University of Cebu
College of Law
STATUTORY COSTRUCTION
COURSE OUTLINE WITH CASES
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. Statutory Construction
1. Definition
“is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law, with respect to its application
to a given case, where the intention is rendered
doubtful, among others, by the reason of the fact
that the given case is not expressly provided for
in the law”
2. Importance
a.) to ascertain the true intent of the
framers/authors of the law;
b.) Rules of Statutory Construction are used to
ascertain legislative intent. But they are not rules of
law, only mere axioms of experience, hence, not
binding nor controlling in court.
B. Construction vs. Interpretation
[GR] One must interpret before he construes.
1. In trying to ascertain legislative intent, courts
should first be guided by intrinsic aids, or those found
in the law itself.
2. If it could be ascertained through intrinsic aids,
then there is no longer a need to use extrinsic aids,
or those found outside the written language of law.
C. When Construction is Necessary
1. Purpose: to determine spirit of the law/legislative
intent in case of ambiguity of the statute
[GR]
a.) If the language of the statute is ambiguous,
doubtful, or obscure, when taken in relation to a set
of facts; and
b.) if reasonable minds disagree as to the meaning of
the language used in the statute.
2. Effect when the text of the statute utterly fails to
express the legislative intent
[GR] Where there is ambiguity in the language of a
statute, the Courts employ Canons of Statutory
Construction to ascertain its true intent and meaning.
Art. 10, Civil Code; “In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the law making body intended right and justice to
prevail.”
3. RULES ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
a.) If the law and its meaning is clear and
unmistakable – no need to interpret further
b.) If construction or interpretation is necessary –
court should interpret according to the meaning
that the legislative intended for it.
c.) If there are two possible interpretation of the
law – the interpretation which will arrive at the
ends desired by the congress should be adopted.
d.) Laws of pleading, practice, and procedure are
likely to be liberally construed in order to –
Promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining a just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.
e.) In case of doubt in the interpretation and
application of the laws, and when other rules of
construction fail – it’s presumed that the
legislature intended for right and justice to
prevail.
D. Determine Legislative Intent from the text of the law,
within the context of the whole
1. Legislative Intent
a.) Spirit of the Law
b.) Must be enforced when ascertained, although it
may not be consistent with the strict letter of the
statute.
CASE: Aisporna vs. CA, 113 SCRA 459
1. WoN receipt of compensation is an essential element
for violation of sec. 189 of the Insurance Act?
a.) No. Noscitur a sociis provides that where a
particular word or phrase in a statement
is ambiguous in itself, the true meaning may be
made clear in the company it is fixed in. In applying
this, the court held that the definition of an insurance
agent in the 2ndparagraph was applicable in the
1st paragraph. To receive compensation be the agent
is an essential element for violation of the
1st paragraph. The appellate court said that she didn’t
receive compensation by the receipt of compensation
wasn’t an essential element for violation of the
1st paragraph. The SC said that this view wasn’t
correct owing to the American insurance laws which
qualified compensation as a qualifying factor in
penalizing unauthorized persons who solicited
insurance.
2. How must legislative intent be ascertained?
a.) Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole.
E. Power to Construe: Judicial Function
1. Separation of Powers
a.) It is the court that has the final word as to WHAT
THE LAW MEANS.
b.) It construes laws as it decide cases based on
facts and laws involved.
c.) Laws are interpreted in the context of a peculiar
factual situation of each case
d.) in Fleete vs Nickerson, 54 LRA 554;
“To declare what the law shall be is a legislative
power, but to declare what the law is or has been is
judicial.”
2. Interrelationship/Overlap of Powers
Legislative Judiciary Executive
Enact Laws Interpret and Execute Laws
Apply Laws
a. Executive and Legislative Powers
- Executive has an allowable overlap on
Legislative through the DELEGATED RULE
MAKING POWER.
- Exercise of this rule-making power which
exceeds the legislative grant shall be stricken
down by the Judiciary as “Ultra Vires” (lit.
beyond the powers)
b. Executive and Judicial Powers
- Powers granted to an Administrative Agency
TO PERFORM QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.
-Quasi-Judicial functions granted by the
Legislature to:
*SEC
*Public Service Commission
*Land Transportation Commission
- When such agency exceeds its jurisdiction
granted by law, it may be set-aside by the
Judiciary.
- In certain cases, the Judiciary may allow the
Executive branch to interpret the acts of the
Legislative branch (a.k.a Executive
Interpretation of Statutes).
-Executive Interpretation is NOT CONCLUSIVE
UPON THE COURTS, but given
SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT.
c. Judicial and Legislative Powers
1.) When is it Construction and When is it
Judicial Legislation?
a.) Judicial Legislation is the power of
the courts to FILL IN THE GAPS OF THE
LAW LEFT, INTENTIONALLY OR
UNINTENTIONALLY, BY THE
LEGISLATIVE.
CASE: Floresca vs. Philex Mining 136 SCRA
506
1.) WoN the employees and their relative are
entitled to additional damages due to the
negligence of Philex Mining, on top of the
granted WCA?
a.) YES. The court held that although the
other petitioners had received the benefits
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
such may not preclude them from bringing
an action before the regular court because
they became cognizant of the fact that
Philex has been remiss in its contractual
 obligations with the deceased miners only
after receiving compensation under the
Act. Had petitioners been aware of said
violation of government rules and
regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought
redress under the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission which
awarded a lesser amount for
compensation. The choice of the first
remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the
choice as it was not an intelligent
choice. The case should therefore be
remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. However, should the
petitioners be successful in their bid before
the lower court, the payments made under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act should
be deducted from the damages that may
be decreed in their favor.
b.) Art. 9, Civil Code; “No judge or court
shall decline to render judgement by
reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of law”
c.) “JUDGES DO AND MUST
LEGISLATE, but they can do so only
interstitially, they are confined from molar
to molecular” according to J. Holmes
d.) “When the courts give effect to a statute
not in accordance with the intent of the law
maker, the court is unjustifiably legislating”
according to J. Melencio-Herrera
e.) “It should be the legislative, not the
court, which should remove the
exclusionary rule of the WCA.” according
to J. Gutierrez
3. Power of Judicial Review: Requisites
a.) Sec. 1, Art. VIII
“The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial Power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”
b.) Requisites:
i. There must be an ACTUAL CASE OR
CONTROVERSY;
ii. The person bringing up the issue of
constitutionality must have LEGAL STANDING
(locus standi);
iii. The constitutional issue must be RAISED AT
THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY –
On the PLEADINGS; and
iv. The constitutional issue must be the LIS
MOTA of the case.
4. Declaration of unconstitutionality of statutes
a. Effect
i. [GR] “Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines”
(Art. 8, New Civil Code / Endencia vs David, 93
Phil 696);
ii. ORTHODOX VIEW
“once a law has been declared
unconstitutional it is deemed to be that
such law didn’t exist in the first place. The
reason being that: it creates no office, it
creates no rights, it creates no obligation, it is
not a source of protection. It is stricken out of
the statute books.”
iii. MODERN VIEW/ OPERATIVE FACT
DOCTRINE
“An unconstitutional law is not stricken
out of the statute books. It remains there
but the court refuses to recognize it. This
is because, before it is declared
unconstitutional, it enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality. At that time, there may be
parties who relied on the provisions of that
law. As to them it remains to be valid. This is
an operative fact that cannot be denied.
Because of this, the declaration of
unconstitutionality is not given retroactive
effect. It is always given prospective
application.”
b. Partial unconstitutionality: separable
provisions/with separability clause
1. Requisites:
- The Legislature must be willing to retain the
valid portions, usually shown by the presence
of a separability clause
- The valid portion can stand independently
as law
CASE: Lidasan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-
28089, October 25, 1967
1.) WoN RA 4790, entitled “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur”, constitutional?
a.) No. The said law is void. The baneful effect
of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the
members of Congress as to the full impact of
the law; it did not apprise the people in the
towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in
the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns
and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in
the dark as to what towns and provinces were
actually affected by the bill that even a
Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to
find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his
own province. These are the pressures which
heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA
4790.
c. Doctrine of Relative of Constitutionality
1.) [GR] “The constitutionality of a statute
cannot, in every instance, be determined by a
mere comparison of its provisions with
applicable provisions of the Constitution, since
the statute may be constitutionally valid as
applied to one set of facts, but invalid if
applied to another.”
CASE: Central Bank Employees Association,
Inc. vs. BSP, 446 SCRA 299
1.) Whether or not the last paragraph of Section
15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653 (The New
Central Bank Act), runs afoul of the
constitutional mandate that “No person shall be
… denied equal protection of the laws”?
a.) YES. The last paragraph of Sec. 15 (c),
Art. II of RA No 7653 (The New Central
Bank Act) is unconstitutional as it
constitutes invidious discrimination on the
2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. This relates to the
constitutionality of classifications between
the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other
GFIs. The classification must not only be
reasonable, but must also apply equally to
all members of the class. The provisio may
be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance but it cannot be grossly
discriminatory in its operation, so as
practically to make unjust distinctions
between persons who are without
differences. In the field of equal protection,
the guarantee that “no person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws”
includes the prohibition against enacting
laws that allow invidious discrimination,
directly or indirectly. The equal protection
clause does not demand absolute equality
but it requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to priveleges conferred
and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For
the principles is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person
under circumstance which, if not identical
are analogous. A statute valid at one time
may become void at another time because
of altered circumstances.Thus, if a statute
in its practical operation becomes arbitrary
or confiscatory, its validity, even though
affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to
inquiry and investigation in the light of
changed conditions.
5. Reversal of Judicial Construction
[GR] “the Legislative has no power to overrule
the interpretation or construction of a statute or
 the Constitution by the Supreme Court, for
interpretation is a Judicial Function assigned to CASE: Sameer Oversees Placement v.
the latter by the fundamental Law” (Perfecto vs Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014
Meer G.R. No. L-2348) 1.) WoN Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired
portion of her salary due to her illegal
6. Promulgation: Operative Act for the Effectivity of dismissal?
a Decision a.) YES. The Court held that the award of
CASES: the three-month equivalent of respondent’s
Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178831-32, salary should be increased to the amount
July 30, 2009 equivalent to the unexpired term of the
1.) WoN COMELEC’s proclamation of Limkaichong employment contract.
as the winner valid?
a.) YES. The The proclamation of Limkaichong In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
was valid. The COMELEC Second Division and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court
rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17, ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months
2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely for every year of the unexpired term,
filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for whichever is less” is unconstitutional for
reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the violating the equal protection clause and
incorporated directive suspending her substantive due process.
proclamation. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration effectively suspended the A statute or provision which was declared
execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no
Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
Resolution was suspended, there was no protection; it creates no office; it is
impediment to the valid proclamation of inoperative as if it has not been passed at
Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 all.”
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides: “Period for Filing Motions for The Court said that they are aware that the
Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a clause “or for three (3) months for every
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a year of the unexpired term, whichever is
Division shall be filed within five (5) days less” was reinstated in Republic Act No.
from the promulgation thereof. Such 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No.
motion, if not pro forma, suspends the 10022 in 2010.
execution for implementation of the
decision, resolution, order and ruling.”
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is
2.) SC Rules state that a DRAFT DECISION being
null because it is inconsistent with the
circulated, but not yet promulgated IS NOT
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured
BINDING.
by reincorporation or reenactment of the
3.) Until such time that there will be a promulgation of
same or a similar law or provision. A law
decision, the court can still change their mind.
or provision of law that was already
4.) Concurrence on a decision means only that they
declared unconstitutional remains as such
agree with the decision result, but the justices are
unless circumstances have so changed as
entitled to their own reasoning behind such
to warrant a reverse conclusion.
decisions.
The Court observed that the reinstated
See also Araneta vs Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044,
clause, this time as provided in Republic
August 26, 1949 [Re: effect of the death of a
Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional
justice (J. Perfecto) who voted in a decision that
rights to equal protection and due
was promulgated subsequent to his death]
process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor
1.) J. Perfecto died 9 days before the promulgation of
General have failed to show any compelling
decision.
change in the circumstances that would
2.) J. Perfecto’s vote can no longer be counted
warrant us to revisit the precedent.
according to the Rules of Court because he is no
longer part of the SC.
The Court declared, once again, the clause,
3.) He may be in favour of the Majority Decision, but
“or for three (3) months for every year of the
since he has not signed it yet, therefore his vote must
unexpired term, whichever is less” in
not be recognized.
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022
4.) Any substitute Justice shall be entitled to their
amending Section 10 of Republic Act No.
own decision and opinion on a case, and shall not be
8042 is declared unconstitutional and,
required to follow the original decision of the
therefore, null and void.
deceased Justice.
II. STATUTES
7. Rulings of the SC (in construing a statute)
A. Definition
a. Part of Legal System (See Art. 8, NCC)
“An act of the Legislative as an organized body,
Art. 8, NCC; “Judicial decisions applying or
expressed in the form, and passed according to the
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
procedure, required to constitute it as part of the law
form a part of the legal system of the
of the land.”
Philippines”
b. Generally, no retroactive effect
1. Philippine Statutes are those passed by:
Art. 4, CC; “Laws shall have no retroactive
a.) Philippine Commission
effect, unless the contrary is provided”
b.) Philippine Legislature
Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution; “No ex
c.) Batasang Pambansa
post facto law or bill of attainder shall be
d.) Philippine Congress
enacted.”
e.) President Marcos – Presidential Declarations
Operative Fact Doctrine – “Acts done pursuant
during Martial Law 1973
to a law which was subsequently declared
f.) President Cory Aquino – Executive Orders during
unconstitutional remain valid, but not when the
