stress on the distinction made by this court in the case Salaysay vs.
PEOPLE v. BUSTAMANTE
G.R. No. L-11598. January 27, 1959
FACTS:
Charged and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Federico Bustamante appealed to this Court
on points of law. Federico Bustamante was charged and convicted of
the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The
records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in
wedlock to one Maria Perez on August 9, 1954, before the Justice of
Peace of Binaloan, Pangasinan. A little over a year late, or on
September 16, 195, he contracted a second marriage with Demetria I.
Tibayan, solemnized before Vice-Mayor Francisco B. Nato of
Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting as mayor of the said
municipality, while the first marriage was still subsisting. The defendant
contended that there could not have been a second marriage to speak
of, as Nato was merely acting as mayor when he celebrated the same,
hence, without authority of law to do so. He lays stress on the
distinction between “Acting Mayor” and “Vice Mayor acting as Mayor”,
urging that while the former may solemnize marriages, the latter could
not. Defendant dwelt with Demetria and her parents for about a month,
after which a time he returned to Calasiao, Pangasinan to live with the
first wife, Maria Perez. In the course of her search for him, Demetria
discovered from the Binalonan municipal authorities the previous
marriage of defendant Bustamante. Hence, this accusation
DEFENDANT-APPELANT’S ARGUMENT:
Appellant, relying upon article 56 of the Civil Code of the Philippines -
Art. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court l
(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justice of the Court of Appeals
(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance
(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities
(5) Municipal judges and justices of the Peace
(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denominations,
church, religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in article 92; and
(7) Ship captains, airplanes chiefs, military commanders, and consuls
and vice-consuls in special cases provided in provided in articles 74
and 75.
Bustamante contends that there could not have been a second
marriage to speak of, as Nato was merely acting as mayor when he
celebrated the same, hence, without authority of law to do so. He lays
Hon. Fred Ruiz Castro, et al. * 52 Off. Gaz., No. 2, 809, between
"Acting Mayor" and "Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor", urging that while the
former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not.
ISSUE: Whether the second marriage was valid and whether the Vice
Mayor has the authority to solemnize the second marriage
HELD:
Yes, the marriage was valid and Vice Mayor Federico Nato, acting as
mayor, has the authority to solemnize the marriage. As acting mayor,
he discharges all duties and wields the power appurtenant to said
office. This instance does not involve a question of title to the office,
but the performance of the functions thereunto appertaining by one who
is admitted to be temporarily vested with it. The case even concedes
and recognizes the powers and duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the
Vice Mayor whenever the latter is in an acting capacity. The word
“acting,” when preceding the title of an office connotes merely the
temporary character as nature of the same.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The penalty imposed by the lower court (imprisonment for not less than
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional
and not more than eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor),
being in accordance with law, is affirmed. Cost against appellant
ALCANTARA v. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007
FACTS:
Restituto Alcantara (petitioner) filed a petition for annulment of his
marriage with Rosita Alcantara (respondent) before the RTC of Manila
alleging that on December 8, 1982, without securing the required
marriage license, he and respondent went to the City Hall of Manila to
look for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
“fixer” who arranged their wedding before Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel. They got married on that same day, December
8, 1982. The wedding took place at the stairs in the Manila City Hall
and not in the CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Navarro belongs. They
also got married at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila
on March 26, 1983. The alleged marriage license, appearing on the
marriage contract, was procured in Carmona, Cavite, neither party was
a resident of Carmona. On the request of the respondent, the Office of
the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite issued a certification that
Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of the parties on
December 8, 1982. However, the marriage contract states that the CA was likewise dismissed for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and
Marriage License No. is 7054033. The petition for annulment was other lawful fees within the reglementary period. After the decision
dismissed by the RTC of Manila and was affirmed by the CA. attained finality, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his
ISSUE: Whether the marriage is void ab initio on the ground that no marriage with the respondent was null and void due to the fact that it
valid marriage license existed during the solemnization of the marriage was celebrated without a valid marriage license. Respondent file a
motion to dismissed on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
RULING: The RTC granted the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for
No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 reconsideration but denied.
