1.Erwin Tulfo vs People of the Philippines and Atty. Carlos T.

So

FACTS:

Erwin Tulfo, in his column in Remate, published four articles in different dates regarding oneAtty.
Carlos “Ding” So of Bureau of Customs Intelligence Unit in South Harbor and his alleged
corruption.

Subsequently, Atty. So filed a libel case against Tulfo and the editors and president of Remate.

In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that
he neither knew Atty. So nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his
criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but
against a person by the name of Atty. “Ding” So at the South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the
practice of certain people to use other people’s names to advance their corrupt practices. He also
claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as per
his source in the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further testified that he did
not do any research on Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to
rely on his source, and that he had several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the
South Harbor.

The other co-accused claimed that none of them edited the columns of Tulfo and that it isTulfo’s
responsibility to publish and edit his own work.

The trial court convicted Tulfo and his colleagues in Remate and the same was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals hence, the petition wherein Tulfo claims for the first time that the assailed articles
are privileged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tulfo and his co-accused are guilty of libel?

RULING:

Yes, they are guilty of libel with modification that in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty must be
imposed on the petitioners.

The court ruled that in order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be
considered privileged under the second paragraph of Article 354 of the RPC, the following
conditions must exist:

(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions;

(b) That it is made in good faith; and

(c) That it is without any comments or remarks.

None of the elements of the second paragraph of Art 354 is present in the articles of Tulfo and
his failure to verify the information on which he based his writings he therefore failed to meet the
test laid down in “reckless disregard test” as laid down in New York Times vs Sullivanand
reiterated in Flor vs People.

On the other hand, the editors and the president of Remate were also held liable as laid down in
the provision of Article 360 of the RPC which states that –

Art. 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication
or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained
therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The Court stated that the provision in the RPC does not provide absence of participation as a
defense, but rather plainly and specifically states the responsibility of those involved in publishing
newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a matter of whether or not they conspired in preparing
and publishing the subject articles, because the law simply so states that they are liable as they
were the author.

2.Almendras, Jr. vs. Almendras, 745 SCRA 674, January 14, 2015

Facts:
● Petitioner sent letters, which were subsequently printed and distributed, with similar
contents on 7 February 1996 to House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February
1996 to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. The letter’s subject was
petitioner's brother Alexis Almendras asking these officials to circulate the fact that he is
not vested with any authority to liaison or transact any business with any department,
office, or bureau, public or otherwise, that has bearing or relation with his office, mandates
or function. He claims that his act of transacting business that affects his person and
official functions is malicious in purpose, done with ill motive and part of a larger plan of
harassment activities to perforce realise his egoistic and evil objectives.
● Alexis Almendras, herein respondent, filed an action for damages arising from libel and
defamation for the evident bad faith and manifest malice to destroy his good name.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Digos City ruled in favor of respondent for petitioner's failure
to give evidence and participate in the trials to disprove the case against him. CA affirmed
RTC’s decision, hence, this petition.
Issue : Whether or not the letters are libelous in nature and Whether or not the letters fall within
the purview of privileged communication;
Ruling:
For an imputation to be libelous under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following
requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given
publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. As an exception to the rule, the presumption of
malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged communication.
In order to qualify as privileged communication under Article 354, Number 1, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social
duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either
be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or
a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish
the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and
without malice.

SC believes that the petitioner's letters are defamatory in nature.

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in

their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by the person reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.

In the instant case, the letters tag respondent as a "renown black mailer," a vengeful family
member who filed cases against his mother and siblings, and with nefarious designs. Even an
impartial mind reading these descriptions would be led to entertain doubts on the person's
character, thereby affecting that person's reputation.

Malice can also be presumed inasmuch as the letters are not privileged in nature.
Petitioner's contention that he has the legal, moral or social duty to make the communication
cannot be countenanced because he failed to communicate the statements only to the person or
persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish
the protection sought by the author of the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter
cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public. This lack
of selectivity on his part is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged
communication because such publication created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance
which brought discredit and shame to respondent's reputation.

