G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994 and capable of administering his estate.
and capable of administering his estate. The parties further
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND
FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.
Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29,
1
1992.
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel
died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on
November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On
September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio
and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew,
respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of
San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of
private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they
ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary,
petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do so,
that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-
deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extra-
judicial, were without issue and/or without descendants
whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised
and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them
by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; . . .
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She
alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in
exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's
heirship to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove
that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez
and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary evidence,
among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2)
Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and
Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late
Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4)
School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said
spouses reared an continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove,
mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to
beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty
six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino
Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their
primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late
2
Vicente, then 77 years of age, categorically declared that
petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who
were unable to physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the
petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents petition for letters
and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate
daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of
the Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed
on May 29, 1992 by the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals. The
dispositive portion of the Decision of the appellate court states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is REVERSED
and another one entered declaring that appellee Marissa Benitez
is not the biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a
legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition to
the petition for the appointment of an administrator of the intestate
of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently, DENIED;
said petition and the proceedings already conducted therein
reinstated; and the lower court is directed to proceed with the
hearing of Special proceeding No. SP-797 (90) in accordance with
law and the Rules.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and
misapprehension of facts when it failed to apply the provisions,
more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code
in this case and in adopting and upholding private respondent's
theory that the instant case does not involve an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child;
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or
impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa's birth, still
the respondent appellate Court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it gave more weight to the testimonial evidence of
witnesses of private respondents whose credibility and demeanor
have not convinced the trial court of the truth and sincerity thereof,
than the documentary and testimonial evidence of the now
petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way
not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of the supreme
Court, more particularly, on prescription or laches.
We find no merit to the petition.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170
and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be
sustained. These articles provide:
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife
with sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise
legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that
both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the
child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the
following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because
of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented
sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons,
the child could not have been that of the husband except in the
instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence.
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be
brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its
recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case,
any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the
birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the
place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was
recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the
Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has
been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs,
the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of
the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
which ever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the
child within the period prescribed in the preceding Article only in
the following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period
fixed for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having
desisted therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain
couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband
(or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under
Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of
said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to
have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived
through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the
appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles
to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the
heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his
child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner
was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the
impugned decision is apropos, viz.:
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now
Article 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased
aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the
decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of
Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that
petitioner was not the biological child or child of nature of the
spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The appellate
court exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties as
follows:
. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's
evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her biological and blood
kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record
is strong and convincing that she is not, but that said couple being
childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the late
Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a
baby, and without he and his wife's legally adopting her treated,
cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their own true
child, giving her the status as not so, such that she herself had
believed that she was really their daughter and entitled to inherit
from them as such.
The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the
following:
First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian
never became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child.
Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian,
admitted that his sister had already been married for ten years
and was already about 36 years old and still she has not begotten
or still could not bear a child, so that he even had to refer her to
the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent
obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who
treated his sister for a number of years. There is likewise the
testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez,
Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped him (he
being the only boy and the youngest of the children of their
widowed mother) through law school, and whom Vicente and his
wife highly respected and consulted on family matters, that her
brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to
adopt her youngest daughter and when she refused, they looked
for a baby to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys
but Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up
unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought home a
baby girl and told his elder sister Victoria he would register the
baby as his and his wife's child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already
77 years old and too weak to travel and come to court in San
Pablo City, so that the taking of her testimony by the presiding
judge of the lower court had to be held at her residence in
Parañaque, MM. Considering, her advanced age and weak
physical condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria
Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly trustworthy and credible, for as
one who may be called by her Creator at any time, she would
hardly be interested in material things anymore and can be
expected not to lie, especially under her oath as a witness. There
were also several disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente
O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio
Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who testified
in this case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost
everyday especially as she had drugstore in the ground floor of
her house, but they never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1954
(the year appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born, according
to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that it is
also true with the rest of their townmates. Ressureccion A. Tuico,
Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician who used to set her hair
once a week at her (Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that
she did not see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she knows that
Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby
Marissa in her crib one day she went to Isabel's house to set the
latter's hair, she was surprised and asked the latter where the
baby came from, and "she told me that the child was brought by
Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29,
1990).
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with
child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be
hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never
became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby
at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a
baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather late age of 36
(the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was
allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother of
that baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente
O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly questionable and
suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who wads already 36
years old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly the
mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate,
should the child not have been born in a hospital under the
experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-
gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at
that late age by Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to
her health and even life? How come, then, that as appearing in
appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the
Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no
physician or even a midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a
practice in recent times for people who want to avoid the expense
and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the child as
their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez,
though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble if
not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through court
proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife as the parents
of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to
legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did not
come around doing so either because he was too busy or for
some other reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a child
in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents
is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status
of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or
her birth certificate, which is a public document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological
daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel
Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr.
Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in the
extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs
of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without
descendants or ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian, placed on a
witness stand by appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-law
Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and that he
signed the same only because the latter told him to do so (p. 24,
tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez make such a
statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is
not really his and his wife's daughter and descendant and,
therefore, not his deceased wife's legal heir? As for Dr.
Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed said document
without understanding completely the meaning of the words
"descendant and ascendant" (p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This we
cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician who
has even gone to the United States (p. 52, tsn, Dec. 13, 1990).
Obviously,
Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of appellee,
the foster-daughter of his deceased sister and brother-in-law, as
against those of the latter's collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa Benitez
is really the daughter and only legal heir of the spouses Vicente
O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the latter, before her
death, would write a note to her husband and Marissa stating that:
even without any legal papers, I wish that my husband and my
child or only daughter will inherit what is legally my own property,
in case I die without a will,
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her
husband —
that any inheritance due him from my property — when he die —
to make our own daughter his sole heir. This do [sic] not mean
what he legally owns or his inherited property. I leave him to
decide for himself regarding those.
(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the
daughter of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for Isabel to write
and plead for the foregoing requests to her husband, since
Marissa would be their legal heir by operation of law. Obviously,
Isabel Chipongian had to implore and supplicate her husband to
give appellee although without any legal papers her properties
when she dies, and likewise for her husband to give Marissa the
properties that he would inherit from her (Isabel), since she well
knew that Marissa is not truly their daughter and could not be their
legal heir unless her (Isabel's) husband makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria
Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother Vicente gave the date
December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because
that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente's) mother. It
is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the
mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the same birthday unless it
is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was only registered by
Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they gave her the birth
date of Vicente's mother.
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the
evidence on record. The weight of these findings was not negated
by documentary evidence presented by the petitioner, the most
notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "3")
purportedly showing that her parents were the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered
on December 28, 1954 appears to have been signed by the
deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil
Code, however, "the books making up the Civil Registry and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents
and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As
related above, the totality of contrary evidence, presented by the
private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of
petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting evidence, the
most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of the Deceased Isabel Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on
July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized
document, they stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the
deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without
descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente
Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of
petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner's father. The
repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he signed
petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack
of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner,
vs.
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
this wise:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof
that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the
mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's
birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the
supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely
affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in
the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review
1
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
2
reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision of the Court of
3
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional
Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No. 3046,
the CA ruled as follows:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the
defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a.
Teofista Guinto.
4 Subsequently, "Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and
pronouncements of the Court, judgment is hereby
rendered, to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of
respondent Teofista Guinto as null and void "ab
initio";
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar
of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth
of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as
Registry No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this-decision to the Local Civil
Registrar of Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel for
private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in
Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as
PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the
cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera
(herafter referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry
of Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3046.
From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted "that
she is the only surviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on
May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on
September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot"
in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena
Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses,
Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the
registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by
simulating that she was the child of the spouses
Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54
years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the
mother by forging her signature . . .; that petitioner, then
15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally
witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in
their house, assisted by "hilot"; that the birth certificate . .
. of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a
simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it
contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to
appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, when she is
not; b) The signature of Hermogena Cariñosa, the
mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c)
The family name BABIERA is false and unlawful and her
correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single;
d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an
illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter, did
not sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth
certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation
of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible for
the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a)
Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera, was already 54 years old;
b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the
year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65
years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of
Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of
petitioner who inherited the estate of cancelled and
declared void and theretofore she prays that after
publication, notice and hearing, judgment [be] render[ed]
declaring . . . the certificate of birth of respondent
Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective
and ordering the respondent local civil registrar of Iligan
to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City
BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, the trial court issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof
in a newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City,
the office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and
TEOFISTA.
TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that
"the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack
on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa
Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the
instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family
Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by
prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family
Code." The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
appeared and filed an answer/opposition in behalf of
private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on
substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private
respondent."
In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred "that she was
always known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista
Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the
late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C.
Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that] plantiff
Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant] Teofista
Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her Certificate of
Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, . . .
Certificate of Baptism, . . . Student's Report Card . . . all
incorporated in her answer, are eloquent testimonies of
her filiation. By way of special and affirmative defenses,
defendant/respondent contended that the petition states
no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of
the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñoza Babiera; that plaintiff
has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant
to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the
instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance
5
with Article 170 of the Family Code.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial
proved that petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena
Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to show that
Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that
she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last
pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the
supposed birth took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced
age of Hermogena and its concomitant medical complications.
Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local
civil registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to
be that of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the
Family Code, which stated that only the father could impugn the
child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a
collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a
situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child
of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the
cancellation of the child's Birth Certificate for being void ab
initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the
father or the mother.
6 child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does
not have the legal capacity to file the special proceeding
of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 subject matter of
this review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No.
CV-56031 is improper and is barred by [the] statute of
limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division
utterly failed to hold, that the ancient public record of
petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral
7
testimony of respondent.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Subject of
the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue,
8
because Article 171 of the Family Code states that the child's
filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special
circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is
not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing
to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
9
entitled to the avails of the suit." The interest of respondent in the
civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which
10
the latter filed against the former. The case concerned the
properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it
applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of
his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the
case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that
petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish
that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present
action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio
and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to
impugn in the first place.
11
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled thus:
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164,
166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at
bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
xxx xxx xxx
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they
do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or
biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles
govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies
as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it
is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said
child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him
to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded
the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have been his
child; (3) that in case of children conceived insemination,
the written authorization or ratification by either parent
was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs
should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said
child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err
when it refused to apply these articles to the case at
bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs
of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not
his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not horn to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling
in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166
SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:
"Petitioners" recourse to Article 263 of the New
Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is
not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an
action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to
this case because this is not an action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action
of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate
child of the deceased, but that she is not the
decedent's child at all. Being neither [a] legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural
child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza
Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
12
deceased. (Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a
child of the late Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed. She
cites Article 170 of the Family Code which provides the
prescriptive period for such action:
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child
shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of
the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the
husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should
reside in the city or municipality where the birth took
place or was recorded.
 If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not
reside at the place of birth as defined in the first
paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be
two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and
three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been
concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his
heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or
knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of
registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the
cancellation of petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her
legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of
the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the
Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly
void ab initio.
1 DECISION
Third Issue:
Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially
Hermogena's testimony that petitioner was not her real child,
cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of
the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth
Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts
attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence
presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First,
there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate
14
itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. More
important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother's
signature therein was different from her signatures in other
documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner
show that Hermogena is not the former's real mother. For one,
there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical
records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate
itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy
of Hermogena during that time.1awphil Moreover, at the time of
her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if
it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it
was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her
advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally
available only in a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition
of Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not give birth to
petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband
Eugenio's. The deposition reads in part:
q Who are your children?
a Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your
legitimate child with your husband Eugenio Babiera,
what can you say about that?
a She is not our child.
xxx xxx xxx
q Do you recall where she was born?
a In our house because her mother was our house
helper.
q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista
Babiera lived with you in your residence?
a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from
time to time.
q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever
assert[ed] her as your daughter with your husband?
a No, sir.
15
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth
Certificate, petitioner has presented no other evidence other than
the said document to show that she is really Hermogena's child;
Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed mother
would make a deposition stating that the former was not the
latter's child at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding
of the trial and the appellate courts that petitioner was not the
child of respondent's parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE
JESUS, minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A.
DE JESUS, Petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN
GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON,
FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and
as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD
MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC.
and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES,
INC., Respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who,
having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate
scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares
in the latters estate under the rules on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on
23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de
Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon
died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable
assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and
some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993
for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the
decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the
deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case,
arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one
for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to
dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration on,
respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994.
Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court
of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the
lower court and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting
assertions should be threshed out at the trial considering that the
birth certificates presented by respondents appeared to have
effectively contradicted petitioners allegation of illegitimacy.
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial
brief and several other motions, respondents filed an omnibus
motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the
recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of
decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely
an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able to
establish their status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine, that
an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise
ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could
only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court,
ultimately, dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause
1 would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
of action and for being improper. It decreed that the declaration
of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch
as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the
instant petition for review on certiorari. Basically, petitioners
maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the
decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to
establish their status as such and does not require a separate
action for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated
2
in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo. cräläwvirtualibräry
In their comment, respondents submit that the rule
in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is inapplicable to the
case because there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate
filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal
of the complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson vs.
3
Court of Appeals, which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy
cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting
but must be seasonably brought up in a direct action frontally
addressing the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much
too long, and it is time that this matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
4
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
5
the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not
6 It was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody
require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead,
a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute
of limitations is essential in order to establish the childs
7
acknowledgment. cräläwvirtualibräry
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born
during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
8
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband
to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the
husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband,
9
which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably,
10
upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in
11
proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect
on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by
the presumption becomes fixed and
12
unassailable. cräläwvirtualibräry
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to
the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their
legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because
the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
13
and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latters
14
heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of
a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy
of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity
of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find
succor in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the action for
partition filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be an
acknowledged spurious child by virtue of a private document,
signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition.
elses illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it
was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly,
to declare that they could not have been the legitimate children,
clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates,
of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased
Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners alleged illegitimate filiation
to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance
in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be
aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been
instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount
declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked
15
collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a
16
direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child
so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as having been an
17
adulteress. cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE , the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant
petition is DENIED. No costs.
G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon
Garcia, Petitioner, v. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL
MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA
CHRISTINA LIYAO, Respondents.
DECISION
 DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
decision dated June 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
1
C.V. No. 45394 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring
William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the
deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl
Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to
recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory
heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional
rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his
mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the
RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory
recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William
Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl
2
Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. The
complaint was later amended to include the allegation that
petitioner was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner having
been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the
3
decedent during his lifetime." cräläwvirtualibräry
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from
Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the
institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late
William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams untimely
demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company
of Corazons two (2) children from her subsisting marriage,
namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of
rented houses in Quezon City and Manila. This was with the
knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan
and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage
with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both
employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which
Corazon and William were then vice president and president,
respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co.
which required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to
show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his
signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the
necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale
of the parcel of land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was
registered under the name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the
Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay
at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the
new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital
expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of
William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary,
Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billys birth certificate.
He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy
4
with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly
5
amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy
to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their
6 Maurita attended Mr. Liyaos funeral and helped Corazon pack his
pictures taken together. cräläwvirtualibräry
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken
showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with
Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyaos legal staff and
7
their wives while on vacation in Baguio. Corazon also presented
pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied
William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other
8
important meetings. During the occasion of William Liyaos last
birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic
Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his
son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends
and said, Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good
9
looking son." Since birth, Billy had been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or
acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latters direct and overt
acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing
and other material needs. However, after William Liyaos death, it
was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of
his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his
personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper
clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he
shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she
knew both Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who were
godparents to her children. She used to visit Corazon and William
Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her
marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike),
together with some housemaids lived with Corazon and William
Liyao as one family. On some occasions like birthdays or some
other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couples residence
and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would
usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon,
during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her child Billy,
Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in
Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she would often see
William Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she was at the
Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy. She
continuously visited them at White Plains and knew that William
Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of
grocery supplies, money for household expenses and
matriculation fees for the two (2) older children, Bernadette and
Enrique. During William Liyaos birthday on November 22, 1975
held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy
and told everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from
his legal marriage, Look, this is my son, very guapo and
10
healthy. He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy
before Christmas. He intended to make it engrande and make the
11
bells of San Sebastian Church ring. Unfortunately, this did not
happen since William Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975.
clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and
12 13
gray which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph as well as another
14
shirt of lime green as belonging to the deceased. A note was
also presented with the following inscriptions: To Cora, Love From
15
William. Maurita remembered having invited the couple during
her mothers birthday where the couple had their pictures taken
while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita
knew that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her
marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated
from her said husband. However, during the entire cohabitation of
William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon
Yulo or any other man in the house when she usually visited
Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor
and that she knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William
Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her customers.
Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazons house in Scout Delgado,
Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous
occasions to see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so
when the couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from
1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was
worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he
insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be
bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong and together
with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions
among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon
with a rented house, paid the salary of the maids and food for
Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that
Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although
Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in
the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his
father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter abandoned and
separated from his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old
when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the
latters death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive
and fond of Enriques half brother, Billy. He identified several
pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in
the office. Enriques testimony was corroborated by his sister,
Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing
Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and
that the negatives were in the possession of her mother, Corazon
Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the
story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao
16
and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. Linda grew up
and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro
Manila until she got married; that her parents were not separated
legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her
parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her
father lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home
regularly. Even during out of town business trips or for
conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father would
change his clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and
habits. Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other peoples
homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a strict
disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would
compensate for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very
tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up
easily. He suffered two strokes before the fatal attack which led to
his death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office
sometime in April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago
Co. He then stayed in the house for two (2) to three (3) months for
his therapy and acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move,
walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her
sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the
collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their
lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had personally
changed. He was not active in business and had dietary
restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the
latter part of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two
(2) to three (3) days and went back to work. He felt depressed,
however, and was easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the
office unlike before and tried to spend more time with his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to
Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from her
husband and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not
17
indicate that the couple obtained any annulment of their
marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking
up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Immediately after the
death of Lindas father, Corazon went to Lindas office for the
return of the formers alleged investments with the Far East Realty
Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and
Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President
of the company, was able to take out documents, clothes and
several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. There
was one instance when she was told by the guards, Mrs. Yulo is
18
leaving and taking out things again. Linda then instructed the
guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita
Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not recognize
any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having
been shown three (3) large suit cases full of mens clothes,
underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married
and had never been separated. They resided at No. 21
Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of
19
her fathers death on December 2, 1975. Her father suffered two
(2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During
the first heart attack sometime between April and May 1974, his
speech and hands were affected and he had to stay home for two
(2) to three (3) months under strict medication, taking aldomet,
serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap,
20
for high blood pressure and cholesterol level control. Tita Rose
testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was
paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment
Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received any
formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as
an illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After assuming the
position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come
across any check signed by her late father representing payment
to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia.
Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs presented by
Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which
were displayed at the latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon
Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974,
who said that he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village,
Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 oclock in the morning. At past
7:00 oclock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin
Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime between April
and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that
he was able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not
able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in September
1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda
added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands
for the latter among which was buying medicine for him
like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was
called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer
leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyaos breast and
decided later to carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao
died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda
Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one
of the employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in the
office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo,
would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda
saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon
Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale,
represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the
claim of Corazon. He freely relayed the information that he saw
Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and
then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the latters law
office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda
said that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao,
Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to
Baguio for a vacation together with the lawyers wives. During his
employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving
for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like
shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia
as the guardian ad litem of the minor William
Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the
illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William
Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao,
Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and
Christian Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the
minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the
deceased William Liyao, entitled to all succesional
rights as such; and
21
(d) Costs of suit. cräläwvirtualibräry
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced
by preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao
sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time
when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court
observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased
by direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth
certificate of petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs.
Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner
as his son; providing sustenance and even introducing herein
petitioner to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial
court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the
illegitimacy of the child and the presumption of legitimacy is
thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy
between husband and wife was physically impossible at the
period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil
Code. The appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of some
witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon
Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured legal
separation, were seen in each others company during the
supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased William
Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate
and the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were
presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof of
paternity in the absence of any evidence that the deceased,
William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates
and considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The
Court of Appeals stated that neither do family pictures constitute
competent proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook which
was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court
observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was
opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia
since William Liyaos signature and name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed
the present petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and
respondents have raised a number of issues which relate solely to
the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his
claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both
parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation:
May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from
the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a
22
valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of
legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration
contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring
23
from the odium of illegitimacy. cräläwvirtualibräry
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to
24
the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than
that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to
his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that access was not
possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living
separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at
the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was
physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon
Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his
claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, Contract of
25
Separation, executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a
waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that Corazon
26
Garcia might acquire in the future. cräläwvirtualibräry
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and
born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband
to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for
impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in
Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband,
or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under
27
Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the
child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his
wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and
28
economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that
his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these
cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would
29
amount o an insult to his memory. cräläwvirtualibräry
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G.
Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to
compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr,
as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It
is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We
30
cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert
the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy
of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child
himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed
to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then
the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be
the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if
the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect
the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the
31
presumption. cräläwvirtualibräry
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed
children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for
herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the
latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that
the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of
the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon
Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the
petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings.
Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through
his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and
Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the
sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on the
petitioners claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In
any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence
presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or
recognized his paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA
ALMONTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs
special safeguard and care, including appropriate legal protection
1
before as well as after birth. In case of assault on his rights by
those who take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the
law will rise in his defense with the single-minded purpose of
upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private
respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose
Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December
2
29, 1989. After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresa‘s
3
parents in Fairview, Quezon City. Almost a year later, on
4
December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa‘s relationship turned out to be short-
lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to
have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of
5
bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma.
Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario
6
Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found
out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights,
Quezon City.
7 "In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty
years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham
and that she never lived with Mario at all.
8 WHEREFORE, the respondent‘s Motion for Reconsideration has
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa‘s marriage to Mario was
valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her
marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose
Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the
child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted
visitation rights.
9 already been declared illegitimate and should therefore use her
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their
marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the
‗bastardization‘ of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of
the above decision "INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the …
decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called ‗visitation
rights‘… between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of
10
any Sunday." She argued that there was nothing in the law
granting "visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an
11
illegitimate child." She further maintained that Jose Gerardo‘s
surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her
maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use
the mother‘s surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights
and the retention of ‗Concepcion‘ as Jose Gerardo‘s surname.
Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court
denied Ma. Theresa‘s motion and made the following
observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get
at or to hurt the other, something they should never do if they
want to assure the normal development and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the
minor needs a father, especially as he is a boy, who must have a
father figure to recognize – something that the mother alone
cannot give. Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and
psychological well-being of the boy would be better served if he
were allowed to maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the
other on this matter, the Court invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD
603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, to wit:
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration."
12
to be, as it is hereby DENIED.
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning
as error the ruling of the trial court granting visitation rights to
Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardo‘s
surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had
surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and
13
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the
law that granted a putative father visitation rights over his
illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the "best interest of
the child" policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that "[a]t
bottom, it (was) the child‘s welfare and not the convenience of the
parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting
14
visitation rights a few hours once a week."
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot
use the mother‘s surname motu proprio. The child, represented by
the mother, should file a separate proceeding for a change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the correction
15
in the civil registry.
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the
adverse decision of the appellate court. She also filed a motion to
set the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate
the issues involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the
parties, the appellate court resolved the motion for
reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose
Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario
during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable – established by the evidence in this
case – that the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario
Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage
with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called "marriage" with the
latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who had
established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was
legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo
was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose
Gerardo – under the law – is the legitimate child of the legal and
subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he
cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-
existent ‗marriage‘ between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is
said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164,
Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that
[Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the
child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name
upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis (even supposing
the child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it
would tend to destroy the existing marriage between [Ma.
Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible rapproachment
between the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon
16
an illegitimate relationship.
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It
gave little weight to Jose Gerardo‘s birth certificate showing that
he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movant‘s argument that various
evidence exist that appellee and the appellant have judicially
admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein,
We cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code
mandates:
"The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress." (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor
cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare
declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed
father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth
certificate of the minor can change his status for the information
contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the
supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what
17
a parent says it is. (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of
18
the above decision but the same was denied. Hence, this
appeal.
19
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article
164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born
20
during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.
21
As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in
22
favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the
23
recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals :
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is
grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy.
24
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code. He
cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose
Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa‘s husband Mario or, in a proper
25
case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose
26
Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a
strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
27
heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void
from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in
28
marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To
overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the
Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that
there was no access that could have enabled the husband to
29
father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is
rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
30
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by
the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband
and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child.
31
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses
32
must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may
take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or
provinces and they were never together during the period of
33
conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of
conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through
the violation of prison regulations.
34
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living
together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola
Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights
are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city
but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove
personal access between them. Considering these
circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her
lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it
physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to
defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts
the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the
presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue
of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
35
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa‘s statement in her answer to the
36
petition for annulment of marriage that she never lived with
Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never any
sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was
binding on her.
Gerardo‘s argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresa‘s statement is that Jose Gerardo
is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with
Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her
child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by
Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the
mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the
legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not
mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could
have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely
no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never
lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened
between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City
during the time material to Jose Gerardo‘s conception and birth.
Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their
proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility.
Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa‘s statement is to allow her
to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband,
37
or in a proper case, his heirs. A mother has no right to disavow a
38
child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa
is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo‘s legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married
woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband
39
and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in
consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It
also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the
40
legitimacy of children.
Gerardo‘s insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never
an issue both in the trial court and in the appellate court does not
hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted
and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial.
That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If
the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be
tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration against
the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial of filiation
of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the
very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status
41
and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of
those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo‘s birth certificate is
misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this case because it was
not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the
court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally
42
offered.
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the
43
moment of his birth. Although a record of birth or birth certificate
44
may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child, as the
status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is
necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being
questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days
following the termination of marriage is sought to be established.
45
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not
under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even
then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs.
Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was
improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the
46
facts contained therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements
in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant
evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the
truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested
47
parties. Between the certificate of birth which is prima
facie evidence of Jose Gerardo‘s illegitimacy and the quasi-
conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not
only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the
best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of
the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would
doggedly press for Jose Gerardo‘s illegitimacy while claiming that
they both had the child‘s interests at heart. The law, reason and
common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable
to the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a
preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames
of both his father and mother, full support and full
48
inheritance. On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to
use the surname and be under the parental authority only of his
mother. He can claim support only from a more limited group and
his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate
49
counterpart. Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the
discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a ‗bastard‘ is
usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor.
Needless to state, the legitimacy presumptively vested by law
upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the
bitter squabble between the very persons who were passionately
declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was
made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should
end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is
specially tragic is that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo
was barely a year old when these proceedings began. He is now
almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant
bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the
controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption
of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the
surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in
50
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A
person‘s surname or family name identifies the family to which he
51
belongs and is passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo
cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes
of the law, not related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardo‘s name and effecting the
corrections of the entries in the civil register regarding his
paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate
proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent
who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights
flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each other‘s
company. There being no such parent-child relationship between
them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose
Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD
603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is
clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Child’s Welfare Paramount. – In all questions regarding
the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare
shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a
Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children
from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of
52
tender years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them from
every one, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual
development as responsible citizens and members of society shall
not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is
especially significant where, as in this case, the issue concerns
their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September
14, 1995 and January 10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner,
vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother
and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.
 DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing (1) the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the
2
Resolution of the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying
petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
3
A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support
pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne),
represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky),
against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment
be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne
Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support
of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly
support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney‘s fees
in the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as
maybe just and equitable in the premises.
4 Since it was duly established that plaintiff‘s mother Jinky
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac
City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into
friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was
already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a
civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial
5
Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio
cohabited and lived together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at
Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was
conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central
Luzon Doctors‘ Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and
Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and
the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joanne‘s
needs – recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky,
and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is
not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinky‘s remonstrance, failed and refused and
continued failing and refusing to give support for the child and to
acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the
heretofore adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter
failed to file any responsive pleading despite repeated motions for
extension, prompting the trial court to declare him in default in its
Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelio‘s Answer with Counterclaim
and Special and Affirmative Defenses was received by the trial
court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her
evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial court on 23 April
1999 rendered a decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the
complaint.
