Arguments Advanced

ISSUE 1 – THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE PETITIONS.

1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the present case the petitions
are maintainable because [1.1.] Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the case
[1.2.]Violation of Fundamental Rights [1.3.] The Petitioners have the locus standi [1.4]
Supreme Court can grant the relief Sought.

[1.1] SUPREME COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE CASE.

2. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the present case under Art. 32 of the
Constitutionof Sentara.The writ petition is maintainable in the present case under Art. 32 of
the Constitution of Sentara as Writ petitions can be filed for enforcement of fundamental
rights and they can be questioned only on the ground of laches, where disputed questions of
facts are involved or enforcement of private or contractual rights is sought to be
enforced.1Every petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution shall be in writing and shall be
heard by a Division Court of not less than fiveJudges.
3. The petitioner humbly submits that the court in the instant case has the jurisdiction
to issue the writ of mandamus and direct the State and the board that maintains the temple
of Saripura to put a restraint on the impugned rule so that women from the age of 10 to 50
years are allowed entry in the temple.
[1.2] VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A GROUND FOR
MAINTAINABILITY OF THE WRIT PETITIONS.
4. There is a right to move to the Supreme Court, by appropriate proceedings, for the
enforcement of the Fundamental Rights enumerated in the Constitution.2 Right to access to
the Supreme Court is a fundamental right and it is absolute in nature. 3The Courts are the
protector and guarantor of the Fundamental Rights and play the role of a ‘sentinel on the qui
vive’. In Narinderjit Singh Sahni v. UOI4it was held “One whose right is violated can move to
court for enforcement of fundamental right.” Furthermore, it was held in Daryao v. State of

1
V.G RAMCHANDRAN, REVISED BY JUSTICE C.K THAKKER AND M.C THAKKER, LAW OF WRITS,
EASTERN BOOK COMPANY, SIXTH EDITION, 2006.
2
Art. 32, INDIA CONST. ;K. D. GAUR, CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, (2002); M. R. BIJU,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING SOCIETY,153 (2005); K. D. GANGRADE, SOCIAL LEGISLATION
IN INDIA, 23 (1978).
3
State of Madras v. V.G Row, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 196,Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC
996.
4
AIR 2001 SC 3810.
U.P5that “It is the solemn duty to protect the fundamental rights zealously and vigilantly.”
The Counsels humbly submit that there was a violation of fundamental rights and that there
was a public interest6involved.
5. It is humbly submitted that The Constitution of Sentara recognizes equality before
law7, which is a fundamental right and has been violated in this case, as The Impugned Rule
makes an arbitrary classification between Hindu men and Hindu women as such classification
has no reasonable nexus with the object of the Act. Also the impugned rule violates ‘equal
protection of laws’. 8Also, the present writ petition has been filed on the grounds of violation
of Art. 15 of the Constitution of Sentara as the Impugned rule discriminates on the basis of
sex only as the temple of saripura is a male only temple and females of age 10 to 50 years
are barred from entering the temple.9
6. It is also stated that the present writ petition is maintainable on the grounds of
violation of Art. 17 which states that ‘Untouchability’ is abolished and its practice in any
form is forbidden.10 In the instant case, the social exclusion of women, based on menstrual
status, is nothing but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values.

[1.3.] PUBLIC CONCERN AS GROUND FOR MAINTAINABILITY OF PETITION

BY THE PETITIONER.

7. The petition has been filed by Shraddha and her other women lawyers to allow entry
of women into the temple without any age restrictions.11 The petition challenges
discrimination on the grounds of sex as well as sought court’s direction to challenge
‘Menstrual Discrimination’ which is prevalent in the instant case.Petitions have been
entertained by Indian Courts espousing the cause of people who have ‘sufficient interest’.12

8. In the instant case the concern of the petitioner is very noble and the entry of women,
if allowed would allow the access of the temple to all the female devotees barring
discrimination of any sort and women of each age group would be allowed to worship their
lord in the temple of their choice. The present petition has been filed in larger public

5
AIR 1961 SC1457.
6
Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI, AIR 1958 SC 578.
7
Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.
8
Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.
9
Moot proposition, 2nd Noida International University, National Moot Court Competition, 2019.
10
Art. 17 of the Constitution of India.
11
Moot proposition, 2nd Noida International University, National Moot Court Competition, 2019.
12
BandhuaMuktiMorcha v. Union of India, (1997) 10 SCC 549; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 4 S.C.C.
463.
interest.13 The allowance in entry would ensure justice, equality and would promote the
sufficient interest of the public at large.14The Supreme Court has expanded the rule of Locus
Standi in petitions and PIL to promote the interest of the Public.15

[1.4.] LOCUS STANDI OF THE PETITIONERS.

9. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the petitioners are Shraddha
and other lawyers in the case at hand.The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in the cases of Akhil
Bhartiya Shoshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. UOI16andFertilizer Corp. Kamgar v.
UOI17that the strict rule of Locus Standi must be relaxed to embrace the interest of the
public. In Mumbai KamgarSabha v. M/S. Abdul Bhai Faizullabhai & Ors18and Ratlam
Municipality v. Vardichan19 it was held that public interest is promoted by a spacious
construction of locus standi.

10. The scope of filing a petition has been increased and is very flexible today, as
prescribed by this Hon’ble Supreme Court whereby it has ruled in one landmark case that it
isn’t necessary for the affected person to personally approach the Court. Any member of the
public having “sufficient interest” can approach the Court for enforcing the legal or
constitutional rights of other persons and seek redressal of a common grievance.20
11. The Supreme Court of Indiana in Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Commit. And Ors.
v. C.K. Rajan and Ors.,21held that the Court in the exercise of powers under Article 32 for the
Constitution can entertain a petition filed by any interested person for the welfare of the
people who is in a disadvantaged position and, thus, not in a position to knock the doors of
the Court.