SC Denies the petition.

3.Ty-Delgado vs. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, 782 SCRA 117, January 26,
2016

Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
against Pichay before the Commission on Elections on the ground that Pichay was convicted of
libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. She argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February
2011, the five-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse. On his defense, Pichay
claimed that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. He contended that he did not
personally perform the acts prohibited and his conviction for libel was only because of his
presumed responsibility as president of the publishing company.

On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur proclaimed Pichay as
the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Sur. Ty-Delgado opposed such proclamation before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). However HRET ruled that Pichay did not participate in the writing of
the libelous articles but his conviction was in line with his duty as the president of the publishing
company. Based on the circumstances, the HRET concluded that Pichay’s conviction for libel did
not involve moral turpitude.

Issues: Whether or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral
turpitude

Ruling: YES.

Under Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, a sentence by final judgment for a crime involving
moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general.

In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. In Tulfo v. People of the
Philippines, the Court found Pichay liable for publishing the four defamatory articles, which are
libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The fact that another
libelous article was published after the filing of the complaint can be considered as further
evidence of malice. Thus, Pichay clearly acted with actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. He committed an “act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which he owes his fellow men, or society in general,” and an act which is “contrary to justice,
honesty, or good morals

The crime of libel would not even be consummated without his participation as publisher of the
libelous articles. One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and
entrust its management to servants or employees whom he selects and controls may be said to
cause to be published what actually appears, and should be held responsible therefor, whether
he was individually concerned in the publication or not.

Accordingly, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral
turpitude. Since Pichay’s ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy and he
was never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives, the votes
cast for him were considered stray votes.
4.Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Piccio 789 SCRA 93 , April 11, 2016

Facts:

John Gimenez, President of the Philippine Integrated Advertising Agency - the advertising
arm of the Yuchengco Group of Companies, to which Malayan Insurance is a corporate member
- filed a Complaint-Affidavit for thirteen counts of Libel before the City Prosecutor of Makati City
against Piccio, et. al, the respondents herein, for purportedly posting defamatory
articles/statements on the website www.pepcoalition.com that besmirched the reputation of the
Yuchengco family and the Yuchengco Group, including herein petitioners.
Respondent filed a motion to quash, which the RTC granted, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It found that the Informations filed in these cases failed to state that any one of the
offended parties resides in Makati City, or that the subject articles were printed or first published
in Makati City.
CA denied the appeal outright on the ground that the same was not filed by the authorized
official which, as per law, should have been the Office of the Solicitor General. It also denied
Malayan Insurance's appeal, but this time, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The ruling was
premised on its finding that the case of Bonifacio v. RTC of Makati which involved one of the
thirteen (13) Libel cases is already controlling and should be adopted hence, all other issues are
rendered moot and academic.

Issues: Whether or not CA erred in denying Malayan Insurance’s Appeal on jurisdictional

grounds?

Ruling:
Yes. The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either
of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.

In this case, the CA proceeded to deny Malayan Insurance's appeal in view that this Court's ruling
in Bonifacio is already "controlling here because they involve the same parties and the same
issues," observing that this case is "one (1) of the thirteen (13) cases/Informations filed before the
[Makati-RTC] which originated from the complaint initiated by Gimenez."

To contextualize, the Libel case involved in Bonifacio was Criminal Case No. 06-876 which, as
the CA observed, involved the same parties herein. Highlighting the Amended Information's
allegation that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City," respondents submitted that "[t]he prosecution erroneously laid the
venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article."
This Court sustained the argument, and directed the Makati-RTC to quash the Amended
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and dismiss the case, ratiocinating in the following wise:
 If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the
offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege
with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as
evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices
in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes
necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its
printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez's premise of equating his first access to the
defamatory article on petitioners' website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn
the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It
hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the
website's author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for
libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the
offending website.

For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of
Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates
to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed
or capable of being accessed.

Nonetheless, petition is still dismissed since Malayan has no legal standing for the proper party
is the OSG.

