1

TORRES v. GONZALES
July 23, 1987 (G.R. No. 76872)
PARTIES:
Petitioner: WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG
Respondents: HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS
FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he
shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in
the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released
from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales
petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres
appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him for violating the
conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they
were still on appeal.

ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner
can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon.

Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.

Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof
must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty
prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not
subject to judicial scrutiny.

*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally pardoned it was a
generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the
convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a
condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the
Government [has] such power been intrusted

*********
A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is
recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the
subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal
penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the

parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must
be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to
suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.chanrob
____________

)))))
 2

People of the Philippines Vs. Abilong

Is Art. 157 applicable to sentence of destierro?

Yes. One evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited area
specified in the judgment of conviction.

Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence of
destierro is not criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly article 157 of the said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to
persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty.
He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said article

We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was
originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs. It is clear that the
word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the
phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that
although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment,
it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the
appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of
Manila.

In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence
under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his
sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering
the City of Manila, he entered said City. (People vs. Abilong, G.R. No. L-1960, November 26,
1948)
****************
We agree.
Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms: first, the
existence of the subject firearm, and second, the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his
residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information
lies with the prosecution.11
The first element — the existence of the firearm — was indubitably established by the
prosecution. Prosecution eyewitness Acaso saw appellant shoot the victim thrice with a .38
caliber revolver.12 Appellant himself admitted that he did not turn over the gun to the security
guards in the building after the shooting.13 The same gun was recovered from the appellant
and offered in evidence by the prosecution. However, no proof was adduced by the
prosecution to establish the second element of the crime, i.e., that the appellant was not
licensed to possess the firearm. This negative fact constitutes an essential element of the
crime as mere possession, by itself, is not an offense. The lack of a license or permit should
have been proved either by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP
Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused was not a licensee of the subject firearm14 or
that the type of firearm involved can be lawfully possessed only by certain military
personnel.15 Indeed, if the means of proving a negative fact is equally within the control of
each party, the burden of proof is on the party averring said negative fact. As the Information
alleged that the appellant possessed an unlicensed gun, the prosecution is duty-bound to
prove this allegation. It is the prosecution who has the burden of establishing beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged, consistent with the basic principle
that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.16 Thus, if the non-existence of
some fact is a constituent element of the crime, the onus is upon the State to prove this
negative allegation of non-existence.17
Hence, in the case at bar, although the appellant himself admitted that he had no license for
the gun recovered from his possession, his admission will not relieve the prosecution of its
duty to establish beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's lack of license or permit to
possess the gun. In People vs. Solayao,18
G.R. No. 131592-93 February 15, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIAN CASTILLO y LUMAYRO,
***********
 3

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO CRUZ alias Rene Hapon G.R. No. 76728 August 30, 1988

the appellant maintains that the revolver and hand grenade in question did not belong to him;
nor was he in actual possession thereof at the time he was arrested. Ownership, however, is
not an essential element of the offense charged. What the law requires is merely possession
which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the
subjection of the thing to one's control and management.7

*********

Eugene C. Firaza vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179319, September 18, 2009.
Illegal possession of firearms; mission order. Permit to carry firearm is not the same as
permit to carry licensed firearm outside one’s residence. Under the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, a Mission Order is defined as “a written directive or
order issued by government authority as enumerated in Section 5 hereof to persons who
are under his supervision and control for a definite purpose or objective during a specified
period and to such place or places as therein mentioned which may entitle the bearer
thereof to carry his duly issued or licensed firearms outside of residence when so specified
therein.”
The Mission Order issued to petitioner authorized him to carry firearms “in connection
with confidential (illegible) cases assigned to [him].” Admittedly, petitioner was at Rivas’
restaurant in connection with a private business transaction. Additionally, the Mission
Order did not authorize petitioner to carry his duly issued firearm outside of his residence.
**********
Mark Clemente Vs. People:
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
the Court finds that the RTC and the CA had overlooked certain substantial facts of value to warrant a
reversal of its factual assessments. While petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense which
must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit... credence, said defense must be
given credence in this case as the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof.
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he
intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake
P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court.
the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the
P500.00 bill.[23] Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge
The twenty-three (23) pieces of... counterfeit bills allegedly seized on petitioner is not sufficient to
show intent, which is a state of mind, for there must be an overt act to manifest such intent.
Principles:
The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or
certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or
other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by... another person; (2) that the
offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or
possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.

possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For
it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said
false treasury or bank... notes
However, in this case, the non-presentation of the informant as witness weakens the prosecution's
evidence since he was the only one who had knowledge of the act which manifested petitioner's
intent to use a counterfeit bill.

**
 4

ALID VS. PEOPLE:

the change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or
to change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for unless that happens, there
could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is
required by article 1 [now Article 3] of the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied) 58

Here we find that, similar to Amara, Jr. and Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, there is no moral certainty that Alid benefitted from the transaction, with the
government or any third person sustaining damage from his alteration of the document.

The peculiar situation of this case reveals that Alid falsified the PAL Ticket just to be
consistent with the deferred date of the turnover ceremony for the outgoing and the
incoming Secretaries of the DA Central Office in Quezon City. Notably, he had no control
as to the rescheduling of the event he had to attend. Neither did the prosecution show
that he had incurred any additional benefit when he altered the document. Moreover,
after he submitted the PAL Ticket that he had used to support his liquidation for a cash
advance of ₱10,496, the public funds kept by the DA remained intact: no apparent illegal
disbursement was made; or any additional expense incurred.

Considering, therefore, the obvious intent of Alid in altering the PAL Ticket - to remedy
his liquidation of cash advance with the correct date of his rescheduled travel - we find
no malice on his part when he falsified the document. For this reason, and seeing the
overall circumstances in the case at bar, we cannot justly convict Alid of falsification of a
commercial document under paragraph 1 of Article 172.

**
Garong Vs. People:
A court interpreter who simulated a court order purportedly issued in a non-existent
judicial proceeding of the court he worked for was guilty of falsification by a private
individual. The aggravating circumstance oftaking advantage of his public office as a court
interpreter could not be appreciated against him because his public office did not facilitate
the commission of the crime.

Having concluded on the petitioner's authorship of the falsified court order, the RTC and the
CA characterized the acts of the petitioner as falsification committed by a private individual
by causing it to appear that persons had participated in the act or proceeding when they did
not in fact so participate, as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 171, Revised Penal Code.

In short, Exhibit B was a simulated court order. Considering that the proceeding relating to
Exhibit B was non-existent in the docket of the court, the acts of the petitioner constituted
falsification. Indeed, the simulation of a public or official document like a court order, done
in such a manner as to easily lead to error as to its authenticity, constitutes falsification; and
it was
not essential that the falsification should have been made in a real public or official
document.20 Based on the foregoing, the petitioner committed falsification by a · ~ private
individual in the manner as provided in paragraph 7, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code,
to wit: ',,;. xx xx 7. I ssuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an
original document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original.

**
Normallah A. Pacasum vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180314, April 16, 2009.

Falsification; elements. The “use” of a falsified document is separate and distinct from the
“falsification” of a public document. The act of “using” falsified documents is not necessarily
included in the “falsification” of a public document. Using falsified documents is punished
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is a settled rule that in the falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary
that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason
that in the falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of
the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. Thus,
the purpose for which the falsification was made and whether the offender profited or hoped
 5

to profit from such falsification are no longer material.

In the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of, and who has
used, a forged document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of falsification. The effect of a
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is offered, will thereby
prevail. A prima facie case of falsification having been established, petitioner should have
presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome such burden.
Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees Clearance under Article 171,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. For one to be convicted of falsification under said
paragraph, the followings elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public officer, an
employee, or a notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that
he falsifies a document by counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.
All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently established.
)

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6085

Section 1. Section one of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby
amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he
was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was
baptized for the first time, or, in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the
bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized
by a competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in
any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval
of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames."

88

Sec. 3. No person having been baptized with a name different from that with which he
was registered at birth in the local civil registry, or in case of an alien, registered in the
bureau of immigration upon entry, or any person who obtained judicial authority to use
an alias, or who uses a pseudonym, shall represent himself in any public or private
transaction or shall sign or execute any public or private document without stating or
affixing his real or original name and all names or aliases or pseudonym he is or may
have been authorized to use."

Commonwealth Act No. 142

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since
his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court.
The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor
in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name.
Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the

original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been
obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted.
Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register.

Section 3. No person having obtained judicial authority to use an alias or aliases shall sign or
execute any document without stating his real name and all aliases he may have been
authorized to use.

))
 6

People Vs. Estrada

No. The Court defined alias, using the case of Ursua, as a name or names used by a
person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the
first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. Hence, it ruled that, in
order to violate CA 142, there must be a sign or indication that the user intends to be
know by the alias in addition to his real name, and there must be habituality. The
repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed habitual, as it does not
amount to a customary practice or use.

The Court also ruled that the fact that Estrada was at the time the President and was
required to his true name is immaterial for CA 142 applies to all and not just to a man on
the street or to the President. The law does not make any distinction, expressly or
impliedly, that would justify a differential treatment.

The court found no merit on the argument of the People that the Sandiganbayan abused
its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information to Estrada's use of the
alias Jose Velarde on February 4, 2000, considering that there were other transactions
covered by the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto.

))
Limson vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 162205, March 31, 2014
On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the court held that respondent’s aliases
involved the names “Eugenio Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Gonzales”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez”,
“Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez”, “Eugenio J. Gonzalez”, and –
per Limson – “Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But these names contained his true names,
albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family
name in one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second names, or
the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and
unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious
names within the purview of the Anti–Alias Law; and that such names were not different
from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for
unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge
against him was justified in fact and in law.

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he was
registered at birth or baptized the first time, or to the substitute name authorized by a
competent authority; a man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly
designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but sometimes a man is
known by several different names and these are known as aliases. An alias is thus a name
that is different from the individual’s true name, and does not refer to a name that is not
different from his true name."
**
False Testimony:

G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Desi Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping. It was alleged that Tomas stated under oath that the Union Bank of the Philippines has
not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency aside from that which is filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for the
collection of sum of money with prayer of writ of replevin filed against Eddie and Eliza Tamondong
and a John Doe.
Tomas filed a motion to quash arguing that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City does not
have jurisdiction over the case as, though it was notarized in Makati, the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was used or submitted before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

HELD:
Yes, the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the case at bar.
 7

Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the
false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City,
despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true.
Ruling:
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court
to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the
court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took
place. In other words, the venue of action and of ... jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged
where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in the
complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or... relief; it may also be in a sworn certification
annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading.
In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a duly
commissioned notary public or any competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a)... he
or she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending... action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same
or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five
days therefrom to the court wherein his or her... aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed.
In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is
the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing
simultaneous remedies in... different fora.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum
Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City.
Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be
under... oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been
made in Makati City
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged
to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the
Information
Tomas' deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the
false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City,
despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were... not true.

)))

ALFONSO C. CHOA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LENI CHOA, G.R. No. 142011 March 14, 2003

Petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration,7 contending, among others, that there is no
basis to convict him of perjury because almost two years prior to the filing of the Information,
his motion to withdraw the petition for naturalization containing the alleged false statements
was granted by the MTCC, hence, the alleged false statements were no longer existing or had
become functus officio.

Both the petitioner and the Solicitor General in their respective pleadings contend that the
challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because: (a) not all the
elements of the crime of perjury are present; and (b) the withdrawal of the petition for
naturalization which contains the alleged untruthful statements bars the prosecution of
petitioner for perjury.
 8

Thus, the issue here is whether petitioner may be convicted of perjury based on the alleged
false statements he stated in his petition for naturalization withdrawn almost two years prior
to the filing of the Information for perjury.

The petition is unmeritorious.

We cannot go along with the submission of the petitioner and the Solicitor General that
petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for perjury in view of the withdrawal of the petition
for naturalization containing his false material statements. In this jurisdiction, it is not
necessary that the proceeding in which the perjury is alleged to have been committed be first
terminated before a prosecution for the said crime is commenced.18 At the time he filed his
petition for naturalization, he had committed perjury. As discussed earlier, all the elements of
the crime were already present then. He knew all along that he wilfully stated material falsities
in his verified petition. Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition without even stating any reason
therefor.19 But such withdrawal only terminated the proceedings for naturalization. It did not
extinguish his culpability for perjury he already committed. Indeed, the fact of withdrawal
alone cannot bar the State from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not
only of the Philippine naturalization law but the judicial proceedings as well. And the petition
for naturalization tainted with material falsities can be used as evidence of his unlawful act.