13
M/s A.R.C. Cement Ltd. v. U.P. , (1993) Supp. (1) SCC 57; Tarun Bharat Sangh v. Union of India., (1993)
Supp. (1) 4; A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu, 63 (1999) 2 SCC 718.
14
Union of India v. B.N. AnantiPadmanabiah, (1971) 3 SCC 278; State of A.P. v. P.T. Appaiah, (1980) 4 SCC
316.
15
M.C.Mehtav.UnionofIndia,(1986)1S.C.R.312;M.C.Mehtav.UnionofIndia,(1996)3Supp.S.C.R.49;D.S. Nakara
v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1308; P. NallaThampyTerah v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1133; Rural
Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2187;
Kurukshetra University and Anr. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2229; Fertilizers Corporation Kamagar
Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344; SarbanandaSonowal v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2920;
People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. UOI, AIR 1983 SC 378.
16
AIR 1981 SC149.
17
AIR 1981 SC344.
18
AIR 1976 SC1455.
19
AIR 1980 SC1622.
20
S.P Gupta v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 149.
21
AIR 2004 SC 561.
12. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors.,22it was opined, that only a person acting
bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding in the PIL will have a locus standi,
and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor and the disadvantaged, suffering
from violation of their Fundamental Rights, and there should not be any personal gain,
political motive or oblique consideration. In Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal v. Government of
Tamil Nadu,23it was held, that the issue which concerns the religious faith and practice of a
large number of citizens of the country and usage having the force of law, and the gravity of
the issue that arises, impel the Court to make an attempt to answer the issues and arising in
the writ petitions for determination on the merits.
13. In Sachidanand Pandey and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.,24it was held, that
it is only when Courts are apprised of gross violation of Fundamental Rights by a group or a
class action or such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the Courts, especially the
Supreme Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its
jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the
needy, the underdog and the neglected.
14. There has been blatant violation of Fundamental Rights of the Petitioners. In the
light of the aforementioned contentions, the present case is maintainable in this Hon’ble
Court.

ISSUE 2 THE SUPREME COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION IN DEFINING THE

BOUNDARIES OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC SPACES

1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that laws of Sentara are pari materia
to that of India.25 In the present case the issue in hand can be divided into 4 sub issues. [2.1]
whether the Board which maintains the The Temple of Saripura qualifies as an
instrumentality of Sate [2.2] whether the impugned rule 3(b) of ABC Places of Worship
(Authorization of Entry Act) qualifies as law under the constitutional scheme [2.3] whether
the impugned rule is in violation of Part III of the Constitution and therefore shall invoke the
WRIT jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [2.4] The Hon’ble Supreme Court has the inherent
jurisdiction to hear the matter and do complete justice in the present dispute.

22
AIR 1993 SC 892.
23
(2016) 2 SCC 725.
24
AIR 1987 SC 1109.
25
¶1, Moot Proposition, 2nd Noida International University, National Moot Court Competition, 2019
[2.1] WHETHER THE BOARD WHICH MAINTAINS THE THE TEMPLE OF
SARIPURA QUALIFIES AS AN INSTRUMENTALITY OF SATE
2. The counsel on behalf of petitioner most humbly submits that as per Article 12 of The
Sentara Constitution, which states the Definition of State the Temple of Saripura located at
Keripura falls under the scope of the definition of State and hence shall be regarded as the
State in respect to all further proceedings in the same respect.
3. In the present situation the rules and regulations of the Temple of Saripura are formed
by Government of Sentara under ABC Places of Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act.26
Therefore the Government of Sentara is liable for all the acts done by the temple because the
authority given to the temple is given to it by the Government itself.
4. In the case Zee telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India the Supreme Court of India stated that :
In absence of any form of authorization if any private body chooses to discharge any public
function or duties which amount to public duties or state functions which is not prohibited by
law then the private body may be considered to be an instrumentality of the State.27
5. As per the given case even if a body doesn’t qualify as an authority under Article 12,
but still fulfill the functions or duties of public welfare then the body shall be considered as a
state instrument. As per this statement it is the state which must be held liable for any actions
done by that private body. Therefore it is the state which must be held liable for any actions
done by the Temple of Saripura because it is undertaking public duties and functions.
6. In a landmark judgement of Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib28 the Supreme Court laid
down 5 tests to adjudge whether a body is an instrumentality of the government or not. As per
the fact above established the board which maintains the temple is established by
Government, also the work done by the board is also very much of the nature of public
welfare also in consonance with the Article 290A, every year a sum of RS 8,00,000/- is paid
to the Temple of Saripura out of the consolidated fund of the State of Keripula.
7. Judgment of a seven Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in Pradeep
Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Development Studies29and Sandeep Biswas v. State of
West Bengal30 , it was concluded that the test formulated in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
was not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any of those tests, it
must be considered to be a “State” within the meaning of Article 12. In Ramanna D.

26
¶4, Moot Proposition, 2nd Noida International University, National Moot Court Competition, 2019
27
Zee telefilms Ltd. V. Union of India AIR 2005 SC 2677
28
AIR 1981 SC 487
29
(2002) 5 SCC 111
30
(2010) 2 Cal WN (Cal) 399
Shetty v. International Airport Authority,31 it was held that if a body is an instrumentality or
agency of the government, it would be subject to the same Constitutional or public law
limitations as the government itself. Moreover, the main test the Courts apply to determine
whether a body is an instrumentality of the government or not are funding and control.32
Hence it is humbly submitted that the maintaining board of the Temple of Saripura will fall
under the ambit of other authorities in Article 12.
[2.2] whether the impugned rule 3(b) of ABC Places of Worship (Authorization of Entry
Act) qualifies as law under the constitutional scheme
8. The council on the behalf of petitioner humbly submits that as per Article 13(3)(a) of
The Constitution of Sentara, which reads as“law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law,
rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of
law33, the rule 3(b) framed by the Government under the authority of a certain Act
namely “The ABC Places of Worship (Authorization of Entry Act)” is included in the
scope of the definition of Law.
9. Article 13 is a protective provision and an index of the importance and preference that
the framers of the Constitution gave to Part III of the Constitution.34 It is the key provision as
it makes Fundamental Rights justiciable. It establishes that the Fundamental Rights are
enforceable and any law inconsistent with a Fundamental Right is void. 35 Powers are to be
exercised by the authorities within the framework of Constitutional and legislative
provisions.36 It confers power and an obligation on the Courts to declare a law void if it is
inconsistent with a Fundamental Right. It makes the judiciary, and especially the Apex
Court, as the guardian, protector and the interpreter of the Fundamental Rights.37
10. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in The State of Bombay v. NarasuAppa
Mali(Narasu)38 considered the ambit of Article 13, in the context of customs, usage and
personal law. In this case it was contended that a provision of a personal law which permits
polygamy is violative of the Article 15 which guarantees the fundamental right of non-
discrimination, and such a practise would be considered as void under Article 13(1). In this
case the Chief Justice Chagla gave the opinion that customs and usage would be included in