5. Belen vs. People, 817 SCRA 370, February 13, 2017

Facts: On March 12, 2004, petitioner, then a practicing lawyer and now a former Judge, filed a
criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle, Nezer D. Belen, Sr. before the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City, which was assigned to then Assistant City Prosecutor Ma.
Victoria Sufiega-Lagman for preliminary investigation. With the submission of the parties and their
respective witnesses' affidavits, the case was submitted for resolution. In order to afford himself
the opportunity to fully present his cause, petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing. Without
acting on the request, Lagman dismissed petitioner's complaint in a Resolution dated July 28,
2004. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (for
Reconsideration & Disqualify), the contents of which later became the subject of this libel case.

Petitioner furnished copies of the Omnibus Motion to Nezer and the Office of the Secretary of
Justice, Manila. The copy of the Omnibus Motion contained in a sealed envelope and addressed
to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City was received by its Receiving Section on
August 27, 2004. As a matter of procedure, motions filed with the said office are first received and
recorded at the receiving section, then forwarded to the records section before referral to the City
Prosecutor for assignment to the handling Investigating Prosecutor.
ACP Suñega-Lagman first learned of the existence of the Omnibus Motion from Michael Belen,
the son of Nezer who is the respondent in the estafa complaint. She was also informed about the
motion by Joey Flores, one of the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City. She then asked the receiving
section for a copy of the said motion, and requested a photocopy of it for her own reference.

On September 20, 2004, ACP Suñega-Lagman filed against petitioner a criminal complaint for
libel on the basis of the allegations in the Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify). The
complaint was docketed as LS. No. 04-931 before the OCP of San Pablo City. Since ACP
Suñega-Lagman was then a member of its office, the OCP of San Pablo City voluntarily inhibited
itself from conducting the preliminary investigation of the libel complaint and forwarded all its
records to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor. On September 23, 2004, the Regional
State Prosecutor issued an Order designating State Prosecutor II Jorge D. Baculi as Acting City
Prosecutor of San Pablo City in the investigation of the libel complaint. On December 6, 2004,
State Prosecutor Baculi rendered a Resolution finding probable cause to file a libel case against
petitioner. On December 8, 2004, he filed an Information charging petitioner with the crime of libel.

After trial, the trial court found petitioner guilty of libel. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's
decision. On the claimed lack of publication, the CA pointed out that the defamatory matter was
made known to third persons because prosecution witnesses Flores and Enseo, who are the staff
in the OCP of San Pablo City, were able to read the Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner, as well
as Michael, son and representative of Nezer in the estafa case then being investigated by ACP
Suñega-Lagman, was furnished copy of the motion. Anent the applicability of the rule on
absolutely privileged communication, the CA ruled in the negative because the subject statements
were unnecessary or irrelevant in determining whether the dismissal of the estafa case filed by
petitioner against Nezer was proper, and they were defamatory remarks on the personality,
reputation and mental fitness of ACP Suñega-Lagman.

In a Resolution dated January 10, 2014, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the element of publication is absent and that petitioner cannot be found is
guilty of libel.

Held:

No. Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to
someone other than the person to whom it has been written. A communication of the defamatory
matter to the person defamed alone cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-
esteem, for a man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in
which other hold him. In the same vein, a defamatory letter contained in a closed envelope
addressed to another constitutes sufficient publication if the offender parted with its possession
in such a way that it can be read by person other than the offended party. If a sender of a libelous
communication knows or has good reasons to believe that it will be intercepted before reaching
the person defamed, there is sufficient publication. The publication of a libel, however, should not
be presumed from the fact that the immediate control thereof is parted with unless it appears that
there is a reasonable probability that it is hereby exposed to be read or seen by third persons.