the Freedom Constitution 1986
acts are done after the declaration of
unconstitutionality.”
2. Law vs Statutes
c. SC ruling cannot be undone by Congress by re-
-“Laws are generally a whole body or system of law”
enacting a provision previously declared
-“It is a rule of conduct, which is just and obligatory,
unconstitutional
laid down by a legislative authority for the common
1.) Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
observance and benefit”.
“Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
if a law or contract violates any norm of the
B. Distinguished from
constitution that law or contract whether
1. Constitution – Fundamental law of the land, which
promulgated by the legislative or by the
establishes the character and basic principles of the
executive branch or entered into by private
government.
persons for private purposes is null and void
2. Ordinances – A rule established by authority; may
and without any force and effect. Thus, since
be a municipal statute of a city council, regulating
the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount
such matters such as zoning, building, safety,
and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
matters of municipality, etc.
written in every statute and contract.”
 3. Administrative orders - Enforceable order issued
by a public authority (under the powers conferred
to it by one or more statutes) to an individual or an
organization to take certain corrective action, or to
refrain from an activity.
C. Classification
1. According to duration: permanent vs. temporary
a. Permanent – one whose operation is not limited in
duration but continues until repealed.
b. Temporary – duration is for a limited period of
time fixed in the statute itself or whose life ceases
upon the happening of a event. (e.g statute to
answer to an emergency)
2. According to time of applicability: prospective vs.
retroactive
3. According to operation: declaratory; curative
4. According to compliance requirement: mandatory vs.
directory
5. According to WON rights are given: substantive vs.
non-substantive (remedial)
6. According to form: affirmative vs. negative
7. According to WON there is a penal provision: penal
vs. non-penal
D. Enactment (How a bill becomes a law)
1. Legislative power: vested on Congress (See Sec. 1,
Art. VI, Constitution)
Sec. 1, Art VI; “The Legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.”
2. Procedure (See Sec 24, 25, 26 and 27, Art. VI of the
Constitution)
HOW A BILL BECOMES A LAW:
1st Reading – the Secretary reports the bill for first
reading: Title, Number, and Referral to the
Appropriate Committee for study and
recommendation.
2nd Reading – the Bill shall be READ IN FULL
(including amendments and proposals by the
Committee).
- The bill will now be subject to debates
- Votes shall be casted approval
- An Approved Bill shall be included in the
Calendar of Bills for 3rd reading.
3 Reading – Approved Bills from the 2nd reading
rd
shall be submitted for final votation by “yeas” and
“nays”.
- Bill approved on the 3rd reading will be
transmitted to the “other house” for concurrence
(same process as abovementioned)
- If the “other house” approves without
amendment, it shall be passed to the President.
- If the “other house” introduces amendments,
and disagreement arises, differences will be
settled by the Conference Committees of BOTH
HOUSES.
- Report and Recommendation of the 2
Conference Committees will have to be approved
by both houses in order to be considered to pass.
Presidential Approval:
- Approval with Signature
- Pocket Veto or Inaction of the President
(lapse of 30 days after receipt in the office of the
President)
- Vetoes with Recommendation by the
President:
> Sent back to the House where it Originated
> 2/3 of the members must approve before it
will be sent to the other house for approval
> 2/3 of the other house must approve
before it shall become a law.
3. Authentication of bill before being sent to the
President
> Indespensable
> Must be signed by the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President, separately.
E. Enrolled Bill Doctrine
“An assumption that once a bill passes a legislative body
and is signed into law, the Courts assume that all Rules of
Procedure in the Enactment Process were properly
followed”
F. Parts of Law
1. Title
a. One subject, one bill rule
This is to impose limitation upon legislation:
i. To refrain from conglomeration, under one
statute, of heterogeneous subjects (prevention
of log-rolling, surprise, or fraud upon legislation)
ii. Title of the bill should be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and
the public and those concerned of the import of
the single subject. (fairly apprise the people,
through publication of the subjects of the
legislation).
CASES:
Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783,
December 8, 1994
1.) Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as
"An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong” did not
mention the creation of a “Legislative District”
which would then create a separation of the
legislative disctrict of San Juan and
Mandaluyong.
2.) The SC held that the creation of the “new
legislative disctrict” of Mandaluyong is just an
incidental effect or necessary consequence of
the conversion of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City whose population is over
250,000, which meets the requirement for the
creation of such legislative district.
3.) Remedy: The Title should have included in
its phraseology “the creation of a lone legislative
district).
Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
147387, December 10, 2003
1.) A Petition alleging that Sec. 14 of RA 9006
entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Elections Practices,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only
one subject which should be in expressed in its
title.”
2.) RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Elections
Practices” originally intended to Uplift the Ban
on Political Ads on Media
3.) Sec. 14 of RA 9006 provides that an elected
official running for any elective post shall remain
in his current held post, this clearly repeals the
provision of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides that if an elected official
riles for candidacy for another government
position, he/she should first resign from his
current elected position.
4.) SC held that Sec 14 of RA 9006 is clearly a
RIDER, not relevant its purpose, and violative of
the One Subject, One Title rule.
2. Enacting clause
Must be written immediately after the title, and should
state the authority by which the act is enacted.
3. Preamble (seldom included)
Prefaratory statement or explanation or a finding of
facts, reciting the purpose, reason, or occasion for
making the law to which it is prefixed
4. Body (purview) of the Statute
Part of the statute which tell what the law is about.
5. Separability Clause
Part of the statute which states if any provision of the
act is declared invalid, the remainder shall not be
affected thereby
>[GR] Statutes are effective AS A WHOLE
>Separability is not controlling as the courts may
invalidate the whole statute where what is left,
after the void part, is not complete and workable.
G. Effectivity (See Art. 2, Civil Code)
1. Publication requirement
Art. 2, CC; “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided. (as amended by E.O. 200)
>[GR] effective after 15days from publication,
provided that publication must be done in the
Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation.
 >the clause “unless otherwise provided” solely
refers to the effectivity period, not the
publication requirement which is
indespensable.
CASES:
Tañada vs. Tuvera (resolution of the M.R.), 146
SCRA 446 (1986)
1.) WoN publication is necessary for the effectivity of
a law duly enacted?
a.) The clause “unless it is otherwise provided”
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date,
without its previous publication.
Phil. Veterans Bank Employees Union vs. Vega,
GR No. 105364, June 28, 2001 (deviation from
Tañada vs. Tuvera)
1.) WoN R.A. 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the
Philippine Veterans Bank) took effect after 15 days
from its publication in the Official Gazette on
February 24, 1992?
a.) NO. R.A. 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the
Philippine Veterans Bank) took effect after it was
signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino
on January 2, 1992 by virtue of its Sec. 10
Effectivity Clause which states; “Sec. 10.
Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.”. Therefore, said law became effective
on said date.
2. Prospective operation of laws (Art. 4, Civil Code)
Art. 4, CC; “Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.
a. No effect on pending actions
b. Exception to prospectivity
i. If the laws themselves expressly provide for
their retroactivity (Art. 4, CC)
ii. If the aws are REMEDIAL IN NATURE.
iii. If the statute is PENAL IN NATURE,
provided:
a.) It is FAVORABLE TO THE
ACCUSED
b.) The accused is NOT A
HABITUAL DELINQUENT or
RECIDIVIST
iv. If the laws are of an EMERGENCY NATURE
and authorized by the POLICE POWER of
the state.
v. if the law is CURATIVE IN NATURE.
(necessarily retroactive for the precise purpose
to cure errors or irregularities)
CASE: Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015
1.) the case involves the JAPEX Exploration on
Tanon Strait from the period of 2002 – 2007.
2.) as of 2007 Tanon Strait has been declared a
protected sea scape in the Philippines.
3.) A procedural issue has risen: There is no
general rule for service contracts.
4.) A challenge on the locus standi of the
advocates was raised, and addressed –
Anybody can avail locus standi for cases
involving violations of our Philippine
Environmental Law (2010).
5. Such was given RETROACTIVE EFFECT
because it is a procedural matter, and the SC
granted the advocates locus standi based on
the rule promulgated for it being procedural in
nature.
H. Amendment
[GR] The legislative has the authority to amend any
existing law, subject to the constitutional requirements.
>The SC in the exercise of its rule-making power
or of its power to interpret the law, has no
authority to amend or change the law, such
authority being the exclusive power vested on the
legislature.
1. Coverage: only specific provisions
-Change or modification, by deletion, alteration, of a
statute which survives in its amended form.
-The amendment of a statute is effected by the
enactment of an amendatory act modifying or
altering some provision of a statute, either
expressly or impliedly.
2. Form
a. Generally, Express
Done by providing in the amendatory act that
specific sections or provisions of a statute be
amended as recited therein or as commonly
indicated, “to read as follows”
b. Amendment by implication
-when a part of a prior statute embracing the
same subject as the latter may not be enforced
without nullifying the pertinent provision of the
latter in which event, the prior act is deemed
amended or modified to the extent of
repugnancy.
3. Construction of amendments
-Statute and Amendment must be read as a
whole.
-An amendment act is ordinarily construed as if
the original statute has been repealed and a new
independent act in the amended form has been
adopted.
-Where the amendment leaves certain portions of
an act unchanged – such portions are continued
in force, with the same meaning and effect they
have before the amendment.
-Where the amendatory act provides that an
existing statute shall be amended to read as
recited in the amendatory act, such portions of
the existing law as are retained either literally or
substantially.
CASE: Estrada vs. Caseda, 84 Phil 791 (1949)
1.) WoN Commonwealth Act No. 689 has been given
retroactive effect by the amendment done in RA. No.
66?
a.) NO. Commonwealth Act No. 689, as
amended by Republic Act No. 66, cannot be
given retroactive effect. The provision of Republic
Act No. 66 amending section 14 of
Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to, and
should be computed from the date of the
approval of the amended act, that is October 15,
1945. The period as thus construed expired on
October 15, 1949.
b.) Where a statute which provide that it shall be
in force for a given period after its approval, the
set period shall be counted from the date the
original statute has been approved and not from
the date the amendatory act was given effect.
2.) 3 Instances when a lessor can occupy a
leased property, notwithstanding consent of the
lessee:
i. Willful & deliberate non-payment of rents by the
lessee;
ii. Lessor, himself, has to occupy the property
being leased; and
iii. Lessee has subleased the property w/o written
consent of the proprietor.
4. Operation of amendments
a. Generally, prospective
[GR] An amendment will not be construed as
having retroactive effect.
b. Exception: express provision on retroactivity
[EX] UNLESS the contrary is provided or the
legislative intent to give retroactive effect is
necessarily implied from the language used
c. Exception to the exception: when vested rights
are impaired
[EX to EX] only if no vested right is impaired.
5. Effect on jurisdiction of courts
[GR] Jurisdiction of a court to try cases is
determined by the law in force at the time the
action is instituted.
i. Jurisdiction remains with the court until
the case is finally decided therein.
6. Effect of nullity of prior or amendatory act
[GR] Where a statute which has been amended is
invalid, nothing in effect has been amended.
i. The amendatory act, complete by itself,
will be considered as an original or
independent act.
I. Revision and Codification
To restate the existing laws into one statute and simply
complicated provision, and make the laws on the subject
easily found.
1. Construction: harmonize the different provisions of
the revised statute or code
[GR] Author has maintained a consisted
philosophy or position. The different provisions
of a revised statute or code should be read and
construed together. Thus, a code enacted as a
single, comprehensive statute, and is to be
considered as such and not as a series of
disconnected articles or provisions.
2. Effect of omission of provision/s of the old laws
a. Generally: what is omitted is deemed
repealed
[GR] All laws and provisions of the old laws
that are omitted in the revised statute or
code are deemed repealed.
Revision or codification is, by its very
nature and purpose, intended to be a
complete enactment on the subject and an
expression of the whole law thereon, which
thereby indicated intent on the part of the
legislature to abrogate those provisions
of the old laws that are not reproduced
in the revised statute or code.
b. Exception: revised statute provides
otherwise
[EX] Unless the statute or code provides
otherwise
3. Effect of change in phraseology
When both intent and scope clearly evince that
idea of a repeal, then all parts and provision of
the prior act that are omitted from the revised
act are deemed repealed.
J. Repeals
“To revoke or annul a law.”
May be:
a.) Total – revoke completely
b.) Partial – leaves the unaffected portions of the
statute in force
c.) Express – A particular or specific law, identified by
its number of title, is repealed
d.) Implied – All other repeals not considered as
express repeal
1. Civil Code provision on repeals [Art. 7 (1), NCC]
Art. 7 (1), NCC; “Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary”
2. Distinguished from Amendments
The repeal of a law differs from the amendment
thereof, because the amendment of a law involves
making a change in a law that already exists, leaving
a portion of the original still standing. When a law is
repealed, however, it is completely abrogated.
3. General Rule: Non-retroactive application
CASE: Tac-an vs. CA, 137 SCRA 803
1.) WoN the Admin Code of Mindanao and Sulu is
still binding, even if it was already repealed by RA
4252 on June 19, 1965?
a.) YES. SC decided that the Admin Code of
Mindanao & Sulu was still in full-force and effect
as of the date of :
i. Execution of the Deed of Quitclaim;
ii. Approval by the Provincial Governor was
given; and
iii. The revocation of such approval.
4. Forms of repeal
a. Express repeal
When the law or statute literally provides that it
repeals a certain provision or section of a prior
law or the whole statute itself.
b. Implied repeal
When a subsequent law is irreconcilable with a
prior law.
(1) Presumption Against Implied Repeal
Repeals by implication are not favoured as
laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and full knowledge of all
existing laws on the subject, the congruent
application of which the courts must
generally presume.
CASE: National Power Corporation vs.
Angas, 208 SCRA 542 (1992)
1.) WoN Central Bank Circular No. 416 has
impliedly repealed or modified Art. 2209,
Civil Code?
a. NO. We do not see any conflict
between Central Bank Circular No. 416
and Art. 2209 of the Civil Code or any
reason to hold that the former has
repealed the latter by implication.
b. repeals or even amendments by
implication are not favored if two laws
can be fairly reconciled.
c. Central Bank Circular No. 416 and
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code contemplate
different situations and apply to
different transactions. In transactions
involving loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits, as well as
judgments relating to such loan or
forbearance of money, goods or
credits, the Central Bank circular
applies. It is only in such transactions
or judgments where the Presidential
Decree allowed the Monetary Board to
dip its fingers into. On the other hand,
in cases requiring the payment of
indemnities as damages, in connection
with any delay in the performance of
an obligation other than those involving
loan or forbearance of money, goods
or credits, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code
applies.
(2) Categories of implied repeal
a) Irreconcilable inconsistency
between two laws with similar
subject matter
CASES:
Villegas vs. Subido, GR No. L-31711,
Sept 30, 1971 (41 SCRA 190)
1. [GR] Later statute repeals prior ones
which are not repugnant thereto – [EX]
Special laws prevails over General
laws.
2.) 1949 Charter of Manila expressly
provides that the President shall
appoint . . . with consent of the
