65.

MANONGSONG VS ESTIMO

Spouses Guevarra had 6 children. The property contested is the parcel of land in San Jose St., Las Pinas, Metro
Manila with an area of 152 sq. m. It is NOT registered under the Torrens System. The Tax Declaration was
registered in the Office of Municipal Assessor described the boundaries of the property registered in the name of
Benigna Lopez, but the IMPROVEMENTS were separately declared in the name of Filomena Estimo.

Petitioners alleged that they are owners pro-indiviso. Invoking Art 494 CC, they prayed for PARTITION and to
award an area of 1/5 of the property to them. They alleged Guevarra as the original owner and upon his death,
her children inherited the property. Each of the 5 children (including Vicente, father of Manongsong). As Vicente’s
sole surviving heir, she claims 1/5 of the property by RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION.

The respondents (surviving spouses of Guevarra) were in possession of the property for as long as they can
remember. The area occupied by each family differed from 25-50 sqm. Petitioners are the only descendants not
occupying the lot.

A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT was entered into by most respondents (Ortiz and Dela Cruz). They agreed that
each group of heirs would receive an equal share in the property; that those who exceeded 1/5 portion must be
reduced so that those who have less and none shall get correct portions.

Jumaquio sisters and Lopez did not sign the compromise. BUT only Jumaquio sisters contended that –
 Navarro (mother of Guevarra SOLD THE PROPERTY to Guevarra’s daughter Enriquieta Jumaquio
 presented a tax declaration stating that the houses of Lopezes stood only as ―improvements‖
 presented a notarized Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa stating that Justina Navarro sold to Enriquieta the lot
for P250
 they were in possession for more than 30 years (invoked acquisitive prescription and petitioners were
barred by laches (should have been filed while Vicente was alive or by Manongsong when he reached
legal age as he is now 33 years old)

RTC decision: FAVORED PETITIONERS. Kasulatan was void, even if validity was not opposed. It was a
conjugal property, it was not proven that it was paraphernal. The name of Justina’s husband was not mentioned
and/or stated that he was still alive. Agatona (compulsory heir) should have the legal right to participate with
distribution to the legitime.
Compulsory heirs cannot be deprived of their legitime except on cases expressly specified by law (ig,
disinheritance for a cause).

CA decision: AFFIRMED THE KASULATAN. Jumaquio sisters appealed and presented a supposed photocopy
of the death certificate of Guevarra stating that her mother was Juliana Gallardo, to certify, an affidavit was
attached signed by a certain Dela Cruz attesting that although he did not know Justina personally, he had lived
with Agatona Guevarra after marriage with Rosario. Manongsong opposed the genuiness and authenticity of the
Kasulatan.
CA said Jumaquio sisters cannot formally offer them as evidence as they had admitted before RTC that
Justina Navarro and not Juliana Gallardo was the original owner.
CA held that RTC erred in assuming that property was conjugal because it was not proven that it was acquired
during marriage (proof as condition sine qua non for presumption to apply). Further, property was declared for
taxation purposes under name of Justina.

ISSUE: WON petitioners were able to prove that Manongsong is a co-owner of the property and is entitled
to demand partition

SC: once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant
to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is
offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Petitioners have the burden to prove that –
1. Manongsong was a co-owner or co-heir by inheritance
2. Vicente inherited from Guevarra 1/5 interest

Both presented tax declarations and testimonies. However, Jumaquio sisters presented a notarized Kasulatan
which controverted the claim.

Kasulatan is valid
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and prima
facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized
document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.

Even if it was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document and thus still presumed to be authentic.
The Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any
alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine.

Not conjugal property

As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only
when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage.

Sale in the Kasulatan did not deprive CHs of their legitime

As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does
not diminish the estate of the seller. There is merely a substitution of values = property sold is replaced by the
equivalent monetary consideration.

No error in not admitting the documents presented by Jumaquios belatedly presented

Presented for the first time on appeal – contrary to due process, deprives respondents of opportunity to examine
and controvert.

But even if these were admitted, they would not controvert Navarro’s ownership because the birth certificate only
casted DOUBT as to WON Navarro was indeed Guevarra’s mother. Petitioners contrary admission constitutes an
IMPERMISSIBLE CHANGE OF THEORY.

Absent any hereditary relationship between Navarro and Guevarra, property would not have passed from N to G,
and then to G’s children including petitioner’s by succession.

The Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of
evidence that property belonged to Guevarra’s estate.

66. SPOUSES JOAQUIN VS CA and SPS. LEONARDO JOAQUIN

Sps. Joaquin are parents of parents and defendants (joined by spouses) all surnamed Joaquin. Defendants seek
to declare null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by defendant in favor of co-
defendant children.
1. 4 Deeds of Sale of lots in a subdivision plan
2. 3 Deeds of Absolute Sale of Real Property in same subdivision plan
They alleged that the deeds of sale are null and void ab ignition because –
1. There was no actual valid consideration for deeds of sale
2. Assuming there was consideration, the properties are more than 3x more valuable than the measly sums
appearing
3. Deeds do not reflect the true intent of parties
 4. Purported sale of properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy to deprive CHs of their
legitime

Defendants aver that –

1. Plaintiffs do not have a cause of action and standing
2. Sales were with sufficient consideration, made in good faith
3. CTs were issued with sufficient factual and legal basis

RTC Ruling: Testimony of defendants, particularly that of the father, will show that the Deeds were all executed
for valuable consideration. Further, in determining the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the
testator shall be considered (Art 908, NCC). Thus, computed as of the time of death of the decedent.

CA decision: AFFIRMED RTC. No question that plaintiffs are CHs. However, their right to the properties is
merely inchoate and vests only upon the latter’s death. While still alive, defendant parents are free to dispose of
their properties, provided that such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.

They cannot be considered as real parties in interest to assail due to gross inadequacy or lack of consideration or
for failure to express the true intent of parties. They have no legal capacity to challenge the validity.

SC:
On the issue of legal interest
In their Complaint, petitioners asserted that the "purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a
deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs of their legitime." Petitioners’
strategy was to have the Deeds of Sale declared void so that ownership of the lots would eventually revert to their
parents.

It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale, but they
have failed to show any legal right to the properties.
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST – party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment

In annulment actions, the RPs are those who are parties to the agreement or are either bound principally or
subsidiarily. These are parties with a present substantial interest versus a mere expectancy or future, contingent
interest.
PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST – such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle
him to recover if evidence is sufficient, or that he has legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected in a
payment to or recovery by him.
Petitioner do NOT have legal interest, their rights are merely inchoate. While sale reduced the estate, the cash of
equivalent value replaced the lots taken from the estate.

WON Deeds of sale are void for lack of consideration - NO

If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of
payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the
contract of sale is valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price,
because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void (1471 CC).

Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the
performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration (right to demand) is different from lack of
consideration (prevents existence).

To prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdoz’s testimony stating that their father, respondent
Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he would transfer a lot to her through a deed of sale without need for her payment
of the purchase price (not credible). ON THE OTHER HAND, the Deeds of Sale which petitioners presented as
evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did respondents’ minds meet as to the purchase price,
but the real price was also stated in the Deeds of Sale.
Price is NOT grossly inadequate
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract, unless
there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence.
Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does NOT affect a contract of sale, except as may indicate a defect in the
consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract.

Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject matter of sale.

Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts
operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been
defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable
judgment, and lose money by them – indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law
intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of the law, the commission of what the law
knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it.

In the instant case, the RTC found that the lots were sold for a valid consideration, and that the children actually
paid the purchase price stipulated in their respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by
the buyer to the seller is a factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.

67. RAYMUNDO VS VDA. DE SUAREZ, ET AL

Marcelo and Teofista Suarez spouses married blessed with material abundance. They were governed by conjugal
partnership of gains regime and acquires numerous properties located in Pasig.

