court can modify or alter a judgment even after the
Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA
CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA
GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati
RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen,
married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their
marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14,
1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union
were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was
denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce
from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the
parental custody of the children should be vested to
Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been
promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public
Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose
of determining the issues of custody of children and
the distribution of the properties between her and
Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her
previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues
of support and custody of their children.
1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in
granting a partial motion for reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes.
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case
that has not yet attained finality, as in the case at
bar.
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the
same has become executory whenever circumstances
transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances
justifying or requiring such modification or alteration
transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory and when it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice or when supervening events
warrant it.
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when
she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards
child custody and support.
Ruling: Yes.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by
foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on
custody, care and support of the children, must still
be determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata
to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody
to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown
that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now
Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private
respondent was given the opportunity to challenge
the judgment of the German court so that there is
basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata
with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have
parental custody of their two children. The
proceedings in the German court were summary. As to
what was the extent of Carmen’s participation in the
proceedings in the German court, the records remain
unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to
obtain custody of the children, the trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine
the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the
children.
Roehr v. Rodriguez et al. (Case Digest)
Roehr v. Rodriguez et al.
G.R. No. 142820
June 20, 2003
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE
JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge
of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
Facts:
Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen and resident of
Germany, married Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on
December 11, 1980, in Germany. They had two
daughters. On August 28, 1996, Carmen filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage at
the Makati RTC, but the petition was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang Roehr obtained a decree of
divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16,
1997. The custody of the two children was granted to
Wolfgang by the said court.
Because of this, Wolfgang filed a Second Motion to
Dismiss on May 20, 1999, on the ground that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the matter since there
is already a divorce decree obtained abroad. Judge
Guevara-Salonga granted the motion to dismiss.
Carmen, however, filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, praying that the case should
proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of
custody of their children and the distribution of the
properties. The judge issued an order partially
setting aside her order to dismiss for the purpose of
tackling the issues of property relations of the
spouses as well as the custody of the children.
Issue:
Can our courts take cognizance of the custody issue
of the children?
Ruling:
Yes. First, it is important to point out that the
divorce was validly obtained and is recognized in the
Philippines. It has been consistently held that a
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
In this case, the divorce decree has not been
questioned by either party. Only the custody of the
children is doubted.
While the court in Germany that granted the divorce
decree has decided regarding the custody of the
children, as a general rule, the legal effects of
divorce, even if obtained abroad, must still be
determined by our courts. This includes issues on
custody and care and support of children. Before our
courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
petitioner by the German court, it must be shown
that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court. It
should be noted that the proceedings in the German
court were merely summary. It cannot be said that
Carmen Rodriguez was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court. While
Wolfgang was represented by two counsels,
Rodriguez had no lawyers to assist her in the
proceedings.
In addition, the divorce decree did not touch on the
issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any
finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain
custody of the children, the trial court was correct in
setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue
of parental custody, care, support and education
mindful of the best interests of the children. This is
in consonance with the provision in the Child and
Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always
the paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody.
Thus, the court may proceed to determine the issue
regarding the custody of the two children.
RECTO V. HARDEN (1959)
Short summary: Recto was hired by
American wife to represent her in RP case
for protection of her interest in the
conjugal property, vs. American husband, in
conjunction with the divorce proceeding
she's going to file in US. They won in TC,
but on appeal, American H & W agreed to
settle. Recto now wants to collect fees for
services, but as defense, Harden spouses
argues that the contract's object was
unlawful (Divorce not allowed in RP) so it is
invalid, thus, Recto cannot enforce it
against them. Court ruled for Recto
Facts:
Mrs. Harden, US Citizen, engaged services
of Claro M. Recto, for suit
…to secure an increase in the amount of
support she was receinging
…to preserve her rights in the properties of
the conjugal partnership
…in contemplation of a divorce suit she's
going to file in the US.