Commission on Appointment.
3.) 1967 Decentralization Act
provides “. . . to effect the City
Mayor be vested the power of
appointment of all other eployees
paid out of city or local funds
subject to Civil Service law, rules,
and regulations.”
4.) 1949 Charter of Manila is
controlling - [EX] Special laws
prevails over General laws.
Hagad vs. Gozo-Dadole, 251 SCRA
242
1.) WoN RA 7160 repealed Sec. 16 RA
6670?
2.) Sec. 19 RA 6670, the Ombudsman
Act grants disciplinary authority to the
Ombudsman to discipline elective and
appointive officials, except those
impeachable officers.
3.) repeal being asserted in RA 7160,
the Local Government Code, insofar as
local elective officials in the various
officials therein named.
4.) SC held that both laws should be
given effect because there is nothing in
the LGC which indicates that it has
repealed – expressly or impliedly, RA
7160.
a.) The two statutes on the
specific matter in question, let
alone irreconcilable, as to compel
us to uphold one and strike down
the other.
b.) two laws must be
incompatible, and a clear finding
thereof must surface, before the
 inference of implied repeal may
be drawn.
b) Later law covers whole subject of
earlier law AND is clearly intended
as a substitute
Implied Repeal by Revision or
Codification:
-Revised statute is in effect a
legislative declaration that whatever is
embraced in the new statute shall
prevail and whatever is excluded there
from shall be discarded.
-Must be intended to cover the whole
subject to be a complete and perfect
system in itself in order that the prior
statutes or part thereof which are not
repeated in the new statute will be
deemed impliedly repealed.
CASE: Pp. vs. Almuete, 69 SCRA
410
1.) Revision of the Agricultural
Tenancy Act by the Agricultural Land
Reform Code. Sec. 39 of the ATC
states “it shall be unlawful for either
the tenant or landlord without mutual
consent, to reap or thresh a portion of
the crop at any time previous to the
date set, for its threshing.”
2.) An action for violation of this penal
provision is pending in court, the
Agricultural Land Reform Code
superseded the Agricultural Tenancy
Act, abolished share tenancy, was not
reproduced in the Agricultural Land
Reform Code.
3.) The effect of such non-
reenactment is a repeal of Sec. 39 of
the Agricultural Tenancy Act.
4.) [GR] An act which purports to
set out in full all that it intends to
contain, operates as a repeal of
anything omitted which was
contained in the old act and not
included in the act as revised.
5.) Thus, a substitute statute, and
evidently intended as the substitute
for it, operates to repeal the former
statute.
5. Nature of repealing clause: predicated on
substantial (irreconcilable) conflict between prior
and later laws
-Not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the act or acts that is intended
to be repealed.
-A clause, which predicates the intended repeal
upon the condition that a substantial conflict
must be found on existing and prior acts of the
same subject matter.
6. Earlier law vs. later law
a. Irreconcilable inconsistency of two laws: later
law prevails
[GR] Later statute repeals prior ones which
are not repugnant thereto
CASE: David vs. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 90
(1997)
1.) Sec. 1 of RA 6679 provides that the term of
barangay officials who were to be elected on
the second Monday of May 1994 is 5 years.
2.) The later act RA 7160 Sec. 43 (c) states that
the term of office of barangay officials who were
to be elected also on the 2nd Monday of may
1994 is 3 years.
3.) There being clear inconsistency between the
two laws, the LATER LAW FIXING THE TERM
OF BARANGAY OFFICIALS TO 3 YEARS
SHALL PREVAIL.
*Constitutional Provision (term has no fixed
# of years)
- the terms for barangay officials ay may be
provided by law, shall be left to the discretion of
the Congress.
b. Earlier special law vs. later general law
(1) Effect: Generalia specialibus non
derogant (Later general law does not
repeal earlier special law)
CASE: Laguna Lake Dev’t Authority vs.
CA, G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7,
1995
1.) WoN LLDA has jurisdiction over
Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as
the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?
a.) YES. LLDA has jurisdiction over
Laguna Lake and its environs insofar
as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned.
b.) the LLDA statute specifically
provides that the LLDA shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits
for the use of all surface water for any
projects in or affecting the said region,
including the operation of fish pens.
While the RA 7160 LGC of 1991 grants
municipalities the exclusive authority to
grant fishery privileges in municipal
waters.
c.) SC held that to harmonize the
two laws, the LLDA statute, being a
Special law, must be taken as an
exception to RA 7160, a general law.
(2) Harmonizing the two laws: Generally,
earlier special law is deemed an
exception to the later general law
CASE: Magtajas vs. Pryce, 234 SCRA
255 (1994)
1.) Sec. 458 of LGC authorized LGU to
prevent or suppress “gambling & other
prohibited games of chance”.
a.) Gambling refers only to illegal
gambling, like other prohibited games
of chance, must be prevented or
suppressed, and not to gambling
authorized by specific statutes like
those allowed by PD 1869 granted to
PAGCOR.
(3) Exceptions
a) Later general enactment intended to
cover the whole subject and to
repeal the all prior laws inconsistent
therewith
CASE: Gaerlan vs. Catubig, 17
SCRA 376 (1966)
1.) WoN Sec 12 of RA 170 as
amended, the Dagupan City Charters,
which fixed the minimum age
qualification for members of the City
Council at 23 years old has been
repealed by Sec. 6 of RA 2259, AN
ACT MAKING ELECTIVE THE
OFFICES OF MAYOR, VICE-MAYOR
AND COUNCILORS IN CHARTERED
CITIES, REGULATING THE
ELECTION IN SUCH CITIES AND
FIXING THE SALARIES AND
TENURE OF SUCH OFFICES?
a.) SC held that there was an
implied repeal of Sec. 12 of the
charter of Dagupan City because
the legislative intent to repeal the
charter provision is clear from the
fact that Dagupan City, unlike
some cities, is not one of those
cities expressly excluded by the
law from its operation and from the
circumstances that it provides that
all acts or parts thereof which are
inconsistent therewith are
repealed.
b.) The last statute is so broad in
its terms and so clear and explicit
in its words so as to show that it
was intended to cover the whole
subject and therefore to displace
the prior statute.
b) Earlier special law establishes a
general rule; later general law
creates specific rule
CASE: City of Manila vs. Teotico, 22
SCRA 276 (1968)
1.) WoN the City of Manila should be
held liable as the incident happened on
a national highway?
a.) YES. Sec. 4 of RA No 409,
Charter of the City of
 Manila(special law), refers to
liability arising from NEGLIGENCE,
in general, regardless of the object
thereof.
b.) Art. 2189 of the Civil
Code(general law) governs
liabilities due to “defective
streets”, in particular.
c.) Since the present action is
based on the alleged defective
condition of a road, Art. 2189 is
decisive thereon.
c) manifest intention of the legislature
to repeal the earlier special law
CASE: City Gov’t of San Pablo vs.
Reyes, 305 SCRA 353 (1999)
1.) Sec. 1 PD 551 provides that any
provision of law or local ordinance to
the contrary, the franchise tax payable
by all grantees of franchise to
generate, distribute, and sell electric
current for light, heat, and power shall
be 25% of their gross receipts.
2.) Sec. 137 of the LGC states:
Notwithstanding any exemption
granted by any law or other special
law, the province may impose a tax on
business enjoying a franchise at a rate
not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross
annual receipts.
3.) SC Held that the phrase is all-
encompassing and clear that the
legislature intended to withdraw all tax
exemptions enjoyed by franchise
holders and this intent is made more
manifest by Sec. 193 of the Code,
when it provides that unless otherwise
provided in this code tax exemptions or
incentives granted to or presently
enjoyed by all persons, except local
water districts, cooperatives, and
non-stock and non-profit hospitals
and educational institutions, are
withdrawn upon the effectivity of the
Code.
c. Earlier general law vs. later special law – Effect:
later special law deemed an exception to earlier
general law
CASES:
Lagman vs. City of Manila, 17 SCRA 579 (GR
L-23305, June 30, 1966)
1.) WoN R.A. no. 409, as amended (Revised
charter of the City of Manila) prevails over
Commonwealth Act no. 598 and Public Service
law (C.A. no. 146, as amended)?
a.) YES. Republic act no. 409 prevails. The
said act is a special law and of later
enactment than C.A. no 548 and the Public
Service law (C.A. no 146, as amended) so
that even if a conflict exist between the
provisions of the former and the latter acts,
Republic Act no. 409 should prevail.
Republic v. Yahon, G.R. No. 201043, June 16,
2014
1.) A VAWC case against Sgt. Yahon ordering
to provide reasonable financial support to his
wife from his retirement benefits.
2.) However, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Finance Center contended that half
of the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon cannot
be given to the respondent as it is from a
military institution.
3.) SC Held that retirement benefit is considered
as “other source” of income which can be
proportionately be considered as a source of
monthly financial support awarded as damages
by the court.
7. Effect of Repeal
a. On when repealed law is rendered inoperative:
date repealing act takes effect
b. On jurisdiction already acquired by courts: not
lost by subsequent repeal or expiration of the
law giving the jurisdiction
(1) But courts are to use the prevailing law in
disposing of the merits of the case
a) Exception: where vested rights are
impaired
c. On contracts previously had under the repealed
law
d. On taxes assessed under the repealed tax law
e. On municipal offices under the old charter of an
LGU
8. Effect of Repeal or Declaration of
Unconstitutionality of Repealing law
CASE: JG Summit Holdings vs. CA, GR No.
124293, Nov. 20, 2000 (See however the
Resolutions dated Sept 24, 2003 and Jan 31,
2005)
1.) The Sec. 13, Commonwealth Act No. 146
expressly declared the Philippine Shipping Yard as
a Public Utility. (PSY = public utility)
2.) PD 666, PROVIDING FOR INCENTIVES TO THE
SHIPBUILDING AND SHIP REPAIR INDUSTRY,
impliedly repealed the Commonwealth Act provision
which declares a “shipyard” as not being “public
utility”. (PSY not public utility)
3.) Sec. 20, BP 391, AN ACT DECLARING THE
1983 INVESTMENT INCENTIVES POLICY BY
MODIFYING THE SYSTEM ON THE GRANT OF
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBERED
SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINE AND
OTHER PERTINENT LAWS ON INVESTMENTS,
expressly repealed Sec. 1, PD No. 666. (PSY
reverts back to being a public utility as originally
intended by CA No 146)
4.) EO 226, THE OMNIBUS INVESTMENTS CODE
OF 1987, expressly repealed BP 391, without
mention of reviving previously repealed PD 666.
(PSY = public utility)
9. Only a law can repeal another law
CASE: Palanca v. CA, G.R. No. 106685, December
2, 1994, reiterated in Sameer Oversees Placement
Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139. August
5, 2014
1.) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a
proportionate increase in payment on the balance of
the purchase price for a piece of real property bought
on installment, pursuant to paragraph 11 of the
subject Contract To Sell on Installment?
a.) In the case at bench, the clear understanding
of the parties is that there should be an upward
adjustment of the purchase price the moment
there is a deterioration of the Philippine peso vis-
a-vis the U.S. dollar. This is the "monetary
fluctuation" contemplated by them as would
justify the adjustment. Under this scenario, it is
an idle task to determine whether the contract
has been visited by an "extraordinary inflation" as
to trigger the operation of Article 1250, CC
provision for adjustments in case of extraordinary
inflation or deflation.
b.) While the contract may contain an "escalator
clause" providing that in the occurrence of certain
events, the contract price shall be increased to a
fixed percentage of the base price ("Escalator"
price adjustment clauses, 63 ALR 2d 1337
[1959], still the autonomy of the parties to provide
such escalator clauses may be limited by law.
c.) The stipulation of the parties is in violation of
R.A. No. 529, as amended, entitled "An Act to
Assure Uniform Value To Philippine Coin and
Currency," otherwise as the Cuenco Law.
2.) A Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only
a law can repeal another law.
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION RULES
A. Ratio Legis: Spirit of the law/Legislative Intent as the
Primary Object
1. As expressed in the literal reading of the text
a. Verba legis (literal or plain meaning rule)
CASES:
IBAA Employees Union vs. Inciong, 132
SCRA 663
1.) WoN monthly paid employees are excluded
from the benefit of holiday pay?
a.) NO. It is elementary in the rules of
statutory construction that when the
language of the law is clear and
unequivocal the law must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. (verbal legis)
b.) Provisions of the Labor Code on the
entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are
 clear and explicit- it provides for both the
coverage of and exclusion from the benefits.
In Policy Instruction 9, the then Secretary of
Labor categorically state that the benefit is
principally intended for daily paid
employees, when the law clearly states that
every worker shall be paid their regular
holiday pay.
c.) While it is true that the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statue by
executive officers whose duty is to enforce it
should be given great weight by the courts,
still if such construction is so erroneous,
the same must be declared as null and
void.
Chartered Bank Employees Association vs.
Ople, 138 SCRA 273
1.) WoN the Ministry of Labor is correct in
maintaining that monthly paid employees are
not entitled to the holiday pay nor all employees
who rendered work during said legal holiday are
entitled to the premium or overtime pay
differentials?
a.) When the language of the law is clear
and unequivocal the law the law must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. (verba
legis)
b.) An administrative interpretation, which
diminishes the benefits of labor more than
what the statute delimits or withholds, is
obviously ultra vires.
c.) Presidential Decree No. 850 states who
are excluded from the holiday provisions of
that law:
i. Government employees
ii.Managerial Employees
iii. Field personnel members of the family
of the employer who are dependent on
him for support
iv. Domestic helpers
v. Persons in the personal service of
another
vi. Workers who are paid by results
as determined by the Secretary of Labor
in appropriate regulations.
(1) Dura lex sed lex
the law may be harsh but it is still the law
CASES:
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA
561
1.) Whether or not Art. 992 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines be interpreted to
exclude recognized natural children from
the inheritance of the deceased?
a.) Yes, [GR] Because the art. 992 of
the Civil Code explicitly states that:
“An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate
child.”
b.) Art. 176 of the FC made no
distinction as to illegitimate children,
whether spurious or natural.
c.) An [EX] being that, if the father
was also an illegitimate, thus the
illegitimate children may now inherit
from the claim of their father.
Aguila vs. CFI, 160 SCRA 352
1.) It has been repeatedly enunciated that
"a client is bound by the action of his
counsel in the conduct of a case and
cannot be heard to complain that the result
might have been different had he
proceeded differently. A client is bound by
the mistakes of his lawyer.
2.) If such grounds were to be admitted
and reasons for reopening cases, there
would never be an end to a suit so long as
new counsel could be employed who could
allege and show that prior counsel had not
been sufficiently diligent or experienced or
learned.
a) Exception: Inapplicability in criminal
cases
CASE: Pp vs. Santayana, 74 SCRA
25 in relation to Pp vs. Mapa, 20
SCRA 1164
1.) Santayana was appointed as a
“secret agent” by Col. Maristela, and
was told that it was not necessary for
him to apply for a license or to register
the said firearm because it was
government property and therefore
could not legally be registered or
licensed in appellant's name.
2.) At the time of appellant's
apprehension, the doctrine then
prevailing is enunciated in the case of
People vs. Macarandang wherein We
held that the appointment of a civilian
as "secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes
sufficiently puts him within the category
of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police
expressly covered by Section 879."
3.) The case of People vs. Mapa
revoked the doctrine in the
Macarandang case only on August 30,
1967. Under the Macarandang rule
therefore obtaining at the time of
appellant's appointment as secret
agent, he incurred no criminal liability
for possession of the pistol in question.
4.) Wherefore, and conformably with
the recommendation of the Solicitor
General, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and appellant Jesus
Santayana y Escudero is hereby
acquitted. The bond for his provisional
release is cancelled.
2. As determined through Construction
a. General Rule: Statute must be capable of
construction, otherwise inoperative
CASE: Santiago vs. COMELEC, 270 SCRA
106
1.) In this case, the Court adopted a literal
meaning thus, concluded that RA 6735 is
inadequate to implement the power of the
people to amend the Constitution (initiative on
amendments) for the following reasons:
i. Does not suggest an initiative on
amendments on to the Constitution because
it is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution and the word “Constitution” is
neither germane nor relevant to said section
ii Does not provide for the contents of a
petition for initiative on the Constitution