After death of Marcelo, Teofista Vda de Suarez et al executed an extrajudicial settlement to partition the
estate. HOWEVER, despite the partition, title remained in the couple’s name. Teofista continued to manage and
administer. Apart from those owned exclusively by her, all properties were held PRO INDIVISO by her and her
children – Teofista as the de facto administrator.

Rizal Realty and Teofista (owning 90%) were sued by petitioners for RESCISSION OF CONTRACT AND
DAMAGES. CFI rescinded the contracts and properties were levied and sold, a final Deed of Sale was issued.

RTC: Before the lapse of 1 year period of redemption, respondents filed to ANNUL the auction sale, alleging that
they cannot be held liable for the judgment against their mother as they were not impleaded. But the court
directed them to vacate the properties, place petitioners in peaceful possession and surrender the owners
duplicate copy of TT. Denied respondents.

Before CA: DISMISSED TEOFISTA’S APPEAL for 2 reasons –

1. No exercise in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
2. As far as Suarez is concerned, she cannot complain about the levy because she was a party. She did not
rd
appeal. As to the children, they should have filed a 3 party complaint
The moment levy was made on the parcels of land, which they claim are theirs by virtue of hereditary succession,
they should have seasonably filed such claim to protect their rights. As the record discloses, however, the children
chose to remain silent, and even allowed the auction sale to be held.

IN ANOTHER CIVIL CASE – preliminary injunction enjoining petitioners from transferring of levied properties.
This was dismissed but dismissal was lifted.
DECISION favored petitioners.
As successors-in-interest of Teofista Suarez, private respondents merely stepped into the shoes of their mother in
regard to the levied pieces of property. Verily, there is identity of parties, not only where the parties in both actions
are the same, but where there is privity with them as in the cases of successors-in-interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or where there is substantial identity.
SC DECISION: REVERSED CA.
It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and the manner of publicly
selling en masse the subject properties for auction. Only ½ of the 5 parcels should have been the subject of the
auction sale.

777 CC provide that rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of decedent.

888 CC provides that the legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of ½ of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother.

892 (2) provides that "If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be
entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."

Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.

The proprietary interest of petitioners [herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned property is different
from and adverse to that of their mother [Teofista]. Petitioners [herein respondents] became co-owners of
the property not because of their mother [Teofista] but through their own right as children of their
deceased father [Marcelo Sr.]. Therefore, petitioners [herein respondents] are not barred in any way from
instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its Resolution of
August 28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to
determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.

It was at this point when another series of events transpired, culminating in the present petition.

Upon our reinstatement of Civil Case No. 51203, each and every pleading filed by herein respondents, as
plaintiffs therein, was hotly contested and opposed by therein defendants, including petitioner Valente. Moreover,
even at that stage, when the case had been remanded with a directive to "determine that portion which belongs to
[herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion," Civil Case No. 51203 had to be re-raffled
and transferred, for varied reasons, to the different court branches in Pasig City. In between all these, petitioner
Valente, along with the other defendants, repeatedly filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 for the
purported failure of herein respondents to prosecute the case. Most of these Motions to Dismiss were denied.

With each transfer of Civil Case No. 51203, the judge to which the case was raffled had to study the records
anew. Expectedly, part of the records went missing and were lost. On April 12, 1993, the Clerk of Court of RTC,
Branch 71, to which Civil Case No. 51203 was remanded, filed a report on the records of the case, to wit:

1. The first volume of the record in the above-entitled case was recorded as received on June 20, 1990,
by Sheriff Alejandro O. Loquinario;

2. That the staff of Branch 71 at this time was sharing a small room with Branch 161 at the First Floor of
the Justice Hall, and as the Branch was newly formed, it had no equipment or furniture of its own, and
was still undermanned;

3. That sometime in August 1990, Branch 71 moved to the staffroom of Branch 159 at the Second Floor
of the Justice Hall;
 4. That on October 25, 1990, this Court received a Notice of Judgment dated October 22, 1990 from the
Court of Appeals that ruled the dismissal of the above-entitled case, and as per standing instructions of
Judge Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall, the same was bound as volume 2 of the case;

5. That just before the Christmas vacation in 1991, the branch was forced to hastily move all of its records
and equipment to branch 69, because of the unexpected notice we received that the room we were
occupying was to be demolished in order to meet the schedule for the renovation of the building;

6. That unfortunately, the room was demolished before the undersigned could make a last check to see if
everything was transferred;

7. That it was only later on that this office discovered that important documents were indeed lost,
including transcripts of stenographic notes in a case that was submitted for decision;

8. That sometime in May 1992, the branch moved its Office to its present location;

9. That on March 8, 1993, this Court received a copy of a Decision of the Supreme Court reversing the
earlier ruling of the Court of Appeals;

10. That it was at this time that the first volume of this case, which was bundled along with other cases
which were decided and/or archived, was reported as missing;

11. That from the time the same was found to be missing, Judge Claravall ordered that a search for the
same be made in all of the offices wherein this branch was forced to share a room with, as well as the
Court of Appeals, in the event that the same was transmitted to said Court;

12. That all the efforts were in vain, as said record could not be located anywhere;

13. That the undersigned now concludes that the first volume of the above-entitled case was probably lost
during the renovation of the Justice Hall Building, and will have to be reconstituted with the use of
documents in the possession of the parties, or documents entered as exhibits in other Courts. 14

In this regard, herein respondents filed a Motion for Reconstitution of Records15 of the case. Initially, petitioner
Valente, and the other defendants -- Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion -- opposed the motion.16 However,
the trial court eventually granted the motion for reconstitution, and ordered petitioner Valente and the other
defendants to submit a copy of their Answer filed thereat and copies of other pleadings pertinent to the case. 17

Thereafter, three (3) incidents, among numerous others, set off by the parties' pleadings, are worth mentioning, to
wit:

18
1. A Motion for Leave to File and Admit Supplemental Complaint filed by herein respondents. The Supplemental
Complaint additionally prayed that the levy and sale at public auction of the subject properties be annulled and set
aside, as the bid price was unconscionable and grossly inadequate to the current value of the subject properties.
The Supplemental Complaint further sought a re-bidding with respect to Teofista's share in the subject properties.
Finally, it prayed that TCT No. 6509 in the name of petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion be
cancelled and TCT No. 30680 in the name of Marcelo Suarez, married to Teofista Isagon, be reinstated.

2. A Manifestation and Motion (to Execute/Enforce Decision dated September 4, 1992 of the Supreme
19
Court) filed by herein respondents pointing out that the Supreme Court itself had noted the current increased
value of the subject properties and that petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion unjustly
enriched themselves in appropriating the subject properties worth millions then, for a measly bid price
of P94,170.00, for a judgment obligation worth only P70,000.00.
3. An Urgent Motion [to direct compliance by plaintiffs (herein respondents) with Supreme Court Decision or to
consider the matter submitted without evidence on the part of plaintiffs]20 filed by therein defendants, including
herein petitioner Valente, pointing out that plaintiffs (herein respondents) have yet to comply with the RTC, Branch
67 Order commanding them to submit (to the RTC) any evidence showing settlement of the estate of the
deceased Marcelo Suarez, in order for the court to determine the portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista.
The Urgent Motion stated in paragraph 2, thus:

2. The defendants [including herein petitioner Valente] did everything possible to expedite the disposition
of this case while the plaintiffs [herein respondents] did everything possible to DELAY the disposition of
the same obviously because the plaintiffs [herein respondents] are in full possession and enjoyment of
the property in dispute. In its decision of September 4, 1992, the SUPREME COURT nullified TWO final
and executory DECISIONS of the Court of Appeals in an unprecedented action. In said decision, the
Supreme Court ordered the plaintiffs [herein respondents] to establish with evidence their personality as
heirs of Marcelo Suarez, and after being able to do so, to adduce evidence that would determine what
portion belongs to plaintiffs hence the above matters need be litigated upon before the RTC can "annul
the sale with regard to said portion" (belonging to the plaintiffs alleged heirs).