Compensation for RECTO: 20% of value of
her share of conjugal partnership after
liquidation
TC: for Mrs. Harden
CA: Harden Sps. Mutually released and
forever discharged each other from all
actions, debts, duties, and claims to the
conjugal partnership
-Recto filed motion contesting agreement
-defense: contract of services invalid: to
secure a divorce decree in violation of our
laws
WON RECTO COULD ENFORCE THE
AGREEMENT? YES
*CONTRACT OF SERVICES IS NOT
CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD
CUSTOMS, PUBLIC ORDER, OR PUBLIC
POLICY
1. The contract has a lawful object: it
is to protect the interests of Mrs. Harden
in the conjugal partnership during the
pendency of a divorce suit
-NOT
…to secure divorce
…to facilitate or promote procurement of
divorce
2. Divorce can be granted to the Sps
Harden, they being nationals of country
whose laws allow divorce (following the
nationality principle in determining the
status and dissolution of the marriage)
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-
*-*-*-*
1. LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION V.
JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
*status, once established by the personal
law of the party, is given universal
recognition. (UNIVERSALITY OF STATUS)
-once status is set by Country A, Country B
is bound to attribute to a person of Country
A the status that is established in Country
A refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of
-Courts of Country B also cannot introduce
exceptions or qualifications that are not set
in Country A
If ALIENS sue and are sued in RP Courts
*RP would apply RP Procedural rules relevant
to status and capacity (JUDICIAL
JURISDICTION)
BUT would apply personal law of the alien to
determine status and capacity
(LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION)
Tenchavez v Escano (1965)
Tenchavez v Escano (1965)
Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27,
on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the
newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24,
1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950,
she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued
by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano
married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada.
She now lives with him in California and by him, has
begotten children. She acquired American citizenship
on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed
a complaint for legal separation and damages against
VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and
Mina Escaño are undeserving of an award for damages
because they are guilty of contributory negligence in
failing to take up proper and timely measures to
dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her
husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and
marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be
considered: first, because this was not raised in the
court below; second, there is no evidence to support
it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of
alienation of affections in that contributory
negligence involves an omission to perform an act
while alienation of affection involves the performance
of a positive act.
Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino
citizen when the divorce decree was issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against Escaño
may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her
consortium, and desertion of her husband.
Held:
1. YES
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano
like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was
then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the
NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force,
does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for
legal separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees
bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of
the declared policy of the State, especially in view of
the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition
would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor
of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those
members of our society whose means do not permit
them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce
outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens,
sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC,
is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction.
2. YES
The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce,
for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was
hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of
injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code,
Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an
award of moral damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral
damages, an additional effect of legal separation has
been added to Article 106. It was plain in the
decision that the damages attached to her wrongful
acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly
cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be
incompatible with the respect accorded to individual
liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who
unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be
denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And
where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders
this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why
the court may not award damage as it may in cases of
breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae
even if in private relations physical coercion be
barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise
cogi and factum".
Tenchavez vs Escano
TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a
prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got
married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez,
32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before
Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage
was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and
was duly registered in the local civil registry. A
certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker
and go-between who had an amorous relationship with
Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student
where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and
Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in
a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However
after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he
disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued
leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went
back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was
single and when it was approved she left for the
United States and filed a complaint for divorce
against Pastor which was later on approved and issued
by the Second Judicial Court of the State of
Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married
Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has
begotten children. She acquired citizenship on
August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have
dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta
Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce.
Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign
decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens
because it would be a violation of the Civil Code.
Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of
rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with
her American husband is enough grounds for the legal
separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of
Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought
and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is
the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in
the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of
an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the
other for damages.
Ramirez vs Gmur
42 Phil 855 [GR No. L-11796 August 5, 1918]
Facts: Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, native of the
Republic of Switzerland, but for many years a
resident of the Philippine Islands, died in the city of
Iloilo on June 29, 1913, leaving a valuable estate of
which he disposed by will. A few days after his
demise the will was offered for probate in the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo and, upon publication of
notice, was duly allowed and established by the court.