iii. Does not provide for subtitles for initiative
on the Constitution
iv. RA is incomplete and does not provide a
sufficient standard
2.) J. Puno dissents:
i. Legislative intent is also shown by the
deliberations on the bill that became RA
6735… (there are 4 more reasons – see
page 130-131, which are not so important)
3.) Interpretation of RA 6735 was not in keeping
with the maxim interpretation fienda est ut res
magis valeat quam pereat – that interpretation
as will give the thing efficacy is to be adopted
b. Specific Rules
(1) Mens Legislatoris: Ascertain
spirit/intent/purpose of the law
CASES:
Prasnik vs. Republic, 98 Phil 665
1.) WoN the CC allowed adoption of
acknowledged natural children by the
father or mother?
a.) The law intends to allow adoption
whether the child be recognized or not.
If the intention were to allow adoption
only to unrecognized children, Article
338 would be of no use.
 b.) The rights of an acknowledged
natural child are much less than those
of a legitimated child.
c.) It is unnecessary to deny the
illegitimate children the chance to
acquire these rights. The trend when it
comes to adoption of children tends to
go towards the liberalism. The law
does not prohibit the adoption of an
acknowledged natural child which
when compared to a natural child is
just. An acknowledged natural child is
a natural child also and following the
words of the law, they should be
allowed adoption
Matabuena vs. Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284
1.) WoN Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every
donation between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void” extends to
donations by live-in partners?
a.) Yes. It is a fundamental principle in
statutory construction that what is
within the spirit of the law is as much a
part of the law as what is written.
b.) The reason for the ban on
donations between spouses during
the marriage is to prevent the
possibility of undue influence and
improper pressure being exerted by
one spouse on the other, there is no
reason why this prohibition shall not
apply also to common-law
relationships.
c.) The court, however, said that the
lack of the donation made by the
deceased to Respondent does not
necessarily mean that the Petitioner
will have exclusive rights to the
disputed property because the
relationship between Felix and
Respondent were legitimated by
marriage.
King vs. Hernandez, 114 SCRA 730
1.) WoN a Chinese may be employed in a
non-control position in a retail
establishment, a wholly nationalized
business under RA 1180 Retail Trade
Law?
a.) NO. the law has to be construed
with the Anti-Dummy Law – prohibiting
an alien from intervening in the
management, operation, administration
or control thereof.
b.) When the law says you cannot
employ such alien, you cannot employ
an alien! The unscrupulous alien may
resort to flout the law or defeat its
purpose!
c.) It is imperative that the law be
interpreted in a manner that would
stave off any attempt at circumvention
of the legislative purpose.
Bustamante vs. NLRC, 265 SCRA 61
1.) How to compute for backwages to
which an illegally dismissed employee
would be entitled until his actual
reinstatement:
i. before Labor Code – to be deducted
from the amount of backwages is the
earnings elsewhere during the period
of illegal dismissal
ii. Labor Code Art. 279 – the amount of
backwages is fixed without deductions
or qualifications but limited to not more
than 3 years
iii. amended Art. 279 – full backwages
or without deductions from the time the
laborer’s compensation was withheld
until his actual reinstatement.
2.) The clear legislative intent of the
amendment in RA 6715 (Labor Code) is to
give more benefits to workers than was
previously given them under the Mercury
Drug rule or the 1st way.
US vs. Toribio, 15 Phil 85
1.) WoN whether the slaughter of large
cattle outside the municipal
slaughterhouse without a permit by the
municipal treasurer is prohibited?
a.) YES. Outside or inside without
permit is prohibited.
2.) The prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption so long
as these animals are fit for agricultural
work/ draft purposes was a “reasonable
necessary limitation” on private ownership.
a.) Ratio Legis - to protect large cattle
against theft and to make easy
recovery and return of such cattle to
their owners, when lost, strayed or
stolen.
Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520
1.) WoN the CFI and a municipal court in
the capital of a province have concurrent
jurisdiction over the crime of libel?
a.) RPC grants jurisdiction for the
cases of libel to the CFI
b.) Jalandoni Doctrine (Jalandoni vs
Endaya); “...There is no need to
make mention against that it is a
court of first instance that is
specifically designated to try a libel
case. Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code so provides. Its
language is categorical; its meaning
is free from doubt. This is one of
those statutory provisions that
leaves no room for interpretation.
All that is required is application.
What the law ordains must then be
followed.”
c.) RTC has rightful jurisdiction of all
libel cases, regardless of what form,
thus it can be filed in any municipal
court where the libellous statement
was made.
Planters Ass’n vs. Ponferrada, 317
SCRA 463
1.) Two conflicting provisions should be
construed as to realize the purpose of the
law.
a.) the purpose of the law is to
INCREASE the workers’ benefits
b.) Benefits under RA 6982 shall be
considered IN ADDITION to the
benefits under RA 809 and PD 621.
c. the word “substituted” cannot be
given the literal interpretation.
a) When literal import must yield to
spirit/intent
CASE: Villanueva vs. COMELEC,
140 SCRA 353 (Read the dissent of
Justice Aquino for the caveat on this
rule)
1.) Villanueva filed his Certificate of
Candidacy as a substitute candidate
for Narciso Mendoza, Jr. as a
candidate for the Vice Mayor of the
Municipality of Dolores, Quezon, 5days
after the last day of filing of CoC.
2.) Mendoza’s withdrawal was done via
an Unsworn Statement, in the evening
of the same day when he filed his CoC
at the last day of filing of CoC.
3.) COMELEC rules requires that a
withdrawal to be valid must be done
via Notarized/Sworn statement of
withdrawal of CoC.
4.) Villanueva won in terms of # of
votes, but the election officers did not
consider this as they deemed him not
officially part of the list of valid
candidates.
5.) COMELEC rules states that
Substitution can be valid if the
withdrawal was done after the last day
of filing of CoC. Hence, there was no
valid withdrawal, and no valid
substitution.
6.) The SC held that since the
withdrawal of Mendoza occurred in
the evening of the last day of filing
of the CoC, it should be deemed as
if it was done, accepted, and
 approved the following day – thus
the withdrawal is to be considered
valid as of the day following the last
day of filing of CoC.
7.) A basic rule on election law; “In
case of doubt, the will of the people
must be upheld.” (doctrine of the
will of the electorate)
b) When the reason of the law ceases,
the law itself ceases
CASES:
Comendador vs. De Villa, GR No.
93177, August 2, 1991
1.) Two Original Challenges in
military/court martial proceedings:
i. CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE – in
case there is a bias due to conflict
between a member of the panel
and any of the party to the case.
ii. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE –
motion to remove a member of the
panel without any specified reason
2.) PD 39 removed the right to
peremptory challenges (no more PC)
3.) PD 39 was rendered inoperative by
Proclamation No. 2045 which
terminated the state of martial law. (PC
was returned by virtue of implied
repeal)
4.) The Court ruled, applying the
principle of when the reason of the
law ceases, the law itself ceases,
that the termination of martial law and
the dissolution of military tribunals
created thereunder, the reason of the
existence of PD 39 ceased
automatically and the decree itself
ceased.
People v. Almuete, supra
(2) ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe
statute as a whole
CASE: Resident Marine Mammals v.
Reyes, supra
a) Harmonize and give effects to all
provisions whenever possible;
reconcile apparently conflicting
provisions
CASES:
National Tobacco Admin vs. COA,
311 SCRA 755 (1999)
1.) WoN Educational Assistance given
to individuals prior to the enactment of
RA 6758 should be continued to be
received?
a.) Yes. Proper interpretation of
section12 RA 6758 depends on the
combination of first and second
paragraph.
b.) First sentence states that “such
other additional compensation not
otherwise specified as may be
determined by the DBM shall be
deemed included in the
standardized salary rates herein
prescribed.” The second sentence
states “such other additional
compensation, whether in cash or
in kind, being received by
incumbents only as of July 1, 1989
not integrated into the standard
shall continue to be authorized.”
c.) In the words of Atty. Cabrera;
“Do not isolate or detach parts
of a statute.”
d.) Construing a statute as a whole
includes reconciling and
harmonizing conflicting provisions.
Republic vs. CA, 263 SCRA 758
(1996)
1.) WoN an appeal of cases involving
just compensation should be made first
by DARAB before RTC under Sec. 57?
a.) NO. RTC has primary
jurisdiction. SC said that the
contention of the Republic and the
Land Bank in the affirmative side
has no merit because although
DARAB is granted a jurisdiction
over agrarian reform matters, it
does not have jurisdiction over
criminal cases.
Dreamwork Construction v. Janiola,
G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009
1.) WoN the MTC or RTC Court erred
in its discretion to suspend
proceedings in Criminal Case on the
basis of “Prejudicial Question “, with
respect to the Civil Case belatedly
filed.
a.) The elements of a prejudicial
question are:
i. the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action; and
ii. the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
b.) Under the amendment, a
prejudicial question is understood
in law as that which must precede
the criminal action and which
requires a decision before a final
judgment can be rendered in the
criminal action. The civil action
must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action.
c.) In this case, the Information was
filed with the Sandiganbayan
ahead of the complaint in Civil
Case filed by the State with the
RTC. Thus, no prejudicial
question exists.
d.) The Resolution of the Civil Case
Is Not Determinative of the
Prosecution of the Criminal Action.
Even if the trial court in the civil
case declares that the construction
agreement between the parties is
void for lack of consideration, this
would not affect the prosecution of
private respondent in the criminal
case. The fact of the matter is
that private respondent issued
checks that were subsequently
dishonored for insufficient
funds. It is this fact that is
subject of prosecution under BP
22.Therefore, it is clear that the
second element required for the
existence of a prejudicial question,
is absent. Thus, no prejudicial
question exists.
(3) Construe Statute in Relation to the
Constitution and Other Statutes
a) Supremacy of the Constitution
Doctrine of Constitutional
Supremacy
“Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates
any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch
or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme
law of the nation, it is deemed written
in every statute and contract.”
b) But when statutes admit of two
constructions, one constitutional
and the other unconstitutional,
construction in favor of
constitutionality should be favoured
 CASE: De la Cruz vs. Paras, GR
No.42591, July 25, 1983
1.) LGC provides that municipal
corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of “night clubs”. They
may only be regulated.
a.) It would be, therefore, an
exercise in futility if the decision
under review were sustained. All
that petitioners would have to do
is to apply once more for licenses
to operate night clubs.
2.) A refusal to grant licenses, because
no such businesses could legally open,
would be subject to judicial correction.
a.) That is to comply with the
legislative will to allow the
operation and continued existence
of night clubs subject to
appropriate regulations
3.) To compel petitioners to close their
establishments, the necessary result of
an affirmance, would amount to no
more than a temporary termination of
their business.
a.) In accordance with the well-
settled principle of constitutional
construction that between two
possible interpretations by one
of which it will be free from
constitutional infirmity and by
the other tainted by such grave
defect, the former is to be
preferred. A construction that
would save rather than one that
would affix the seal of doom
certainly commends itself.
c) Statutes in Pari Materia (lit. same
subject)
- Statutes in pari materia must be
interpreted in light of each other since
they have a common purpose for
comparable events or items.
CASES:
Vda. de Urbano vs. GSIS, GR No.
137904, Oct 19, 2001
1.) Petitioners raised the issue of Sec.
79 of PD 1445 and the COA Circular
86-264 mandated the GSIS to dispose
of the assets through public bidding
and only upon its failure, through a
public sale.
2.) GSIS contended that SEC 79 of PD
1445 did not apply because it covered
unserviceable govt property and not
acquired assets.
3.) SC Held that GSIS is correct, as the
provision (SEC 79) applies only to
unserviceable govt property or those
no longer needed. The house was
obviously not unserviceable. And it
was still used by petitioners.
a.) COA Circular 86-264 or the
“General guidelines on the
divestment or disposal of assets of
government owned corporations”
the law stipulated that it availed of
an exception to the requirement of
disposition through public bidding
and such exception applied to
sales of merchandise held for sale
in the regular course of business.
b.) The Court read it in relation to
Coa circular 89-296 which provided
for “Audit Guidelines on the
Disposal of Property and other
Assets of Government Agencies”,
which also did not apply the public
bidding disposal requirement to
merchandise or inventory held for
sale in the regular course of
business nor to the disposal by
gov’t financial institutions of
foreclosed assets or collaterals
acquired in the regular course of
business and not transferred to the
Govt under proclamation no 50.
c.) The modes of disposal included
Public auction and Sale thru
negotiation.
4.) With regard to these 2 laws, the
Court held the question whether the
subject property was covered by the
said Circular or falls under its
exception. It held that 89-296 was to
be interpreted with 86-264.
a.) statutes that relate to the same
thing ought to be taken in
consideration in construing any one
of them, and it is an established
rule of law that all acts in pari
material are to be taken together
as if they were one law.
Cabada vs. Alunan, 260 SCRA 828
(1996)
1.) WoN an appeal lies from the
decision of Regional Appellate Board
(RAB) imposing disciplinary action
against a member of the PNP under
Sec. 45 of RA 6975 regarding finality of
disciplinary action?
a.) SC held that the “gap” in the law
which is silent on filing appeals
from decisions of the RAB
rendered within the reglementary
period should be construed and
harmonized with other statutes, i.e.
Sec 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution because the PNP is
part, as a bureau, of the
reorganized DILG, as to form a
unified system of jurisprudence.
b.) if RAB fails to decide an
appealed case within 60 days from
receipt of the notice of appeal, the
appealed decision is deemed final
and executory, and the aggrieved
party may forthwith appeal
therefrom to the Secretary of DILG.
c.) Likewise, if the RAB has
decided the appeal within 60-day
reglementary period, its decision
may still be appealed to the
Secretary of DILG.
Declarador v. Gubaton, G.R. No.
159208 August 18, 2006
1.) WoN Bansales is entitled to the
automatic suspension granted by PD
No. 603?
a.) NO. The accused was found
guilty of murder, a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death. It is clear from the words
of Section 32 of P.D. No. 603 that a
person who is convicted of an
offense punishable by death, life
imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is disqualified from
availing the benefits of a
suspended sentence.
b.) The word "punishable" does
not mean "must be punished,"
but "liable to be punished" as
specified. The term refers to the
possible, not to the actual
sentence. It is concerned with the
penalty which may be, and not
which is imposed.
c.) The law merely amended Article
192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended
by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the
suspension of sentence shall be
enjoyed by the juvenile even if he
is already 18 years of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement
of his/her guilt. The other
disqualifications in Article 192 of
P.D. No. 603, as amended, and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC
have not been deleted from
Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344.
Evidently, the intention of Congress
was to maintain the other
disqualifications as provided in
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
amended, and Section 32 of A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles
 who have been convicted of a
crime the imposable penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua to death or death, are
disqualified from having their
sentences suspended.
d.) Case law has it that statutes in
pari materia should be read and
construed together because
enactments of the same legislature
on the same subject are supposed
to form part of one uniform system;
later statutes are supplementary or
complementary to the earlier
enactments and in the passage of
its acts the legislature is supposed
to have in mind the existing
legislations on the subject and to
have enacted the new act with
reference thereto. Statutes in pari
materia should be construed
together to attain the purpose of an
expressed national policy.
Naga City vs. Agna, GR No. 36049,
May 31, 1976
1.) WoN RA 2264 repealed Sec. 2309
of the Revised Administrative Code?