MONFORT III V. SALVATIERRA (CRIM)

Private respondent Ramon H. Monfort had sufficiently and reasonably explained the
circumstances surrounding the preparation and his signing of the erroneous statements in
the 1996 GIS of the MHADC. He narrated that as Vice-President of the MHADC, he signed
and certified the same under oath; that he was not, however, aware of the erroneous
statements therein at the time when he signed it; that it was LDA as MHADC's corporate
accountant which had solely prepared the 1996 GIS of the MHADC; that he always relied on
the accuracy of LDA; that he hastily signed it since, at that time, the LDA representative
was in a hurry to beat the deadline in submitting the same to the SEC; that after being
informed of the erroneous statements, the LDA sent a letter to the SEC informing the latter
of the mistakes and supplying the correct informations therein; that the erroneous
statements were due to the oversight of the LDA; and, that he admitted that he was
negligent in not carefully reading and analyzing the statements therein. [42]

The naïve reliance of the private respondents on the foregoing circumstances in executing
their respective counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998 negates willful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of
the accused.[43] Willfully means intentionally, with evil intent and legal malice, with
consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should
be received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to "knowingly."
"Deliberately" implies "meditated" as distinguished from "inadvertent acts." It must
appear that the accused knows his statement to be false or is consciously ignorant of its
truth.[44]

In this case, the private respondents believed in good faith that, based on the above-
explained events, their statements in their respective counter- affidavits dated 11 June
1998 are true and correct. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense vis-a-vis the
allegation of deliberate assertion of falsehood in perjury cases. [45]

It should also be borne in mind that perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according
to belief or conviction as to its truth. Bona fidebelief in the truth of a statement is an
adequate defense.[

PERJURY is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by
authority of law on a material matter.

Elements:

That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter;
That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath;
That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made WILLFUL AND DELIBERATE ASSERTION OF A
FALSEHOOD; and
That the sworn statement or afidavit containing the falsity is required by law to be made for a legal
purpose.
 9

The third element of perjury requires that the accused had willfully and deliberately asseted a
falsehood. A mere assertion of a false objective fact is not sufficient. It msut be deliberate and
willful.

88
DRUG CASES:
People vs. Jesusa Figueroa
Facts:

PNP received a report from an informant about drug-pushing activities of accused-appelant Figueroa
alis “Baby”. After conducting discreet surveillance operations to verify the information, PO3 Josefino
Callora of the PNP and the informant met Figueroa to order Shabu. After a week, the PNP conducted
a buy bust operation after Figueroa made contact with the informant that the shabu is already
available and agreed to deliver the drug on the same day. During the said meet-up, Figueroa showed
the shabu to PO3 Callora. When PO3 Callora was about to hand over the payment, Figueroa sensed
the presence of Police
Officers nearby and in fear, ran away with her vehicle. Thus, the act (sale of shabu) was not
consummated. There were two information filed against the accused appellant Jesusa Figueroa.
Criminal case No. 04-2432 for illegal possession, direct custody and control of dangerous drugs and
Criminal Case No. 04-2433 on illegal attempt to sell, give away, distribute and deliver dangerous
drugs. Both are in violation of Sec. 26 Article II of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding accused guilty of the offense of attempt
to sell shabu as provided under section 26 Article II of RA 9165

Held:

Under the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a crime when the offender commences
its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.[25] This definition has essentially been adopted by this Court in interpreting Section 26 of
Republic Act No. 9165. Thus in People v. Laylo,[26] we affirmed the conviction of the appellant therein
and held that the attempt to sell shabu was shown by the overt act of appellant therein of showing
the substance to the poseur-buyer. In said case, the sale was aborted when the police officers
identified themselves and placed appellant under arrest.

Accused-appellant’s contention is unmeritorious. It is settled that Section 86 of Republic Act

No. 9165 does not invalidate operations on account of the the law enforcers’ failure to
maintain close coordination with the PDEA. Thus, in People v. Berdadero,13 the Court noted
that Section 86, as well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is
silent as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the
authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust operation. This Court consequently held
that "this silence [cannot] be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the
participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest
inadmissible."14 The same conclusion was reached by this Court in People v. Roa, 15 People v.
Mantalaba16 and People v. Sabadlab.17
88

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SALIM ISMAEL

G.R. No. 208093, February 20, 2017

Del Castillo J

Salim was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 for
selling and possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).

Elements of Illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its
consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is important is that the sale transaction of drugs actually took place and that
 10

the object of the transaction is properly presented as evidence in court and is

shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused.

Elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs

[1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs;
[2] such possession was not authorized by law; and
[3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of
dangerous drugs.

The dangerous drug seized from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the
offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity and identity of the
seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved. "The chain of custody
rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.

The first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs
or related items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related
items by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature
or other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended

violator immediately upon arrest. xxx In short, the marking immediately upon
confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable
in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value.

SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago did not mark the seized drugs immediately
after they were confiscated from appellant. No explanations were given why
markings were not immediately made. At this stage in the chain, there was already
a significant break such that there can be no assurance against switching, planting,
or contamination. The Court has previously held that, "failure to mark the drugs
immediately after they were seized from the accused casts doubt on the
prosecution evidence warranting an acquittal on reasonable doubt."

Due to the apparent breaks in the chain of custody, it was possible that the seized
item subject of the sale transaction was switched with the seized items subject of
the illegal possession case. This is material considering that the imposable penalty
for illegal possession of shabu depends on the quantity or weight of the seized
drug.

Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the
arresting officers also failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was done
in the presence of the appellant. This requirement must not be brushed aside as a
mere technicality. It must be shown that the marking was done in the presence of
the accused to assure that the identity and integrity of the drugs were properly
preserved. Failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to the prosecution's
case.

The prosecution failed to:

(1) overcome the presumption of innocence which appellant enjoys;
(2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime;
(3) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs; and
(4) offer any explanation why the provisions of Section 21, RA 9165 were not
complied with.

The Court is thus constrained to acquit the appellant based on reasonable doubt.
))

Amado Saraum Vs. People

The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other

paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1)
possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting,
or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not
 11

authorized by law.10 In this case, the prosecution has convincingly established that
Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled
tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered and admitted in evidence.

Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require
a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.11 In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very
moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in
the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.12

xxx

While the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it
is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.24 Thus, failure to strictly
comply with Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an
accused person's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible.25

x x x Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such
law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will
be accorded it by the courts. x x x

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about
the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with
said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value -
to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends
on the circumstances obtaining in each case.26

The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items.27 In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been compromised
because it established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items from
the time they were first discovered until they were brought to the court for examination.
Even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and
photograph of the drug paraphernalia, this will not render Saraum's arrest illegal or the
items seized from him inadmissible. There is substantial compliance by the police as to
the required procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated items. The
succession of events established by evidence and the overall handling of the seized
items by specified individuals all show that the evidence seized were the same evidence
subsequently identified and testified to in open court.

Certainly, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation
are generally accorded full faith and credit in view of the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties and especially so in the absence of ill-motive that could be
attributed to them.28 The defense failed to show any odious intent on the part of the
police officers to impute such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and
liberty of an innocent person.29 Saraum’s mere denial cannot prevail over the positive
and categorical identification and declarations of the police officers. The defense of
denial, frame-up or extortion, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in
most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.30 As evidence that is both
negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive
evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed.31 To merit consideration, it has
to be substantiated by strong, clear and convincing evidence, which Saraum failed to do
for presenting no corroborative evidence.32
 12

Settled is the rule that, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have
been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, the findings and
conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
and will not be disturbed because it has the advantage of hearing the witnesses and
observing their deportment and manner of testifying.33 The rule finds an even more
stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA as in this case. 34 In this
case, the quantum of evidence necessary to prove Saraum 's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt had been sufficiently met since the prosecution stood on its own strength and did
not rely on the weakness of the defense. 'The prosecution was able to overcome the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

****
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MYRNA GAYOSO Y ARGUELLES

G.R. No. 206590 March 27, 2017

Whether the chain of custody was established.

RULING:

2. No. From the foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was established at all. What
we have here are individual links with breaks in-between which could not be seamlessly woven or
tied together. The so-called links in the chain of custody show that the seized shabu was not handled
properly starting from the actual seizure, to its turnover in the police station and the PDEA, as well
as its transfer to the crime laboratory for examination. The Court therefore cannot conclude with
moral certainty that the shabu confiscated from appellant was the same as that presented tor
laboratory examination and then presented in court.

Aside from the failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody, another
procedural lapse casts further uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the subject shabu. This
refers to the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the most basic procedural safeguards
relative to the custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165.

In this case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical inventory of the seized
items at the place where the search warrant was served in the presence of a representative of the
Department of Justice, nor did it photograph the same in the presence of appellant after their initial
custody and control of said drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same. Neither
was an explanation offered for such failure.
**

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
FERNANDO RANCHE HAVANA a.k.a. FERNAMDO RANCHE ABANA, January 11, 2016

G.R. No. 198450

that coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police
authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation; that in fact, even the absence of
coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust operation.17 Neither is the
presentation of the informant indispensable to the success in prosecuting drug-related
cases.18 Informers are almost always never presented in court because of the need to
preserve their invaluable service to the police. Unless their testimony is absolutely
essential to the conviction of the accused, their testimony may be dispensed with since
their narrations would be merely corroborative to the testimonies of the buy-bust team.
88

Estipona Vs. Hon. Lobrigo

Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of
guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the same
law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and
the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
 13

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all
violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.

Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon

the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the
Executive and Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power
to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province
of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws
or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the part
of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of
Court

))

Roma Drug, et al. v. Glaxo SmithKline, et al.G.R. No. 149907

Facts

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) raided
Roma Drug and five other drug stores at the request of SmithKline Beecham Research Limited
(SmithKline), the authorized local distributor for its London-based parent company. In the raid,
the NBI and BFAD seized several imported medicines sold by the drug stores, alleging that the drug
stores had violated section 3 of the Republic Act No. 8203 (Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs or
SLCD), which prohibited the sale of counterfeit drugs, defined to include an “unregistered
imported product.” The seized medicines had been imported directly by the drug stores rather than
purchased through SmithKline, who held the patents and trademarks for the drugs in the
Philippines. However, in all other respects, the seized drugs were identical to their Philippine-
registered counterparts and it was not suggested that they had been mislabeled or tampered with in
any way.

The owner of Roma Drug challenged the constitutionality of the SLCD, alleging that it violated the
right to health and the equal protection clause of the constitution.

Decision and Reasoning

The Court held that there was no issue to be resolved, as the relevant prohibitions in the SCLD had
been implicitly repealed by the Republic Act No. 9502 (the Act) in 2008. This Act had amended the
Intellectual Property Code so as to “unequivocally [grant] third persons the right to import drugs
or medicines whose patent were registered in the Philippines by the owner of the product.” While
the Act had not expressly repealed any provision of the SCLD, the SCLD’s definition of
“counterfeit” to include “unregistered imported drugs” and the criminal penalties it imposed for
selling “unregistered imported drugs” was clearly in conflict with the provisions of the Act.

However, the Court considered that had the relevant SCLD provisions been applicable, they may
have violated the constitutional right to health. The law, as written, made it a crime to import any
unregistered drug, regardless of purpose or whether the medicine was despearately needed by
patients. It did not accommodate situations where the drug was out of stock domestically, or allow
family and friends to bring necessary drugs from abroad for patients who were unable to travel
 14

and make use of the personal use exemption allowed under the SCLD. As such, it discriminated
against citizens without the financial resources to travel abroad to purchase cheaper medicines. The
law also deprived denied citizens “plausible and safe means of purchasing medicines at a cheaper
cost.” Finally, it equated importers who were motivated by altruism or love with counterfeiters and
purveyors of spurious medicines who sought to make a profit at the cost of public safety. As such,
the Court welcomed the repeal of the SCLD by means of the Act.