His widow, Doña Ana M. Ramirez, was named as
executrix in the will, and to her accordingly letters
testamentary were issued. By the will everything was
given to the widow, with the exception of a piece of
real property located in the City of Thun,
Switzerland, which was devised to the testator’s
brothers and sisters. As appears from the original
baptismal entry of Leona Castro made in the church
record of Bacolod, she was born in that pueblo on
April 11, 1875, her mother being Felisa Castro, and
father “unknown.” Upon the margin of this record
there is written in Spanish an additional annotation of
the following tenor: “According to a public document
(escritura) which was exhibited, she was recognized
by Samuel Bischoff on June 22, 1877.” As the years
passed Leona Castro was taken into the family of
Samuel Bischoff and brought up by him and his wife a
a member of the family; and it is sufficiently shown
by the evidence adduced in this case that Samuel
Bischoff tacitly recognized Leona a his daughter and
treated her as such. In the year 1895 Leona Castro
was married to Frederick von Kauffman, a British
subject, born in Hong Kong, who had come to live in
the city of Iloilo. Three children were born of this
marriage, namely, Elena, Federico, and Ernesto, the
youngest having been born on November 10, 1898. In
the month of April 1899, Leona Castro was taken by
her husband from Iloilo to the City of Thun,
Switzerland, for the purpose of recuperating her
health. She was there placed in a sanitarium, and on
August 20th the husband departed for the Philippine
Islands, where he arrived on October 10, 1899. Leona
Castro continued to remain in Switzerland, and a few
years later informed her husband, whom she had not
seen again, that she desired to remain free and would
not resume life in common with him. As a
consequence, in the year 1904, Mr. Kauffman went to
the City of Paris, France, for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce from his wife under the French
laws; and there is submitted in evidence in this case a
certified copy of an extract from the minutes of the
Court of First Instance of the Department of the
Seine, from which it appears that a divorce was there
decreed on January 5, 1905, in favor of Mr. Kauffman
and against his wife, Leona, in default. Though the
record recites that Leona was then in fact residing at
No. 6, Rue Donizetti, Paris, there is no evidence that
she had acquired a permanent domicile in that city.
Issue: Whether or not the the the divorce obtained
by Mr. Kauffman is valid.
Held: No. It is established by the great weight of
authority that the court of a country in which neither
of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both
of them may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine
their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by
such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere.
The voluntary appearance of the defendant before
such a tribunal does not invest the court with
jurisdiction.
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the
ground of the plaintiff’s residence in the State or
country of the judicial forum, his residence must be
bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and
goes to another State for the sole purpose of
obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of
remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the courts of that State. This
is especially true where the cause of divorce is one
not recognized by the laws of the State of his own
domicile.
FACTS:
The PNB opened a letter of credit and advanced
$120,000.00 to Edington Oil Refinery for 8,000 tons
of hot asphalt, of which 2,000 tons worth
P279,000.00 were delivered to Adams & Taguba Corp.
(ATACO) under a trust receipt guaranteed by Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co. To pay for the asphalt ATACO
constituted PNB its assignee and attorney-in-fact to
receive and collect payments from the Bureau of
Public Works.
ATACO delivered asphalt worth P431,466.52 to
the Bureau of Public Works, PNB regularly collected
the payments amounting to P106,382.01, until they
ceased to collect payments. Then in 1962 PNB found
that there were more payables to ATACO from
the Bureau of Public Works. PNB sued ATACO and
the Surety, to recover the balance of P158,563.18
when their demands for payment were refused.
The trial court ordered ATACO and the Surety to
pay PNB the sum of P174,462.34, and the total
amount payable by the Surety shall not exceed
P75,000.00. PNB recoursed to the Court of Appeals,
which rendered an adverse decision and modified the
judgement of the court of origin as to the Surety’s
liability. Motions for reconsideration were also
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is the duty of the surety and not
that of the creditor, to see to it that the obligor
fulfils his obligation, and that the creditor owed the
surety no duty of active diligence to collect any sum
from the principal debtor.