of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage Argument/s:
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license
must be apparent on the marriage contract or at the very least, Petitioner RESPONDENT
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such o While the relief prayed for the o While the present suit is
marriage license was issued to the parties. The Certification issued by
two cases was the same, that is, anchored on a different ground, it
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite enjoys the
presumption that official duty was performed and the issuance of the the declaration of nullity of his still involves the same issue, that is,
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. marriage to respondent, the cause the validity of their marriage, and
of action in the earlier case was prays for the same remedy that is,
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
distinct and separate cause of the declaration of nullity of their
residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the action in the present case because marriage
completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere the operative facts upon which
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An they were based as well as the
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
evidence required to sustain
validity but the party/ies responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. either were different.
o Claims that res judicata does o Petitioner violated the rule on
A closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the not lie to bar the second petition. forum shopping and also violated
numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may either read as
7054133 or 7054033. It does not detract from the conclusion regarding And maintains that there was no the rule on multiplicity of suits as
the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties. violation of the rule on forum the ground he cites in both cases
shopping or of rule which was the same.
proscribe the splitting of a cause
MALLION vs. ALCANTARA
GR. NO. 141528. October 31,2006. of action.

Facts:
On October 24, 1995, Oscar filed a petition the with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of
Executive Order No. 209 ,as amended , otherwise known as the Family
code, citing the psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition
upon the finding that petitioner “failed to adduce preponderant evidence
to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking.” Then appeal file with the
Issue: Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the
absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family
Code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being
impugned on the ground of a party’s psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code?
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
The present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting
single causes of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res
judicata. Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different
grounds for the same cause of action. In both petition, petitioner has
the same cause that is the declaration of nullity of his marriage. What
differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated, that
is the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the
marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took
place due to the alleged lack of marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP
4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had
been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner in
now bound this admission. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly
conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court
finds that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision dated
November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil
Case No. SP 4341-95.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
Principles:
Res judicata is defined as “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. I
This doctrine is a rule which pervades ever well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common
law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2)…
the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and
quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of
the litigious disposition on the part of the suitors to the… preservation of
the public tranquillity and happiness.
On the other hand of the, section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its
concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or otherwise known as the
rule of auteur action pendant which ordains that issues actually and…
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in an further
case between the same parties involving a different cause of action
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a
judgment or an order on the… merits; and (4) there is – between the
first and the second actions – identity, of subject matter, and causes of
action
If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the
subsequent action
GO-BANGAYAN vs. BANGAYAN, JR.
G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013.
FACTS:
Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s
father was against the relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office
in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered. Sally filed criminal actions
for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin,
using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn,
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that
his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the
partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with
Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of
the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration
of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered
properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court.
Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his
petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local
civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be
registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena. The
trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous.
ISSUE: Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property
relations
RULING:
YES. The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code which states: Art. 148. In cases of
cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties
are in bad faith.
PRINCIPLES:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or comes into a possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him.
Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's
property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the
latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was
benefited.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions, in accord with
Article 148.
TUPAL v. ROJO
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner Rex M. Tupal filed a complaint in Office of the Court
Administrator against respondent Judge Remegio V. Rojo, who
presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental, for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages
without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of
cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties. The Office of
the Court Administrator ruled in favor of the respondent. It contended
that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with
municipal trial court judges’ official functions and duties. Under the
Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary, a judge’s duty is to personally examine the allegations in the
affidavit of cohabitation before performing the marriage ceremony.
Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
PETITIONER:
1. For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage
he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90
dated February 26, 1990.8 Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial
court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize
documents only if connected with their official functions and duties.
Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a
judge’s official functions and duties as solemnizing officer.9 Thus,
Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriage he solemnized.
2. Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He
also did not require the parties to present their competent pieces of
evidence of identity as required by law.
RESPONDENT:
1. The respondent argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the
father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch
5 for allegedly making false statements in her affidavit of
cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to delay
Frialyn’s case.
2. Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He
argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was connected with
his official functions and duties as a judge. The Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does
not prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Thus, Judge Rojo did
not violate Circular No. 1-90.
3. Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a notary public. Thus, he was
not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized.
4. Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits
with the parties presenting their competent pieces of evidence of
identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their
affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who
executed the affidavit. The parties’ identities are "unquestionable."
5. Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay
City also notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage they solemnized. He pleaded "not to make him
[complainant Tupal’s] doormat, punching bag and chopping block"
since other judges also notarized affidavits of cohabitation.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Rojo is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Yes.
The respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
ISSUE and RULING:
1. WON The RESPONDENT MAY ACT AS NOTARY PUBLIC IN THE
CASE AT BAR. NO. Although municipal trial court and municipal circuit
trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they may do so
only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents,
contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of their official
functions and duties as provided in Circular No. 1-90. Furthermore, they
may only act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries
public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction. They must certify
as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when notarizing documents
ex officio. Hence, failing to satisfy these requirements, the respondent
cannot act both as the notary public while being the solemnizing officer.
Secondly, it is good to note that before performing the marriage
ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting parties
and examine the requirements they submitted. The parties must have
complied with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
Among these formal requisites is a marriage license. A marriage license
is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the
qualifications and none of the legal disqualifications to contract
marriage. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally examine the marriage license presented. If the contracting
parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least 5 years and
have no legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of
cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally
examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived
together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and the absence of
any legal impediment to marry each other. The judge must also execute
a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the parties’
qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Following these tasks of a judge as a solemnizing officer, it is
conclusive that being a notary public to those affidavits of cohabitation,
is not an ex officio capacity.
2. WON THE AFFIDAVITS OF COHABITATION NOTARIZED BY THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE ARE PRIVATE DOCUMENTS. YES. An
affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document,
"[rendering the document] admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity." The affidavit of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public
purpose," remains a private document until notarized. Thus, when
Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine
private documents. As discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not
connected with a judge’s official duty to solemnize marriages. Judge
Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
3. WON the respondent Judge also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. YES. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if
the signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary
public must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of
identity. A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person
appearing before the notary public is the signatory to the instrument or
document to be notarized. If the notary public does not personally know
the signatory, he must require the signatory to present a competent
evidence of identity. That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and
that he interviewed them do not make the parties personally known to
him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their
affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at
least be acquainted with them.45 Interviewing the contracting parties
does not make the parties personally known to the notary public.
VDA DE CHUA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116835. March 5, 1998.
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private
respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union,
the couple begot two illegitimate children. On 28 May 1992, Roberto
Chua died intestate in Davao City. On 2 July 1992, private respondent
filed a Petition for the declaration of Heirship and guardianship over
the person and properties of Robert Rafson and Rudyard Pride, their
illegitimate children.
a. Respondent is of legal age, married but separated residing in
Cotabato City.
b. They had two children staying with herein petitioner at Cotabato
City.
c. Their father is Roberto Chua who died intestate on Davao City
d. The aforementioned decease left properties both real and personal
which are worth 5,000,000.oo pesos
e. Roberto Chua died single without legal heirs.
On 21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua,
representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion
to Dismiss 2 on the ground of improper venue.
Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent’s death Davao City
was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the
proper forum.
Exh. "1" was the xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract between
the movant and the petitioner. This cannot be admitted in evidence on
the ground of the timely objection of the counsels for petitioner that the
best evidence is the original copy or authenticated copy which the
movant cannot produce. Further, the counsels for petitioner in
opposition presented the following: a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar concerned that no such marriage contract was ever
registered with them; a letter from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged
person to have solemnized the alleged marriage that he has not
solemnized such alleged marriage. Exhibit "2" through "18" consist
among others of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of
Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao
City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City
indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income
Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of
the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent
specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City.
Petitioner through counsels, objected to the admission in evidence of
Exhibits "2" through "18" if the purpose is to establish the truth of the
alleged marriage between the decedent and Antonietta Garcia. The
best evidence they said is the marriage contract. They do not object to
the admission of said exhibit if the purpose is to show that Davao City
was the business residence of the decedent.
Motion to dismiss is denied for lack of merit. Florita contends that
movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the
late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since
the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.
ISSUE: Whether Antoinnetta Garcia Vda. De Chua’s claim that she is
the surviving spouse of the deceased is tenable
HELD:
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the
decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a
marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The lower
court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage
certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best
evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. The
trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order.
Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and
other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the
petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter
from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not
solemnized said alleged marriage
Under her third assignment of error, petitioner claims that the trial court
issued its orders, Annexes "P" to "T" without prior hearing or notice to
her, thus, depriving her of due process. Apart from the fact that
petitioner was not entitled to notice of the proceedings of the trial court,
not being able to establish proof of her alleged marriage to the
deceased, or of her interest in the estate as creditor or otherwise. Due
process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an
actual hearing should always and indispensably be held.Denial of due
process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. As to the last
assignment of errors, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
proper remedy of the petitioner in said court was an ordinary appeal
and not a special civil action for certiorari; which can be availed of if a
party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. Except for her bare allegation that an ordinary appeal would be
inadequate, nothing on record would indicate that extraordinary remedy
of certiorari or prohibition is warranted. Finally, petitioner further argues
as supplement to her memorandum that the ruling of the Court of
Appeals treating the Special Proceeding No. 331 as one for both
guardianship and settlement of estate is in contravention of our ruling in
Gomez vs. Imperial,28 which the petitioner quotes:
The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a
function pertaining property not to the guardianship proceedings, but to
another proceeding which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.
Petitioner's reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the
action before the lower court was merely one for guardianship.
Therefore said court did not have the jurisdiction to distribute the estate
of the deceased. While in the case at bar, the petition filed before the
court was both for guardianship and settlement of estate. ARGUMENTS

Disposition: PETITIONER RESPONDENTS

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner Antonietta
Chua is hereby denied. • Cites as manifestations of her • Petitioner’s testimony concerning
SO ORDERED. husband's psychological incapacity respondent's purported
It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth the following: psychological incapacity falls short
of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The (1) habitual alcoholism; of the quantum of evidence
best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the movant failed to (2) refusal to live with her without required to nullify a marriage
produce. Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the fault on her part, choosing celebrated with all the formal and
motion to dismiss as she is not related to the deceased, nor does she
have any interest in his estate as creditor or otherwise. to live with his mistress essential requisites of law
instead; and • Petitioner failed to show that the
(3) refusal to have sex with her, alleged psychological incapacity of
SY v. COURT OF APPEALS performing the marital act respondent had existed at the time
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000
only to satisfy himself. of the celebration of their marriage
FACTS in 1973.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted
marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes ISSUES AND RULINGS
in Quezon City. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick
and Farrah Sheryll. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their 1. Whether the marriage between petitioner and private
conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son license at the time of the ceremony. YES. The date of celebration
Frederick transferred to his father’s residence at Masangkay, Tondo, of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by
Manila on May 15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father. On petitioner and private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record
February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before showed that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its
petition for separation of property. The Trial Court dissolved their absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of their children marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
to her. Later on, Filipina was punched at different parts of her body and 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor
was even choked by Fernando when she started spanking their son private respondent ever resided in Carmona The marriage license
when the latter ignored her while she was talking to him. The Trial Court was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the
convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable
separation was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
infidelity. Filipina then filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code, those
marriage citing psychological incapacity. The Trial Court and Court of solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
Appeals denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she assailed exceptional character, are void ab initio. This is clearly applicable in
for the first time that there was no marriage license during their this case.
marriage. 2. Whether private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at
the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration
of its absolute nullity. The remaining issue on the psychological
incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain the Court. It
 is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to
respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time
their marriage was solemnized.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9, 1993 as
well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No.
44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973
between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is
hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time
of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
PRINCIPLES
Article 80 of the Civil Code. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
(1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by
the male and female respectively, even with the consent of the parents;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages;
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character;
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under article 83,
number 2;
(5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in article 81;
(6) Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty
of the killing of the spouse of either of them;
(7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages
specified in article 82.
ARTURIO TRINIDAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD
(deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD
G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998
FACTS:
On August 10, 1975, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint for
partition and damages against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes,
both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First Instance of Aklan,
Branch I. On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page
decision in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed the trial court’s decision
on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove that his parents were legally married to each other and that
acquisitive prescription against him had set in. Patricio Trinidad and
Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children,
namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940,
survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land,
all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan. Arturio Trinidad, born on
July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. Sometime after the marriage, he demanded from the
defendants to partition the land into three equal shares and to give him
the (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
Arturio Trinidad filed, an action for partition of four parcels of land.
Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he
died in 1941, before plaintiff’s birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff
had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in
the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their
father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the
produce of the land. Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position.
Jovita Gerardo testified that Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato
are the parents of Arturio; that Felix and Lourdes as the uncle and aunt
of Arturio; and also identified pictures where the respondents were with
Arturio and his family.(At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died]
without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad.)
Another witness, ISABEL MEREN, 72 years old and a widow testified
that she knows Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad; that
she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as the parents of
Arturio and that she was present when they were married in New
Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano
Lajaylajay. She further testified that upon the death of Inocentes,
Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him. ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself,
was presented as witness. As proof that he is the son of Inocentes
Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism, and
a certificate of loss issued by the LCR that his birth certificate was
burned during World War 2. He also testified that he lived with Felix and
Lourdes and provided for his needs.
On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones who testified
that Inocentes was not married when he died in 1940s. Lourdes
Trinidad also testified that she was not aware that his brother married
anybody and denied that Arturio lived with them. Beatriz Sayon also
testified that Inocentes died in 1941, and that Felicidad Molato had
never been married to Inocentes. The trial court rendered a twenty-
page decision in favor of Arturio. The CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his
parent’s marriage and his filation
RULING:
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricio's
real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner
or co-heir of the decedent's estate. His right as a co-owner would, in
turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid
and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his
putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was
successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the
assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.
Filiation may be proven by the following:
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of
birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a
final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article,
the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a
legitimate child.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final
judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant
proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent’s estate.
His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born
during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his
mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes).
When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in
litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove
the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence:
the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and
open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the
birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union,
and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of
the CivilRegistrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and
marriages were lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese
occupation of said municipality. Although the marriage contract is
considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner’s failure
to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of
relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a marriage contract,
two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren and Jovita
Gerardo. It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented
his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named
as the child’s father and mother, and family pictures.
The totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates over
private respondent’s self- serving negations.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision is
REINSTATED.
REPUBLIC v. CA and CASTRO
G.R. No. 103047. September 2, 1994.
FACTS:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas
were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M.
Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was
celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant
Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents
required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage
contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued
in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig,
Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as
husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's
parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered
she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together.
However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro
gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the
consent of Cardenas. The baby is now in the United States.
Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her
marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a
lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible
annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they
discovered that there was no marriage license issued to
Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from
the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that the names
EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were
allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under
an alleged (s)upportive marriage license no. 3196182 allegedly
issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as
said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig
on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license.
Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her
signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in
Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. It held that the above
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance
of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage
between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying
official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show
that there was no marriage license issued." Unsatisfied with the
decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She
insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar
sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license. As stated
earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the
trial court. It declared the marriage between the contracting
parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
cancel the subject marriage contract.
ISSUE: Whether the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior
to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin
F. Cardenas
RULING:
YES. Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro
sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage
license.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24,
1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code.
The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without
a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one
of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a
license would render the marriage void ab initio.
The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by
an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy,
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor
is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify
that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist
in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such
other relevant data. The certification of "due search and inability
to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due
search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did
not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
Disposition:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no
showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate
court.
VILLANUEVA v. CA and VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 132955. October 27, 2006
FACTS:
In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva
before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992,
Orlando filed before the trial court a petition for annulment of his
marriage.He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to
marry Lilia who was then pregnant. He did not get her pregnant prior to
the marriage, that he never cohabited with her after the marriage and
that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery
on August 29, 1988
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the
dismissal of the petition arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily
married her. That petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a
month after their marriage and that petitioner wrote letters to her after
he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him
personally and knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended
in their son being born prematurely.
The RTC dismisses the petition for Annulment and ordered Orlando to
pay Lilia of Moral damages and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC. The Supreme Court affirmed with modification of
the moral damages is deleted for lack of merits.
ISSUE: Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground
of vitiated consent under Article 45 of the Family Code
RULING:
No. The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in this
case. Therefore, the petition for annulment, which is anchored to his
allegation that he did not freely give his consent, should be dismissed.
The SC ruled that Orlando’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is
untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orlando is only seeking to
annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed
bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed.