31
AIR 1979 SC 1628.
32
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 889 (8 th ed. 2018)
33
Constitution of Sentara, Art. 13
34
RamlilaMaidan Incident v. Home Secretary, UOI, (2012) 5 SCC 1
35
State of Madras v. VG Row, AIR 1952 SC 196
36
Renu v. District and Sessions Judge, AIR 2014 SC 2175; State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of
Democratic Rights, West Bengal, AIR 2010 SC 1476 (1490); Brij Mohan Lal v. UOI, (2012) 6 SCC 502 (569)
37
Daryao v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1457
38
AIR 1952 Bom 84
the definition of Laws in Force in Article 13(1). This is the reason why the validity of
customs and usages needs to be tested for its conformity with Part III of the Constitution.
11. Similarly in AK Gopalan v. State of Madras 39, a seven judge bench dealt with the
constitutional validity of the Preventive Detention Act 1950. In this case as well Justice Fazl
Ali suggested that if an Act or ordinance is in violation of an article of Part III of Constitution
then under Article 13(1) it will be considered as void and also a single Act or Ordinance or
custom can be in violation of more than one Fundamental Right. In the given case the Rule
3(b) is in violation Article 14(equality), 15(non-discrimination), 17(abolition of
untouchability) and 25(freedom to profess, propagate and practise one’s religion) and
therefore will be void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution.40
12. The council humbly submits before the court that a very similar situation to the
present situation came to light in the ShayaroBano case (ShayaraBano v. Union of India41). In
this case the constitutionality of Triple Talaq was questioned. This practise was considered
unconstitutional under Article 13(1) as it was in direct violation of Part III of the Constitution
and this practise didn’t amount to an essential practise of Muslim religion. In the present
situation also baring of women and female children between the age of 10-50 years will be
considered as void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution as this practise is violative of
Article 14, 15, 17, 25 and 26 of the Constitution and also this practise(custom) is not an
essential practise of Hindu Religion. This is because the Hindu religion doesn’t have a
practise of treating women or children any different from men. In most of the Hindu practises
or customs the inclusion of women is considered necessary. There are many different
situations in Hindu mythology which shows that women held a very important position in
Hindu religion. Therefore this practise doesn’t include in the essential practise of Hindu
customs and hence will be included in the Article 13 and should be held void as it is in direct
violation of Part III of the Constitution.
[2.3] whether the impugned rule is in violation of Part III of the Constitution and
therefore shall invoke the WRIT jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
13. It is humbly submitted by the counsel from the side of Petitioner that since there is a
violation of Part III of the constitution by the rule 3(b) of ABC Places of Worship
(Authorisation of Entry) Act therefore the Supreme Court of Sentara should issue the Writ of
Mandamus (A writ issued by a court to compel performance of a particular act by lower

39
1950 SCR 88
40
RustomCavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978
AIR 597 also had similar decisions.
41
(2017) 9 SCC 1
court or a governmental officer or body, to correct a prior action or failure to act.)42under its
WRIT Jurisdiction under Article 32(1) and Article 32(2)43 of the Constitution of Sentara.
TheHon’ble Supreme Court is the sentinels of justice and has been vested with the
extraordinary power of judicial review to ensure that the rights of citizens are duly
protected.44
14. In Assam SanmilitaMahasangha v. Union of India45 Article 32 was described as the
heart and soul of the constitution as it guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court for the
enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution,
therefore this Article was itself considered as a Fundamental Right.46
15. Article 13 is the provision in the Constitution of Sentara which makes Fundamental
Rights justiciable and if any law is in violation of any Fundamental Right in Part III of the
Constitution then that law shall be considered as void under Article 13. It is the role of the
Supreme Court to make sure that no such inconsistent law comes into force and if there is any
law in force then also it’s the duty of Supreme Court to declare that law unconstitutional and
hence void. It’s the power given to the Supreme Court under Article 32 which ensures the
Right to Constitutional Remedies for the citizens of Sentara.47
16. The counsel humbly submits in front of the Hon’ble Court that since the Rule 3(b) of
the ABC Places of Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act is in direct violation of Part III of
the Constitution therefore the Petitioners have a right to demand for the issue of the Writ of
Mandamus as there is a grave violation of Part III of the Constitution of Sentara by the State
of Keripula and by the Board of the Temple of Saripura.
[2.4] The Hon’ble Supreme Court has the inherent jurisdiction to hear the matter and
do complete justice in the present dispute.
17. The counsel humbly submits in front of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of the State of
Sentara that since all above sub issues of the issue in hand is in favour of the Petitioner,
therefore the Supreme Court is having the inherent jurisdiction to hear in the given matter.
18. Along with facts and laws the counsel has proved that Board which maintains the
Temple of Saripura against which the matter has been filed is an instrumentality of state as