RULING:
The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals did not hold the bank
answerable for negligence in failing to collect from
the principal debtor but for its negligence in
collecting the sum due to the debtor from the Bureau
of Public Works, contrary to its duty as holder of an
exclusive and irrevocable power of attorney to make
such collections, since an agent is required to act
with care of a good father of a family and becomes
liable for the damages which the principal may suffer
through his non performance.
Even if the assignment with power of attorney from
the principal debtor were considered as more
additional security, by allowing the assigned funds to
be exhausted without notifying the surety, the Bank
deprived the former of any possibility of recoursing
against that security. The Bank exonerated the
surety, pursuant to Art. 2080 0f the Civil Code.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON.
MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON, respondents
October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is
a citizen of the United States. They were married in
Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in
the Philippines. They had two children and they were
divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner
remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The
private responded filed against petitioner stating
that the petitioner’s business is a conjugal property
of the parties and that respondent is declared with
right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where
respondent acknowledged that they had no community
property as of June 11, 1982.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent as
petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets?
RULING:
The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.
The policy against absolute divorce cover only
Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain
divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines provided they are valid according to their
national law.
From the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage
between them with the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to
his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case as petitioner’s husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped
by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private
respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married
in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their
residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They
were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner
remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit
against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating
that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the
Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and
prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an
accounting of the business and he be declared as the
administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between
the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino
citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets.
He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital
obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality
laws. She should not be discriminated against her
own country if the end of justice is to be served.
LORENZO LLORENTE, petitioner vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondent
G.R. NO. 124371. November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter
referred to as “Paula”) were married before a parish
priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines
Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo
departed for the United States and Paula stayed in
the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to
United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by
the United States District Court, Southern District
of New York. Paula gave birth to a boy registered in
the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as “Crisologo
Llorente,” with the certificate stating that the child
was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name
was left blank.
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on
November 16, 1951 filed for divorcewith the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County
of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John
Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On
November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State
of California, for the County of San Diego found all
factual allegations to be true and issued an
interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. On
December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13]
Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as
Paula, who did not oppose the marriage
or cohabitation.
Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will
was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano,
duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.
In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property
to Alicia and their three children.
Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga,
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and
allowance of his last will and testament wherein
Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate.
Paula filed with the same court a petition*22+ for
letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her
favor.
RTC: considering that this court has so found that
the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo
Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted
with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
likewise void. CA Affirmed
ISSUE:
Who are entitled to inherit?
RULING:
However, intestate and testamentary succession,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.”
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of
the Court of Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold
that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the
estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court. “Art. 17. The forms
and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of
the country in which they are executed. Will is valid.
SC reversed the decision.
LLORENTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 124371. November
23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,
respondents
November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were
married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an
enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he
left for the US where through naturalization, he
became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife,
he discovered that she was living with his brother
and a child was born. The child was registered as
legitimate but the name of the father was left blank.
Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on
became final. He married Alicia and they lived
together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made
his last will and testament stating that all his
properties will be given to his second marriage. He
filed a petition of probate that made or appointed
Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before
the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula
filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s
estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the
motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified
the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared
co-owner of whatever properties, she and the
deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of
cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.
RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen
when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation
when he married Alicia and executed his will. As
stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly
required in their National Law. Thus the divorce
obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that
governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law
since the divorce was contracted after he became an
American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law
allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
GARCIA vs. RECIO G.R. No. 138322. October 2,
2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,
petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO,
respondent
October 2, 2001
FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In
1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of
divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992,
respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994,
he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner,
in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage
license, respondent was declared as “single” and
“Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately;
and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets
were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s
former marriage only in November. On the other
hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his
prior marriage in 1993, before they were married.
Respondent also contended that his first marriage
was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial
court declared that the first marriage was dissolved
on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as
valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this
petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent
and Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to
marry Grace Garcia.
RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article
26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract
a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry”. A divorce obtained abroad by two
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore,
before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the
respondent and Samson appears to be authentic,
issued by an Australian family court. Although,
appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the
rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must
be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on
account of petitioner’s failure to object properly
because he objected to the fact that it was not
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce
decree, which was validly admitted as evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry
under Australian law. However, there are two types
of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage
and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage.
In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the
respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court
may under some foreign statutes, still restrict
remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree “a
party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute commits the offense of
bigamy”. This shows that the divorce obtained by the
respondent might have been restricted. Respondent
also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the
foreign law governing his status. Together with other
evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged
foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage
between the petitioner and respondent can not be
declared null and void based on lack of evidence
conclusively showing the respondent’s legal capacity
to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence,
the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties’
marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.
Lessons Applicable: divorce
Laws Applicable: Art. 15 and Art. 26 par. 2 FC
FACTS:
Grace J. Garcia-Recio (2nd mariage) ----- Rederick A.
Recio à Editha Samson (Wife)
 March 1, 1987: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino
was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Malabon, Rizal
 May 18, 1989: a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was
issued by an Australian family court
  June 26, 1992: Recio became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the
Australian government
 January 12, 1994: Recio married Grace j.
Garcia, a Filipino, in Cabanatuan City. Recio
declared himself as "single" and "Filipino."
 October 22, 1995: Recio and Grace J. Garcia
ak.a. Garcia-Recio begun to live separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage
 May 16, 1996: In accordance to the Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided
 March 3, 1998: Garcia-Recio filed a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy claiming she only learned of
the prior marriage in November, 1997
 Recio prayed in his answer that it be
dismissed for no cause of action
 RTC: marriage dissolved on the ground that
the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines
ISSUE: W/N the divorce between Recio and Samson
was valid and proven
HELD: NO. Remand the case to the court a quo for
the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively
show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner;
and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage
void on the ground of bigamy
 Divorces:
1. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of
Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
2. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry."
3. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
it is consistent with their respective national laws.
 Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it
o legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by
the national law of the party concerned
o A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself
§ The decree purports to be a written act or record of
an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign
country
o Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either:
1. an official publication; or
2. a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be:
1. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept; and
2. authenticated by the seal of his office
 Since the divorce was a defense raised by
Recio, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon
him
 In its strict legal sense, divorce means the
legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of
different types:
1. absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii - terminates
the marriage
2. limited divorce or a mensa et thoro - suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force
 Recio presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree – a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce
o On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree
contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before
this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy."
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros
Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a
son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Orbecido discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen and learned from
his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a
divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He
thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under
Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the
legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding
Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry
under Philippine law.
Salud R. Arca and Alfredo Javier Jr. v. Alfredo Javier | GR No
L-6768 | July 31, 1954
Nature of the Case
Petition for Certiorari on the decision of the CFI
granting the P60.00 monthly allowance for the Petitioner
herein.
Facts:
- Salud and Alfredo got married in 1937, solemnized
by Judge Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court of
Manila. At the time of marriage, Junior was already
born. Alfredo left for the US in 1938, and at the time
of their marriage Alfredo was already an enlisted
Navy armyman.
- When Alfredo left, Salud moved in with the former’s
parents. Due to friction, Salud went back to her
hometown. Eventually the couple’s relations soured,
wherein Alfredo filed an action for divorce against
Salud before the Alabaman courts.
- In response to the complaint, Arca alleged that Javier
was not a resident of Alabama, but of Naic, Cavite,
and that she alleged that the reason for their
separation was that Alfredo was in the US-Navy, thus
leaving her behind in the Philippines, and that he has
always supported them. Their separation was due to
physical impossibility (also, the Civil Code stated that
the wife is not bound to live her with her husband if
the latter has gone to marine colonies). Salud then
prayed for the complaint for divorce to be dismissed,
contesting the jurisdiction of the Mobile County
courts.
Issue: Whether the divorce decree is recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction.