a.) NO. There is a presumption
against implied repeal; a general rule.
subsequent provision only
repeals a prior provision clearly
contradictory to it. If two laws
can be harmonized, then the
Courts shall do so.
b.) Sec. 2309 of the Revised Admin
Code applies in this case because
the new tax changed a prior tax
system. RA 2264 only applies for
entirely new tax provisions.
(4) When the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish (Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemus)
CASES:
Ramirez vs. CA, 248 SCRA 590 (1995)
1.) WoN the violation thereof refers to the
taping of a communication other than a
participant to the communication or even to
the taping by a participant who did not
secure the consent of the party to the
conversations.?
a.) NO. Law did not distinguish
whether the party sought to be
penalized ought to be party other than
or different from those involved in the
private communication. The intent is to
penalize all persons unauthorized to
make any such recording, underscored
by “any”
b.) Anti-Wire Tapping Law - Republic
Act No. 4200 “Act to Prohibit &
Penalize WireTapping and Other
related Violations of Private
Communications and Other Purposes”
c.) “It shall be unlawful, not being
authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement…”
Garvida vs. Sales, 271 SCRA 767 (1997)
1.) WoN petitioner who was over 21 but
below 22 was qualified to be an elective
SK member?
a.) NO. The distinction is apparent: the
member may be more than 21 years of
age on election day or on the day he
registers as member of Katipunan ng
Kabataan. But the elective official,
must not be more than 21 years of age
on the day of election.
b.) Sec.424 of the LGC provides that a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
must not be 21 yrs old.
c.) Sec. 428 as additional requirement
provides that elective official of
Sangguniang Kabataan must not be
more than 21 yrs. “on the day of
election”.
(5) Meaning of Words and Phrases
a) Statutory definition
CASE: Victorias Milling vs. Social
Security Commission, 114 SCRA
555 (1962)
1.) “compensation” to include all
renumerations, except bonuses,
allowances & overtime pay
a.) Definition was amended:
deleted “exceptions”
2.) the amendment shows legislative
intent that bonuses & overtime pay
now included in employee’s
renumeration.
a.) by virtue of express substantial
change in phraseology, whatever
prior judicial or executive
construction should give way to
mandate of new law.
3.) A statutory definition of term
containing a general rule and an
exception thereto is amended by
eliminating the exception, the
legislative intent is clear that the
term should now include the
exception within the scope of the
b) Ordinary sense of the words vs.
technical or legal meaning
CASES:
Mataguina Integrated Wood vs. CA,
263 SCRA 490 (1996)
1.) WoN transferee of a forest
concession is liable for obligations
arising from transferor’s illegal
encroachment into another forest
concessionaire, which was committed
prior to the transfer?
a.) NO. Court held that the
transferee is NOT liable and
explained: “Obligations”
construed to mean obligations
incurred by transferor in the
ordinary course of business. Not
those as a result of
transgressions of the law, as
these are personal obligations of
transferor.
b.) Sec. 61 of PD 705 “the
transferee shall assume all the
obligations of the transferor.”
c.) Construe using ordinary
meaning & avoid absurdity
Mustang Lumber vs. CA, 257 SCRA
430 (1996)
1.) WoN “lumber” is included in the
classification of “timber”?
a.) YES. Reversing 1st ruling, SC
says lumber is included in timber.
Statute: Sec. 68 PD 705 -
penalizes the cutting, gathering &
or collecting timber or other forest
products without a license.
b.) Simply means, lumber is a
processed log or forest raw
material. The Code uses lumber in
ordinary common usage. In 1993
ed. of Webster’s International
Dictionary, lumber is defined as
timber or logs after being prepared
for the market. Therefore, lumber is
a processed log or timber. Sec 68
of PD 705 makes no distinction
between raw & processed timber
c) Specific words
1. “May” vs. “Shall”
CASES:
Director of Lands vs. CA, 276
SCRA 276 (1997)
1.) WoN publication of the notice
of initial hearing in an original land
registration case is MANDATORY
or DIRECTORY in relation to
Section 23(1) of PD 1529?
a.) YES. Law requires in
petitions for land registration
 that “upon receipt of the order
of the court setting the time
for initial hearing to be
published in the OG and once
in a newspaper
of general circulation in the
Philippines”
b.) Law expressly requires
that the initial hearing be
published in the OG AND in
the newspaper of general
circulation – reason: OG is not
as widely read of the
newspaper of general
circulation.
c.) “shall” is imperative/
mandatory
d.) Without initial hearing
being published in a the word "may" in a statute
newspaper of general
circulation is a nullity
Capati vs. Ocampo, 113 SCRA
799 (1982)
1.) WoN the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of
improper venue was correct?
a.) NO. The dismissal was
incorrectly grounded on
improper venue. The rule on
venue of personal actions
cognizable by the CFI is
found in Sec. 2(b), Rule 4
of the Rules of Court,
which provides that such
"actions may be commenced
and tried where the Defendant
or any of the Defendants
resides or may be found, or
where the Plaintiff or any of
the Plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the Plaintiff."
b.) The word "may" is merely
permissive and operates to
confer discretion upon a
party.
c.) Under ordinary
circumstances, the term "may
be" connotes possibility; it
does not connote certainty.
"May" is an auxiliary verb
indicating liberty, opportunity,
permission or possibility.
PCFI vs. NTC and PLDT, 131
SCRA 200 (1984) (But see
dissent of Abad Santos, J.)
1.) WoN respondent acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it
approved the Revised Subscriber
Investment Plan (SIP) of
respondent PLDT in the absence
of specific rules and regulations
implementing Presidential Decree
No. 217?
a.) YES. There is merit in the
contention of petitioner that it
is the duty of respondent NTC
to promulgate rules and
regulations.
2.) In the separate opinion of
Justice Abad Santos, it is said
that the case involves a simple
problem of statutory construction -
that of Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 217. The decision
sustained the petitioner's
contention that it is the duty of
NTC to first promulgate rules and
regulations. The resolution does
not subscribe to the view that the
NTC should or must promulgate
rules and regulations because the
decree must be given its ordinary
meaning; the word used is the
permissive "may" and not the
mandatory "shall."
a.) The non-unanimous
resolution thus relies on the
canons index animi sermo
est (speech is the indication
of intent) and a verba legis
non est recedendum (from
the words of the statute there
should be no departure). Any
lawyer of modest
sophistication knows that
canons of statutory
construction march in pairs
of opposite.
b.) Thus with the canons
above mentioned we have the
following opposite: verba
intentioni, non e contra,
debent inservire (words
ought to be more subservient
to the intent and not the intent
to the words)
c.) It is an elementary rule in
statutory construction that
is permissive while the
word "shall" is mandatory.
The rule, however, is not
absolute. The literal
interpretation of the words of
an act should not prevail if it
creates a result contrary to
the apparent intention of the
legislature and if the words
are sufficiently flexible to
admit of a construction which
will effectuate the legislative
intention.
Berces vs. Guingona, 241
SCRA 539 (1995)
1.) WoN Sec. 68 of R.A. No.
7160, 1991 LGC, repealed Sec. 6
of Administrative Order No. 18?
a.) NO. Petition was
dismissed. “Stay of execution”
applied.
b.) The first sentence of
Section 68 merely provides
that an “appeal shall not
prevent a decision from
becoming final or executory.”
As worded, there is room to
construe said provision as
giving discretion to the
reviewing officials to stay the
execution of the appealed
decision. There is nothing to
infer therefrom that the
reviewing officials are
deprived of the authority to
order a stay of the appealed
order.
c.) If the intention of Congress
was to repeal Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18, it
could have used more direct
language expressive of such
intention.
2. “Or” vs. “And”
CASES:
GMCR vs. Bell Telecom, 271
SCRA 790 (1997)
1.) WoN the NTC is a collegial
body or under the direct and sole
control of Commissioner
Kintanar?
a.) YES. NTC is a collegial
body requiring a majority
vote out of the three
members of the
commission in order to
validly decide a case or any
incident therein. Corollarily,
the vote alone of the chairman
of the commission, absent the
required concurring vote
coming from the rest of the
membership of the
commission to at least arrive
at a majority decision, is not
sufficient to legally render an
NTC order, resolution or
decision.
b.) Commissioner Kintanar is
not the National
Telecommunications
 Commission. He alone does
not speak for and in behalf of
the NTC. The NTC acts
through a three-man body,
and the three members of the
commission each has one
vote to cast in every
deliberation concerning a
case or any incident therein
that is subject to the
jurisdiction of the NTC.
Having been organized by EO
146 as a three-man
commission, the NTC is a
collegial body and was a
collegial body even during
the time when it was acting
as a one-man regime.
US vs. dela Santa, 9 Phil 22
(1907)
1.) WoN the case should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction?
a.) It is contended that these
provisions authorize the
institution of criminal
proceedings by the father in
all cases of seduction
because the offense can only
be committed upon a woman
under age and legally
incapacitated to institute
criminal proceedings on her
own behalf. But if the father
does not institute such
proceedings until after his
daughter has attained full age,
we are of opinion that he
loses the right so to do, and
that this right vests exclusively
in the offended party, unless,
of course, there is some legal
impediment, not arising out of
nonage, which prevents her
from maintaining such
criminal action.
b.) The right to institute
criminal proceedings in cases
of seduction could not be
reposed in the offended
person, her parents,
grandparents, and guardian,
at one and the same time,
without occasioning grave
difficulties in the
administration of justice,
resulting from the attempts of
some of these persons to
institute criminal proceedings
contrary to the wish and
desire of the others; and that
this was not the intention of
the lawmaker becomes
manifest in the light of the
peculiar provisions of the Art.
448 of the Penal Code;
“Criminal proceedings for
seduction can only be
instituted on the complaint of
the offended person or her
parents, grandparents, or
guardian.”
c.) Hence, although these
persons are mentioned
disjunctively, the above
provision of the Penal Code
must be construed as
meaning that the right to
institute criminal
proceedings in cases of
seduction is exclusively
and successively reposed
in these persons in the order
in which they are named, so
that no one of them has
authority to proceed if there is
any other person previously
mentioned therein with legal
capacity to appear and
institute the action.
Hda. Luisita Inc. vs. PARC, G.R.
No. 171101, Resolution,
November 22, 2011
1.) WoN the operative fact
doctrine is applicable to the
present case?
a.) YES. The operative fact
doctrine is a rule of equity. As
a complement of legal
jurisdiction, equity seeks to
reach and complete justice
where courts of law,
through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of
power to adapt their
judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are
incompetent to do so.
b.) Equity regards the spirit
and not the letter, the intent
and not the form, the
substance rather than the
circumstance, as it is
variously expressed by
different courts.
2.) A rule in statutory construction
is that the word “or” is a
disjunctive term signifying
dissociation and independence
of one thing from other things
enumerated unless the context
requires a different
interpretation.
a.) In its elementary sense,
OR, as used in a statute, is a
disjunctive article indicating
an alternative. It often
connects a series of words or
propositions indicating a
choice of either. When or is
used, the various members of
the enumeration are to be
taken separately.
Gonzales v. Comelec, G.R. No.
L-28196, November 9, 1967
1.) WoN the congress, through
ordinary legislation, have the
power to amend or propose
amendments to the constitution?
a.) YES. Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
Constitution provides:
“Sec. 1. The Congress in joint
session assembled, by a vote
of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives
voting separately, may
propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a
convention for that purpose.
Such amendments shall be
valid as part of this
Constitution when approved
by a majority of the votes cast
at an election to which the
amendments are submitted to
the people for their
ratification.”
b.) The petitioner argues that
Congress cannot both call a
convention and propose
amendment. Sec. 1 of Art. XV
states that Congress "may
propose amendments or call a
convention for that purpose".
The term "or", however, is
frequently used as having the
same meaning as "and"
particularly in permissive,
affirmative sentences so that
the interpretation of the word
"or" as "and" in the
Constitution in such use will
not change its meaning
(Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co. v.
Goodenough, 32 So. 404,
411, 108 La, 442).
 c.) It should be pointed out
that the resolutions proposing
amendments (R.B.H. Nos. 1
and 3) are different from that
calling for a convention
(R.B.H. No. 2). Surely, if
Congress deems it better or
wise to amend the
Constitution before a it effectively amended Section
convention called for is
elected, it should not be
fettered from doing so. For
our purposes in this case,
suffice it to note that the
Constitution does not prohibit
it from doing so.
Romulo, Mabanta, et al. v.
HDMF, G.R. No. 131082. June
19, 2000
1.) WoN the board of HDMF
exceeded its delegated power.
a.) YES. The controversy lies
in the legal signification of the
words “and/or.”
b.) It seems to us clear from
the language of the enabling
law that Section 19 of P.D.
No. 1752 intended that an
employer with a provident
plan or an employee housing
plan superior to that of the
fund may obtain exemption
from coverage. If the law had
intended that the employee
[sic] should have both a
superior provident plan and a
housing plan in order to
qualify for exemption, it would
have used the words “and”
instead of “and/or.”
b.) Notably, paragraph (a) of
Section 19 requires for annual
certification of waiver or
suspension, that the features
of the plan or plans are
superior to the fund or
continue to be so. The law
obviously contemplates that
the existence of either plan is
considered as sufficient basis
for the grant of an exemption;
needless to state, the
concurrence of both plans is
more than sufficient. To
require the existence of both
plans would radically impose
a more stringent condition for
waiver which was not clearly
envisioned by the basic law.
By removing the disjunctive
word “or” in the implementing
rules the respondent Board
has exceeded its authority.
c.) It is without doubt that the
HDMF Board has rule-making
power as provided in Section
51 17 of R.A. No. 7742 and
Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752.
However, it is well-settled that
rules and regulations, which
are the product of a delegated
power to create new and
additional legal provisions that
have the effect of law, should
be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by
the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is
required that the regulation
be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law,
and be not in contradiction
to, but in conformity with,
the standards prescribed by
law.
d.) In the present case, when
the Board of Trustees of the
HDMF required in Section 1,
Rule VII of the 1995
Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing
R.A. No. 7742 that employers
should have both
provident/retirement and
housing benefits for all its
employees in order to qualify
for exemption from the Fund,
19 of P.D. No. 1752. And
when the Board subsequently
abolished that exemption
through the 1996
Amendments, it repealed
Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752.
Such amendment and
subsequent repeal of Section
19 are both invalid, as they
are not within the delegated
power of the Board. The
HDMF cannot, in the exercise
of its rule-making power,
issue a regulation not
consistent with the law it
seeks to apply. Indeed,
administrative issuances must
not override, supplant or
modify the law, but must
remain consistent with the law
they intend to carry out. Only
Congress can repeal or
amend the law.
3. “Principally”/”Primarily” vs.
“Exclusively”
CASES:
Alfon vs. Republic, 97 SCRA
859 (1980)
1.) WoN legitimate and
legitimated children are required
to use the surname of their
father?
a.) NO. Article 364 of the Civil
Code provides:
“Legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use
the surname of the father.”
b.) The word "principally"
as used in Article 364 is not
equivalent to "exclusively"
so that there is no legal
obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should
choose to use the surname of
its mother to which he or she
is equally entitled. Petitioner is
therefore allowed to change
her name from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Alfon
Duterte to Estrella Alfon
Floresca vs. Phillex Mining, 136
SCRA 142 (1985)
Chavez vs. NHA, G.R. No.
164527, August 15, 2007
4. “Term” vs. “Tenure”
CASE: Appari vs. CA, 127
SCRA 231 (1984)
5. “Every”
CASE: NHC vs. Juco, G.R. No.
L-64313 January 17, 1985
6. “foreigner”
CASE: Gatchalian vs.
COMELEC, 35 SCRA 435 1970)
7. “government”
CASE: C & C Commercial vs.
NAWASA, 21 SCRA 984 (1967)
8. “national government”
CASE: Central Bank vs. CA, 63
SCRA 431 (1975)