6
In its Decision dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural
child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly
support of P10,000.00 and further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorney‘s fees
in the amount of P5,000.00 and the cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default
and a motion for reconsideration seeking the court‘s
understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to find
7
a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer
that the decision of the trial court dated 23 April 1999 be vacated
and the case be considered for trial de novo pursuant to the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
8
Procedure.
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelio‘s
Motion for New Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendant‘s motion for new trial to
be impressed with merit, the same is hereby granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default
and the decision is this court dated April 23, 1999 are
hereby set aside but the evidence adduced shall remain
in record, subject to cross-examination by defendant at
the appropriate stage of the proceedings.
In the meantime defendant‘s answer is hereby admitted,
subject to the right of plaintiff to file a reply and/or answer
to defendant‘s counterclaim within the period fixed by the
Rules of Court.
Acting on plaintiff‘s application for support pendente lite
which this court finds to be warranted, defendant is
hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum
of P2,000.00 a month from January 15, 1999 to May
1999 as support pendente lite in arrears and the amount
of P4,000.00 every month thereafter as regular support
9
pendente lite during the pendency of this case.
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the
defendant is the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin
Diaz.
Diaz was married at the time of the birth of Joanne
Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a
legitimate child of the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and
Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still
presumed legitimate even if the mother may have
declared against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the same
Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there
must be physical impossibility for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 days following the birth of the child because of
–
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife;
 b) husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse was not
possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which
prevented sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a
Japanese national and that he was living outside of the
country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes
home only once a year. Both evidence of the parties
proved that the husband was outside the country and no
evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country
in the year 1997 preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne
Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a
relationship with another man before she met the
defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual
relations with other men on or about the conception of
Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see
Exh. "A"), so her first child, a certain Nicole (according to
defendant) must have a different father or may be the
son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who
shouldered the hospital bills representing the expenses
in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of
admission that he is the real father of plaintiff. Defendant
also admitted that even when he stopped going out with
Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even after 1996.
Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he still
used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rodjin.
Defendant was even the one who fetched Jinky after she
gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that
Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant
Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter should
support plaintiff.
10
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and
disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of
defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The
Order of this Court awarding support pendente lite dated
June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that the support
should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have
11
reached majority age.
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for
lack of merit in an Order of the trial court dated 19 January
12
2001. From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio
appealed to the Court of Appeals. After all the responsive
pleadings had been filed, the case was submitted for decision and
ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and report as early
as 12 July 2002.
13
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals,
Rogelio‘s counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court that
Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution
was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in
14
the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong, which motion was
15
accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals
held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal
is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated
December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac,
Tarlac, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court a
quo for the issuance of an order directing the parties to
make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of
determining the paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin
Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with
laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.
16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as
follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-
appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early stage of the
proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and
plaintiff‘s mother submit themselves to a DNA or blood
testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign of good
faith. However, the trial court did not consider resorting
to this modern scientific procedure notwithstanding the
repeated denials of defendant that he is the biological
father of the plaintiff even as he admitted having actual
sexual relations with plaintiff‘s mother. We believe that
DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms,
would be the most reliable and effective method of
settling the present paternity dispute. Considering,
however, the untimely demise of defendant-appellant
during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court, in
consultation with out laboratories and experts on the field
of DNA analysis, can possibly avail of such procedure
with whatever remaining DNA samples from the
deceased defendant alleged to be the putative father of
plaintiff minor whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of
this action for support.
17
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for
resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS RESPONDENT‘S
COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT ROGELIO G.
ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE RESPONDENT
AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND
HER JAPANESE HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT
RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE
PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE
COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO
18
THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be
modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding the case to the
trial court for DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of
minor Joanne for compulsory recognition, and by declaring the
minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.
19
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court
finds it prudent to concentrate its attention on the third one, the
propriety of the appellate court‘s decision remanding the case to
the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing. Considering that a
definitive result of the DNA testing will decisively lay to rest the
issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve
the first two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be
rendered moot by the result of the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of
filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the
said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity,
such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or
inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who
alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child.
There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case,
affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
20
resemblance between the putative father and child.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is
21
presumed legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to
protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code
provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in
favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the
22
recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals :
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of
the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy
to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to
23
the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty
days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted
other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband‘s having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that access was not possible;
24
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and
assertions bandied about by the parties to the present petition.
But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the
availability of new technology, it can now be determined with
reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the
minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a person‘s entire genetic
make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in
every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence,
25
a person‘s DNA profile can determine his identity.
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a
biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The
DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the
individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is
unique for each person, except for identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an
individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical
twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA is
unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every
cell in the human body, the DNA of an individual‘s blood
is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles,
muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or
other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are
known as A (Adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T
(thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in
an individual‘s DNA determines his or her physical make
up. And since DNA is a double stranded molecule, it is
composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and
G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base
pairs distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a
person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA
framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They
are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas
analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In
other words, DNA typing simply means determining the
"polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample
obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed
to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5)
techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP
(restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot
 blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases
that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S.
as of November 1994; DNA process; VNTR (variable
number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is
known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based
STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996,
was availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world.
PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an
evidence sample a million times through repeated
cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA
polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes
measurements in 13 separate places and can match two
(2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less
than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches"
are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint
tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case,
the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared
with the "known" print. If a substantial amount of the
identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint
is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one
feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed
not to have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show
variations between people. In each of these regions, a
person possesses two genetic types called "allele," one
inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the
forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and
child, it is possible to determine which half of the child‘s
DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must
have been inherited from the biological father. The
alleged father‘s profile is then examined to ascertain
whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match
the paternal types in the child. If the man‘s DNA types do
not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the
father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded
26
as the father.
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Rule,
the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA
profiles, results and other genetic information directly
generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from
DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a
person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as
originating from that person;
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific
methods which include the extraction of DNA from
biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and
the comparison of the information obtained from the DNA
testing of biological samples for the purpose of
determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not
the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological
samples originates from the same person (direct
identification) or if the biological samples originate from
related persons (kinship analysis); and
(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical
estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative
parent compared with the probability of a random match
of two unrelated individuals in a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the
resolution thereof may provide the definitive key to the resolution
of the issue of support for minor Joanne. Our articulation
27
in Agustin v. Court of Appeals is particularly relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so
steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of
Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in
1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because
"DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet
been accorded official recognition by our courts.
Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such
conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating
acts,verbal and written, by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting
DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v.
Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354
SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now
the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is
based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother
and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said,
that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said results is to deny
progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and
authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came
in 2002 with out en banc decision in People v.
Vallejo [G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192]
where the rape and murder victim‘s DNA samples from
the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in
evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing
(was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed)
between the evidence sample and the reference sample.
The samples collected (were) subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4
April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we acquitted the accused
charged with rape for lack of evidence because "doubts
persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real
malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been
perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we
wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our
doubts."
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos.
161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA
277], where the Court en banc was faced with the issue
of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe,
Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
 difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. A
positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this
Court has acknowledged the strong weight of
DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v.
Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428
SCRA 504], we affirmed the conviction of the
accused for rape with homicide, the principal
evidence for which included DNA test results. x
x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court,
petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court
of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA
testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues
that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no
longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the
alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for
purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioner‘s
argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA
28
Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu
proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or
on application of any person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order
shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties
upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
(ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the
results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to
produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court
may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or
integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner
does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as
long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any
organic material originating from a person‘s body, even if found in
inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This
includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and
bones.
29
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples
as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA
testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of
obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for
the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA
30
testing. In People v. Umanito, citing Tecson v. Commission on
31
Elections, this Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on
Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA
277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in
our jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or
paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate
child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to."
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of
whether appellant is the father of AAA‘s child, which may
be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the
fair and correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under
Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after
due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA
testing. However, while this Court retains jurisdiction
over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and
act on the matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts and does not, in the course of daily
routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more
appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for
reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due
notice to the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of
32
Appeals :
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been
marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their
existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for
such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long
believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case
comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of
evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to
forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid
means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005
and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Erlinda B. Espejo for petitioners.
C.B. Carbon & Associates for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners
filed Civil Case No. Q-45567 for support against the private
respondent before the RTC of Quezon City. The complaint was
dismissed on December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P.
1
Solano, who found that "(t)here is nothing in the material
allegations in the complaint that seeks to compel (private
respondent) to recognize or acknowledge (petitioners) as his
illegitimate children," and that there was no sufficient and
competent evidence to prove the petitioners filiation.
2
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the case
at bench, another action for recognition and support against the
private respondent before another branch of the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 87. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
50111.
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the
mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO
ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, met
sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A
Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend
his week-ends regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father
served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She
claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6)
months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of
petitioner Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John
Paul on not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two
children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October,
1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage
license which they used was spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following
documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying
respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of
petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent
Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of
petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro
taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario
3 4 5
Cantoria, Dr. Milagros Villanueva, Ruby Chua Cu, and Fr.
6
Liberato Fernandez. The first three witnesses told the trial court
7
that Violeta Esguerra had, at different times, introduced the
private respondent to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez, on
the other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented
himself as the father of petitioner Claro during the latter's baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he
sired the two petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the
sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was
corroborated by the testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an
officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of
petitioner Claro during his baptism. The Private respondent also
presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the Lighthouse
Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation that she and
respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their
affair. Arcagua stated he never saw Violeta Esguerra and
respondent Carlito together at the said restaurant. Private
respondent also declared he only learned he was named in the
birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was
sued for support in Civil Case No.
Q-45567.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court
ruled in favor of petitioners, viz.:
In view of the above, the Court concludes and
so holds that the plaintiffs minors (petitioners
herein) are entitled to the relief's prayed for in
the complaint. The defendant (herein private
respondent) is hereby ordered to recognize
Claro Antonio Carlito Fernandez, now aged 6,
and John Paul Fernandez, now aged 41/2 as
his sons. As the defendant has admitted that he
has a supervisory job at the Meralco, he shall
give the plaintiffs support in the amount of
P2,000 each a month, payment to be delivered
to Violeta Esguerra, the children's mother and
natural guardian, with arrears reckoned as of
the filing of the complaint on February 19, 1987.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners complaint
8
dismissed by the respondent Court of Appeals in its impugned
decision, dated October 20, 1992. It found that the "proof relied
upon by the (trial) court (is) inadequate to prove the (private
respondent's) paternity and filiation of (petitioners)." It further held
that the doctrine of res judicata applied because of the dismissal
of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was denied on December 22, 1992.
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred
in: (1) not giving full faith and credit to the testimony in of Violeta
Esguerra; (2) not giving weight and value to the testimony of
Father Liberato Fernandez; (3) not giving probative value to the
numerous pictures of respondent Carlito Fernandez taken during
the baptismal ceremony and inside the bedroom of Violeta
Esguerra; (4) not giving probative value to the birth certificates of
petitioners; (5) giving so much credence to the self-serving and
incredible testimony of respondent Carlito Fernandez; and (6)
holding that the principle of res judicata is applicable in the case
at bar.
We find no merit in the petition.
The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals may be reviewed by this court only under exceptional
circumstances. One such situation is when the findings of the
appellate court clash with those of the trial court as in the case at
bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our extraordinary
power, and settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate
court that private respondent is not the father of the petitioners is
substantiated by the evidence on record.
We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the
petitioners which the respondent court rejected as insufficient to
prove their filiation. Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on
the photographs showing the presence of the private respondent
in the baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh. "B-8", Exh. "B-12", Exh.
"H" and Exh. "I"). These photographs are far from proofs that
private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained
by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the
sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by
Rodante Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing
private respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the
evidence required to prove paternity (Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-
7", "B-14" and "B-15"). As we held in Tan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA
764, viz:
. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness
Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show
unusual closeness between Respondent and
Jewel, like playing with him and giving him
paternity. The same must be said of . . . (the)
pictures of Jewels and Respondent showing
allegedly their physical likeness to each other.
Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity
and much less would prove violation of
complaint's person and honor. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner Claro
naming private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary
value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in
its preparation. On this score, we held in Berciles vs. Systems, et
al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the
rule is that although the baptismal record of a
natural child describes her as a child of the
record the decedent had no intervening, the
baptismal record cannot be held to be a
voluntary recognition of parentage. . . . The
 reason for this rule that canonical records do
not constitute the authentic document
prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the
legitimate filiation of a child is that such
canonical record is simply proof of the only act
to which the priest may certify by reason of his
personal knowledge, an act done by himself or
in his presence, like the administration of the
sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of
the declarations in the record with respect to the
parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and
distinct facts which require separate and
concrete evidence.
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we
also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They
are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries
therein with respect to the child's paternity.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the
petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are not
also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the
records do no show that private respondent had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the
ruling of the respondent court is in accord with our
pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050
(1958), viz:
. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines explicity
prohibited, not only the naming of the father or
the child born outside wedlock, when the birth
certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or
made by him, but, also, the statement of any
information or circumstances by which he could
be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil
Registrar had no authority to make or record the
paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person and the certificate
of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only
by the mother of the latter, is incompetent
evidence of fathership of said child. (Emphasis
supplied)
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a
birth certificate no signed by the alleged father therein indicated is
not competent evidence of paternity."
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses
for the petitioners and we are satisfied that the respondent
appellate court properly calibrated their weight. Petitioners
capitalize on the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez who
solemnized the baptismal ceremony of petitioner Claro. He
declared on the witness stand:
Q Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion when you called
for the father and the mother of the child, that both father and
mother were present?
A Yes.
Q Would you able to recognized the father and the mother who
were present at that time?
A Yes.
Q Please point to the court?
A There (witness pointing to the defendant, Carlito Fernandez).
Q For instance, just give us more specifically what question do
you remember having asked him?
A Yes, like for example, do you renounce Satan and his works?
Q What was the answer of Fernandez?
A Yes, I do.
Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please look at the
defendant again. I want to be sure if he is the person who
appeared before you on that occasion?
A I am sure.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that
he has to be shown a picture of the private respondent by Violeta
Esguerra to recognize the private respondent, viz:
Q When was the, approximately, when you were first shown this
picture by Violeta Esguerra?
A I cannot recall.
Q At least the month and the year?
A It must be in 1986.
Q What month in 1986.
A It is difficult. . .
Q When was the first time you know you are going to testify here?
A Let us see, you came there two times and first one was you
want to get a baptismal certificate and then the second time was I
asked you for what is this? And you said it is for the court.
Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra went to your
place, you were already informed that you will testify here before
this Honorable Court?
A Yes.
Q And you were informed by this Ms. Violeta Esguerra that this
man wearing the blue T-shirt is the father?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who. . .
A Yes.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend
of Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent which should
render unquestionable his identification of the private respondent
during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof, we
are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who officiates
numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can
remember the parents of the children he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the
credibility of Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly suspect as
it is self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity
of the petitioners.
We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the
respondent appellate court applying the doctrine of res judicata as
additional reason in dismissing petitioners action for recognition
and support. It is unnecessary considering our findings that
petitioners evidence failed to substantiate their cause of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision
of the respondent court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO
FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND and WIFE, EDDIE C. FERNANDEZ
and LUZ FERNANDEZ, SPOUSES, petitioners,
vs.
ROMEO FERNANDEZ, POTENCIANO FERNANDEZ,
FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, JULITA FERNANDEZ, WILLIAM
FERNANDEZ, MARY FERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
FERNANDEZ, GERARDO FERNANDEZ, RODOLFO
FERNANDEZ and GREGORIO FERNANDEZ, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
1
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated December 22,
2
1999 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 40,
Dagupan City in an action for nullity of contracts, partition,
recovery of possession and damages in favor of plaintiffs-
appellees, herein respondents.
The facts as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
3 physical and mental incapacity of the deceased
"The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa
A. de Venecia were the registered owners of a parcel of
land located at Dagupan City covered by TCT No. T-
9267 (525) consisting of 194 sq. meters, and the two-
storey building constructed thereon covered by Tax
Declaration 22-592-1. It is undisputed that Generosa
gave birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died when
he was only twelve (12) years old as paralytic. In the
testimony of Romeo Fernandez (TSN, Aug. 31, 1994, pp.
9-14) it was revealed that the late Spouses being
childless by the death of their son, purchased from a
certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The
boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo
Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken
care of by the couple and was sent to school and
became a dental technician. He lived with the couple
until they became old and disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby
leaving his wife Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo
Fernandez and an estate consisting of the following:
(a) "A parcel of land (Lot 9132, before Lot No.
444-C, of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan,
Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral
Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of
Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE.
by Lot No. 447; on the SE. by Lot No. 9134; on
the SW. by the Arellano Street; and on the NW.
by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One
Hundred Ninety Four (194) square meters,
more or less. Covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan Registry of
Deeds."
(b) "A two (2) storey residential building made of
concrete and wood, G. I. roofing with a floor
area of 154 square meters and 126 square
meters of the first and second floor,
respectively. Declared under Tax Decl. No. 22-
592-1 and assessed therein at P26,000.00."
On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia
executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating
to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez
(a) 119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of
the land;
(b) Whole residential house above-mentioned;
To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez
74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern
portion of the land.
On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez,
appellant's son over the following:
"A portion of One Hundred Nineteen and One-
Half (119.5) Square meters including the
building and/or all existing thereon to be taken
from the southwestern portion of the parcel of
land described as follows, to wit:
'A parcel of land (Lot No. 9132, before Lot No.
444-C, of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan,
Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral
Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of
Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE.
by Lot No. 447; on the SE by Lot No. 9134; on
the SW. by the Arellano Street; and on the NW.
by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One
Hundred and Ninety-Four (194), Square Meters,
more or less, covered by TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 525 (T-9267) —
Pangasinan Registry of Deeds" (Exh.
"8", Exhibits for the Defendants)
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano,
Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo,
Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being
nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K.
Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose,
filed on September 21, 1994, an action to declare the
Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void
ab initio (docketed as Civil Case No. 94-00016-D).
The complaint alleged that defendants (herein
appellants), motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate
and malicious acts of depriving the plaintiff and other
heirs (herein appellees) of the deceased spouses,
without basis of heirship or any iota of rights to
succession or inheritance, taking advantage of the total
Generosa de Venecia aggravated by unlawful scheme
confederated, colluded and conspired with each other in
causing the fake, simulated grossly inauthentic contracts
purporting to be executed on August 31, 1989 and jointly
on the same date, caused the execution of the deed of
absolute sale purportedly signed by Generosa de
Venecia covering the same property described in the
deed of extra-judicial partition and by virtue of the said
acts, appellants were able to secure new land titles in
their favor (Records, pp. 3-4, Complaint). Appellees thus
prayed that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, Deed of
Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54641
be declared void from the beginning.
 Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged:
"16. That the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez
and Generosa were husband and wife blessed
with one child the herein defendant Rodolfo V.
Fernandez whom they acknowledged during
Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the spouses.
Rodolfo's claim as a son of the deceased spouses Fernandez was
negated by the fact that (1) he only reached high school and was
told to stop studying so that he could help in the clinic of Dr.
Fernandez, (2) he failed to present any birth certificate, (3) the
book entitled Fercolla clan which was compiled and edited by
public document was executed as an application for the
recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No. 897.
Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their motion for
reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated May 17,
2000.
6

their lifetime. (italics supplied)
18. That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the late
Generosa de Venecia and defendant Rodolfo V.
Fernandez which are now in question were all
made with the full knowledge, consent and
approval of the parties thereto and for value."
(Records, pp. 20-21, Answer)."
On May 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in
4
favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs and against the defendants;
1. Declaring the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated
August 31, 1989 (Exh. "3 ), the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. 8"), the TCT No. 54641,
and the TCT No. 54693 null and void;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey to, and to
peacefully surrender to the plaintiffs the possession of
the house and lot in question;
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay to
plaintiffs the following:
(a) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(d) P2,000.00 as litigation costs.
SO ORDERED."
In so ruling, the trial court found that defendant Rodolfo
Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of
spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia
respected people such as Ambassador Armando Fernandez,
Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita Coquia-Sison, showed the
geneology of the family of Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant petition for review with
without a child; a pedigree may be admitted in evidence to prove the following issues:
the facts of genealogy and that entries in a family bible or other
family books or charts, engravings or rings, family portraits and I
5
the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree, (4) the
certification issued by the Records Management and Archives
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
Office that there was no available information about the birth of THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT ORDERING
petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses Fernandez, (5) the application of THE DEFENDANTS, PETITIONERS HEREIN, TO
Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay certificate naming petitioner RECONVEY TO, AND PEACEFULLY SURRENDER TO
Rodolfo as his son was doubtful considering that there were THE PLAINTIFFS, RESPONDENTS HEREIN, THE
blemishes or alteration in the original copy; (6) that Rodolfo's POSSESSION OF THE HOUSE AND LOT IN
baptismal certificate was spurious and falsified since there were QUESTION BECAUSE THE SAID ORDER IS
no available records of baptism with the parish from June 7, 1930 PALPABLY CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS
to August 8, 1936, while Rodolfo's baptismal certificate which was THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, FOR THE
issued in 1989 showed that he was baptized on November 24, FOLLOWING REASONS:
1934. The court found that the extra-judicial partition and the deed
of absolute sale were prepared and executed under abnormal,
unusual and irregular circumstances which rendered the (a) THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION ARE
documents null and void. ADMITTED BY THE PARTIES TO BE
CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES
DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA
Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al appealed to the respondent DE VENECIA, AND
Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's judgment in its
assailed decision dated December 22, 1999.
(b) RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE NOT
RELATED TO GENEROSA DE VENECIA BY
In resolving the appeal, the respondent court delved into the CONSANGUINITY, ARE NOT HER
legitimacy of defendant-appellant Rodolfo Fernandez' filiation with
INTESTATE HEIRS AND CANNOT SUCCEED
the deceased spouses. It found that appellants' evidence which AB INTESTATO TO HER INTESTATE
consisted of a certificate of baptism stating that he was a child of ESTATE.
the spouses Fernandez and the application for recognition of
rights to back pay under RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez,
wherein the latter referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not acquire II
evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. The appellate court
concluded that while baptismal certificates may be considered THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
public documents, they were evidence only to prove the THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT DECLARING
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, (1) THE DEED OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION
but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. '3'), THE DEED OF
therein with respect to his kinsfolk; that while the application for ABSOLUTE SALE ALSO DATED AUGUST 31, 1989
back pay was a public document, it was not executed to admit the (EXH. '8'), TCT NO. 54641, AND TCT NO. 54693 NULL
filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the AND VOID FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
herein appellant; that the public document contemplated in Article
172 of the Family Code referred to the written admission of
(a) IT HAS NO FACTUAL BASIS DULY
filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as an
ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the
RECORD, AND
 (b) RESPONDENTS, NOT BEING PARTIES
TO THE QUESTIONED DEEDS, HAVE NO
PERSONALITY TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY
OF SAID DOCUMENTS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ WAS NOT THE
CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND
GENEROSA DE VENECIA BECAUSE
(a) THE FILIATION OF PETITIONER
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ COULD NOT BE
COLLATERALLY ATTACKED IN AN ACTION
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
DOCUMENTS, PARTITION, RECOVERY OF
POSSESSION AND DAMAGES, AND;
(b) THE DECISION AS AFFIRMED BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECLARE IN
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION THEREOF
THAT PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ
IS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE
FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA FERNANDEZ.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
TO THE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO
FACTUAL BASIS IN THE AFFIRMED DECISION TO
JUSTIFY SUCH AWARD.
The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights
of the parties to the conjugal property of the deceased spouses
Fernandez.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-
judicial partition executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and
Generosa Fernandez, widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and void
because the former allegedly failed to prove legitimate filiation to
his putative father, the late Dr. Jose Fernandez. Petitioners,
contend, however, that the burden of proof lies with the
respondents because they were the ones contesting the filiation of
Rodolfo Fernandez. They insist that both lower courts had no
power to pass upon the matter of filiation because it could not be
collaterally attacked in the present action but in a separate and
independent action directly impugning such filiation.
We are not persuaded.
It must be noted that the respondents' principal action was for the
declaration of absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed of
extra-judicial partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an
action to impugn one's legitimacy. The respondent court ruled on
the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez in order to determine
Rodolfo's right to the deed of extra-judicial partition as the alleged
legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez. While we are aware
that one's legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no
application in the instant case considering that respondents' claim
was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses
Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we do not have a situation
wherein they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of their
uncle's wife. The case of Benitez-Badua vs. Court of
7
Appeals, which has a similar factual backdrop is instructive:
8 whether or not Rodolfo Fernandez was the son of the deceased
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that
they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant
case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of
nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather,
these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his
heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under
Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the
legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for
biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been his child; (3) that in case of children
conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as
they speak of the prescriptive period within which the
husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then,
the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply
these articles to the case at bench. For the case at
bench is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.
Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not
born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457
cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Art. 263 of the New
Civil Code (now Art. 170 of the Family Code) is
not well taken. This legal provision refers to an
action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to
this case because this is not an action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action
of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate
child of the deceased, but that she is not the
decedent's child at all. Being neither legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural
child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza
Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
deceased.""
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner
Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the
purpose of determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the
property subject of the extra-judicial partition. In fact, the issue of
spouses Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely
9
raised by petitioners in their pre-trial brief filed before the trial
court, hence they are now estopped from assailing the trial court's
ruling on Rodolfo's status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that petitioner
Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses
Fernandez. Such is a factual issue which has been thoroughly
passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate
court. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on
the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they carry even
10
more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual
11
findings of the trial court. We accordingly find no cogent reason
to disagree with the respondent court's evaluation of the evidence
12
presented, thus:
"The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft
of any records of the birth of appellant Rodolfo
Fernandez. On October 11, 1995, it issued a certification
worded as follows:
"This is to certify that the Register of Births for
the Municipality of Dagupan, Pangasinan in the
year 1984 is not on file with the National
Archives, hence, there is no available
information about the birth of Rodolfo V.
Fernandez alleged to have been born on
November 24, 1934 to the spouses Jose K.
 Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia in
Dagupan, Pangasinan" (Records, p. 146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for
Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a
public document and a conclusive proof of the legitimate
filiation between him and the deceased spouses (Rollo,
p. 41, Appellants' Brief). We do not agree.
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition
of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public
document nevertheless, it was not executed to admit the
filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez,
the herein appellant. The public document contemplated
in Article 172 of the Family Code refer to the written
admission of filiation embodied in a public document
purposely executed as an admission of filiation and not
as obtaining in this case wherein the public document
was executed as an application for the recognition of
rights to back pay under Republic Act No. 897. Section
23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
"SECTION 32. Public documents as
evidence — Documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third
person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter."
The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of
a public document are conclusive evidence against the
contracting parties as to the truthfulness of the
statements made therein. They constitute only prima
facie evidence of the facts which give rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter. Thus, a baptismal
certificate issued by a Spanish priest under the Spanish
regime constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts
certified to by the parish priest from his own knowledge
such as the administration of the sacrament on the day
and in the place and manner set forth in the certificate;
but it does not constitute proof of the statements made
therein concerning the parentage of the person baptized
(Francisco, Evidence, 1994 ed., p. 516, citing Garcia vs.
Gajul, 53 Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil.
350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5 Phil. 193; Siguion vs. Siguion, 8
Phil. 7). Public documents are perfect evidence of the
fact which give rise to their execution and of the date of
the latter if the act which the officer witnessed and
certified to or the date written by him are not shown to be
false; but they are not conclusive evidence with respect
to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the
interested parties (Martin, Rules of Court in the
Philippines with Note and Comments, vol. 4, p. 577).
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay
Rights Under Act No. 897 is only a proof that Jose K.