Holding: The divorce decree has no valid effect in Philippine
jurisdiction
Ratio:In order to determine whether a country has
jurisdiction over valid decree of divorce, plaintiff must have
been domiciled in good faith in the State in which it was
granted. It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the
divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in view of the
summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action
cannot be interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of
the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim
of appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that time
was Mobile County, and to show that the ground of desertion
imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should
be considered as a special appearance the purpose of which
is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the case.
It is established by the great weight of authority that the
court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort
merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no
jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a
divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition
elsewhere. The voluntary appearance of the defendant
before such a tribunal does not invest the court with
jurisdiction. It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the
ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of
the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a
spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State
for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no
intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the courts of the State. This is especially
true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the
laws of the State of his own domicile. But even if his
residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court had
acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit,
the decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the
appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being
the City of Manila, and no new domicile having been acquired
in West Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not
having entered an appearance in the case, either personally
or by counsel, did not confer jurisdiction upon said court over
her person. At all times the matrimonial domicile of this
couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the
residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband for
the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide
residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of
the State to dissolve the bonds of matrimony.
It cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County Court of
Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case for the
simple reason that at the time it was filed appellant's legal
residence was then in the Philippines. He could not have
acquired legal residence or domicile at Mobile County when
he moved to that place in 1938 because at that time he was
still in the service of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room
where he used to stay during his occasional shore leave for
shift duty. That he never intended to live there permanently
is shown by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis
in 1941, he moved to New York where he bought a house and
a lot, and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his
retirement from the U.S. Navy, he returned to the Philippines
and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived
ever since. It may therefore be said that appellant went to
Mobile County, not with the intention of permanently
residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent
abode, but for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce from his
wife. Such residence is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
the court.
It is a well known principle of Private International Law
which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment, or the
law affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or
fundamental policy of the State of the forum. It is also in
keeping with our concept or moral values which has always
looked upon marriage as an institution. And such concept
has actually crystallized in a more tangible manner when in
the new Civil Code our people, through Congress, decided to
eliminate altogether our law relative to divorce. Because of
such concept we cannot but react adversely to any attempt
to extend here the effect of a decree which is not in
consonance with our customs, morals, and traditions.
Ramirez v. Gmur
Doctrine:It is established by the great weight of
authority that the court of a country in which
neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which
one or both may resort merely for obtaining a
divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their
matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such
a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere.
The voluntary appearance of the defendant before
such a tribunal does not invest the court with
jurisdiction.
Facts:
 Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, a native of
Switzerland but a resident of the
Philippines, died in Iloilo City on Junne 29,
1913, leaving valuable asset which he
disposed by will. His will was offered for
probate in the CFI of Iloilo, which allowed it.
Werthmuller’s widow, Doñ a Ana M.
Ramirez, was named as executrix.
Everything was given to the widow, as the
will provided, except for a piece of real
property in the City of Thun, Switzerland,
which was devised to Werthmuller’s
brothers and sisters.
 Werthmuller seemed to have ignored in
making his will that he had heirs from his
natural daughter, Leona Castro.
 Leona Castro was the daughter of Felisa
Castro and an unknown father. There was
an annotation on the margin of the original
baptismal entry of Leona Castro that a
public document (an “escritura”) states that
she was recognized by Samuel Bischoff on
June 22, 1877. This annotation was
authenticated by the signature of Father
Ferrero, whose deposition was taken in this
case. Father Ferrero testified that the word
“escritura” in this entry means a public
document; and he says that such document
was exhibited to him when the marginal
note was added to the baptismal record
and supplied the basis of the annotation in
the entry.
 Samuel Bischoff tacitly recognized Leona
Castro as his daughter and treated her as
such. Leona Castro was later married to
Frederick von Kauffman, a British subject,
born in HK and lived in Iloilo City. Leona
Castro and von Kauffman had 3 children
(Elene, Federico and Ernesto). Leona Castro
was then brought to Thun, Switzerland to
recuperate her health. Years later, Leona
Castro informed von Kauffman that she
does not want to stay married with the
latter.