42
Black's law dictionary, Ninth Edition
43
Constitution of Sentara, Art. 32
44
ManoharLal Sharma v. Principal Secretary, (2014) 2 SCC 532; Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner,
UP, AIR 1963 SC 996
45
AIR 2015 SC 783
46
State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu (2017), 3 SCC 3662; RomeshThappar v. State of Madras, AIR
1950 SC 124; KesavanandaBhartiSripadagalvaru&Ors. v. State of Kerela&Anr., (1973) 4 SCC 225; Supreme
Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1
47
State of Madras v. V G Row, AIR 1952 SC 196
well as the Rule 3(b) of ABC Places of Worship(Authorisation of Entry) Act which is the
impugned rule in question qualifies as law under the constitutional scheme. Also since the
given matter is under the Writ Jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of
the Constitution of Sentara therefore the Hon’ble Supreme Court has the inherent jurisdiction
to hear the matter and do complete justice in the present dispute.
ISSUE 3 WHETHER RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF
CERTAIN AGE UNDER RULE 3(b) AMOUNTS TO VIOLATION OF ITS PARENT
ACT? WHETHER SUCH RESTRICTION AMOUNTS TO VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 14, 15, 17 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Laws of the Sentara are
parimateriato the laws of India48.In the instant case the restrictions imposed on women and
children of certain age group, which is any female between the age group of 10 and 50 and
Rule 3(b) of the ABC Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, will result in
violation of rights which they have been guaranteed according to Part III of the Constitution
of Sentara. The issue at hand can be divided into four sub issues. [3.1]Restriction amounts to
the violation of Article 14[3.2] Restriction amounts to the violation of Article 15 [3.3]
Restriction amounts to the violation of Article 17 [3.4] Restriction amounts to the violation of
Article 21.
[3.1] RESTRICTION AMOUNTS TO THE VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14
2. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that equality before law is prima
facie violated in this particular case. Article 14 of the Constitution embodies in itself the
concept of equality and is one of the magnificent corner-stones of Indian democracy. Article
1449 states that the State shall not deny to any person equality before law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India.
3. The principle of equality before law does not mean that the same law should apply to
everyone inspite of difference in circumstances or conditions.50 It means that like should be
treated alike and unlike should be treated differently. Thus, though the Constitution allows
permissible classification, it is imperative that two conditions must be fulfilled, namely: the
classification must be found on intelligible differentia and the differentia must have a
reasonable nexus with the objective sought to be achieved.51

48
¶1, Moot Proposition, 2nd Noida International University, National Moot Court Competition, 2019
49
Sentara Constitution Art 14
50
ChiranjeetLal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.
51
K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, AIR 2001 SC 467
4. In the instant case, the devotees were excluded from entering and worshipping in the
temple on the ground of being in menstruating age52.Thus, the Board has failed to comply
with the conditions which are imperative for reasonable classification under Article 14.

3.2.1 That the act of boarddoes not satisfy the test of reasonable classification

5. Equality before law is dynamic term and has two meanings i.e. No person is above the
law and the state is authorised to ensure equality among all individuals.” In case of E.P.
Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu53, court emphasised that ‘Equality is a dynamic concept
with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be cribbed, cabined and confined within
traditional and doctrinaire limits.’
6. While Article 14 forbids the class legislation, it does not forbid the reasonable
classification of persons, objects and transactions. The test of reasonable classification was
laid inBudhanChaudhary v. State of Bihar,54 which provides that the classification must be
based on:

Principle of Intelligible Differentia

7. The expression intelligible differentia means difference capable of being understood

and should be reasonable and not arbitrary.55 It has been held that the classification should
not be artificial or evasive. It should be based on an intelligible differentia, some real and
substantial distinction, which distinguishes persons or things grouped together in class from
others left out of it.56

8. The Apex Court has held in a previous judgement that “Equal protection of the laws
is now being read as a positive obligation on the state to ensure equal protection of laws by
bringing in necessary social and economic changes so that everyone may enjoy equal
protection of the laws and If the state leaves the existing inequalities untouched laws by its
laws, it fails in its duty of providing equal protection of its laws to all persons57”.

52
¶3, Moot Proposition, 2nd Noida International University, National Moot Court Competition, 2019
53
AIR 1981 SC 487.
54
AIR 1955 SC 191. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC75
55
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 876 (7 th ed., Lexis Nexis Butterworth WadhwaPublication,Nagpur,
2016).
56
LaxmiKhandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873,891 ; State of Haryana v. Jai Singh (2003) 9 SCC
114.
57
St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, 152 (2008) DLT 228.
9. In the instant case, the Board has failed in taking adequate measures to provide equal
protection of laws58. It creates two classes of people: one class which consist of men as well
as women (who does not fall between the ages of 10-50years) and the second class of those
who are inclined otherwise. Although both the classes of people seek to exercise the right to
worship and enter the temple but only a class of them are allowed to do so. The act causes
discrimination on women who are between 10-50 years of age that is those who are in
menstruating age. The Impugned Rule violates the right of women to equal protection of laws
as Hindu women are not provided the protection against discrimination in regard to temple
entry as opposed to Hindu men who are protected by virtue of Section 3 of the Act even
though the Act applies equally to Hindu women.
10. It was held in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India &Ors.59that,
“each person’s self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to their
personality and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and freedom”.
Therefore, it is averred that the classifications are not based on intelligible differentia and
thus violate Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to equality.