d) Specific Phrases/Clauses
1. Provisos
a. Purpose: to limit application
of provision; or to except
something therefrom; or to
qualify or restrain its general
application; or exceptionally,
to enlarge instead of restrict
CASE: U.S. vs. Sto. Nino,
13 Phil 141 (1909)
b. What a proviso qualifies:
only the phrase immediately
preceding it
CASES:
ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC, 234
SCRA 678 (1994)
Arenas vs. San Carlos
City, 82 SCRA 318
2. Exceptions
a. Distinguished from provisos
b. Illustrations
CASES:
Meralco vs. PUEA, 79
SCRA 409 (1947)
Tolentino vs. Secretary,
235 SCRA 630 (1994)
e) Associated Words
1. Noscitor A Sociis (where a
particular word or phrase is
ambiguous, consider
company of words in which it is
associated to ascertain the
correct construction)
CASES:
Buenaseda vs. Flavier, 226
SCRA 645 (1993)
Magtajas vs. Pryce, supra
only words or phrases to which
they are immediately associated)
CASES:
Pangilinan vs. Alvendia, 101
Phil 794 (1957)
Florentino vs. PNB, 98 Phil 959
(1956)
Mapa vs. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76
(1989)
Pp. vs. Tamani, 55 SCRA 153
(1973)
Amadora vs. CA, 160 SCRA 315
(1988)
c. Rules on Implications
(1) Doctrine of Necessary Implication (what
is implied in a statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed;
opposite of the rule of expressio unios est
exclusio alterius)
CASES:
Chua vs. CSC, 206 SCRA 65 (1992)
Batungbakal vs. National Development
Co., 93 Phil 182 (1953)
the

