J. Inst. Eng. India Ser.
A
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40030-019-00383-x
REVIEW PAPER
Governance Issues in Public Utility Public–Private Partnerships:
A Theoretical Perspective
Tharun Dolla1 • Boeing Singh Laishram1
Received: 11 January 2019 / Accepted: 23 April 2019
Ó The Institution of Engineers (India) 2019
Abstract Public–private partnership mode of infrastruc-
ture procurement has entered into the municipal solid waste
management (MSWM) projects of late. Among various
governance issues, the choice between the two governance
options, i.e., to bundle or unbundle the MSWM supply
chain concerning the PPP concession, is a tough task for
public organizations. This is not addressed so far in the
extant literature. The current paper, while arguing this
problem, posits that the network governance approach and
usage of organizational theories would hold a promising
theoretical framework in formulating and understanding
the aforesaid governance choice. Based on the conceptu-
alization of this paper, future research can ground the
framework for bundling problem formulations on the
established and prominent theories of economics, organi-
zation, and procurement, namely transaction cost theory,
agency theory, and auction theory.
Keywords Governance
Municipal solid waste (MSW)

Network infrastructure
Public–private partnership (PPP)

Bundling/unbundling
& Boeing Singh Laishram
boeing@iitg.ac.in
Tharun Dolla
tharun@iitg.ac.in
1 and Build Own Operate is governed by the constructs such
Infrastructure Engineering and Management Division,
Department of Civil Engineering, Indian Institute of
Technology Guwahati, Guwahati, Assam 781039, India
Introduction
Network infrastructure are public utilities having fixed
operations in the network for the delivery of services.
Infrastructure projects in natural gas, water and wastewater
treatment, municipal solid waste management (MSWM),
telecommunications, public transport, power are recog-
nized as utilities and network services of urban local bodies
(ULBs) [1]. In India, the 74th constitutional amendment act
in 1992 delegated the provision of MSW services to ULBs.
SWM rules 2016 constitutes the by-laws which govern the
actions of the ULBs and stipulates the regulation of various
service provisions across the country. In public–private
partnership (PPP) project life cycle for MSW projects,
activities in the project inception such as planning and
procurement are steered by the ULB with the help of
transaction advisory.
MSWM is one social sector where the highest form of
governance challenges surface due to complex and non-
excludable nature of these services [2]. MSW rules aim at
sustainable and efficient services with the help of bench-
marks proposed by MOUD (currently Ministry of Housing
and Urban Affairs). PPPs ingress is with the assumption
that private sector will bring the skills and their finances and
improve the service levels. Among the various PPP models
available for private sector participation, the question of
which modal is better has derived attention than which
segments such as collection, transportation, treatment, and
disposal of MSW deserve a particular PPP model. The
selection of the PPP from the basket of modals such as
service contract, management contract, lease, Build Oper-
ate Transfer/Design Build Finance Operate and Transfer,
as asset ownership, operation and maintenance, investment,
commercial risk, and the intended duration of the contract.
123

Nevertheless, this kind of selection is still elementary and
fails to provide the right governance choice. This is because
of missing focus in the extant literature on the differentia-
tion of bundling and unbundling but laying only the prin-
ciples necessary for implementing PPP projects [3]. Sectors
concerned with environment but requiring technical
expertise such as MSWM may need to extend as separate
and contested networks instead of the identical partnerships
[4].
Some researchers have tried to put the studies of PPPs in
the lens of governance such as Ping Ho et al. [5] and De
Schepper et al. [6] to study various problems of PPPs. But
no past study has extended its network governance model
to address the current research inquiry. This gap in the
body of knowledge necessitates unraveling theoretical
support to study the case of MSW sector. The reason is that
procurement options of both bundling the segments of
value chain into an integrated PPP project or unbundling
the segments of the value chain with bundling/unbundling
of functions have been practiced by various public entities
of India without knowing the implications and effects of
such decisions. Hence, understanding the intricacies of
procurement would require knowledge of the choice and
effects of governance structures. This study argues the
appropriateness of synthesizing from existing theories,
particularly grounded on the network governance
approach, to this problem formulation.