There is no Rational Nexus between Classification and Objective Sought

11. In order to satisfy the twin test, it was held that the differentia adopted as the basis of
classification must have a rational or reasonable nexus with the object sought to be
achieved.60 Equal protection does not necessitate that all people be managed
indistinguishably, yet it requires that a refinement made have some pertinence to the reason
for which the grouping is made.61
12. It is submitted that the Impugned Rule by denying entry of women into places of
public worship violates the right of women to equality before the law62and fails to fulfill both
the tests laid down for the reasonable classification63. The Impugned Rule makes an arbitrary
classification between Hindu men and Hindu women as such classification has no reasonable
nexus with the object of the Act.
13. It is contended that authoritative act of Board targets individuals on the basis of
menstruation and thus has no nexus to the categorization made.The Supreme Court in the

58
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41; Raj SahibanShersingh v. The State of Rajasthan,
AIR 1954 PH 21; Neera Gupta v. Delhi University, 1996 (39) DRJ 2005; Kesar Chand v. State of Punjab, 1988
(5) SLR 27.
59
WRIT PETITION (Civ.) No. 494 of 2012.
60
Javed v. State of Haryana(2003) 8 SCC 369.
61
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111, 86 S.Ct. 760, 763 (1966).
62
Supra 13
63
Supra 14
case, Bhimsaya&Ors. v. Janabi (Smt) Alias Janawwa64 while adjudicating the share of a
person claiming to be an adopted son of the deceased by custom in ancestral property, it was
held that custom must be ancient, certain and reasonable and cannot be opposed to public
policy.
14. In the instant case, the State of Keripura has failed in fulfilling its responsibilities and
that has led to the violation of Art. 1465 granted to the women worshippers of Temple of
Saripura. Art. 14 aim at striking down hostile discrimination66 or oppression of inequality to
give equal protection to all persons. Since the restriction on the entry by the Board impairs
their right to equality. Discrimination on the basis of menstruation prevents them from having
social justice. Thus, it is submitted that the classification is unreasonable as it is
discriminatory and there is no rational nexus between the object and the classification.

[3.2] RESTRICTION AMOUNTS TO THE VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 15

15. It is humbly submitted that Article 15(1) provides that “State shall not discriminate
against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of
them67”.The denial of entry to women between the ages of 10 to 50 years is based on the fact
of menstruation during that period alone and not on other fact and is therefore based on
biological factors of women. It is therefore discrimination on the basis of sex alone.
16. It is submitted that the impugned rule perpetuate gender stereotypes which is a form
of discrimination based on sex. In the case of AnujGarg v. Hotel Association68 while
adjudicating a challenge to Section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, which prohibited the
employment of any man under the age of 25, and any woman, in any part of an establishment
in which liquor or another intoxicating drug was being consumed, rejected the gender
stereotypical arguments that said act was essential to ensure the “security” of women. The
court found that the legislation amounted to “invidious discrimination perpetrating sexual
differences” and struck it down. In the instant case the exclusionary practice per se violates

64
Bhimsaya&Ors. v. Janabi (Smt) Alias Janawwa, (2006) 13 SCC 627
65
Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of AP, 1993 AIR 217; Govinda v. State of UP, 1999 Cri. LJ 1950; Miss Mohini
Jain v. State of Karnataka, 1992 AIR 1858; A.P. Christian Medical Educational Society v. State of A.P., (1986)
2 SEC
667; T.V. Vateeshwaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1983 AIR 361; SheelaBarse v. State of Maharashtra, 1983 SC
378.
66
Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745; CB Muthamma, IFS v. UOI, 1979 (4) SCC 260; Shyam
SundarKhaitan v. State of West Bengal, 86 CWN 1002.
67
Sentara Constitution Art 15
68
AIR 2008 SC 663
Article 15(1) of the Constitution which amounts to discrimination on the basis of sex 69 as the
physiological feature of menstruation is exclusive to females alone.
17. In consonance with Art15(2)(b), it is humbly submitted that places of public resort
are places which are frequented by the public like public parks, public roads, public bus,
ferry, public urinal, railways, hospitals, etc70.
18. Where a place of public resort is not maintained by the state, and shall be open
dedicated by the owner to use of the general public71. In the instant case the temple of
Saripurais sight of largest pilgrimage in the world with an estimate of between 17 million and
50 million devotees visiting every year72 which clearly shows that is is a place which is
frequented by public hence the temple of Saripura comes under ‘places of public resort73’.
19. It is contended that since the temple of Saripura comes under the purview of state74
and is a public place of worship being open and dedicated to public therefore the denial of
entry to women between the age of 10-50 years violates Article 15(2)(b) of the Sentara
Constitution.
20. It can be inferred from Art. 15 (3) “that no less favorable treatment is to be given to
women on gender based criterion which would favor the opposite sex and women will not be
deliberately selected for less favorable treatment because of their sex75”. In the instant case
by excluding women between the ages of 10-50 years and imposing no such restriction on
entry of men in the temple this gender based less favorable treatment clearly favors the
opposite sex. It is hereby submitted that such exclusionary practice violates Art. 15(3) of the
Constitution
a) The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction to be considered while framing laws
21. The State is bound to uphold the Constitution so far as it upholds the right of the
citizens to equality under Article 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The safeguard given under
Article 26 of the Constitution cannot be used as a defence if it is not proved as an essential
and integral part of the religion, and no part of the Constitution can be used in such a manner
or be interpreted in such a way which would result in curtailing or destroying any other part
of the Constitution76. There needs to be a harmonious construction between all the parts of

69
CharuKhurana v. Union of India, 2015 (1) SCC 192
70
V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India 91 (13th ed. 2017)
71
ibid
72
¶2, Moot Proposition, 2nd Noida International University, National Moot Court Competition, 2019
73
Supra 25
74
Sentara Constitution Art 12
75
Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Yeshaswinee Merchant, (2003) 6 SCC 277
76
Dr. NoorjehanSafiaNiaz v. State of Maharastra, (2016) 5 AIR Bom R 660; Haji Ali Dargah Trust v.
NoorjehanSafiaNiaz, (2016) 16 SCC 788.
the Constitution and no part can be interpreted in such a manner result of which will destroy
any other part of it.
b) Custom and Usages
22. Article 13 of the Constitution States that any law which is inconsistent with the
provisions of Part III of the Constitution shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.
Article 13(3)(a) under the definition of law also included “customs and usages”.