2. Ejusdem Generis (literally: same

kind or species; general word or
phrase that follow an enumeration
of particular and specific words,
which are of the class or kind, are
restricted only to things or cases
of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned)
CASES:
Pp. vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA
212 (1995)
NPC vs. Angas, 208 SCRA 542
(1992)  MODIFIED BY
Republic v. CA,
Republic vs. Migriño, 189 SCRA
289 (1990)
Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003
Colgate-Palmolive vs. Jimenez,
1 Phil 267 (1961)
RC Archbishop of Manila vs.
SSC, 1 SCRA 10 (1961)

3. Expressio Unios est Exclusio

Alterius (opposite of the doctrine
of necessary implication: express
mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the
exclusion of all others)
CASES:
Santos vs. Pano, 120 SCRA 8
(1983)
Samson vs. CA, 145 SCRA 654
(1986)
Catu v. Rellorasa, A.C. No.
5738, February 19, 2008
Gomez vs. Ventura, 54 Phil 726
(1930)
Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA
1042 (1962)

4. Cassus Omissus (a person,

object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally)
CASES:
Pp. vs. Manantan, supra
Rufino Lopez & Sons vs. CTA,
100 Phil 850

5. Doctrine of last antecedent

(qualifying words restrict or modify

B. Basic Rules of Construing Specific Statutes
1. Political Laws
a. Election Laws
-Should be LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN
FAVOR OF THE WILL OF THE ELECTORATE
CASES:
Villanueva vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 352
1.) WoN Mendoza’s withdrawal is considered
valid under Sec. 27 of the Election Code?
a.) YES. The fact that Mendoza’s
withdrawal was not sworn is but a
technicality which should not be used to
frustrate the people’s will in favour of the
petitioner as the substitute candidate.
b.) In fact, Mendoza's name, even
though his candidacy was filed on the
last day within the deadline, was not in
the Comelec's certified list of
candidates. His unsworn withdrawal filed
later on the same day had been accepted
by the election registrar without protest nor
objection.
c.) Jurisprudence provides, in Guzman vs
Board of Canvassers (48 Phil 211), "(T)he
will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality that the certificate of candidacy
had not been properly sworn to, This legal
provision is mandatory and non-
compliance therewith before the election
would be fatal to the status of the
candidate before the electorate, but after
the people have expressed their will, the
result of the election cannot be defeated by
the fact that the candidate has not sworn to
his certificate or candidacy.”Thus
Mendoza’s failure to observe the
requirement should be considered a
harmless irregularity.
2.) WoN Villanueva’s substitution is valid
under Sec. 28 of the Election Code?
a.) YES. The Comelec's post-election act
of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy
certainly does not seem to be in
consonance with the substance and spirit
of the law.
b.) The spirit of the law rather than its
literal reading should have guided
Respondent Commission in resolving the
issue of last minute withdrawal and
substitution of other persons as candidate.
Rulloda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154198,
January 20, 2003
1.) WoN Petronilla “Betty” Rulloda’s
substitute candidacy, after the death of her
husband, is valid?
a.) YES. Contrary to the respondents
claim, the absence of a specific provision
governing substitution of candidates in
barangay elections cannot be inferred as a
prohibition against the said substitution.
b.) Private respondent argues that in as
much as the barangay election is non-
partisan, there can be no substitution
because there is no political party from
which to designate the substitute:
- Section 77 of the Omnibus
Elections Code on Candidates: In
case of death, disqualification or
withdrawal of another. If after the last
day of the filing of certificates of
candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for
any cause, only a person belonging to,
and certified by the same political party
may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the
political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-
day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should
occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day,
said certificate may be filed with any
board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is a
candidate or, in the case of candidates
to be voted by the entire electorate of
the country, with the Commission.”
c.) Election means the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote;
embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the
sovereign power of the people.
b. Local Government Code (See Section 5, RA
7610)
Section 5. Rules of Interpretation. - In the
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the
following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local
government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers
and of the lower local government unit.
Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted
in favor of the local government unit
concerned;
(b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or
revenue measure shall be construed
strictly against the local government unit
enacting it, and liberally in favor of the
taxpayer. Any tax exemption, incentive or
relief granted by any local government unit
pursuant to the provisions of this Code
shall be construed strictly against the
person claiming it.
(c) The general welfare provisions in this
Code shall be liberally interpreted to give
more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people
in the community;
(d) Rights and obligations existing on the
date of effectivity of this Code and arising
out of contracts or any other source of
presentation involving a local government
unit shall be governed by the original terms
and conditions of said contracts or the law
in force at the time such rights were
vested; and
(e) In the resolution of controversies
arising under this Code where no legal
provision or jurisprudence applies, resort
may be had to the customs and traditions
in the place where the controversies take
place.
c. Expropriation laws
-Statutes expropriating or authorizing the
expropriation of property are strictly construed
against the expropriating authority and
liberally in favor of property owners.
d. Naturalization laws
-Naturalization laws are strictly construed
against the applicant and must be rigidly
followed and enforced.
-Naturalization is statutory than a natural
right.
2. Labor and Social Legislation
Labor Laws
- construed in favour of the workingman’s
welfare
Social Legislation
- liberally construed to implement social
justice and protection of labor provision in
the Constitution
- must be resolved in favour of the persons
whom the law intended to benefit.
CASES:
Manahan vs. ECC, 104 SCRA 198
1.) WoN Manahan is entitled to the GSIS
death benefit of her husband, who died of
enteric fever, under P.D. 626?
a.) YES. This Court applied the provisions
of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as
amended, on passing upon petitioner’s
claim. The illness that claimed the life of
the deceased may have its onset before
10 December 1974, thus, his action
 accrued before 10 December 1974. Still,
in any case, and in case of doubt, the
same should be resolved in favor of the
worker, and that social legislations — like
the Workmen’s Compensation Act and
the Labor Code — should be liberally
construed to attain their laudable
objective, i.e., to give relief to the
workman and/or his dependents in the
event that the former should die or sustain
an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and
applying now the provisions of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act in this case,
the presumption of compensability subsists
in favor of the claimant.
Villavert vs. ECC, 110 SCRA 223
1.) WoN Villavert is entitled to receive the
GSIS death benefit of her son, who died of
hemorrhagic pancreatitis, pursuant to P.D.
No. 626?
a.) YES. From the foregoing facts of
record, it is clear that Marcelino N.
Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis which was directly caused
or at least aggravated by the duties he
performed as code verifier, computer
operator and clerk typist of the
Philippine Constabulary. Further, Article
4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, provides that “all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this
Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor.”
Del Rosario and Sons vs. NLRC, 135 SCRA
669
1.) WoN the NLRC erred in dismissing the
appeal of the Security Agency despite their
failure to file the appeal under oath and pay
the appeal fee on time?
a.) YES. The SC rules that the NLRC has
the right to accept the appeal despite the
lack of verification and the delay in the
payment of the appeal fee. Article 221 of
the Labor Code provides that, unlike in
the Courts of law where the rules of
evidence are controlling, the primordial
interest of the Labor Code and the
NLRC is to speedily and objectively
ascertain the facts of the case without
regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due
process. Anyway, the deficiency in the
verification in this case can be cured in the
actual oath-taking.
b.) The formal defects in the appeal of the
Security Agency were not fatal defects.
The lack of verification could have been
easily corrected by requiring an oath. The
appeal fee had been paid although it was
delayed. Failure to pay the docketing fees
does not automatically result in the
dismissal of the appeal. Dismissal is
discretionary with the Appellate Court
and discretion must be exercised wisely
and prudently, never capriciously, with
a view to substantial justice. Failure to
pay the appeal docketing fee confers a
directory and not a mandatory power to
dismiss an appeal and such power must
be exercised with sound discretion and
with a great deal of circumspection,
considering all attendant circumstances.
2.) WoN the NLRC erred in deciding that the
Petitioner and the Security Agency are
jointly and severally liable to pay the
Security Guards.
a.) NO. The SC affirms the decision of the
NLRC holding the Petitioner and the
Security Agency jointly and severally liable
for the underpayment of the salary and the
non-payment of the living allowance and
13th month pay to the Security Guards.
Under Article 106 of the Labor Code, the
Principal (in this case, the Petitioner)
should be held jointly and severally liable
with the Contractor (in this case, the
Security Agency), in case the latter fails to
pay the wages of its employees. This is
more so the case with Petitioner
considered as an indirect employer under
the definition stated in Article 107 of the
same Labor Code.
Articles 106 of the Labor Code
provides that “in the event that the
contractor or subcontractor fails to pay
the wages of his employees in
accordance with this Code, the
employer shall be jointly and severally
liable with his contractor or
subcontractor to such employees to
the extent of the work performed under
the contract, in the same manner and
extent that he is liable to employees
directly employed by him,”
Article 107 of the Labor Code
provides that “the provisions of the
immediately preceding Article shall
likewise apply to any person,
partnership, association or corporation
which, not being an employer,
contracts with an independent
contractor for the performance of any
work, task, job or project.”
b.) The joint and several liability imposed
by the Court is however without prejudice
to the Petitioner’s right to reimburse from
the Security Agency the amount it paid the
Security Guards.
In the case at bar, petitioner became
an indirect employer of respondents-
complainants when petitioner entered
into a Contract of Services with the
Security Agency and the latter hired
the complainants to work as guards for
the former. However, the petitioner’s
liability should be without prejudice to a
claim for reimbursement against the
Security Agency for such amounts as
petitioner may have to pay to
complainants.
c.) The SC further ruled that the
inadequate contract price received by the
Security Agency from the Petitioner is
irrelevant because the Security Agency is
expected to have known the labor laws
and the correct compensation it should
have demanded for its services.
The Security Agency may not seek
exculpation by claiming that petitioner’s
payments to it were inadequate. As an
employer, it is charged with knowledge
of labor laws and the adequacy of the
compensation that it demands for
contractual services is its principal
concern and not any other’s.
The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment under review, without
prejudice to petitioner’s right to seek
reimbursement from Calmar Security
Agency for such amounts as petitioner
may have to pay to complainants.
Costs against the private respondent.
3. Penal Statutes: strictly against the State; liberally in
favor of the accused
CASES:
Pp. vs. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684
1.) WoN a justice of peace is included in the
prohibition of Sec. 54 of the Revised Election
Code?
a.) YES. A justice of the peace is included
in the prohibition of Sec. 54 of the Revised
Election Code. The maxim casus omisus
can operate and apply only if and when the
omission has been clearly established.
In this case, it has already been
shown that the legislature did not
exclude or omit justices of the
peace from the enumeration of
officers precluded from engaging in
partisan political activities. Rather,
they were just called “judges.”
When a statute appears upon its face to
limit the operation of its provision to
particular persons or things by
enumerating them, but no reason exists
 why other persons or things not so
enumerated should not have been
included and manifest injustice will
follow by not including them, the
omission must not have been intended.
Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197
1.) WoN Solicitation for religious purposes
without securing permit from the Dept. of Social
Services (DSWD) violates P.D. No. 1564, making
it a criminal offense for a person to solicit or
receive contributions for charitable or public
welfare purposes?
a.) No. Charitable and religious specifically
enumerated only goes to show that the framers
of the law in question never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its
coverage.
The 1987 Constitution and other statutes
treat the words “charitable” and “religious”
separately and independently of each other.
P.D. 1564, it merely stated “charitable or
public welfare purposes” which means that it
was not the intention of the framers of the
law to include solicitations for religious
purposes. The world “religious purpose” is
not interchangeable with the expression
“charitable purpose”.
4. Tax Laws
-Are to be construed LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE
TAX PAYER, STRONGLY AGAINST THE TAXING
AUTHORITY
a) Those imposing taxes and custom duties
- a tax cannot be imposed without clear and
express words for that purpose.
- provisions of a taxing act are not to be
extended by implication
b) Those granting exemptions
- exemptions from taxation are highly disfavored
in law
- “taxation is the rule, and tax exemption is the
exception”
- The one who claims an exemption from his or
its share of the common burden in taxation must
justify his or its claim by showing that the
legislature intended to exempt him by words
was too plain to be mistaken.
c.) Refund on taxes
- a claim of refund is strictly construed against
the claimant
- a claim for tax refunds or the issuance of tax
credits partakes of the nature of an exemption,
which cannot be allowed unless granted in the
most explicit and categorical language
5. Civil Law
-STRICTLY NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT, UNLESS
THE CONTRARY IS PROVIDED
a) Family Law
b) Wills and Succession
c) Obligations and Contracts (Read Art. 1370-
1379, NCC)
CHAPTER 5
Interpretation of Contracts
ARTICLE 1370. If the terms of a contract are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident
intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail
over the former. (1281)
ARTICLE 1371. In order to judge the intention
of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered. (1282)
ARTICLE 1372. However general the terms of a
contract may be, they shall not be understood to
comprehend things that are distinct and cases
that are different from those upon which the
parties intended to agree. (1283)
ARTICLE 1373. If some stipulation of any
contract should admit of several meanings, it
shall be understood as bearing that import
which is most adequate to render it effectual.
(1284)
ARTICLE 1374. The various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together, attributing
to the doubtful ones that sense which may
result from all of them taken jointly. (1285)
ARTICLE 1375. Words which may have
different significations shall be understood in
that which is most in keeping with the nature
and object of the contract. (1286)
ARTICLE 1376. The usage or custom of the
place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation
of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the
omission of stipulations which are ordinarily
established. (1287)
ARTICLE 1377. The interpretation of obscure
words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor
the party who caused the obscurity. (1288)
ARTICLE 1378. When it is absolutely
impossible to settle doubts by the rules
established in the preceding articles, and the
doubts refer to incidental circumstances of a
gratuitous contract, the least transmission of
rights and interests shall prevail. If the contract
is onerous, the doubt shall be settled in favor of
the greatest reciprocity of interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object
of the contract in such a way that it cannot be
known what may have been the intention or will
of the parties, the contract shall be null and
void. (1289)
ARTICLE 1379. The principles of interpretation
stated in Rule 123 of the Rules of Court shall
likewise be observed in the construction of
contracts. (n)
IV. AIDS IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. Public Policy sought to be implemented
CASES:
Tinio vs. Francis, 98 Phil. 32 (1955)
1.) WoN the conveyances are valid under Sec. 20 of
the Public Land Act?
a.) NO. Order for the issuance of patent is the same
in effect as the issuance of the patent itself. And if
the law (Sec. 118, CA 114) prohibits the sale of a
homestead after the issuance of a patent, the
prohibition should be extended, in view of the
apparent policy of the law which is to conserve the
land which a homestead has acquired under the
Public Land Act to the date on which the order of the
issuance of the patent is issued, which in this case is
1943.
Policy of the law – to conserve the land of
the homesteader
“xxx not be subject to encumbrance/ alienation
from the date of the approval of the application
and for a term of 5 years from and after the date
of the issuance of the patent or grant:
- from the ORDER for the issuance of
patent
- if literal interpretation is to be used,
policy will be defeated
Cajiuat vs. Mathay, 124 SCRA 710 (1983)
1.) WoN the petitioners are exempted from receiving
double pension under P.D. No. 4?
a.) No, this is so because to assume otherwise would
not only be an act of "over-liberality" on the part of
the State but likewise inconsistent with its policy
against double pension or gratuity for the same
service." It is similarly obvious that the retirement
benefits he was found to be entitled to receive were
in consideration of the same services to the
government.
The rule in construing or applying pension and
gratuity laws is that, in the absence of express
provisions to the contrary, they will be so
interpreted as to prevent any person from
receiving double compensation."