Fernandez filed said application on June 5, 1954 in
Dagupan City but it does not prove the veracity of the
declaration and statement contained in the said
application that concern the relationship of the applicant
with herein appellant. In like manner, it is not a
conclusive proof of the filiation of appellant with his
alleged father, Jose K. Fernandez the contents being,
only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and
possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the
spouses openly and continuously until they died (Rollo,
p. 42; Appellants' Brief). Open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant the
enjoyment by the child of the position and privileges
usually attached to the status of a legitimate child such
as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the
parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant
attendance to the child's support and education, and
giving the child the reputation of being a child of his
parents (Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the
Philippines, pp. 245-246). However, it must be noted
that, as was held in Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA
590, possession of status of a child does not in itself
constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a
child to compel recognition by his assumed parent.
Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate
child appellant presented a baptismal certificate issued
by Fr. Rene Mendoza of the St. John Metropolitan
Cathedral of Dagupan City on August 10, 1989 stating
therein that appellant is a child of the late spouses
having been born on November 15, 1934 and baptized
on November 24, 1934 (Exh. "1" Exhibits for the
Defendants). As stated, while baptismal certificates may
be considered public documents, they are evidence only
to prove the administration of the sacraments on the
dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to
his kinsfolk (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
439). It may be argued that a baptismal certificate is one
of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the
authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful
when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the
Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City
issued a certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that
the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8,
1936 were all damaged (Records, p. 148, Exh. "G").
Neither the family portrait offered in evidence establishes
a sufficient proof of filiation Pictures do not constitute
proof of filiation (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals) (supra). In
fine, the evidence presented by appellant did not acquire
evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. Consequently the
Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 executed
by appellant Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de
Venecia is null and void."
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a
child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of
Dr. Jose Fernandez, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa
vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo
13
is concerned pursuant to Art. 1105 of the New Civil Code which
states:
"A partition which includes a person believed to be an
heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to
such person."
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that the
property in question was the conjugal property of the late spouses
Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia, thus when Dr.
Jose Fernandez died intestate in 1982, his estate consisted solely
of ½ pro indiviso of the conjugal property and the other half
belonged to his wife Generosa de Venecia; that granting Dr. Jose
Fernandez was only survived by his wife, the respondents
nephews and nieces of Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the ½ share
of the decedent's estate while the ¾ share of the conjugal
property will still belong to Generosa as the widow of Dr. Jose
Fernandez, hence the trial court's order reconveying the
possession of the subject lot and building to respondents was
contrary to the admitted facts and law since respondents are not
related by consanguinity to Generosa vda de Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
"Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one
half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children to the other half."
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as provided
in the above-quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to the ½ of the
inheritance and the respondents to the other ½. In effect, ¾ pro
indiviso is the share of Generosa as the surviving spouse, i.e., ½
as her share of the conjugal property estate and ½ of the
remaining ½ as share as heir from her husband's estate. Thus, we
find well taken the petitioners' assertion that the annulment of the
extra-judicial partition between Generosa and petitioner Rodolfo
does not necessarily result in respondents' having exclusive right
to the conjugal property, as erroneously found by the respondent
court. Generosa, during her lifetime, had the right to enjoy and
dispose of her property without other limitations than those
14
established by law, which right she exercised by executing a
deed of sale in favor of petitioner Eddie Fernandez.
Petitioners assails respondents' right, not being heirs of
Generosa, to question the validity of the deed of sale since the
action for the annulment of contracts may only be instituted by all
15
who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily.
We disagree.
As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party
obliged principally or subsidiarily under a contract. However, when
a contract prejudices the rights of a third person, he may exercise
an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights
with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show
detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in
16
which he had no intervention. As we have discussed above,
respondents are entitled to the ¼ of the entire conjugal property,
i.e., lot and building; however considering that widow Generosa,
during her lifetime, sold the entire building to petitioner Eddie
Fernandez, respondents had been deprived of their ¼ share
therein, thus the deed of sale was prejudicial to the interest of
respondents as regards their ¼ share in the building.
Respondents therefore, have a cause of action to seek the
annulment of said deed of sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in
declaring null and void the deed of sale executed between
Generosa and petitioner Eddie Fernandez concluding that the
same was simulated or false and in affirming the trial court's
findings that the deed was prepared and executed under
abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances without however,
particularly stating the circumstances.
We agree.
Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and
simulated because there was no consideration for the sale.
However, this assertion was controverted by vendee petitioner of attorney's fees, which is in violation of the proscription against
25
Eddie Fernandez' declaration, that the money he paid for the sale the imposition of a penalty on the right to litigate.
came from his savings as overseas contract worker in Saudi
Arabia from 1982-1989 which respondents failed to controvert by WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is
presenting evidence to the contrary. The presumption that a hereby Affirmed with Modification, as follows:
contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a
17
mere assertion that it has no consideration. Under Art. 1354 of
the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary is 1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are
proven. entitled to the ¼ share of the conjugal lot and building of the
deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez who died
childless and intestate;
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in the deed
of sale was not that of Generosa because she was already
bedridden with both legs amputated before she died. Forgery 2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the
cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and share of petitioner Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is concerned and
18
convincing evidence and whoever alleges it has the burden of the title issued pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo
19
proving the same; a burden respondents failed to discharge. The Fernandez;
respondents had not presented any convincing proof to override
the evidentiary value of the duly notarized deed of sale. A notarial 3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the ¾ share
document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner of Generosa sold to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693
therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. is cancelled and a new title should be issued in the names of
To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents as co-owners of the
20
convincing and more than merely preponderant. ¾ and ¼ shares respectively in the conjugal building.
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building 4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees
to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did not only sell her ¾ are deleted.
undivided share in the building but also the ¼ share of the
respondents. We rule, that such a sale of the entire building SO ORDERED.
without the consent of the respondents is not null and void as only
the rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making
the buyer, petitioner Eddie, a co-owner of the ¾ share of the G.R. No. 132305 December 4, 2001
building together with the respondents who owned the ¼ share
21
therein. IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner,
vs.
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages and NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO, AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and HON.
attorney's fees awarded by the trial court, we find them to be COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
bereft of factual basis. A party is entitled to an adequate
compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as QUISUMBING, J.:
22
he has duly proven. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not
only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a
23 This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision
reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on 1
dated March 4, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and
24 32817, which reversed and set aside the judgment dated October
amount of damages. The testimony of respondent Romeo 2
17, 1990, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in
Fernandez that he suffered around P100,000 actual damages
Civil Case No.87-41515, finding herein petitioner to be the owner
was not supported by any documentary or other admissible
of 1/3 pro indiviso share in a parcel of land. 1âwphi1.nêt
evidence. We also agree with the petitioners that the respondent
court should not have awarded moral damages in the amount of
P100,000 since they also failed to show proof of moral suffering, The pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the records, are as
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded follows:
feelings and social humiliation. Attorney's fees should likewise be
deleted for lack of factual basis and legal justification. Both the
lower courts did not cite specific factual basis to justify the award
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
64729, located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name alone,
his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein) sued
3
Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property. On April 20, 1981,
the trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters,
recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the property
covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of Manila was
required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the
4
certificate of title to said property.
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987,
respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from her the 1/3 portion
of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's
sole possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to
them by operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs of
their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They claimed
that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to
5
petitioner sometime in March 1979 was executed through
petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her
to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No.
6 7
172334 ) in petitioner's name alone.
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery .The
deed showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but
respondents averred that, having been able to graduate from
college, Jose never put his thumb mark on documents he
executed but always signed his name in full. They claimed that
Jose could not have sold the property belonging to his "poor and
unschooled sisters who. ..sacrificed for his studies and personal
8
welfare." Respondents also pointed out that it is highly
improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration
of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property because petitioner
was unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at
the time of the alleged sale. They also stressed that it was quite
unusual and questionable that petitioner registered the deed of
sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight years after the
9
execution of the sale.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida
C. Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She
claimed not to know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala.
She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his
share in the subject property. She maintained that she had always
stayed on the property, ever since she was a child. She argued
that the purported sale of the property was in fact a donation to
her, and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his
thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his signature. She
pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged
respondents' claim over the property such that respondents had to
sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented that respondents had
to disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of the whole
property.
Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two
ejectment cases against her and other occupants of the property.
The first was decided in her and the other defendants' favor, while
the second was dismissed. Yet respondents persisted and
resorted to the present action.
Petitioner recognized respondents' ownership of 2/3 of the
property as decreed by the RTC. But she averred that she caused
the issuance of a title in her name alone, allegedly after
respondents refused to take steps that would prevent the property
from being sold by public auction for their failure to pay realty
taxes thereon. She added that with a title issued in her name she
could avail of a realty tax amnesty.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner,
decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing
the plaintiffs [herein respondents] as being entitled to the
ownership and possession each of one-third
(1/3) pro indiviso share of the property originally covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 64729, in the name of
Jose T. Santiago and presently covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 172334, in the name of herein
defendant [herein petitioner] and which is located at No.
3075-A Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as
per complaint, and the adjudication to plaintiffs per
decision in Civil Case No. 56226 of this Court, Branch VI,
and the remaining one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share
adjudicated in said decision to defendant Jose T.
Santiago in said case, is hereby adjudged and
adjudicated to herein defendant as owner and entitled to
possession of said share. The Court does not see fit to
adjudge damages, attorney's fees and costs. Upon
finality of this judgment, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
172334 is ordered cancelled and a new title issued in the
names of the two (2) plaintiffs and the defendant as
owners in equal shares, and the Register of Deeds of
Manila is so directed to effect the same upon payment of
the proper fees by the parties herein.
SO ORDERED.
10
According to the trial court, while there was indeed no
consideration for the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of
petitioner, said deed constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were
not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the
property as Jose's daughter. The trial court ruled that the following
evidence shows petitioner to be the daughter of Jose: (1) the
decisions in the two ejectment cases filed by respondents which
stated that petitioner is Jose's daughter, and (2) Jose's income tax
return which listed petitioner as his daughter. It further said that
respondents knew of petitioner's existence and her being the
daughter of Jose, per records of the earlier ejectment cases they
filed against petitioner. According to the court, respondents were
not candid with the court in refusing to recognize petitioner as Ida
C. Santiago and insisting that she was Ida C. Labagala, thus
affecting their credibility.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed
the decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED
and one is entered declaring the appellants Nicolasa and
Amanda Santiago the co-owners in equal shares of the
one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the late Jose
Santiago in the land and building covered by TCT No.
172334. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Manila is
directed to cancel said title and issue in its place a new
one reflecting this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Apart from respondents' testimonies, the appellate court noted
that the birth certificate of Ida Labagala presented by respondents
showed that Ida was born of different parents, not Jose and his
wife. It also took into account the statement made by Jose in Civil
Case No. 56226 that he did not have any child.
Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are
raised for consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence
to prove that she is the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of the
petitioner as the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in ruling that
she had adduced sufficient evidence to prove her filiation by Jose
Santiago, making her his sole heir and thus entitled to inherit his
1/3 portion. She points out that respondents had, before the filing
 11
of the instant case, previously "considered" her as the daughter
of Jose who, during his lifetime, openly regarded her as his
legitimate daughter. She asserts that her identification as Jose's
daughter in his ITR outweighs the "strange" answers he gave
when he testified in Civil Case No. 56226.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her
filiation collaterally, citing the case of Sayson v. Court of
12
Appeals in which we held that "(t)he legitimacy of (a) child can
be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by
the proper parties and within the period limited by
13
law." Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code in support
14
of this contention.
For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the
daughter of Jose, per her birth certificate that indicates her
parents as Leo Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of Jose
15
Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. They argue that the
provisions of Article 263 of the Civil Code do not apply to the
present case since this is not an action impugning a child's
legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership, and possession
of property .
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1) whether
or not respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action
for recovery of title and possession; and (2) whether or not
petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-
owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.
On the first issue, we find petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the
Civil Code to be misplaced. Said article provides:
.Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child
shall be brought within one year from the recording of the
birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the
same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen
months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two
years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been
concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery
of the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in
the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A
careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates
situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child
by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs)
denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a
16
child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child,
to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife.
However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is
not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at
17
all. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and
possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on
prescriptive periods.
Petitioner's reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual
milieu present in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. What
was being challenged by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity
of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the legitimate status of Doribel
Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not have
been validly adopted since Doribel had already been born to the
Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at the same time made the
conflicting claim that Doribel was not the child of the couple. The
Court ruled in that case that it was too late to question the decree
of adoption that became final years before. Besides, such a
challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made
18
collaterally but in a direct proceeding.
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner's legitimate
status but are, instead, asserting that she is not at all their
brother's child. The birth certificate presented by respondents
support this allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that:
19
The Certificate. of Record of Birth (Exhibit H) plainly
states that... Ida was the child of the spouses Leon
Labagala and [Cornelia] Cabrigas. This document states
that it was Leon Labagala who made the report to the
Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the
entries in said Certificate. Therefore, this certificate is
proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee however denies that
Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists that she is
not Ida Labagala but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is not her
birth certificate, then where is hers? She did not present
any though it would have been the easiest thing to do
considering that according to her baptismal certificate
she was born in Manila in 1969. This court rejects such
denials and holds that Exhibit H is the certificate of the
record of birth of appellee Ida...
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only
present her testimony and a baptismal certificate (Exhibit
12) stating that appellee's parents were Jose Santiago
and Esperanza Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in
evidence states that a baptismal certificate is not a proof
of the parentage of the baptized person. This document
can only prove the identity of the baptized, the date and
place of her baptism, the identities of the baptismal
sponsors and the priest who administered the sacrament
20
-- nothing more. (Citations omitted.)
At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioner's counsel
admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating
that she is Ida Santiago, though she had been using this name all
21
her life.
Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her
relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her
22
baptismal certificate. However, as we held in Heirs of Pedro
Cabais v. Court of Appeals :
...a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacrament on the dates therein
specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein
stated with respect to [a person's] kinsfolk. The same is
conclusive only of the baptism administered, according
to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who
baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity
of the declarations and statements contained in the
certificate concerning the relationship of the person
23
baptized.
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof
24
of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return,
which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount
25
thereof.
We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy
of her birth certificate but petitioner, without advancing any reason
therefor, failed to do so. Neither did petitioner obtain a certification
that no record of her birth could be found in the civil registry, if
such were the case. We find petitioner's silence concerning the
absence of her birth certificate telling. It raises doubt as to the
existence of a birth certificate that would show petitioner to be the
daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to
show her birth certificate would raise the presumption that if such
evidence were presented, it would be adverse to her claim.
Petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner had been using
Santiago all her life. However, use of a family name certainly does
not establish pedigree.
Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago,
26
has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala. The similarity is too
uncanny to be a mere coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied
knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the
birth certificate of Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court,
however, she stated that Cornelia is the sister of her mother,
Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made conflicting statements
that affect her credibility and could cast along shadow of doubt on
her claims of filiation.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the
Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon
Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment,
not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child
of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through
intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the
property in dispute was validly transferred to petitioner through
sale or donation.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that:
...This deed is shot through and through with so many
intrinsic defects that a reasonable mind is inevitably led
to the conclusion that it is fake. The intrinsic defects are
extractable from the following questions: a) If Jose
Santiago intended to donate the properties in question to
Ida, what was the big idea of hiding the nature of the
contract in the facade of the sale? b) If the deed is a
genuine document, how could it have happened that
Jose Santiago who was of course fully aware that he
owned only 1/3 pro indiviso of the properties covered by
his title sold or donated the whole properties to Ida? c)
Why in heaven's name did Jose Santiago, a college
graduate, who always signed his name in documents
requiring his signature (citation omitted) [affix] his
thumbmark on this deed of sale? d) If Ida was [the] child
of Jose Santiago, what was the sense of the latter
donating his properties to her when she would inherit
them anyway upon his death? e) Why did Jose Santiago
affix his thumbmark to a deed which falsely stated that:
he was single (for he was earlier married to Esperanza
Cabrigas ); Ida was of legal age (for [ s ]he was then just
15 years old); and the subject properties were free from
liens and encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice of
Adverse Claim and Entry No. 6388, Notice of Lis
Pendens were already annotated in the title of said
properties). If the deed was executed in 1979, how come
it surfaced only in 1984 after the death of Jose Santiago
and of all people, the one in possession was the
27
baptismal sponsor of Ida?
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the
right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since
28
2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could not have
given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the
29
time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential
30
requisites of a contract, including one of sale, absent which
there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did
31
not pay any centavo for the property, which makes the sale void.
Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but
the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation,
or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of
donation. Again, as explained by the Court of Appeals:
...Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a
valid donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee
required by Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in
1979, the acceptance of the donation should have been
made by her father, Leon Labagala or [her] mother
Cornelia Cabrigas or her legal representative pursuant to
Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of those mentioned in
the law - in fact no one at all - accepted the "donation"
32
for Ida.
In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals, hence it must be
upheld. 1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CY No. 32817 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146737 December 10, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
JUAN "JHONNY" LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter
of the late Maria Locsin Araneta), the successors of the late
LOURDES C. LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN
JARANTILLA and the intestate estate of the late JOSE C.
LOCSIN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
JUAN C. LOCSIN, JR., respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry,
a copy of which is transmitted to the Civil Registry General
pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, is prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. However, if there are material discrepancies
between them, the one entered in the Civil Registry General
prevails.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the
September 13, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 57708 which affirmed in toto the September 13, 1996
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, of Iloilo City in
Special Proceeding No. 4742. The September 13 order of the trial
court appointed Juan E. Locsin, Jr., respondent, as the sole
administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Juan "Jhonny"
Locsin, Sr.
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months
1
after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11,
1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of
Administration" (docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4742)
praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate
of the deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he is an
acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that
during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which
include undetermined savings, current and time deposits with
various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real
properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin,
Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester
Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the
decedent.
On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the
petition for hearing on January 13, 1992, which order was duly
2
published, thereby giving notice to all persons who may have
opposition to the said petition.
Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992, the heirs
of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and
Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased,
filed an opposition to respondent's petition for letters of
administration. They averred that respondent is not a child or an

acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during
his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed
by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De
Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the
successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that
respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or
the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the
deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings,
joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance
and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla
(another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no
filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased.
Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of
the deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed
administrator of the intestate estate, respondent submitted a
3
machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") of his Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the
Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D"
contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C.
Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated
therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3").
To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied, respondent
presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
She produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957
records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit
4
"C") showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a
coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph,
respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been
recognized as family members of the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified
true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil
Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit
5
"8", indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his
mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain
the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as
anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October
22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957,
however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was
recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other
hand, Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used
before respondent's birth. This scenario dearly suggests that
Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as witness, Col.
Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified that the
signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") are forgeries. He thus concluded that the said
Certificate is a spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the
bound volume of birth records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City.
After hearing, the trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and the photograph (Exhibit "C") are
sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the
deceased, issued on September 13, 1996 an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is
hereby GRANTED and the petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr.
is hereby appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate
of the late Juan "Johnny" Locsin, Sr.
"Let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor, upon
his filing of a bond in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) to be approved by this Court.
6
"SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged
Decision affirming in toto the order of the trial court dated
September 13, 1996. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration,
while respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
Both motions were, however, denied by the Appellate Court in its
Resolution dated January 10, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by petitioners.
The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two documents
— Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine.
The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and
7
may not be reviewed on appeal does not apply when there
appears in the record of the case some facts or circumstances of
weight and influence which have been overlooked, or the
significance of which have been misinterpreted, that if considered,
8
would affect the result of the case. Here, the trial court failed to
appreciate facts and circumstances that would have altered its
conclusion.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the
persons preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration, thus:
"Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court,
or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
a person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select." (Emphasis ours)
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person,
thus:
"Sec. 2 Contents of petition for letters of administration.
— A petition for letters of administration must be filed by
an interested person and must show, so far as known to
the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" (Emphasis ours)
An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
9
against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose
relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to
 10
share in the estate as distributees. In Gabriel v. Court of
11
Appeals, this Court held that in the appointment of the
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the
one to be appointed administrator.
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin,
was not survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of
letters of administration, respondent alleged that he is
an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that he is
an interested person in the estate and is considered as next of
kin. But has respondent established that he is an acknowledged
natural son of the deceased? On this point, this Court, through Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall
be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action
is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not
just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for
recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the
12
child's acknowledgment." (Emphasis ours)
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the
deceased, presented to the trial court his Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and a photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during
the burial of the deceased.
Regarding the genuineness and probative value of Exhibit "D", the
trial court made the following findings, affirmed by the Appellate
Court:
"It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 in the name of Juan E. Locsin, Jr., the
original having been testified to by Rosita Vencer, exists
in the files of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo. Petitioner
since birth enjoyed the open and continuous status of an
acknowledged natural child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he
together with his mother was summoned to attend to the
burial as evidenced by a picture of relatives facing the
coffin of the deceased with petitioner and his mother in
the picture. x x x. It was duly proven at the trial that the
standard signatures presented by oppositors were not in
public document and may also be called questioned
document whereas in the certificate of live birth No. 477,
the signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was the original or
primary evidence. The anomalous and suspicious
characteristic of the bound volume where the certificate
of live birth as alleged by oppositors was found was
testified to and explained by Rosita Vencer of the office
of the Local Civil Registrar that they run out of forms in
1957 and requisitioned forms. However, the forms sent
to them was the 1958 revised form and that she said
their office usually paste the pages of the bound volume
if destroyed. All the doubts regarding the authenticity and
genuineness of the signatures of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and
Emilio Tomesa, and the suspicious circumstances of the
bound volume were erased due to the explanation of
Rosita Vencer."
This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil
Register), the records of births from all cities and municipalities in
the Philippines are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil
Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars.
Since the records of births cover several decades and come from
all parts of the country, to merely access them in the Civil Registry
General requires expertise. To locate one single birth record from
the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It
is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro Manila
would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record
originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested
parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of
Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than those considered by
the trial court should have been presented by respondent.
The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature
of Exhibit "D" are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer,
Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the
record of respondent's birth which took place on October 22,
1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's
knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and
entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based
merely on her general impressions of the existing records in that
Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local
Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to
the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the
variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational
manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's explanation not
convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was
recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958
form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was
recorded, Vencer answered that "x x x during that time, maybe the
forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil
Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958
13
Revised Form."
The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does
not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1,
1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2)
years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the
Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No
102, revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it
is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be
used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in
1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D."
The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil
Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the
bound volume, not sewn like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit
"D" is a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a
sore thumb because the entries therein are typewritten, while the
records of all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the
contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate
important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race,
occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an
entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of
Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father,
but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his
Residence Certificate were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume,
Vencer had no answer except to state, "I am not aware of this
because I am not a bookbinder." As to why Exhibit "D" was not
sewn or bound into the volume, she explained as follows:
"COURT:
I will butt in. Are these instances where your
employees would only paste a document like
this Certificate of Live Birth?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the
leaves just to replace the record. Sometimes we
just have it pasted in the record when the
leaves were taken.
ATTY. TIROL:
You mean to say you allow the leaves of the
bound volume to be taken out?
A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are
14
detached so we have to paste them." (Emphasis ours)
There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital
document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume.
Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from explaining the
anomalous circumstances surrounding Exhibit "D", she actually
highlighted the suspicious circumstances surrounding its
existence.
The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that
Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should
have been given more faith and credence by the courts below.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar
to send copies of registrable certificates and documents
presented to them for entry to the Civil Registrar General, thus:
"Duties of Local Civil Registrar. — Local civil registrars
shall (a) file registrable certificates and documents
presented to them for entry; (b) compile the same
monthly and prepare and send any information required
of them by the Civil-Registrar; (c) issue certified
transcripts or copies of any document registered upon
payment of proper fees; (d) order the binding, properly
classified, of all certificates or documents registered
during the year; (e) send to the Civil Registrar-General,
during the first ten days of each month, a copy of the
entries made during the preceding month, for filing; (f)
index the same to facilitate search and identification in
case any information is required; and (g) administer
oaths, free of charge, for civil register
15
purposes" (Emphasis ours)
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by
the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be
identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept by the
latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil
Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in
the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such
circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to
declare Exhibit "D" a spurious document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by
his mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of
Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that he
and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November
28, 1954 do not appear.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces
16
vs. Local Civil Registrar that:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the
naming of the father of the child born out of
wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is
not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any
information or circumstances by which he could be
identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no
authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate
child upon the information of a third person and the
certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed
only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence
of fathership of said child." (Emphasis ours)
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further
17
elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals where this Court
said that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who
had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of
paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by
both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for
purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate
offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by
18
contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained
where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from
which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of
nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was
removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two
Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned
the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry.
What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry
General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the
coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute
19
proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous
precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims.
Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin
with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the
deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the
late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "D") is spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested
person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
57708 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's petition for
issuance of letters of administration is ORDERED DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140500 : January 21, 2002
 ERNESTINA BERNABE, Petitioner, v. CAROLINA ALEJO as
guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to
illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family
Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors
have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to
file an action for recognition.
Statement of the Case
1 Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7,
2 3
1999 Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-GR CV No. 51919
4
and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the
two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
City (Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court
dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the lower
court for trial on the merits.[5
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in
this wise:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with
his secretary of twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant
Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and
was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13,
1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same
year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid
complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be
given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being
held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family Code as
well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the
complaint is now barred x x x.[6
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina
Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision
and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition. Citing
Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the
putative father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since
the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian
filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the
opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest
of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in
1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code,
which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years
after the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent
enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.
7 Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action
Issues
8
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our
consideration:
I which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case
against petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative father,
for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative
fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of
paternity by the latter.
II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
respondents had four years from the attainment of minority to file
an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code,
in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of
the Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the
Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is
fatally defective for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one
of the respondents.[9
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall
discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action
for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been
supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that
the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested
right would be impaired. We do not agree.
for recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document
should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which
either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years
from the finding of the document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have
however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family
Code, which we quote:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the
child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs
should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In
these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate
child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The
Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still
a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by
the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that
illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy
and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x
x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to
affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if
10
he or she is already dead. cräläwvirtualibräry
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that
have already vested prior to its enactment should not be
prejudiced or impaired as follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right
to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of
the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the
Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and
which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
11
contingency x x x. Respondent however contends that the filing
of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from
12
procedural laws. cräläwvirtualibräry
13
Bustos v. Lucero distinguished substantive from procedural law
in these words:
x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two
terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive
rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys
under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion.[14 (Citations
omitted)
15
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto, the Court laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court,
for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges,
enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the
rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it
may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals
merely with procedure.[16cräläwvirtualibräry
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of
the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to
file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining
majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take
Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right
had already vested prior to its enactment.
17
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals is not applicable to the case at
bar, because the plaintiff therein sought recognition as an
illegitimate child when he was no longer a minor. On the other
18
hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals the Court ruled that an
action for recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect
should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family
Code, because the right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for
recognition of natural children. Thus, petitioner contends that the
provision cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the time
of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each
other. In other words, he is not a natural child.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception,
were not disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each
19
other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles, the Court explained:
A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each
other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a natural
child.[20cräläwvirtualibräry
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been
frowned upon by this Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which
allowed minors to file a case for recognition even if their parents
were disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint
averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an
extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were
born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for
recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while
the alleged putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of
their conception, the two childrens parents were legally
disqualified from marrying each other. The Court allowed the
Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed almost a year
after the death of the presumed father. At the time of his death,
both children were still minors.
21
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira, the Court
said that the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment
of natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such
action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent
portions of the case are quoted hereunder:
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than
natural children, commonly known as bastards, include those
adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married
woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a
married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They
are entitled to support and successional rights. But their filiation
must be duly proven.
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code
allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious
children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284
of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory
recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural
children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the
rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural
children may be applied to spurious children.
That does not mean that spurious children should be
acknowledged, as that term is used with respect to natural
children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for
the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish
the filiation of spurious children.
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of
natural children.
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the
spurious child, then his filiation may be established by means of
the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition
prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory
recognition in the case of natural children, as provided for in
article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious
children.[22 (Citations omitted, italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior
23
successional rights over spurious ones. However, Rovira treats
them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right to
recognition granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the
time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died
during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition
(under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four
years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not
impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights
of minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the
lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in
24
his Memorandum, the State as parens patriae should protect a
minors right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when
the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged
father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.
Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is
nolonger required to implead the lower courts or judges x x x
either as petitioners or respondents. Under Section 3, however,
the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition.