))
Roma Drug vs RTC
G.R. No. 149907 April 16, 2009

FACTS: The petitioner Roma Drug was among the 6 local drugstores in Pampanga raided by the
joint NBI and BFAD inspectors where various medicines were found and seized on the strength of
a search warrant issued by the RTC of Pampanga and upon the request of Glaxo Smithkline, a
registered corporation and the authorized Philippine distributor of the medicines seized from said
drugstores. The NBI proceeded in filing a complaint against petitioner for violation of Section 4 (in
relation to Sections 3 and 5) of Republic Act No. 8203, also known as the Special Law on
Counterfeit Drugs (SLCD), with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in San Fernando,
Pampanga. The law prohibits the sale of counterfeit drugs, which include an "unregistered
imported drug product". The term "unregistered" signifies lack of registration with the Bureau of
Patent, Trademark and Technology Transfer of a trademark of a drug in the name of a natural or
juridical person. The seized drugs are identical in content with their Philippine-registered
counterparts. No claim was made that the drugs were adulterated in any way or mislabeled at the
least. Their classification as "counterfeit" is based solely on the fact that they were imported from
abroad and not purchased from Philippine-registered owner of the patent or trademark of the
drugs.

Petitioner Roma Drug challenged the constitutionality of the SLCD during the preliminary
investigation but the provincial prosecutors issued a resolution recommending that Rodriguez,
the owner of Roma Drug, be charged with violation of Section 4 of the SLCD.

Thus, Roma Drug filed a Petition for Prohibition before the Supreme Court questing the RTC-
Guagua Pampanga and the Provincial Prosecutor to desist from further prosecuting Rodriguez,
and that Sections 3(b)(3), 4 and 5 of the SLCD be declared unconstitutional.

The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the trial
against Rodriguez, and the BFAD, the NBI and Glaxo Smithkline from prosecuting the petitioners.

Glaxo Smithkline and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) have opposed the petition. On the
constitutional issue, Glaxo Smithkline asserts the rule that the SLCD is presumed constitutional.
The OSG invokes the presumption of constitutionality of statutes and asserts that there is no
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution presented by the SLCD.

ISSUE: WON RA 9502 impliedly abrogates the provisions of RA 8203 (SLCD) with which the
petitioner is criminally charged? Yes

HELD: (petition granted, writ of prohibition issued, TRO made permanent)

It may be that Rep. Act No. 9502 (Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of
2008) did not expressly repeal any provision of the SLCD. However, it is clear that the SLCD's
classification of "unregistered imported drugs" as "counterfeit drugs," and of corresponding
criminal penalties therefore are irreconcilably in the imposition conflict with Rep. Act No. 9502
since the latter indubitably grants private third persons the unqualified right to import or
otherwise use such drugs. Where a statute of later date, such as Rep. Act No. 9502, clearly reveals
an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject that intention must
be given effect. When a subsequent enactment covering a field of operation co-terminus with a
prior statute cannot by any reasonable construction be given effect while the prior law remains in
operative existence because of irreconcilable conflict between the two acts, the latest legislative
expression prevails and the prior law yields to the extent of the conflict. Irreconcilable
inconsistency between two laws embracing the same subject may exist when the later law
nullifies the reason or purpose of the earlier act, so that the latter loses all meaning and function.
Legis posteriors priores contrarias abrogant.

For the reasons above-stated, the prosecution of petitioner is no longer warranted and the
quested writ of prohibition should accordingly be issued.
___

ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner, vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, G.R. No. 64785 April 29,
2009

Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech.

The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected
speech or low-value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography,
 15

false or misleading advertisement, insulting or "fighting words", i.e., those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security.

The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to
the average child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court of
Appeals, the Court expressed difficulty in formulating a definition of obscenity that would
apply to all cases, but nonetheless stated the ensuing observations on the matter:

There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California
which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. But, it would be a serious
misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in
determining what is "patently offensive." x x x What remains clear is that obscenity is an
issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on
the judge’s sound discretion.35

Following the contextual lessons of the cited case of Miller v. California,36 a patently offensive
utterance would come within the pale of the term obscenity should it appeal to the prurient
interest of an average listener applying contemporary standards.

))))))))
Fernando v CA G.R. No. 159751 December 6, 2006
Did petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene materials? We
emphasize that mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit,
or give them away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the purpose of the
law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any
of the forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The mayor’s
permit shows that Fernando was the owner of the store.
Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged in selling
and exhibiting the obscene materials. Prosecution witness Police Inspector Tababan,
who led the PNP-CIDG NCR that conducted the search, identified him as the store
attendant upon whom the search warrant was served.

00

Sec. 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

a) Illegal Numbers Game. - Any form illegal gambling activity which uses numbers or
combinations thereof as factors in giving out jackpots.

b) Jueteng. - An illegal numbers game that involves the combination of thirty-seven

(37) numbers against thirty-seven (37) numbers from number one (1) to thirty seven
(37) or the combination of thirty-eight (38) numbers in some areas, serving as a form
of local lottery where bets are placed and accepted per combination, and its variants.

c) Masiao. - An illegal numbers game where the winning combination is derived from
the results of the last game of Jai Alai or the Special Llave portion or any result
thereof based on any fictitious Jai Alai game consisting of ten (10) players pitted
against one another, and its variants.

d) Last Two. - An illegal numbers game where the winning combination is derived
from the last two (2) numbers of the first prize of the winning Sweepstakes ticket
which comes out during the weekly draw of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO), and its variants

***

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section
4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
 16

also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

1. Finally, Section 7 was left for future determination to await the application to an actual
case. But that portion of Section 7 on the double charging of a person, respectively, for
online libel and child pornography, both under RA 10175 and the Revised Penal Code (for
online libel) or under RA 10175 and RA 9775 (for child pornography) was invalidated under
the principle of double jeopardy.

Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double Jeopardy and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution:
o • Persons who commit crimes using information and communication
technologies (ICTs) face the possibility of being imprisoned more than
double the imprisonment laid down in the RPC or special law, simply by the
passage of the Cybercrime Act;
o • the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of the Act are
absolutely identical to the crimes defined in the RPC and special laws
which raises the possibility that an accused will be punished twice for the
same offense in violation of the Constitution;
o • Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes “by, through or
with the use” of ICTs in violation of the equal protection clause

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of
Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation
of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both
Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in
respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

**

Prohibited Acts

The Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act prohibits the following acts:
1. The unconsented taking of a photo or video of a person or group of persons engaged in
a sexual act or any similar activity, or capturing an image of the private area of a person,
under circumstances in which the said person has a reasonable expectation of privacy;
2. The copying or reproduction of such photo or video recording of the sexual act;
3. The selling or distribution of such photo or video recording;
4. The publication or broadcasting, whether in print or broadcast media, or the showing of
such sexual act or any similar activity through VCD/DVD, the internet, cellular phones,
and other similar means or devices without the written consent of the persons
featured.[2]
Prohibitions numbered 2, 3, and 4 will still apply even if the person or persons featured
in the photo or video consented to the taking of the photo or recording of the sexual act.

Are these materials admissible in evidence?

As a general rule, no. The record, photo or video, or copy thereof, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of this law shall not be admissible in evidence
in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
 17

However, any peace officer may secure an order of the court to use the record or
any copy thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of the
crime of photo or video voyeurism. The written order shall only be issued or
granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of
the applicant and the witnesses he/she may produce, and upon showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that photo or video voyeurism has been
committed or is about to be committed, and that the evidence to be obtained is
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution or prevention of
such, crime.

Any person

Important things to remember 1. Photo or Video Voyeurism means: a. the act of

taking a photo or video of a person/s performing a sexual act or any similar
activity without the latter's consent, under circumstances where such person/s
has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy; b. capturing an image of the
private area of a person/s without the latter's consent, under circumstances
where such person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy

(f) "Under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy"

means believe that he/she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that an
image or a private area of the person was being captured; or circumstances in which a
reasonable person would believe that a private area of the person would not be visible to
the public, regardless of whether that person is in a public or private place.

It means circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that:

1. he/she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that an image or a private area
of the person was being captured; or
2. a private area of the person would not be visible to the public, regardless of whether that
person is in a public or private place.

**

Crimes committed by public officers:

People Vs. Pantaleon

FACTS:

In 1998, Mayor Teofilo Pantaleon, Jr. and Municipal Treasurer

Jaime conspired to illegally disburse and misappropriate the public funds
of Castillejos, Zambales by falsifying the supporting documents relating to
3 fictitious or "ghost" construction projects. It further alleged that the
vouchers were not signed by municipal accountant and budget officer; that
the SB did not adopt a resolution authorizing Mayor Teofilo Pantaleon, Jr.
to enter into a contract with La Paz Construction and/or Ken Swan Tiu; and
that no project was actually undertaken.

Appellants pleaded not guilty. Prosecution presented the following

witnesses:

Engr. Ramos:

He was acting municipal engineer; he prepared 3 programs of

work upon the instruction of Vallejos but never implemented any for it was
already implemented by previous engineer, hence, disbursement not
 18

needed. Appellant instructed him to place dates earlier than Mar. 1998
although he prepared them on Mar. 1998.

SB Member Aurelio:

No market stall was constructed in the public market in 1998 and

1999, and no infrastructure project could have been made in January 1998
because it was an election period.

Bookkeeper Nida:

She reviewed vouchers in question only after the indicated

amounts had been paid. A voucher is certified by the local budget officer
and by the municipal accountant, and that without her signature, a voucher
is defective.

Ken Swan Tiu:

Owner of La Paz Construction. He did not enter into any contract

with Castillejos, and his company never received any payment. The
signatures were not his.

DEFENSE:

Vallejos:

He paid the vouchers despite the absence of the accountant's signature

because the projects were already completed and the sub-contractor was already
demanding payment and was threatening to sue him if he would not pay.

He signed the vouchers because the municipal accountant and budget officer
refused, without any valid or legal reason, to sign them.

Pantaleon:

He signed the vouchers and allowed the treasurer to pay the amounts stated
because the accountant and the budget officer were reluctant to sign; and that the
signatures of the accountant and budget officer were not important. He approved the
money because the treasure told him that there was an appropriation in the approved
annual budget.

Admitted that the SB did not adopt a resolution authorizing him to enter into a
contract. Also admitted that he entered into a contract with Baquilat without inquiring if
he was authorized by La Pa Cons.

Sandiganbayan convicted the appellants of complex crime of malversation of

public funds through falsification of public documents (Art. 217, 171, and 48).

ISSUE:

W/N the appellants committed the complex crime of malversation of public

funds through falsification of public documents.

HELD:

Yes. Falsification of public documents is a necessary means to commit the

crime of malversation.

Elements of Malversation (Art. 217) [P-CAM]

 19

1. Offender be a public officer;

Appellants were mayor and municipal treasurer

 He had the custody of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;

Any disbursement and release of public funds require their approval

 The funds or property were public funds or property for which he

was accountable;

The funds disbursed belongs to the municipality and were under the collective custody
of the officials who had to act together to disburse the funds for their intended municipal
use.

 He appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or

negligence, permitted another person to take them.

The project was never implemented.

The appellants were guilty under Art. 171, pars. 2 and 5. Par. 2 is committed
when (a) the offender causes it to appear in a document that a person or persons
participated in an act or a proceeding; and (b) that such person or persons did not in fact
so participate in the act or proceeding. Vallejos filled up the spaces for the voucher
number and the accounting entry which were required to be filled up by Nida as the
municipal accountant.

For par 5, Pantaleon and Vallejos instructed Engr. Ramos to place the dates
January 5, 1998 on the first and third programs of work, and January 14, 1998 on the
second program of work, although he prepared the programs only in March 1998.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, we AFFIRM the February 4, 2003 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25861-63, insofar as it found appellant Jaime F.
Vallejos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of the complex crime of
malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents, as defined and
penalized under Article 217 in relation with Articles 48 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

We make no pronouncement with respect to appellant Teofilo Pantaleon, Jr. whose

withdrawal of appeal has been previously granted by this Court.

Costs against appellant Vallejos.

))))

Ysidoro Vs. People

The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code[4] has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that
he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and c)
that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the
purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. [5] Ysidoro
claims that he could not be held liable for the offense under its third element because the
four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not
appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.