Literature Review
Governance relates to the government programs and its
decisions including the processes involved. This includes
the kind of institutes and functions in tandem with their
effectiveness for policy implementation. The governance
structure is an ‘institutional framework in which the
integrity of a transaction or related set of transactions is
decided’ [7, p. 11]. Moreover, governance structures are
the means to reduce the inefficiencies in the ex ante and ex
post performance of the transaction and would be instru-
mental in the coordination mechanisms [8]. This definition
of governance primarily is from the contractual governance
perspective. In a rudimentary form, governance structure is
classified by attributes such as incentive intensity, admin-
istrative control, and contract law regime. Based on these,
three major classifications are made in governance struc-
ture as markets, networks, and hierarchy. Earlier under-
standing of governance referred to markets and hierarchies
[7], whereas networks emerged as governance structure in
the past 3 decades [9]. Markets refer to ‘the arm’s length
market exchange governed by contracts’; hierarchies refer
to ‘the internal organization governed by unified ownership
and internal control’; and network governance refers to
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J. Inst. Eng. India Ser. A
‘involves a select, persistent, and structured set of auton-
omous firms (as well as nonprofit agencies) engaged in
creating products or services based on implicit and open-
ended contracts [5], [10].’ This advent is because when
solving the societal problems, the need to improve the
coordination between the actors particularly the horizontal
relations across the networks with the problem domain
increased [11].
In infrastructure, governance means the approaches,
tools and norms, and also the decision-making and moni-
toring processes in the provision of infrastructure services.
More specifically, it relates to the partnership of the public
and private parties embedded in the opted delivery
modality. PPP mode emerged as a long-term contract
aimed at the delivery of services as opposed to procure-
ment of assets in infrastructure procurement. Governance
design is arguably most important due to the tension built
up in PPP by virtue of public and business environments
and has a clear bearing on viability [12]. Such a design of
appropriate governance mechanism enables the protection
of public interest regardless of the delegation of authority
to parties dominated by business motivations. Robinson
et al. [13] note that principles of ‘governance’ relate to the
development process, the organizational structures, deci-
sion-making aspects that are critical and to the monitoring
mechanisms available for ‘governing’ the development of a
PPP/PFI project from one delivery stage to the next of the
life cycle. The issues of governance carry right from the
inception (ex ante) till the end of concession period (ex
post award governance). Also, PPPs are often exposed to
ex post governance issues related to internal, external, and
public sector interfaces [14]. For each PPP project,
exploring the inter- and intra-relationship between the
concerning parties—public sector bodies responsible for
the project, the procuring authorities, the SPV setup for the
execution and operation of the project, and between the
SPV members—is essential [15]. Explicitly, the focus is on
the design of procurement process to prequalify and select
the bidder of the PPP concession [16]. In principle, public
agency should focus on governance aspects such as
establishing the institutional framework, the grounds of
decision to invest, procure, and finance the project with or
without PPP mode, and also on maintaining integrity in the
procurement process. Nevertheless, studies in this direction
were scant as noted by Wilson et al. [17] that the antici-
pated benefits from PPPs are the major focus, whereas the
crucial elements such as the structural relations within the
PPP arrangement and the decision making have not been
focused.
Governance issues have been focused by few research-
ers of India with a motive of understanding the current
impediments in executing PPP in MSW sector. In this
regard, Mahalingam [18] has evaluated the performance of
J. Inst. Eng. India Ser. A
PPP in urban infrastructure including MSWM by looking
into the barriers, enablers, and the required strategies. He
finds—contrasting mindset and distrust between the private
and public actors, dearth of political drive concerning
project implementation, absence of enabling institutional
environment, paucity of public sector ability to select and
procure PPP projects, poor project design and structuring—
as the key barriers of PPP project including MSWM.
Laishram and Devkar [19] note that PPP deals are taking
longer time caused by rigorous due diligence exercises and
asset–liability mismatch. Additionally, they note that
preference is increased toward short period of loans due to
changes in interest rates and reluctance to make long-term
commitments. It was noted that urban renewal projects are
crucial in the involvement of people during the design of
projects and partnerships, unlike large infrastructure pro-
jects. Forsyth [4] examined Indian PPP waste-to-energy
project and identified that the principles of institutional
design can potentially enhance the deliberative nature of
public–private partnerships in environmental programs.
This meant a widened role in the governing of projects and
their outcomes. Significant focus is needed on the post-
governance issues such as performance monitoring, tariff
changes, and regulation. One of the many problems pla-
gues the nation is the poor capacity building initiatives for
urban local bodies to develop small-size social and eco-
nomic infrastructure projects in PPP routes. Although PPPs
are accorded as right medium, the inappropriateness of the
current PPP models determines the need to devise appro-
priate PPP models that will facilitate effective operations
based on the design, planning, and implementation phases
[19].
Relationships in utility projects can be represented as a
multilayer independent network. For municipal solid waste
management and sewerage projects, provision of services
requires the creation and operation of separate assets for
collection mechanism, treatment, and disposal. MSW
supply chain works in a manner where collection feeds into
transportation and further to treatment and disposal. There
would be a web of contracts with public sector if those
tasks are to be managed by different parties. Some seg-
ments, for instance collection, are sought to be carried by
non-governmental organizations also in addition to private
sector participation (PSP). The rationale of bundling in PPP
model needs further scrutiny when the infrastructure pro-
ject comprises of several assets with different functionality
forming the segments of the value chain. Network infras-
tructure has shown serious need for this bundling decision.