Hence, the failure of petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as
a party is not a reversible error; it is infact the correct procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE
DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS
OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE
AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO,
ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO
PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA,
RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA
DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF
GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO,
CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-
REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO
CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-
MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely,
GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF
HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON,
HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-
ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN
RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA
RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA,
FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and
1
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors; and GUILLERMA
2
RUSTIA, as Intervenor, Respondents.
3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate
the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
4
Manila, Branch 55, in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed
5
and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated
October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of
6
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. The main issue in this
case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is
attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of
Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and
(2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his
7 8 9
sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and
10
the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of
11
Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five
other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario,
Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado.
Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa
and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa
Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa
12
Delgado‘s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa
had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio
Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage,
the legal status of Ramon Osorio‘s and Felisa Delgado‘s union is
in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever
got married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will
determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of
the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between
13
legitimate and illegitimate relatives. If Ramon Osorio and Felisa
Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis
Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado
and therefore excluded from the latter‘s intestate estate. He and
his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation
between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the
couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado‘s intestate estate, as they
would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were
never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence
was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an
allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is
clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So
did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got
14
married, his Partida de Casamiento stated that he was "hijo
natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
15
Delgado), significantly omitting any mention of the name and
16
other circumstances of his father. Nevertheless, oppositors (now
respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged
marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took
place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She
was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives,
the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973,
Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa
17
Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed.
According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as
husband and wife but were never married. To prove their
assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested
marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal
certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred
to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that
the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean
that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then
on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on
September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a
century, they were known among their relatives and friends to
have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors
presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1,
1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P.
Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United
States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D.
Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for
Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military or
Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004,
503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration
of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J.
Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to
his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June
18
1919;
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo
Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children.
With no children of their own, they took into their home the
youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These
children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was
known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage
19
to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent
Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to
Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own
flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous
possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father‘s
demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado‘s obituary which was prepared by
Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of
their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo
20
Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma
Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia
as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child.
They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement
prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim
voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented
were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil
21
Code.
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa
22
Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption of
their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath
"[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
23
children or natural children by legal fiction." The petition was
overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was
survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased
brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano,
Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia,
24
Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of
Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration
of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and
25
Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. This
petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo
Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
26
Rustia-Cruz; (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia‘s late brother,
Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina
Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were
barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-
blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene
in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving
descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the
objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was
granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration
was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
were never married but had merely lived together as husband and
wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a
motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of
Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the
ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants
remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon
submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa
substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had
died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de
27
la Rosa as administratrix of both estates. The dispositive portion
of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-
claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the
Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby
declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who
died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and
entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance
with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as
the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia,
and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the
exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado
executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is
hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled,
and their settlement [is] considered consolidated in this
proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor
is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota
Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the
appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby
APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate
of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of
DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO
VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the
sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby
ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the
subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the
appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and
income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates
to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of
this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an
accounting of her actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
28
SO ORDERED.
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on
29
the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time. They
30
then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus which was
31
dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However, on motion for
reconsideration and after hearing the parties‘ oral arguments, the
Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to
oppositors‘ appeal in the interest of substantial justice.
32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the
resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors‘
failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period
was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October
10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The
33
pertinent portion of our decision read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed.
However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of
an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court‘s
pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating to
the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party
entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be
raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of
the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents‘ intention to raise valid issues
in the appeal is apparent and should not have been construed as
an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial court‘s decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for
the APPROVAL of the private respondents‘ Record on Appeal
and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch
LV Regional Trial Court‘s May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
34
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals partially set aside the
35
trial court‘s decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Court
36
of Appeals amended its earlier decision. The dispositive portion
of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision
of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the
intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas
and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition
among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in
accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the
oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance
with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-
appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late
Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr.
Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants
upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the
sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered
to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject
estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her
collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and
titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator,
immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the
requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina
Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator‘s
qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to
determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas
and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the
said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of
a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts.
Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and
presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either
37
conclusive or disputable.
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions
are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married.
Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the
original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record
38
of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness attesting
that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which
39
referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary
evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no
40
marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage
arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The
evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage
but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado
41
as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa
42
D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo
43
Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to
the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of
marriage. These are public documents which are prima
44
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the
truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners‘ own witness whose
testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position,
confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as
husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage.
45
Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the
baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was
no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
46
contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried
("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its
preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every
intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to
be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and,
if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law
and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always
47
presume marriage.
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the
questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa
Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or
disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law
makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how
48
strong, may overturn them. On the other hand, disputable
presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can
be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the
contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa
Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents)
chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage
even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of
the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado‘s and Caridad
49
Concepcion‘s Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo
natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).
50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently
overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado
and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children
born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio
and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent
51
Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.
52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another
woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters,
but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other
reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate
children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though
there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that
to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another
illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the
former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than
a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers
and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the
prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case under
consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in
category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no
such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of
the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all
stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate
children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules
regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be
applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters
should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and
sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood,
they shall share equally.
53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related
to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother.
Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from
each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the
nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa
Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
54
grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are
her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at
the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested
55
right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear
on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were
the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa
Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo
56
Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
57
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half
of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia,
Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa‘s estate all to
himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedent‘s entire estate to himself
by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the
estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are
all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in
the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they
may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an
affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate
58
child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to
successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition
59
of paternity. She, however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the
death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was
already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950),
illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This
draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code
which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children
but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or
60
voluntary. Recognition is compulsory in any of the following
cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of
the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status
61
of a child of the alleged father (or mother) by the direct
acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when
the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father.
62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in
63
any authentic writing.
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first,
compulsory recognition through the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second,
voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of
an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative
father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have
64
compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual
limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
65
parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory
66
recognition can no longer be filed. In this case, intervenor
Guillerma‘s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed
upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma‘s second ground)
must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary
recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of
the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be
67
his. Did intervenor‘s report card from the University of Santo
Tomas and Josefa Delgado‘s obituary prepared by Guillermo
Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code?
Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not
bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name
appears there as intervenor‘s parent/guardian holds no weight
since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while
witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who
drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was
published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that
published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by
the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing
was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of
Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper
clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed
manuscript was fatal to intervenor‘s claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina
Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law.
Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia,
it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter‘s
death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses
and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We
quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created]
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results
from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made
through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is
not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To
establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly
carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact
of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven]
68
by the person claiming its existence.
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the
estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia
and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful
heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if
there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of
Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his
69 70
sisters, nieces and nephews.
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer
the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court,
or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for administration or to request that
the administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors,
if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration
71
is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order
of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
72
represented in the management of the estates, a situation which
obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in
the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a
nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are
the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11,
1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED.
The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia‘s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-
adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit
half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The
remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings
of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children
of any of Josefa Delgado‘s full- or half-siblings who may
have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her
death. Josefa Delgado‘s grandnephews and grandnieces
are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial
court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in
her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustia‘s estate (including its one-half share
of Josefa Delgado‘s estate) shall be inherited by
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia
Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and
the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived
Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall
be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now
deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their
estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled
intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to
a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as
joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of
the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined
by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007
TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as
mother of minor VERNA AIZA POSADA, CONSTANTINO
POSADA and FRANCISCA POSADA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
1
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision dated
2
May 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated August 27, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557. The appellate court
3
had affirmed with modification the Judgment dated January 4,
1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes,
Branch 42, in Civil Case No. 1401. The RTC held petitioner liable
to pay monthly support to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on
September 23, 1987 as well as moral and exemplary damages,
attorney‘s fees and costs of suit.
The facts in this case as found by the lower courts are as follows:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from
the barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a
close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of
Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the
visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioner‘s offer and worked as a casual
employee in the mayor‘s office starting on September 1, 1986.
From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de
Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she
accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on
town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched
Clarissa from "My Brother‘s Place" where the seminar was being
held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at
Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When
they reached the place her companions were nowhere. After
petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous advances on
her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room
where she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly
exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident
to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was
following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac,
Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay projects. At around
11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on
instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress
of her mission. They met at the lobby and he led her upstairs
because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at
the upper floor.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in,
and suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy
with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he
could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She
succumbed to his advances. But again she kept the incident to
herself.
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation,
she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant. In
another letter in February 1987, she told him she was pregnant. In
a handwritten letter dated February 4, 1987, he replied:
My darling Chris,
Should you become pregnant even unexpectedly, I should have
no regret, because I love you and you love me.
Let us rejoice a common responsibility – you and I shall take care
of it and let him/her see the light of this beautiful world.
We know what to do to protect our honor and integrity.
Just relax and be happy, if true.
With all my love,
Ninoy
4
2/4/87
Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and addressed
her as "Chris," probably because of their twenty-five (25)-year age
gap. In court, she identified petitioner‘s penmanship which she
claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office.
5
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters sent to her by
petitioner, two of which were in his letterhead as mayor of
6
Pandan. She also presented the pictures petitioner gave her of
his youth and as a public servant, all bearing his handwritten
notations at the back.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her
pregnancy, handed her a letter and ₱2,000 pocket money to go to
Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA
review course or look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner went to
see her in Manila and gave her another ₱2,000 for her delivery.
When her parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July,
her father fetched her and brought her back to Pandan. On
7
September 23, 1987, she gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza
Posada.
Clarissa‘s mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissa‘s story. She
said they learned of their daughter‘s pregnancy through her
husband‘s cousin. She added that she felt betrayed by petitioner
and shamed by her daughter‘s pregnancy.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with
Support Pendente Lite before the RTC, Virac, Catanduanes
8
against petitioner on October 23, 1987.
On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in their
favor, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the [respondents] and against the [petitioner]
and ordering the latter:
1. to pay a monthly support of ₱2,000.00 to Verna Aiza
Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987 as he
was proved to be the natural father of the above-named
minor as shown by the exhibits and testimonies of the
[respondents];
2. to pay the amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral damages;
3. to pay the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
4. to pay the sum of ₱10,000.00 as attorney‘s fees; and
5. to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
9
Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
judgment with modification, specifying the party to whom the
damages was awarded. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals‘ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with
modification by ordering [petitioner] Teofisto I. Verceles:
1. To pay a monthly support of ₱2,000.00 to Verna Aiza
Posada from her birth on September 23, 1987.
2. To pay [respondent] Maria Clarissa Posada the sum of
₱15,000.00 as moral damages and [P]15,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
3. To pay [respondents] spouses Constantino and
Francisca Posada the sum of ₱15,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. To pay each of the said three [respondents]
₱10,000.00 as attorney‘s fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
10
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now presents the following issues for resolution:
I.
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THAT
APPELLANT VERCELES WAS THE FATHER OF THE CHILD?
 II.
WOULD THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES PROSPER?
III.
WOULD THE RTC COURT HAVE ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER THIS ISSUE OF APPELLANT‘S PATERNITY OF THE
CHILD, WHICH IS MADE COLLATERAL TO THIS ACTION FOR
11
DAMAGES?
In sum, the pertinent issues in this case are: (1) whether or not
paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages
with support pendente lite; (2) whether or not the filiation of Verna
Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven; and
(3) whether or not respondents are entitled to damages.
In his Memorandum, petitioner asserts that the fact of paternity
and filiation of Verna Aiza Posada has not been duly established
or proved in the proceedings; that the award for damages and
attorney‘s fees has no basis; and that the issue of filiation should
be resolved in a direct and not a collateral action.
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna
Aiza Posada as father and that it was respondent Clarissa who
placed his name on the birth certificate as father without his
consent. He further contends the alleged love letters he sent to
Clarissa are not admissions of paternity but mere expressions of
12
concern and advice. As to the award for damages, petitioner
argues Clarissa could not have suffered moral damages because
she was in pari delicto, being a willing participant in the
13
"consensual carnal act" between them. In support of his
argument that the issue on filiation should have been resolved in
a separate action, petitioner cited the case of Rosales v. Castillo
14
Rosales where we held that the legitimacy of a child which is
15
controversial can only be resolved in a direct action.
On the other hand, respondents in their Memorandum maintain
that the Court of Appeals committed no error in its decision. They
reiterate that Clarissa‘s clear narration of the circumstances on
"how she was deflowered" by petitioner, the love letters and
pictures given by petitioner to Clarissa, the corroborating
testimony of Clarissa‘s mother, the fact that petitioner proffered no
countervailing evidence, are preponderant evidence of paternity.
16
They cited the case of De Jesus v. Syquia where we held that a
conceived child can be acknowledged because this is an act
17
favorable to the child. They also argue that damages should be
awarded because petitioner inveigled Clarissa to succumb to his
18
sexual advances.
Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages?
On this score, we find petitioner‘s stance unmeritorious. The
caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. In a string
of cases we made the following rulings. It is not the caption but
the facts alleged which give meaning to a pleading. Courts are
called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance
19
thereof. In determining the nature of an action, it is not the
caption, but the averments in the petition and the character of the
relief sought, that are controlling.
20
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although
its caption states "Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite,"
Clarissa‘s averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer
of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her
pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support
for her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of
paternity. We have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate
child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground
for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition
21
that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
The letters of petitioner marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" are
declarations that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that he sired
Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used an alias in these letters, the
similarity of the penmanship in these letters vis the annotation at
the back of petitioner‘s fading photograph as a youth is
unmistakable. Even an inexperienced eye will come to the
conclusion that they were all written by one and the same person,
petitioner, as found by the courts a quo.
We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner admitted his
affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters between them,
22
and his giving her money during her pregnancy.
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for
establishing filiation. They are as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten
instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza‘s filiation
under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of
evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures
and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence
that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner‘s illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he
himself presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are
telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
which merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who
23
testify on affirmative matters.
We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to
24
damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states moral
damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable
in this case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she
had an affair with petitioner.
Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there is
nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a
consenting adult who begets a love child to damages.
Respondents Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited
any law or jurisprudence to justify awarding damages to them.
We, however, affirm the grant of attorney‘s fees in consonance
25 26
with Article 2208 (2) and (11) of the New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 30, 2003 and the
Resolution dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 50557 are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages and exemplary
damages be DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA
CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA
CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil
Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San
Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique
Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of
Dominique‘s parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas
Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
1 of their Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two
months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live
with Dominique‘s parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner
minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors
Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the child‘s birth, using
Dominique‘s surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil
Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the
2
child‘s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of
3
the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and
Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique‘s father
4
Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that
during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously
acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had
never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document
entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his
lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of
which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
I‘M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS
OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005. I
5
RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN,
TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I
HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS
AQUINO. MY FATHER‘S NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO
AND MY MOTHER‘S NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO.
x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE
MET EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT
FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN
LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD
COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR
THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT‘S
6
ALL. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
7 In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father
By letter dated November 11, 2005, the City Civil Registrar of
Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie‘s
application for registration of the child‘s name in this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004
(Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
9255 ["An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the ‗Family Code
of the Philippines‘"]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the
Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a
public document is executed by the father, either at the back of
the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private
handwritten instrument, the child shall use the surname of the
father, provided the registration is supported by the following
documents:
8
a. AUSF
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the
time of the filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly
the paternity between the father and the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any
organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately
died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge
his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal
Form No. 102 – Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of
Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).
(Underscoring supplied)
9
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for
injunction/registration of name against respondent before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No.
06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint
alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the child‘s
name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased
father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by
10
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255, which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father
if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register,
or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique
constitutes an admission of paternity in a "private handwritten
instrument" within the contemplation of the above-quoted
provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service
of summons, respondent was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the
circumstances of her common-law relationship with Dominique
and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime,
11
he had acknowledged his yet unborn child. She offered
Dominique‘s handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit "A") as her
12
documentary evidence-in-chief. Dominique‘s lone brother,
Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenie‘s
13
declarations.
14
By Decision of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the
complaint "for lack of cause of action" as the Autobiography
was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms)
of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules
and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A.
9255) which defines "private handwritten document" through
which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument – an instrument executed in
the handwriting of the father and duly signed by him where
he expressly recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring
supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any
express recognition of paternity.1avvphi1
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on
Certiorari raising this purely legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN
STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR
CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A
RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE
HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE
CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE,
AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID
15
MINOR TO USE HIS FATHER‘S SURNAME. (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended, does not expressly require that the private handwritten
instrument containing the putative father‘s admission of paternity
must be signed by him. They add that the deceased‘s handwritten
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the
requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of
the Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must be
"duly signed" by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the
16
earlier-quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding
that Dominique‘s handwritten Autobiography contains a "clear and
17
unmistakable" recognition of the child‘s paternity.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits
that respondent‘s position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in
consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the
petition. It further submits that Dominique‘s Autobiography "merely
acknowledged Jenie‘s pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the
18
child she was carrying in her womb."
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255,
permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if
the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
through an admission made in a public or private handwritten
instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child‘s
paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is
19
necessary.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed,
explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument
acknowledging the child‘s paternity must be signed by the putative
father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with
related provisions of the Family Code which require that
recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a
written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly
implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2
of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such
requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of Article 176
as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold
that Dominique‘s Autobiography, though unsigned by him,
substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child‘s birth.
Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography,
unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts
20
culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third,
Jenie‘s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominique‘s father Domingo Aquino and
testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary
rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned
recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating
Dominique‘s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE
FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
21
In Herrera v. Alba, the Court summarized the laws, rules, and
jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
 (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The
relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect
to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before
the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred,
and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members,
may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be
also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving
on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are
acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a
case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity
still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative
father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary
recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the
putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the
putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose
filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered
acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good
father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the
child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live
birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a
written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract
where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism
nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted
statements in Dominique‘s Autobiography have been made and
written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant
herein – that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living
together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at
his parents‘ house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal;
she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005;
and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child
– they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique‘s.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit
to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing
the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is
the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement
that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument
is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be
shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of
such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
"paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting
22
him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly
emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
23
be a primary consideration. (Underscoring supplied)
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on
the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially
24
of illegitimate children x x x." Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae
affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to their development."
25
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the
stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child‘s best interests to
allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique
and enter it in his birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar
of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname
of the late Christian Dominique Sto.
Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela
Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the
Register of Births.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, Petitioner,
vs.
ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother
ARACELI LOPEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by
1
her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition and
support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno (petitioner).
Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten
out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that
petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth;
and that, by a handwritten note dated August 7, 1999, petitioner
nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial support in the
amount of ₱1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month
beginning August 15, 1999.
Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the
handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to:
(1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support pendente lite in
the increased amount of ₱8,000 a month, and (3) give her
adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of
majority.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the
father of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the
handwritten note on account of threats coming from the National
2
People‘s Army.
3
By Order of July 4, 2001, Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, on
the basis of petitioner‘s handwritten note which it treated as
"contractual support" since the issue of Arhbencel‘s filiation had
yet to be determined during the hearing on the merits, granted
Arhbencel‘s prayer for support pendente lite in the amount of
₱3,000 a month.
After Arhbencel rested her case, petitioner filed a demurrer to
evidence which the trial court granted by Order dated June 7,
4
2006, whereupon the case was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
The trial court held that, among other things, Arhbencel‘s
Certificate of Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to
petitioner as it did not bear petitioner‘s signature; that petitioner‘s
handwritten undertaking to provide support did not contain a
categorical acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that
there was no showing that petitioner performed any overt act of
acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after the
execution of the note.
On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July
5
20, 2007, reversed the trial court‘s decision, declared Arhbencel
to be petitioner‘s illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered
petitioner to give Arhbencel financial support in the increased
amount of ₱4,000 every 15th and 30th days of the month, or a
total of ₱8,000 a month.
The appellate court found that from petitioner‘s payment of
Araceli‘s hospital bills when she gave birth to Arhbencel and his
subsequent commitment to provide monthly financial support, the
only logical conclusion to be drawn was that he was Arhbencel‘s
father; that petitioner merely acted in bad faith in omitting a
statement of paternity in his handwritten undertaking to provide
financial support; and that the amount of ₱8,000 a month was
reasonable for Arhbencel‘s subsistence and not burdensome for
petitioner in view of his income.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution
6
dated January 3, 2008, petitioner comes before this Court
7
through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the documentary evidence
presented by Araceli is an explicit statement made by him that he
is the father of Arhbencel; that absent recognition or
acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not entitled to support
from the putative parent; that the supposed payment made by him
of Araceli‘s hospital bills was neither alleged in the complaint nor
proven during the trial; and that Arhbencel‘s claim of paternity and
filiation was not established by clear and convincing evidence.
Arhbencel avers in her Comment that petitioner raises questions
of fact which the appellate court had already addressed, along
8
with the issues raised in the present petition.
The petition is impressed with merit.
9
The relevant provisions of the Family Code that treat of the right
to support are Articles 194 to 196, thus:
Article 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.1awph!1
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for
some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and
from school, or to and from place of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles,
the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent
set forth in the preceding article:
1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate
and illegitimate children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
half-blood.
Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether
of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other
to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the
need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a
cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Arhbencel‘s demand for support, being based on her claim of
filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article
195(4). As such, her entitlement to support from petitioner is
dependent on the determination of her filiation.
10
Herrera v. Alba summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence
on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part as follows:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or
 (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The
relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect
to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before
the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred,
and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members,
may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be
also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving
on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are
acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a
case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity
still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative
father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary
recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing.
To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative
father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative
father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable
evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the
child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on
various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved
filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent
to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative
father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing.
Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures
are sufficient to establish filiation. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the
handwritten note executed by petitioner which reads:
Manila, Aug. 7, 1999
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide
financial support in the amount of ₱1,500.00 every fifteen and
thirtieth day of each month for a total of ₱3,000.00 a month
starting Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the
custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the necessity of
demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of
the child and my income.
The abovequoted note does not contain any statement
whatsoever about Arhbencel‘s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore,
not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the
Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate
filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial
agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not
even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement
must be accompanied by the putative father‘s admission of
filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however,
not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through
contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a
11
copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to
establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the
same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner‘s handwritten
undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without
more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful
that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and
filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the
disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy
and peace of the putative father‘s legitimate family.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE. The Order dated June 7,
2006 of Branch 130 of the Caloocan City RTC dismissing the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner v. EDNA G.
SIASAT, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the
2
August 30, 2006 Decision and December 20, 2011 Resolution of
3
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229
4
affirming the August 17, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591
and denying petitioner‘s Motion for
5
Reconsideration. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the
Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and without debts, on August 26,
1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in their estate
are two parcels of land (herein subject properties) covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070 of
the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject
6
titles). chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of
Bacolod City (Bacolod RTC) a civil case for mandatory injunction
with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat. Docketed as
Civil Case No. 96-9591 and assigned to Branch 49 of the Bacolod
7
RTC, the Complaint alleged that petitioner is the only son and
sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner)
discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he
suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen
the same; that he executed affidavits of loss of the subject titles
and filed the same with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and
Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod RTC
a Petition for the issuance of second owner‘s copy of Certificate of
Title No. T-25896, which respondent opposed; and that during the
hearing of the said Petition, respondent presented the two missing
owner‘s duplicate copies of the subject titles. Petitioner thus
prayed for mandatory injunctive relief, in that respondent be
ordered to surrender to him the owner‘s duplicate copies of the
subject titles in her possession; and that damages, attorney‘s
fees, and costs of suit be awarded to him.
8
In her Answer, respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son
and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere
stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity
and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted
child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar
predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter
inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her
estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles were not
stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of counterclaim, respondent
prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney‘s fees.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the
Aguilar spouses as their son. To prove filiation, he presented the
following documents, among others:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary
School, Purok No. 2, Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company
(BMMC), Bacolod City (Exhibit ―C‖ and submarkings),
wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner‘s
parent;chanrobleslaw
2. His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit ―F‖), which
indicated that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his
mother;chanrobleslaw
3. Alfredo Aguilar‘s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1
dated October 10, 1957 (Exhibit ―G‖), a public instrument
subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar
during his employment with BMMC, which bears his
signature and thumb marks and indicates that petitioner,
who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and
dependent;chanrobleslaw
4. Alfredo Aguilar‘s Information Sheet of Employment with
BMMC dated October 29, 1954 (Exhibit ―L‖), indicating
that petitioner is his son;chanrobleslaw
5. Petitioner‘s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan
(Exhibit ―M‖), where it is declared that the Aguilar
spouses are his parents; and
6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit ―O‖) addressed to
a BMMC supervisor introducing petitioner as Alfredo
Aguilar‘s son and recommending him for employment.
7. Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the
Bacolod City Civil Registry to the effect that the record of
births during the period 1945 to 1946 were ―all destroyed
by nature,‖ hence no true copies of the Certificate of Live
Birth of petitioner could be issued as requested (Exhibit
―Q‖).
9 upon Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar‘s affidavit (Exhibit ―2‖) attesting
Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie
Abendan-Aguilar (Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano
(Aguilar-Pailano), his aunt and sister of Alfredo Aguilar. Abendan-
Aguilar confirmed petitioner‘s identity, and she testified
that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar spouses and that during
her marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter in the Aguilar
spouses‘ conjugal home built on one of the subject properties. On
the other hand, 81-year old Aguilar-Pailano testified that she is the
sister of Alfredo Aguilar; that the Aguilar spouses have only one
son – herein petitioner – who was born at BMMC; that after the
death of the Aguilar spouses, she and her siblings did not claim
ownership of the subject properties because they
recognized petitioner as the Aguilar spouses‘ sole child and heir;
that petitioner was charged with murder, convicted, imprisoned,
and later on paroled; and that after he was discharged on
parole, petitioner continued to live with his mother Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar in one of the subject properties, and continues to
10
live there with his family. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a
retired teacher; that she does not know petitioner very well, but
only heard his name from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that
she is not related by consanguinity or affinity to petitioner; that she
attended to Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was under
medication in a hospital until her death; that Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar‘s hospital and funeral expenses were paid for by Nancy
Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an affidavit to the
effect that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir to her
husband Alfredo Aguilar‘s estate; that she did not steal the subject
titles, but that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar; that a prior planned sale of the subject properties
did not push through because when petitioner‘s opinion thereto
was solicited, he expressed disagreement as to the agreed
11
price. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-
Nicavera (Siasat-Nicavera), 74 years old, who stated that the
Aguilar spouses were married on June 22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo;
that she is the sister of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she does
not know petitioner, although she admitted that she knew a
certain ―Rodolfo‖ whose nickname was ―Mait‖; that petitioner is not
the son of the Aguilar spouses; and that Alfredo Aguilar has a
12
sister named Ester Aguilar-Pailano. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (Exhibit ―2‖) announcing among others
that she and Alfredo have no issue, and that she is the sole heir to
Alfredo‘s estate.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision,
decreeing as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid
evidence attesting to the fact that plaintiff herein is either a
biological son or a legally adopted one was ever
presented. Neither was a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever
introduced confirming his biological relationship as a son to the
deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a
matter of fact, in the affidavit of Candelaria S. Aguilar (Exhibit 2)
she expressly announced under oath that Alfredo and she have
no issue and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is
(sic) concrete proof that plaintiff herein was never a son by
consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the deceased spouses
Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar.
This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with
sufficient interest in this action to be considered qualified or
entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandatory injunction and
damages prayed for.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff‘s
complaint with cost.
The counterclaim of the defendant is likewise dismissed for lack of
legal basis.
SO ORDERED.
13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
14
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R.