But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte
enacted Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001.[6] This
appropriation was based on the executive budget[7] which allocated P100,000.00 for the
SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social
Services[8] which covers the CSAP housing projects.[9] The creation of the two items
shows the Sanggunian's intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in
the annual budget.

Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods
 20

should be used for SFP's needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the
qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The target clientele of the SFP according
to its manual[10]are: 1) the moderately and severely underweight pre-school children aged
36 months to 72 months; and 2) the families of six members whose total monthly income
is P3,675.00 and below.[11] This rule provides assurance that the SFP would cater only to
the malnourished among its people who are in urgent need of the government's limited
resources.

Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to
those providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical
malversation. If Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction materials
appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither
could he distribute the food intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.

But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act
of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public
purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the
prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive
law forbids its commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and
convenience.[13] It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been
violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.

**

Anti graft

BAVARIA VS. ZOLETA

Manuel V. Baviera filed several complaints[2] against officers or directors of the Standard
Chartered Bank (SCB), Philippine Branch, including Sridhar Raman, an Indian national
who was the Chief Finance Officer of the bank, as respondents with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), to wit:
Violations of General Banking Law of 2000. The New Central Bank Act, various BSP-
Circular letters and BSP Manual Regulations, Securities Regulation Code, Corporation
Code of the Philippines, and/or Various Rules and Regulations of the SEC Labor Code of
the Philippines Violation of Anti-Money Laundering Act as Amended P.D. 1689 in
connection with Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code

Baviera claimed that he was a former employee of the bank, and at the same time, an
investor who was victimized by the officers or directors of SCB, all of whom conspired
with one another in defrauding him as well as the investing public by soliciting funds in
unregistered and unauthorized foreign stocks and securities.
On September 26, 2003, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong issued an
Order[4] granting the request of Baviera. He issued HDO No. 0193. A copy of the order
was served on the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for implementation. On the same day, the
BI issued an Order[5] implementing that of the Secretary of Justice.

Meanwhile, Secretary Datumanong went to Vienna, Austria, to attend a

conference. Undersecretary Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez was designated as Acting
Secretary of the DOJ.[6]

\
On September 28, 2003, a Sunday, Raman arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) for his trip to Singapore but was apprehended by BI agents and NAIA
officials based on the HDO of the Secretary of Justice. However, the next day,
September 29, 2003, Raman was able to leave the country via Singapore Airlines-SQ-71
at an 8:15 a.m. flight. He was to attend a conference in Singapore and to return to the
Philippines on October 2, 2003.

It turned out that Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas N. Gutierrez had verbally
allowed the departure of Raman. On the same day, Raman, through counsel, wrote
Secretary Datumanong for the lifting of the HDO insofar as his client was
 21

concerned.[7] Acting Secretary Gutierrez issued an Order[8] allowing Raman to leave the
country. In said Order, she stated that the Chief State Prosecutor had indicated that he
interposed no objection to the travel of Raman to Singapore.

On October 3, 2003, Baviera filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman
charging Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez for violation of Section 3(a), (e), and
(j) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended.

In her Counter-Affidavit, respondent Gutierrez denied the allegations against her. She
averred that she did not violate any law or rule, in allowing Raman to leave the
country. She merely upheld his rights to travel as guaranteed under the Constitution.
Moreover, the DOJ may allow persons covered by HDOs to travel abroad, for a specific
purpose and for a specific period of time.

Respondent Gutierrez requested the Office of the Ombudsman to dismiss the complaint
against her, thus:
(a) There is no basis for the complaint for violation of Section 3(a) of RA No. 3019, as
amended, because I never persuaded, induced nor influence any public officer to violate
the rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority. When I allowed Mr.
Raman to travel, I relied on Department Circular No. 17 (1998), particularly the first
Whereas Clause thereof, recognizing every person's right to travel, absent the grounds
for impairment of the right under the Constitution.

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN CLEARLY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED
THAT RESPONDENT GUTIERREZ CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE UNDER SECTION 3(a) OF
RA 3019 ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE, DOCUMENTARY OR
TESTIMONIAL, TO SHOW THAT SHE HAS RECEIVED MATERIAL REMUNERATION AS A
CONSIDERATION FOR HER USE OF INFLUENCE ON HER DECISION TO ALLOW MR.
RAMAN TO TRAVEL ABROAD.

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act

constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation
or offense.

On the merits of the petition, the Court finds that petitioner failed to establish that the
respondent officials committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must
have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.[34]

The Court has reviewed the assailed resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, and
finds that petitioner likewise failed to establish probable cause for violation of Sections
3(a), (e) and (j) of RA No. 3019. Indeed, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of
discretion, this Court will not interfere with the exercise of the Ombudsman's discretion,
who, based on his own findings and deliberate consideration of the case, either
dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it.[35]

**

G.R. No. 186421*, April 17, 2017

ROBERTO P. FUENTES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
 22

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 30,
2008 and the Resolution3 dated February 16, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case
No. 28342, which found petitioner Roberto P. Fuentes4 (Fuentes) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Article 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, entitled the
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."5

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from an Information charging Fuentes of violation of Article 3
(e) of RA 3019, the accusatory portion of which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on January 8, 2002 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at the Municipality
of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused ROBERTO P. FUENTES, a high-ranking public officer,
being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte, in such capacity and committing the offense
in relation to office, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to private complainant Fe N.
Valenzuela by then and there refusing for unreasonable length of time, to renew the
latter's Business Permit to engage in Ship Chandling Services in the Port of Isabel
without any legal basis or reason despite the fact that Fe N. Valenzuela has complied
with all the requirements and has been operating the Ship Chandling Services in the Port
of Isabel since 1993, which act caused damage to the perishable ship provisions of Fe N.
Valenzuela for M/V Ace Dragon and a denial of her right to engage in a legitimate
business thereby causing damage and prejudice to Fe N. Valenzuela.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6
On September 15, 2006, Fuentes pleaded "not guilty" to the aforesaid charge. 7

The prosecution alleged that private complainant Fe Nepomuceno Valenzuela

(Valenzuela) is the sole proprietor of Triple A Ship Chandling and General Maritime
Services (Triple A), which was operating in the Port of Isabel, Leyte since 1993 until 2001
through the Business Permits issued by the Local Government Unit of Isabel (LGU)
during the said period. However, in 2002, Fuentes, then Mayor of Isabel, refused to sign
Triple A's Business Permit, despite: (a) Valenzuela's payment of the renewal fees; (b) all
the other municipal officers of the LGU having signed the same, thereby signifying their
approval thereto; and (c) a Police Clearance8 certifying that Valenzuela had no
derogatory records in the municipality. Initially, Triple A was able to carry out its
business despite the lack of the said Business Permit by securing temporary permits
with the Port Management Office as well as the Bureau of Customs (BOC). However,
Triple A's operations were shut down when the BOC issued a Cease and Desist
Order9 after receiving Fuentes's unnumbered Memorandum10 alleging that Valenzuela
was involved in smuggling and drug trading. This caused the BOC to require Valenzuela
to secure a Business Permit from the LGU in order to resume Triple A's operations. After
securing the Memorandum, Valenzuela wrote to Fuentes pleading that she be issued a
Business Permit, but the latter's security refused to receive the same. Valenzuela
likewise obtained certifications and clearances from Isabel Chief of Police Martin F.
Tamse (Tamse),11 Barangay Captain Dino A. Bayron,12 the Narcotics Group of Tacloban
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Isabel
Police Station, and the Police Regional Office 8 of the PNP similarly stating that she is of
good moral character, a law-abiding citizen, and has not been charged nor convicted of
any crime as per verification from the records of the locality. Despite the foregoing, no
Business Permit was issued for Triple A, causing: (a) the spoilage of its goods bought in
early 2002 for M/V Ace Dragon as it was prohibited from boarding the said goods to the
vessel due to lack of Business Permit; and (b) the suspension of its operations from 2002
to 2006. In 2007, a business permit was finally issued in Triple A's favor.13

In his defense, Fuentes averred that as early as 1999, 2000, and 2001, he has been
hearing rumors that Valenzuela was engaged in illegal activities such as smuggling and
drug trading, but he did not act on the same. However, in 2002, he received written
reports from the Prime Movers for Peace and Progress and Isabel Chief of Police Tamse
allegedly confirming the said rumors, which prompted him to hold the approval of
Valenzuela's Business Permit for Triple A, and to issue the unnumbered Memorandum
addressed to port officials and the BOC. Fuentes maintained that if he went on with the
approval of such permit and the rumors turned out to be true, many will suffer and will be
victimized; on the other hand, if the rumors were false, then only one stands to suffer.
Further, Fuentes presented corroborative testimonies of other people, essentially: (a)
 23

refuting Valenzuela's claim that Triple A was unable to resume operations due to lack of
Business Permit; and (b) accusing Valenzuela of pulling out her application for Business
Permit from the Mayor's Office, which precluded Fuentes from approving the same.14
The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit. Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
As may be gleaned above, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as
follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial,
or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public
officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference
in the discharge of his functions.19

After a judicious review of the case, the Court is convinced that

the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Fuentes of the crime charged, as will be
explained hereunder.

Anent the first element, it is undisputed that Fuentes was a public officer, being the
Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte at the time he committed the acts complained of.

As to the second element, it is worthy to stress that the law provides three modes of
commission of the crime, namely, through "manifest partiality", "evident bad faith",
and/or "gross negligence." In Coloma, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,20 the Court defined the
foregoing terms as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive
or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.""Gross negligence has been so
defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons
may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless
men never fail to take on their own property."21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, there is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. On the other
hand, "evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for

some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior
purposes.22

In the instant case, Fuentes's acts were not only committed with manifest partiality, but
also with bad faith. As can be gleaned from the records, Fuentes himself testified that
according to the rumors he heard, all five (5) ship chandlers operating in the Port of
Isabel were allegedly involved in smuggling and drug trading. Yet, it was only
Valenzuela's chandling operations through Triple A that was refused issuance of a
Business Permit, as evidenced by Business Permits issued to two (2) other chandling
 24

services operators in the said port, namely: S.E. De Guzman Ship Chandler and General
Maritime Services; and Golden Sea Kers Marine Services. Moreover, if Fuentes truly
believed that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal smuggling and drug trading, then
he would not have issued Business Permits to the latter's other businesses as well.
However, and as aptly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, Fuentes issued a Business
Permit to Valenzuela's other business, Gemini Security, which provides security services
to vessels in the Port of Isabel. Under these questionable circumstances, the Court is led
to believe that Fuentes's refusal to issue a Business Permit to Valenzuela's Triple A was
indeed committed with manifest partiality against the latter, and in favor of the other ship
chandling operators in the Port of Isabel.

As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor's prerogative to
suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits pursuant to Sections 16 23 and 444
(b) (3) (iv)24 of the Local Government Code as an incident of his power to issue the same,
it must nevertheless be emphasized that: (a) the power to suspend or revoke is premised
on the violation of the conditions specified therein; and (b) the power to refuse issuance
is premised on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for said issuance. In the exercise
of these powers, the mayor must observe due process in that it must afford the applicant
or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.25

Here, it is clear that Valenzuela had complied with all the pre-requisites for the issuance
of a Business Permit for Triple A, as her application already contained the prior approval
of the other concerned officials of the LGU. In fact, Valenzuela even submitted numerous
certifications issued by various law enforcement agencies clearing her of any kind of
participation from the alleged illegal smuggling and drug trading activities in the Port of
Isabel. Despite these, Fuentes still refused to issue a Business Permit for Valenzuela's
Triple A without affording her an opportunity to controvert the rumors against her.
Worse, he even issued the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A
from conducting its ship chandling operations without a Business Permit. Quite plainly,
if Fuentes truly believed the rumors that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal
activities in the Port of Isabel, then he should have already acted upon it in the years
1999, 2000, and 2001, or when he allegedly first heard about them. However, Fuentes's
belated action only in 2002 - which was done despite the clearances issued by various
law enforcement agencies exonerating Valenzuela from such activities - speaks of
evident bad faith which cannot be countenanced.

