Villar v.

Paraiso, 96 Phil 659 March 14, 1955

The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the
minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his
religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public. This is especially so
with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law
mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). Registration must be made in the Bureau of Public
Libraries

Aranes v. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402, April 11, 2002

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity
of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Martinez v. Tan, 12 Phil. 731 February 5, 1909

No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petition signed by the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had
mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage.
The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they
ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the
marriage were produced.

Madridejo v. Deleon, 55 Phil. 1 October 6, 1930

The mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana
Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not
invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required
by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

Macua v Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.

Keuppers v. Judge Murcia

A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction violates
Article 7 of the Family Code, and is guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. He should be properly sanctioned.

Palma and Mercado v. Judge Omelio

"No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State."42 Marriage should not be trivialized,
especially by the solemnizing officers themselves.

Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. No.: 183896, January 30, 2013

The reliance of Gloria on the marriage to prove that a marriage license existed is not sufficient in
light of the fact that Syed was able to present evidence to show that the marriage license number
stated in their marriage certificate was registered to another couple. Without the actual marriage
license to prove its existence, the Court held that the marriage was void for absence of a formal
requisite.

Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, March 8, 2001

Marriage Licenses; Husband and Wife; Legal Ratification of Marital Cohabitation; Requisites.—For
this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other,
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least
five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer
must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that
he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Ninal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000

(Art.34 of the Family Code now applies and a perfect 5-year cohabitation period is no longer
needed based on Uribe’s lecture.)

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the
time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted
for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.

Republic v. Albios
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all
the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97

With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in
1923, the CA correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually
married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption
that persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption,
especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent
proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy.

Fiel v. Banawa, 76 O.G. 4 619

Philippine law does not recognize common-law marriages. A man and woman not legally married
who co-habit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally “married” in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
In the Philippines, the property of such “common-law relationships” are governed by Art. 144 of
the Civil Code:
“When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.”
For Art. 144 to apply, two requisites must be satisfied:
1) The couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage; and
2) That the properties must have been acquired through the work or industry of both or
either of them.

People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 645 September 28, 1954

Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless: (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; (b) The first
spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and
void by a competent court.This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from
mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga
Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven
consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until
declared null and void by a competent court.
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 February 28, 1957
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and
void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
distinguished from mere annullable marriages.

Tolentino v. Paras, 122 SCRA 525 May 30, 1983

Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of
the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she
is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction
of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an
adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted
against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual most affected,
is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local
Civil Registrar is also a party defendant.

In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private
respondent and that the entry made in the corresponding local register is thereby rendered false,
it may be corrected. While documents, such as death and birth certificates, are public and entries
therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield
to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy.

Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 August 19, 1986

Marriage; Nullity of marriage; Proof that first marriage was vitiated by force, not necessary in an
action for a declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the second husband; Reason.—There is no
need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both
parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85,
Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear
that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently,
her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

Introducing evidence about existing prior marriage, not necessary as the first marriage though
void, still needs a judicial declaration of such fact; Woman’s marriage to second husband void; Case
at bar.—There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law.

Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441 April 15, 1988

Prejudicial Question; Nature and concept of a prejudicial question.—A prejudicial question has
been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. A
prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.

Requisites of a prejudicial question, not present in case at bar; Issue of nullity of the second
marriage filed by the second wife before the juvenile court is not determinative of the husband’s
guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.—The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain
in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato’s guilt
or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner’s second wife, the herein
private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage
on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner husband has not shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by
the use of threats, force and intimidation.—ln the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently
shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and
intimidation.

The rule on prejudicial questions cannot apply since a case for annulment of marriage can be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that
petitioner’s consent to the marriage was obtained by duress, violence and intimidation.—Pursuant
to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on
prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner’s consent to
such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish
that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the
basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Petitioner husband merely raised in case at bar the issue of prejudicial question to evade the
prosecution of the criminal case against him,—Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of
prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to
petitioner’s second marriage on September 26,1978, he had been living with private respondent
Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
petitioner’s averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belied by the fact
that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived
together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years. One month and one day
until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private
respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6 July 3, 1992

Marriage contracted in good faith with woman already married is valid. Hence, contracting a
subsequent marriage with another woman would be bigamous.—Even if we were to assume,
arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will
follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem
must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

Republic v. Granada
Even if the RTC erred in ruling that therespondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief”
that her absent spouse was already dead, such order already final and can no longer be modified
or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final
and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law.”
Republic vs. Cantor
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded
belief that the prior spouse was already dead. The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to
show that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code are present. Since it is the present
spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative
of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.

Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 March 6, 1937

The Court held that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his
or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

In re Szatrow, 49 OG 243
In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner
against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or
status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact for the petition does not pray for a declaration
that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years.
This declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because
such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if
final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that
reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass.

The disputable presumption established by the rule of evidence that a person not heard from in
seven years is dead, may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special
proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court.
Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be
invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding.

Republic v. CA and Molina, 240 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological — not physical. Although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
 (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also
be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other —
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

Choa v.Choa, 392 SCRA 641, November 26, 2002

A medical examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so
long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately. Here,
however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination.

Barcelona v. Court of Appeals and Tadeo R. Bengzon, September 24, 2003

A petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity should specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not
be alleged.

Barcelona v. CA and Bengzon

DIANA contends that the 2nd petition of his husband is defective because it fails to allege the root
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It is not defective since the new rules do not require
the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is no need
to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. (only experts can determine
the root cause and at times they couldn’t determine it). What the new Rules require the petition to
allege are physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Second petition of Tadeo
complies with this requirement. (he has stated in his petition facts to support his claim – stated in
the FACTS)

Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, 428 SCRA 735, May 20, 2004

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability.—The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos: “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically
or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.

Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly
helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his
illness.—We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment
was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other
evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly
helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his
illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty
as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.—We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for
legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of
abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the
mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As
we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis
of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms for determining psychological
incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.—In proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be
lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general.
Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.

Republic v. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013

Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations

Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations
or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations
of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.

Upon the view we take of this case, thus, this Court believes that the protagonists in this case are
in reality simply unwilling to work out a solution for each other’s personality differences, and have
thus become overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or disillusionment toward one another.
Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.

Garlet v. Garlet
While it is true that courts rely heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of human
personality, still the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological
illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, and said incapacity established by the totality of
the evidence presented during trial. Likewise, although there is no requirement that a party to be
declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a
psychologist (as a condition sine qua non), there is nevertheless still a need to prove the
psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said
disorder.

In the instant case, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature
and the incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained. What can be perused from the
psychological report prepared by Ms. De Guzman is that it only offered a general evaluation on the
supposed root cause of Vencidor's personality disorder. The report failed to exhaustively explain
the relation between being a pampered youngest son and suffering from a psychological malady
so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond.

The psychological report failed to reveal that the personality traits of Vencidor were grave or
serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Ms.
De Guzman merely stated in the said report that it is beyond the capacity of Vencidor to attend to
his responsibility and understand and comply with his marital obligations. Such statement is a
mere general conclusion which, unfortunately, is unsubstantiated. We cannot see how Vencidor's
supposed personality disorder would render him unaware of the essential marital obligations or
to be incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by him.

Also, we cannot help but note that Ms. De Guzman's conclusions about Vencidor's psychological
incapacity were primarily based on the informations fed to her by Yolanda whose bias for her cause
cannot be doubted. Moreover, Ms. De Guzman testified that the informations that she obtained
from Yolanda were the result of one-hour interview with Yolanda and initial testing given at
intervals.

While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report,
testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards.
Ms. De Guzman only examined Vencidor from a third-party account. To make conclusions on x x x
Vencidor's psychological condition based on the information fed by Yolanda, during a one-hour
interview, is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence.

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its
recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Presumption is always in
favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Bakunawa v. Reyes-Bakunawa
The totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas,
as well as the latter's psychological evaluation report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang, the Court held that "[i]f the incapacity can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted tosupport
a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologist's examination and
report." In Toring v. Toring, et al., the Court stated that: Other than from the spouses, such evidence
can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family
doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about
the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity
already present at the time of marriage.

In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses'
psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable witness to
establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to Article 36 of the Family Code,
since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.

While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician, much less be
subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity

Kalaw v. Hernandez
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised
on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners
experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits
to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners
experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties.

The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of
psychological incapacity.

Singson v. Singson

There are two doctrines in this case.

(1) Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. NO.
(2) Whether or not the testimonies of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio and son Jose are meritorious. NO.

(1) The evidence on record does not establish that respondent's psychological incapacity was
grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since "[respondent] had a job;
provided money for the family from the sale of his property; provided the land where the
family home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and their
children."