On the merits of the case, Orlando’s allegation of fear was not
concretely established. The Court is not convinced that appellant’s
apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive
him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant
worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that
time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of
self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of
harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to
bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the
assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police
regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither
did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their
marriage. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation
that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is
incredible and is an outright lie. His counsel also conceded before the
lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with Lilia.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26,
1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832
affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil
Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment
of his marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the
award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
AILEEN A. FERANCULLO v. ATTY. SANCHO M. FERANCULLO, JR.
A.C. No. 7214. November 30, 2006.
Administrative complaint for disbarment filed by petitioner against
respondent grounded on his alleged commission of estafa, bigamy and
violation of the lawyer's oath.
RULINGS:
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP: issued its Report and
Recommendation to dismiss the complaint against respondent for lack
of merit.
SC: Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. is found guilty of gross immorality
and is suspended from the practice of law for 2 years with a warning
that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the
same or a similar offense hereafter.
FACTS:
Both parties have starkly contrasting stories to tell. Hence, the
necessity of presenting both versions. The Court finds that
complainant's version is more credible.
Complainant’s facts: Respondent allegedly took advantage of their
attorney-client relationship to extort money from her in consideration of
the out-of-court settlement of her criminal cases and deceived her into
marrying him by concealing his previous marriage. Sometime in
February 2004, Respondent was referred to complainant as she
needed legal aid concerning complaints for estafa filed against her.
They allegedly agreed to a monthly retainer fee of P10,000.00 in
consideration for respondent's legal services. Complainant recounted
that respondent prodded her to move into a more secure location in
Parañaque. That allegedly became the start of his courtship.
Complainant averred that respondent would send her breakfast and
flowers. When asked about his personal circumstances, respondent
supposedly told complainant that he was still single although he had a
child out of wedlock.
Complainant claimed that in the beginning, respondent diligently
attended to her cases and advised her not to appear at the hearings
before the Office of the Prosecutor, assuring her that he would attempt
at a compromise agreement with the adverse parties. For this purpose,
between February and July 2004, complainant purportedly entrusted to
respondent varying amounts of money totalling P431,000.00 based on
his assurance that her cases merely involved money claims which can
be settled amicably. Complainant did not ask from respondent for any
receipt evidencing the transaction. Complainant further alleged that she
and respondent moved to a unit at Parrison Tower at F.B. Harrison,
Pasay City sometime in April 2004, where they started living together
as husband and wife. To corroborate her allegation that they lived
together as husband and wife, showed 5 photographs, 3 of which show
intimate poses of complainant and respondent. Complainant also
recounted that during respondent's birthday celebration on 2004, he
supposedly introduced complainant as his wife to his guests.
Complainant showed a VCD copy documenting the event where it
shows that as the guests started to get food from the buffet table,
complainant approached respondent. Respondent placed his hand on
the hips of complainant while the latter whispered at him.
On August 2004, complainant and respondent allegedly wed in a rite
solemnized in Kawit, Cavite. In support of this averment, complainant
showed a photocopy of the marriage certificate. In a casual
conversation with Teresita Santos, another client of respondent, she
told complainant that respondent was already married to a certain
Marlin M. Maranan. Complainant then confronted respondent who
allegedly admitted that he was married but assured complainant that he
was ready to leave his wife so that they can be together. The
relationship between complainant and respondent turned sour
eventually leading to their separation.
Complainant sought assistance from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). In a letter dated 14 October 2006, Atty. Romarico
Ayson sent a demand letter to respondent, urging the latter to shoulder
complainant's hospitalization until her delivery and provide monthly
support for the child. She also discovered that the criminal complaints
remained pending filed against her with the Office of the Prosecutor.
She claimed that respondent had been exerting efforts so that the
criminal complaints against her would proceed.