Anent the third and last element, suffice it to say that Fuentes's acts of refusing to issue
a Business Permit in Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered
Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from engaging in its ship chandling
operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the part
of Valenzuela. Undeniably, such suspension of Triple A's ship chandling operations
prevented Valenzuela from engaging in an otherwise lawful endeavor for the year 2002.
To make things worse, Valenzuela was also not issued a Business Permit for the years
2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, as it was only in 2007 that such permit was issued in Triple
A's favor. Under prevailing case law, "[p]roof of the extent of damage is not essential, it
being sufficient that the injury suffered or the benefit received is perceived to be
substantial enough and not merely negligible."26

In view of the foregoing, Fuentes committed a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, and
hence, must be held criminally liable therefor.

((

SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and
EMERLINA MOLETA,Respondents. G.R. No. 175750-51 April 2, 2014

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

On or about 14 June 1994, petitioner, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao
del Norte, together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as loan from private respondent
Hermelina Moleta (Moleta), the sum of ₱320,000.00, to pay for the salaries of the
 25

employees of the municipality and to construct the municipal gymnasium as the

municipality’s Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) had not yet arrived. As payment,
petitioner issued three (3) Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) checks signed by Jaime
Rusillon (Rusillon), the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of General Luna: (1) Check
No. 11281104 for ₱130,000.00 dated 14 June 1994; (2) Check No. 9660500 for ₱130,000.00
dated 14 June 1994; and (3) Check No. 9660439 for ₱60,000.00 dated 11 July 1994.

Between 15 June 1994 and 18 August 1994, in several attempts on different occasions,
Moleta demanded payment from petitioner and Rusillon, but to no avail.

Thus, on 18 August 1994, Moleta deposited the three (3) LBP checks to her account in
Metrobank-Surigao Branch. Upon presentation for payment, Metrobank returned the
checks to Moleta as the checks had no funds. The following day, Moleta again deposited
the checks. This time, however, she deposited the checks to her LBP account. Upon
presentation for payment, the checks were again returned for the reason, "Signature Not
on File." Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that the municipality’s account was
already closed and transferred to Development Bank of the Philippines, and that
petitioner, the municipal treasurer, has been relieved from her position.

Hence, Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2) sets of Information against petitioner,
in the latter’s capacity as Municipal Treasurer and Rusillon, in his capacity as Municipal
Mayor of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, to wit:

(1) Criminal Case No. 24182 - Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act:

That on or about 15 June 1994, or sometime after said date, at the General Luna,
Surigao del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused
Municipal Treasurer Silverina Consigna (with Salary Grade below 27), and
Municipal Mayor Jaime Rusillon (with Salary Grace 27) did then and there, willfully
and unlawfully, with evident bad faith, in cooperation with each other, and taking
advantage of their official positions and in the discharge for the functions as
such, borrow the amount of ₱320,000.00 from one Emerlina Moleta to whom they
misrepresented to be for the municipality of General Luna, when in fact the same
is not; and fail to pay back said amount thereby causing undue injury to said
Emerlina Moleta in the amount of ₱320,000.00.2

(2) Criminal Case No. 24183 – Art. 315 of the RPC, otherwise known as Estafa:

That on or about 15 June 1994, or sometime after said date, at the General Luna,
Surigao del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Municipal Treasurer Silverina Consigna (with Salary Grade below 27), and
Municipal Mayor Jaime Rusillon (with Salary Grade 27), did then and there,
willfully and unlawfully, with evident bad faith, in cooperation with each other,
representing themselves to be transacting in behalf of the [M]unicipality of Gen.
Luna, in truth and in fact they are not, contract a loan from one Emerlina Moleta in
the amount of ₱320,000.00 for which they issued three (3) checks: LBP Check No.
11281104 dated 14 June 1994 in the amount of ₱130,000.00, LBP Check No.
9660500 dated 14 June 1994 in the amount of ₱130,000.00, and LBP Check no.
9660439 dated 11 July 1994 in the amount of ₱60,000.00, all in favor of said
Emerlina Moleta, knowing fully well that the account belongs to the Municipality of
the (sic) Gen. Luna, and that they have no personal funds [of] the same account

such that upon presentation of the said checks to the bank, the same were
dishonored and refused payment, to the damage and prejudice of said Emerlina
Moleta in the amount of ₱320,000.00.3

As defense, petitioner argued that the court a quo has no jurisdiction because (1) the
crime as charged did not specify the provision of law allegedly violated, i.e., the specific
type of Estafa; and (2) Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the
court a quo because the offense as charged can stand independently of public office and
public office is not an element of the crime.4

The court a quo admitted that the Information for violation of Estafa did not specify the
provision of law allegedly violated.5 However, based on the allegations of deceit and
 26

misrepresentation, the court a quo allowed the prosecution to indict petitioner and
Rusillon under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC.

On the charge of graft and corruption, petitioner argued that, "[w]hen allegations in the
information do not show that the official position of the [petitioner] was connected with
the offense charged, the accused is not charged with an offense in relation to her official
functions".6 Petitioner, citing Lacson v. The Executive Secretary,7 further argued:

x x x [M]ere allegation in the information "that the offense was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is a mere conclusion of
law not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense
charged and the discharge of accused’s official duties."8

Petitioner also contends that there was no fraud or misrepresentation. By demanding

payment from Rusillon, Moleta attested that there exists no fraud or misrepresentation.
In petitioner’s words, "… why will she [Moleta] insist payment from [Rusillon] if she has
no knowledge that the money loaned have reached him?"9

On the other hand, Rusillon maintained that he had no participation in the acts
committed by petitioner. Based on his testimony, he signed the three (3) checks to pay
the following: (1) payroll of the following day; (2) daily expenses of the municipal
building; (3) construction of the municipal gymnasium; and (4) health office’s medical
supplies.10 As found by the court a quo, "the only link of Rusillon to [petitioner] with
respect to the loan transaction is his signature on the three (3) checks which [petitioner]
used as security to Moleta."11

After trial, the Sandiganbayan, on 12 December 2006, found petitioner guilty, but
exonerated Rusillon. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:12

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 24182, accused SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA is found

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of the Republic Act
No. 3019, and is hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six
(6) years and one (1) month to eight (8) years.

Accused JAIME RUSILLON is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove

his guilt with moral certainty.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 24183, accused SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA is found

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, and is hereby SENTENCED to the indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as MINIMUM, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as MAXIMUM.

Accused JAIME RUSILLON is ACQUITTED as his guilt was not proven with moral
certainty.

(3) Accused SILVERIA E. CONSIGNA is ordered to pay private complainant

Emerlina F. Moleta the amount of Ph₱368,739.20 by way of actual damages;
Ph₱30,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs of suit; and

(4) The hold departure order against accused JAIME RUSILLON in connection with
these cases is hereby LIFTED.

Hence, this Petition.

Given the above disquisition, it becomes superfluous to dwell further on the issue raised
by petitioner that Sec. 3(e) applies only to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or other concessions.
Nonetheless, to finally settle the issue, the last sentence of the said provision is not a
restrictive requirement which limits the application or extent of its coverage. This has
long been settled in our ruling in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,38 where we categorically
declared that a prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie
 27

regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is "charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions." Quoted hereunder is an excerpt from
Mejorada:39

Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any
public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without
distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the
view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e)
is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic) or
government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not
come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying
exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or
other concessions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The above pronouncement was reiterated in Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,40 where the Court
affirmed the Mejorada ruling that finally puts to rest any erroneous interpretation of the
last sentence of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law.

All the elements of the crimes as charged are present in the case at bar.1âwphi1 All told,
this Court finds no justification to depart from the findings of the lower court. Petitioner
failed to present any cogent reason that would warrant a reversal of the Decision
assailed in this petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan

((

.R. Nos. 182020-24

JOEY P. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN-FOURTH DIVISION and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

The Information in Criminal Case No. 27944 states:

That on January 11, 1996 or thereabout, in Parañaque City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public Officers JOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high
ranking public official, being the City Mayor of Parañaque City and Chairman, Committee
on Awards, together with the members of the aforesaid Committee, namely: SILVESTRE
DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26),
FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget Officer (SG 26), OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC
General Services Office (SG 26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor
(SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties and
taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another and with the accused private individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner
and proprietor of ZARO Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of
Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very
least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions, through
personal canvass, with said ZARO Trading, for the purchase of 5,998 pieces of "walis
ting-ting" at ₱25 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-96-12-8629 in the total
amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(₱149,950.00), without complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and
Regulations and other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, and which
transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the "walis
ting-ting" was only ₱11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision
No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, of ₱14.00 per piece or a
total overpriced amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO
PESOS (₱83,972.00), thus, causing damage and prejudice to the government in the
aforesaid sum.

The Information in Criminal Case No. 27946 states:

Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:

 28

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers—In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(g) Entering on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction, manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or
will profit thereby.

For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1)
that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on
behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.17

The presence of the first two elements of the crime is not disputed. Hence, the threshold
question we should resolve is whether the walis tingting purchase contracts were
grossly and manifestly injurious or disadvantageous to the government.

We agree with petitioners that the fact of overpricing is embedded in the third criminal
element of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Given the factual milieu of this case, the
subject contracts would be grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government if
characterized by an overpriced procurement. However, the gross and manifest
disadvantage to the government was not sufficiently shown because the conclusion of
overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven. Thus, we grant the
petitions.

In criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of an accused must be

established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.18 The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined disputable presumption
of innocence.19 The court, in ascertaining the guilt of an accused, must, after having
marshaled the facts and circumstances, reach a moral certainty as to the accused’s guilt.
Moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.20 Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted.

In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COA’s finding of
overpricing which was, in turn, based on the special audit team’s report. The audit team’s
conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the
following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting without handle
actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on the walis tingting
accomplished by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where
the audit team purchased walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement
Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las Piñas City.
These documents were then compared with the documents furnished by petitioners and
the other accused relative to Parañaque City’s walis tingting transactions.

Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence of
the prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers
of Parañaque City. In fact, even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners
and the other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by the
Parañaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At the
barest minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in order to substantiate the

allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in
1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases were
disadvantageous to the government because only then could a determination have been
made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make a public
official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.

1. First and foremost, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioners guilty of
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.

Rios Vs. Sandiganbayan

 29

G.R. No. 129913 September 26, 1997

DINDO C. RIOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, and THE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNOR OF ROMBLON, respondents.

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated
March 24, 1997, granting the motion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to
suspend petitioner Dindo C. Rios pendente lite, and its resolution dated June 25, 1997
denying his Motion for Reconsideration.

On March 6, 1996, an information was filed against petitioner who is the incumbent
Mayor of the Municipality of San Fernando, Romblon for alleged unauthorized
disposition of confiscated lumber, in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information alleged:

That on or about May 16, 1994, in San Fernando, Romblon, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, a public officer, . .
. while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and with
evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the
disposition of confiscated, assorted and sawn tanguile lumber consisting of 1,319
pieces without proper authority therefor, thus, causing undue injury to the
Government.

Before his arraignment, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash Information and Recall
Warrant of Arrest," dated August 4, 1996, on the ground that the information was invalid
as there was no probable cause to hold him liable for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019.1

On September 16, 1996, the OSP filed a "Motion to Suspend Accused (herein
petitioner) Pendente Lite," to which petitioner filed an "Opposition," reiterating the same
ground stated in his motion to quash.

The Sandiganbayan overruled the argument in its resolution of October 14, 1996.
Thereupon, petitioner filed a verified petition with this Court which was docketed as G.R.
No. 126771. Among the issues raised was the alleged invalidity of the information. The
Court resolved to deny this petition on December 4, 1996 on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan committed to grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned
judgment.

When the petitioner was arraigned on January 20, 1997, he entered a plea of "not guilty"
no longer questioning the validity of the information against him.

On March 24, 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the OSP's motion to suspend petitioner
in an order which provides in part:

WHEREFORE, accused Dindo C. Rios is ordered suspended from his position as

Mayor of the Municipality of San Fernando, Romblon and from any other public
position he may be holding for a period of ninety (90) days counted from receipt of

this Resolution. The Honorable Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, Quezon City, and the Provincial Governor of Romblon, Romblon are
ordered furnished with copies of this Resolution so that they may implement the
same and report on their actions thereon.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in a

resolution dated June 25, 1997. Hence, this petition.

In support of his petition, petitioner posits the following arguments:

 30

I. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN

IT RULED THAT THE FACTS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION CONSTITUTE A
VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 3019.

II. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN

IT PROVIDED FOR SUSPENSION OF NINETY (90) DAYS IN CLEAR DISREGARD
OF THE PROVISION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE.

The first argument propounded by petitioner has already been passed upon by this Court
when it held that the act of disposing of confiscated lumber without prior authority from
DENR and the Sangguniang Bayan constituted a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
3019.2 Therefore, there is probable cause to hold petitioner liable for such act, for which
the information was validly filed. Although any further discussion of this issue would be
unnecessary, the Sandiganbayan's ruling is herein reiterated as a reminder to public
officials of their crucial role in society and the trust lodged upon them by the people.

The act complained of in this case is "the disposition (by petitioner) of confiscated,
assorted and sawn lumber consisting of 1,319 pieces without proper authority therefor,
thus causing undue injury to the Government."

Petitioner maintains that the mere fact that he acted beyond the scope of his authority by
selling the confiscated lumber without the prior approval of the DENR through its
Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices and without a resolution from
the Sangguniang Bayan, does not constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
What renders the disposition of lumber contrary to law is any resulting "undue injury"
which, however, is absent in this case because the proceeds of the dispositions went to
the coffers of the Municipal Government.

On the other hand, we find merit in petitioner’s second assigned error. The
Sandiganbayan erred in imposing a 90 day suspension upon petitioner for the single
case filed against him. Under Section 63 (b) of the Local Government Code, “any single
preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60)
days.” (Rios v. Sandiganbayan; GR 129913, Set. 26, 1997)

)))))))

PEOPLE v. HENRY GO G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014 Corrupt practices of public
officers, R.A. 3019, Conspiracy MARCH 18, 2019

FACTS:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information
filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No.
3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Herein respondent was indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted
because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.

Thus, in an Information, respondent was charged before the Sandiganbayan.

Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that
the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019.

It appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his
alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was
 31

filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the SB granted the
Motion to Quash and the Information filed was ordered quashed and dismissed.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy
in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged
to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.

RULING: The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x x

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or
will profit thereby.

The elements of the above provision are:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of
the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer.

The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted
together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already
died, the private person may be indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for

conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them
pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they
are jointly responsible therefor.

This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution
or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by
each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or
insane at the time of trial.

The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the
survivor or survivors.
Fact:
An Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court’s which nullified the
various contracts awarded by the Government. Subsequent to the Decision, a certain
Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals
for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was
then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then
DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent
for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable
cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the
issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order
to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
 32

person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public
official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused
in this case. The Sandiganbayan grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in
this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed. Hence this case.

Issue:
Whether the death of a Public Officer in a crime extinguishes the Liability of his co-
conspirators

Held:
No, It is true that by reason of death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the
allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of public
officer is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove
the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated
differently, the death of a public officer does not mean that there was no public officer
who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019, that there was probable cause to the
public officer for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his
death, he should have been charged. The requirement before a private person may be
indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private
person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the
private person may be indicted alone.

)))))))))))))))
 33

brgy. Captain Rodomeil Domingo Vs. Ombudsman

The antecedent facts follow.

A complaint-affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman by Sangguniang

Kabataan (SK) officials Kathryn Joy Paguio, Allan Jay Esguerra and Neil Patrick Celis
(respondents) against petitioner as Barangay Chairman and Barangay Treasurer Fe T. Lao
(Lao), both of Barangay 686, Zone 75, District V, Manila, for malversation, falsification of
public document, dishonesty and grave misconduct.5

Respondents alleged that petitioner and Lao misappropriated the cash advance taken by
respondents from the SK funds amounting to ₱16,784.00 in the year 2002. They added that
petitioner gave a false statement in his Justification supporting the 2003 Barangay Budget
and Expenditures by declaring that his barangay had no incumbent SK officials at that time
contrary to the fact that respondents are duly elected and incumbent SK officials of
the barangay.6

In support of their claims, respondents presented as evidence: (1) the Audit Observation
Memorandum dated 9 February 2004 issued by the Office of the City Auditor of Manila;7 (2)
the photocopy of the certified true copy of the allegedly falsified Justification;8 (3) the
certificate of canvass of voters and proclamation of the winning candidates for SK Chairman
and Council members during the SK election on 15 July 2002;9 and (4) the affidavit of
Esguerra, Danilo Baldivia and Paolo Tagabe attesting to the fact that their services were hired
by respondent Paguio to paint the barangay sidewalk.10

Petitioner denied the allegations in his counter-affidavit and asserted that all financial
transactions of the barangay, particularly the expenditures, were supported by pertinent
documents and properly liquidated. He explained that the check covering the sum of
₱16,784.00, the object of the alleged misappropriation, had been properly liquidated with the
submission of pertinent documents as of 26 June 2003.11

In his reply-affidavit, petitioner questioned the authenticity of the Justification in that his
signature therein was forged.12

The OMB rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No.
6713, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Barangay Chairman Rodomiel J. Domingo of Barangay

686, Zone 75, District V, Manila, GUILTY of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. [No.] 6713, he
should be meted the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six (6) months
pursuant to Section 11 of the same Act.

The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment. The
provision commands that "public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill." Said
provision merely enunciates "professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by
public servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political
neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to
democracy and simple living. Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of
R.A. No. 6713 adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of incentives and
rewards to officials and employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based
on their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4. In other words, under the
 34

mandated incentives and rewards system, officials and employees who comply with the high
standard set by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot expect the same
favorable treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have to
be sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the
Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for administrative disciplinary action only acts
"declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code." Rule X specifically mentions at least twenty-
Failure to
three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for administrative disciplinary action.
abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of R.A. No.
6713 is not one of them.
Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and
employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and
execution of official duties:

_______

RA 6713

Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure. - (a) The designated Committees of both Houses of
the Congress shall establish procedures for the review of statements to determine whether said
statements which have been submitted on time, are complete, and are in proper form. In the event a
determination is made that a statement is not so filed, the appropriate Committee shall so inform the
reporting individual and direct him to take the necessary corrective action.

The Facts and the Case

Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 259, investigators of the Department of Finance (DOF) Revenue
Integrity Protection Service (RIPS) made lifestyles check of DOF officials and employees. As a result
of these investigations, the DOF charged petitioner Liberato Carabeo, Parañaque City Treasurer,
before the Office of the Ombudsman for violations of Section 7 in relation to Section 8 of Republic
Act (R.A.) 3019 and Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The informations filed with the
Sandiganbayan totaled eight in all. These, in essence, accused Carabeo of failing to disclose
several items in his sworn SALN filed over the years.

Two informations, docketed as Criminal Cases SB-09-CRM-0034 and 0039, were raffled to the
Sandiganbayan’s Fourth Division. They charged Carabeo with failing to disclose personal properties
consisting of three motor vehicles, misdeclaring the acquisition cost of a real property in Laguna, and
falsely declaring his net worth in his SALN for 2003.

At the pre-trial of these cases, Carabeo submitted his Pre-Trial Brief, proposing the following issues
for trial:

1. Whether or not the accused was allowed to previously exercise his right to be informed
beforehand and to take the necessary corrective action on questions concerning his
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN, for brevity), as provided under Section
10 of Republic Act No. 6713 before the instant charges were filed against him;

Carabeo asserts that he was entitled to be informed of any error in his SALN and given the
opportunity to correct the same pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. 6713.

Carabeo claims that his head office, the DOF, should have alerted him on the deficiency in his SALN
and given him the chance to correct the same before any charge is filed against him in connection
with the same. But, the Sandiganbayan, citing Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG),4held that the review of the SALN by the head of
office is irrelevant and cannot bar the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting an independent
investigation for criminal violations committed by the public official or employee.

Carabeo contends, however, that the head of office has a mandatory obligation to inform him of
defects in his SALN and give him the chance to correct the same. Further, he cannot be subjected to
any sanction until such obligation has been complied with. Carabeo points out that Pleyto could not
apply to him because the authority that reviewed the SALN in Pleyto was not the head of office.
Although the respondents involved in that case were employees of the Department of Public Works
and Highways, it was the Philippine National Police that investigated and filed the complaints against
them. Carabeo points out that, in his case, it was the DOF-RIPS, headed by the Secretary of
 35

Finance, which filed the complaints against him with the Office of the Ombudsman. As city treasurer,
Carabeo reports to the Bureau of Local Government Finance under the Secretary of Finance.

But what Carabeo fails to grasp is that it was eventually the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOF-
RIPS, that filed the criminal cases against him before the Sandiganbayan. That office is vested with
the sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or on complaint of any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office, or agency when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.5 The Office of the Ombudsman could file the informations
subject of these cases without any help from the DOF-RIPS.

True, Section 10 of R.A. 6713 provides that when the head of office finds the SALN of a subordinate
incomplete or not in the proper form such head of office must call the subordinate’s attention to such
omission and give him the chance to rectify the same. But this procedure is an internal office matter.
Whether or not the head of office has taken such step with respect to a particular subordinate cannot
bar the Office of the Ombudsman from investigating the latter.6 Its power to investigate and
prosecute erring government officials cannot be made dependent on the prior action of another
office. To hold otherwise would be to diminish its constitutionally guarded independence.

Further, Carabeo’s reliance on his supposed right to notice regarding errors in his SALNs and to be
told to correct the same is misplaced. The notice and correction referred to in Section 10 are
intended merely to ensure that SALNs are "submitted on time, are complete, and are in proper form."
Obviously, these refer to formal defects in the SALNs. The charges against Carabeo, however, are
for falsification of the assets side of his SALNs and for declaring a false net worth. These are
substantive, not formal defects. Indeed, while the Court said in Pleyto that heads of offices have the
duty to review their subordinates’ SALNs, it would be absurd to require such heads to run a check on
the truth of what the SALNs state and require their subordinates to correct whatever lies these
contain. The responsibility for truth in those SALNs belongs to the subordinates who prepared them,
not to the heads of their offices.

Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in excluding from its pre-trial order the
first and fourth issues that Carabeo proposed.

))))))
 36

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560 November 19,2001
FACTS:
 An information is filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. 'Asiong
Salonga' and 'Jose Velarde,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas and John Does & Jane
Does of the crime of Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder)
 June, 1998 to January 2001: Estrada himself and/or in connivance/conspiracy with his
co-accused, who are members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue advantage
of his official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself,
directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth of P4,097,804,173.17 thereby unjustly enriching
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines, through any or a combination or a series of overt or
criminal acts, or similar schemes or means
 Received P545,000,000.00 in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form
of pecuniary benefit, by himself and/or in connection with co-accused Charlie 'Atong'
Ang, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does
and Jane Does, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling
 Diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or misusing directly or indirectly,
for his or their personal gain and benefit, public funds of P130,000,000.00, more or
less, representing a portion of P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance
with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does & Jane Does
 For His Personal Gain And Benefit, The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
To Purchase 351,878,000 Shares Of Stocks, More Or Less, And The Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 Shares Of Stock, More Or Less, Of The Belle Corporation
worth P1,102,965,607.50 and P744,612,450.00 respectively and by collecting or
receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance with John Does and
Jane Does, commissions or percentages by reason of said purchases which became
part of the deposit in the equitable-pci bank under the account name “Jose Velarde”
 by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares, percentages,
kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary benefits, in connivance with John Does and Jane
Does, P3,233,104,173.17 and depositing the same under his account name “Jose
Velarde” at the Equitable-Pci Bank

Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to so classify it

plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent (mens rea)

o Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense.
o In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court.
 indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility
of the offender is determined by his criminal intent
 37

o The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se

THE WELLEX GROUP BORROWED FROM THE JOSE VELARDE ACCOUNT (IMA ACCOUNT) BEING
MANAGED BY BDO P500,000,000.00 AND AS SECURITY MORTGAGED TO BDO WPI SHARES. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN CONVICTED PRES. ESTRADA OF PLUNDER AND DECLARED THAT THE WPI SHARES
AMONG OTHERS ARE FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF THE GOVT. THE JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL.
SANDIGANBAYAN WAS ABOUT TO SELL AT PUBLIC AUCTION THE WPI SHARES. THE WELLEX GROUP
FILED A CASE AT RTC TO STOP THE AUCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THEY ALREADY PAID THEIR LOAN
DIRECTLY TO JOSE VELARDE AND THEREFORE THEY SHOULD GET BACK THEIR COLLATERAL, THE WPI
SHARES. RTC DISMISSED THE CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION AND FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
RULE ON HIERARCHY OF COURT

Petitioner The Wellex Group, Inc. (Wellex) assails the mentioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan,
alleging that the latter unduly included 450 million shares of stock of Waterfront Philippines, Inc. in
the forfeiture proceedings ordered under respondent’s Amended Writ of Execution in Criminal Case
No. 26558. Petitioner asserts that the subject shares of stock should not be forfeited as part of the
execution process in the plunder case, because Wellex is not a party to the case. Thus, it avers that
the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Resolutions,
which included the shares for forfeiture.

