CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v.

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT 482 SCRA 233 (2005)

“Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service Commission, a constitutional

commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition
to fund releases to it may be imposed. The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of
2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds
released by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving
an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by
DBM on the ground of their ―no report, no release‖ policy. Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus
seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it
seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DBM‘s policy, ―no report, no release‖ is constitutional.

HELD:

DBM‘s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared
unconstitutional.

The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy
is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy
without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall
enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released. The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, ―automatic release‖ in Section 6, Article X
of the Constitution is defined as ―an automatic manner; without thought or conscious intention.‖ Being
―automatic,‖ thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs
are not required to perform any act to receive the ―just share‖ accruing to them from the national
coffers. By parity of construction, ―automatic release‖ of approved annual appropriations to petitioner,
a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean
that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the
Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a ―no report, no release‖
policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions, of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the CSC may
be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that
extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others
which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by
the Constitution.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION (CHREA) vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN

RIGHTS

G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004.

FACTS:

On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution
No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission. To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution,
authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel
Services. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to
provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were:
one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one
Accounting Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM
with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request. In light
of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital
Region Office, through a memorandum recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile,
the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested
the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its
ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to
evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The
CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading, reclassification,
creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the
Department of Budget and Management?
HELD:

CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning the CHR’s
alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create positions inasmuch as the approval of the
DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the CSC and the Court of
Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial matters are
concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of positions therein. The CHR,
although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices
accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.as the law’s designated body to implement
and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative
government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily
controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,we echoed the
basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.