On these incidents, the records reveal the following Orders issued by the different branches of the RTC:

1. Order dated March 17, 1995, issued by Presiding Judge Rodrigo B. Lorenzo of Branch 266, Pasig City,
admitting herein respondents' Supplemental Complaint.21

2. Order dated January 22, 1996, issued by Judge Apolinario B. Santos resolving: (a) herein respondents'
Manifestation and Motion (to execute/enforce Decision dated September 4, 1992 of the Supreme Court), and (b)
therein defendants' (including herein petitioner Valente's) Request for Answer to Written Interrogatories. 22 The
RTC, Branch 67, resolved the incidents, thus:

From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, this Court is convinced beyond a shadow of doubt that the
Decision of the Supreme Court of September 4, 1992, being the final arbiter in any judicial dispute, should
be implemented for the following reasons:

xxxx

On the request for Answers to Written Interrogatories filed by the defendants, it is obvious that at this
stage of the proceedings where the Supreme Court had already pronounced the undisputed facts, which
binds this court, the answer sought to be elicited through written interrogatories, therefore, are entirely
irrelevant, aside from having been filed way out of time.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court, implements the decision of the Supreme Court dated
September 4, 1992 which mandates that:

"xxx and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to
petitioner and to annul the sale with regard to said portion."

In order to enforce such mandate of the Supreme Court, this court orders that:

a. The auction sale of the five (5) parcels of land and all prior and subsequent proceedings in
relation thereto are declared null and void.

b. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6509 in the name of defendant Valente Raymundo is also
declared null and void, and the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Pasig City, is ordered to issue a new
one in the name of the deceased Marcelo Suarez or to reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No.
30680 in the name of Marcelo Suarez.
 c. Teofista Suarez is ordered to reimburse the amount of P94,170.00, plus legal interest from the
date of issuance of this order, and failing which, the portion of the estate of Marcelo Suarez
belonging to the surviving spouse, Teofista Suarez, may be levied on execution.

d. [Herein respondents], including Teofista Suarez, are hereby ordered to submit to this court any
evidence showing settlement of the estate of the deceased, Marcelo Suarez, in order for this
court to determine the portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista Suarez.

Therein defendants, including petitioner Valente, filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the trial court denied on
May 29, 1996.

3. Order dated September 10, 1996, issued by Judge Santos denying the appeal interposed by petitioner Valente
from the January 22, 1996 and May 29, 1996 Orders, ruling that these are interlocutory orders, and, therefore, not
23
appealable.

4. Order dated April 8, 1999, issued by Pairing Judge Santiago Estrella which declared, thus:

Considering that counsel for the plaintiffs does not have the birth certificates of the heirs of the plaintiff to prove
their affiliation with the deceased which is one of the matters written in the decision of the higher court which must
be complied with, and in order for counsel for the plaintiffs [herein respondents] to have the opportunity to
complete all documentary evidence and in view of abbreviating the proceedings and as prayed for, today's
scheduled pre-trial is re-set for the last time to May 19, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.

In this connection, counsel for plaintiffs [herein respondents] is advised to secure all the documentary
evidence she needs material to this case which will expedite the disposition of this case. 24

This last Order and therein defendants' Urgent Motion spawned another contentious issue between the parties. In
this connection, Judge Estrella issued an Order25 requiring the parties to file their respective position papers due
to the "divergent views on the nature of the hearing that should be conducted in compliance with" our decision in
Suarez. Both parties duly filed their position papers, with herein respondents attaching thereto a copy of the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate executed by the heirs of Marcelo Suarez in 1957.

In resolving this latest crossfire between the parties, the RTC, Branch 67, issued an Order dated January 11,
2000, which reads, in part:

This Court is of the view that the Honorable Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, precisely it directed that
the records of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.

xxxx

It is a matter of record that there was no trial on the merits completed in the Regional Trial Court. xxx The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of Civil
Case No. 51203. Naturally, there was no trial on the merits before this Court that allowed the parties to
adduce evidence to establish their respective claims in the plaintiffs' [herein respondents] complaint and
in the defendants' [including petitioner Valente] counter-claim, respectively. It is in this context that the
Honorable Supreme Court reinstated the "action [of herein respondents] to annul the auction sale to
protect their [herein respondents] own interest.

While this Court is of the view that trial on the merits is necessary for the purpose of giving the plaintiffs
[herein respondents] a chance to adduce evidence to sustain their complaint and the defendants
[including petitioner Valente] to prove their defense, consistent with the directive of the Honorable
Supreme Court (in its Decision promulgated on September 4, 1992), the Court is, however, confronted
 with the very recent decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in "Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay, et al. vs. Del
Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999" where it held that -

The declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an

independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solve vs. Court of Appeals (182 SCRA
119, 128). The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special
proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In as much as the leading case on the matter is that of "Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, G.R. No.
124320, March 2, 1999" it is left with no choice but to obey said latter doctrine.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, this Court holds that in the light of the doctrine laid
down in the case of "Heirs of Yaptinchay vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999" this case is
dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs' [herein respondents'] filing a special proceeding consistent
with said latest ruling.26

Herein respondents moved for reconsideration thereof which, however, was denied by the RTC, Branch 67 on
March 14, 2000.27

Consequently, herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion in
the trial court's order dismissing Civil Case No. 51203 without prejudice. All the defendants in the trial court were
impleaded as private respondents in the petition. Yet, curiously, only petitioner Valente filed a Comment thereto.
The appellate court granted the petition, recalled and set aside RTC, Branch 67's Orders dated January 11, 2000
and March 14, 2000, and reinstated Judge Santos' Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996. It
disposed of the petition, thus:

We agree with [herein respondents].

On September 4, 1992, the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 94918) reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and mandates that Civil Case No. 51203 be reinstated in order to determine the portion in the
estate which belongs to Teofista Suarez. The sale of the parcels of land was declared null and void.
Necessarily, the title (TCT No. 5809) in the name of respondents was also declared null and void. xxx

xxxx

Hon. Apolinario Santos of Br. 67, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, on January 22, 1996 and on motion of
[herein respondents], issued an order to execute/enforce the decision of the Supreme Court xxx.

xxxx

[Petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion] filed a notice of appeal on the order of Judge
Santos. The appeal, on motion of [herein respondents] was denied on September 10, 1996. Obviously,
the decision of the Supreme Court had become final and executory. Likewise, both orders of Judge
Santos dated May 29, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration and the denial of the notice of appeal
dated September 6, 1996 had also become final and executory.

The denial of petitioner Valente's Motion for Reconsideration prompted the filing of this present petition
for certiorari.
Petitioner Valente posits that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in recalling and setting
aside the Orders of Judge Estrella and reinstating those of Judge Santos because:

1. The CA ruled that the Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos
were final and executory, and yet the latter did not allow an appeal to be taken therefrom ratiocinating that
the questioned orders were interlocutory, and therefore, not appealable; and

2. The CA ignored and violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario28 which
held that a declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding and not in a civil action.

We find the petition bereft of merit.

At the outset, we note that petitioner Valente incorrectly filed a petition for certiorari to appeal the CA decision.
Petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Simply imputing
in a petition that the decision sought to be reviewed is tainted with grave abuse of discretion does not magically
transform a petition into a special civil action for certiorari. The CA decision disposed of the merits of a special
civil action, an original petition, filed thereat by herein respondents. That disposition is a final and executory order,
appealable to, and may be questioned before, this Court by persons aggrieved thereby, such as petitioner
Valente, via Rule 45.