CEB-CV No. 64229, the appeal essentially argued that petitioner
is indeed the Aguilar spouses‘ son; that under Article 172 of the
15
Family Code, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned constitutes proof of filiation; that through the
documentary evidence presented, petitioner has shown that he is
the legitimate biological son of the Aguilar spouses and the sole
heir to their estate. He argued that he cannot present his
Certificate of Live Birth as all the records covering the period
16
1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were
destroyed as shown by Exhibits ―Q‖ to ―Q-3‖; for this reason, he
presented the foregoing documentary evidence to prove his
relationship to the Aguilar spouses. Petitioner made particular
reference to, among others, Alfredo Aguilar‘s SSS Form E-1
(Exhibit ―G‖), arguing that the same was made under oath and
thus sufficient under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish
that he is a child and heir of the Aguilar
spouses. Finally, petitioner questioned the trial court‘s reliance
that she and Alfredo have no children and that she is the sole heir
to the estate of Alfredo, when such piece of evidence has been
discarded by the trial court in a previous Order dated April 1,
1998, stating thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Except for defendant‘s Exhibit ―2‖, all other Exhibits, Exhibits ―1‖,
―3‖, ―4‖ and ―5‖, together with their submarkings, are all admitted
17
in evidence.
On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the
assailed Decision affirming the trial court‘s August 17,
1999 Decision, pronouncing thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his
filiation with the deceased spouses Aguilar deserve scant
consideration by this Court. The Elementary School Permanent
Record of plaintiff-appellant cannot be considered as proof of
filiation. As enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
439:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
―Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do
not constitute evidence of filiation.‖
As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, WE hold that it cannot be
considered as evidence of filiation. As stated by the Supreme
Court in the case of Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA
360:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
―A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive
proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax
return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the
amount thereof.‖
With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is
shown that the parents of the former are Alfredo and Candelaria
Siasat Aguilar does not prove filiation. The Highest Tribunal
declared that a marriage contract not signed by the alleged father
of bride is not competent evidence of filiation nor is a marriage
contract recognition in a public instrument.
The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security
Form E-1 (Exhibit ―G‖) and the Information Sheet of Employment
of Alfredo Aguilar (Exhibit ―L‖), allegedly tend to establish that
plaintiff-appellant has been and is presently known as Rodolfo
Siasat Aguilar and he has been bearing the surname of his
alleged parents.
WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellant‘s argument. Use of a family
surname certainly does not establish pedigree.
Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of
Employment of Alfredo Aguilar are concerned, WE cannot accept
them as sufficient proof to establish and prove the filiation of
plaintiff-appellant to the deceased Aguilar spouses. While the
former is a public instrument and the latter bears the signature of
Alfredo Aguilar, they do not constitute clear and convincing
evidence to show filiation based on open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. Filiation is a serious
matter that must be resolved according to the requirements of the
law.
All told, plaintiff-appellant‘s evidence failed to hurdle the ―high
standard of proof‖ required for the success of an action to
establish one‘s legitimate filiation when relying upon the
provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the
deceased spouses Aguilar, thereby negating his right to demand
the delivery of the subject TCTs in his favor, this Court cannot
grant the writ of mandatory injunction being prayed for.
xxxx
In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a
clear and unmistakable right that has been violated. Neither had
he shown permanent and urgent necessity for the issuance of the
writ.
With respect to the damages prayed for, WE sustain the trial court
in denying the same. Aside from the fact that plaintiff-appellant
failed to show his clear right over the subject parcels of land so
that he has not sustained any damage by reason of the
withholding of the TCTs from him, there is no clear testimony on
the anguish or anxiety he allegedly suffered as a result
thereof. Well entrenched in law and jurisprudence is the principle
that the grant of moral damages is expressly allowed by law in
instances where proofs of the mental anguish, serious anxiety and
moral shock were shown.
ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition,
the appeal is hereby DENIED. The impugned Decision of the trial
court is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
18
SO ORDERED.
19
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but in a December
20, 2011 Resolution, the CA held its ground. Hence, the
present Petition.
Issues
20
In an August 28, 2013 Resolution, this Court resolved to give
due course to the Petition, which raises the following
issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In issuing the assailed DECISION affirming in toto the Decision of
RTC Branch 49, Bacolod City, and
the Resolution denying petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration,
the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error [in] not
taking into consideration petitioner‘s Exhibit ―G‖ (SSS E-1
acknowledged and notarized before a notary public, executed by
Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing the petitioner as his son) as public
document that satisfies the requirement of Article 172 of the
[Family] Code in the establishment of the legitimate filiation of
the petitioner with his father, Alfredo Aguilar.
The herein [P]etition raises the issue of pure question of law with
respect to the application of Article 172 of the Family Code
particularly [paragraph] 3 thereof in conjunction with Section 19
and Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court relating to public
document which is substantial enough to merit consideration of
this Honorable Court as it will enrich jurisprudence and forestall
21
future litigation.
Petitioner’s Arguments
22
In his Petition and Reply seeking to reverse and set aside the
assailed CA dispositions and praying that judgment be rendered
ordering respondent to surrender the owner‘s duplicates of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462)
1070, petitioner argues that Alfredo Aguilar‘s SSS Form E-1
(Exhibit ―G‖) satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family
Code. Petitioner contends that said SSS Form E-1 is a
declaration under oath by his father, Alfredo Aguilar, of his status
as the latter‘s son; this recognition should be accorded more
weight than the presumption of legitimacy, since Article 172 itself
declares that said evidence establishes legitimate filiation without
need of court action. He adds that in contemplation of law,
recognition in a public instrument such as the SSS Form E-1 is
the ―highest form of recognition which partake (sic) of the nature
of a complete act of recognition bestowed upon‖ him as the son of
the late Alfredo Aguilar; that respondent has no personality to
impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy;
that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed
23
pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code; and that
having proved his filiation, mandatory injunction should issue, and
an award of damages is in order.
Respondent’s Arguments
24 25
In her Comment and Memorandum, respondent simply echoes
the pronouncements of the CA, adding that the Petition is a mere
rehash of the CA appeal which has been passed upon succinctly
by the appellate court.
Our Ruling

The Court grants the Petition.
26
This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, has held
that –
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does
not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child‘s acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born
during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live
birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the
child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and
wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon
the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in
proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on
03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by
27
the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it
must be concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5,
1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria
28 29
Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths – has
sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar‘s SSS
Form E-1 (Exhibit ―G‖) satisfies the requirement for proof of
filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172
of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an
―admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.‖
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of
Live Birth since all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of
the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which
necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence –
particularly Alfredo Aguilar‘s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit ―G‖) – to
prove filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document
as mere proof of open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the
Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph
thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public
instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required. And, relative to said form of
acknowledgment, the Court has further held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit
to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing
the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is
made:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by
other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim
of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten
by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
―paramount consideration‖ in resolving questions affecting him.
Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a
Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly
emphatic:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.cralawred
It is thus ―(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on
the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially
of illegitimate children x x x.‖ Too, ―(t)he State as parens
patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
30
development.‖ (Emphasis supplied)
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he
obtained a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National
Statistics Office (NSO), since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy
thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to go through the
trouble of presenting other documentary evidence; the NSO copy
would have sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the
Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City
Civil Registry (Exhibit ―Q‖) contained just such an advice
for petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General at the NSO in Manila to secure a copy of his Certificate of
Live Birth, since for every registered birth in the country, a copy of
the Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to said office.
As to petitioner‘s argument that respondent has no personality to
impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy,
and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already
prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code,
the Court has held before that –
31
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man‘s child by his
wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner‘s
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is
not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at
32
all.
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of
the Aguilar spouses, then he is as well heir to the latter‘s
estate. Respondent is then left with no right to inherit from her
aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar‘s estate, since succession
pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct
33
line. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30,
2006 Decision and December 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229, as well as the August
17, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,

Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered
to SURRENDER to the petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owner‘s
duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-
(15462) 1070.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163362, July 08, 2015
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO
ALCORIZA, PEDRO ARADO, HEIRS: JUDITHO
ARADO, JENNIFER ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO ARADO, SHIRLY
ABAD, ANTONIETA ARADO, NELSON SOMOZA, JUVENIL
ARADO, NICETAS VENTULA, AND NILA ARADO, PEDRO
ARADO, TOMASA V. ARADO, Petitioners, v. ANACLETO
ALCORAN AND ELENETTE SUNJACO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review on certiorari is the decision promulgated on
1
February 28, 2003, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the judgment rendered on January 15, 1997 by the Regional Trial
2
Court, Branch 43, in Dumaguete City (RTC) dismissing the
complaint and the counterclaim for being without merit.
Antecedents
Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado
(Joaquina), and their marriage produced a son named Nicolas
3
Alcoran (Nicolas). In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan
4
(Florencia) but their union had no offspring. During their
marriage, however, Nicolas had an extramarital affair with
Francisca Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to respondent
5
Anacleto Alcoran (Anacleto) on July 13, 1951 during the
6
subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia. In 1972, Anacleto
7
married Elenette Sonjaco. redarclaw
Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died m 1954. Likewise,
8
Florencia died in 1960, and Joaquina in 1981. redarclaw
Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and
9
Veronica Limpahan. Joaquina had four siblings, i.e., Alejandra,
10
Nemesio, Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed Arado. Nemesio
had six children, namely: (1) Jesusa, who was married
to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro, who was married to Tomasa
11
Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5) Gliceria; and (6)
12
Felicisima. During the pendency of the case, Pedro died, and
was substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1) Juditho and his
spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse, Shirly
Abad; (3) Juvenil and his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta
and her spouse, Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila.
On January 14, 1992, Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza,
Pedro and Tomasa filed in the RTC a complaint for recovery of
property and damages (with application for a writ of preliminary
13
mandatory injunction) against Anacleto and Elenette. Named as
unwilling co-plaintiffs were Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica
Limpahan, along with Teodorico, Josefina, Gliceria and
Felicisima.
The properties subject of the action were the following: (1) Lot No.
4100, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OV-1379;
(2) Lot No. 4054, covered by OCT No. OV-1380; (3) a parcel of
land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6065; (4) a parcel of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 20470; (5) a parcel of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 11-028-A; (6) Lot No. 709
covered by OCT No. OV-7784; (7) a parcel of land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 87-011-215-A; (8) a parcel of land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 87-011-217; (9) Lot No. 5234 covered by
OCT No. 3489-A; and (10) Lot No. 5224 covered by Tax
14
Declaration No. 8-201. The parties later stipulated that the first
eight of the subject properties had previously belonged to
Raymundo, while the last two had been the paraphernal
15
properties of Joaquina. redarclaw
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that when Raymundo died
in 1939, his properties were inherited by his son Nicolas alone "as
it was during the period of the old Civil Code, where the spouse
could not inherit but only a share of the usufruct, which was
16
extinguished upon the death of the usufructuary;" that when
Nicolas died in 1954 without issue, half of his properties were
inherited by his wife, Florencia, and the other half by his mother,
Joaquina; that Florencia was, in turn, succeeded by her siblings
Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica; that during the marriage of Nicolas
and Florencia, the former had an affair with Francisca, from which
affair Anacleto was born, but it was unknown whether he was the
spurious son of Nicolas; that Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto
as his spurious child during Nicolas' lifetime; hence, Anacleto was
not entitled to inherit from Nicolas; that nonetheless, Anacleto
claimed entitlement to the properties as the heir of Nicolas and by
virtue of the will executed by Joaquina; that the will was void for
not having been executed according to the formalities of the law,
and the same did not reflect the true intention of Joaquina; that
the supposed testator did not acknowledge the will, which was not
submitted for probate; that they were the rightful heirs to the
properties; that notwithstanding their repeated demands for the
return of the properties, the defendants persistently refused; that a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction should issue to prevent
the defendants from further violating their rights in the properties;
and that the defendants should be ordered to reconvey the
properties, and to pay; P20,000.00 as actual damages;
P20,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P20,000.00
17
as attorney's fees. redarclaw
18
In their answer, the defendants (respondents herein) countered
that Anacleto was expressly recognized by Nicolas as the latter's
son, a fact evidenced by the certificate of birth of Anacleto; that
Anacleto thus had the right to inherit the properties from Nicolas;
that because Anacleto was still too young when Nicolas died, the
administration of the properties passed to Anacleto's
grandmother, Joaquina; that Joaquina executed a last will and
testament in Anacleto's favor; that Joaquina's possession of the
properties was for and in behalf of Anacleto, who had been living
with her since his birth; that such possession began in 1954 when
Nicolas died and continued until Joaquina's death in 1981; that
Anacleto then took over the possession of the properties to the
exclusion of all others; that granting for the sake of argument that
the plaintiffs had rights in the properties, the same were already
lost through laches, estoppel and prescription; and that Anacleto
was the rightful owner of the properties, and his ownership and
possession should not be disturbed.
By way of counterclaim, the defendants prayed that the plaintiffs
be ordered to pay 50,000.00 as moral damages, 1,000.00 "as
initial expenses as costs of this litigation which will increase as the
19
case progresses" and 10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Veronica Limpahan and Sulpicio Limpahan likewise filed their
20
answer to the complaint, stating that they were not interested in
pursuing any claim of ownership in the properties; that assuming
that they were entitled, they were abandoning their rights,
interests, title and participation in the properties; and that they be
excluded from further court processes.
Judgrnent of the RTC
On January 15, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment, decreeing
thusly:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim for lack of merit.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
21
SO ORDERED.
The RTC opined that Anacleto established that he was really the
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It cited the certificate of
birth of Anacleto (Exhibit 4) and Page 53, Book 4, Register No.
214 of the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong (Exhibit
3), which proved that Nicolas had himself caused the registration
of Anacleto's birth by providing the details thereof and indicating
that he was the father of Anacleto. It observed that the name of
Nicolas appeared under the column "Remarks" in the register of
births, which was the space provided for the name of the
informant; that because the plaintiffs did not present evidence to
refute the entry in the register of births, the entry became
conclusive with respect to the facts contained therein; that
Anacleto's claim of recognition was bolstered by his baptismal
certificate (Exhibit F), in which was indicated that his parents were
Nicolas Alcoran and Francisca Sarita; that also presented was a
picture taken during the wake of Nicolas (Exhibit 5) showing the
young Anacleto being carried by Joaquina, and also Nicolas' wife,
Florencia; that in addition, the school records of Anacleto (Exhibit
6) showed that Joaquina stood as his guardian during his grade
school years; that when Anacleto got married, it was Joaquina
who gave consent to his marriage because he was then still a
minor (Exhibit 8); and that Joaquina executed her will in 1978
(Exhibit 9), bequeathing the subject properties to Anacleto, but the
will was yet to be probated.
As the case was filed during the effectivity of the Family Code, the
22 23 24
RTC ruled that Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family
Code allowed Anacleto to establish his filiation during his lifetime
through the record of his birth appearing in the civil register. It
further ruled that because there were no legitimate children of
Nicolas who contested Anacleto's right to inherit, the rule on the
separation of the legitimate from the illegitimate family was
rendered irrelevant; and that, accordingly, Anacleto was entitled to
possess the subject properties upon having established that he
was the acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. Consequently,
it also dismissed the defendants' counterclaim for lack of sufficient
basis.
25
The plaintiffs appealed to the CA. redarclaw
Decision of the CA
On February 28, 2003, the CA promulgated
26
its decision, affirming the judgment of the RTC in this
wise:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Dumaguete City, Branch 43 stands.
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC to the effect that Anacleto
was an acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It agreed that
the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros
Oriental showed that Nicolas was the father of Anacleto, and that
the former had supplied the information on the latter's birth. It
declared that the plaintiffs did not rebut the filiation of Anacleto by
contrary evidence; that the baptismal certificate of Anacleto and
the picture taken during the wake of Nicolas further showed that
Anacleto had been acknowledged by Nicolas; that based on the
Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, the law applicable
at the time of the filing of the case, Anacleto's filiation was
established by the record of his birth appearing in the civil
register; and that Anacleto possessed rights in the subject
properties.
Anent the successional rights of the parties, the CA pronounced
that after Raymundo died in 1939, his wife, Joaquina, and his son,
Nicolas, inherited his properties; that when Nicolas died in 1954,
he was survived by Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his
legitimate wife), and Anacleto (his illegitimate son); that Joaquina
was entitled to one-half of Nicolas' estate, and the remaining half
should be divided between Florencia and Anacleto; that in 1960,
when Florencia died without issue, the share she had inherited
from Nicolas was inherited by her siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and
Veronica; and that when Joaquina died in 1981, she was survived
27
by her sibling Alejandra; her nieces Jesusa, Josefina, Gliceria
and Felicisima; her nephews Pedro and Teodorico; and her
illegitimate grandson, Anacleto.
The CA declared that the plaintiffs were already barred from
asserting their rights in the properties by estoppel by laches; that
Joaquina had executed her last will and testament on April 19,
1978, whereby she bequeathed her properties to Anacleto; that
the properties were thus transmitted to Anacleto upon her death in
1981; that the plaintiffs filed their complairtt in the RTC only on
January 14, 1992; that it would be unjust to award the subject
properties to the plaintiffs who had slept on their rights for a long
time; and that the plaintiffs could probably pursue their claim in
the appropriate intestate or testate proceedings.
28
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA
denied their motion on March 24, 2004.
Issues
29
In this appeal, the plaintiffs, herein petitioners, implore the Court
to nullify the assailed rulings of the CA, and to determine once
and for all the following issues:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas
Alcoran x x x; and
30
(b) Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation.
The petitioners insist that Anacleto was not duly recognized as
Nicolas' illegitimate son; that inasmuch as Anacleto was born to
Francisca during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to
Florencia, Anacleto could only be the spurious child of Nicolas;
that there was no law for the acknowledgment of a spurious child;
that even if Anacleto would be given the benefit of the doubt and
be considered a natural child. Article 278 of the Civil Code states
that "[r]ecognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing;"
that the appearance of the father's name in the certificate of birth
alone, without his actual intervention, was insufficient to prove
paternity; that the mere certificate by the civil registrar that the
father himself registered the child, without the father's signature,
was not proof of the father's voluntary acknowledgment; that the
baptismal certificate was insufficient proof of paternity; and that if
there was ground for Anacleto's recognition, the period to claim
recognition already prescribed.
The petitioners reject the claim of Anacleto that Joaquina
bequeathed the subject properties to him by last will and
testament. They assail the validity and due execution of the will,
which was not submitted for probate; that the joint affidavit
allegedly executed in favor of Anacleto by Sulpicio, Braulia and
Veronica Limpahan, with Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima Arado,
whereby they ceded their rights in the subject properties in favor
of Anacleto, was unwarranted; and that the veracity of the affidavit
was doubtful because it was purportedly inconsistent with
Anacleto's stance that he had inherited the properties in his own
right.
In tum, the defendants, herein respondents, counter that Nicolas
recognized Anacleto as his illegitimate child because Nicolas had
himself caused the registration of Anacleto's birth; that
the petitioners' allegation of prescription lacked basis inasmuch as
Anacleto was not seeking compulsory recognition; and that
Anacleto had already been voluntarily recognized by Nicolas as
his illegitimate son.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint by the RTC,
albeit for different reasons.
The complaint filed by the petitioners in the RTC to recover the
subject properties is properly characterized as an accion
31
reivindicatoria. According to Cañezo v. Bautista, an "[a]ccion
reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes
the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional
trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff
alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its
full possession." In essence, the petitioners seek to put an end to
Anacleto's possession of the properties on the basis of their being
the rightful heirs considering that Anacleto, being the spurious
child of Nicolas, held no successional rights in the estate of
Nicolas.
The burden of proof to establish the averments of the complaint
by preponderance of evidence pertained to the petitioners as the
plaintiffs. In that regard, we have discoursed on preponderance of
 32
evidence in Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr., thusly:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of
the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered
to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence"
or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. If plaintiff claims a right
granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by
competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his
opponent. (Bold underscoring for emphasis)
The petitioners did not discharge their burden of proof.
At the outset, the Court affirms the holding by the RTC and the
33
CA that the provisions of the Family Code should apply because
the petitioners' complaint was filed, litigated and decided by the
RTC during the effectivity of the Family Code. Under the Family
Code, the classification of children is limited to either legitimate or
34
illegitimate. Illegitimate filiation is proved in accordance with
Article 175 of the Family Code, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article I72, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
On the other hand, legitimate filiation is established m accordance
with Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code, which
state:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or laws.
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the
child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to
the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years
within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that
Nicolas had duly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
The birth certificate of Anacleto appearing in the Register of Births
of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental (Exhibits 3, 3-A)
showed that Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the
birth of Anacleto. The showing was by means of the name of
Nicolas appearing in the column "Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4,
Register No. 214 of the Register of Births. Based on the
certification (Exhibit 3-B) issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, the column in the
Register of Births entitled "Remarks" (Observaciones) was the
space provided for the name of the informant of the live birth to be
registered. Considering that Nicolas, the putative father, had a
direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate, reliance on
the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was
35
fully warranted. redarclaw
Anacleto's baptismal certificate (Exhibit 7) was of no consequence
in determining his filiation. We have already held in Cabatania v.
36
Court of Appeals that "while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of
the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not
the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity;" and
that baptismal certificates were "per se inadmissible in evidence
as proof of filiation," and thus "cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove [filiation]." Hence, we attach no
probative value to the baptismal certificate as proof of the filiation
of Anacleto.
The weight accorded by the RTC and the CA to the picture
depicting the young Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina as she
stood beside the coffin of the departed Nicolas (Exhibit 5) was
also undeserved. At best, the picture merely manifested that it
was Joaquina who had acknowledged her filiation with Anacleto.
Cautioning against the admission in evidence of a picture of
similar nature, we have pointed out in Solinap v. Locsin,
37
Jr. that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[R]espondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the
late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,
lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would
encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a
picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and
thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
The school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6), which evinced that
Joaquina was the guardian of Anacleto in his grade school years,
and the marriage contract between Anacleto and Elenette
(Exhibits 8 to 8-C), which indicated that Joaquina had given
consent to Anacleto's marriage, did not have the evidentiary value
accorded by the RTC and the CA. Joaquina's apparent
recognition of Anacleto mattered little, for, as we stressed
38
in Cenido v. Apacionado, the recognition "must be made
personally by the parent himself or herself, not by any brother,
sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a
voluntary declaration by the parent, of if the parent refuses, by
judicial authority, to establish the paternity or maternity of children
born outside wedlock."
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited
corroborative evidence notwithstanding, Anacleto's recognition as
Nicolas' illegitimate child remained beyond question in view of the
showing that Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged
Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
How should the acknowledgment of Anacleto by Nicolas affect the
respective rights of the parties in relation to the specific properties
subject of the complaint?
To recall, the parties stipulated that the first eight of the subject
properties had previously belonged to Raymundo, while the
remaining two had been the paraphernal properties of Joaquina.
With Raymundo having died in 1939, the Spanish Civil Code of
1889 was the governing law on succession. Under Article 807
39
thereof, Joaquina and Nicolas, i.e., the surviving spouse and the
legitimate son of Raymundo, were the forced heirs who acquired
legal title to Raymundo's estate upon his death. In accordance
40
with Article 834 thereof, Nicolas was entitled to inherit the entire
estate of Raymundo, while Joaquina was entitled to a portion in
usufruct equal to the one third portion available for betterment.
When Nicolas died in 1954, the Civil Code of the Philippines was
41 42
already in effect. Under Article 1000 thereof, the heirs entitled
to inherit from Nicolas's estate were Joaquina (his mother),
Florencia (his surviving spouse), and Anacleto (his acknowledged
illegitimate son). Said heirs became co-owners of the properties
comprising the entire estate of Nicolas prior to the estate's
43
partition in accordance with Article 1078 of the Civil Code.
Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose
estate included the first eight of the subject properties that had
previously belonged to Raymundo. Anacleto became a co-owner
of said properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in
44
1954. Likewise, Joaquina succeeded to, and became a pro

indiviso co-owner of, the properties that formed part of the estate
of Nicolas. When Joaquina died in 1981, her hereditary estate
included the two remaining properties, as well as her share in the
estate of Nicolas. In as much as Joaquina died without any
surviving legitimate descendant, ascendant, illegitimate child or
45
spouse, Article 1003 of the Civil Code mandated that her
collateral relatives should inherit her entire estate.
Contrary to the rulings of the lower courts, Anacleto was barred by
law from inheriting from the estate of Joaquina. To start with,
Anacleto could not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation
46
of Nicolas, the legitimate son of Joaquina. Under Article 992 of
the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; in the same manner, such children or relatives shall not
inherit from the illegitimate child. As certified in Diaz v.
47
Intermediate Appellate Court, the right of representation is not
available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the
inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. And, secondly, Anacleto
could not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the
latter's last will and testament, i.e., the Katapusan Tugon
(Testamento) (Exhibit K). Article 838 of the Civil Code dictates
that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the
same is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
48
Court. We have clarified in Gallanosa v. Arcangel that in order
that a will may take effect, "it has to be probated, legalized or
allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the
will is mandatory." It appears that such will remained ineffective
considering that the records are silent as to whether it had ever
been presented for probate, and had been allowed by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The petitioners alleged this fact in their
complaint, and the respondents did not controvert the allegation.
In the absence of proof showing that the supposed will of
Joaquina had been duly approved by the competent court, we
hold that it had not been so approved. Hence, we cannot sustain
the CA's ruling to the effect that Joaquina had bequeathed her
properties to Anacleto by will, and that the properties had been
transmitted to him upon her death.
As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina,
they are the ones entitled to inherit from her estate.
Nonetheless, the petitioners' appeal still fails because the parties
did not establish that the estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and
Joaquina had been respectively settled with finality through the
appropriate testate or intestate proceedings, and partitioned in
due course. Unless there was a proper and valid partition of the
assets of the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and
Joaquina, whether extrajudicially or judicially, their heirs could not
adjudicate unto themselves and claim specific portions of their
estates, because, as we have declared in Carvajal v. Court
49
of Appeals:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot
claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without
partition, either by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the
estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of
the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by
such heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of
his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left
with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to
him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-
owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.
Without the showing that the respective estates of Raymundo,
Nicolas and Joaquina had been previously partitioned, the Court
concludes and holds that none of the parties herein can lay claim
over any of the disputed specific properties.
The petitioners cannot contend, therefore, that they were the
rightful owners of the properties of the late Joaquina to the
exclusion of Anacleto. Thus, we uphold the dismissal of
the petitioners' complaint for recovery of such properties.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
February 28, 2003 by the Court of Appeals;
and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, Petitioner, v. KAREN
SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
1
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and
2
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
88650 promulgated on January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011,
3
respectively, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 8. Both courts a
quo ruled that the subject document titled Pagmamana sa Labas
ng Hukuman is null and void, and ordered herein petitioner
Eugenio San Juan Geronimo (Eugenio), who was previously
joined by his brother Emiliano San Juan Geronimo (Emiliano) as
co-defendant, to vacate the one-half portion of the subject 6,542-
square meter property and surrender its possession to respondent
4
Karen Santos. In a Resolution dated November 28, 2011, this
Court ordered the deletion of the name of Emiliano from the title of
the instant petition as co-petitioner, viz.:
x x x The Court resolves:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(2) to AMEND the title of this petition to read "Eugenio San Juan
Geronimo, petitioner vs. Karen Santos, respondent,"
considering the sworn statement of Eugenio San Juan
Geronimo that he does not know whether his brother is still
alive and that his brother did not verify the instant petition; x x
5
x
The following facts were found by the trial court and adopted by
the appellate court in its assailed Decision, viz.:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only
child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint
for annulment of document and recovery of possession against
the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the
brothers of her father. She alleged that with the death of her
parents, the property consisting of one-half of the parcel of land
located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration
No. 99-02017-00219 and belonging to her parents was passed on
to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that
defendants executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas
ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses
Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the property in
question; and that consequently they took possession and were
able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their
names. She prayed that the document Exhibit C be annulled and
the tax declaration of the land transferred to her, and that the
defendants vacate the property and pay her damages.
In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that
plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother. They
disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were
childless and took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth,
the child of Caridad's sister. They claimed that the birth certificate
of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was allegedly
impossible for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff
in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they had never lived or
sojourned in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary
teacher in Bulacan never filed any maternity leave during the
period of her service from August 1963 until October 1984.
The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were
Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. The defendants Eugenio and
Emiliano were the half-brothers of her father Rufino, being the
children of Rufino's father Marciano Geronimo with another
woman Carmen San Juan. Rufino co-owned Lot 1716 with the
defendants' mother Carmen, and upon his death in 1980, when
the plaintiff was only 8 years old, his share in the property
devolved on his heirs. In 1998, some 18 years later, Caridad and
she executed an extra-judicial settlement of Rufino's estate
entitled Pagmamanahan Sa Labas ng Hukuman Na May
Pagtalikod Sa Karapatan, whereby the plaintiffs mother Caridad
waived all her rights to Rufino's share and in the land in question
to her daughter the plaintiff. Be that as it may, in 1985,
guardianship proceedings appeared to have been instituted with
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos by Caridad in which it was
established that the plaintiff was the minor child of Caridad with
her late husband Rufino. Caridad was thus appointed guardian of
the person and estate of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff further declared that she and her mother had been
paying the real estate taxes on the property, but in 2000, the
defendants took possession of the land and had the tax
declaration transferred to them. This compelled her to file the
present case.
Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the
plaintiff is the only child and legal heir of his brother Rufino. He
disclosed that when Rufino's wife could not bear a child, the
couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad's niece from
Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13 years after the marriage,
when Karen joined her adoptive parents' household. Believing that
in the absence of a direct heir, his brother Emiliano and he should
succeed to the estate of their brother, they executed in 2000 an
extra-judicial settlement called Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman.
Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiffs alleged birth
certificate. It had irregular features, such as that it was written in
pentel pen, the entry in the box date of birth was erased and the
word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma
Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the
informant's signature.
Two more witnesses were adduced. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal
consultant of the DECS in Bulacan brought the plaintiffs service
record as an elementary school teacher at Paombong[,] Bulacan
to show that she did not have any maternity leave during the
period of her service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984,
and a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent that
the plaintiff did not file any maternity leave during her service. He
declared that as far as the service record is concerned, it reflects
the entry and exit from the service as well as the leaves that she
availed of. Upon inquiry by the court, he clarified that
the leaves were reflected but the absences were not. Testifying
on the plaintiffs birth certificate, Exhibit 14, Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, confirmed that there was an alteration
in the date of birth and signature of the informant. In view of the
6
alterations, he considered the document questionable.
On October 27, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondent, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Declaring the document Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman
dated March 9, 2000 executed in favor of Eugenio San Juan-
Geronimo and Emilio San Juan-Geronimo as null and
void;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. Annulling Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-01453 of the subject
property in the names of Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and
Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
3. Ordering defendants Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and
Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo to vacate the 1/2 portion of the
subject property and to surrender the possession to the
plaintiff;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of
[P]30,000.00 as attorney's fees;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
5. To pay the costs of the suit.
7
SO ORDERED.
The trial court ruled that respondent is the legal heir - being the
legitimate child - of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo (spouses Rufino and Caridad). It found that
respondent's filiation was duly established by the certificate of live
birth which was presented in evidence. The RTC dismissed the
claim of petitioner that the birth certificate appeared to have been
tampered, specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth
of respondent and the name of the informant. The trial court held
that petitioner failed to adduce evidence to explain how the
erasures were done. Petitioner also failed to prove that the
alterations were due to the fault of respondent or another person
who was responsible for the act. In the absence of such contrary
evidence, the RTC relied on the prima facie presumption of the
veracity and regularity of the birth certificate as a public
document.
The trial court further stated that even granting arguendo that the
birth certificate is questionable, the filiation of respondent has
already been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC
considered the following overt acts of the deceased spouses as
acts of recognition that respondent is their legitimate child: they
sent her to school and paid for her tuition fees; Caridad made
respondent a beneficiary of her burial benefits from the
Government Service Insurance System; and, Caridad filed a
petition for guardianship of respondent after the death of her
husband Rufino. Lastly, the trial court held that to be allowed to
impugn the filiation and status of respondent, petitioner should
have brought an action for the purpose under Articles 170 and
171 of the Family Code. Since petitioner failed to file such action,
the trial court ruled that respondent alone is entitled to the
ownership and possession of the subject land owned by Rufino.
The extrajudicial settlement executed by petitioner and his brother
was therefore declared not valid and binding as respondent is
Rufino's only compulsory heir.
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the
birth certificate of respondent and the offered evidence of a mere
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry instead of the birth
certificate itself. According to petitioner, respondent's open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is only
secondary evidence to the birth certificate itself. Respondent
questioned if it was legally permissible for petitioner to question
her filiation as a legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and
Caridad in the same action for annulment of document and
recovery of possession that she herself filed against petitioner and
his then co-defendant. Respondent argued that the conditions
enumerated under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code,
giving the putative father and his heirs the right to bring an action
to impugn the legitimacy of the child, are not present in the instant
case. She further asserted that the Family Code contemplates a
direct action, thus her civil status may not be assailed indirectly or
collaterally in this suit.
In the assailed Decision dated January 17, 2011, the appellate
court held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two
dates: the date the child was born to the mother during the
marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded in
the civil registry. The CA found no evidence or admission that
Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date. It
further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case,
Exhibit 14, does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the
civil register as envisioned by the law, viz.:
x x x The reason is that under the statute establishing the civil
register, Act No. 3753, the declaration of the physician or midwife
in attendance at the birth or in default thereof, that declaration of
either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of birth in the civil register. The document in question
was signed by one Emma Daño who was not identified as either
the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife who attended
to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot be the birth certificate
envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant as shadowy
as Emma Daño, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be
opened. Neither may the order of the court Exhibit E be treated as
the final judgment mentioned in Article 172 as another proof of
filiation. The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a
competent court finding the child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an

order granting letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad based
8
on her representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff.
Noting the absence of such record of birth, final judgment or
admission in a public or private document that respondent is the
legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and Caridad, the appellate
court — similar to the trial court - relied on Article 172 of
the Family Code which allows the introduction and admission of
secondary evidence to prove one's legitimate filiation via open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The
CA agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven her
legitimate filiation, viz.:
We agree with the lower court that the plaintiff has proven her
filiation by open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. The evidence consists of the following: (1) the
plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family
name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school
paying for lier tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was
the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS;
(4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was
appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff
from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the
plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of
the deceased.
It is clear that the status enjoyed by the plaintiff as the legitimate
child of Rufino and Caridad has been open and continuous, x x x
The conclusion follows that the plaintiff is entitled to the property
left by Rufino to the exclusion of his brothers, the defendants,
9
which consists of a one-half share in Lot 1716.
10
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied
in the assailed Resolution dated May 24, 2011. Hence, this
petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ALLOWED THE
INTRODUCTION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE AND
RENDERED JUDGMENT BASED THEREON
NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF PRIMARY
EVIDENCE OF BIRTH CERTIFICATE [EXHIBIT 14].
II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONERS HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO IMPUGN
11
RESPONDENT'S LEGITIMATE FILIATION.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that secondary evidence to
prove one's filiation is admissible only if there is no primary
evidence, i.e, a record of birth or an authentic admission in
12
writing. Petitioner asserts that herein respondent's birth
certificate, Exhibit 14, constitutes the primary evidence
enumerated under Article 172 of the Family Code and the ruling of
both courts a quo that the document is not the one "envisioned by
law" should have barred the introduction of secondary evidence.
Petitioner expounds this proposition, viz.:
The findings of the courts a quo that the birth certificate [Exhibit
14] is not [the] one envisioned by law finds support in numerous
cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court. Thus, a
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is
not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is
no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation
of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of
authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person. Where the birth certificate and the
baptismal certificate are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof
of filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial
evidence to prove the same. x x x
x x x The birth certificate Exhibit 14 contains erasures. The date of
birth originally written in ball pen was erased and the date April 6,
1972 was superimposed using a pentel pen; the entry on the
informant also originally written in ball pen was erased and the
name E. Daño was superimposed using also a pentel pen; there
is no signature as to who received it from the office of the registry.
Worst, respondent Karen confirms the existence of her birth
certificate when she introduced in evidence [Exhibit A] a mere
Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Sta.
Maria, Ilocos Sur, which highlighted more suspicions of its
existence, thus leading to conclusion and presumption that if such
evidence is presented, it would be adverse to her claim. True to
the suspicion, when Exhibit 14 was introduced by the petitioner
and testified on by no less than the NSO representative, Mr.
Arturo Reyes, and confirmed that there were alterations which
renders the birth certificate questionable.
Argued differently, with the declaration that the birth certificate is a
nullity or falsity, the courts a quo should have stopped there, ruled
that respondent Karen is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not
13
entitled to inherit from the estate.
On the second issue, petitioner alleges that the CA gravely erred
and abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
ruled that he does not have personality to impugn respondent's
14
legitimate filiation. While petitioner admits that the CA "did not
15
directly rule on this particular issue," he nonetheless raises the
said issue as an error since the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner argues that in so affirming,
the CA also adopted the ruling of the trial court that the filiation of
respondent is strictly personal to respondent's alleged father and
16
his heirs under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, thereby
denying petitioner the "right to impugn or question the filiation and
17
status of the plaintiff." Petitioner argues, viz.:
x x x [T]he lower court's reliance on Articles 170 and 171 of the
Family Code is totally misplaced, with due respect. It should be
read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on
paternity and filiation of the Family Code. A careful reading of said
chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt
exists that a child is indeed a man's child, and the father [or, in
proper cases, his heirs] denies the child's filiation. It does not refer
to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a
particular couple. Petitioners are asserting not merely that
respondent Karen is not a legitimate child of, but that she is not a
18
child of Rufino Geronimo at all. x x x
We grant the petition.
Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent
offered in evidence is questionable, the trial court ruled that
respondent is a legitimate child and the sole heir of deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad. The RTC based this conclusion on
secondary evidence that is similar to proof admissible under the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code to prove the
filiation of legitimate children, viz.:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the following evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Petitioner argues that such secondary evidence may be admitted
only in a direct action under Article 172 because the said
provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and
proof of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the
instant case which is an action for annulment of document and
recovery of possession.
Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or
illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in a direct and
separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. The
rationale behind this procedural prescription is stated in the case
19
of Tison v. Court of Appeals, viz.:
x x x [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot
be attacked collaterally.

The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code xxx actually
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child
can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. The necessity of an independent action
directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: 'The contest of the
legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in
any other way is void.' This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because
they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy."
This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and
within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be
brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious
intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in
wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also
aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of
such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must
necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception
of the child, may still be easily available.
xxxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the
moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional
cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn
20
legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory."
What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this
procedural rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy -
or illegitimacy - of a child is at issue. This situation does not obtain
in the case at bar.
In the instant case, the filiation of a child - herein respondent - is
not at issue. Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the
legitimate child of his deceased brother Rufino and his wife
Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that respondent is not the child
of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad at; all. He proffers
this allegation in his Amended Answer before the trial court by
way of defense that respondent is not an heir to his brother
Rufino. When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of
the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings
below, jurisprudence shows that the trial court was correct in
admitting and ruling on the secondary evidence of respondent -
even if such proof is similar to the evidence admissible under the
second paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not
being a direct action to prove one's filiation. In the following cases,
the courts a quo and this Court did not bar the introduction of
secondary evidence in actions which involve allegations that the
opposing party is not the child of a particular couple — even if
such evidence is similar to the kind of proof admissible under the
second paragraph of Article 172.
21
In the 1994 case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, therein
deceased spouses Vicente Benitez (Vicente) and Isabel
Chipongian (Isabel) owned various properties while they were still
living. Isabel departed in 1982, while Vicente died intestate in
1989. In 1990, Vicente's sister (Victoria Benitez-Lirio) and nephew
(Feodor Benitez Aguilar) instituted an action before the trial court
for the issuance of letters of administration of his estate in favor of
Feodor. In the said proceedings, they alleged that Vicente was
"survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or
descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted x
22
x x." They further argued that one "Marissa Benitez[-]Badua who
was raised and cared for by them since childhood is, in fact, not
related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not
23
a legal heir [of Vicente]." Marissa opposed the petition and
proffered evidence to prove that she is an heir of Vicente. Marissa
submitted the following evidence, viz.:
1. her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3);ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4);ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
3. Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership
with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter
(Exhs. 10 to 21); and
4. School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6).
She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously
24
treated her as their legitimate daughter.
Feodor and his mother Victoria offered mostly testimonial
evidence to show that the spouses Vicente and Isabel failed to
beget a child during their marriage. They testified that the late
Isabel, when she was 36 years old, was even referred to an
obstetrician-gynecologist for treatment. Victoria, who was 77
years old at the time of her testimony, also categorically stated
that Marissa was not the biological child of the said spouses who
25
were unable to physically procreate. cralawred
The trial court, relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family
Code, declared Marissa as the legitimate daughter and sole heir
of the spouses Vicente and Isabel. The appellate court: reversed
the RTC's ruling holding that the trial court erred in applying
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code. On appeal to this Court,
we affirmed the reversal made by the appellate court, viz.:
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child
is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a
husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus,
under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the
legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible
for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child
could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children
conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization
or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and
171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the
appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these
articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one
where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that
petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear
submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166
SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now
Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision
refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this
case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They
do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the
decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor
an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of
Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
26
deceased."
27
Similarly, the 2001 case of Labagala v. Santiago originated from
a complaint for recovery of title, ownership and possession before
the trial court. Respondents therein contended that petitioner is
not the daughter of the decedent Jose and sought to recover from
her the 1/3 portion of the subject property pertaining to Jose but
which came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents sought to prove that petitioner is not the daughter of
the decedent as evidenced by her birth certificate which did not
itself indicate the name of Jose as her father. Citing the case
of Sayson v. Court of Appeals and Article 263 of the Civil Code
28
(now Article 170 of the Family Code), petitioner argued that
respondents cannot impugn her filiation collaterally since the case
was not an action impugning a child's legitimacy but one for
recovery of title, ownership and possession of property. We ruled
in this case that petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil
Code is misplaced and respondents may impugn the petitioner's
filiation in an action for recovery of title and possession. Thus, we
affirmed the ruling of the appellate court that the birth certificate of
petitioner Labagala proved that she "was born of different parents,
29
not Jose and his wife." Citing the aforecited cases of Benitez-
30
Badua and Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we stated, viz.:
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in
the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A
careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates
situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child
by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs)
denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a
31
child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child,
to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his
wife. However, the present case is not one impugning
petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely
that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is
32
not a child of Jose at all. x x x
Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in
admitting secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible
under Article 172 of the Family Code in this action for annulment
of document and recovery of possession, we are constrained to
rule after a meticulous examination of the evidence on record that
all proof points to the conclusion that herein respondent is not a
child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. While we
ascribe to the general principle that this Court is not a trier of
33
facts, this rule admits of the following exceptions where findings
of fact may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil.
257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95
Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953);
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca,
L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.); (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401
[1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622
[1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10)
The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
34
evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
It is clear in the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a
quo declaring respondent as a legitimate child and sole heir of the
deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad is one based on a
misapprehension of facts.
A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would
show that it was tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to
the date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant.
Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent - April 6, 1972 -
and the name of the informant -Emma Daño - were both
superimposed on the document. Despite these glaring erasures,
the trial court still relied on the prima facie presumption of the
veracity and regularity of the birth certificate for failure of petitioner
to explain how the erasures were done and if the alterations were
due to the fault of respondent. It thus ruled that respondent's
filiation was duly established by the birth certificate. The appellate
court did not agree with this finding and instead ruled that the birth
certificate presented does not qualify as the valid registration of
birth in the civil register as envisioned by the law. We reiterate the
relevant pronouncement of the CA, viz.:
x x x The document in question was signed by one Emma Daño
who was not identified as either the parent of the plaintiff or the
physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally,
cannot be the birth certificate envisioned by the law; otherwise,
with an informant as shadowy as Emma Daño, the floodgates to
spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the order of the
court Exhibit E be treated as the final judgment mentioned in
Article 172 as another proof of filiation. The final judgment
mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding the
child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of
guardianship to the parent Caridad based on her representations
35
that she is the mother of the plaintiff.
Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that
respondent has proven her filiation by showing that she has
enjoyed that open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad, viz.:
x x x The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was
allowed by her putative parents to bear their family name
Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying
for her tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was the
beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GS1S; (4)
after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and. was appointed
legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the
estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the
basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the
36
deceased.
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The
appellate court itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the
superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of the
informant made the document questionable. The corroborating
testimony of Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further
confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the signature of
the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which
rendered the document questionable. To be sure, even the
respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such
irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and
the totality of the following circumstances surrounding the alleged
birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
regularity attached to respondent's birth certificate, viz.:
1. The identity of one Emma Daño, whose name was
superimposed as the informant regarding the birth of respondent,
remains unknown.
2. The testimony of Atty. Elmer De Dios Lopez, a legal consultant
of the Department of Education in Bulacan, proved that the
deceased Caridad did not have any maternity leave during the
period of her service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984 as
shown by her Service Record as an elementary school teacher at
Paombong, Bulacan. This was corroborated by a certification from
Dr. Teofila R. Villanueva, Schools Division Superintendent, that
she did not file any maternity leave during her service. No
testimonial or documentary evidence was also offered to prove
that the deceased Caridad ever had a pregnancy.
3. Based on the birth certificate, respondent was born in 1972 or
13 years into the marriage of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad. When respondent was born, Caridad was already 40
years old. There are no hospital records of Caridad's delivery, and
while it may have been possible for her to have given birth at her
own home, this could have been proven by medical or non-
medical records or testimony if they do, in fact, exist.
4. It is worthy to note that respondent was the sole witness for
herself in the instant case.
Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary
evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently
establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is
indeed a child of the deceased spouses. Both the RTC and the
CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her putative
parents because she was allowed to bear their family name
"Geronimo", they supported her and her education, she was the
beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy,
Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in
relation to the estate left by Rufino, and she and Caridad
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino as his
legal heirs.

37
In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romnaldo Villanueva which
incisively discussed its parallelisms and contrasts with the case
38
of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the
presence of a similar set of circumstances - which were relied
upon as secondary proof by both courts a quo in the case at bar -
does not establish that one is,a child of the putative parents. Our
discussion in the Rivera case is instructive, viz.:
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in
attempting to prove that she was the sole heir of the late Vicente
Benitez, submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal certificate,
income tax returns and an information sheet for membership in
the Government Service Insurance System of the decedent
naming her as his daughter, and her school records. She also
testified that she had been reared and continuously treated as
Vicente's daughter.
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua's
alleged parents had been unable to beget children, the siblings of
Benitez-Badua's supposed father were able to rebut all of the
documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that was
counted against Benitez-Badua was that her supposed mother
Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after ten
years of marriage, all of a sudden conceived and gave birth to her
at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following
pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her
birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a
valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of
an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or
her birth certificate, which is a public document, (emphasis ours)
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely
a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not
conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made
there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez,
respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857 should
have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of
her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such
evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-
Badua that are simply too compelling to ignore. First, both
Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina submitted birth
certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be
children of parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both claimed
to have been born after their alleged parents had lived together
childless for several years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-
Badua and this case which ineluctably support the conclusion that
respondent Angelina was not Gonzales' daughter, whether
illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua's alleged
mother Chipongian, was not only 36 years old but 44 years old,
and on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth.
Unlike Chipongian who had been married to Vicente Benitez for
only 10 years, Gonzales had been living childless with Villanueva
for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not
sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she
cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly
participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial partition which
39
she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid.
In view of these premises, we are constrained to disagree with
both courts a quo and rule that the confluence of the
circumstances and the proof presented in this case do not lead to
the conclusion that respondent is a child of the deceased
spouses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 88650 dated January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011,
respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in
Civil Case No. 268-M-2001 for Annulment of Document and
Recovery of Possession is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
With costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016
VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N.
MACAPAZ, REPRESENTED BY ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ,
JR., Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
1 2
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 20, 2009 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 which affirmed with modification
3
the Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 06-173,
an action for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of title
4
with damages. The CA Resolution dated April 5, 2010 denied
the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Facts
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject
matter of this case, with Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and
Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia) (respondents) are the children of
Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and
Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is
located at No. 1273 Bo. Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe
Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered in the names of
the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under
5
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088. In said certificate
of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an
Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a
6
portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m.
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7,
2005, TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a new certificate of
7
title, TCT No. 221466, was issued in the name of
8
the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005
whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to
the petitioner for P300,000.00. Included among the documents
submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an
9
Affidavit dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both
the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the affidavit
of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy
Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally
10
ineffective. On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.
On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint
for two counts of falsification of public documents under Articles
171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against
11
the petitioner. However, said criminal charges were eventually
dismissed.
On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the
heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of
Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against
the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.
12
In her Answer with Compulsory
13
Counterclaim, the petitioner averred that the respondents have
no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that
they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have
no right over Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil
Code which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate
from the legitimate children and relatives of their father and
mother.
After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered
14
its Decision on September 28, 2007. The fallo of the
RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring the Deed of Sale purportedly executed by
[Silvestra] in favor of [the petitioner] on January 18, 2005
over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 183088 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City, as Null and Void;
2. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati City to cancel
TCT No. 221466 issued in the name of [the petitioner],
the same having been issued on the basis of a
fraudulent/falsified Deed of Sale, and thereafter to
reinstate TCT No. 183088 issued in the name of
[the petitioner] and [Silvestra] with all the liens and
encumbrances annotated thereon, including the adverse
claim of [Fidela]; [and]
3. Ordering [the petitioner] to pay the [respondents] the
sum of PI00,000.00 as moral damages and another
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as and
by way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
[The petitioner's] counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.
15
SO ORDERED.
The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005
presented for the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 was a forgery
considering that Silvestra, who purportedly executed said deed of
sale died on November 11, 2002, about three years before the
16
execution of the said Deed of Sale. Respecting the respondents'
legal capacity to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in this wise:
Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality
of the [respondents] to initiate this action as the alleged heirs of
[Silvestra]. The marriage between [Anastacio Sr.J and [FidclaJ
is evidenced by the Certificate of (canonical) Marriage (Exh.
"M"). The name 'Fidela Obera Poblete' is indicated in [the
respondents'] respective birth certificates as the mother's
maiden name but Fidela signed the same as the informant as
"Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth certificates, "Anastacio
Nator Macapaz" is indicated as the name of the
17
father. (Emphasis ours)
Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on
the argument that the respondents are without legal personality to
institute the civil action for cancellation of deed of sale and title on
the basis of their claimed status as legitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr., the brother and sole heir of the deceased,
18
Silvestra.
On October 20, 2009, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the
RTC decision with modification as to the amount of damages.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is
hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The Decision dated
September 28, 2007 of the [RTC] of Makati City, Branch 147 in
Civil Case No. 06-173 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
in that the award of moral and exemplary damages is hereby
reduced from PI00,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively.
With costs against the [petitioner].
19
SO ORDERED.
The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of TCT No.
183088 and the issuance of TCT No. 221466 in the name of
the petitioner were obtained through forgery. As to the question of
whether the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra and thus
have the legal capacity to institute the action, the CA ruled in this
wise:
Reviewing the evidence on record, we concur with the trial court
in sustaining the appellees' legitimate filiation to Silvestra's brother
[Anastacio, Sr.] The trial court found unsuccessful the attempt of
Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of marriage
between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] with a certification from the
NSO that their office has no record of the certificate of marriage of
[Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela], and further claiming the absence of a
marriage license.
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage
contract. A certificate of marriage issued by the Most Holy Trinity
Parish, Alang[-]alang, Leyte (Exh. "M") as well as a copy of the
marriage contract were duly submitted in evidence by the
[respondents].
xxxx
The Marriage Contract (Exh. "U") in this case clearly reflects a
marriage license number and in the absence of a certification from
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued,
the marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] may not be
invalidated on that ground.
x x x.
xxxx
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. This jurisprudential attitude
towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The Courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Here, the fact of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela]
was established by competent and substantial proof. [The
respondents] who were conceived and born during the
subsistence of said marriage are therefore presumed to be
legitimate children of [Anastacio, Sr.], in the absence of any
20
contradicting evidence. (Citations omitted)
21
The petitioner sought reconsideration, but her motion was
22
denied in the Resolution dated April 5, 2010.
Hence, this petition.
Notably, even before the CA, the petitioner never assailed the
factual finding that forgery was indeed committed to effect the
cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the consequent transfer of
title of the property in her name. Verily, in this petition,
the petitioner continues to assail the legal capacity of the
respondents to institute the present action. Invoking the provisions
23
of Article 992 of the Civil Code, the petitioner insists that the
respondents have no legal right over the estate left by Silvestra
for being illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the
legal heir of Silvestra, she, however, claims that the respondents
failed to establish their legitimate filiation to Anastacio, Sr.
considering that the marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela
was not sufficiently proven. According to the petitioner, the
24
marriage contract presented by the respondents is not
admissible under the Best Evidence Rule for being a mere fax
copy or photocopy of an alleged marriage contract, and which is
not even authenticated by the concerned Local Civil Registrar. In
addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that said document
was ever received by said office. Further, while the respondents
also presented a Certificate of (Canonical)
25
Marriage, the petitioner asserts that the same is not the
marriage license required under Articles 3 and 4 of the Family
 26
Code; that said Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage only proves
that a marriage ceremony actually transpired between Anastacio,
27
Sr. and Fidela. cralawred
Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth
of the respondents do not conclusively prove that they are
legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
28
In their Comment, the respondents reiterate the finding and
ruling of the CA that the petitioner's argument has no leg to stand
on considering that one's legitimacy can only be questioned in a
direct action seasonably filed by a party who is related to the
29
former either by consanguinity or affinity.
Thereupon, the resolution of this case rests upon this fundamental
issue: whether or not the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, as held
30
in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al., this Court however deems it
necessary to pass upon the respondents' relationship to Silvestra
so as to determine their legal rights to the subject property.
Besides, the question of whether the respondents have the legal
capacity to sue as alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the
issues agreed upon by the parties in the pre-trial.
At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage
between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photo copy of
the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical certificate of
marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of
marriage without running afoul with the Rules on Evidence of the
Revised Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on
Evidence provides that: "When the subject of the inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, x x x." Nevertheless, a
reproduction of the original document can still be admitted as
secondary evidence subject to certain requirements specified by
31
law. In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr., it was held that:
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with
Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents
by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to
satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the
execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction
of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the
unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of
the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document
and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the
32
introduction of secondary evidence, x x x. (Citation omitted)
On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a
public document. As early as in the case of United States v.
Evangelista,33 it has been settled that church registries of births,
marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no
longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public
34
officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must
therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance
35
with the rules of evidence. Accordingly, since there is no
showing that the authenticity and due execution of the canonical
certificate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly
proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered
to establish the fact of a solemnized
36
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may
be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
37
parents.
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents
presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the
38
National Statistics Office where Fidela signed as the Informant
in item no. 17 of both documents.
A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were
apparently born to the same parents — their father's name
is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's maiden name
is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24.
DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate
birth)" it was stated therein that respondents' parents were
39
married on "May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte."
The petitioner asserts that said documents do not conclusively
prove the respondents' legitimate filiation, albeit, without offering
any evidence to the contrary. The certificates of live birth contain
no entry stating whether the respondents are of legitimate or
illegitimate filiation, making said documents unreliable and
unworthy of weight and value in the determination of the issue at
hand.
Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents' certificates
of live birth, only the signature of Fidela appears, and that they
were not signed by Anastacio, Sr. She argues that the birth
certificate must be signed by the father in order to be competent
evidence to establish filiation, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
40
invoking Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila where it was
held that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father is not
41
competent evidence of paternity.
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of
entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil
Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
42
(Civil Registrar)." Thus, being public documents, the
respondents' certificates of live birth are presumed valid, and
43
are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.
"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient
on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is
sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts
constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted
44
or contradicted, will remain sufficient."
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed
by the father in order to be a competent evidence of legitimate
filiation does not find support in law and jurisprudence. In fact,
45
the petitioner's reliance on Roces is misplaced considering that
what was sought to be proved is the fact of paternity of an
illegitimate child, and not legitimate filiation.
46
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the declaration
of either parent of the new-born legitimate child shall be sufficient
for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the
registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require
that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to
acknowledge the child.
The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 reads:
Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The declaration of
the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of cither parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary
stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to
the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of parents
or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil

status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; if) and such
other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxxx
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be
signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or
only the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall
not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of
the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein
any information by which such father could be identified, x x x
(Emphasis Ours)
Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live
birth were duly executed consistent with the provision of the law
respecting the registration of birth of legitimate children. The fact
that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said documents is of
no moment because Fidela only signed as
the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as
legitimate children.