23. Rule 3(b) of the ABC Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, States
that women “at such time” during which they are not by the “custom and usage” allowed to
enter a place of public worship, the said rule States that women are not allowed at such time
during which custom and usages don’t allow them, “customs and usages” if has a force of
“law” as per Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution, and the State is bound and under the
obligation to ensure proper enforcement of such.

24. However, if there is no material in the context of Constitutional provision with which
we are concerned, and then naturally the next step that will follow is that the State is bound to
protect its citizen’s Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 14 and 15 of the
Constitution, the State cannot deprive its citizens of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed 77.
This means that the State needs to ensure that there is no gender discrimination been done by
the Saripura Temple.

(c) Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women

(CEDAW)
25. The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) was adopted by the UN general assembly and came into force in the year 1981,
referred commonly as the international bill of rights for women. Sentara has ratified this
Convention on 9th July 199378.

26. Article 1 of the said convention defines the term “discrimination against women”
which means exclusion, restriction or distinction of women on the basis of gender which
results in impairing or nullifying them from the enjoyment and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field.

77
Haji Ali Dargah Trust v. NoorjehanSafiaNiaz, (2016) 16 SCC 788.
78
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, State Parties, (Feb 15, 2019)
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.html.
27. Article 2 of the same says that States agree to eliminate all sort of discrimination
against women. Article 3 of the same States that the State needs to ensure there is equality
between men and women, and Article 5 States that there should not be ant stereotyping or
cultural prejudices or culturally discriminatory practices.
[3.3] RESTRICTION AMOUNTS TO THE VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 17.
28. It is humbly submitted that Art. 17 of the constitution provides for the “Abolition of
Untouchability”. It says that “Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is
forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of “Untouchability” shall be an
offence punishable in accordance with law79.”
29. Article 17 is enforceable against anyone be it the State, individuals, group of
individuals or any other authority, it is an embodied enforceable Constitutional mandate.
Article17 was placed on a Constitutional pedestal of enforceable Fundamental Rights for two
reasons: First, untouchability is violation of the basic rights of socially backward individuals
and their dignity; second, the framers believed that the abolition of untouchability is a
Constitutional imperative to establish an equal social order80.
30. It is submitted that the use of the expression “in any form” includes untouchability
based on social factors and is wide enough to cover menstrual discrimination against women.
Since the menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have
a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and
religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in
humiliation and a violation of dignity.
31. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the provisions of Article 17 were
enforced by means of the Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 3
penalise the act of preventing any person from entering a place of public worship and from
worshiping or offering prayers in such a place. It is hereby contended that the exclusion of
women, based on menstrual status, is a form of untouchability and hence it violates Article 17
of the constitution.
[3.4] RESTRICTION AMOUNTS TO THE VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 21
32. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Board has violated the rights
of the petitioners, provided under Article 21 of the Constitution of Sentara. The act of the
Board portends an absolute denial of dignity and individuality of the petitioners and has also
violated. It is contended that the act of the Board violates Right to life mentioned under

79
Sentara Constitution Art 17
80
Indian Young Lawyer Association &Ors. v. The State of Karela&Ors., (Civil Writ Petition) no. 373, 2006.
Article 21 of the constitution of Sentara as [3.4.1] it violates Right to Privacy of the
petitioners, [3.4.2] it violates Right to dignity of the petitioners.

[3.4.1]The act of the Trust violates Right of Privacy of the petitioners

33. It is humbly submitted that in a case of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India81it was
held that right to privacy comes under right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of
Sentara82. In the instant case exclusionary practice in its implementation results in
involuntary disclosure by women of both their menstrual status and age which amounts to
forced disclosure that consequently violates the right to dignity and privacy embedded in
Article 21 of the Constitution of Sentara.
34. It is averred that the Constitution protects the right to privacy of the individuals and
hence, the termination of membership cause a breach of the same. The right to privacy cannot
be denied, even if there is a miniscule fraction of population which is getting affected. Hence,
the petitioner’s personal liberty should not be curbed by the interference of the Trust.

[3.4.2]The Act of the Trust Violates Right to Dignity of the Petitioners

35. It is submitted that in a case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India83it was held that
right to life embodied in Article 21 is not merely a physical right but it also includes within
its ambit, the right to live with human dignity. The right to dignity is an important aspect of
the right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. In the Indian context, the right
to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution does not merely provide for a
physical existence rather it implies the existence of human life which is qualitative and
meaningful.84 The right to dignity forms a part of human culture and that it needs no
elaboration that the right to life under Article 21 encompasses protection of a person’s
dignity, autonomy and privacy.85
36. It is humbly submitted that in the instant case the exclusionary practice considers
women to be polluted, which has a huge psychological impact on them, and undermines their
right to live with human dignity86 under Article 21. Thus the denial of entry by the Board
takes away the right to dignity of the petitioners as provided under Article 21 of the
Constitution.

81
(2015) 8 SCC735
82
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India,WP(Crl.) No. 76/2016.
83
AIR1978 SC597
84
Olga Tellis and Ors.v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors., (1985) 3 SCC 545.
85
Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration,AIR 1980 SC 1535.
86
Public Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharastra (2014) 10 SCC 635
ISSUE 4WHETHER THE TEMPLE OF SARIPURA CAN ASSERT A CLAIM ON
EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF RIGHT TO MANAGE
ITS OWN AFFAIRS IN THE MATTER OF RELIGION AND WHETHER THE
EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE VIOLATES RIGHT TO RELIGION UNDER
ARTICLE 25?
1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Laws of the Sentara are pari
materia to the laws of India87.In the instant case the issue at hand can be divided into two sub
issues [4.1] Exclusionary practice violates Right to Religion[4.2] Religious institution does
not have a right to manage its own affairs in the matter of religion.
[4.1] Exclusionary practice violates Right to Religion

2. Religion is the belief which binds spiritual nature of man to supernatural being. It
includes worship, belief, faith, devotion, etc and extends to rituals.88 Such a relationship and
expression of devotion cannot be circumscribed by dogmatic notions of biological or
physiological factors arising out of rigid socio-cultural attitudes which do not meet the
constitutionally prescribed tests.89
3. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the acts of the Board amounts to
gross violation of right to freedom of religion enshrined under Article 25 of the Constitution.
In the instant case, petitioners’ right to freedom of religion has been violated by the Board
since their entry in the temple has been restricted on the ground of Menstruation.
4. Based on this, it is contended that [4.1.1.] there is violation of Clause (1) of Article 25
of the Constitution of Sentara which provides for the “freedom of conscience” and “the right
freely to profess, practice and to propagate religion”[4.1.2.] The ban on entry of women of
menstruating age does not constitute an “essential religious practice” under Article 25 of the
Constitution [4.1.3.] The State has a duty to throw open the public Hindu temples to all
classes of Hindu under Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution.