The decision on bundling in such sectors needs not only to
take into consideration the merits and demerits of bundling
the functions but also the synergies that could be expected
in bundling the various segments of the value chain. In the
Indian scenario, the decision of bundling or unbundling is
reached far early in the procurement phase without any
emphasis on the aforementioned issues. Hence, the rela-
tions of these contractors with the ULB form governance
problem in light of delivery modality and the contractual
enforcement. Additionally, social, environmental, and
political governance aspects become more critical in
MSWM unlike the traditional understanding of governance
[20].
Procurement of MSW PPPs: The Problem
PSP involves various organizational forms and arrange-
ments such as short-term service contracts, management
contracts, lease contracts, greenfield projects, and conces-
sionaire where the difference is the extent of private par-
ticipation [21]. Indian government enabled PPP initiatives
at the state and municipal level. But the adoption of these
initiatives is significantly different across the states ranging
from vibrant PPP programs to creating hybrid institutional
forms for project delivery instead of using PPPs [22]. This
showed that organizational fields that surround the orga-
nizations affect and shape the diffusion of the PPP regimes.
Bel et al. [23] argue that cost savings, cost characteristics
of the service, the transaction costs involved, and the policy
environment stimulating competition precedes the aspect
of choice of the delivery of the services in MSW sector.
Joha and Janssen [24] argue that public agencies are find-
ing difficult to make the right choice among various pro-
curement arrangements and this requires to unravel
intentions underlying their usage. Especially, as Bresnen
[25] notes, assessment of the potency of the different types
of project delivery will require to understand and account
the factors of influence on the practical operations. Pro-
curement process would need particular attention from the
selection of mode and various factors on which effective
delivery is dependent. Weisheng et al. [20] find that pro-
curement system has evident dependability on the social,
economic, technological, environmental, legal, and politi-
cal conditions in the realm of procurement innovation
which aims at procurement methods that support the
delivery of efficiency and value in public projects and
services. Moreover, in such cases, lengthy concessions and
the possible uncertainties during operations make con-
tractual governance problematic [26]. Seppala et al. [27],
as a remedy to this situation, suggest considering the nature
of the intended services, transaction costs, and the experi-
ence over the concession, in the selection of modes of
sanitation service implementation because, in PPPs, gov-
ernance issues are at the core and therefore need articula-
tion for better projects. Although PPPs are accorded as a
right medium, inappropriateness of the current PPP modals
points to the need to devise appropriate PPP models that
123

will facilitate effective operations based on the design,
planning, and implementation phases [19]. Eriksson and
Westerberg [28] note that knowledge of how different and
new procurement procedures would work and affect the
project performance is a key change agent and such
research studies would increase the understanding and
direct the client actions. Thus, sanitation projects will
require accounting the long-term developments in the
procurement process to achieve the objectives of gover-
nance [27].
Network Governance: The Possible Solution?
Contractual procurement mechanisms and the public policy
tools adopted are the causes of poor performance of PPPs.
This indicates the tip of the governance problem in
municipal infrastructure projects [29]. This meant that
there has been no formed understanding regarding pro-
curement mechanism. Network governance starts when the
inability of governments to exercise the appropriate level
of control over the service provision and when there is an
increasing need of specialization. Along these lines,
Cavelty and Suter [30] suggest that governments should
more focus on coordinating the networks, i.e., the segments
of the supply chain, and identify mechanisms that stimulate
the networks to meet the requirements. The network type
of governance studies lends support to policy-related net-
works, service delivery and implementation, and public
administration related to governing networks [11]. In pol-
icy-related network realm, Forsyth [4] argues the need to
recognize insights from network theory regarding the
communication of environmental and political norms in
PPPs. Currently, few extant literature focuses on the ser-
vice delivery and its implementation, and public adminis-
tration and relations governing networks. Network
governance primarily suggests to engage an exclusive,
determined, and regulated contractors/nonprofit agencies in
creating products or services. This should be based on tacit
knowledge and open-ended contracts to adapt to various
possibilities and thereby support coordination and precau-
tionary measures [10]. Moreover, the involvement of not-
for-profit organizations in the services of the network of
MSW supply chain calls the suitability of network gover-
nance approaches [11]. Albalate et al. [31] show that net-
work characteristics observed through transaction costs,
investments, and competition are important determinants of
the degree of private participation and more appropriately
the suitability of PPP. Such an understanding ties to the
fact that governance of PPPs over its lifecycle is signifi-
cantly important wherein high standards in governance
would ensure attractive private participation in the delivery
of the public services [13]. Thus, applications new to this
123
J. Inst. Eng. India Ser. A
network infrastructure type of contracting should begin
with separate contracting mechanisms to have a better
understanding of more specific facilities [31]. This requires
governments to extend beyond the standard approach of the
dichotomous privatization decisions and facilitate specific
forms of relational arrangements between project sponsors
and private agencies. For instance, Devapriya [32] notes
that the unbundling of network infrastructure utilities is due
to the alignment with the market forms and its principles.
Governance formulation investigates the organizational
forms that would be effective and the influence of condi-
tions that shape them. Based on the network governance
theory, the focus should rest on self-regulating and self-
organizing networks. Thus, the government’s role shifts
from leading and monitoring to coordinating the networks
by recognizing instruments that motivate networks toward
achieving the service goals [30]. In other words, the
question, now that, public–private collaboration is essen-
tial, organizing it should be the focus. The governments
must shape the framework conditions in such a way that
cooperation functions efficiently [30]. One of the deter-
minants for the organization structure of network infras-
tructure is the need to manage asset specific risks [32].
Williamson [7] affirms that one governance form will
emanate and become effective than the other alternative
mechanisms. This emergence will be based on the context
of the transactions and how a particular governance
mechanism will address them. This intriguing research area
that is far from being fully understood requires an insight
of precise determinants of a governance model for its
development and as a successful organizational form [10].
Thus, a synthesis of theories related to organizations and
governance such as the established and prominent theories
of economics, organization, and procurement, namely
transaction cost theory, agency theory, and auction theory,
can resolve the uncertainty of governance form concerning
the segment bundling matters of network infrastructure. A
cursory search for these theories shows increasing popu-
larity in construction management research (CMR), but
few studies have been attempted for governance approach.
Such synthesis of various theories is widely attempted
across disciplines in the past, and this also advances the
understanding of those theories [10].
Way Forward
This study leaves twofold objective for further study. First,
the suggested theories will result in a framework that will
help the ULBs in making the bundling and unbundling
decision. The current article grounds on the service deliv-
ery and implementation where the main research question
is ‘how can complex services of MSWM be coordinated
J. Inst. Eng. India Ser. A
and what mechanisms are effective and efficient in this
pursuit’? Second, applying the framework further across
some select cases will leave insights on the specific form of
network governance (among the various forms, namely
participant-governed networks, lead organization-governed
networks, or network administration organization) that may
be optimal in the conditions prevailing. Participant-gov-
erned networks are where MSWM is completely decen-
tralized and the actors are equally motivated to strive for
network success. Lead organization-governed networks are
where the decentralization is not feasible or effective and
hence requires a lead organization typically a ULB to
completely coordinate the activities of the supply chain by
maintaining the buyer–supplier relationships. The third
form of MSWM would be the establishment of a separate
administrative unit to exclusively govern the network and
its activities with a centralized form of working. Similar
structure is found in the procurement of MSW treatment
facilities in the state of Andhra Pradesh where Swach
Andhra Corporation looks after the MSWM activities of
the network. Moreover, as Provan et al. [33] argue, these
striving and thriving are coordinated by both quantitative
and qualitative variables such as trust, goal consensus,
number of participants, and need for network competen-
cies. This is because the network governance requires
spontaneous and bureaucratic shrewdness in the actors
where the negotiation among the actors decides the success
[11].
The developed theory can be extended to other infras-
tructure sectors to understand the coordination mechanisms
of the networks in those sectors. The benefits derived from
such attempts will answer the phenomenon reported in past
studies. For instance, in the water supply segment, there is
an increase in cost production because of the bundled
procurement [34] and thus observed restructuring [35].
Besides, some of the market reforms were already reported
in the network infrastructure such as separating generation
and transmission in the power sector, and production from
transmission and distribution in gas [36, 37]. India still
lacks representation in these kinds of studies [38]. These
phenomena can also be studied in the lens of the current
theoretical foundations to formulate an effective and effi-
cient solution to manage these network infrastructure.
Conclusions
PPP infrastructure projects are hallmarked with the bund-
ling of various phases of a project and bundling of various
segment/service in the facility. The extant literature has
provided ample guidance to bundle various phases,
whereas the influence of segment bundling on PPP
infrastructure project has not been studied so far. This
study has initiated the research trajectory on the theoretical
perspective using a governance lens which would further
guide the empirical probe on the bundling decision in
projects involving PSP. The study suggests grounding the
theoretical framework for bundling problem formulations
on the established and prominent theories of economics,
organization, and procurement, namely transaction cost
theory, agency theory, and auction theory. Another aspect
is the suitability and thriving of network form of gover-
nance which requires the use of theoretical apparatus which
is currently underdeveloped, at least on the conceptual
ground. By this conceptualization, the paper expands the
understanding of governance issues in PPP projects, par-
ticularly to the use of network infrastructure supply chain
management options and organizational modes for
achieving solutions for the municipal infrastructure of
India.
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