In claiming that he did not intend to expose the Omnibus Motion to third persons, but only
complied with the law on how service and filing of pleadings should be done, petitioner conceded
that the defamatory statements in it were made known to someone other than the person to whom
it has been written. Despite the fact that the motion was contained in sealed envelopes, it is not
unreasonable to expect that persons other than the one defamed would be able to read the
defamatory statements in it, precisely because they were filed with the OCP of San Pablo City
and copy furnished to Nezer, the respondent in the estafa complaint, and the Office of the
Secretary of Justice in Manila. Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well aware that such motion is
not a mere private communication, but forms part of public record when filed with the government
office. Inasmuch as one is disputably presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence
of his act, petitioner cannot brush aside the logical outcome of the filing and service of his
Omnibus Motion.

It is not amiss to state that generally, the requirement of publication of defamatory matters is not
satisfied by a communication of such matters to an agent of the defamed person. In this case,
however, the defamatory statement was published when copy of the Omnibus Motion was
furnished to and read by Michael, the son and representative of respondent Nezer in the estafa
complaint, who is clearly not an agent of the defamed person, ACP Suñega-Lagman. Petitioner
then argues that there is no publication as to Flores and Enseo, the staff of the OCP of San Pablo
City, who had read the contents of the Omnibus Motion. In support thereof, he cites the settled
rule that "when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication
to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject
matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to publication."15 Petitioner's
argument is untenable. As mere members of the administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo
City, Flores and Enseo cannot be said to have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter
of his motion, which is to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of his Estafa complaint and to
disqualify ACP Suñega-Lagman from the preliminary investigation of the case. Their legal duty
pertains only to the clerical procedure of transmitting the motions filed with the OCP of San Pablo
City to the proper recipients.

6.Punongbayan-Visitacion vs. People, 850 SCRA 222, January 10, 2018

Facts:
Petitioner Marilou Punongbayan-Visitacion was the corporate secretary and assistant treasurer
of St. Peter's College of Iligan City. On 26 July 1999, acting on the advice of her counsel, she
wrote a letter to private respondent Carmelita P. Punongbayan claiming, among other things, that
Visitacion KNOWINGLY COMMITTED ACTS OF FALSIFICATION when she misrepresented to
the bank that her signature is essentially required in disbursements above P5,000.00. Insulted,
respondent Punongbayan filed a Complaint for Libel against Visitacion.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent Punongbayan. Aggrieved, Visitacion filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals which was denied on the ground that the promulgation of the judgment
despite Visitacion's absence was proper. Trial in absentia is permitted should the accused fail to
appear during the date of promulgation despite due notice.
Visitacion files a petition in the Supreme Court and she assails the decisions of the courts a quo
in sentencing her to one (1) year imprisonment and to pay Punongbayan P3,000,000.00 as moral
damages, claiming that they were unjust.

Issues: Whether or not the penalties given by CA were rightful

Ruling:

On the matter of imprisonment: NO, it was not rightful. A.C. No. 08-08 which allows either for
imprisonment or fine as penalty, provides that the court can choose which penalty is best fit
depending on the nature of the circumstance. In the case at bar, the Court finds that the imposition
of a fine, instead of imprisonment, is sufficient. It is noteworthy that Visitacion is a first-time
offender with no other criminal record under her name. Further, the degree of publication is not
that widespread considering that the libelous letter was circulated only to a few individuals.

On the P3,000,000.00 Penalty: YES, it is rightful. Moral damages is the amount awarded to a
person to have suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. It is given to ease
the victim's grief and suffering, and should reasonably approximate the extent of the hurt caused
and the gravity of the wrong done.

The RTC found Punongbayan entitled to moral damages because Visitacion's libelous act caused
her to suffer ridicule, sleepless nights, and moral damage. For moral damages to be awarded,
the complainant's injury should have been due to the actions of the offending party.

Here, the evidence on record justify the award of moral damages to Punongbayan. She was a
high-ranking officer of an educational institution whom Visitacion accused of criminal or improper
conduct. Such accusations were not made known only to the victim but also to other persons such
as her staff and employees of a bank the school had transactions with. Thus, Punongbayan's
reputation was besmirched and she was humiliated before her subordinates and other people.
Clearly, her reputation was tarnished after being accused of unsavory and questionable behavior,
primarily attributable to Visitacion's act of circulating the letter imputing wrongdoing of
Punongbayan.