[4.1.1]Board has violated the petitioners’ right to freedom of religion enshrined under
Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India.

5. It is submitted that the Board has violated the right of the petitioner’s which they have
with regard to Article 25. It is an Article of faith in the Constitution, incorporated in

87
¶1, Moot Proposition, 2nd Noida International University, National Moot Court Competition, 2019
88
PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001.
89
Indian Young Lawyers Association &Ors.v. State of Kerala &Ors, WP (Civil) No. 373/ 2006.
recognition of the principle that the real test of a true democracy is the ability of even an
insignificant minority to find its identity under the country’s Constitution. This has to be
borne in mind in interpreting Article 25.90 Though our Constitution protects religious
freedom and consequent rights and practices essential to religion, this Court will be guided by
the pursuit to uphold the values of the Constitution, based on dignity, liberty and equality.91
6. It is submitted that since the constitution has been adopted and given by the people of
this country to themselves, the term public morality in Article 25 has to be appositely
understood as being synonymous with constitutional morality.92 The Hon’ble Court in
ManojNarula v. Union of India93, expounded on the concept of constitutional morality as,
“The principle of constitutional morality basically means to bow down to the norms of the
Constitution and not to act in a manner which would become violative of the rule of law or
reflectible of action in an arbitrary manner”.
7. It is averred that the women under the restricted age group has a right to the right
freely to profess, practise and to propagate religion which is being violated because of the ban
imposed on their entry in the Tempe of Saripura.

[4.1.2.] EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE DOES NOT FORM AN “ESSENTIAL

RELIGIOUS PRACTICE”.

8. It is humbly submitted before this court that Article 25 protects the freedom to
practice rituals, ceremonies, etc. which are an integral part of a religion as observed by this
court in John Vallamattom and anothers v. U.O.I94 the court ruled that the disposition
towards making gifts for charitable or religious purpose can be designated as a pious act of a
person, but the same cannot be said to be an integral part of any religion.
9. It is humbly submitted before this court that in Commr., Hindu Religious
Endowments v. Sri LakshmindraThirthaSwamiar of ShriShirur Mutt95 held that what
constitutes an essential part of a religion will be ascertained with reference to the tenets and
doctrines of that religion itself. In Mohd. HanifQuareshi v. State of Bihar96, this Court
rejected the argument of the petitioner that sacrifice of cow on Bakr-id was an essential

90
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerela, AIR 1987 SC 748.
91
sabrimala
92
Sabrimala.
93
2014 (9) SCC 1.
94
AIR 2003 SC 2902
95
AIR 1954 SC 282
96
AIR 1958 SC 731
practice of Mohammedan religion and ruled that it could be prohibited by the State under
Clause 2(a) of Article 25.
10. It may be noted that in Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali97, the court
held that “in order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion they
must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part; otherwise even purely
secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part of religion are apt to be
clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being treated as religious practices
within the meaning of Article 26. Similarly, even practices though religious may have sprung
from merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and unessential
accretions to religion itself”. Thus, the state and the Court must respect the integrity of
religious group life except where the practices in question lead to the exclusion of individuals
from economic, social or cultural life in a manner that impairs their dignity, or hampers their
access to basic goods.”98
11. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that by allowing women to enter into
the Saripura temple for offering prayers, it cannot be imagined that the nature of Hindu
religion would be fundamentally altered or changed in any manner. It is hereby contended
that, the exclusionary practice, which has been given the backing of a subordinate legislation
in the form of Rule 3(b), framed by the virtue of the Act, is neither an essential nor an
integral part of the Hindu religion without which Hindu religion, of which the devotees of
Lord A are followers, will not survive99. Therefore this exclusionary practice does not form
essential religious practice.
[4.1.3]The State has a duty to throw open the public temples to all classes of Hindus
under Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution.

12. It is contended that Article 25(2)(b) enables the state to take steps to remove the
scourge of untouchability from amongst the Hindus. The word “public” here includes any
section of public. Art. 25(2)(b) of the Constitution of India protects the right to enter a Hindu
religious institutions of public character for the purposes of worship. The fact is that though

97
(1962) 1 SCR 383; Sri VenkataramanaDevaru v State of Mysore AIR 1958 SC255 ; Commra., Hindu
Religious Endowments v. Sri LakshmindraThirthaSwamiar of ShriShirur Mutt AIR 1954 SC 282;
JagannathRamanuj Das v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 400
98
Gautam Bhatia, Freedom from community: Individual rights, group life, state authority and religious freedom
under the Indian Constitution, Global Constitutionalism, Cambridge University Press (2016) at page 382.
99
Tilkayat Sri GovindlaljiMaharaj v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1963 SC 1638
Art. 25(1) deals with rights of individuals, Art. 25(2) is much wider in its contents and has
reference to the rights of communities, and controls both Art. 25(1) and Art.26(b).100
13. It is pertinent to note that court in Sri VenkataramanaDevaru and Others v. State
of Mysore101, held that the entry into temple is a matter of religion and in the following
words: “The conclusion is implicit in Art. 25 which after declaring that all persons are
entitled freely to profess, practice and propagate religion, enacts that this should not affect
the operation of any law throwing open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to
all classes and sections of Hindus”.
14. In this case, petitioners were excluded from the temple premises . The barring of
excommunication on grounds other than religious grounds say, on the breach of some
obnoxious social rule or practice might be a measure of social reform and a law which bars
such excommunication merely might conceivably come within the saving provisions of
clause 2(b) of Art. 25.”102

[4.2] THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO MANAGE

ITS OWN AFFAIRS IN THE MATTER OF RELIGION.
15. It is humbly submitted by the Petitioners that the religious institution in the present
case that is the Board cannot assert a claim in regards of practice of exclusion of women
between the age of 10-50 years under the umbrella of right to manage its own affairs in the
matters of religion under Article 26(b) of the Constitution of Sentara.