It was established during the trial of the plunder case that the source of funding for the loan
extended to Wellex was former President Estrada, who had in turn sourced the fund from S/A 0160-
62501-5 and coursed it through IMA Trust Account 101-78056-1. After his conviction for the crime of
plunder, the IMA Trust Account under the name of Jose Velarde was forfeited. As a consequence,
all assets and receivables of the said trust account were also included in the forfeiture, which was
without any legal basis.

No less than Movant had admitted that while the Decision of the Court includes forfeiture of a
specific sum, the Plunder Law limits this only to property derived or traceable to the instruments or
proceeds of the crime.

Not only does the Plunder Law authorize the forfeiture of the ill-gotten wealth as well as any asset
acquired with the use of the ill-gotten wealth, Section 6 likewise authorizes the forfeiture of these ill-
gotten wealth and any assets acquired therefrom even if they are in the possession of other persons.
Thus, Section 6 provides:

"Section 6. Prescription of Crimes – The crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty
(20) years. However, the rights of the State to receive properties unlawfully acquired by public
officers from them or from their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches,
or estoppel."39

Even petitioner admits that the amount of P506,416,666.66 was deposited to S/A 0160-62501-5 via
a credit memo, and that P500 million was subsequently withdrawn from the said savings account,
deposited to IMA Trust Account No. 101-78056-1, and then loaned to petitioner. The

Sandiganbayan made a categorical finding that former President Estrada was the real and beneficial
owner of S/A 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde.

****

Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco GR No. 18343, 30 September 1965

FACTS:
Defendants Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department
of Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank to produce at a hearing the records
of the bank deposits of Ernesto Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In
declining to reveal its records, the plaintiff bank invoked Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405.

On the other hand, the defendants cited Section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act No. 3019) in support of their claim of authority,which allegedly provides an
additional ground for the examination of bank deposits.
 38

ISSUE:
Whether Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides an additional ground for the
examination of bank deposits.

HELD:
Yes. The truth is that these laws are so repugnant to each other than no reconciliation is
possible. x x x. The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended
to amend section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule
against the disclosure of bank deposits.

x x x [W]hile section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely

confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances:
(1) Upon written permission of the depositor;
(2) In cases of impeachment;
(3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials;
(4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of
unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty x x x.

Section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by
providing an additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.
Facts: Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of
Justice, required the Philippine National Bank to produce at a hearing the records of the
bank deposits of Ernesto Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth.

PNB refused to disclose his bank deposits, invoking Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405. On
the other hand, the prosecutors cited the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, particularly
Section 8 therewith, to wit:

“Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. – If in accordance with the provisions of RA

1379, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in
his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly
out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for
dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such
public official, may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate
means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the
enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.” PNB then
filed an action for declaratory judgment in the CFI of Manila which ruled that Section 8 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act clearly intended to provide an additional ground for the
examination of bank deposits. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not a bank can be compelled to disclose the records of accounts of a
depositor who is under investigation for unexplained wealth

Held : Yes. While Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are “absolutely
confidential … and may not be examined, inquired or looked into,” , the Anti-Graft Law
directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits shall be taken into consideration
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary

While No reconciliation is possible between Republic Act No. 1405 and Republic Act No.
3019 as the two laws are so repugnant to each other. Thus, while Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are “absolutely confidential … and, therefore, may not
be examined, inquired or looked into,” except in those cases enumerated therein, Section 8
of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-graft law) directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits
“shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary.” The only conclusion possible is that Section 8 of the Anti-
Graft Law is intended to amend Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing an additional
exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.

With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making bank
deposits confidential, it is enough to point out that while Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405
 39

declares bank deposits to be “absolutely confidential,” it nevertheless allows such disclosure

in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of
impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty
of public officials; (4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject of the litigation.

Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no
reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank

deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to
the other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any
person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as
relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.

___

EJERCITO
V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 157294-95
Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. NO. 157294-95
DATE: November 30, 2006
FACTS:
The Special Prosecution Panel filed before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena directing the President of Export and
Industry Bank (EIB, formerly Urban Bank) or his/her authorized representative to produce
documents relating to Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account of President Estrada. The
SB granted the request.

Estrada filed a Motion to Quash the subpoenas claiming that his bank accounts are covered
by R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the
exceptions stated therein. He further claimed that the specific identification of documents in
the questioned subpoenas, including details on dates and amounts, could only have been
made possible by an earlier illegal disclosure thereof by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the then Urban Bank. The
disclosure being illegal, petitioner concluded, the prosecution in the case may not be allowed
to make use of the information. The SB denied the motion.

ISSUE/S:
1. Is the Trust Account covered by the term “deposit”under the Bank Secrecy Law?
2. Are the Trust and Savings Accounts of Estrada excepted from the protection of the Bank
Secrecy Law?
3. Does the fruit of poisonous tree principle apply?

RULING:
1. YES. The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term “deposits,”as used in
R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the
trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term
“deposits”used therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which
give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank. If the money
deposited under an account may be used by banks for authorized loans to third persons, then
such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the
depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to
protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the country.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between
Estrada and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers “deposit, placement or
 40

investment of funds”by Urban Bank for and in behalf of Estrada. The money deposited under
Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to
be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405
would encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by banks in
other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.

The phrase “of whatever nature”proscribes any restrictive interpretation of

“deposits.”Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the
law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This
further shows that the law was not intended to apply only to “deposits”in the strict sense of
the word. Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase “or invested.”
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.

2. YES. The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there being recognized
exceptions thereto, as abovequoted Section 2 provides. In the present case, two exceptions
apply, to wit: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in

cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

Estrada contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, his accounts are
not excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405. He is wrong. Cases of unexplained wealth are
similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes
of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to
one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion that
a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the
full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny. An
examination of the “overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)”of R.A. No. 7080 would
make the similarity between plunder and bribery even more pronounced since bribery is
essentially included among these criminal acts. Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the
exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.

The plunder case now pending with the SB necessarily involves an inquiry into the
whereabouts of the amount purportedly acquired illegally by former President Joseph
Estrada. In light then of this Court’s pronouncement in Union Bank, the subject matter of the
litigation cannot be limited to bank accounts under the name of President Estrada alone, but
must include those accounts to which the money purportedly acquired illegally or a portion
thereof was alleged to have been transferred. Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No.
0116-17345-9 in the name of petitioner fall under this description and must thus be part of
the subject matter of the litigation.

In sum, exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against former President Estrada
is analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while exception (2) applies because the money
deposited in petitioner’s bank accounts is said to form part of the subject matter of the same
plunder case.

3. NO. The “fruit of the poisonous tree”principle, which states that once the primary source
(the “tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence
(the “fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible, does not apply in this case. In the first place,
R.A. 1405 does not provide for the application of this rule. R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere
provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained
therefrom inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, there is no basis for applying the same in this
case since the primary source for the detailed information regarding petitioner’s bank
accounts—the investigation previously conducted by the Ombudsman—was
lawful.

))
 41

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian,
and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape
and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several
dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to
escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral,
exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China
Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be
made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it
amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the
writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of
Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and
award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show
that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if
it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being
unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law
failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as
the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking
System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the
foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws
because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain
his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a
transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to
a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest
like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides
that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”

NOTES:
– On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured
petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg
Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to
rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989.
On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli
was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from
Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303,
US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account —
 42

China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money

(P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the
complainant.

Republic v Judge Eugenio G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008

Facts: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to
inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and
Cheng Yong before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of
Appeals Justice) Sixto Marella, Jr. The application was docketed as AMLC No. 05-
005. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy Director of the AMLC, Richard
David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the AMLC. [14] Thereafter, on 4
July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting

the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez,
Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed
p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank accounts, details of which
appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to the offense of violation of Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of criminal prosecution before the
Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations, Exhibits C, D, E, F, and G Pursuant to
the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and examine the
deposits, investments and related web accounts of the four.[16]
Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-Ignacio,
wrote a letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts
of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter
adverted to probable cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the
commission of unlawful activities that were committed a in relation to the criminal cases
then pending before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on
why the investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above
criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. In response to the letter of the Special
Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121 Series of
2005,[19] which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to inquire into and examine
the accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank
and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The Resolution
characterized the memorandum attached to the Special Prosecutors letter as extensively
justif[ying] the existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and
entities mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of Sections
3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.
Issue: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.

Held: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated.
Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank
accounts may be examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial; namely
when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the
examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception
to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as
well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the
AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of
violation of the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable cause that the
deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the
law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where
there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for
ransom,[certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,hijacking
and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no
need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts. It
cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under
Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank
Secrecy Act which is when money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional
 43

relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a full-blown
trial. Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank
Secrecy Act it does not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle
established in the older law that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature. Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely
confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to
above.

))

EN BANC

[ AM No. CTA-01-1, Apr 02, 2002 ]

ATTY. SUSAN M. AQUINO v. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA

The present administrative case filed with this Court originated from a sworn affidavit-
complaint 1 of Atty. Susan M. Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA), charging Judge Ernesto Acosta, Presiding Judge of the same court, with
sexual harassment under R.A. 7877 and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Code
of Professional Responsibility.

In her affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged several instances when respondent judge

sexually harassed her.

On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation in the United States,
bringing gifts for the three judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon of the
same day, he entered her room and greeted her by shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled
her towards him and kissed her on her cheek.

On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by
phone, saying he will get something in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room,
shook her hand and greeted her, "Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and
kissed her. She was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away. Complainant
submitted the Joint Affidavit 2 of Ma. Imelda C. Samonte and Anne Benita M. Santos, CTA
Tax Specialists, to prove that respondent went to her office that day.

On the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she
could see him in his chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived
there, respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to evade his sexual attempt. She then
resolved not to enter his chambers alone.

Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the
CTA, while complainant and her companions were congratulating and kissing each other,
respondent suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her.

In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called complainant, requesting her to go
to his office. She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany her.
Fortunately, when they reached his chambers, respondent had left.

The last incident happened the next day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent called
complainant and asked her to see him in his office to discuss the Senate bill on the CTA. She
again requested Ruby to accompany her. The latter agreed but suggested that they should
act as if they met by accident in respondents office. Ruby then approached the secretarys
table which was separated from respondents office by a transparent glass. For her part,
complainant sat in front of respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to know
about the Senate bill. Respondent seemed to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at
Ruby who was searching for something at the secretary's desk. Forthwith, respondent
approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and stepped out of the office. When
he returned, Ruby said she found what she was looking for and left. Respondent then
approached complainant saying, me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa. Thereupon, he
tried to grab her. Complainant instinctively raised her hands to protect herself but
 44

respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him and kissed her. She pushed him
away, then slumped on a chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and
covered his face with his hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself
inside a comfort room. After that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a
note 3 stating, sorry, it wont happen again.

In his comment, respondent judge denied complainants allegation that he sexually

harassed her six times. He claimed that he has always treated her with respect, being the
head of the CTA Legal Staff. In fact, there is no strain in their professional relationship.

Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent judge demanded,
requested or required any sexual favor from complainant in exchange for favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or privileges specified under Section 3 of R.A.
7877. Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics or the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

While we exonerate respondent from the charges herein, however, he is admonished not to
commit similar acts against complainant or other female employees of the Court of Tax
Appeals, otherwise, his conduct may be construed as tainted with impropriety.

We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront
to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and
accuse her superior of sexual harassment. However, her assessment of the incidents is
misplaced for the reasons mentioned above.