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also
intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as
husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they
had two children — the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born
more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact
is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage.
Court Resolution dated February 13, 2013 in GR. No. 183262
entitled Social Security System (SSS) v. Lourdes S.
47
Enobiso had the occasion to state:
Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other
proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized
marriage, viz:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as
proof of marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a witness
to the matrimony; b) the couple's public and open cohabitation
as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and
baptismal certificate of children born during such union; and d) the
48
mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
49
Moreover, in a catena of cases, it has been held that, "[p]ersons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio —
50
Always presume marriage."
Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela transpired way before the effectivity of
the Family Code, the strong presumption accorded by then Article
220 of the Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage cannot be
disregarded. Thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of
the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward
the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds,
the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of
unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 20, 2009
and Resolution dated April 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 90907 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 9255 February 24 2004
AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE
SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 176 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippine Congress Assembled:
SECTION 1. Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended
to read as follows:
"Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by the father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission
in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime
of a legitimate child."
SECTION 2. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
SECTION 3. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
REPUBLIC ACT. NO. 9858
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN
BORN TO PARENTS BELOW MARRYING AGE, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code of the Philippines", as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so
disqualified only because either or both of them were below
eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated."
"Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid
marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage
shall not affect the legitimation."
Section 2. Implementing Rules. – The civil Registrar General
shall, in consultation with the chairpersons of the Committee on
Revision of Laws of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Youth, Women and Family Relations of the Senate,
the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the office of the
Supreme Court Administrator, the Philippine Association of Civil
Registrars (PACR) and the UP Law Center, issue the necessary
rules/regulations for the effective implementation of this Act not
later than one (1) month from its effectivity.
Section 3. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and/or administrative regulations
which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
amended, modified, superseded or repealed accordingly.
Section 4. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in
at least two (2) newspapers of national circulation.
Republic Act 8043
The Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995
Files:
"AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES TO GOVERN INTER-
COUNTRY ADOPTION OF FILIPINO CHILDREN, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES"
Section 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995."
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy
of the State to provide every neglected and abandoned child with
a family that will provide such child with love and care as well as
opportunities for growth and development. Towards this end,
efforts shall be exerted to place the child with an adoptive family
in the Philippines. However, recognizing that inter-country
adoption may be considered as allowing aliens not presently
allowed by law to adopt Filipino children if such children cannot be
adopted by qualified Filipino citizens or aliens, the State shall take
measures to ensure that inter-country adoptions are allowed when
the same shall prove beneficial to the child's best interests, and
shall serve and protect his/her fundamental rights.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act. the term:
(a) Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of
adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen
permanently residing abroad where the petition is filed, the
supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of adoption
is issued outside the Philippines.
(b) Child means a person below fifteen (15) years of age
unless sooner emancipated by law.
(c) Department refers to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development of the Republic of the Philippines.
(d) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.
(e) Authorized and accredited agency refers to the State
welfare agency or a licensed adoption agency in the country of
the adopting parents which provide comprehensive social
services and which is duly recognized by the Department.
(f) Legally-free child means a child who has been voluntarily
or involuntarily committed to the Department, in accordance with
the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
(g) Matching refers to the judicious pairing of the adoptive child
and the applicant to promote a mutually satisfying parent-child
relationship.
(h) Board refers to the Inter-country Adoption Board.
ARTICLE II
THE INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION BOARD
Sec. 4. The Inter-Country Adoption Board. — There is hereby
created the Inter-Country Adoption Board, hereinafter referred to
as the Board to act as the central authority in matters relating to
inter-country adoption. It shall act as the policy-making body for
purposes of carrying out the provisions of this Act, in consultation
and coordination with the Department, the different child-care and
placement agencies, adoptive agencies, as well as non-
governmental organizations engaged in child-care and placement
activities. As such, it shall:
(a) Protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking
and/or sale or any other practice in connection with adoption
which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the child;
(b) Collect, maintain, and preserve confidential information
about the child and the adoptive parents;
(c) Monitor, follow up, and facilitate completion of adoption of
the child through authorized and accredited agency;
(d) Prevent improper financial or other gain in connection with
an adoption and deter improper practices contrary to this Act;
(e) Promote the development of adoption services including
post-legal adoption;
(f) License and accredit child-caring/placement agencies and
collaborate with them in the placement of Filipino children;
(g) Accredit and authorize foreign adoption agency in the
placement of Filipino children in their own country; and
(h) Cancel the license to operate and blacklist the child-caring
and placement agency or adoptive agency involved from the
accreditation list of the Board upon a finding of violation of any
provision under this Act.
Sec. 5. Composition of the Board. — The Board shall be
composed of the Secretary of the Department as ex officio
Chairman, and six (6) other members to be appointed by the
President for a nonrenewable term of six (6) years: Provided, That
there shall be appointed one (1) psychiatrist or psychologist, two
(2) lawyers who shall have at least the qualifications of a regional
trial court judge, one (1) registered social worker and two (2)
representatives from non-governmental organizations engaged in
child-caring and placement activities. The members of the Board
shall receive a per diem allowance of One thousand five hundred
pesos (P1,500) for each meeting attended by them: Provided,
further, That no compensation shall be paid for more than four (4)
meetings a month.
Sec. 6. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board shall
have the following powers and functions:
(a) to prescribe rules and regulations as it may deem
reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act, after
consultation and upon favorable recommendation of the different
agencies concerned with the child-caring, placement, and
adoption;
(b) to set the guidelines for the convening of an Inter-country
Adoption Placement Committee which shall be under the direct
supervision of the Board;
(c) to set the guidelines for the manner by which
selection/matching of prospective adoptive parents and adoptive
child can be made;
(d) to determine a reasonable schedule of fees and charges to
be exacted in connection with the application for adoption;
(e) to determine the form and contents of the application for
inter-country adoption;
(g) to institute systems and procedures to prevent improper
financial gain in connection with adoption and deter improper
practices which are contrary to this Act;
(h) to promote the development of adoption services, including
post-legal adoption services,
(i) to accredit and authorize foreign private adoption agencies
which have demonstrated professionalism, competence and have
consistently pursued non-profit objectives to engage in the
placement of Filipino children in their own country: Provided, That
such foreign private agencies are duly authorized and accredited
by their own government to conduct inter-country adoption:
Provided, however, That the total number of authorized and
accredited foreign private adoption agencies shall not exceed one
hundred (100) a year;
(j) to take appropriate measures to ensure confidentiality of the
records of the child, the natural parents and the adoptive parents
at all times;
(k) to prepare, review or modify, and thereafter, recommend to
the Department of Foreign Affairs, Memoranda of Agreement
respecting inter-country adoption consistent with the
implementation of this Act and its stated goals, entered into,
between and among foreign governments, international
organizations and recognized international non-governmental
organizations;
(l) to assist other concerned agencies and the courts in the
implementation of this Act, particularly as regards coordination
with foreign persons, agencies and other entities involved in the
process of adoption and the physical transfer of the child; and
(m) to perform such other functions on matters relating to inter-
country adoption as may be determined by the President.
ARTICLE III
PROCEDURE
Sec. 7. Inter-Country Adoption as the Last Resort. — The
Board shall ensure that all possibilities for adoption of the child
under the Family Code have been exhausted and that inter-
country adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this
end, the Board shall set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will
be taken to place the child in the Philippines before the child is
placed for inter-country adoption: Provided, however, That the
maximum number that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall
not exceed six hundred (600) a year for the first five (5) years.
Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may
be the subject of inter-country adoption. In order that such child
may be considered for placement, the following documents must
be submitted to the Board:
(a)Child study;
(b)Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
(c)Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of
abandonment/death certificate of parents;
(d)Medical evaluation /history;
(e)Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
(f)Recent photo of the child.
Sec. 9. Who May Adopt. — An alien or a Filipino citizen
permanently residing abroad may file an application for inter-
country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least
sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted, at the time
of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the
child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent:
(b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and
responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws, and
has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited
counselor in his/her country;
(d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
(f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to
give the necessary moral values and example to all his children,
including the child to be adopted;
(g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied
under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to
implement the provisions of this Act;
(h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has
diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly
authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed
under his/her national laws; and
(i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable Philippine
laws.
Sec. 10. Where to File Application. — An application to adopt a
Filipino child shall be filed either with the Philippine Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the child, or with the Board, through
an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an authorized
and accredited agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive
parents, which application shall be in accordance with the
requirements as set forth in the implementing rules and
regulations to be promulgated by the Board.
The application shall be supported by the following documents
written and officially translated in English.
(a) Birth certificate of applicant(s);
(b) Marriage contract, if married, and divorce decree, if
applicable;
(c) Written consent of their biological or adoptive children above
ten (10) years of age, in the form of sworn statement;
(d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation by a duly
licensed physician and psychologist;
(e) Income tax returns or any document showing the financial
capability of the applicant(s);
(f) Police clearance of applicant(s);
(g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the
applicant's employer and a member of the immediate community
who have known the applicant(s) for at least five (5) years; and
(h) Recent postcard-size pictures of the applicant(s) and his
immediate family;
The Rules of Court shall apply in case of adoption by judicial
proceedings.
Sec. 11. Family Selection/Matching. — No child shall be
matched to a foreign adoptive family unless it is satisfactorily
shown that the child cannot be adopted locally. The clearance, as
issued by the Board, with the copy of the minutes of the meetings,
shall form part of the records of the child to be adopted. When the
Board is ready to transmit the Placement Authority to the
authorized and accredited inter-country adoption agency and all
the travel documents of the child are ready, the adoptive parents,
or any one of them, shall personally fetch the child in the
Philippines.
Sec. 12. Pre-adoptive Placement Costs. — The applicant(s)
shall bear the following costs incidental to the placement of the
child;
(a) The cost of bringing the child from the Philippines to the
residence of the applicant(s) abroad, including all travel expenses
within the Philippines and abroad; and
(b) The cost of passport, visa, medical examination and
psychological evaluation required, and other related expenses.
Sec. 13. Fees, Charges and Assessments. — Fees, charges,
and assessments collected by the Board in the exercise of its
functions shall be used solely to process applications for inter-
country adoption and to support the activities of the Board.
Sec. 14. Supervision of Trial Custody. — The governmental
agency or the authorized and accredited agency in the country of
the adoptive parents which filed the application for inter-country
adoption shall be responsible for the trial custody and the care of
the child. It shall also provide family counseling and other related
services. The trial custody shall be for a period of six (6) months
from the time of placement. Only after the lapse of the period of
trial custody shall a decree of adoption be issued in the said
country a copy of which shall be sent to the Board to form part of
the records of the child.
During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall submit to the
governmental agency or the authorized and accredited agency,
which shall in turn transmit a copy to the Board, a progress report
of the child's adjustment. The progress report shall be taken into
consideration in deciding whether or not to issue the decree of
adoption.
The Department of Foreign Affairs shall set up a system by which
Filipino children sent abroad for trial custody are monitored and
checked as reported by the authorized and accredited inter-
country adoption agency as well as the repatriation to the
Philippines of a Filipino child whose adoption has not been
approved.
Sec. 15. Executive Agreements. — The Department of Foreign
Affairs, upon representation of the Board, shall cause the
preparation of Executive Agreements with countries of the foreign
adoption agencies to ensure the legitimate concurrence of said
countries in upholding the safeguards provided by this Act.
ARTICLE IV
PENALTIES
Sec. 16. Penalties. —
(a) Any person who shall knowingly participate in the conduct or
carrying out of an illegal adoption, in violation of the provisions of
this Act, shall be punished with a penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a
fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), but not more
than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200.000), at the discretion
of the court. For purposes of this Act, an adoption is illegal if it is
effected in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act or
established State policies, its implementing rules and regulations,
executive agreements, and other laws pertaining to adoption.
Illegality may be presumed from the following acts:
(1)consent for an adoption was acquired through, or attended
by coercion, fraud, improper material inducement;
(2)there is no authority from the Board to effect adoption;
(3)the procedures and safeguards placed under the law for
adoption were not complied with; and
(4)the child to be adopted is subjected to, or exposed to
danger, abuse and exploitation.
(b)Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to
the confidentiality and integrity of records, documents and
communications of adoption applications, cases and processes
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year
and one (1) day to two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than
Five thousand pesos (P5,000), but not more than Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000), at the discretion of the court.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the
consummated felony under this Article shall be imposed upon the
principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein
enumerated.
Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a syndicate
or where it involves two or more children shall be considered as
an offense constituting child trafficking and shall merit the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out
any of the unlawful acts defined under this Article.Penalties as are
herein provided shall be in addition to any other penalties which
may be imposed for the same acts punishable under other laws,
ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations.
Sec. 17. Public Officers as Offenders. — Any government
official, employee or functionary who shall be found guilty of
violating any of the provisions of this Act, or who shall conspire
with private individuals shall, in addition to the above-prescribed
penalties, be penalized in accordance with existing civil service
laws, rules and regulations: Provided, That upon the filing of a
case, either administrative or criminal, said government official,
employee or functionary concerned shall automatically suffer
suspension until the resolution of the case.
ARTICLE V
FINAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 18. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — The Inter-
country Adoption Board, in coordination with the Council for the
Welfare of Children, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the
Department of Justice, after due consultation with agencies
involved in child-care and placement, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to implement the provisions of
this Act within six (6) months after its effectivity.
Sec. 19. Appropriations. — The amount of Five million pesos
(P5,000,000) is hereby appropriated from the proceeds of the
Lotto for the initial operations of the Board and subsequently the
appropriations of the same shall be included in the General
Appropriations Act for the year following its enactment.
Sec. 20. Separability Clause. — If any provision, or part hereof
is held invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the
provision not otherwise affected, shall remain valid and subsisting.
Sec. 21. Repealing Clause. — Any law, decree, executive order,
administrative order or rules and regulations contrary to, or
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.
Sec. 22. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
Approved: June 7, 1995
Republic Act No. 8552 February 25, 1998
AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES AND POLICIES ON THE
DOMESTIC ADOPTION OF FILIPINO CHILDREN AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the
"Domestic Adoption Act of 1998."
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. – (a) It is hereby declared the
policy of the State to ensure that every child remains under the
care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love,
care, understanding and security towards the full and harmonious
development of his/her personality. Only when such efforts prove
insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within the
child's extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated
person be considered.
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a
child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in
accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social
and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of
Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and
Adoption, Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague
Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall
provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care
or adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or
abandoned.
(c) It shall also be a State policy to:
(i) Safeguard the biological parent(s) from making
hurried decisions to relinquish his/her parental authority
over his/her child;
(ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from
his/her biological parent(s);
(iii) Protect adoptive parent(s) from attempts to disturb
his/her parental authority and custody over his/her
adopted child.
Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental
authority shall be administratively or judicially declared
so as to establish the status of the child as "legally
available for adoption" and his/her custody transferred to
the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to
 any duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-
caring agency, which entity shall be authorized to take
steps for the permanent placement of the child;
(iv) Conduct public information and educational
campaigns to promote a positive environment for
adoption;
(v) Ensure that sufficient capacity exists within
government and private sector agencies to handle
adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption
applications, and offer adoption-related services
including, but not limited to, parent preparation and post-
adoption education and counseling; and
(vi) Encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the
child's identity and culture in his/her native land, and only
when this is not available shall intercountry adoption be
considered as a last resort.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act, the
following terms shall be defined as:
(a) "Child" is a person below eighteen (18) years of age.
(b) "A child legally available for adoption" refers to a child
who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to
the Department or to a duly licensed and accredited
child-placing or child-caring agency, freed of the parental
authority of his/her biological parent(s) or guardian or
adopter(s) in case of rescission of adoption.
(c) "Voluntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s)
knowingly and willingly relinquishes parental authority to
the Department.
(d) "Involuntarily committed child" is one whose
parent(s), known or unknown, has been permanently and
judicially deprived of parental authority due to
abandonment; substantial, continuous, or repeated
neglect; abuse; or incompetence to discharge parental
responsibilities.
(e) "Abandoned child" refers to one who has no proper
parental care or guardianship or whose parent(s) has
deserted him/her for a period of at least six (6)
continuous months and has been judicially declared as
such.
(f) "Supervised trial custody" is a period of time within
which a social worker oversees the adjustment and
emotional readiness of both adopter(s) and adoptee in
stabilizing their filial relationship.
(g) "Department" refers to the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.
(h) "Child-placing agency" is a duly licensed and
accredited agency by the Department to provide
comprehensive child welfare services including, but not
limited to, receiving applications for adoption, evaluating
the prospective adoptive parents, and preparing the
adoption home study.
(i) "Child-caring agency" is a duly licensed and
accredited agency by the Department that provides
twenty four (24)-hour residential care services for
abandoned, orphaned, neglected, or voluntarily
committed children.
(j) "Simulation of birth" is the tampering of the civil
registry making it appear in the birth records that a
certain child was born to a person who is not his/her
biological mother, causing such child to lose his/her true
identity and status.
ARTICLE II
PRE-ADOPTION SERVICES
Section 4. Counseling Service. – The Department shall provide
the services of licensed social workers to the following:
(a) Biological Parent(s) – Counseling shall be provided to
the parent(s) before and after the birth of his/her child.
No binding commitment to an adoption plan shall be
permitted before the birth of his/her child. A period of six
(6) months shall be allowed for the biological parent(s) to
reconsider any decision to relinquish his/her child for
adoption before the decision becomes irrevocable.
Counseling and rehabilitation services shall also be
offered to the biological parent(s) after he/she has
relinquished his/her child for adoption.
Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no
hurried decisions are made and all alternatives for the
child's future and the implications of each alternative
have been provided.
(b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) – Counseling
sessions, adoption fora and seminars, among others,
shall be provided to prospective adoptive parent(s) to
resolve possible adoption issues and to prepare him/her
for effective parenting.
(c) Prospective Adoptee – Counseling sessions shall be
provided to ensure that he/she understands the nature
and effects of adoption and is able to express his/her
views on adoption in accordance with his/her age and
level of maturity.
Section 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). – It shall be the duty
of the Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency
which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her
unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be
registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal
proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned.
Section 6. Support Services. – The Department shall develop a
pre-adoption program which shall include, among others, the
above mentioned services.
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
Section 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full
civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character,
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of
caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than
the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care
for his/her children in keeping with the means of the
family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as
above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines
for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of
the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that
he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency
 that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee
to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements
on residency and certification of the alien's qualification
to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the
following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse;
or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the
termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, However, that the other spouse
has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the
illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall
be exercised by the spouses.
Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. – The following may be
adopted:
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who
has been administratively or judicially declared available
for adoption;
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the
other spouse;
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to
improve his/her status to that of legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said
person has been consistently considered and treated by
the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously
rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has
died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated
within six (6) months from the time of death of said
parent(s).
Section 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. –
After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to
give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the
legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality
which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10)
years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if
any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age
or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the
latter's spouse, if any; and
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.
ARTICLE IV
PROCEDURE
Section 10. Hurried Decisions. – In all proceedings for adoption,
the court shall require proof that the biological parent(s) has been
properly counseled to prevent him/her from making hurried
decisions caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child, and to
sustain that all measures to strengthen the family have been
exhausted and that any prolonged stay of the child in his/her own
home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest.
Section 11. Case Study. – No petition for adoption shall be set
for hearing unless a licensed social worker of the Department, the
social service office of the local government unit, or any child-
placing or child-caring agency has made a case study of the
adoptee, his/her biological parent(s), as well as the adopter(s),
and has submitted the report and recommendations on the matter
to the court hearing such petition.
At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case study, the
concerned social worker shall confirm with the Civil Registry the
real identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of the
adoptee was not registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the
responsibility of the concerned social worker to ensure that the
adoptee is registered.
The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is
legally available for adoption and that the documents to support
this fact are valid and authentic. Further, the case study of the
adopter(s) shall ascertain his/her genuine intentions and that the
adoption is in the best interest of the child.
The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it finds,
after the conduct of the case studies, that the petition should be
denied. The case studies and other relevant documents and
records pertaining to the adoptee and the adoption shall be
preserved by the Department.
Section 12. Supervised Trial Custody. – No petition for
adoption shall be finally granted until the adopter(s) has been
given by the court a supervised trial custody period for at least six
(6) months within which the parties are expected to adjust
psychologically and emotionally to each other and establish a
bonding relationship. During said period, temporary parental
authority shall be vested in the adopter(s).
The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party reduce
the trial period if it finds the same to be in the best interest of the
adoptee, stating the reasons for the reduction of the period.
However, for alien adopter(s), he/she must complete the six (6)-
month trial custody except for those enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i)
(ii) (iii).
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the
prospective adopter(s) through a pre-adoption placement
authority issued by the Department, the prospective adopter(s)
shall enjoy all the benefits to which biological parent(s) is entitled
from the date the adoptee is placed with the prospective
adopter(s).
Section 13. Decree of Adoption. – If, after the publication of the
order of hearing has been complied with, and no opposition has
been interposed to the petition, and after consideration of the
case studies, the qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody
report and the evidence submitted, the court is convinced that the
petitioners are qualified to adopt, and that the adoption would
redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of adoption
shall be entered which shall be effective as of the date the original
petition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case the
petitioner(s) dies before the issuance of the decree of adoption to
protect the interest of the adoptee. The decree shall state the
name by which the child is to be known.
Section 14. Civil Registry Record. – An amended certificate of
birth shall be issued by the Civil Registry, as required by
the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the
child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname.
The original certificate of birth shall be stamped "cancelled" with
the annotation of the issuance of an amended birth certificate in
its place and shall be sealed in the civil registry records. The new
birth certificate to be issued to the adoptee shall not bear any
notation that it is an amended issue.
Section 15. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records.
– All hearings in adoption cases shall be confidential and shall not
be open to the public. All records, books, and papers relating to
the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department, or any
other agency or institution participating in the adoption
proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third
person is necessary for purposes connected with or arising out of
the adoption and will be for the best interest of the adoptee, the
court may merit the necessary information to be released,
restricting the purposes for which it may be used.
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
Section 16. Parental Authority. – Except in cases where the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed
and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
Section 17. Legitimacy. – The adoptee shall be considered the
legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to
love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the
family.
Section 18. Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, the
adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if
the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law
on testamentary succession shall govern.
ARTICLE VI
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
Section 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon
petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a
minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated
physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c)
sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s)
may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of
the Civil Code.
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. – If the petition is granted,
the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if
known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if
the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights
and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other
shall be extinguished.
The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended
certificate of birth of the adoptee and restore his/her original birth
certificate.
Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but
only as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights
acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without
prejudice to the penalties imposable under the Penal Code if the
criminal acts are properly proven.
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
Section 21. Violations and Penalties. – (a) The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on
any person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion,
undue influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or
other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards
provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to
danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the
birth of a child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her
biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall
be punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not
exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
Any physician or nurse or hospital personnel who, in violation of
his/her oath of office, shall cooperate in the execution of the
abovementioned crime shall suffer the penalties herein prescribed
and also the penalty of permanent disqualification.
Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to
the confidentiality and integrity of records, documents, and
communications of adoption applications, cases, and processes
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year
and one (1) day to two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than
Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not more than Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00), at the discretion of the court.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the
consummated offense under this Article shall be imposed upon
the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein
enumerated. Acts punishable under this Article, when committed
by a syndicate or where it involves two (2) or more children shall
be considered as an offense constituting child trafficking and shall
merit the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out
any of the unlawful acts defined under this Article. Penalties as
are herein provided, shall be in addition to any other penalties
which may be imposed for the same acts punishable under other
laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations.
When the offender is an alien, he/she shall be deported
immediately after service of sentence and perpetually excluded
from entry to the country.
Any government official, employee or functionary who shall be
found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this Act, or who
shall conspire with private individuals shall, in addition to the
above-prescribed penalties, be penalized in accordance with
existing civil service laws, rules and regulations: Provided, That
upon the filing of a case, either administrative or criminal, said
government official, employee, or functionary concerned shall
automatically suffer suspension until the resolution of the case.
Section 22. Rectification of Simulated Births. – A person who
has, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a child
shall not be punished for such act: Provided, That the simulation
of birth was made for the best interest of the child and that he/she
has been consistently considered and treated by that person as
his/her own son/daughter: Provided, further, That the application
for correction of the birth registration and petition for adoption
shall be filed within five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act
and completed thereafter: Provided, finally, That such person
complies with the procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act
and other requirements as determined by the Department.
ARTICLE VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 23. Adoption Resource and Referral Office. – There
shall be established an Adoption Resources and Referral Office
under the Department with the following functions: (a) monitor the
existence, number, and flow of children legally available for
adoption and prospective adopter(s) so as to facilitate their
matching; (b) maintain a nationwide information and educational
campaign on domestic adoption; (c) keep records of adoption
proceedings; (d) generate resources to help child-caring and
child-placing agencies and foster homes maintain viability; and (e)
do policy research in collaboration with the Intercountry Adoption
Board and other concerned agencies. The office shall be manned
by adoption experts from the public and private sectors.
Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within six
(6) months from the promulgation of this Act, the Department, with
the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Office of Civil Registry
General, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor
General, and two (2) private individuals representing child-placing
and child-caring agencies shall formulate the necessary
guidelines to make the provisions of this Act operative.
Section 25. Appropriations. – Such sum as may be necessary
for the implementation of the provisions of this Act shall be
included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its
enactment into law and thereafter.
Section 26. Repealing Clause. – Any law, presidential decree or
issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative
order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified, or amended
accordingly.
Section 27. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is
held invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected
thereby shall remain valid and subsisting.
Section 28. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days following its complete publication in any newspaper of
general circulation or in the Official Gazette.
Approved: February 25, 1998
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO,
RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC;
and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years
of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries
which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by
petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of
the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed
[Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto,
however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on
the ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas
and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor
Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the
then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for
adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982, that
is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption,
claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties
to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting
parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was
filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc
was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority
had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and
granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners'
complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto
indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7
December 1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or on 14
December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15
January 1988. It appearing, however, that the motions failed to
comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court — that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties
concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said
motion; and that said notice shall state the time and place of
hearing — both motions were denied by the trial court in an Order
dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed
the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed

beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December
1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision
dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and
6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling
that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend
that respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to
the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child,
Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the
following issues: (1) whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding
loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant Petition;
conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of the
case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time;
and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental
authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to
make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage
case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the
latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological
parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental
motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having
complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and
Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were
considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend the
reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the
motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of
hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did not
1
interrupt the reglementary period. As in fact repeatedly held by
this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the motion on the
opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing.
2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant.
Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be served, the
Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical
rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of
appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and
the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by
petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary
period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals:
3 Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on
their merits. The rules of procedure ought not
be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules
of procedure are used only to help secure not
override, substantial justice. if d technical and
rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim
4
would be defeated.
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of
shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of
action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil
Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with
them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall
cease when the person herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis
supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed
negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not
only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and
for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a
natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of
parents — their parental authority — which includes the
5
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. The basis for
the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court
6
in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from
negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for the
legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — to
limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such
an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary,
for reasons of public policy. to extend that liability, without regard
to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for
the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to
exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature
which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual
liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in
which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to
be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed
to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to
exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agent or
servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their
status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the
7
person made liable for their conduct. (Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of
their minor children living with them, may be seen to be
based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil
Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that
when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to
supervise the child who is in their custody and control.
Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying
such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only
presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents
had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an
air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in
respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that
because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in
favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in
the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the
petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer
which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were
therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's
allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after
considering the report of the Department of
Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement
agency and the evidence submitted before it,
the court is satisfied that the petitioner is
qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the
child, that the trial custody period has been
completed, and that the best interests of the
child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree
of adoption shall be entered, which shall be
effective he date the original petition was
filed. The decree shall state the name by which
the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article
36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same
Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption
shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural
parents, except where the adopter is the
spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have
been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil
Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is
the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child
living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents
exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child
under their parental authority in accordance
with the civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
9
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines has similarly
insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act,
shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be
held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated children living
in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect
may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting
parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted
child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of
the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had
been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have
foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they
were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody
over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.
Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious
liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental
dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact
subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the
conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally
granted unless and until the adopting parents are given by the
courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to
assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal
union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall
be vested in the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally
vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual
custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case,
the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already
been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case,
actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not
the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit
for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the
trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being
already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint
filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is
REMANDED to that court for further proceedings consistent with
this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This
Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 143989 - July 14, 2003
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, Petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO
(previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM"), Respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than
complete without children. The realization could have likely
prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to
take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to
bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin
enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated
the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom
fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the
couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an
order granting the petition was issued that made all the more
intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for
Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga
City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin
Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in
December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind
the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred
"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said
spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo
to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband
until the latter died, and even before his death he had made
known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was
prevented by petitioner's supplication, however with his further
request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or
interest may pertain to respondent in the future.
xxx - xxx - xxx
"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the
utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records
with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name
as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the
present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his
practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxx - xxx - xxx
"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this
city with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned
for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent
remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her
once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of
petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg
ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need
most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the
more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner
which is not expected of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of
petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to
visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by
their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a
strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and
petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that
after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy
of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and
her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case
No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding
her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree
of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner,
for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is
no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for
1
revocation,"
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic
Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the
law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of
the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if
over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated
physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c)
sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
comply with parental obligations.
"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s)
may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of
the Civil Code." (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending
principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case
and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the
aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated,
by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should
not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for
rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article
2 3
348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit,
Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court,
having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of
the facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs.
Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the
right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under
the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed
there is lack of cause of action.
"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired
under the provisions of the Family Code should be respected.
Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to
rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said
right should have been exercised within the period allowed by the
Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the
legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to
petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the
instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any,
had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of
Court)
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the
4
petition is ordered dismissed."
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Court, petitioner raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be
revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some
insights on the subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook
5
adoption to assure male heirs in the family. The continuity of the
adopter's family was the primary purpose of adoption and all
matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter.
There was hardly any mention about the rights of the
6
adopted. Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in
an effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed
7
nor recognized adoption. It was only much later when adoption
was given an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the
8
child became a paramount concern. Spain itself which previously
disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman
law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way
to the archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their own
ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made
9
the interests of the child an overriding consideration. In the early
part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited
universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child
of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
10
1948, followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights
11
of the Child, were written instruments that would also protect
and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of
12
the Philippines of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child
13
and Youth Welfare Code and then by the Family Code of the
14
Philippines, gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the
rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the
Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State
Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No.
8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most
importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child,
not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new
law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption
decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the
legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not
adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor
deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both
being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws
then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the
15
constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
16
against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
17
become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to
18
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and
19
perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
20
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, a petition to adopt Jason
Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988
when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No.
603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of
them. After the trial court had rendered its decision and while the
case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption
by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued
that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs.
Bobiles alone and without being joined by the husband. The Court
concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at the
time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles
to file the petition, without being joined by her husband, according
21
to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller, spouses
Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael
Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize
Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken into their care.
At the time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed
aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into
law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino
children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the
adoption decree. In discarding the argument posed by the
Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be
resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition
was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein
petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted
22
in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and
repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the
Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its
earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action
for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer
could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to
set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under
23
Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose
the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right
entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person
24
has no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has
often been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to
adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right
25
merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the
state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best
26
interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the
adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the
27
State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be
28
taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter
a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in
cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable,
it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply
the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that
those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy,
however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties
of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For
instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may
deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament,
may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable
portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
1
the Rules of Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
2
G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733
granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein.
The Antecedents
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the
United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a
3
resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors
4
Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma
5
Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene
6
Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The minors are
the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner‘s brother, and
Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel
7
died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal
grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia,
went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her
second marriage and no longer communicated with her children
by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to
the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially
supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad;
as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires
to adopt the children; the minors have given their written
8
consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by
the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own
who are already married, gainfully employed and have their
respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam,
USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant
server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the
9
minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of
the minors. Petitioner‘s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns
substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to
support the minors while in petitioner‘s custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in
her favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable
Court that after publication and hearing, judgment be rendered
allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos,
Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner,
and ordering that the minor children‘s name follow the family
name of petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the
10
premises.
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as
mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than April 4,
11
2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition. The
12
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance but
deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its
13
behalf. Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was
14
allowed to present her evidence ex parte.
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine
Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written
15
consent executed by her and her siblings. The petitioner marked
in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her
children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed
Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as
proof of said consent.
16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of
the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study
Report, with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma &
Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the
following reasons:
1. Minors‘ surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily
consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata
Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the
parental care, guidance and support they need. An
Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is
hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also
expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins the
petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of
consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close
attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as
second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary
guardian who has also family to look after. As young
adolescents they really need parental love, care,
guidance and support to ensure their protection and well
being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended
that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D.
Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial
custody is hereby further recommended to be dispensed with
considering that they are close relatives and that close
attachments was already developed between the petitioner and
17
the 3 minors.
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:
The mother of minors came home together with her son John
Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her
appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her
children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata
Landingin was conceived after the death of their paternal
grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including the
petitioner who attended the wake of their mother were very much
concerned about the well-being of the three minors. While
preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a
family to stay with minors and act as their temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and
after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she
voluntarily consented. She realized that her children need
parental love, guidance and support which she could not provide
as she already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing
also that the petitioners & her children have been supporting her
children up to the present and truly care for them, she believes
her children will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a
better position to provide a secured and bright future to her
18
children.
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and
offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary
evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for
adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine
Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be
freed from all legal obligations obedience and maintenance from
their natural parents and that they be declared for all legal intents
and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial
custody is dispensed with considering that parent-children
relationship has long been established between the children and
the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be
changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding
changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the above-
mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.
19
20
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals on
21
December 2, 2002. In its brief for the oppositor-appellant, the
OSG raised the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES‘ BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT
OF THE PETITIONER‘S CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONER‘S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH
THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED
ADOPTEES.
22
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision reversing the
ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the children‘s
natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the
petitioner‘s children could not also be admitted in evidence as the
same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or
acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although
petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support the
children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision
dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63,
Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
23
24
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 21, 2004,
which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.
25
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on
26
certiorari on September 7, 2004, assigning the following errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS
OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND
IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD
HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE
IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE
27
THREE CHILDREN.
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the
following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors
without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia
Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly
executed by the petitioner-adopter‘s children sufficiently complies
with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially
capable of supporting the adoptees.
The Court‘s Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept,
28
as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava, that adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to
be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide
homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and
family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless
couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these
29
noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
30
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, the Court also ruled that
the liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to
adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the
law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising
therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the
overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be
understood in its proper context and perspective. The Court‘s
position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to
extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the
child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the
31
parents over the child.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After
being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or
withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of
the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the
legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality
which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10)
years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if
any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age
or over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the
latter‘s souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship
from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the
32
manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the
natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must
be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be
terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to
the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able
to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her
son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the
Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible
that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a
Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did
the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in
support of the petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the
biological mother is no longer necessary because when Amelia‘s
husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The
children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal
grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who
provided for the children‘s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the
biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children.
Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12
years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC
that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on
vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker,
was able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to
the social worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three
children by the petitioner.
Petitioner‘s contention must be rejected. When she filed her
petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in
effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the
legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by
petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written
consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his
child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled
33
purpose to forego all parental duties. The term means neglect
and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity
to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and
34
maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the
35
care of others is not such an abandonment. To dispense with
the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to
36
have existed at the time of adoption.
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of
Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had
abandoned her children. Petitioner‘s testimony on that matter
follows:
Q Where is the mother of these three children now?
A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an
instance where she communicated with the family?
A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another xxxx
man.
V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for
Q From whom did you learn that? Adoption:
A From others who came from Italy, sir. xxxx
Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger
marriage? siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works and has fun with
them. She also encourages openness on their problems and
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.
37 concerns and provides petty counseling. In serious problems she
40
already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt.
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
xxxx
Q Where is your mother now?
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein
minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and comfortable
A In Italy, sir.
life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which include the
petitioner had continued providing support for them. However
Q When did your mother left for Italy? being ashamed of just depending on the support of her husband‘s
relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in
A After my father died, sir. need of financial help as they are undergoing maintenance
medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she
used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3
A Two years old, sir. children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned
home for good, however she died on November 2000.
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother
communicate with you? While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from
Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son
38
John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are
A No, sir.
considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is
planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker
amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular
also stated the following:
support.
IV. Background of the Case:
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-
P15,000 a month through her parents who share minimal amount
xxxx of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and
other paternal relatives are continuously providing support for
most of the needs & education of minors up to present.
41
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the
care and custody of their maternal grandmother. However, she
died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon
now serves as their guardian. The petitioner, together with her her children, or to permanently sever their mother-child
children and other relatives abroad have been supporting the relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by
minor children financially, even during the time that they were still financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not
living with their natural parents. Their mother also sends financial surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing
39
support but very minimal. the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed
by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious
personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial
support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared
to what her affluent in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the
minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties between
the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the
42
same shall then be vested on the adopter. It would thus be
against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be
the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a
person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has
to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the
children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel
43
if they are given to an adopting parent. Again, it is the best
interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the
Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until
admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for
which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of
paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of
documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any
evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.
44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao‘s Report and of the
Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children;
the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint
45
written consent of petitioner‘s children was notarized on January
16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court
in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs
46
to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103, which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and
authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered authentic if
the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance
with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé d
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or
place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify
that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him, and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the
same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the
acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an
officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding
paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the
officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated
by an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation,
chargé de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent
of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited. The officer
making the authentication shall certify under his official
seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was
at the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that
he was duly exercising the functions of the office by
virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as such he
had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of
instruments or documents in the place where the
acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and
seal, if any, are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioner‘s legitimate children
did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be
treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity
must be proved either by anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the makers.
47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by
petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate
children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was
not stable enough to support the children and is only relying on
the financial backing, support and commitment of her children and
48
her siblings. Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is
financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has
savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of
not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have
likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing should
the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the
statement in the Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited
income." Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial
backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor
adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who
should be in a position to provide support in keeping with the
means of the family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of
the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective
parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter
should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or
children, in keeping with the means of the family.
49
According to the Adoption Home Study Report forwarded by the
Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government
of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her
legitimate children, as the latter are already adults, have individual
lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner
was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress,
earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month.
Petitioner‘s main intention in adopting the children is to bring the
latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in
Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner
likewise knows that the limited income might be a hindrance to the
adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner
will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the
three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is
rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial
support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is
correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is
personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation
between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not
prove nor support petitioner‘s allegation that her siblings and her
children are financially able and that they are willing to support the
minors herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of
the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of
intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities
that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case,
petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of
the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim
1
(petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision dated 15
September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City,
Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259,
which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for
adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by
profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They
were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown,
were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban).
Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim
registered the children to make it appear that they were the
2
children‘s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely
eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was
3
born on 15 March 1977. Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban
brought him to petitioner‘s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August
4
1983.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were
their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used
the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December
2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American
citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
5 6
the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to
those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24
April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL
PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the
filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months
old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as
7
evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave his
consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
8
Consent. Petitioner‘s husband Olario likewise executed an
9
Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an
abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were
10 11
unknown. The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner
had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with
her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of
RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but
the motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In
denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall
under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA
8552. Petitioner‘s argument that mere consent of her husband
would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are
additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party
in this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated
and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental
authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the
purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated
child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain
obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of
whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed
because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the
paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted.
Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not
applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental
authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the
petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental
authority is not anymore necessary since they have been
emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by
herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no
other recourse but to affirm the trial court‘s decision denying the
petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section
7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full
civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character,
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of
caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than
the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care
for his/her children in keeping with the means of the
family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee‘s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as
above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines
for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of
the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that
he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency
that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee
to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements
on residency and certification of the alien‘s qualification
 to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the
following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses;
or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the
termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from
each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the
illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall
be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This
is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over
the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.
12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner,
having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only
by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial
court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this
ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not
the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario.
Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner.
And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from
each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in
his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain
requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen.
He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552
such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have
been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years
prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must
maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4)
he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the
adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter‘s country as the latter‘s
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and
proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien‘s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to
Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore
necessary since the children have been emancipated having
reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for
civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their
13
moral, mental and physical character and well-being. The father
and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
14
persons of their common children. Even the remarriage of the
surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the
children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
15
guardian of the person or property of the children.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation —
16
that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age —
emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and
property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible
17
for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just
one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552
enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed
and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the
legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to
love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the
family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the
adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if
the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law
on testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when
the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the
adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter
and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the
right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known;
and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and
18
compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation
terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a
19
legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate
child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be
entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely,
the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy
20
all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as
21 22
support and successional rights.
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane
and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society and family, as
well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the
joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of
23 24
the law. But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes,
which is the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly,
the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain
rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied
with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the
fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education
for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a
position to affirm the trial court‘s decision favoring adoption in the
case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified
without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is
amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses‘ petition for
adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband.
We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events
would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible
because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to
petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage
between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent
to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a
judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the
case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We
reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint
adoption is mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision
dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General
Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and
1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA
CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M.
CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE
MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA
GREGORIO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there
must be a showing of notice and consent. This cannot be
defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it
appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock,
the other spouse and other legitimate children must be personally
notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough
that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
1 2
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied
the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The
petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of
the trial court that granted respondents' decree of
3
adoption. chanrobleslaw
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed
Lemuel Gregorio (Jéd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina)
by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of
Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne
Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her
baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her nickname,
"Jayrose."
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5,
1962 in Laoag City. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled.
They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in 1963, but
succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for nine
days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months
4 22
because of the incompatibilities between them. chanrobleslaw
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario
gave birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as
husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in Manila and
Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during
weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently because
Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies. She
5
insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen (15)
6
years despite their separation(.)" chanrobleslaw
7
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition for adoption before the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he
alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with
8
Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), whom Rosario alleged
9
was his erstwhile housekeeper. At the time of the filing of the
10
petition, Jose was 70 years old. chanrobleslaw
11
According to the Home Study Report conducted by the Social
Welfare Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and
respected family, being one of the three children of former
Governor Mauricio Castro.
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos
12
Norte. The report mentioned that he was once married to
13
Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any children. It also
stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and
Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on August 1987,
14
and Regina on March 1989. Under "Motivation for Adoption," the
social welfare officer noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he
was not able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with
the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic]
and it is his intention to legalize their relationship and surname. . .
15
.
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and
16
Regina temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte. The children have
allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's death in July
17
1995. chanrobleslaw
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the
18
adoption, having ruled that "[n]o opposition had been received
by this Court from any person including the government which
19
was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General." A
20
certificate of finality was issued on February 9, 2006.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty.
Rene V. Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose
21
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. In her complaint, she
alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support for their
daughter, Joanne, for the past 36 years. She alleged that she
single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne
while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged
lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of
adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and
23
Joanne's knowledge and consent. She also alleged that Jose
made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina
were his illegitimate children with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up
24
for his homosexual relationship with Larry. chanrobleslaw
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose
denies being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her
minority. He alleged that he always offered help, but it was often
 25
declined. He also alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina
because they are his illegitimate children. He denied having
committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario. He also
stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him
paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished
because several properties had to be sold to pay for medical
26
treatments. He then implored the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and
27
equity." chanrobleslaw
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos
28
Norte. chanrobleslaw
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the
October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and
29
Regina's adoption. chanrobleslaw
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of
30
the adoption sometime in 2005. They allege that Rosario's
31
affidavit of consent, marked by the trial court as "Exh. K," was
32
fraudulent. They also allege that Jed and Regina's birth
certificates showed different sets of information, such as the age
of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They argue
that one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in
another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the
33
father to be Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover. It was further
alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate
children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were
34
married at the time of their birth. chanrobleslaw
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario
and Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is
"no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate
child of the adopter . . . should be personally notified of the
35
hearing." chanrobleslaw
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme
employed by [Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of
[his illegitimate children] to the prejudice of the interests of his
36
legitimate heirs" but stated that its hands were bound by the trial
court decision that had already attained "finality and
37
immutability." chanrobleslaw
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent
information contained in the different sets of birth certificates
required the determination of the identities of the persons stated
therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for
annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also perpetrated
during the trial and could not be classified as extrinsic fraud,
which is required in an action for annulment of
38
judgment. chanrobleslaw
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was
39
denied on July 10, 2009, they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred
in denying the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1)
show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the
existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in
its application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a
40
judgment. They argue that because of the fabricated consent
obtained by Jose and the alleged false information shown in the
birth certificates presented as evidence before the trial
41
court, they were not given the opportunity to oppose the petition
since the entire proceedings were concealed from
42
them. chanrobleslaw
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and
misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due
process, notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable
43
parties. They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children
requires the consent, not only of the spouse, but also the
legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such
44
consent was never secured from Joanne. chanrobleslaw
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners
could not have been deprived of their day in court since their
interest was "amply protected by the participation and
representation of the Solicitor General through the deputized
45
public prosecutor." chanrobleslaw
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice
through publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but
46
also notice to the world of the adoption proceedings. They argue
that since the alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it
cannot be said to be extrinsic fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not
47
a ground for annulment of judgment. They also argue that
petitioners were not indispensable parties because adoption is an
action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the
48
state. chanrobleslaw
The petition is granted.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
may file an action with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial
Courts. This remedy will only be available if "the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
49
the petitioner." chanrobleslaw
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of
50
Appeals: chanrobleslaw
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so
exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final
resolution sought, to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking
jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being
exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily
abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or
resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting
the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition
for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards
cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a
judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for the
remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and
unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the
dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability
and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to
make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an
end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification
is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and
whether the modification is made by the court that rendered the
decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter,
controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that
the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in
51
suspense for an indefinite period of time. (Emphasis supplied)
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only
two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of:
extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years from discovery,
and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred
52
by estoppel or laches. chanrobleslaw
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over
the nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction
53
over the parties. Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is "[that
which] prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his
entire case to the court, or [that which] operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it
54
is procured." chanrobleslaw
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the
trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings,
and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
vis-a-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the
trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws require their consent
as a requisite in the proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
55
action." As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1,
56
2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the
proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by
the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the
consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband
must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his
own children born out of wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may
adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified, his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . .
(Emphasis supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and
wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is
stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P.
57
Lim: chanrobleslaw
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This
is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over
the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
58
between the spouses.
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in
a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children
born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not
necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first
obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment,
Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto
separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina,
Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose,
however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His submission
of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be
considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario
been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would
have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the
affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible
to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children
if they are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After
being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or
withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of
the following to the adoption is hereby
required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of
age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis
supplied)
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it
ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also
sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to
share their parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes,
with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate
child and that she was over 10 years old at the time of the
adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was
necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the
trial court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing
Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written
consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by
Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have
been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure
that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely
on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of
procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive
statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario
and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired
jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud
may have been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud,
rather than extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro
59
Florece: chanrobleslaw
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party
in litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby
the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side
of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving
him a false promise of a compromise, or where the defendant
never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by
the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or
60
without authority connives at his defeat. (Emphasis supplied)
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought
61
within four years from discovery. Petitioners alleged that they
were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this
petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the
rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no
relation to any of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City,
 62
llocos Norte. Larry and Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6,
63
Laoag City. Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos
64
Norte. Rosario and Joanne were residents of Parañaque City,
65
Manila. The petition for adoption, however, was filed in the
66
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. The trial court gave
due course to the petition on Jose's bare allegation in his petition
67
that he was a resident of Batac, even though it is admitted in the
Home Study Report that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag
68
City. chanrobleslaw
69
Second, using the process of delayed registration, Jose was
able to secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to
70
be the father and Larry as merely the informant. Worse still is
that two different sets of fraudulent certificates were procured: one
showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married on December 4,
71
1986 in Manila, and another wherein the portion for the mother's
72
name was not filled in at all. The birth certificates of Jed and
Regina from the National Statistics Office, however, show that
73
their father was Larry R. Rentegrado. These certificates are in
clear contradiction to the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the
trial court in support of his petition for adoption.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that
his motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario,
74
were childless, to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The
consent of Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario
75
and alleged to be fraudulent. chanrobleslaw
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the
trial court in approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario
and Joanne from participating in the proceedings or opposing the
petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by
Jose as intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged instruments
76
or perjured testimonies" presented during the trial. It failed to
understand, however, that fraud is considered intrinsic when the
other party was either present at the trial or was a participant in
the proceedings when such instrument or testimony was
presented in court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented
a fair and just determination of the case, but the difference is that
the acts or things, like falsification and false testimony, could have
been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of the
case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner
of his day in court because he can guard against that kind of fraud
through so many means, including a thorough trial preparation, a
skillful, cross-examination, resorting to the modes of discovery,
and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of
documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court
testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation
of any party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore,
77
constitutive of extrinsic fraud. (Emphasis supplied)
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the
participation of any other interested party, as in this case, then the
fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed
through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during
the trial.
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a
reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and
Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have
hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other
conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial court granted
the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its
provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No.
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the
court shall be imposed on any person who shall commit any of
the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue
influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar
acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided
by the law for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger,
abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the
birth of a child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not
his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth,
and shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period
and a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00).
(Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of
78
any of his criminal liabilities. Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to
provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees if the
adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners
also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No.
79
8552 since rescission of adoption can only be availed of by the
adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in
law other than the annulment of the judgment.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice.
There is reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having never
experienced the love and care of a father, her parents having
separated a year after her birth. She has never even benefited
from any monetary support from her father. Despite all these
adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical degree from the
80
University of the Philippines College of Medicine and is now
81
working as a doctor in Canada. These accomplishments,
however, are poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is
allowed to continue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated
October 16, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is
rendered NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME
SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to
1
annul the March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-
0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security
System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that
petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor
2
Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626.
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as
electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the
vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was
enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation
3
Program (ECP). Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
4
which led to his untimely death the following day.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus,
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John‘s biological mother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death
benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at
San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office,
5
in a letter dated June 10, 2009 addressed to petitioner, denied
the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your
claim because you are no longer considered as the parent of
JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO
COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees‘ Compensation
Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union
Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the
claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
6
SO ORDERED.
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC
ruled against petitioner‘s entitlement to the death benefits sought
after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be
considered John‘s primary beneficiary. As culled from the records,
John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great
grandfather, petitioner‘s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio),
7
by virtue of the Decision in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the
Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which
8
decree of adoption attained finality. Consequently, as argued by
the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John‘s primary
beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would
petitioner qualify as John‘s secondary beneficiary even if it
wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC
ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that
beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and
legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries;
Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates
to the legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by
Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees‘
Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not
considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up
the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect,
the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of
the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological
parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting
parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D.
626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the
claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein
9
appellant. (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
10
was likewise denied by the ECC. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECC‘s Decision is contrary to evidence
on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in
denying the just, due and lawful claims of the petitioner
as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of
discretion in not giving due course/denying petitioner‘s
11
otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration.
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological
parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered
secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases,
to receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECC‘s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence
on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied
petitioner‘s claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is
John‘s biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his
adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by
the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to
whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which
would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social
Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the
adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive and
well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit being the
primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that
appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social
Security law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot
claim the benefit legally provided by law to the primary
beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are
generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by
reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agenciesover matters falling under their
12
jurisdiction. However, in the extant case, the ECC had
overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner –
Cornelio‘s death certificate.
13
Based on Cornelio‘s death certificate, it appears that John‘s
14
adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only less than three
(3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which
15
attained finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled
that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has
already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is
contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John‘s work-related
demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of
the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the
context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries
and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In
their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary
beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural
child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are
no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for
monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c)
supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations
governing the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes
arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has
issued the Amended Rules on Employees‘ Compensation,
interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or
secondary, and determined atthe time of employee‘s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of
the employee‘s death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged
natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not
over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor
mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority;
Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child
shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are
no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for
monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or
more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from
the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee
for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age,
or over 21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated and
incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which
is congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner‘s claim on the
ground that she is no longer the deceased‘s legitimate parent, as
required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the
adoption decree severed the relation between John and
petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate
parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees‘
Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of
the Labor Code, as amendedExamining the Amended Rules on
Employees‘ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as mended,
it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized
administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167
of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision.
Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue
16
v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order
to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot
be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative
regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will
always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended
Rules on Employees‘ Compensation is patently a wayward
restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the
Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to
refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was
17
resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court in
this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed
in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has
this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not
defined by it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory
interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a general and
inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia
verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a
distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit,
nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article
992 in a more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not
warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states
that when the law intends to use the termin a more restrictive
sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles
1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a
statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the
kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that
it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as
already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent
parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is
usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be
unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The
phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents,
whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by
adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not
distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need
of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that
Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to
solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167
provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are
secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated
"dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would
have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants."
The manner by which the provision in question was crafted
undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was
intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents
by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees‘
Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision
is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection
under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an
illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the
Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such
postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
18
individuals in a similar manner. In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
19
governmental objective.
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make
for a valid classification."
20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to
discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-
cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits
to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of
reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law
being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or
interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the
rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind
the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its
mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that employees and their
dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event
of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent
beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course
of action to take other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the
phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of
the Amended Rules on Employees‘ Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John‘s dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the
adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an
opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby
equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental
authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision,
had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have still
claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that
"legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental
authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in
the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In
addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its
boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the
deceased‘s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly
equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify
as John‘s secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2)
years old, petitioner‘s parental authority over John was severed.
However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed,
aside from Cornelio‘s death, was that when the adoptive parent
died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was
still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John‘s minority at the time of his adopter‘s death is a significant
factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental
authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the
biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent
ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are
21
no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to
care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in
favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20
22
of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of
adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's
biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
(emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar
as the restoration of custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The manner
herein of terminating the adopter‘s parental authority, unlike the
23
grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and
obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the
consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who
is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially
since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio‘s death. Truth be told,
there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern
contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant
petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and
24
the state policies behind RA 8552 wherein the paramount
consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to
justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the
child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and
upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered
incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the
adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the
absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else
could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent
other than the adoptee‘s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though
parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties
between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely
eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome
instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned
from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the
adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall
divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or
ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive,
then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol‘s death, which was prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art.
984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no
children or descendants, his parents and relatives by
consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain
their rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the
subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of
an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estateof the
adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate
succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the
biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to
receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain
rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should
certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of
parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their
minor offspring‘s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined
the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life
under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by
death‘s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child‘s quality of life
might have been better off not being adopted at all if he would
only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that
Cornelio‘s death at the time of John‘sminority resulted in the
restoration of petitioner‘s parental authority over the adopted
child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of
petitioner‘s dependence on John can be established from the
documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the
records, petitioner, prior to John‘s adoption, was a housekeeper.
Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven
(7) children. But since she was unable to "give a bright future to
her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to
Cornelio‘s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelio‘s death in 1987, so records reveal, both
petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan,
Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress
25
was used in John‘s Death Certificate executed in Brazil, and in
the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the
26
master of the vessel boarded by John. Likewise, this is John‘s
27
known address as per the ECC‘s assailed Decision. Similarly,
this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim before
the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the
ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been
restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually
execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.
28
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one
of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise
known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not
cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and
expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not
related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John‘s
deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least
evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent.
Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio‘s
death during John‘s minority, the restoration ofpetitioner‘s parental
authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and
John‘s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary -
effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit
claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent
parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of
legal basis. Cornelio‘s adoption of John, without more, does not
deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming
from John‘s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio‘s
untimely demise during John‘s minority. Since the parent by
adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein
petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17,
2010 Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in
ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to
a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John
Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.