(2) Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity could be attributed to the latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances
prior to the parties' marriage; no evidence has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is
there basis for upholding petitioner's contention that respondent's family was "distraught"
 and that respondent's conduct was "dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to
this. These are very serious charges which must be substantiated by clear evidence which,
unfortunately, petitioner did not at all adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a
specific finding that this was the origin of respondent's alleged inability to appreciate
marital obligations.

Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's
psychological incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage. It has been held that the
parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was
happening between his parents until long after his birth."

Espina-Dan v. Dan
“Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect, and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.

Republic v. Javier
We cannot absolutely rely on the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle. There were no
other independent evidence establishing the root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's
alleged psychological incapacity. While this Court cannot discount their first-hand observations, it
is highly unlikely that they were able to paint Dr. Adamos a complete picture of Michelle's family
and childhood history. The records do not show that Michelle and Jose Vicente were childhood
friends, while Martin, on the other hand, was introduced to Michelle during their adulthood. Either
Martin or Jose Vicente, as third persons outside the family of Michelle, could not have known about
her childhood, how she was raised, and the dysfunctional nature of her family. Without a credible
source of her supposed childhood trauma, Dr. Adamos was not equipped with enough information
from which he may reasonably conclude that Michelle is suffering from a chronic and persistent
disorder that is grave and incurable.

Martin was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, with tendencies toward sadism. Dr.
Adamos concluded from the tests administered on Martin that this disorder was rooted in the
traumatic experiences he experienced during his childhood, having grown up around a violent
father who was abusive of his mother. This adversely affected Martin in such a manner that he
formed unrealistic values and standards on his own marriage, and proposed unconventional
sexual practices. When Michelle would disagree with his ideals, Martin would not only quarrel with
Michelle, but would also inflict harm on her. Other manifestations include excessive love for
himself, self-entitlement, immaturity, and self-centeredness.

These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential characteristics of psychological
incapacity on the part of Martin. As such, insofar as the psychological incapacity of Martin is
concerned, the CA did not commit a reversible error in declaring the marriage of the
respondents null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Republic v. Mola Cruz

To entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of
the evidence must sufficiently prove that the respondent spouse’s psychological incapacity was
grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. “There must be proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to the marriage – which must be linked with the manifestations of
the psychological incapacity. “ The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an
adolescent and continued well into adulthood. It fully appreciated Liezl’s psychological evaluation
that revealed her unconsciousness of her disorder. The courts a quo duly connected such aberrant
acts of Liezl as actual manifestations of her histrionic personality disorder. A person with such a
disorder was characterized as selfish and egotistical, and demands immediate gratification. These
traits were especially reflected in Liezl’s highly unusual acts of allowing her Japanese boyfriend to
stay in the marital abode, sharing the marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and introducing her
husband as her elder brother, all done under the threat of desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and
lack of regard for the sanctity of the marital bond and home cannot be expected from a married
person who reasonably understand the principle and responsibilities of marriage.

Mirasol Castillo v. Republic

Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and

irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent’s

unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality,
completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse.

It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

As discussed, the findings on Felipe’s personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview
with the subject himself. Apart from the psychologist’s opinion and petitioner’s allegations, no
other reliable evidence was cited to prove that Felipe’s sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his
alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable.

The Court is not persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically or
clinically established.

Yaptinchay v. Torres, 28 SCRA 489 June 9, 1969

There are two doctrines in this case.

1. The presumption of marriage - When a man and woman lives together as husband and wife,
the presumption is they are married. Thus follow the rule on CPG (see date of marriage)
2. Since this case involves a bigamous marriage, meaning there is impediment to marry each
other, then follow the rule on Co-ownership. Thus, there is a need to show actual
contribution.

"When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." But
stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is
circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided
thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13 One such condition is that there must be a clear showing
that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property
involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property
in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the
protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the existence of a clear positive right
especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent
or future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. At any rate, it would seem to us
that the interests of the parties would be better safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park
property be in the hands of the bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts
would be subject to the control of the probate court. Having been constructed on the lot of Isidro
Y. Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of his
marriage with respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be under the
control of the special administratrix.

Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse “is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse.” Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognise
a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to
cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

In this case, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her
father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity
thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.

Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014

The entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she
was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims
that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such
contract. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were
complied with. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer
of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified.
Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was
different from respondent’s signature appearing in some of her government issued identification
cards.The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed
in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

Republic v. Cote
Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign divorce involving Filipino
citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise benefits from the effects of the divorce cannot
automatically remarry. Before the divorced Filipino spouse can remarry, he or she must file a
petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce.

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that,
as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

To clarify, respondent filed with the RTC a petition to recognize the foreign divorce decree
procured by her naturalized (originally Filipino) husband in Hawaii, USA. By impleading the Civil
Registry of Quezon City and the NSO, the end sought to be achieved was the cancellation and or
correction of entries involving her marriage status.

Wiegel v. Sempio- Diy, supra

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. There is likewise no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court, a
judicial declaration of such fact.

Terre v. Terre, supra

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the
first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which
underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the
same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to
Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first
cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent.
Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran
counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely,
that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are
to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must
be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as
bigamous and criminal in character.

Morigo v. People, 422 SCRA 376, February 6, 2004

FC - A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as “void. In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone,
without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner
might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.

Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 272, February 18, 2004

[T]he declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is
not an indicator that petitioner's marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The
requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal
capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing
officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony
wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in
the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of
the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37
and 38 may contract marriage. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity
of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and
they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between
the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects.
Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of
the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among
these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render
the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment.

Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. It is a settled rule that the
criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.

People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013

Bigamy; Elements of.—An examination of the information filed against respondent, however,
shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all
the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) That
the offender has been legally married; (2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code; (3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) That the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistance of the first marriage.
(Montañez vs. Cipriano, 684 SCRA 315 [2012])

Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void
from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized
without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of
Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of
the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from
the beginning." Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

Jocson v. Robles, 22 SCRA 521 February 10, 1968

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well founded belief that the absent
spouse has already dead.

Tolentino v. Villanueva, 56 SCRA 1 March 15, 1974

Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision
in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and
if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence
for the plaintiff

Buccat v. Buccat, 72 Phil. 19

VALIDEZ.-Marriage is a very sacred institution is the foundation upon which the society. To
unselect, they are necessary to clear and convincing evidence. In this case there are no such
evidence.
There is no fraud. It is unlikely that the plaintiff Godofredo had not suspected anything about
Luida’s condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy. As she gave birth
less than 3 months after they got married, she must have looked very pregnant even before they
were married. Since Godofredo must have known that she was not a virgin, the marriage cannot
be annulled.

Aquino v. Delizo, 109 Phil. 19.

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was
allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it
is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was “naturally
plump”. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s abdomen
reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and
apparent.

Anaya v. Palaroan, 36 SCRA 97

Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit
as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest
such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her
consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was
solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself
alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same,
whether it agrees with the rule or not.

Sison v. Te Lay Li, supra.

While a marriage effected by force or intimidation may be ratified and confirmed by cohabitation,
such cohabitation must be voluntary and “must be something more than merely living together in
the same house or even occupying the same bed, but is the living together of the parties as husband
and wife, and including sexual relations.

Ruiz v. Atienza, (CA) 40 OG 1903

The Marriage Law (sec 30, Act No. 3613) which, referring to "force"or "violence", does not seem to
include mere intimidation, at least where it does not in legal effectamount to force or violence. (See
article 1267, Civil Code.)

Sarao v. Guevara, (CA) 40 OG 1st supp. 263

It is held that the test of impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate. In this
case, the defendant was not impotent at the time the marriage was celebrated, as supported by the
opinion of the doctor that the existence of fibrous tumor in the ovaries did not necessarily render
her incapable of copulation or even procreation. The removal of her uterus and ovaries rendered
her sterile but did not make her unfit for sexual intercourse. Thus, the defendant’s sterility cannot
be a ground for annulment since what the law provides as a ground for annulment is the incapacity
to copulate, and not to procreate.

Jimenez v. Canizares, 109 Phil. 273 August 31, 1960

Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part,
yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise
or be inferred, because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not
submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority.

This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing upon her constitutional right. A
physical examination in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She
is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. "Impotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed.

The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is
physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound
them together as husband and wife.

Jocson v. Robles, supra

On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion
for summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon
a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for
summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
Tolentino v. Villanueva, supra
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision
in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and
if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence
for the plaintiff

Jones v. Hortiguela, supra

The Court held that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his
or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Lukban v. Republic, 98 Phil 574 February 29, 1956

Lukban does not need to secure a judicial declaration of presumptive death of her husband because
the Civil Code and not the Family Code governs their marriage which was celebrated in 1933. It
provides that “for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that
each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time
of the celebration of the marriage.

Gue v. Republic, 107 Phil. 381 March 24, 1960

A judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in
seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the
stage of finality or become final.

People v. Masinsin, (CA) 49 OG 3909

If the widow contracts the marriage in good faith in the belief that her husband was permanently
impotent or sterile, there is no liability.