On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright. However, we have disregarded this
procedural flaw and now resolve this case based on the merits or lack thereof.

Petitioner asseverates that the assailed CA ruling "is unfair and it amounts to a trickery to prevent an appeal
against a final order by claiming that the appealed order is merely interlocutory and later maintain that the same
order has become final after declaring it to be interlocutory."

We reject petitioner's paltry contention. Petitioner apparently does not comprehend the distinction between an
interlocutory order which is final and executory, and a final order which disposes of the controversy or case; much
less, understand the available remedies therefrom.

We have defined an interlocutory order as referring to something between the commencement and the end of the
suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy.29 It does not
terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the
case is finally decided on the merits.30 Upon the other hand, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing
more to do to resolve the case.31

On more than one occasion, we laid down the test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final i.e., "Does
it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case?" If it does, it is interlocutory;
if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the
32
merits of the case. The Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos are
interlocutory, and therefore, not appealable, as they leave something more to be done on the merits of the case.
In fact, in paragraph (d) of Judge Santos' Order dated May 29, 1996, herein respondents were directed to submit
evidence showing settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo Sr.

Contrary to petitioner Valente's stance, there is no trickery or chicanery in the CA's distinction between an
interlocutory and a final order. Indeed, as ruled by the CA, the RTC Order denying petitioner Valente's Notice of
Appeal attained finality when he failed to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

We cannot overemphasize the rule that the correct identification of the nature of an assailed order determines the
remedies available to an aggrieved party. The old Rules of Court in Section 2, Rule 41 reads, thus:
 SEC. 2. Judgments or orders subject to appeal.-Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal.
No interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the
subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other.

xxxx

With the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1, Rule 41 now provides for the appropriate remedy
to be taken from an interlocutory order, thus:

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

xxx

(c) An interlocutory order;

xxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Clearly, the denial of therein defendants' (including petitioner Valente's) appeal from the Orders dated May 29,
1996 and September 6, 1996 was in order. Thus, the CA decision affirming the RTC's denial was correct.

Further, on this crucial distinction as applied to this case, petitioner Valente filed a petition for certiorari from the
CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 58090, which is not an interlocutory order. It is a final order which completely
disposed of the merits of the case with nothing more left to be done therein. The correct and available remedy
available to petitioner Valente was, as previously discussed, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

In fine, petitioner Valente erroneously sought relief through reversed remedies. He tried to appeal the interlocutory
orders of the RTC which are unappealable. Thus, the RTC properly denied his Notice of Appeal, and the CA
correctly upheld the RTC. He should have filed a petition for certiorari; under Rule 65. On the other hand, from the
final order of the CA, he comes before this Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper
remedy is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.

33
In the recent case of Jan-Dec Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals we ruled in this wise:

As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules.

Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature
of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to the Court by filing a petition for review, which
would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. It seeks to correct errors of
judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer. In contrast, a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and proper only if there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is an
extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and cannot be availed of as a substitute
for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.
Independently of this procedural infirmity, even on the merits of the case, the petition does not fare otherwise. It
must be dismissed for lack of merit.

Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario,34 herein respondents
must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action to annul the judicial sale of what is,
undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.

We disagree. Our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.

Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista ― and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs ―
has been firmly established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of Appeals.35 True, this Court is not a
36 37
trier of facts, but as the final arbiter of disputes, we found and so ruled that herein respondents are children,
and heirs of their deceased father, Marcelo Sr. This having been settled, it should no longer have been a litigated
issue when we ordered a remand to the lower court. In short, petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and Maria
Concepcion's representation in the RTC that our ruling in Suarez required herein respondents to present evidence
of their affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is wrong.

As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez, "Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that
portion which belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion." There is clearly
no intimation in our decision for the RTC to have to determine an already settled issue i.e., herein respondents'
status as heirs of Marcelo Sr.

Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of herein respondents as legitimate
children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first prove their filiation to
Marcelo Sr. The following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.'s and Teofista's paternity of herein respondents, and the
latter's status as legitimate children:

1. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 10646 to 10649 where Teofista, along with herein respondents,
questioned the RTC, Branch 151's Orders dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986. Although the CA ruled
against Teofista and herein respondents, it explicitly recognized the latter's status as legitimate children of
Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and38

2. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20320 which incorrectly ruled that herein respondents were, as children of
Teofista, merely successors-in-interest of the latter to the property and by virtue thereof, bound by the judgment in
Civil Case Nos. 21376 to 21379 consistent with the doctrine of res judicata.39 We subsequently reversed this
ruling on the wrong application of res judicata in the conclusive case of Suarez. We retained and affirmed,
however, the CA's factual finding of herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. We categorically held
therein that "the proprietary interest of [herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned [properties] is different
from and adverse to that of [Teofista]. [Herein respondents] became co-owners of the property not because of
[Teofista] but through their own right as children of their deceased father [, Marcelo Sr.]."

Clearly, herein respondents' long possessed status of legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot be
indirectly or directly attacked by petitioner Valente in an action to annul a judicial sale.

Articles 262,40 263,41 265 and 26642 of the Civil Code, the applicable law at the time of Marcelo's death, support
the foregoing conclusion, to wit:

Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of the child only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;

(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted from the
same;
 (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the
recording of birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case,
any of his heirs.

If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the Philippines;
and two years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the
discovery of the fraud.

Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register,
or by an authentic document or a final judgment.

Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed
for failure of the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that they had been declared the
legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a
document, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein respondents as
Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. The same document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr.
specifying Teofista's paraphernal properties, and separates the properties she owns in common with her children,
herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and
prolong this case interminably.

Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, became owners of the subject properties
only by virtue of an execution sale to recover Teofista's judgment obligation. This judgment obligation is solely
Teofista's, and payment therefor cannot be made through an execution sale of properties not absolutely owned by
her. These properties were evidently conjugal properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr.
married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.'s death, by virtue of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.'s share in
the conjugal partnership was transmitted by operation of law to his compulsory heirs.

Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article 778 43 of the Civil
Code. It reserves a portion of the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or
combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of succession.44 The portion that is so reserved is the legitime.
Article 886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as "that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of
because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Herein respondents
are primary compulsory heirs,45 excluding secondary compulsory heirs,46 and preferred over concurring
compulsory heirs in the distribution of the decedent's estate.47

Even without delving into the Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate in 1957, it must be stressed that
48
herein respondents' rights to the succession vested from the moment of their father's death. Herein respondents'
ownership of the subject properties is no longer inchoate; it became absolute upon Marcelo's death, although their
respective shares therein remained pro indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties were sold on
execution sale to answer for Teofista's judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents' share therein was
null and void.

In fine, Teofista's ownership over the subject properties is not absolute. Significantly, petitioner Valente does not
even attempt to dispute the conjugal nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a portion of the
subject properties, only that portion could have been, and was actually, levied upon and sold on auction by the
provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate declaration of heirship by herein respondents is not necessary to
annul the judicial sale of their share in the subject properties.
 49
We note the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, where we scrutinized our rulings in Heirs of
50 51
Yaptinchay and the cited cases of Litam v. Rivera and Solivio v. Court of Appeals, and Guilas v. CFI Judge of
52
Pampanga cited in Solivio. We ruled thus:

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the
estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the
circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship
should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted
but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heirs has lost the right to have
himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then
an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the
partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate,
executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of
Rule 74, Section of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a
person dies leaving property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint
a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in
case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.

xxx

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the
Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding
which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceedings.
And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case-subject of the present case, could
and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case
upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugal's estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners'
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners xxx.53

All told, under the circumstances, in addition to the already settled status of herein respondents as heirs of
Marcelo Sr., there is no need to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 and require herein respondents to institute a
separate special proceeding for a declaration of their heirship.