Policy – against double pensions for the
same services
A law which grants retirable employees certain
gratuity “in addition to other benefits which they
are entitled under existing laws” CANNOT be
construed as to authorize the grant of
double gratuity
“other benefits” may be:
- Refund on Contributions
- Payment of the money value of
accumulated vacation and sick leaves
B. Presumptions
1. Of Constitutionality/Validity of Statutes
- In the absence of evidence demonstrating the
alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in
question, there is no basis for its nullification in
view of the presumption of validity which every law
has in its favor.
- [GR] Statutes are presumed to be valid
-[EX] If it clearly appears that the statute violates
the fundamental law (Constitution)
CASES:
NHA vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245 (1983) 
SUPERSEDED by EPZA v. Dulay, G.R. No. L-
59603, April 29, 198
Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)
2. Of the Beneficial Operation of Statutes
CASES:
CIR vs. S.C. Johnson and Sons, Inc., 309 SCRA
87 (1999)
Sesbreno vs. CBAA, 270 SCRA 360 (1997)
3. Of Prospective Application
CASES:
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 317
(1997)
Grego vs. COMELEC, 274 SCRA 481 (1997)
4. In favor of right and justice
CASE: Salvacion vs. Central Bank, 278 SCRA 27
(1997)
5. Against Absurdity
- Statutes must receive a sensible construction
such as will give effect to the legislative intention
so as to avoid an unjust and absurd conclusion.
- Presumptions against undesirable consequences
were never intended by a legislative measure.
CASE: Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 (1974)
6. Against Injustice
- The law should never be interpreted in such a
way as to cause injustice as this never lies within
the legislative intent.
- Judges do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and
consequence.
- ART 10, CC; “In case of doubt in the
interpretation and application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right
and justice to prevail.”
CASES:
Amatan vs. Aujero, 248 SCRA 511 (1995)
Ursua vs. CA, 256 SCRA 147 (1996)
7. Against Implied Repeals
- In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent
law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exists in terms of the new and old
laws.
- REQUISITES:
a. Statutes must touch the same subject
matter; and
b. There is irreconcilable inconsistency
and repugnancy between the statutes.
CASES:
NPC vs. Province of Lanao del Sur, 264 SCRA
271 (1996)
Velunta vs. Chief, Philippine Constabulary, 157
SCRA 147 (1988)
C. Intrinsic Aids
- The term “intrinsic” means internal or within. Intrinsic
aids, therefore, are those aids within the statute.
- Intrinsic aids are resorted to only if there is
ambiguity.
- In resorting to intrinsic aids, one must go back to
the parts of the statute: the title, the preamble,
context or body, chapter and section headings,
punctuation, and interpretation.
1. Title
- The title of a statute serves as aid, in case of doubt
in the language, to its construction and to
ascertaining legislative will.
- The title may indicate the legislative intent to
extend or restrict the scope of law, and a statute
couched in a language of doubtful import will be
construed to conform to the legislative intent as
disclosed in its title.
CASES:
City of Baguio vs. Marcos, 27 SCRA 342 (1969) 
[Compare with Director of Lands vs. Abaja, infra]
Ebarle vs. Sucaldito, 156 SCRA 803 (1987)
2. Preamble
- A preamble is that part of the statute written
immediately after its title, which states the
purpose, reason or justification for the enactment
of law.
- It is usually expressed in the form of “Whereas”
clauses.
- Preamble used as a guide in determining the
intent of the lawmaker.
- The intent of the law as culled from its preamble
and from the situation, circumstances and
conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced.
CASES:
Pp. vs. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542 (1978)
Pp. vs. Echavez, 95 SCRA 663 (1980)
3. Body of the statute
- Legislative intent should accordingly be
ascertained from a consideration of the whole
context of the statute and not from an isolated
part or particular provision.
a. Context of the whole text
- The context may circumscribe the meaning of
a statute; it may give to a word or phrase a
meaning different from its usual or ordinary
signification. In such a case, the meaning
dictated by the context prevails.
CASE: CIR vs. TMX Sales, Inc., 205 SCRA
184 (1992)
b. Punctuation marks
- Punctuations such as a comma, a semi-colon,
and a period are grammatical marks. It is a rule
of legal hermeneutics that punctuation marks
are aids of low degree and can never control
against the intelligible meaning of written
words.
CASES:
Agcaoili vs. Sunguitan, 48 Phil 678 (1926)
Pp. vs. Subido, 66 SCRA 545 (1975)
4. Head notes and epigraphs of sections
- An explanatory note is a short exposition or
explanation accompanying a proposed legislation by
its author or proponent.
- It contains statements of the reason or purpose
of the bill, as well as argument advanced by its
author in arguing its passage.
- When there is ambiguity in a statute or where a
statute is susceptible of more than one
interpretation, courts may resort to the
explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and
 ascertain the purpose or intent of the statute. The
statute may then be so construed as to give effect
to the purpose or intent as disclosed in its
explanatory note.
CASE: Pp. vs. Yabut, 58 Phil. 499 (1933)
D. Extrinsic Aids
- These are existing aids from outside sources,
meaning outside of the four corners of the statute.
- If there is any doubt as to the meaning of the
statute, the interpreter must first find that out
within the statute.
- Extrinsic aids therefore are resorted to after
exhausting all the available intrinsic aids and still
there remain some ambiguity in the statute
- Courts may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body to assist in
determining the construction of a statute of
doubtful meaning.
- They may resort to the legislative deliberation
in the legislature on a bill which eventually was
enacted into law to ascertain the meaning of its
provisions.
- Thus, where there is doubt as to what
provision of a statute means, that meaning
which was put to the provision during the
legislative deliberation or discussion on the
bill may be adopted.
CASES:
Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125
(1920)

Phil. Assn. of Gov’t Retirees, Inc. vs. GSIS,

Extrinsic Aid Matrix 121 Phil 1402 (1965)
Kind Value Reason Case
Disini v, Secretary, G.R. No. 203335,
Legislative History Great Best means Celestial
February 18, 2014 (re provision on cybersex)
(antecedents of the weight to ascertain Nickel v.
statute) legislative MicroAsia f. Changes in the phraseology before final
intent (G.R. No. approval
169080) CASE: CIR vs. CTA, 224 SCRA 665 (1993)
Executive Great Expertise and Cemco
g. Amendment by deletion
Construction respect experience Holdings v. CASES:
(by administrative National Life Gloria vs. CA, 306 SCRA 287 (1999)
bodies) Buenaseda v. Flavier, supra
Contemporary Strongest in Made by three branches of
Circumstances law gov’t h. Prior laws from which the statute is based
(conditions during CASES:
enactment) Director of Lands vs. Abaja, 63 Phil 559
(1936)  [Compare with City of Baguio vs.
Policy of law Great It embodies Tinio v. Marcos]
(what the law weight legislative Frances (G.R. Salaysay vs. Castro, 98 Phil 364 (1956)
encourages) intent No. 171815)
Judicial Construction Great Part of Legal Tung Chin i. Origin of Adopted Statute
(stare decisis) CASE: Pp. vs. Pagpaguitan, 315 SCRA 226
weight System (Art. Hui v.
(1999)
4, New Civil Rodriguez
Code) (G.R. No. (1) Limitations
137571) CASE: Procter & Gamble vs.
Legislative Respectful But cannot Endencia v. Commissioner of Customs, 23 SCRA
691 (1968)
Interpretation consideratio prevail over David (93
(prescribes rules of n court’s Phil. 696) j. Legislative history to determine intent
construction) prerogative - It is a well-settled rule of statutory
to decide construction that where a statute is
Dictionaries Great Use of Estrada v. susceptible of several interpretations or
(List of words with their weight definition is Sandiganbayan where there is ambiguity in its language, there
meanings) presumed (G.R. No.
is no better means of ascertaining the will
148560)
and intention of the legislature than that
Foreign Decisions Great Adoption of People v.
which is afforded by the history of the
(Construction by foreign weight foreign Pagpaguitan
courts) statute.
decisions is (315 SCRA CASE: Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738,
presumed 226) March 2, 2001

2. Contemporary Construction
1. Legislative History a. Executive Construction
- It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction - The opinions and rulings of officials of the
that where a statute is susceptible of several government called upon to execute or
interpretations or where there is ambiguity in its implement administrative laws command
language, there is no better means of ascertaining much respect and weight.
the will and intention of the legislature than that - An interpretation embodied in a circular,
which is afforded by the history of the statute. directive or regulation is an expressed
- Generally speaking, the history of a statute interpretation.
refers to all its antecedents from its inception
until its enactment into law. (1) Kinds
- Its history proper covers the period and the steps a) construction by an
executive/administrative officer called
done from the time the bill is introduced until it is to implement the law
finally passed by the legislature. CASE: San Miguel Corp. vs.
Inciong, 103 SCRA 139 (1981)
a. President’s message to the Legislature
CASE: Camacho vs. CIR, 80 Phil 848 (1948) b) by the DOJ Secretary in his capacity
as Chief legal adviser of the
b. Explanatory Note of the author/s government (See Sec. 83, RAC)
CASE: Nepomuceno vs. Ocampo, 95 Phil CASE: Maceda vs. Macaraeg, 197
292 (1954) SCRA 771 (1991)

c. Committee Reports on the legislative c) by an executive officer exercising

investigations and public hearings quasi-judicial function

d. Sponsorship Speech (2) Weight: entitled to great weight

CASES:
e. Debates and Deliberations
 Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. CA, 203 Filoteo vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA
SCRA 504 (1991) 222 (1996)
Phil. Sugar Central vs. Collector of
Customs, 51 Phil 143 (1927) b. Aids
(1) Intrinsic Aids
(3) erroneous construction: does not bind the a) Language of the constitution itself
courts; does not preclude judicial b) Interpret Constitution as whole
correction nor create rights; exception CASES: Tolentino vs. Secretary,
CASES: supra (construction of Sec. 24, Art.
Legaspi vs. Executive Secretary, 68 VI, Constitution)
SCRA 253 (1975) (2) Extrinsic Aids
ABS-CBN vs. CTA, 108 SCRA 142 (1981) a) History or realities at the time of the
adoption
b. Legislative Interpretation b) Object sought to be accomplished
CASE: Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil 696 c) Proceedings/debates of the
(1953) Convention
CASES:
3. Stare decisis Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR,
- The legal maxim which requires the past decisions of 192 SCRA 51 (1990)
the court be followed in the adjudication of cases is Montejo vs. COMELEC, 242 SCRA
known as stare decisis et non quieta movere. 415 (1995)
- It means one should follow past precedents and d) Changes in the phraseology
should not disturb what has been settled. CASE: Galman vs. Pamaran, 138
- The rule rests on the desirability of having stability in SCRA 294 (1985)
the law. e) Previous laws and judicial decisions
CASE: Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil
CASES: 567 (1950), dissent of J. Ozaeta
Pines City Educational Center vs. NLRC, 227 f) Consequences of alternative (more
SCRA 655 (1993) than one) constructions
Pp. vs. Macadaeg, 91 Phil 410 (1952) CASE: Marcelino vs. Cruz, supra
g) Contemporaneous construction and
a. Ratio decidendi vs. obiter dictum writings
CASE: Delta Motors vs. CA, 276 SCRA 212 CASES:
(1997) De Los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil
289 (1950)
b. Limitations of stare decisis Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil 192 (1946)
CASE: Koppel (Phils.), Inc. vs. Yatco, 77 Phil
496 (1946)

V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
A. Primary purpose: to ascertain the intent or purpose of the
framers
CASES:
JM Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413 (1970)
Co vs. Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)

B. Rules of Constitutional Construction

1. Apply rules of Statutory Construction
CASE: Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987)

2. If no ambiguity: Verba legis

a. Give ordinary meaning to the words
CASES:
Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)
Ordillo vs. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1992)

(1) Exception: where technical terms are

employed

b. Words are used in a broad sense to cover all

possible contingencies

3. If ambiguity exists
a. Rules
(1) Ratio Legis Est Anima: Consider intent of
the framers/object to be accomplished
CASES:
Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance, 115
SCRA 418 (1982)
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive
Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

(2) ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe

the constitution as a whole
CASE: Datu Michael Abas Kida vs.
Senate of the Phils., G.R. No. 196271,
October 18, 2011

(3) Self-executing rather than needs an

implementing statute
CASE: Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS,
267 SCRA 408 (1997)

(4) Mandatory rather than directory

CASE: Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51
(1983)

(5) Prospective rather than retroactive

CASES:
Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil
285 (1945)