16. Article 26, clause (b) talks about that “subject to the public order, morality and health
every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to manage its own
affairs in the matters of religion”. Although it is important to note that the rights conferred
under Article 26 are not unqualified and have certain restrictions to it. It has been upheld by
this Court that where the denominational rights would substantially diminish Article 25
(2)(b), the former must yield to the latter. And also, that such rights must be strictly
denominational in nature103.
17. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court thatThe Apex Court has held in the
case of S.P. Mittal v. Union of India104, that to recognize any religious institution as a
“religious denomination” in itself according to article 26 of the Indian Constitution, three

100
Sri VenkataramanaDevaru and Ors.v. State of Mysore and Ors, AIR 1958 SC 255.
101
1958 SCR 895/ AIR 1958 SC 255.
102
SardarSyednaTaherSaifuddinSaheb v. State of Bombay, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 496.
103
Sri VenkataramanaDevaru v. State of Mysore, (1958) SCR 895.
104
AIR 1983 SC 1 ;AcharyaJagdishwaranandAvadhuta v. Commr. Of Police. (1983) 4 SCC 522 : AIR 1984 SC
51
conditions must be fulfilled: “(1) It must be a collection of individuals who have a system of
beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a
common faith; (2) Common organisation; and (3) Designation by a distinctive name”. While
with time another element was added to this test that is of the position of a common set of
religious tenets105.
18. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the instant case the Temple of
Saripura failed to fulfil all the three tests laid down by this court in the above mentioned case.
As the Temple of Saripura does not have a common faith hence fails to fulfil the first
condition, as it is mentioned in the facts that “It is a male only temple and women between
the ages of 10 to 50 years, that is those who are in menstruating age, are barred from entering
the temple106”.Which shows that all persons, irrespective of their caste or religion are
worshippers at the said temple. They can therefore be regarded as has been held in Sri Adi
Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple Varanasi and ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors.107, as
Hindus who worship the idol of Lord A as part of the Hindu religious form of worship but not
as denominational worshippers.
19. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Second condition is also not
fulfilled since to be within the fold of Article 26, denomination must be a religious sect or
body. Worship of Lord A is not confined to supporters of a particular religion as every Hindu
could visit the temple. Along with this there is also an absence of common spiritual
organisation which is necessary element in the formation of religious denomination. It is
hereby contended that since everyone irrespective of religious belief can worship the deity.
Therefore the practices associated with the forms of worship do not constitute the devotees
into a religious denomination.
20. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that it is nowhere mentioned in the
facts that these worshippers are designated by a distinct name which is the third test to form
the religious denomination therefore third condition is also not fulfilled.
21. It is, thereby, contended that since the Temple of Saripura fails to fulfil all the three
tests laid down by this court hence the Temple of Saripura does not form a religious
denomination and therefore it does not have the right to manage its own religious affairs
under Article 26(b).

105
NallorMarthandamVellalar v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, (2003) 10 SCC
712.
106
¶3, Moot Proposition, 2nd Noida International University, National Moot Court Competition, 2019
107
(1997)4 SCC 606 ; Sri KanyakaParmeswari Anna Satram Committee v. Commr. Hindu Religious and
Charitable Endowment Deptt., (1997) 5 SCC 303; AIR 1997 SC 2332
Harmonious Construction between Article 25 and Article 26
22. It is submitted by the Petitioners that even if we consider the religious institution to be
a religious denomination it still cannot claim the right under Article 26(b) to manage its own
affairs in the matters of religion. It is submitted that Article 26 is subjected to Article 25 of
the Constitution. And if any of the rights exercised under Article 26 stands in violation of
Article 25, such right has to be nullified.
23. It is submitted that Article 26 is subject to Article 25 of the Constitution. The idea of
rule of harmonious construction is that when there are in an enactment two provisions which
cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect
could be given to both.
24. It may be noted that the Hon’ble court in Commissioner of Hindu Religious
Endowments, Madras v. LakshmindraThirthaSwamiar of ShriShirur Matt 108, was of
the view that Article 26(b) should be read subject to Article 25(2)(b) which involves the
throwing open of public Hindu temples to all classes of Hindus, but then this Constitutional
interference is only applicable when it involves a general and total exclusion of public from
worship at all times. And if any of the rights exercised under Article 26 stands in violation of
Article 25, such right has to be nullified. Thus, the right of religious minority under Article
26(b) is not only subject to “public order, morality and health, but also to Article 25(2)(b),
viz. providing for social welfare and reform.”109
25. Thus, it is submitted that the right to manage the affairs of the Board under Article 26
is not absolute. Any law or custom to be protected under Article 26 must have Constitutional
legitimacy. The Constitution protects religious freedom and consequent rights and practices
essential to religion, but in doing so the Court will be guided by the pursuit to uphold the
values of the Constitution, based in dignity, liberty and equality.

26. It is hereby contended that even though if we consider the religious institution to be of
a denominational character then, as per the Devaru case110 there needs to be a harmonious
construction between Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, and thus, to completely deny
women of the age group of 10 to 50 years from entering the temple would be impermissible
as per the Devaru Case111.

108
AIR 1954 SC 282.
109
M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1310 (8 TH ED. 2018).
110
Supra 17
111
ibid