68. DE PAPA VS CAMACHO

This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was submitted for
judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":

1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and
granduncles.

2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late
Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant. The family relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made
an integral part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this
stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.

4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two
legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and
leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-
indiviso shares.

5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife
Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the
partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and
16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were
adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the
said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in
equal pro-indiviso shares.

6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2)
pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole
intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently annotated on
the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.

7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of
land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject
to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.

8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7)
parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.

10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7)
parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino
Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim
because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest
was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of
their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of whether defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the
plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-
half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to
three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and,
therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko
Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to
plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon legal advice in pursuing their
respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all
their claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this
Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by
the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as
well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of
land in dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows:

... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca
Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or
three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled
to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from
the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs'
share in the rentals.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all their claims against each other
for damages including attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs' share in
the rentals, the court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7)
parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554
of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an
accounting of all rents received by her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose of determining the
legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of the property in question.

SO ORDERED. 2

Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.

The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of
the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable
property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came. (811),

or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should be determined
by, the rules on intestate succession.

That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where the reservatario was survived by
eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood,
and the claim was also made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the
nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces
of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:

The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva troncal, where the
only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the
descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood,
should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood
take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?

xxx xxx xxx

The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the subject. After mature
reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule
designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line
from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant (reservista).

xxx xxx xxx

The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of
the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between
one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the
respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate
succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those
nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905).
And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates
in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are relatives of the descendant within
the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the
right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property came.
Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the
law does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right
as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on
the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490)
(Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule
that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood.
If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of
nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be
likewise operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to whom the property
should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable
rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened
by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly
needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p.
250):

... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el
alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la
disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos
extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que
se crea.

The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's hostility to
successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion
legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees
must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon
(the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are
related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris4 where Arts. 1001, 1004,
1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy nephews and nieces of the de
cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily
apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitle to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.

Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces who are the children of the
decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers and sisters, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate.

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more
clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force
(R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:

Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of the former, whether of the
whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased.

Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse,
the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of the whole blood.

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab
intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The
present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and
brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other
collaterals.

xxx xxx xxx

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed. ...

This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the reservable property,
the reservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:

... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose
of it by will, as long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do
not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286;
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .

To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that intestacy proceedings to determine the
right of a reservatario are not necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the
name of the reservista over property subject to reserva troncal Identifies the reservatario and there are no other
claimants to the latter's rights as such:

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that the reservatario win
succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not
the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of the reservista's estate;
the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely
reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime.
The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must be
deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even
answer for the debts of the latter. ... .

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees
would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason
why a different result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the
interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the
reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-
Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is
dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

69. GONZALES VS CFI MANILA

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her
complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the
properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335).
The facts are as follows:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was
survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa
and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by
his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were
represented by Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother,
Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which
she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the
following: 1äwphï1.ñët

(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.

(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain
shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company,
Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.

(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261
and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.

1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203,
48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon
City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;

1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry
of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and
48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);

l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets and Estero):

2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.

These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races
succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other
six children.

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the
properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose
(sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads: 1äwphï1.ñët

A mis hijos :

Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he
heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario'
recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.

De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas
de Jesus, en Guipit

La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta construida
sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1äwphï1.ñët

(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA

6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the
properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited
in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order
dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of
Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs.
Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to
exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena
Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed
Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action
against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a
declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her
holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs.
Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).

As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No.
5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in
question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.

On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower court
erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her
conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that
Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and
prescription.

The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review
is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and
gave due course to the petition for review.

In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts. Since on the
basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are
subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.

The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be
resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed
by this Court.

The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code,
formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of
her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the
reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance
automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?

As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved in Florentino
vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case
and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also
called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.

Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature of reserve
troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to
prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the
reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the
confinement of property within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic
oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.

The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest.
Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.

However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored the reserve troncal, a
legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are
difficult to resolve.

Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët

ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido
por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que
hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer
grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a
brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law
from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which
the said property came.

So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an
ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law
(intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another
ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the
first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th
Ed., pp. 198-9).

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her
properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by
his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the
meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).

The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was
received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who
received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
(prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property
should be reserved by the reservor.

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not
included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).

The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen
bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que,
por un azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado
en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited
two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina
Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.

It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan
and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under
the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-
law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.

In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal
land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share
was inherited by her father, Anacleto Mañalac who owned the other one-half portion.

Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that the said one-
half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by
Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Mañalac, who belonged to the
line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Mañalac 114 Phil. 964).

Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs.
Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil.
664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo
Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line from
which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called
the prepositus (Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).

In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia
died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable property. Upon
the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who
was her nearest relative within the third degree.

First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even represent their
parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480).

Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation. But
the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are
excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as
donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed.,
195 l, p. 360).

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2)
the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that
such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the
reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at
the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.
(Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;
Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)

The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso
conditional.

The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time
of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf
there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod
vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).

On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would
disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor predecease the
reserves.

The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the reservable
character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for being a
contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).

And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally.
The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reserves survives
the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) said
property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally
stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being
reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than
a than interest in the reservable property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105
Phil. l5.)

Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the
property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might
frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their
right in the registry of property even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar,
Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
 This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the
reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista
who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs.
Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).

The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant (prepositus) of
whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive
the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th
Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27,
1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by
operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda.
Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the
reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs.
Legarda.

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties
by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the
reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is
already res judicata or cosa juzgada.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable
properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form
part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis
causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.

As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from
the prepositus, not from the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within
the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select
the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share
therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the
reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring
violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a
similar case, where it was ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët

Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista)
together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part
of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued
to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict
obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest
(prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at
the same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two
children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in
1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her
daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through
their son, Apolonio III.

The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the
deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable
properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father
Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.

Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will
in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's estate and could
not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.

As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the properties. The other
six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.

Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine of
the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there
are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common
descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its reservable
character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the
reserves to whom the reservable property should be awarded.

The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives within the third
degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to
reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.

It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties because only
relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said
properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to
the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein".

That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable properties to
her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-
blood of the prepositus.

In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her
daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the
seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did not pass into
the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the
reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of
their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).

Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in
question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said
properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second
degree from Filomena Legarda.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but from the
prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the
reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-existence of third-
degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the
Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.

That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the
time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the
second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the
said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in
accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate.
(Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the properties
inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and
accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and
Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who
died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

70. JARDIN VS VILLAMAYOR

Appeal filed by the applicants against the order of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas that denied their
amended request and dismissed the matter, without costs. The appeal is filed with the Court of Appeal which is
sent to this Supreme Court because it is only a matter of law.

The applicants initiated the Intestate of the deceased Leoncia Filomena Jardin in the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas and in the amended application they submitted requested that one of them, Andres Jardin, be appointed
as a judicial administrator. By order of October 9, 1939, the Court agreed to the original request, appointed
Andres Jardin as special administrator through bail of P1,000 and signaled the matter pal on the 7th of the
following month, at 8.30 a.m. m., for the declaration of heirs and the determination of whether the summary
distribution of the deceased's assets proceeded.

In the vixta it seems that there was opposition to the original request by some pol people whose motive and after
the tests of both parties practiced the Court, dated November 7, 1939, issued another order granting 5 days to the
applicants to amend their request and 15 days to each party to discuss, perhaps in writing, the question of
whether the property left by the decedent had the character of reserves, in view of the fact that Severina
Villamayor, one of the opponents according to the order, alleges that said goods He had inherited them from the
late Leoncia Filomena Jardin. We say that it appears that opposition was filed, because the opposition document
does not mention or transcribe the opposition document.