 Von Kauffman later obtained a divorce
decree in Paris, France. It showed that
Leona Castro lived in Paris, though there is
no evidence showing that she acquired
permanent domicile in Paris.
 The estrangement of von Kauffman and
Leona Castro was because Leona Castro was
attracted to Dr. Ernest Emil Mory, the
physician in charge of the sanitarium in
Switzerland where Leona Castro was brought.
 Dr. Mory and Leona Castro was
 later married in London, England. It
appears that Dr. Mory was already married to
a certain Helena Wolpman, but had divorced
her.
 Before Dr. Mory and Leona Castro got
married, they begot a daughter named
Leontina Elizabeth in Thun, Switzerland. A
2nddaughter, Carmen Maria, was born in
Berne, Switzerland, and a 3rddaughter, Esther.
On October 6, 1910, Leona Castro died.
 Now, the 2 sets of children are claiming from
the estate of Samuel Werthmuller. Otto Gmur
is the guardian of the 3 Mory daughters.
Frederick von Kauffman appeared as
guardian for his own children.
 Ana Ramirez insists, as against the Mory
daughters, that the Leona Castro had
never been recognized by Samuel
Werthmuller at all.
 As to the Mory daughters, Leontina Elizabeth
is considered an illegitimate daughter which
was legitimated by the subsequent marriage
of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro. Carmen Maria
and Esther Renate, on the other hand, are
toconsidered legitimate offspring of Leona
Castro since the latter’s marriage to von
Kauffman was already divorced when they
were born and Leona was already married to
Dr. Mory.
 The von Kauffman children insists that the
divorce decree was wholly invalid; that the
Mory daughters are the offspring of an
adulterous relationship; and that the von
Kauffman daughters alone should be entitled
to participate in the division of the estate.
Issue: Whether or not the Mory daughters and the
von Kauffman children are entitled to participate
in the division of the estate of Samuel Bischoff
Werthmuller.
Held: The SC held that the von Kauffman children
are entitled to participate in the inheritance as
legitimate children of Leona Castro and Frederick
von Kauffman. Leona Castro’s relationship to
Samuel Werthmuller was ruled as follows:
 It is satisfactorily shown that Leona Castro
was a recognized natural daughter of Samuel
Bischoff. The memorandum made by Father
Ferrero as to the recognition of Leona Castro
was found satisfactory, even though the
original was not presented after diligent
search and secondary evidence as well as Fr.
Ferrero’s deposition was presented.
 It will be observed that the recognition of
Leona Castro as the daughter of Samuel
Bischoff occurred prior to the date when the
Civil Code was put in force in these Islands;
and consequently, her rights as derived from
the recognition must be determined under the
law as it then existed, that is, under Law 11 of
Toro, which afterwards became Law 1, title 5,
book 10, of the NovisimaRecopilacion. Under
that law recognition could be established by
proof of acts on the part of the parent
unequivocally recognizing the status of his
offspring. In other words, at tacit recognition
was sufficient. Under article 131 of the present
Civil Code, the acknowledgment of a natural
child must be made in the record of birth, by
will, or in another public instrument. We
believe the recognition of Leona Castro is
sufficiently shown whether the case be judged
by the one provision or the other.
 But it is contended by counsel for Doña Ana
Ramirez that only children born of persons
free to marry may possess the status of
recognized natural children, and there is no
evidence to show that Felisa Castro was
either a single woman or widow at the time of
the conception or birth of Leona. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, it must be
presumed that she was single or a widow.
 From the fact that Leona Castro was an
acknowledged natural daughter of her father,
it follows that had she survived him she would
have been his forced heir, he having died after
the Civil Code took effect; and as such forced
heir she would have been entitled to one-third
of the inheritance.
 To determine the rights of the Mory
daughters, the SC had to consider the
validity of the divorce decree obtained by
von Kauffman in Paris. If the decree is
valid, then the marriage of Mory and Leona
Castro is valid and the Mory daughters are
entitled to participate in the division of the
estate. Otherwise, the Mory daughters
would have no such right.
