaang salaysay positively identifying of him as the leader of the perpetrators of the abduction.

Thirdly, Pascua's version of being a victim of the same abduction deserved no consideration. For one, he
could not even mention the type and the color of the vehicle that he and Pablo were supposedly ordered
to board. Such inability was uncharacteristic of a veteran police officer like him. To justify his alleged
inability to provide details about the abductors in his counter-affidavit, he stated that he and Pablo were
told to "bow their heads and not to look." The justification was implausible, however, because it was
incompatible with his declaration in the same counter-affidavit to the effect that the "[s]ame vehicle,
together with two or more vehicle apparently taking the lead, drove all the way to EDSA southbound
passing by the street near the building where the Department of Interior and Local Government is
located."24 Furthermore, he said that he was released by the abductors only after having introduced
himself as a police officer. But he thereby contradicted himself because he also stated in the same
counter-affidavit that he feared being shot during the abduction if he identified himself as a police officer.
Moreover, he claimed that although he was released he submissively complied with the order of one of
the abductors for him "not to look back or [he] would be shot."25 The claim of submissiveness was
unnatural for a police officer like him because he was expected - mainly because of his training and
experience as a police officer, or even because of simple curiosity on his part - to have at least glanced at
the fleeing vehicle of the abductors in order to get a clue for the follow-up investigation. That he did not
give chase or tail the vehicle, or alert other police officers about the abduction soonest added to the
suspiciousness of his denial of participation in the abduction. And, lastly, his proceeding to a relatively
farther police station to report the incident, instead of to the nearer police station or outpost made his
version absolutely suspicious.

Fourthly, Regina presented other witnesses, namely: Ricardo Cayanan26 and Leonila R. Francisco,27 to
corroborate the allegation on the occurrence of the abduction. Such other witnesses also identified
Pascua as the person leading the abductors of Pablo and Perez.

And, fifthly, Perez's recantation of his sinumpaang salaysay had no evidentiary value for being general and
bereft of any details. A perusal shows that the recantation did not offer details of what had really occurred
if the abduction of Pablo did not actually happen. Such details were the only means to directly contradict
the details stated in the recanted sinumpaang salaysay.

It is relevant to note that the RTC, whose ascertainment of the credibility of conflicting testimonies is
generally accorded great respect by the reviewing court, easily disbelieved Perez's recantation of his
sinumpaang salaysay, observing as follows:

Even the recantation of Ronaldo Perez of his Sinumpaang Salaysay as presented by the respondent
SPO2 Rolando Pascua is frowned upon by the Court. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded such affidavit
as exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually
through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Considering that the respondents herein belong to
the police force, the motive of Ronaldo Perez in executing his Affidavit of Recantation is doubted by the
Court. Moreover, Ronaldo Perez's defiance of the subpoena sent to him by this Court proved all the more
the doubt of the Court of the veracity of his recantation.28

II.

The CIDG did not observe the

required extraordinary diligence

Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the diligence required of a public official or employee
who is named as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo, to wit:

Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required
by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed to evade the responsibility or liability.

The CIDG posits that it was only required to observe ordinary diligence in conducting its investigation of
the disappearance of Pablo and in determining Pablo's whereabouts.

The CIDG's position is incorrect. The diligence required of the CIDG was extraordinary.

Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo expressly states what a public official or employee impleaded
as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo should submit with the verified written return, to
wit:

Section 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent
shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things,
contain the following:

(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right
to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;

(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;

(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission
against the aggrieved party; and
 (d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have
or will still be taken:

(i) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(ii) to recover ·and preserve the evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;

(iii) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;

(iv) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any
pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;

(v) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and

(vi) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.

The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution
of the case.

A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

In its return, the CIDG only attached passive certificates issued by its operating divisions to the effect that
Pablo was not being detained by any of them.29 Said certifications were severely inadequate. It is almost
needless to characterize the certifications as non-compliant with the requirement for a detailed return.
As such, the certifications amounted to a general denial on the part of the CIDG. The quoted rule requires
the verified written return of the CIDG to be accompanied by supporting affidavits. Such affidavits, which
could be those of the persons tasked by the CIDG and other agencies like the NBI and probably the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) to collaborate in the investigation of the abduction of Pablo, would have
specified and described the efforts expended in the search for Pablo, if such search was really conducted,
and would have reported the progress of the investigation of the definite leads given in the Perez's
sinumpaang salaysay on the abduction itself.

The allegation that the CIDG had continuously searched for Pablo among its various operating divisions
similarly constituted a general denial because the CIDG did not thereby indicate who had conducted the
search, and how thoroughly the allegedly continuous searches had been conducted.

The CIDG pointed out in its return that the CIDG had undertaken an administrative investigation against
Pascua, and submitted in that regard the certification on the pre-charge evaluation and investigation of
Pascua. The CIDG asserts that its investigation of the disappearance of Pablo was conducted in tandem
with that of the NBI; that it had also formed its own investigating team to conduct a "thorough
investigation" of the abduction of Pablo; and that it had meanwhile verified the vehicle used in the
abduction from the LT0.30
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the investigations
conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that would enable the RTC to judiciously determine
whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo's whereabouts had been sincere and adequate. The return
by the CIDG was non-compliant in that regard. To be noted at this juncture is that the CIDG should have
exerted greater effort at complying with both the letter and spirit of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in
light of Perez's sinumpaang salaysay having fully placed the responsibility for the abduction and
disappearance of Pablo right at the very doorsteps of the CIDG in Camp Crame. It is disheartening for us
to see the CIDG's investigation having been limited to Pascua despite the circumstances justifying a
broader inquiry. There was also no affirmative showing of any investigation of the area of the abduction
itself despite Regina having presented witnesses from the area. Indeed, the CIDG did not seem to have
itself investigated Perez on the abduction.31

III.

The petition for the writ of amparo

was not defective

In his comment, which the CIDG adopted, Pascua reminds that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was partly
patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo adopted in Mexico. He posits that it has been an essential
requirement in Mexico for the petition for the writ of amparo to state where the victim of involuntary
disappearance was being held. He argues that upon the recantation by Perez of his sinumpaang salaysay,
there was no more evidence from which to determine where Pablo was being held.

The argument of Pascua is unfounded.

Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo lists the matters to be alleged in the petition for the writ of
amparo:

Section 5. Contents of the Petition. - The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the
following:

(a) The personal circumstance of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission,
or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of
the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together
with the report;
 (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

As Section 5 shows, there is no requirement for the petition to state the probable whereabouts of the
victim. We have no doubt, however, that Regina was not aware where Pablo had been kept at the time
she filed her petition for the writ of habeas corpus.

Nonetheless, the Court clarifies that the application and implementation of the rule of amparo adopted
in Mexico or in any other country could only be persuasive at best. Despite its being patterned after the
rules on the writ of amparo of other countries, particularly those in Latin-American, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo promulgated by the Court should not be wholly dependent on how those other rules of amparo
have operated, or have been implemented. Such operation and implementation, if worthy of emulation,
are only best practices to be considered and optionally relied upon, if at all. Circumstances and needs
peculiar to our country, which the Court has well considered in crafting the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,
dictate different operation and implementation.

It was actually presumptuous for Pascua to argue that there was no evidence at all that indicated the
whereabouts of Pablo following the abduction. There was such evidence, and it was substantial.
Specifically, Perez's sinumpaang salaysay stated the place where Pablo was detained or was last seen, to
wit:

11. T: Saan kayo dinala ni PABLO?

S: Inikut-ikot kami sa labas ng Crame mga kalahating oras (3:00- 3:30 nh), tapos po ay pumasok sa loob
ng Crame sa tapat ng CIDG Building, parking area. Nasa labas lang kami ng CIDG Building nakapark, mga
isa't kalahating oras (3:30-5:00 nh), nasa loob lang ako ng Pajero ni PASCUA. Si PABLO ay kinakausap nila
SPO2 ROLANDO PASCUA sa loob ng Sportivo. Pinaalis na po ako mga bandang alas singko (5:00) ng hapon;
tumuloy na ako sa upisina sa Pinyahan. Naiwan po doon si PABLO CAYANAN, Jr., bantay siya ng mga
dumukot sa kanya, kasama si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA.

12. T: Paano mo nasabing nasa CIDG Crame kayo?

S: Madalas po ako doon, makikita po sa labas ng building na may malaking nakasulat na Criminal
Investigation and Detention (sic) Group (CIDG).32

Pascua suggests that the State, or any of its agencies or institutions like the CIDG, cannot be made a
respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo. He probably bases his suggestion on the text of Section
1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which provides:
 Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. (Emphasis supplied)

The suggestion of Pascua lacks substance. Although Section 1 states that the violation may be committed
by the persons therein listed (i.e., public official or employee, or a private individual or entity), it does not
state that only the listed persons can be made respondents. The rule does not list the State or its agencies
as possible violators simply because the State and its agencies may not be presumed to sanction such
violations.

In proper circumstances, the State or any of its relevant agencies may be impleaded; otherwise, the rule
on the writ of amparo may be rendered ineffective or toothless. There may be occasions when the remedy
of the writ of amparo can be made effective only through the State and its agencies. This is because the
State is vested with the authority and responsibility for securing every inhabitant's life, liberty and
property. After all, the State controls the legal, moral and material resources by which to fully enforce the
Constitution and the laws guaranteeing life, liberty and property.

IV.

The issuance of the writ of amparo did not impair

SPO2 Pascua's right to the presumption of innocence

Pascua supposes that the issuance of the writ of amparo issued against him impaired or diminished his
right to the presumption of innocence.1âwphi1

Pascua's supposition entirely misses the point.

The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin or similar to those in criminal
prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence of the respondents is not determined, and no penal
sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies
against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty or security. The presumption of innocence is never an
issue. In the latter, the prosecution of the accused with due process of law is the object of the proceedings.
The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is always the starting point. Hence, the need for
the State to adduce proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.

V.

Reliefs to be granted

We next consider the reliefs to be granted in addition to the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo.

According to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the court hearing the petition may grant the
privilege of the writ of amparo "and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate." This means that the
amparo court should enable every act or move to prevent any violation of another person's right to life,
liberty and security or to defeat any threat of a violation of such right.

Under Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the respondent is required to also state in the return
the actions that have been or will still be taken: (a) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (b) to
recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the
petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible; (c) to identify witnesses
and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance; (d) to determine the cause,
manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance; (e) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved
in the death or disappearance; and (f) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.

With the records of the hearing sufficiently indicating the personal participation of Pascua in the
abduction of Pablo, Pascua ostensibly knew more than he cared to reveal thus far about the abduction.
As a start, Pascua, as the leader of the abduction, knew the identities of the eight or nine other abductors.
He should be assiduously investigated for his participation in the abduction, and, if warranted, he should
be promptly but duly held accountable for it. All those conspiring with him in abducting Pablo should also
be held to account to the full extent of the law. The CIDG and the NBI should not halt in seeing to this, for
they bear the primary responsibility in that respect.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the resolution rendered
on December 13, 2007 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, in Quezon City in all respects subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS of the dispositive portion, as follows:

Foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:

1. The Court hereby grants the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;

2. Ordering respondent CIDG Chief/Director and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to
cause the speedy conduct of a thorough investigation of the disappearance of Pablo A. Cayanan probably
caused by members of the Philippine National Police then assigned in Camp Crame, presumably with the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group;

3. Requiring the full investigation of SPO2 Rolando V. Pascua and other persons who took part in the
abduction of Pablo A. Cayanan; and, if warranted, charging them with the appropriate criminal offense or
offenses in the Department of Justice in relation to the abduction of Pablo A. Cayanan;

4. The Temporary Protection Order is hereby made permanent;

5. And the Granting of the Witness Protection Program availed of by the petitioner is hereby retained
until the finality of the case/cases related thereto.

It is so ordered.
The Court REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, in Quezon City for the
implementation of and compliance with this decision with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.