On December 11, 1939, the Court issued the appeal appealed in which he declared that the assets relieved by
the deceased had ceased to be reserved because he was not survived by any relative within the third degree and
that Canuto Jardin is a relative of the deceased within of the fourth grade and Andres Jardin within the fifth grade,
and I deny the amended application and dismiss the matter, without costs.

It is admitted by the parties that all the assets left by the late Leoncia Filomena Jardin are in the hands of the
opposition Severina Villamayor, who claims to be now the absolute owner of them for inheriting them from her
daughter, the late Leoncia Filomena Jardin, who in turn he died without offspring and when he was only 10 years
old; that Juan Jardin was the great-grandfather of the deceased; that Canuto Jardin, who passed away during the
appeal, was the uncle's grandfather for being the grandfather's brother of this so-called Vicente; and that Andres
Jardin, is uncle of the deceased for being brother of the father of this called Januario Jardin, already deceased.

The following genealogical chart prepared by the opposition's lawyer graphically illustrates the relationship
between the parties and the deceased:

JUAN JARDIN

Children:
Victoria Justo Feliciano Canuto Vicente Catalina

Children (deceased married

during the with

appeal) Ignacia

Andres Jardin Campo-

(appellant) and sacred

other seven. Only child

Januario Jardini.

married to

Severina Villamayor (appealed)

Only daughter

Leoncia Jardin

deceased in 1925

at 10 years old

The cross means that he has already passed away.

The articles of the Civil Code that are applicable to the question raised of whether the goods that are treated as
administrative, continue to be reserved, or not, are the following:

"ART. 811. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant goods that he would have acquired by lucrative title
of another ascendant or of a brother, is obliged to reserve those that he had acquired by ministry of the law in
favor of the relatives that are within of the third grade and belong to the line where the goods come from. "cralaw
virtua1aw library

"ART. 918. The lines count as many degrees as generations or as persons, discounting that of the parent.
"On the straight line he climbs only to the trunk. Thus, the son is one degree away from the father, two from the
grandfather and three from the great grandfather.

"In the collateral one goes up to the common trunk and then goes down to the person with whom the computation
is done. Therefore, the brother is two degrees away from the brother, three deltio, full of his father or mother, four
from the cousin, and so on appellant.

According to article 811 they have the character of reserveable ;, the goods that an ascendant inherits from his
descendant, when he has acquired it from another ascendant, or from a brother, for a lucrative title; and provides
that in such a case the reservist is obliged to reserve said assets in favor of the relatives that are within the third
grade and belong to the same line from which the assets originate. Since, according to the provisions of article
918, Canuto Jardin was a relative within the fourth grade of the late Leoncia Filomena Jardin and Andres Jardin
within the fifth grade, it is clear that the disputed assets have ceased to be reserved and the applicants they have
no right to them, being the true current owner of them the opponent 3everina Villamayor for being the forced
heiress of her daughter Leoncia Filomena Jardin.

71. PADURA VS BALDOVINO

Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in its Special Proceedings
No. 4551.

The facts are simple and undisputed. Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime. With his first
wife, Gervacia Landig, he had one child whom they named Manuel Padura, and with his second, Benita Garing;
he had two children named Fortunato Padura and Candelaria Padura.

Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly probated in Special Proceedings
No, 664 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, wherein he bequeathed his properties among his children,
Manuel, Candelaria and Fortunato, and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Under the probate proceedings,
Fortunate was adjudicated four parcels of land covered under Decree No. 25960 issued In Land Registration
Case No. 86 G. L. R. O. No. 10818, object of this appeal.

Fortunato Padura died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having executed a will; and not having any issue, the
said parcels of land were inherited exclusively by her mother, Benita Garing. She applied for and later was issued
a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, but subject to the condition that the properties were reservable in favor
of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, in accordance with the
applicable provision of law, under a decree of the court dated August 25, 1916, in Land Registration Case No. G.
L. R. O. No. 10818.

On August 26, 1934, Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only heirs, her four legitimate children, the appellants
herein, Cristeta, Melania, Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed Baldovino, Six years later, on October 6, 1940, Manuel
Padura also died. Surviving him are his legitimate children, Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Gornelio, Francisco, Juana,
and Severino, all surnamed Padura, the appellees herein.

Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista), on October 15, 1952, appellants and appellees took possession
of the reservable properties. In a resolution, dated August 1, 1953, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in
Special Proceedings No. 4551, the legitimate children of the deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria Baldovino
were declared to be the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the original
reserveess Candelaria Padura and Manuel Padura, having predeceased the reservista). The instant petition,
dated October 22, 1956, filed by appellants Baldovino seeks to have these properties partitioned, such that one-
half of the same be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they
inherit by right of representation from their respective parents, the original reservees. To this petition, appellees
filed their opposition, maintaining that they should all (the eleven reservees) be deemed as inheriting in their own
right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal share.
Based on the foregoing finding of facts, the lower court rendered judgment declaring all the reservees (without
distinction) "co-owners, pro-indiviso, equal shares of the parcels of land" subject matter of the suit.

The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva troncal, where the
only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the
descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood,
should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood
take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?

The appellants contend that notwithstanding the reservable character of the property under Art, 891 of the new
Civil Code (Art. 811 of the Code of 1889) the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to a share
twice as large as that of the others, in conformity with Arts, 1006, 1008 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Arts.
949 and 951 of the Code of 1889) on intestate succession.

"Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half
blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.(949)n

"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stripes, in accordance
with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood, (951)"
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the subject. After mature
reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule
designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line
from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant (reservista). To this end, the Code provides:

"Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came. (811)"
It is well known that the reserva troncal had no direct precedent in the law of Castile. The President of the
Spanish Code Commission, D. Manuel Alonso Martinez, explained the motives for the formulation of the reserva
troncal in the Civil Code of 1889 in his book "El Codigo Civil en sus relaciones con las Legislaciones Forales"
(Madrid, 1884, Vol. 1, pp. 226-228, 233-235) in the following words:

"La base cuarta, á más de estar en pugna con la legislacion española, es una desviacion del antiguo derecho
romano y del moderno derecho europeo, perfectamente conformes ambos con el tradicional sistema de
Castilla. En qué se fundó, pues, la Comision para semejante novedad? Que razones pudieron moverla á
establecer la sucesion lineal, separándose del cáuce secular?

"Lo diré en breves frases. Hay un case, no del todo raro, que subleva el sentimiento de cuantos lo imaginan ó lo
ven: el hijo mayor de un magnate sucede á su padre en la mitad Integra de pingues mayorazgos, tocando á sus
hermanos un lote modestisimo en la division de la herencia paterna; aquel hijo se casa y fallece al poco tiempo
dejando un tierno vástago; la viuda, todavia jóven, contrae segundas bodas y tiene la desdicha de perder al hijo
del primer matrimonio heredando toda su fortuna con exclusion de la madre y los hermanos de su primer
marido. No hay para qué decir que, si hay descendientes del segundo matrimonio, á ellos se trasmite en su dia
la hereticia. Por donde resulta el irritante espectáculo de que los vástagos directos del magnate viven en la
estrechez y tal vez en la miseria, mientras gozan de su rico patrimonio personas extrañas á su familia y que, por
un órden natural, la son profundamente antipáticas. Esta hipótesis se puede realizar y se realize, aunque por lo
general en menor escala, entre propietarios, banqueros é industriales. labradores y comerciantes, sin necesidad
de vinculaciones ni titulos nobiliarios.

"Pues bien, la mayoria de la Comision se preocupó vivamente de esto, considerando el principio de familia como
superior al del afecto presumible del difunto. A esta impresion obedecia la propuesta del Sr. Garcia Goyena,
para que á los ascendientes se les diera su legitima tan sólo en usufructo: en idéntica razon se apoyaba el Sr.
Franco para pedir con insistencia se declarase que, si un ascendiente tenia hecha una donacion á su
descendiente, bien fuese al contraer matrinionio ó bien con cualquiera otro motivo, y muriese el donatario sin
sucesion, volvieran los bienes donados al donante, sin perjuicio de la legitima que pudiera corresponderle en su
calidad de ascendiente. La Comision no se atrevió a ir tan allá como estos dos Sres. Vocales; pero, para eludir
las consecuencias que á las veces produce el principio de la proximidad del parentesco y que he puesto de
relieve poco há, proclamó, no sin vacilar, la doctrina de la sucesion lineal." (pp.226-227)

"Y este fué el temperamento que, por indicacion mia, adoptó la Comision Codificadora, norabrando una Sub-
comision que redactara las bases é que habia de sujetarse esta especie de reversion de los bienes inmuebles al
tronco de donde procedan, lo mismo en la sucesion testamentaria que en la intestada, sin perjuicio del derecho
sacratisimo de los padres al disfrute de la herencia de sus hijos malogrados prematuramente.

"Dicha Subcomision, compuesta de los Sres. Durán y Bás y Franco como defensores del régimen f oral, y de los
Sres. Manresa y Garcia Goyena en representacion de la legislacion castellana, sometieron á la deliberacion de la
Comision Codificadora la proposicion siguiente:

'El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrativo de_ otro
ascendiente ó de un hermano, se halla obligado á reservar los que hubiese adquirido por ministerio de la ley en
favor de los parientes del difunto que se hallaran comprendidos dentro del tercer grado y que lo sean por la parte
de donde proceden los bienes.'
"No voy á discutir ahora si esta fórmula es más ó ménos feliz, y si debe aprobarse tal cual está redactada ó si há
menester de enmienda ó adicion. Aplazo este examen para cuando trate de la sucesion intestada, á la cual tiene
mayor aplicacion. Por el momento me limito á reconocer. primero: que con esta base desaparece el peligro de
que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente y á titulo gratuito á manos extrañas por el
azar de los enlaces y de muertes prematuras; segundo: que sin negar que sea una novedad esta base del
derecho de Castllla, tiene en rigor en su abono la autoridad de los Códigos más niveladores y el ejemplo de las
naciones más democráticas de Europe, si no en la extension en que lo presenta la Comision Codificadora, á lo
ménos en el principio generador de la reforma." (pp.233-235)
The stated purpose o£ the reserva is accomplished once property has devolved to the specified relatives of the
line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between
one reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the
respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate
succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those
nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus) , excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree
(Florentine vs. Florentine, 40 Phil. 489-490; T. S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March
1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation
operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).

"Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are re1atives of the descendant within
the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the
reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such
property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal
and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be
considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right
as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on
the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x x." (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-
490) (Emphasis supplied) (see also Nieva and Alacala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule
that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half-
blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation
of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be
likewise operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property
should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable
rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened
by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly
needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p.
250):

"creándose un verdadero estado excepcipnal del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino más bien restringirse, el
alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepción mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la
disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentals del Código en materia de sucesión, en aquellos
extremos no resueltos de un raodo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accián de la reserva que
se crea."
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's hostility to
successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserve viudal and the reversion
legal of the Code of 1889 (Arts. 812 and 968-980).

There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are
the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything
that might frustrate their reversionary right: and for this purpose they can compel the annotation of their right in
the Registry of Property even while the reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295). This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of
the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may
not dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The
latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservist, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.
(Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Torao 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) Had the
nephews of whole and half-blood succeeded the prepositus directly, those of full-blood would undoubtedly receive
a double share compared to those of the half-blood (Arts. 1008 and 1006, jam cit.) Why then should the latter
receive equal shares simply because the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the
reserva? The decedent (causante) the heirs and their relationship being the same, there is no cogent reason why
the hereditary portions should vary.

It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is supported by distinguished commentators of the
Civil Code of 1889, among them Sanchez Román (Estudios, Vol. 65 Tomo 2, p. 1008) and Mucius Scaevola
(Código Civil, Vol 14, p. 342). The reason given by these authors is that the reservatarios are called by law to
take the reservable property because they belong to the line of origin; and not because of their relationship. But
the argument, if logically pursued, would lead to the conclusion that the property should pass to any and all
the reservatarios, as a class, and in equal shares, regardless of lines and degrees. In truth, such is the thesis of
Scaevola, that later became known as the theory of reserva integral (14 Scaevola, Cod. Civ. p. 332 et seq.). But,
as we have seen, the Supreme Courts of Spain and of the Philippines have rejected that view, and consider that
the reservable property should be succeeded by the reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to the basic
rules of intestacy. The refutation of the trial court's position is found in the following, passage of Manresa's
Commentaries (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 346):

"A esto se objeta que el derecho consignado en el articulo 811 es un derecho propio que nace de la mera calidad
de pariente; no un derecho que se adquiere por sucesión. Ciertamente, el derecho se concede a los parientes
lineales dentro del tercer grado; pero se les concede con motivo de la muerte de un descendiente y en la
sucesión de este. Ellos suceden por la procedencia especial de los bienes después de ser éstos disfrutados por
el ascendiente; pero suceden a titulo lucrativo y por causa de muerte y ministerio de la ley, lo cual es dificil
poderlo negar. Hasta podrlan estimarse esos parientes legitimarios o herederos forzosos, como el mismo autor
reconoce en otro lugar de su obra. De modo que este argumento no es convincente."
All told, our considered opinion is that reason and policy favor keeping to a minimum the alterations introduced by
the reserva in the basic rules of succession mortis causa.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 5, 1956 is reversed and set aside, and the reservatarios who are
nephews of the whole blood are declared entitled to a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-
blood. Let the records be remanded to the court below for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

72. CANO VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS

In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case No. 12, G.L.R.O. Rec. No.
2835, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Juban
(Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the following terms and conditions:

In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly published and posted as
required by law, and that the title of the applicant to the above-mentioned two parcels of land is
registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and decreed, and with reaffirmation of the order of general
default, that the two parcels of land described in plan SWO-24152, known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of
the Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their improvements, be registered in the name of Maria Cano,
Filipina, 71 years of age, widow and resident of Juban, province of Sorsogon, with the understanding that
Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article
 891 of the Civil code. After this decision shall have become final for lack of appeal therefrom within the
30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding decree issue.

So ordered. (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)

The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20) were issued in the name of
Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero. In October 1955, counsel for the reserve
(reservatorio) Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court, alleging the death of the original registered owner
and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered
cancelled and a new one issued in favor of movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered to place
her in possession of the property. The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of
the reservista Maria Cano, who contended that the application and operation of the reserva troncal should be
ventilated in an ordinary contentious proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to grant
the motion.

In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in the final decree of registration, the
lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a new certificate, for the reason that the death of
the reservista vested the ownership of the property in the petitioner as the sole reservatorio troncal.

The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting that the ownership of
the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial
administration proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as the reservatorio entitled to the reservable property,
are to be declared. In this connection, appellants argue that the reversion in favor of the reservatorio requires the
declaration of the existence of the following facts:

(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister;

(2) Said descendant dies without issue;

(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and

(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line from which said property came.
(Appellants' Brief, p. 8)

We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been declared to exist by
the decree of registration wherein the rights of the appellee as reservatario troncal were expressly recognized:

From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799 was acquired by the
Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her deceased daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who, in turn,
inherited the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls squarely under the provisions of
Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of the private oppositors are within the third
degree of consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, and who belonging to the same line from
which the property came.

It appears however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with the exception of Eustaquia Guerrero,
who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his former marriage, all the other
oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by his former marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero,
being the nearest of kin, excludes all the other private oppositors, whose decree of relationship to the
decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil Code; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 62 Phil., 279). (Rec. App. pp.
16-17)

This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are bared thereby from contesting the
existence of the constituent elements of the reserva. The only requisites for the passing of the title from
the reservista to the appellee are: (1) the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact that the reservatario has
survived the reservista. Both facts are admitted, and their existence is nowhere questioned.

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that the reservatario will
succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not
the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of the reservista's estate;
the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant ( prepositus), said property merely
reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime.
The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed
to have enjoined no more than a life interest in the reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even
answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by the reservatario may be entered in the property
records without necessity of estate proceedings, since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally
well settled that the reservable property can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis
causa,(like appellants herein) so long as a reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and belonging
to the line whence the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.

Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the property, without
determining the identity of the reservatario (as in the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or where
several reservatarios dispute the property among themselves, further proceedings would be unavoidable. But this
is not the case. The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have been expressly recognized, and it is
nowhere claimed that there are other reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that the heirs of
the reservista are merely endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of the reservable property to the detriment of the
party lawfully entitled thereto.

We find no error in the order appealed from and therefore, the same is affirmed with costs against appellants in
both instances. So ordered.

73. AGBLIBOT VS MANALAC

Leona and Evarista Aglibot commenced the present action (Civil Case No. 1482) in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales on July 31, 1952 to recover from Andrea Acay Mañalac and her children — Ramona, Gregorio, Felix,
Angela, Juanita and Purisima, all surnamed Mañalac — the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated
in barrio Namanaan, Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales, more particularly described in paragraph 2 of their
complaint, and damages.

Briefly stated, the allegations of the complaint are that the Aglibots inherited the property subject matter thereof
from their deceased niece Juliana Mañalac; that upon the death of Anacleto Mañalac, father of Juliana, the
defendants took possession of said property, claimed it as their own and had since then appropriated for
themselves all the palay annually harvested therefrom amounting to 30 cavanes; that nothwithstanding demands
made upon said defendants by the Aglibots, they had refused to surrender the property to the latter.1äwphï1.ñët

In their answer, after denying some material averments of the complaint, appellants alleged substantially the
following as affirmative defense: that the land in question was purchased from Esteban Garcia by the spouses
Anacleto Mañalac and Maria Aglibot for P1,000.00; that when Maria Aglibot died, only P300.00 of this amount had
been paid; that the remaining P700.00 was paid to the vendor during the marriage of Anacleto Mañalac and
appellant Andrea Acay; that Juliana Mañalac, the only daughter of Anacleto and his first wife, died in 1920, while
Anacleto died in 1942; that upon his death, his widow, Andrea Acay, and their children acquired the property in
question as his sole legal heirs. Their answer likewise claimed the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees by way of
counterclaim. After due trial, upon the issue thus joined, the lower court rendered judgement as follows: .

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the
plaintiffs owners pro-indiviso of one half (1/2) of the land covered by Original Certificate No. 10 described
in paragraph 2 of the amended complaint, ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs the
possession of the said one-half (1/2) of the property covered by said title; ordering the defendants jointly
and severally to deliver to the plaintiffs 15 cavanes of palay yearly as the share of the plaintiffs from the
produce of the land or its equivalent value at P10.00 a cavan from the date of the filing of the complaint
until the said one-half (1/2) portion of the property described in Original Certificate No. 10 is delivered to
the plaintiffs and ordering the defendants to pay the costs.

From the above judgment Andrea Acay and her children took the present appeal.
The evidence shows that, originally, the land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Anacleto Mañalac and Maria Aglibot, and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10 of the Register of
Deeds of Zambales in the name of Anacleto Mañalac, married to Maria Aglibot; that said spouses had an only
child named Juliana Mañalac; that Maria Aglibot died on October 2, 1906; that on April 25, 1910, Anacleto
Mañalac married appellant Andrea Acay with whom he had six children (the other appellants herein); that Juliana
Mañalac died intestate on October 22, 1920, leaving no other relatives except her father, Anacleto Mañalac, and
her half brothers and sisters already mentioned; that upon the death of Anacleto on June 2, 1942, his widow,
Andrea Acay, and her six children took possession of the parcel of land in controversy and since then have
refused to surrender the ownership and possession thereof to the appellees; that the land produces thirty cavanes
of palay yearly.

On May 18, 1951, appellees Leona and Evarista Aglibot filed a verified petition in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales for the summary partition or distribution of the properties left by the deceased Juliana Mañalac among
her rightful heirs (Special Proceeding No. 594). The court, after proper proceedings, issued an order dated
October 30, 1951, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: .

Wherefore, the Court declares that the applicant Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot are the only heirs
within the third degree of Juliana Mañalac, and belonging to the same line from which these properties
originally belonged, that is, from Maria Aglibot, being the sisters of the latter; that the value of these
properties does not exceed six thousand pesos (P6,000); and that each of the applicants is entitled to
receive and enter into possession of one-half of the first five parcels and one-fourth of the last two, after
paying such debts of the estate if there be any — and the proportionate expenses of this special
proceedings, subject to the provisions of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. (Page 10, Rec. on App.).

After securing the decision abovequoted appellees made the unsuccessful demands upon appellants for the
surrender of the property in question to them, and subsequently filed the present action.

The main question to be resolved now is: Who is entitled to the land which Anacleto Mañalac inherited from his
daughter, Juliana, as between appellees(sisters of Maria Aglibot, first wife of Anacleto Mañalac), on the one hand,
and appellants (Anacleto's second wife and their children), on the other?.

It is clear from the facts of the case that the land in question is reservable property in accordance with the
provisions of Article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code (Art. 891 of the New Civil Code). Both parties now admit that
the entire parcel covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10 belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Anacleto Mañalac and Maria Aglibot; that upon the death of the latter on October 2, 1906, their only
daughter, Juliana Mañalac, inherited one-half of the property, the other pertaining to her father as his share in the
conjugal partnership; that upon the death of Juliana Mañalac on October 2, 1920 without leaving any descendant,
her father inherited her one-half portion of said property. In accordance with law, therefore, Anacleto Mañalac was
obliged to reserve the portion he had thus inherited from his daughter, for the benefit of appellees, Leona and
Evarista Aglibot, aunts of Juliana on the maternal side and who are, therefore, her relative within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came.

Appellants' contention that the major portion of the purchase price of the land in question was paid to the original
owner, Esteban Garcia, after the death of Maria Aglibot is rendered clearly untenable not only by the lack of
sufficient evidence to this effect but also by the very significant circumstance that the property was titled in the
name of Anacleto Mañalac "married to Maria Aglibot" — circumstance that strongly indicates that said spouses
had acquired full ownership thereof during the lifetime of Maria Aglibot.

A Secondary question raised by appellants is to the effect that the lower court erred in ordering them, jointly and
severally, to deliver to appellees fifteen cavanes of palay yearly or pay their equivalent value of P10.00 a cavan,
from the date of the filing of the complaint. Considering the belief of appellants that the property in controversy
formed part of the estate of Anacleto Mañalac and that upon the latter's death ownership thereof was transmitted
to all his heirs, subject to the usufructuary rights of the surviving spouse, Maria Acay, their contention — not
sufficiently rebutted — that only the latter enjoyed possession of the property since her husband's death and
received the annual share pertaining to the landlord seems to be reasonable and logical. She should be the only
one, therefore, sentenced to pay the fifteen cavanes of palay yearly from the date of the filing of the complaint.

The remaining contention of appellants that the lower court should have ordered appellees to refund to them 50%
of the annual realty tax paid on the property cannot be sustained, this matter having been raised by them for the
first time on appeal.