 As to the Mory daughters, the SC held that
the divorce decree relied upon cannot be
recognized as valid in the courts of the
Philippines. The French tribunal has no
jurisdiction to entertain an action for the
dissolution of a marriage contracted in the
Philippines by a person domiciled here,
such marriage being indissoluble under
the laws then prevailing in this country.
 The evidence shows conclusively that
Frederick von Kauffman at all times since
earliest youth has been, and is now, domiciled
in the city of Iloilo in the Philippine Islands;
that he there married Leona Castro, who was
 a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and that
Iloilo was their matrimonial domicile; that his
departure from iloilo for the purpose of taking
his wife to Switzerland was limited to that
purpose alone, without any intent to establish
a domicile elsewhere; and finally that he went
to Paris in 1904, for the sole purpose of
getting a divorce, without any intention of
establishing a permanent residence in that
city. The evidence shows that the decree was
entered against the defendant in default, for
failure to answer, and there is nothing to show
that she had acquired, or had attempted to
acquire, a permanent domicile in the City of
Paris. It is evident of course that the presence
of both the spouses in that city was due
merely to the mutual desire to procure a
divorce from each other.
 It is established by the great weight of
authority that the court of a country in
which neither of the spouses is domiciled
and to which one or both may resort
merely for obtaining a divorce has no
jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial
status; and a divorce granted by such a
court is not entitled to recognition
elsewhere. The voluntary appearance of
the defendant before such a tribunal does
not invest the court with jurisdiction.
 It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction
on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in
the State or country of the judicial forum,
his residence must be bona fide. If a
spouse leaves the family domicile and
goes to another State for the sole purpose
of obtaining a divorce, and with no
intention of remaining, his residence there
is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
the courts of that State. This is especially
true where the cause of divorce is one not
recognized by the laws of the State of his
own domicile.
 As the divorce granted by the French court
must be ignored, it results that the marriage of
Doctor Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in
London in 1905, could not legalize their
relations; and the circumstance that they
afterwards passed for husband and wife in
Switzerland until her death is wholly without
legal significance. The claims of the Mory
children to participate in the estate of Samuel
Bischoff must therefore be rejected. The right
to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated,
and acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are wholly
excluded. The word "descendants," as used in
article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be
interpreted to include illegitimates born of
adulterous relations.
 Even if the claims of the children were made
after the probate, the same are not divested
by the decree admitting the will to probate
since such decree is only conclusive as to the
due execution of the will and not its intrinsic
validity
PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA
 174 SCRA 653
 FACTS: On September 7, 1979, Imelda
Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and the
respondent to the case, and Erich Geiling, a
German national, were married at
Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. After about three and a half years
of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce
proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in
January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for
legal separation, support and separation of
property before RTC of Manila in January
23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil
case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court
of Germany promulgated a divorce decree
on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child,Isabella
Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery alleging that,
while still married to respondent, petitioner
had an affair with a certain William Chia and
Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983
respectively. The respondent city fiscal
approved a resolution directing the filing of
two complaints for adultery against
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
motion in both criminal cases to defer her
arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. Respondent judge
merely reset the date of the arraignment
but before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the suspension of proceedings.
On September 8, 1987, respondent judge
denied the motion to quash and also
directed the arraignment of both accused.
Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus
charged with direct contempt and fined.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the private
respondent’s adultery charges against the
 petitioner is still valid given the fact that
both had been divorced prior to the filing of
charges.
 HELD: The law provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage
the person who can legally file the
complaint should only be the offended
spouse. The fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country in
1983, is admitted. According to Article 15 of
the Civil Code, with relation to the status of
Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since
the legal separation of the petitioner and
respondent has been finalized through the
courts in Germany and the RTC in Manila,
the marriage of the couple were already
finished, thus giving no merit to the charges
the respondent filed against the petitioner.
Private respondent, being no longer
married to petitioner holds no legal merit to
commence the adultery case as the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit in
1986. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case was made permanent.