Respondent’s facts: In compliance with the IBP Order dated 6
January 2005, respondent filed an answer, denying the allegations that
he committed estafa, maintained an illicit relationship and contracted a
bigamous marriage with complainant.While admitting that complainant
sought his legal services in connection with the latter's cases for estafa
and illegal recruitment pending before the Office of the Prosecutor,
respondent insisted that his relationship with complainant was purely
professional. Respondent maintained that complainant insisted on
skipping the scheduled hearings before the Office of the Prosecutor. He
also denied receiving P431,000.00 from complainant, arguing that on
the alleged dates of payments, he was out for court appearances. He
also denied courting complainant asserting that the latter had already
known since February 2004 that he was happily married. He denied
living in together with complainant or providing a residence for
complainant. According to him, complainant vacated her residence at
Pasay City because her lease application was denied. While he
admitted that the unit at Parrison Tower at F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
belonged to his client, respondent insisted that his relatives had been
occupying the same since March 2004, thus making it impossible for
complainant to have transferred to said unit in April 2004. Respondent
described as contrary to human experience the allegation of
complainant that he introduced her as his wife during his birthday
celebration on May 2004, where his brothers and sisters were also
present. To support this claim, he submitted the affidavits of fifteen
guests in his party, stating that respondent did not introduce
complainant as his wife. Respondent also denied that a marriage
celebration between him and complainant took place on 4 August 2004
or that he signed the marriage certificate and or that he got her
pregnant. He had already instituted corresponding criminal complaints
against complainant for the alleged falsification of his signature in the
marriage certificate. Respondent claimed that complainant was
extorting money from him, hence the filing of the administrative
complaint.
Complainant’s response and evidence: Complainant annexed to her
reply receipts of payments on utilities to prove that she actually lived at
Parrison Tower and a VCD copy showing the video clip of respondent's
birthday party. As well as a blue polo barong and pants allegedly worn
by respondent during his birthday party; the original bank statement
reciting the deposits made by complainant's parents of the amount of
P431,000.00; an original passbook in the names of complainant and
respondent; and the certified xerox copy from the original of their
marriage contract.
Respondent’s response: Respondent moved to expunge from the
records the annexes to complainant's Manifestation and Reply on the
ground that he was not furnished a copy of said annexes and that the
Manifestation and Reply was an unsigned pleading. Complainant filed
an opposition thereto.
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP: issued its Report and
Recommendation to dismiss the complaint against respondent for lack
of merit.
IBP Rationale: The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
Respondent’s Report and Recommendation finding it to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering that the complaint lacked merit. The IBP believed that
the complainant failed to present a clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof to warrant the disbarment or suspension of respondent. The IBP
also ruled that the pictures and VCD not having been duly
authenticated could not be received in evidence. The IBP made only a
general conclusion that complainant must be motivated by greed in
filing the instant administrative complaint.
SUPREME COURT:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. is found GUILTY of
gross immorality and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the
specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should
he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter.
SC Rationale:
Administrative proceedings’ burden of proof - on the complainant’s and
should be established by substantial evidence
Substantial evidence - relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
On IBP’s ruling:
There is a preponderance of evidence that respondent maintained an
illicit relationship with complainant who was not his legal wife. It also
appears that respondent contracted a second marriage with
complainant as evidenced by their marriage certificate.
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage
contract
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows: Sec. 7.
Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When
the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified
copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer
was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage
certificate plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between
respondent and complainant on 4 August 2004, and it should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. The
marriage certificate should prevail over respondent's claim that the
marriage certificate or his signature therein was falsified.
The rule is that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
presumption of regularity.
On Respondent’s response:
The records show otherwise. A copy of said marriage certificate,
denominated as Annex "G," accompanied the initiatory complaint filed
before the IBP and furnished to respondent. In fact, respondent
admitted in paragraph 61 of his answer that he received a copy of the
marriage contract. A copy of complainant's Manifestation and Reply, to
which a certified true copy of the questioned marriage certificate was
annexed, was also sent by registered mail to the IBP.
On the matter of P431,000.00.:
The Court, however, finds no sufficient evidence indicating that
respondent falsely promised the settlement of complainant's criminal
cases in consideration of the amount of P431,000.00. The bank
statements showing the deposits made by complainant's parents are
not conclusive of said claim because they do not prove that said
amounts were received by respondent.
ON ISSUE: For what ethical breaches then may respondent be held
liable?
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a
patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of
an attorney
Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, includes: deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the lawyer’s oath, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so the purposes of the requirement of good moral character: (1) to
protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (3) to
protect prospective clients. (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves

IN RELATION TO TOPIC:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him.
- The respondent is suspended due to his immoral conduct.
Since the Complainant failed to prove that respondent misappropriated
her money, she is not entitled to compensation.