People vs.

Jesalva (2017)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO ESPERANZA JESALVA
G.R. No. 227306, June 19, 2017
JARDELEZA, J.:
Facts: An Information was filed charging accused-appellant, Ryan Menieva and Junie
Ilaw alleging that accused, conspiring together, feloniously with intent to kill with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of Amel Ortigosa, by then and there stabbing
him with a sharp bladed instrument hitting him on the chest, causing his untimely death.
Accused-appellant denied any participation in Ortigosa's stabbing. He claimed that on
the night of the incident, he was waiting for his sister on the corner of Dupax Street.
While waiting, he saw and heard people running and shouting which caused him to
leave the place.
RTC and CA held that appellant is liable for murder as he conspired with the other
accused.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of murder.
Ruling: No. To determine if accused-appellant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw, the
focus of the inquiry should necessarily be the overt acts of accusedappellant before,
during and after the stabbing incident.
In this case, no evidence showing that appellant was purposely waiting for Ortigosa at
the time and place of the incident and that Menieva and Ilaw were on standby, awaiting
for accused-appellant's signal. Surely, appellant could not have anticipated that on
September 16, 2007, at around 1:00 a.m., Ortigosa and his group would pass by and go
to the store to buy cigarettes. Appellant's act of pointing to the victim and his group is
not an overt act which shows that accused-appellant acted in concert with his
coaccused to cause the death of Ortigosa. Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval
of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
establish conspiracy.
Ratio Decidendi: The presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any
person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or even property.
The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be
consistent with all of them.
Gist: This appeal seeks to reverse and set aside the CA’s Decision, which upheld the
Decision of the RTC, which found appellant Roberto Esperanza Jesalva guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
 PEOPLE vs. TAMPUS
(G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009)
“Accomplice”
FACTS:

ABC, is the daughter of appellant, Montesclaros, and was a minor at the time of the incident.
Montesclaros worked as a waitress in a beer house. Montesclaros and ABC were renting a room in a
house owned by Tampus, who was a barangay tanod. On April, 1995, ABC stated that she was in the
house with Montesclaros and Tampus who were both drinking beer. They forced her to drink beer and
when she became intoxicated she was now very sleepy then she overheard Tampus requesting her
mother, Montesclaros that he be allowed to have sexual intercourse with her. Montesclaros agreed and
instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he was finished. Montesclaros left for work essentially leaving
Tampus alone with the victim. She fell asleep and when she woke up she noticed that the garter of her
panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain all over her body noticed that her
panties and short pants were stained with blood which was coming from her genitals. Montesclaros
arrived home from work the following morning, she kept on crying but appellant ignored her.

A similar incident ensued on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since
her mother was at work at the beer house. Tampus went inside their room and threatened to kill her if
she would report the previous incident to anyone. Same thing happened as Monteclaros ignored her
again when the victim told her about the incident.

Without other recourse she filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of rape she declared in
her Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with co-accused Montesclaros, her mother, who gave
permission to Tampus to rape her. The victim also stated a similar incident effectively filing two separate
cases.

The trial court appreciated in Montesclaros’ favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which
would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts,
pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of
rape and found Montesclaros guilty as an accomplice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court’s decision to implicate Ida Montesclaros as an accomplice in the
rape of ABC accurate?

RULING:

Yes, Montesclaros is accountable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC. Accomplices
are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the execution
of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

The requisites that are needed are fulfilled to find Montesclaros guilty as an accomplice to
Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design between
Montesclaros and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Montesclaros had knowledge of and agreed to
Tampus' intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when
ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express
consent to Tampus' plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. It is settled jurisprudence that the
previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the
crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation.

People vs. fronda

People vs. Fronda (May 14, 1993) Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Thursday, March 08, 2012
Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: Brothers, Edwin & Esminio Balaan were taken by 7 armed men in
fatigue uniforms with long firearms, suspected to be NPA members, accompanied by the accused Rudy
Fronda and Roderick Padua from the house of Ferminio Balaan. The armed men tied the hands of the
deceased at their back lying down face downward, in front of the house of Ferminio. They all proceeded
towards Sitio Tulong passing through the rice fields. Three years later, the bodies or remains of the
Balaan brothers were exhumed. Afterwhich, the remains, were brought to the house of Freddie Arevalo,
a reltive of the deceased where they were laid in state for the wake. The RTC declared Fronda guilty as a
principal by indispensable cooperation. The appellant says he was only taken by the armed men as a
pointer & interposes the exempting circumstance under RPC A12(6) claiming that all his acts were
performed under the impulse of uncontrollable fear and to save his life. Issue: Whether or not Fronda
can claim the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear. Held: No. Fear in order to be valid should
be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. (People vs. Abanes) In the case at
bar, the records indicate that appellant was seen being handed by and receiving from one of the armed
men a hunting knife. Also, as aforesaid, appellant was not able to explain his failure to report the
incident to the authorities for more than three years. These circumstances, among others, establish the
fact that the appellant consciously concurred with the acts of the assailants. In order that the
circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character
as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat. (People v. Loreno) Appellant had
the opportunity to escape when he was ordered by the armed men to go home after bringing the victims
to the mountains. He did not. Instead he joined the armed men when required to bring a spade with
which he was ordered to dig the grave. Appellant also chose to remain silent for more than three years
before reporting the killing to the authorities. Based on these circumstances, We hold that the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of appellant cannot be regarded as having been done under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear.

People v. Parungao 006 GR No. 125812, 28 Nov 1996, Melo, J. De Jesus, Justin Froi, S. • Law 126 -
Evidence Topic: Parungao, one of the prisoners and allegedly the mastermind of a jailbreak, was charged
with a crime of robbery with homicide and when it reached the trial court, the testimony of the three
witnesses presented by the prosecution was given probative value convicting Parungaofor a lifetime
imprisonment. Court herein found that hearsay evidence, which was recognized by the court below
violates the constitutional rights of Parungao. FACTS • On May 30, 1989, the detention prisoners in two
cells of the Pampanga Provincial Jail at the Provincial Capitol in San Fernando, staged a jailbreak where
two jail guards were killed and one was seriously wounded. Firearms were also forcibly taken. • An
Information against herein accused-appellant Abelardo Parungao and 15 other prisoners charging them
with the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries. • In an earlier and a separate
trial, the court below, handed down a decision in 1990, convicting four of the accused while two were
acquitted. The judgment of conviction was later affirmed by this Court in a decision in 1993 (People vs.
Pamintuan) • Herein accused-appellant Parungao, allegedly the mastermind of the jailbreak, was
arraigned and was tried separately and thereafter convicted by the RTC. • The prosecution presented its
evidence having four witnesses to establish the existence of conspiracy and that accused-appellant was
co-conspirator and a principal by inducement in the commission of the crime charged. Parungao, on the
other hand, remained that he did not participate in the jailbreak and just remained in his cell at the time
it happened. • Trial Court was persuaded by the prosecutions evidence and found Parungao guilty. •
Parungao appealed assailing error on the part of the trial court in accepting and giving full probative
valueto the hearsay and uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution witnesses. 1 ISSUES & HOLDING •
WoN the testimonies of the four witnesses of the prosecution is sufficient to prove the allegations and
convict Parungao? – NO. Such evidence being merely hearsay because said witnesses testified and
conveyed to the court matters not of their own personal knowledge but matters only narrated to them
by other detainees. There is nothing in their testimony pointing to accused-appellant as the very source
of their information that he planned the jailbreak. RATIO • The general rule is that hearsay evidence is
not admissible. However, the lack of objection to hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as
evidence. • In this case, neither accused-appellant nor his counsel objected to the admission of the
testimony of the prosecutions witnesses. But one should not be misled into thinking that such
declarations are thereby impressed with probative value. • Admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not can not be given
credence for it has no probative value. • In several cases, it has been consistently held that, “the failure
of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or
evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same
does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent
evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. • To
give weight to the hearsay testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana, and to make the same the basis for
finding accused-appellant a co-conspirator and for imposing the penalty of life imprisonment, gravely
violates the hearsay rule and the constitutional right of the accused-appellant to meet the witnesses
face-to-face and to subject the source of the information to the rigid test of cross-examination, the only
effective means to test their truthfulness, memory, and intelligence. • Obviously, the trial court gravely
erred in accepting, and worse still, in giving weight to the hearsay testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana,
that accused appellant masterminded the jailbreak, and was a co-conspirator. • Conspiracy has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt. o It is a rule that although there is no direct evidence of prior
agreement to commit the crime, conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during,
and after the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of
sentiments (People v. De Leon) • The record is bereft of any evidence indicating a prior plan or
agreement between accused-appellant and the other inmates in the implementation of a common
design to bolt jail, kill the guards, and rob the prison armory. There is no evidence that accusedappellant
participated in the killing of the two guards, Basa and Valencia, nor in inflicting injuries on Aldana. In fact,
accused-appellant before, during and after the incident never left his cell. • In the light of the established
circumstances, the Court is not convinced that there is enough evidence to prove accused-appellant’s
guilt beyond the shadow of a doubt. • WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and
REVERSED. Accused-appellant Abelardo Parungao is hereby ACQUITTED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DINA DULAY

G.R. No. 193854 ; 24 September 2012

PONENTE: Peralta

SUBJECTS: Rape, R.A. 7610

FACTS:

On 3 July 2005, AAA was introduced to the accused during the wake of a relative of
AAA. Thereafter, the accused convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San
Dionisio, Paranaque City. However, before they went to the wake, they went to look for
the boyfriend of the accused. They went to Bulungan Fish Port were they found the
boyfriend of the accused. They proceeded to the kubuhan, located at the back of the
Bulungan Fish Port. Upon arrival, the accused suddenly pulled AAA inside a room
where a man known only as “Speed” was waiting. AAA saw “Speed” give the accused
some money, then the latter left. “Speed” wielded a knife and tied AAA’s hands to
the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant’s help when she saw the latter
peeping into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the
rape, “Speed” and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they
would get back at her. AAA, accompanied by her sister and mother filed a complaint for
Rape. The RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as a co-principal
by indispensable cooperation for the crime of Rape.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused should be held liable as a co-principal for the crime of Rape

HELD:

No, in order to be considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must

participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose
and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without
which it would not have been accomplished. The Supreme Court held that the accused
did not participate in the criminal resolution of the crime of Rape but merely delivered
AAA to “Speed”
However, the accused is still liable for violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610
or a) Those who engage in or promote,

People v. De Vera y Garcia

G.R. No. 128966. August 18, 1999.
Panganiban, J.

Facts: Edwin de Vera y Garcia, together with Roderick Garcia, Kenneth

Florendo and Elmer Castro, was charged with Murder before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City in connection with the killing of one Frederick
Capulong. De Vera and Garcia pleaded not guilty during arraignment. The
other two accused, Florendo and Castro, were at large. During trial, the
prosecution presented as witness one Bernardino Cacao who testified that
he saw De Vera in the car, where an altercation later occurred. Thereafter,
he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong
and shot him in the head moments later. Aside from Cacao’s testimony, the
prosecution also presented De Vera’s extrajudicial statement which
established that he knew that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that
the three co-accused were carrying weapons and that he acted as a lookout
to watch for passersby. Thereafter, the trial court convicted De Vera and his
co-accused Garcia of the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victim.
In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found
that the killing was attended by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse
of superior strength. One of these was enough to qualify the crime as
murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating circumstances. The
trial court explained that the evidence established evident premeditation,
for Florendo’s group acted with deliberate forethought and tenacious
persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design. Treachery was
also proven, because the attack was planned and performed in such a way
as to guarantee the execution of the criminal design without risk to the
group. There was also abuse of superior strength, because the attackers
took advantage of their superiority in numbers and weapons.
Furthermore, the trial court found that it was indeed Florendo who
actually shot the victim. However, it convicted De Vera as a principal
because the scientific and forensic findings on the criminal incident directly
and substantially confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the four
accused.
Aggrieved, de Vera appealed his conviction before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting De Vera as
principal?

Held: Yes. The testimony of the prosecution eyewitness contained nothing

that could inculpate De Vera. Aside from the fact that he was inside the car,
no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to
conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere
presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common
design to commit murder. Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The fact that De Vera was at the locus criminis in order to
aid and abet the commission of the crime did not make him a conspirator; at
most, he was only an accomplice. Moreover, the prosecution evidence has
not established that De Vera was part of the conspiracy to kill Capulong. De
Vera’s participation, as culled from his own statement, was made after the
decision to kill was already a fait accompli.
The trial court erred in appreciating two generic aggravating
circumstances, because treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength.
Hence, there is only one generic aggravating circumstance, not two.
Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance, we
cannot impose the death penalty, because the crime was committed before
the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law.
When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the
Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a high order. The defense has the
burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress or
promise of reward. De Vera failed to overcome the overwhelming
prosecution evidence to the contrary.
In the present case, De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had
intended to kill Capulong at the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But
he himself did not participate in the decision to kill Capulong; that decision
was made by Florendo and the others. He joined them that afternoon after
the decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was there because
“nagkahiyaan na.” Consequently, he is convicted as an accomplice, not as a
principal, in the crime of murder.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby partially GRANTED.

NORBERTO CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R.
No. 166441, October 08, 2014)
ACTS: In December 1993, Norberto Cruz (Norberto) and his wife went to La
Union to sell plastic and glass wares. Along with them is AAA and BBB. Upon
reaching their destination, they set up a tent in order that they will have a
place to sleep.
At around 1 AM, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top
of her. The person was Norberto who was mashing her breast and touching
her private parts. He fought back and kicked Norberto twice. He was not able
to pursue his lustful desires; he offered AAA money and told her not to tell the
incident to her mother. Thirty minutes later, when AAA retured to her tent, she
again saw Norberto touching private parts of BBB.

Later that day, they reported the incident to the police. Norberto was
summoned to the police station which resulted to an argument. He deined the
allegations contending that there were many people around who were
preparing for the “simbang gabi”, and that once AAA and BBB would scream,
the policemen in the municipal hall could hear them.

RTC found Norberto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of

ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS. CA promulgated its
decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner for attempted rape in
Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness.

ISSUE: WON accused was guilty of attempted rape.

RULING: NO. There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
this own spontaneous desistance.
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the
offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal
knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates
rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender
performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only
means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to
have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear
showing of his intent to lie with the female.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching
her genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself
from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. It is obvious that
the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness is the offender’s intent to lie with the female.

The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis
capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the
female Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
committed.

The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner,
even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts
directly leading to rape. In People v. Bugarin, the Court said that The accused
was held liable only for acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit
rape “is not apparent from the act described,” and the intent to have sexual
intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia.

The Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO

CRUZ y BARTOLOMEguilty of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS.

De Guzman v. People (G.R. 178512, November 26, 2014)

ACTS: On the fateful midnight of Christmas, 1997, while Alexander Flojo

(Alexander) is fetching water, Alfredo de Guzman (Alfredo) suddenly
appeared and stab Alexander in the left part of his body causing him to
sustain two stab wounds.
Cirilino Bantaya, Alexander’s son-in-law, who saw the incident, rushed him to
the hospital. The attending physician said that one of the stab wounds is fatal
and would have caused Alexander’s death if he did not get rushed to the
hospital quickly.

RTC found Alfredo guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of frustrated
homicide and was sentenced six months and 1 day of prision correccional as
minimum to 6 years and one day of prision mayor as maximum.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that his intent to kill
was not established, and that any person could have inflicted the wounds. The
petitioner also insisted that he should only be guilty of slight physical injuries,
not frustrated murder.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the intent to kill, which is a critical element of the
crime charged, is established in the case.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is properly found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of frustrated homicide.

HELD: (1) YES. The wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuff-
marks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them.
The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. There is
also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to
result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
(2) YES. With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already
performed all the acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide
as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was
properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.

Criminal Case: People vs. Gutierrez G.R. No. 188602,

February 4, 2010
People vs. Gutierrez G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010

Self-defense- the burden of proof is on the accused

Facts:

On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder and three
(3) counts of attempted murder were filed against appellant.

When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not
guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits then ensued.

Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC convicted him of murder,
frustrated murder and attempted murder on three (3) counts.

Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving credence to the prosecution’s evidence.
He admits having killed Regis and wounding Dalit, but insists that he did so in self-defense.

Issue:

Did the accused act in self-defense?

Ruling:

No. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes
only if satisfactorily proved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on his part.

In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, we explained:

One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the
burden of proving: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person claiming self-defense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on
the accused to prove its elements clearly and convincingly. While all three elements must
concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.

In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression.
His version of the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less credible
by the trial court. On the other hand, the surviving victims were unanimous that appellant
suddenly fired at them, without any provocation on their part. The credibility of the
prosecution witnesses had been weighed by the trial court, and it found their testimonies to
be more convincing. As a rule, the appellate court gives full weight and respect to the
determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge has the
best opportunity to observe their demeanor. While this rule admits of exceptions, none of
such exceptions obtains in this case.

In Razon v. People, we held:

Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and

competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-
defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.

The trial court and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for rejecting appellant’s plea of self-
defense.

This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a qualifying
circumstance. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor
on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves,
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victims.

The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to show that
treachery was employed by appellant. The attack was sudden, as testified to by the
witnesses, and unexpected. Provocation on the part of the victims was not proven, and
appellant’s testimony that the victims were about to attack him cannot be given credence.
The victims had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming and had no opportunity to mount a
defense. Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated as a circumstance to qualify the crime to
murder.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the penalty imposed for the
crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 223 of the RPC. The prison term imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-
3639 is correct.

We also affirm the CA ruling that appellant is guilty of attempted murder, not of frustrated
murder, in Criminal Case No. 03-3640 for the injury sustained by Dalit. No convincing proof
was offered to show that the wound inflicted on Dalit was fatal and would have caused his
death had medical help not been provided. It is well settled that where the wounds inflicted
on the victim are not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, as
the accused had not performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the
victim's death