Exonerated but advised to be more circumspect in his deportment

BONIFACIO NIEVA Y MONTERO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 188751, 2016-11-16

Facts:
On October 28, 2005, at around six o'clock in the evening, Luna and Raymundo were doing
carpentry works for Judy at Kaunlaran, Hernandez, Catmon, Malabon City. Judy was
supervising the construction of her nipa hut when Nieva arrived and approached her.[7] Judy
was then the President of the Catmon Homeowners Association. Nieva inquired on the
electrification project of the Homeowners Association, to which Judy replied that the matter
was already taken care of by the Manila Electric Company (MERALC0).[8] However, Nieva
suddenly shouted at Judy and cursed her saying: "Mga putang ina nyo, lima kayo mga
president kayo, kung gusto nyo magkaroon ng mga problema, bibigyan ko kayo ng mga
problema ngayon."[9] He then drew a .357 caliber revolver (wrapped in a white piece of cloth)
from his waist.[10] Overwhelmed with fear, Judy clung to Luna's back and used him as a
 45

shield against Nieva.[11]Nieva, who was about two arms' length away, pointed his gun at Judy
and fired several times but the gun jammed.[12] At this point, Raymundo, who was at the roof
of the nipa hut, jumped from the hut to help her aunt, Judy. However, before Raymundo
reached Judy, he heard a gunshot and saw Judy fall to the ground.[13] As she simultaneous
fell, Judy was able to push Luna towards Nieva. Luna and Nieva then grappled for the gun.
With the help of Raymundo, Luna seized the gun from Nieva.[14]
Issues:
Nieva had no intent to kill Judy, thus, he should only be convicted of physical injuries.
Ruling:
Nieva submits that he has no intent to kill Judy considering that the gun was pointed to the
ground when it was fired and Judy's wound was not fatal.
Nieva's contentions are untenable.In Rivera v. People,[52] we explained that intent to kill may
be proved by: (a) the means used by the malefactors; (b) the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim; (c) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; (d) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed; and (e) the motives of the accused.[53]We concur with the findings of the CA that
intent to kill was present.[54] It is undisputed that Nieva used a gun, a deadly weapon, in
assaulting Judy. At that time, Judy was unarmed and could not have defended herself. Nieva
fired the gun several times towards Judy. If the bullets had not jammed, Nieva could have
killed Judy through multiple gunshot wounds. As it was, the gun's bullets jammed and the gun
fired only once; albeit, leaving Judy with a wound on her upper right leg, which according to
Dr. Serrano could have caused her death if not for the timely medical intervention at the MCU
Hospital. Prior to the incident, Nieva also admitted that there had been several quarrels
between him and Judy.[55] These circumstances showing the weapon used, the nature of the
wound sustained by Judy, and the conduct of Nieva before and during the incident, manifest
Nieva's intent to kill Judy.
Nieva repeatedly uses the testimony of Judy that the gun was aimed at the ground when it
fired in order to exculpate him from liability. However, as we had explained earlier, Nieva fired
the gun several times before the bullet finally went off. With the urgency and suddenness of
the situation, minor lapses in Judy's testimony cannot be used against her.In fine, the
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of frustrated homicide, which
are: first, the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon
in his assault; second, the victim sustained a fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of
timely medical assistance; and third, none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.[56]

=---

PEOPLE v. MACASPAC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs RODRIGO MACASPAC
G.R. No. 198954
February 22, 2017

FACTS

At around 8:00 in the evening of July 7, 1988, Macaspac along with four other persons
including one Robert Jebulan. In the course of their drinking spree, an argument ensued
between Macaspac and Jebulan. It became so heated that, Macaspac uttered to the group:
“Hintayin nyo ako d’yan, wawalisin ko kayo, “and then left. After around three minutes,
Macaspac returned wielding a knife. He confronted and taunted Jubulan, saying, “Ano?”.

Jebulan simply replied, “Tama na”. At that point, Macaspac suddenly stabbed Jebulan on the
lower right area of his chest and ran away. The others witnessed the stabbing of Jebulan. He
was rushed to the hospital but was rushed dead on arrival.

Macaspac initially invoked self-defense, testifying that he and Jebulan had scuffed for the
possession of the knife, and that he had then stabbed Jebulan once he seized control of the
knife. However, he later on claimed that Jebulan had been stabbed by accident when he fell
on the knife. He denied being the person with whom Jebulan had the argument, which he
insisted had been between Barcomo and one Danny. According to him, he tried to pacify their
argument, but his efforts angered Jebulan, who draw out the knife and tried to stab him. He
fortunately evaded the stab thrust of Jebulan, whom he struck with a wooden chair to defend
himself. The blow caused Jebulan to fall on the knife, puncturing his chest.
 46

On February 19, 2008, the RTC found Macaspac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
and sentenced him to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the CA affirmed
conviction of Macaspac with modification of the imposition of the civil liability. The case
elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming Macaspac’s conviction for murder on the ground
that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for murder beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD
The Court sees no misreading by the RTC and the CA of the credibility of the witnesses and
the evidence of the parties. On the contrary, the CA correctly observed that inconsistencies
had rendered Macaspac’s testimony doubtful as to shatter his credibility. The Court cannot
uphold the CA’s conclusion on the attendance of treachery.
According to the facts, he did not mount the attack with surprise because the heated
argument between him and the victim and his angry threat of going back “to sweep them”
had sufficiently forewarned the latter of the impending lethal assault. The requisites for the
appreciation of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his
determination to commit the crime; and, the lapse of a sufficient length of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

The first and second requisites were established. But it is the essence of this circumstance
that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the
resolve to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment. By quickly returning to the group with a knife, he let no appreciable time pass to
allow him to reflect upon his resolve to carry out his criminal intent. It was as if the execution
immediately followed the resolve to commit a crime. As such, the third requisite was absent.

Without the prosecution having sufficiently proved the attendance of either treachery or
evident premeditation, Macaspac was guilty only of homicide for the killing of Jebulan

PEOPLE v. RODRIGO MACASPAC Y ISIP + R No. 198954, Feb 22, 2017 ]

This is where we differ from the lower courts. We cannot uphold their conclusion
on the attendance of treachery.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to
directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.[19] Two conditions must concur in
order for treachery to be appreciated, namely: one, the assailant employed means,
methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and two, said means,
methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the

assailant.[20] Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and competently and

clearly proved, qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder. [21]

Based on the records, Macaspac and Jebulan were out drinking along with others
when they had an argument that soon became heated, causing the former to leave
the group and punctuating his leaving with the warning that he would be back "to
sweep them," the vernacular for killing the others (Hintayin n'yo ako d'yan,
wawalisin ko kayo). His utterance was threat of an impending attack. Shortly
thereafter, Macaspac returned to the group wielding the knife, immediately
confronted and directly taunted Jebulan (Ano?), and quickly stabbed the latter on
the chest, and then fled. The attack, even if it was sudden, did not constitute
treachery. He did not mount the attack with surprise because the heated argument
between him and the victim and his angry threat of going back "to sweep them"
had sufficiently forewarned the latter of the impending lethal assault.
 47

Nonetheless, the information also alleged the attendance of evident

premeditation. We now determine if the records sufficiently established this
circumstance.

The requisites for the appreciation of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when
the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse
of sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[22]

Macaspac's having suddenly left the group and his utterance of Hintayin n'yo ako
d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo marked the time of his resolve to commit the crime. His
returning to the group with the la1ife manifested his clinging to his resolve to
inflict lethal harm on the others. The first and second elements of evident
premeditation were thereby established. But it is the essence of this circumstance
that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolve to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient
to arrive at calm judgment.[23] Was the lapse of time between the determination
and execution matter of three minutes, based on the records-sufficient to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act? By quickly returning to the group
with the knife, he let no appreciable time pass to allow him to reflect upon his
resolve to carry out his criminal intent. It was as if the execution immediately
followed the resolve to commit the crime. As such, the third requisite was absent.

Accordingly, we cannot appreciate the attendance of evident premeditation in the

killing, for, as explained in People v. Gonzales:[24]

x x x The qualifying circumstance of premeditation can be satisfactorily

established only if it could be proved that the defendant had ample and sufficient
time to allow his conscience to overcome the determination of his will, if he had so
desired, after meditation and reflection, following his plan to commit the
crime. (United States v. Abaigar, Phil., 417; United States v. Gil, 13 Phil., 530.) In
other words, the qualifying circumstance of premeditation can be taken into
account only when there had been cold and deep meditation, and tenacious
persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal act. (United States v. Cunanan,
37 Phil. 777.) But when the determination to commit the crime was immediately
followed 1Jy execution, the circumstance of premeditation cannot be legally
considered. (United States v. Blanco, 18 Phil. 206.) x x x (Bold underscoring is
supplied for emphasis)
Without the Prosecution having sufficiently proved the attendance of either
treachery or evident premeditation, Macaspac was guilty only of homicide for the
killing of Jebulan

_____
People vs. Abarca
Criminal Law – Crimes Against Persons – Article 247 – Death Inflicted Under Exceptional
Circumstances
One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a peephole, caught his wife having sexual
intercourse with one Khingsley Paul Koh inside the Abarca residence. The two also caught

Abarca looking at them and so Koh grabbed his pistol and thereafter Abarca fled. One
hour later, Abarca, armed with an armalite, went to the gambling place where Koh usually
stays and then and there shot Koh multiple times. Koh died instantaneously. However, two
more persons were shot in the adjacent room. These two other persons survived due to
timely medical intervention.

Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of the complex crime of murder with
frustrated double murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of conviction is correct.

HELD: No. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides:
 48

Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer
the penalty of destierro.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises
his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he
kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are
present in this case.
Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time Abarca caught his wife with Koh
and the time he killed Koh, the killing was still the direct by-product of Abarca’s rage.
Therefore, Abarca is not liable for the death of Koh. However, Abarca is still liable for the
injuries he caused to the two other persons he shot in the adjacent room but his liability
shall not be for frustrated murder. In the first place, Abarca has no intent to kill the other
two persons injured. He was not also committing a crime when he was firing his gun at
Koh – it being under Art. 247. Abarca was however negligent because he did not exercise
all precaution to make sure no one else will be hurt. As such, he shall be liable for less
serious physical injuries through simple negligence for the injuries suffered by the two
other persons who were in the adjacent room when the incident happened.
Supreme Court noted that “Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed
between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with
the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be
the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal
Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he
should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse
in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the
same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing
must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
----
PP vs. Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
Facts: As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito
and Tita decided to live separately. Manolito retained custody of their two (2)
children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyn’s
house for two (2) months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas residence,
located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented the second floor.

Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts
towards reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very
reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. In fact, she was very open about her
relationship with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he
chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by
the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City. Manolito confronted Tita and
Jesus about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his
wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill him.
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed

Manolito a letter from the Iligan City National High School. The letter mentioned
that his son Julius failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting
at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the
afternoon the next day, Manolito went to Tita’s house to ask her to attend the
school meeting in his behalf.
Upon reaching Tita’s rented place, he heard “sounds of romance” (kissing)
coming from the inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting knife. He
caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of
Tita and his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately
stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 5’9” in height and weighed about 70 kg., the
suddenness of the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito
took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the
room upon seeing Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She
 49

hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting “kill him Jake, kill him
Jake.”
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell
down and Manolito stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the
arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in
the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts of her body.
Tita fell near the lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo,
the owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and
inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere
because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague,
Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his friend’s neighbor. He threw away the
knife he used in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the
morning of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for
Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that
there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to
the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City.
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife’s place,
Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he received
threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they
could live together.

Held: After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies
of the witnesses, we find accused to have acted within the circumstances
contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-
appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon
Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having
sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who
fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she
reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his
wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to
the police when a call for him to surrender was made.

Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting
circumstances to the satisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of any
criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following
essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises
his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2)
that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and
(3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter)
or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse.33 Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence,
otherwise his defense would be untenable. "The death caused must be the

proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon
his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of his
wife must concur with her flagrant adultery."34

There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The
crucial fact that accused must convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his
wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.

After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the
witnesses, we find accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated
in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised
his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.

To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon
Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having
 50

sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who
fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she
reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his
wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to
the police when a call for him to surrender was made.

The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended
spouse the opportunity to avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the
Court put it in People v. Wagas:35

"The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the scandal an

unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a
man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a
purification is so severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful
spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with
great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only
during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter."