1|CrimPro Set 2 Cases
G.R. Nos. 216007-09, December 08, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, v. LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH
DIVISION), Respondent.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 216007-09, December 08, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ AND
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION), Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
seeks to nullify and set aside the October 10, 2014 Resolution 1 of public
respondent Sandiganbayan Fifth Division, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the (i) Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix
the Amount of Bail and the (ii) Urgent Supplemental Motion to the Motion to
Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail with
Additional Prayer to Recall/List Warrant of Arrest filed by accused Luzviminda S.
Valdez, are GRANTED.
Let the Order of Arrest issued in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322
and 0324 adopting the "no bail" recommendation of the Office of the
Ombudsman be RECALLED. Instead, let an Order of arrest in said cases be
issued anew, this time, fixing the bail for each offense charged in the amount of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
SO ORDERED.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit3 executed by Sheila S. Velmonte-
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Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both State Auditors of the Commission on Audit
Region VI in Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a post-audit of the disbursement
vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government. Among the subjects thereof
were the reimbursements of expenses of private respondent Luzviminda S.
Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of Bacolod City, particularly:
1. D.V. No. 6 dated January 8, 2004 amounting to P80,000.00;
2. D.V. No. 220 dated March 24, 2004 amounting to P68,000.00;
3. D.V. No. 278 dated April 13, 2004 amounting to P19,350.00; and
4. D.V. No. 325 dated April 30, 2004 amounting to P111,800.00 for Cash
Slip No. 193402.4
Based on the verification conducted in the establishments that issued the
official receipts, it was alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to
enable Valdez to claim/receive reimbursement from the Government the total
amount of P279,150.00 instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate
overclaim of P274,306.75.
The Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Office of the
Ombudsman - Visayas received the joint affidavit, which was thereafter
resolved adverse to Valdez.
Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-
0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents under Articles 2175 and 171,6 in relation to Article 487 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). All the cases were raffled before public respondent.
Since the Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322, and
0324, Valdez, who is still at-large, caused the filing of a Motion to Set Aside No
Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail.8 She argued that the three
cases are bailable as a matter of right because no aggravating or modifying
circumstance was alleged; the maximum of the indeterminate sentence shall be
taken from the medium period that ranged from 18 years, 8 months and 1 day
to 20 years; and applying Article 48 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is 20
years, which is the maximum of the medium period.
Petitioner countered in its Comment/Opposition9 that the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISL) is inapplicable as the attending circumstances are raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
immaterial because the charge constituting the complex crime have the passed upon in the lower court;
corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, bail is discretionary. Instead of a motion to fix bail, a (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
summary hearing to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong is, therefore, any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
necessary conformably with Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules.
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
Due to the issuance and release of a warrant of arrest, Valdez subsequently useless;
filed an Urgent Supplemental Motion to the Motion to Set Aside No Bail
Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail with Additional Prayer to (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
Recall/Lift Warrant of Arrest.10 Petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition for relief;
thereto.11 Later, the parties filed their respective Memorandum of Authorities. 12
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
As aforesaid, on October 10, 2014, public respondent granted the motions of granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
Valdez. It recalled the arrest order issued in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-
0321, 0322 and 0324. In lieu thereof, a new arrest order was issued, fixing the (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
bail for each offense charged in said cases in the amount of Two Hundred process;
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Without filing a motion for reconsideration,
petitioner elevated the matter before Us to resolve the lone issue of whether an (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
accused indicted for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru opportunity to object; and,
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right. (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is
involved.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court shall first tackle Valdez's procedural objection. She avers that the
The issue being raised here is one purely of law and all the
petition must be dismissed outright on the ground that it was filed without first
argument, pros and cons were already raised in and passed upon by public
filing a motion for reconsideration before public respondent, and that, even if
respondent; thus, filing a motion for reconsideration would be an exercise in
there are exceptions to the general rule, this case does not fall under any of
futility. Likewise, as petitioner claims, the resolution of the question raised in
them.
this case is of urgent necessity considering its implications on similar cases filed
and pending before the Sandiganbayan. As it appears, there have been
We disagree.
conflicting views on the matter such that the different divisions of the anti-graft
court issue varying resolutions. Undeniably, the issue is of extreme importance
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
affecting public interest. It involves not just the right of the State to prosecute
non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an
criminal offenders but, more importantly, the constitutional right of the accused
opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a re-
to bail.
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
Now, on the main issue:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the following
exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding
The controversy is, in fact, not one of first impression. Mañalac, Jr. v.
the failure to file a motion for reconsideration:
People14 already resolved that an accused charged with Malversation of Public
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents where the amount involved
jurisdiction;
exceeds P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a matter of right because it has an
actual imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua.
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
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In Mañalac, Jr., the defendants argued that they should be allowed to post bail
since reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense but
merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the fraud involved.
It was also posited that Article 48 of the RPC applies "only after the accused
has been convicted in a full-blown trial such that the court is mandated to
impose the penalty of the most serious crime," and that the reason for the
imposition of the penalty of the most serious offense is "only for the purpose of
determining the correct penalty upon the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law." This Court, through the Third Division, however, denied the
petition and resolved in the affirmative the issue of whether the constitutional
right to bail of an accused is restricted in cases whose imposable penalty
ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Citing People
v. Pantaleon, Jr., et al.,15 in relation to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution
and Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules, it was held that Mañalac, Jr. is not
entitled to bail as a matter of right since he is charged with a crime whose
penalty is reclusion perpetua.
To recall, the amounts involved in Pantaleon, Jr. were manifestly in excess of
P22,000.00. We opined that the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and that the ISL is inapplicable since it is an indivisible
penalty. The Court's pronouncement is consistent with the earlier cases
of People v. Conwi, Jr.,16People v. Enfermo,17 and People v. Pajaro, et al.18 as
well as with the fairly recent case of Zafra v. People.19
The rulings in Pantaleon, Jr. and analogous cases are in keeping with the
provisions of the RPC. Specifically, Article 48 of which states that in complex
crimes, "the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period." Thus, in Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents, the prescribed penalties for
malversation and falsification should be taken into account. Under the RPC, the
penalty for malversation of public funds or property if the amount involved
exceeds P22,000.00 shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua, aside from perpetual special disqualification and a fine
equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.20 On the other hand, the penalty ofprision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P5,000.00 shall be imposed for falsification committed by a
public officer.21 Considering that malversation is the more serious offense,
the imposable penalty for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00
is reclusion perpetua, it being the maximum period of the prescribed penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of bail application, however, the ruling in Mañalac, Jr. should be
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revisited on the ground that Pantaleon, Jr. (as well as Conwi, Jr., Enfermo,
Pajaro, et al., and Zafra) was disposed in the context of a judgment of
conviction rendered by the lower court and affirmed on appeal by this Court. As
will be shown below, the appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of right to
an accused who is charged with a complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that
exceeds P22,000.00.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Pursuant thereto, Sections 4 and 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. (4a)
SEC. 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The pivotal question is: How should We construe the term "punishable" under
the provisions above-quoted?
In Our mind, the term "punishable" should refer to prescribed,
not imposable, penalty. People v. Temporada,24 which was even cited by
petitioner, perceptibly distinguished these two concepts:
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies
defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is what is
referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 249 of the
RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal which ranges
from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code
provides for attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the
commission of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on
a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the "imposable 48 by imposing the same in its maximum period.
penalty." In the case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable For purposes of determining whether a person can be admitted to bail as a
penalty under the RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. matter of right, it is the imposable penalty prescribed by law for the crime
From this imposable penalty, the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also charged which should be considered and, not the penalty to be actually
called a straight penalty) which is the "penalty actually imposed" on a imposed. Illustrative cases such as Catiis v. Court of Appeals, et al. and People
convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve. 25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary v. Hu Ruey Chun evidently confirm this to be so.
Petitioner contends that the imposable penalty is the one provided by the RPC
xxxx
before conviction to determine whether the charge is bailable or not, while
the penalty actually imposed pertains to the prison sentence upon
In both cases, therefore, it is the penalty imposable for the offense charged
conviction.26 Hence, it is maintained that the penalty imposable for the offense
that was considered for purposes of bail.
charged against private respondent is reclusion perpetua, which makes Criminal
Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324 non-bailable.
A circumspect reading of substantive law validates this view. Section 13, Article
III of the Constitution provides that: x x x x
The argument is erroneous.
On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
Following Temporada, for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds
amended, provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00, the "prescribed penalty" is reclusion temporal in its maximum
xxxx
period to reclusion perpetua. After trial, should the commission of such crime
be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the "imposable
Notably, the word used is ["punishable,"] which practically bears the same
penalty" is reclusion perpetua in view of the RPC mandate that the prescribed
meaning as "imposable." It is only logical that the reference has a direct
penalty of reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua shall be applied
correlation with the time frame "before conviction" since trial is yet to begin;
in its maximum.27 The falsification, which is the means used to commit the
hence, it can only be the penalty imposable of the offense charged that can be
crime of malversation, is in the nature of a generic aggravating circumstance
considered for purposes of bail.
that effectively directs the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum
period.28 The phrases "shall be applied" and "shall impose," found in Articles 63
In these cases, the offenses charged are the complex crimes of Malversation of
and 64, respectively, of the RPC, are of similar import as the phrase "shall be
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents. In determining the
imposed" found in Article 48. Both Articles 63 and 64 refer to the penalty to be
penalty imposable, it is the penalty for the most serious crime which is
imposed after considering the aggravating or mitigating circumstance/s. Finally,
considered. Between Malversation and Falsification, it is Malversation which
the "penalty actually imposed" is still reclusion perpetua, considering that
provides the graver penalty. As thus provided under Article 217 of the Revised
the ISL finds no application as the penalty is indivisible. 29
Penal Code, "[i]f the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua."
The October 10, 2014 Resolution of public respondent is spot on had it not
confused imposable penalty with prescribed penalty. Nonetheless, reading
The penalty, however, cannot be immediately applied in its maximum period,
through the text of the assailed Resolution reveals that the anti-graft court
or reclusion perpetua, since this will already consider the application of the
actually meant prescribed penalty whenever it referred to imposable penalty.
penalty in the event of a conviction.
Therefore, in essence, the ruling is correct. Respondent court held:
If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification be imposed in its
A clear perusal of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
maximum period, there is no doubt that, in case of conviction, the penalty to
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The cases, however, are still at their
inception. Criminal proceedings are yet to ensue. This is not the proper time,
xxxx
therefore, to call for the application of the penalty contemplated under Article

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The word used is "imposed," not imposable. Thus, the reference can only point
to the time when a judgment of conviction is impending. If and when "the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in
its maximum period," is thus applied in the proper application of the penalty to
be imposed on the accused. Certainly, this cannot be considered for purposes
of bail.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in
charging a complex crime, the information should allege each element of the
complex offense with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses
were the subject of separate prosecutions.31 Where a complex crime is charged
and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component
offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the offense proven. 32
At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an aggravating
circumstance, must be alleged and proved during the trial. For purposes of bail
proceedings, it would be premature to rule that the supposed crime committed
is a complex crime since it is only when the trial has terminated that
falsification could be appreciated as a means of committing malversation.
Further, it is possible that only the elements of one of the constituent
offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or worse, none of them,
would be proven after full-blown trial.
It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and grant
her the same only after trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime
committed. Likewise, it is unjust for Us to give a stamp of approval in depriving
the accused person's constitutional right to bail for allegedly committing a
complex crime that is not even considered as inherently grievous, odious and
hateful. To note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not change the
nature of the constituent offenses; it only requires the imposition of the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law. When committed through
falsification of official/public documents, the RPC does not intend to classify
malversation as a capital offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of Malversation
of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds P22,000.00 should have been expressly included in
Republic Act No. 7659.33 If truly a non-bailable offense, the law should have
already considered it as a special complex crime like robbery with rape, robbery
with homicide, rape with homicide, and kidnapping with murder or homicide,
which have prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of right to an accused
6|CrimPro Set 2 Cases
charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is palpable when
compared with an accused indicted for plunder, which is a heinous crime
punishable under R.A. No. 7080, 34 as amended by R.A. No. 765935 and R.A. No.
9346.36 Observe that bail is not a matter of right in plunder committed through
malversation of public funds, but the aggregate amount or total value of ill-
gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired must be at least Fifty Million
Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In contrast, an accused who is alleged to have
committed malversation of public funds thru falsification of official/public
documents, which is not a capital offense, is no longer entitled to bail as a
matter of right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as low as P22,000.01.
Such distinction is glaringly unfair and could not have been contemplated by
the law.
The foregoing interpretation is more favorable to Valdez as an accused
following the rule of lenity:
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The rule
applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal
statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to
him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to
the accused.37ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The time-honored principle is that penal statutes are construed strictly against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused.38 When there is doubt on the
interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused.39 Since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must
determine whether their application is consistent with the purpose and reason
of the law.40
For having ruled that an accused charged with the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents that
involves an amount in excess of P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of
right, a summary hearing on bail application is, therefore, unnecessary.
Consistent with Miranda v. Tuliao,41 an affirmative relief may be obtained from
the court despite the accused being still at-large. Except in petition for bail,
custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs sought by the
defendant (such as a motion to set aside no bail recommendation and to fix the
amount of bail in this case) where the mere application therefor constitutes a
waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez is entitled to bail, as a matter of right,
 in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324.
G.R. No. 187464, November 25, 2015
CABIB ALONTO TANOG, Petitioner, v. HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG,
Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, 12th Judicial
Region, MARAWI CITY, AND GAPO SIDIC, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N BRION, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Cabib Alonto Tanog (Cabib)
1 raffle before the RTC, Branch 10 since he had been in detention for more than
assailing the orders dated February 11, 2009; February 13, 2009; and March 2,
2009, respectively, issued by respondent Hon. Rasad G. Balindong (Judge
Balindong), then Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 8, Marawi City, in Criminal Case No. 4471-04.
The Antecedents:
On July 5, 2004, Cabib Tanog, Jr. was shot to death by a group of armed
persons inside the canteen of Dansalan College Foundation, Inc. in Marawi City,
Lanao del Sur.
On the same day, members of the Marawi City police apprehended Gapo Sidic
(Sidic) at a police checkpoint while he was on board a Tamaraw FX vehicle
bound for Iligan City.
On July 8, 2004, the petitioner filed a complaint for murder before the Office of
the City Prosecutor in Marawi City against Sidic, Anwar Bonsalagan, Papas
Balindong, Nago Balindong, and Arsad Balindong for the death of his son,
Cabib, Jr.
In its resolution dated August 3, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor found
probable cause to indict the five (5) accused, and recommended the filing of an
information2 for murder against them.
7|CrimPro Set 2 Cases
The prosecution filed an Information for murder before the Regional Trial Court
of Marawi City against the accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 447i_04.
This case was raffled to Branch 9, which was presided by Judge Amer Ibrahim.
Thereafter, Judge Ibrahim issued an "order of arrest" against the accused.
On January 8, 2005, Sidic filed a motion to fix bail before the RTC, claiming
that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong. 3 After the prosecution
presented four witnesses, the RTC, Branch 9: (a) considered the presentation
of evidence by the prosecution for the purposes of the motion to fix bail
deemed terminated; and (b) set the presentation of Sidic's counter evidence on
May 21, 2008.
Due to the death of Judge Ibrahim, Judge Lacsaman Busran of the RTC, Branch
11, Marawi City, was designated as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 9. The
records of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 was re-raffled to Branch 10 because
Judge Busran had been previously designated as its Acting Presiding Judge.
On February 4, 2009, Sidic filed an urgent ex-parte motion to direct special
four years, and Branch 10 was already overburdened with numerous cases.
In its Order of February 4, 2009, Judge Busran granted Sidic's motion to direct
a special raffle, and directed his Branch Clerk of Court to forward the records of
Criminal Case No. 4471-04 to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC).
On the next day, the OCC transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 4471-
04 to RTC, Branch 8, presided by respondent Judge Balindong.
In its order dated February 11, 2009,4 the RTC, Branch 8 granted Sidic's motion
to fix bail, and fixed the amount at P30,000.00. It essentially held that
evidence of guilt against Sidic was not strong since the witnesses presented by
the prosecution did not actually see the victim shot.
In its order5 of February 13, 2009, the RTC, Branch 8 directed the City Warden
to release Sidic after the latter had posted the P30,000.00 cash bond.
The prosecution filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration to cancel bond
posted for the provisional liberty of the accused and for inhibition 6 before the
RTC, Branch 8.
In his order7 dated March 2, 2009, Judge Balindong held that "[t]he motion to
fix bail was resolved justly and fairly in accordance with the law, rules and
jurisprudence."8 He, however, opted to inhibit himself "from further taking
action on the other incidents"9 of the case out of "delicadeza." The dispositive
portion of this order provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the undersigned Acting Presiding Judge is inhibiting himself from
trying and deciding the case of accused Gapo Sidic. The rest of the accused are
at large, hence, the most that the next Judge/Acting Judge can do is to archive
the case insofar as they are concerned and issue alias Warrant of Arrest.
Let the record in its entirety be forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for
appropriate action considering that it cannot be re-raffled to RTC Branch 9 as
the latter sala is presided by Judge Lacsaman M. Busran of RTC Branch 10 who
earlier inhibited himself from trying this case.
SO ORDERED.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
The Petition for Certiorari
In the present petition, the petitioner alleged that Judge Balindong committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
granted Sidic's motion to fix bail despite the strong evidence of guilt against
him, and in fixing the amount of bail at only P30,000.00. He maintained that
Judge Balindong should have inhibited himself from taking part in Criminal Case
No. 4471-04 since the latter is related to the accused within the prohibited
degree under Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
OUR RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to DISMISS the petition.
The case is already moot
A case is said to be moot or academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a ruling would be of no
practical use or value. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over moot cases
because there is no substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled and
which would anyway be negated by the dismissal of the petition. 11
In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago,12 we held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication,
there must be an actual case or controversy—one which involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
8|CrimPro Set 2 Cases
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extralegal or
other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the
issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and
an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do not
sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging.cralawlawlibrary
The events which took place during the pendency of the present case have
rendered the present petition for certiorari moot. The record shows that during
the pendency of this petition, the RTC, Branch 28, Catbalogan City, presided by
Judge Sibanah E. Usman,13 rendered a decision on January 20, 2015, in
Criminal Case No. 4471-04 finding Sidic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The decision became final and executory on March 26, 2015.
We recall that the present petition questioned Judge Balindong's orders
granting the motion to fix bail filed by Sidic and setting the amount of bail at
only P30,000.00. Sidic was charged with a capital offense, and his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of guilt against him of the offense charged
was strong. Thus, whatever judgment is reached in this case would no longer
have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be
enforced. Simply put, the petitioner's conviction of a capital offense, which
had already attained finality,14 warranted his incarceration. Any resolution
on the propriety of Judge Balindong's challenged orders relating to Sidic's
provisional release would be of no useful or practical value.
The petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of judicial hierarchy.
We also point out that the present petition for certiorari should have been filed
with the Court of Appeals (CA) and not with this Court pursuant to the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the CA, and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction, the
commonality does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice in the forum to be used.15 The appropriate forum is the court lowest
in the judicial hierarchy.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the
precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases that some of these
cases may have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or because these courts are better
equipped to resolve the issues given that this Court is not a trier of facts. 16
 tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
In Dy v. Bibat-Palamos,17 the Court recognized various exceptions to the strict jurisdiction.
application of the principle of hierarchy of courts, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary a. The grant of the motion to fix bail

xxx, the invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs The right to bail flows from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to
of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and a person in the custody of the law who may be allowed provisional liberty upon
important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as, (1) when dictated by filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required
the public welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded under specified conditions. Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or
by the broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by
nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. If the offense charged is punishable
called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the by reclusion perpetua, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Bail is denied if the
case.cralawlawlibrary evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. 21
Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
Corollarily, Article 114, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional
amended, states that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
and compelling circumstances (such as cases of national interest and of serious
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of
implications) justify the use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, calling for
guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.18 Exceptional and compelling
prosecution.
circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a) Chavez v.
Romulo on citizens' right to bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of
We point out that the accused were charged of murder, a crime punishable
America v. Purganan on bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on
by reclusion perpetua to death. If the information charges a capital offense, the
Elections v. Quijano-Padilla on government contract involving modernization
right to bail becomes a matter of discretion and the grant thereof may be
and computerization of voters' registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v.
justified as a matter of right if the evidence of guilt is not strong. The
Zamora on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich v. Corona on
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter
the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of the President which modified
of judicial discretion, remains with the judge.
the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area. 19
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court is not absolute nor beyond control.
In the present case, the petitioner failed to offer any explanation on why he
It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion,
failed to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy; he gave no justification
by its very nature involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the
why he did not challenge the assailed RTC orders before the CA. We thus
law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules that,
reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain a direct invocation
while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual
of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
views, prevent rulings that are out of control. 22
appropriate courts below, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
the resort to this Court through the extraordinary remedy of writ
In the present case, we find that Judge Balindong did not act in a whimsical,
of certiorari.20 We reiterate that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary
arbitrary, and capricious manner when he granted Sidic's motion to fix bail. The
remedy and the party who seeks to avail of this remedy must strictly observe
records showed that a hearing on the application for bail was conducted and
the procedural rules laid down by law and the rules.
that the prosecution presented four witnesses, namely Noma Tanog, Cabib
Tanog, Sr., Saripada Tanog, and Saripoden Tanog Lucman. Judge Balindong
The grave abuse of discretion issue
evaluated the testimonies of these witnesses, and found out that none of them
witnessed the actual shooting of the victim: Noma merely saw Sidic running
Even if we decide the case on the merits, we still dismiss the present petition
towards the direction of the vehicles after he (Noma) went to Dansalan College
for its failure to establish that the assailed orders of Judge Balindong were
Foundation, Inc. to verify the gunshots he heard; Saripada admitted that he did
9|CrimPro Set 2 Cases
not see Sidic shoot the victim; Cabib admitted that it was Noma who pointed
Sidic to him as one of the victim's assailants; and Saripoden merely described
the attire of one of the men he saw at the canteen, and did not mention the
name of Sidic. On the basis of these testimonies, Judge Balindong concluded
that the prosecution failed to show that the evidence against Sidic was strong.
We additionally examined the affidavits of Cabib and Noma, 23 and found that
these documents supported the findings of Judge Balindong.
In his affidavit, Cabib stated that he was informed of the death of his son by
Adil Dima;24 and that it was Noma who told him the identities of five of the
assailants. For his part, Noma stated in his.affidavit that he saw Sidic as one of
the persons who ran towards a maroon Tamaraw FX (bearing plate number ATF
754) and a blue Toyota Corona (without any plate number) after the shooting.
He (Noma) mentioned, however, that the Tamaraw FX the police flagged down
was colored red.25cralawred
In the light of the testimonies and affidavits of the witnesses, we cannot fault
Judge Balindong if he had ruled that the evidence of guilt against the accused
was not strong.
That the RTC eventually convicted Sidic is of no moment, since the trial judge,
in determining the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail, did not sit to try
the merits of the case.
b. Amount of bail
Contrary to the petitioner's claim, we also hold that Judge Balindong did not act
with grave abuse of discretion when he set the amount of Sidic's
bailatP30,000.00.
Section 9 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that in fixing the amount of
bail in criminal cases, judges shall primarily consider the following factors: (a)
financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) nature and circumstances of the
offense; (c) penalty for the offense charged; (d) character and reputation of
the accused; (e) age and health of the accused; (f) weight of the evidence
against the accused; (g) probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h)
forfeiture of other bail; (i) the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and (j) pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
It is settled that the amount of bail should be reasonable at all times. In
implementing this mandate, regard should be taken of the prisoner's pecuniary
circumstances. We point out that what is reasonable bail to a man of wealth
may be unreasonable to a poor man charged with a like offense. Thus, the right
10 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
to bail should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is relatively
excessive. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the
defendant when required, but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill
this purpose.26
Judge Balindong explained how he arrived at the amount in this
manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Considering the guidelines under Section 9, Rule 114, Rules of Court, among
them: the health of the accused who has languished in jail since his
apprehension on July 5, 2004 and up to the present or for more than four (4)
years; his character and reputation as he is a former Councillor of Pualas,
Lanao del Sur, in fact, he was incumbent councillor at the time of his detention;
the weight of evidence against him, a weak one; and his financial ability and
considering further the constitutional and statutory provision that "excessive
bail shall not be required," the bail is fixed at P30,000.00. 27cralawlawlibrary
Assuming that the bail set by Judge Balindong is low considering that the 2000
Bail Bond Guide of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommends "no bail" for
murder, we cannot use this fact alone to hold that his order -with respect to the
amount of bail set - had been issued with grave abuse of discretion. We point
out that the DOJ Bail Bond Guide - while persuasive and merits attention - is
not binding on the courts. In fixing the amount of bail, the judge is given the
discretion to set an amount which he or she perceives as appropriate under
given circumstances in relation to the factors enumerated under Section 9 of
Rule 114. As quoted above, Judge Balindong enumerated the reasons (i.e.,
accused's incarceration for more than 4 years; his reputation as a former
councillor; his financial ability; and the weak evidence against him) why he set
the amount of bail at P30,000.00.
c. Non-inhibition of Judge Balindong
The rule on disqualification of judges is laid down in Rule 137, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in
any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel
within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or
in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record.
xxx
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above,
(emphasis ours)
cralawlawlibrary
The reason behind the rule on compulsory disqualification of judges was
explained in Villaluz v. Judge Mijares28 as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in
the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge
should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and
the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its
fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge
cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason,
prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence
of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the
people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.cralawlawlibrary
In the present case, we hold that the petitioner failed to substantiate his
allegation that Judge Balindong is related to Sidic within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity to warrant his (Judge Balindong's) mandatory
inhibition from the case.
In his omnibus motion for reconsideration to cancel bond posted for the
provisional liberty of the accused and for inhibition, the petitioner prayed,
among others, that Judge Balindong inhibit himself from trying and deciding the
case on the merit[s]. He alleged that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx the accused is allegedly a relative of the Honorable Acting Presiding Judge
of this Court especially the other accused, namely: Papas Balindong, Nago
Balindong alias Hilal and Arsad Balindong. Besides, accused Gapo Sidic is a
resident and native of Barangay Yaran which is an adjacent or adjoining
barangay of Barangay Dapao which is allegedly the native place of the
Honorable Acting Presiding Judge. Moreover, Barangays Yaran and Dapao are
parts of the Sultanate territory of Picong wherein the Honorable Acting
Presiding Judge of this Honorable Court was crowned as Sultan [of]
11 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
Picong.29 (emphasis ours)cralawlawlibrary
The petitioner described the relationship between Judge Balindong and the
accused with more specifity in the present petition for certiorari by alleging
that: Judge Balindong is the "uncle-in-law" of Sidic; Judge Balindong is the first
cousin of accused Papas; and accused Nago and Arsad are Judge Balindong's
"nephews by first degree cousins."
To support these claims, the petitioner attached to the present petition an
affidavit executed by Manorbi Sidic essentially stating that: (1) Sidic's mother-
in-law is the sister of Judge Balindong; (2) Judge Balindong and Papas are first-
degree cousins; and (3) Nago and Arsad are the "nephews by first-degree
cousins" of Judge Balindong.
To our mind, these bare claims, supported by a mere affidavit of Manorbi that
had not been presented before the RTC, Branch 8, are grossly insufficient to
determine whether Judge Balindong falls within the compulsory inhibition under
Rule 137. We point out that the petitioner's use of the term 'allegedly' in
his omnibus motion for reconsideration to cancel bond posted for the
provisional liberty of the accused and for inhibition revealed that he himself was
unsure and uncertain if Judge Balindong was indeed related to Sidic and the
other accused. Corollarily, the presentation of Manorbi's affidavit - attached for
the first time in this petition for certiorari - without any other evidence to
substantiate the matters stated therein, is inadequate and lacking to determine
the degree of Judge Balindong's relationship to the accused. We note in this
regard that a mere relation by affinity or consanguinity is not enough cause for
the compulsory inhibition of a judge; it should be shown that the he or she is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree.
We are not unaware that after Judge Balindong had granted Sidic's motion to
fix bail, he opted to inhibit himself "from further taking action on the other
incidents"30 of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 out of "delicadeza." The records do
not indicate what Judge Balindong meant to convey when he used the term
"delicadeza" to justify his inhibition; we cannot imply something that is not
supported by the records of the case.
It would have been ideal if the petitioner had filed an administrative case
against Judge Balindong if he truly believed that the latter committed a
violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics or the Rules. This would have enabled
Judge Balindong to properly answer the charges against him, particularly his
decision not to initially inhibit from Criminal Case No. 4471-04. It would have
also given us ample and sufficient basis to rule on the validity of the petitioner's
claim that Judge Balindong was related to the accused within the prohibitive
degree under Rule 137.

We reiterate that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction or an arbitrary and
despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. In this case, the
petitioner failed to establish that Judge Balindong gravely abused his discretion
in issuing the challenged orders.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DISMISS the petition

for certiorari filed by petitioner Cabib Alonto Tanog.

SO ORDERED.
In any case, the amount should correspond to the medium penalty multiplied
by Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for every year of imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

12 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s

G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON.
AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON.
ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the “petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the Court En Banc to
act on the petition; (b) to expedite the proceedings and to set the case for oral
arguments; and (c) to issue a temporary restraining order to the respondents
from holding a pre-trial and further proceedings in Criminal Case No. SB-14-
CRM-0238”1 filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) challenging the July
11, 2014 resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan.
I.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information 3 for plunder
against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and
John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable
Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a
Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator
Enrile’s Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES,
RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through
13 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE
ASIS, and others, kickbacks or commissions under the following
circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification,
NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the
cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly
or through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’
non-government organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded projects turned
out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the
PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
(b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions,
authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus
motion (motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish probable
cause and ad cautelam motion for bail),4 and (2) a supplemental opposition to
issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information,5 on June 10,
2014, and June 16, 2014, respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both motions
on June 20, 2014.
On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to both
motions.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and ordered the
issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case against the
accused.6redarclaw
On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing7 informing him that his
arraignment would be held before the Sandiganbayan’s Third Division on July
11, 2014.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars8 before the
Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he filed a motion for deferment of
arraignment9 since he was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH).
On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the
Sandiganbayan’s order and his motion for bill of particulars was called for
hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Enrile’s counsel, argued the
motion orally. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo
Cabotaje-Tang (Cabotaje-Tang), declared a “10-minute recess” to deliberate on
the motion.
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the
Court’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars essentially on the
following grounds:
(1) the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the
arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to the issuance
of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information; and
(2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated
during trial.
Atty. Mendoza asked for time to file a motion for reconsideration, stating that he
would orally move to reconsider the Sandiganbayan’s denial if he would not be
given time to seek a reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan then directed Atty.
Mendoza to immediately proceed with his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the reconsideration of
the denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars. The Sandiganbayan again
declared a recess to deliberate on the motion. After five (5) minutes, PJ
Cabotaje-Tang announced the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion for
reconsideration.10redarclaw
The Sandiganbayan reduced its rulings into writing on Enrile’s written and oral
motions. The pertinent portion of this ruling reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In today’s consideration of accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion for Bill of
Particulars, the Court heard the parties on oral arguments in relation thereto.
Thereafter, it declared a ten-minute recess to deliberate thereon. After
deliberating on the said motion as well as the arguments of the parties, the
Court resolves to DENY as it hereby DENIES the same motion for bill of
particulars for the following reasons: (1) the details desired in paragraphs 2 to 5
of the said motion are substantially reiterations of the arguments raised by
accused Enrile in his Supplemental Opposition to Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
and for Dismissal of Information dated June 16, 2014 x x x.
The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information
14 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
charging accused Enrile, among other persons, with the crime of plunder in its
Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It finds no cogent reasons to reconsider the said
ruling.
Moreover, the “desired details” that accused Enrile would like the prosecution to
provide are evidentiary in nature, which need not be alleged in the Information.
They are best ventilated during the trial of the case.
Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a reconsideration of the
denial of his motion for bill of particulars which was opposed by the prosecution.
The Court then declared another ten-minute recess to deliberate on the said
motion for reconsideration. After deliberation thereon, the Court likewise
resolved to DENY as it hereby DENIES accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s motion for
reconsideration there being no new or substantial grounds raised to warrant the
grant thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan Ponce Enrile shall
now proceed as previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.11
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enrile’s arraignment.
The Sandiganbayan responded by directing the doctors present to determine
whether he was physically fit to be arraigned. After he was declared fit, the
Sandiganbayan proceeded with Enrile’s arraignment. Enrile entered a “no plea,”
prompting the Sandiganbayan to enter a “not guilty” plea on his behalf.
II.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion
for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information
filed against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific
participation in the crime of plunder had been. He posits that the Information
should have stated the details of the particular acts that allegedly constituted
the imputed series or combination of overt acts that led to the charge of
plunder. Enrile essentially reiterates the “details desired” that he sought in his
motion for bill of particulars, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
 Allegations of Information
“x x x accused JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator,
JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then
Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s
Office, both public officers,
committing the offense in relation
to their respective offices,
conspiring with one another and
with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD
JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE
ASIS, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally amass,
accumulate, and/or acquire ill-
gotten wealth amounting to at least
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)
through a combination or series of
overt acts, x x x.”
x x x by repeatedly receiving from
NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and
others, kickbacks or commissions
under the following circumstances:
before, during and/or after the
project identification, NAPOLES
gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES
received, a percentage of the cost
of a project to be funded from
ENRILE’S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in
consideration of ENRILE’S
endorsement, directly or through
REYES, to the appropriate
15 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
Details Desired
a. Who among the accused acquired the
alleged “ill-gotten wealth amounting to at
least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php172,834,500.00)”? One of them, two
of them or all of them? Kindly specify.
b. The allegation “through a combination
or series of overt criminal acts” is a
conclusion of fact or of law. What are the
particular overt acts which constitute the
“combination”? What are the particular
overt acts which constitute the “series”?
Who committed those acts?
a. What was “repeatedly” received? If
sums of money, the particular amount. If
on several occasions and in different
amounts, specify the amount on each
occasion and the corresponding date of
receipt.
government agencies, of NAPOLES’
non-government organizations
which became the recipients and/or
target implementers of ENRILE’S
PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or
fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES
to misappropriate the PDAF
proceeds for her personal gain;
b. Name the specific person(s) who
delivered the amount of
Php172,834,500.00 and the specific
person(s) who received the amount; or if
not in lump sum, the various amounts
totaling Php172,834,500.00. x x x Specify
particularly the person who delivered the
amount, Napoles or Lim or De Asis, and
who particularly are “the others.”
c. To whom was the money given? To
Enrile or Reyes? State the amount given
on each occasion, the date when and
the place where the amount was given.
d. x x x Describe each project allegedly
identified, how, and by whom was the
project identified, the nature of each
project, where it is located and the cost of
each project.
e. For each of the years 2004-2010,
under what law or official document is a
portion of the “Priority Development
Assistance Fund” identified as that of a
member of Congress, in this instance, as
ENRILE’s, to be found? In
what amount for each year is ENRILE’s
Priority Development Assistance Fund?
When, and to whom, did Enrile endorse
the projects in favor of “Napoles non-
government organizations which became
the recipients and/or target implementers
of ENRILE’s PDAF
projects?” Name Napoles non-government
organizations which became the recipients
 and/or target implementers of ENRILE’s
PDAF projects. Who paid Napoles, from
whom did Napoles collect the fund for the
projects which turned out to be ghosts or
fictitious? Who authorized the payments
for each project?
f. x x x what COA audits or field
investigations were conducted which
validated the findings that each of Enrile’s
PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010
were ghosts or spurious projects?
x x x by taking undue advantage, a. Provide the details of how Enrile took
on several occasions of their official undue advantage, on several occasions, of
positions, authority, relationships, his official positions, authority,
connections, and influence to relationships, connections, and influence
unjustly enrich themselves at the to unjustly enrich himself at the expense
expense and to the damage and and to the damage and prejudice, of the
prejudice, of the Filipino people and Filipino people and the Republic of the
the Republic of the Philippines. Philippines. Was this because
he received any money from the
government? From whom and for
what reason did he receive any money or
property from the government through
which he “unjustly enriched himself”?
State the details from whom
each amount was received, the place and
the time.
Enrile posits that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in nature; they are
material facts that should be clearly alleged in the Information so that he may
be fully informed of the charges against him and be prepared to meet the issues
at the trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of particulars are cited
in a context different from his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
He maintains that the resolution of the probable cause issue was interlocutory
and did “not bar the submission of the same issue in subsequent proceedings
especially in the context of a different proceeding.”
Enrile thus prays that: “(a) the Court en banc act on the present petition; (b) by
way of an interim measure, the Court issue a TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the Sandiganbayan from holding the pre-trial and
subsequent proceedings against him in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238
16 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
during the pendency of the present petition; (c) the Court expedite the
proceedings and set the case for oral arguments; and (d) at the conclusion of
the proceedings, the Court annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan’s July 11,
2014 resolution and his arraignment.”
A. The People’s Comment
In its Comment,12 the People of the Philippines13 counters that the
Sandiganbayan did not exercise its discretionary power in an arbitrary or
despotic manner. Even assuming that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of Enrile’s
motion for bill of particulars was erroneous, the error did not amount to lack or
excess or jurisdiction. It further maintains that the assailed Sandiganbayan
rulings were arrived at based on the procedures prescribed under Section 2,
Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.
The People also argues that the Information already contained the ultimate
facts; matters of evidence do not need to be averred.
B. Enrile’s Reply
In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for a bill of
particulars is “ancillary to and in implementation” of an accused’s rights to due
process, to be heard, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. He maintains that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his
motion for bill of particulars is not “a mere denial of a procedural right under the
Rules of Court, but of rights vested in an accused under the Constitution to
ensure fairness in the trial of the offense charged.” Enrile also adds that there
could only be a fair trial if he could properly plead to the Information and
prepare for trial.
Enrile further argues that the People’s Comment did not dispute the relevance of
the details sought in the motion for bill of particulars. He likewise claims
that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of documents
marked by the prosecution during the preliminary conference. Finally,
Enrile maintains that his motion for bill of particulars was not dilatory.
III.
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the petition
under the terms outlined below.
A. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.14 This right has long been established in English law, and is the same right
expressly guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution. This right requires that the
offense charged be stated with clarity and with certainty to inform the accused
of the crime he is facing in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his
defense.15redarclaw
In the 1904 case of United States v. Karelsen,16 the Court explained the purpose
of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him from the
perspective of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The object of this written accusation was – First. To furnish the accused with
such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court
of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542.) In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of
time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstances
necessary to constitute the crime charged. x x x. 17 [Emphasis supplied.]
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to fully
appraise the accused of the nature of the charge against him and to avoid
possible surprises that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be
left speculating on why he has been charged at all. 18redarclaw
In People v. Hon. Mencias, et al.,19 the Court further explained that a person’s
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him signifies that an accused should be given the necessary data on why
he is the subject of a criminal proceeding. The Court added that the act or
conduct imputed to a person must be described with sufficient particularity to
enable the accused to defend himself properly.
The general grant and recognition of a protected right emanates from Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which states that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The purpose of the
guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty, and
property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
17 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of
private rights and distributive justice x x x; and to secure to all persons equal
and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. 20redarclaw
Separately from Section 1, Article III is the specific and direct underlying root of
the right to information in criminal proceedings – Section 14(1), Article III –
which provides that “No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.” Thus, no doubt exists that the right to be informed
of the cause of the accusation in a criminal case has deep constitutional roots
that, rather than being cavalierly disregarded, should be carefully protected.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),21 the Court, in
sustaining the Sandiganbayan’s grant of the motion for bill of particulars of
Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., held that “the facile verbosity with which the legal
counsel for the government flaunted the accusation of excesses against the
Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of particulars,
so that respondent can properly prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and
so that trial in this case will proceed as expeditiously as possible.” 22 The Court
additionally stated that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude of
discretion in setting aside default orders justified under the right to due process
principle. Plain justice demands and the law requires no less that defendants
must know what the complaint against them is all about.
x x x In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in the individual
respondents' minds that they are being railroaded out of their rights and
properties without due process of law.23
B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information
An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
signed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. 24 The Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, in implementing the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, specifically
require certain matters to be stated in the Information for its sufficiency. The
requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his
defense since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts constituting the offense charged.25redarclaw
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.26redarclaw

If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section
or subsection of the statute penalizing it. The acts or omissions constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances alleged must be
stated in ordinary and concise language; they do not necessarily need to be in
the language of the statute, and should be in terms sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is charged and what qualifying
and aggravating circumstances are alleged, so that the court can pronounce
judgment.27 The Rules do not require the Information to exactly allege the date
and place of the commission of the offense, unless the date and the place are
material ingredients or essential elements of the offense, or are necessary for
its identification.
B.1. Ultimate facts versus Evidentiary facts
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense;
the evidentiary and other details (i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts)
can be provided during the trial.28redarclaw
Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will
support. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars
of evidence by which these material elements are to be established.” It refers
to the facts that the evidence will prove at the trial. 29redarclaw
Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal, determinative, and
constitutive facts on whose existence the cause of action rests; 30 they are also
the essential and determining facts on which the court's conclusion rests and
without which the judgment would lack support in essential
particulars.31redarclaw
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the
ultimate facts; they are the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as
conclusion.32They are facts supporting the existence of some other
alleged and unproven fact.33redarclaw
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court explained these two concepts in
relation to a particular criminal case, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these
elements is analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate
facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and
substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary right and
duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or
establish said ultimate facts. x x x.35 [Emphasis supplied.]
18 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the
Information, matters of evidence – as distinguished from the facts essential to
the nature of the offense – do not need to be alleged. Whatever facts and
circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be determined based on the
definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes. 36redarclaw
C. Arraignment
The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the
accused be arraigned so that he may be fully informed as to why he was
charged and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on showing
that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove
the evidence against him.37 During arraignment, the accused is granted the
opportunity to fully know the precise charge that confronts him and
made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending
on the nature of the crime imputed to him.38redarclaw
An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted with the
nature of the crime imputed to him in the Information and the circumstances
under which it is allegedly committed.39 It is likewise at this stage of the
proceedings when the accused enters his plea, 40 or enters a plea of not guilty to
a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. 41redarclaw
A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the
Information should provide the accused with fair notice of the accusations
made against him, so that he will be able to make an intelligent plea and
prepare a defense.42Moreover, the Information must provide some means
of ensuring that the crime for which the accused is brought to trial is in
fact one for which he was charged, rather than some alternative crime
seized upon by the prosecution in light of subsequently discovered
evidence.43Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or crimes an
accused is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to
retry him for the same crime or crimes.44 In other words, the Information
must permit the accused to prepare his defense, ensure that he is prosecuted
only on the basis of facts presented, enable him to plead jeopardy against a
later prosecution, and inform the court of the facts alleged so that it can
determine the sufficiency of the charge.
Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the material elements
of the crime charged. If the Information fails to comply with this basic standard,
it would be quashed on the ground that it fails to charge an offense. 45Of
course, an Information may be sufficient to withstand a motion to
quash, and yet insufficiently inform the accused of the specific details of
the alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court allow the
accused to move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead
and to prepare for trial.46redarclaw
C.1. Bill of Particulars
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the
charges or claims in an action, which an accused may avail of by motion
before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial. In
civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been defined as a complementary
procedural document consisting of an amplification or more particularized
outline of a pleading, and is in the nature of a more specific allegation of the
facts recited in the pleading.47 The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in
civil cases is to enable a party to prepare his responsive pleading properly.
In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited
in the Information but nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime
charged. Its purpose is to enable an accused: to know the theory of the
government’s case;48 to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to
plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same
offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering
evidence.49redarclaw
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is governed by
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment, move for a
bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The
motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the
details desired.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient
particularity to apprise the accused of the crime charged with and to enable the
court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that persons
of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the Information
means.50redarclaw
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, is to guard against surprises during trial. It is not the function
of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the
prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters of
evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the offense
charged or how the people intend to prove any item of factual information
included in the bill of particulars.51redarclaw
19 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
C.2. Origin of bill of particulars in criminal cases 52redarclaw
Even before the promulgation of the 1964 Rules of Court, when the applicable
rules for criminal procedure was still General Order No. 58, 53 the Court had
already recognized the need for a bill of particulars in criminal cases. This
recognition came despite the lack of any specific provision in General Order No.
58 setting out the rules for a bill of particulars in criminal cases.
In U.S. v. Schneer,54 the issue presented was whether a bill of particulars was
available in a criminal case for estafa after the accused had already been
arraigned. The Court essentially ruled that there was no specific provision of law
expressly authorizing the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal
cases, and held that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We know of no provision either in General Orders, No. 58, or in the laws existing
prior thereto which requires the Government to furnish such a bill of particulars,
and we accordingly hold that it was not error on the part of the court below to
refuse to do so.
In U.S. v. Cernias,55 however, the Court formally recognized the existence and
applicability of a bill of particulars in criminal cases. In this case, the prosecution
filed an information charging Basilio Cernias with several counts of brigandage
before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. In overruling the accused’s
objection, the Court declared that the prosecution’s act of specifying certain acts
done by the conspirators in the Information “did no more than to furnish the
defendant with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to prove at the
trial x x x.”56redarclaw
In sum, the Court essentially held that a detailed complaint or information is not
objectionable, and that the details it contains may be properly considered as
specifications or bill of particulars.57redarclaw
In People v. Abad Santos,58 the court first recognized a bill of particulars, as a
right that the accused may ask for from the court. In this case, the prosecution
charged respondent Joseph Arcache with the crime of treason before the
People’s Court. The Information filed against the accused contained, in counts 2
and 3, the phrase “and other similar equipment.”
The counsel for the accused verbally petitioned the People’s court to order the
prosecution to “make more specific [the] phrase ‘and other similar equipment,’”
which request the People’s Court granted. The People of the Philippines filed a
petition for certiorari, but the Court dismissed this petition.
In upholding the order of the People’s Court, the Court ruled that “in the
absence of specific provisions of law prohibiting the filing of specifications or bills
of particulars in criminal cases, their submission may be permitted, as they
cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the accused. On the contrary, they
will serve to apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed against them, and
thus enable them to prepare intelligently whatever defense or defenses they
might have.59redarclaw
Notably, Abad Santos emphasized the importance of a bill of particulars in
criminal cases, stating that “x x x inasmuch as in criminal cases not only the
liberty but even the life of the accused may be at stake, it is always wise and
proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the true charges against
them, and thus avoid all and any possible surprise, which might be detrimental
to their rights and interests; and ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be
permitted in criminal complaints or informations; and if any such phrase has
been included therein, on motion of the defense, before the commencement of
the trial, the court should order either its elimination as surplusage or the filing
of the necessary specification, which is but an amendment in mere matters of
form.”60redarclaw
In these cited cases, the Courts did not rely on the Rules of Court to provide for
a bill of particulars in criminal cases. A specific provision granting the accused
the right “to move for or demand a more definite statement or a bill of
particulars” was not incorporated as a formal rule until the 1964 Rules of
Court,61under its Section 6, Rule 116. This initial provision later became Section
10 of Rule 116 under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure 62and Section 9 of
Rule 116 under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended.63redarclaw
C.3. The Distinctive Role of a Bill of Particulars
When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the
accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the
complaint or information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare
for trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that presents all the
elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the
specifications that a bill of particulars may supply are only formal amendments
to the complaint or Information.
In Virata v. Sandiganbayan,64 the Court expounded on the purpose of a bill of
particulars as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It is the office or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill of
particulars to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and particularly
a claim or defense set up and pleaded in general terms, give information, not
20 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
contained in the pleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the precise
nature, character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense relied on
by the pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to
meet, to the end that the proof at the trial may be limited to the matters
specified, and in order that surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trial
may be avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his
answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also been stated that it is
the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify,
particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to
expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general function or purpose of
a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when
that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a bill. 65redarclaw
x x x x [Emphasis ours.]
Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of the
details desired deprives him of the right to object to evidence that could
be introduced and admitted under an Information of more or less
general terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite
crime.66redarclaw
Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed to the sound
discretion of the court67 it should nonetheless exercise its discretion within the
context of the facts and the nature of the crime charged in each case
and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him. As articulated in the case of People v.
Iannone:68
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has a basic and fundamental right to be
informed of the charges against him so that he will be able to prepare a
defense. Hence the courts must exercise careful surveillance to ensure that a
defendant is not deprived of this right by an overzealous prosecutor attempting
to protect his case or his witnesses. Any effort to leave a defendant in ignorance
of the substance of the accusation until the time of trial must be firmly rebuffed.
This is especially so where the indictment itself provides a paucity of
information. In such cases, the court must be vigilant in safeguarding the
defendant's rights to a bill of particulars and to effective discovery. Should the
prosecutor decide to use an indictment which, although technically sufficient,
does not adequately allow a defendant to properly prepare for trial, he may well
run afoul of the defendant's right to be informed of the accusations against him.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards
its granting69 and order the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on
the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill 70 to give full
meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing
certain overt acts through the Information and withholding others subsequently
discovered, all of which it intends to prove at the trial. This is the type of
surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. 71The accused is entitled to
the observance of all the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict.
This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime
charged carries with it the severe penalty of capital punishment and
entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts involving
a great number of transactions spread over a considerable period of
time.
C.4. Motion to Quash vs. Motion for Bill of Particulars
A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a motion to quash is a
jurisdictional defect on account that the facts charged in the Information does
not constitute an offense.72redarclaw
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent, avers that the allegations in the
information are not vague because the Information needs only allege the
ultimate facts constituting the offense for which the accused stands charged, not
the finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged were committed. In
support of his position, Justice Carpio cited the cases of Miguel v.
Sandiganbayan,73Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,74 and People v.
Romualdez,75 among others, to support the superfluity of the details requested
by Enrile.
Justice Carpio’s reliance on these cases is misplaced for they involve the
issue of quashal of an information on the ground that the facts charge do
not constitute an offense, rather than a request for bill of particulars. That is,
these cited cases involve the critical issue of the validity of an information, and
not a request for specificity with request to an offense charged in an
information.
On the other hand, the cases of People v. Sanico,76People v. Banzuela,77Pielago
v. People,78People v. Rayon, Sr.,79People v. Subesa,80People v.
Anguac,81 and Los Baños v. Pedro,82 which were likewise cited by Justice Carpio,
involve the issue that an Information only need to allege the ultimate facts, and
not the specificity of the allegations contained in the information as to allow the
accused to prepare for trial and make an intelligent plea. 83redarclaw
Notably, in Miguel,84 to which Justice Carpio concurred, this Court
mentioned that the proper remedy, if at all, to a supposed ambiguity in
21 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
an otherwise valid Information, is merely to move for a bill of
particulars and not for the quashal of an information which sufficiently
alleges the elements of the offense charged.85redarclaw
Clearly then, a bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid
information for it merely fills in the details on an otherwise valid
information to enable an accused to make an intelligent plea and
prepare for his defense.
I stress, however, that the issue in the present case involves abuse of discretion
for denying Enrile’s request for a bill of particulars, and not a motion to quash.
If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is
in order.86redarclaw
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so
vague that the accused cannot prepare to plead or prepare for trial,
then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper remedy. 87redarclaw
Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct
and separate remedies, the latter presupposing an information sufficient in law
to charge an offense.88redarclaw
D. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court
where the Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the
trial court will not be reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly
erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is shown. 89redarclaw
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment that amounts or is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law such as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 90 For the extraordinary writ
of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of
power.
It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars on two grounds, namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the details sought were evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated
during trial; and
(2) his desired details were reiterations of the details he sought in his
supplemental opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
We shall separately examine these grounds in determining whether the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied Enrile’s
motion for a bill of particulars and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Sandiganbayan Ground #1:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The details sought were evidentiary in nature
D.1. The Law of Plunder
A determination of whether the details that Enrile sought were evidentiary
requires an examination of the elements of the offense he is charged
with, i.e., plunder under Republic Act No. 7080.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d)
hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree
of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances,
as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The
court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Based on this definition, the elements of plunder are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or
22 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of government-owned or -controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. [Emphasis supplied.]
D.1.a. The Conspiracy Element and its Requested Details
Taking these elements into account, we hold that Enrile’s requested details
on Who among the accused acquired the alleged “ill-gotten
wealth” are not proper subjects for a bill of particulars.
The allegation of the Information that the accused and Jessica Lucila G. Reyes,
“conspiring with one another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and
John Raymund de Asis x x x” expressly charges conspiracy.
The law on plunder provides that it is committed by “a public officer who acts by
himself or in connivance with x x x.” The term “connivance” suggests an
agreement or consent to commit an unlawful act or deed with another;
to connive is to cooperate or take part secretly with another. 91 It implies both
knowledge and assent that may either be active or passive. 92redarclaw
Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with
other persons, and the Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica
Lucila Reyes conspired with one another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald
John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to specify, as an
essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at
least P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one, by two or by all of the
accused. In the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth
acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as
the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at least P50 x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted which
million. validated the findings that each of Enrile’s PDAF projects in the years
2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as a crime by
These matters will simply establish and support the ultimate fact that Enrile’s
itself but only as the mode of committing the crime. Thus, there is no absolute
PDAF was used to fund fictitious or nonexistent projects. Whether a
necessity of reciting its particulars in the Information because conspiracy is not
discretionary fund (in the form of PDAF) had indeed been made available to
the gravamen of the offense charged.
Enrile as a member of the Philippine Congress and in what amounts are
evidentiary matters that do not need to be reflected with particularity in the
It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in
Information, and may be passed upon at the full-blown trial on the merits of the
either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word “conspire,” or its
case.
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude; or (2) by
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person
D.1.b(i) The yearly PDAF Allocations
of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision
as the nature of the crime charged will admit, to enable the accused to
Specifically, we believe that the exact amounts of Enrile’s yearly PDAF
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same
allocations, if any, from 2004 to 2010 need not be pleaded with specific
facts.93redarclaw
particularity to enable him to properly plead and prepare for his defense. In
fact, Enrile may be in a better position to know these details than the
Our ruling on this point in People v. Quitlong94 is particularly
prosecution and thus cannot claim that he would be taken by surprise during
instructive:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
trial by the omission in the Information of his annual PDAF allocations.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of
conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties
Thus, whether the amounts of Enrile’s PDAF allocations have been specified or
therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts
not, Enrile has been sufficiently informed that he stands charged of endorsing
connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy.
Napoles’ non-government organizations to implement spurious or fictitious
Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
projects, in exchange for a percentage of his PDAF.
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the
indictment contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the
D.1.b(ii) The details of the COA Audits
offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature
of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
The details of the “COA audits or field investigations” only support the ultimate
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the
fact that the projects implemented by Napoles’ NGOs, and funded by Enrile’s
accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based
PDAF, were nonexisting or fictitious. Thus, they are evidentiary in nature and do
on the same facts. x x x95
not need to be spelled out with particularity in the Information.
D.1.b. The Requested Details of Enrile’s PDAF
To require more details on these matters from the prosecution would amount to
We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars for asking for evidentiary information that the latter intends to present at the trial;
specifics sought under the questions – it would be a compulsion on the prosecution to disclose in advance of the trial
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official document is the evidence it will use in proving the charges alleged in the indictment.
a portion of the “Priority Development Assistance Fund” identified as
that of a member of Congress, in this instance, as ENRILE’s, to be D.1.c. Other Sources of Kickbacks and Commissions
found? In what amount for each year is ENRILE’s Priority Development
Assistance Fund? We also deny Enrile’s plea for details on who “the others” were (aside
from Napoles, Lim and De Asis) from whom he allegedly received kickbacks and
and commissions. These other persons do not stand charged of conspiring with
Enrile and need not therefore be stated with particularly, either as specific

23 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
individuals or as John Does. The Court cannot second-guess the prosecution’s
reason for not divulging the identity of these “others” who may potentially be
witnesses for the prosecution.
What the Constitution guarantees the accused is simply the right to meet and
examine the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has the prerogative to call
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information, subject to
the defense’s right to cross-examine them.96 Making these “others” known
would in fact be equivalent to the prosecution’s premature disclosure of its
evidence. We stress, to the point of repetition, that a bill of particulars is not
meant to compel the prosecution to prematurely disclose evidentiary matters
supporting its case.
D.2. The Overt Acts constituting the “Combination” or “Series” under
the Plunder Law
We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought
under the following questions –
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the “combination”?
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the “series”? Who
committed those acts? [Emphasis ours.]
D.2.a. Reason for Requirement for Particulars of Overt Acts
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth
involving at least P50 million by means of a combination or series of overt
acts.97 Under these terms, it is not sufficient to simply allege that the amount of
ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the manner of
amassing the ill-gotten wealth – whether through a combination or series of
overt acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 – is an important element
that must be alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at least two (2)
acts falling under different categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A.
No. 7080 [for example, raids on the public treasury under Section 1, paragraph
(d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the
National Government under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or more overt
or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Section
1, paragraph (d) [for example, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the
public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph
(1)].98redarclaw
24 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
With respect to paragraph (a) of the Information –
[(i.e., by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM,
DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or commissions under the following
circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES
gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project
to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in
consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the
appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government organizations
which became the recipients and/or target implementers of ENRILE’S PDAF
projects, which duly funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus
enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain x
x x)] –
we hold that the prosecution employed a generalized or shotgun approach in
alleging the criminal overt acts allegedly committed by Enrile. This approach
rendered the allegations of the paragraph uncertain to the point of
ambiguity for purposes of enabling Enrile to respond and prepare for his
defense. These points are explained in greater detail below.
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or series of overt
or criminal acts.” Hence, even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth
amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act. This
interpretation of the Plunder Law is very clear from the congressional
deliberations.99redarclaw
Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can be no
crime of plunder, the various overt acts that constitute the “combination” and
“series” the Information alleged, are material facts that should not only be
alleged, but must be stated with sufficient definiteness so that the accused
would know what he is specifically charged of and why he stands charged, so
that he could properly defend himself against the charge.
Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the overall
scheme or conspiracy must not be generally stated; they should be stated
with enough particularity for Enrile (and his co-accused) to be able to prepare
the corresponding refuting evidence to meet these alleged overt acts.
It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts had
been repeatedly done (although this may constitute a series if averred with
sufficient definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted in the accumulation or
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00, as in this
case. The Information should reflect with particularity the predicate acts that
underlie the crime of plunder, based on the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A.
No. 7080.
A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case shows
that the prosecution made little or no effort to particularize the
transactions that would constitute the required series or combination of
overt acts.
In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its recital of
the manner Enrile and his co-accused allegedly operated, thus
describing its general view of the series or combination of overt
criminal acts that constituted the crime of plunder.
Without any specification of the basic transactions where kickbacks or
commissions amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been allegedly
received, Enrile’s preparation for trial is obviously hampered. This defect is not
cured by mere reference to the prosecution’s attachment, as Enrile already
stated in his Reply that the “desired details” could not be found in the
bundle of documents marked by the prosecution, which documents are
not integral parts of the Information. Hence, the prosecution does not
discharge its burden of informing Enrile what these overt acts were by simply
pointing to these documents.
In providing the particulars of the overt acts that constitute the “combination” or
“series” of transactions constituting plunder, it stands to reason that
the amounts involved, or at their ball park figures, should be stated; these
transactions are not necessarily uniform in amount, and cannot simply
collectively be described as amounting to P172,834,500.00 without hampering
Enrile’s right to respond after receiving the right information.
To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very specific
sum based on a number of different acts and hence must have a
breakdown. Providing this breakdown reinforces the required specificity in
describing the different overt acts.
Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is later given the
chance to object to unalleged details, he stands to be surprised at the trial at
the same time that the prosecution is given the opportunity to play fast and
loose with its evidence to satisfy the more than P50 Million requirement of law.
D.2.b. Approximate Dates of Commissions or Kickbacks
Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of the receipt of the
kickbacks and commissions, so that he could prepare the necessary pieces of
25 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
evidence, documentary or otherwise, to disprove the allegations against him.
We point out that the period covered by the indictment extends from “2004 to
2010 or thereabout,” of which, we again stress that different overt acts
constituting of the elements of Plunder took place during this period.
Undoubtedly, the length of time involved – six years – will pose difficulties to
Enrile in the preparation of his defense and will render him susceptible to
surprises. Enrile should not be left guessing and speculating which one/s from
among the numerous transactions involving his discretionary PDAF funds from
2004 to 2010, are covered by the indictment.
D.2.c. The Projects Funded and NGOs Involved
Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that Enrile allegedly
funded coupled with the name of Napoles’ NGO (e.g., Pangkabuhayan
Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform Enrile of the particular transactions
referred to.100redarclaw
Be it remembered that the core of the indictment is:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the funding of nonexisting projects using Enrile’s PDAF;
(2) Enrile’s endorsement of Napoles’ NGOs to the government agencies
to implement these projects; and
(3) Enrile’s receipt of kickbacks or commissions in exchange for his
endorsement.
Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed by Enrile and his
co-accused, the project identification was what started the totality of acts
constituting plunder: only after a project has been identified could Enrile have
endorsed Napoles’ NGO to the appropriate government agency that, in turn,
would implement the supposed project using Enrile’s PDAF. Note that without
the project identification, no justification existed to release Enrile’s PDAF to
Napoles’ allegedly bogus NGO.
In these lights, the “identified project” and “Napoles’ NGO” are material
facts that should be clearly and definitely stated in the Information to allow
Enrile to adequately prepare his defense evidence on the specific transaction
pointed to. The omission of these details will necessarily leave Enrile guessing
on what transaction/s he will have to defend against, since he may have funded
other projects with his PDAF. Specification will also allow him to object to
evidence not referred to or covered by the Information’s ultimate facts.
D.2.d. The Government Agencies Serving as Conduits (1) projects involved;

The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles’ NGOs are also (2) Napoles’ participating NGOs; and
material facts that must be specified, since they served a necessary role in the
crime charged – the alleged conduits between Enrile and Napoles’ NGOs. (3) the government agency involved in each transaction
They were indispensable participants in the elaborate scheme alleged to have
will undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know the specific
been committed.
transactions involved, and thus enable him to prepare adequately and
intelligently whatever defense or defenses he may have.
The particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the
transactions, need not anymore be named in the Information, as these are
We reiterate that the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the
already evidentiary matters. The identification of the particular agency vis-à-vis
Information that are indefinite, vague, or are conclusions of law to enable the
Napoles’ NGO and the identified project, will already inform Enrile of the
accused to properly plead and prepare for trial, not simply to inform
transaction referred to.
him of the crime of which he stands accused. Verily, an accused cannot
intelligently respond to the charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or are
In Tantuico v. Republic,101 the Republic filed a case for reconveyance, reversion,
unclear to him.
accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan against former
President Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez, and
We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established
Francisco Tantuico, Jr. Tantuico filed a motion for bill of particulars essentially
is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-
alleging that the complaint was couched in general terms and did not have the
gotten wealth. In the language of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080, for purposes of
particulars that would inform him of the alleged factual and legal bases. The
establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable
Sandiganbayan denied his motion on the ground that the particulars sought are
doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
evidentiary in nature. Tantuico moved to reconsider this decision, but the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten
Sandiganbayan again denied his motion.
wealth.102redarclaw
The Court overturned the Sandiganbayan’s ruling and directed the prosecution
The term “overall unlawful scheme” indicates a general plan of action or
to prepare and file a bill of particulars. Significantly, the Court held that the
method that the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with
particulars prayed for, such as: names of persons, names of
him follow to achieve their common criminal goal. In the alternative, if no
corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for
overall scheme can be found or where the schemes or methods used by the
identification purposes, the particular transactions involving
multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy
withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts
to attain a common criminal goal.103redarclaw
as would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are
not evidentiary in nature. The Court explained that those particulars are
Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the prosecution to allege that a set
material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint so
of acts has been repeatedly done (thereby showing a ‘pattern’ of overt criminal
that the defendant may be fairly informed of the claims made against him and
acts), as has been done in the present case, we point out that this section does
be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
not dispense with the requirement of stating the essential or material facts of
each component or predicate act of plunder; it merely prescribes a rule of
To be sure, the differences between ultimate and evidentiary matters are not
procedure for the prosecution of plunder.
easy to distinguish. While Tantuico was a civil case and did not involve the crime
of plunder, the Court’s ruling nonetheless serves as a useful guide in the
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,104 we construed this procedural rule to mean that
determination of what matters are indispensable and what matters may be
[w]hat the prosecution needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt was only the
omitted in the Information, in relation with the constitutional right of an accused
number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series that would constitute a
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
pattern involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There was no need to
prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been
In the present case, the particulars on the:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
26 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth. 105redarclaw
If, for example, the accused is charged in the Information of malversing public
funds on twenty different (20) occasions, the prosecution does not need to
prove all 20 transactions; it suffices if a number of these acts of malversation
can be proven with moral certainty, provided only that the series or combination
of transaction would amount to at least P50,000,000.00. Nonetheless, each of
the twenty transactions should be averred with particularity, more so if
the circumstances surrounding each transaction are not the same. This
is the only way that the accused can properly prepare for his defense during
trial.
D.3. Paragraph (b) of the Information
As his last requested point, Enrile wants the prosecution to provide the details of
the allegation under paragraph (b) of the Information (i.e., x x x by taking
undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official position, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines) in the following manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on several occasions, of
his official positions, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to
unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. Was this because he received
any money from the government? From whom and for what reason did he
receive any money or property from the government through which he “unjustly
enriched himself”? State the details from whom each amount was received,
the place and the time.
Our ruling on Enrile’s desired details – specifically, the particular overt act/s
alleged to constitute the “combination” and “series” charged in the Information;
a breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks and commissions allegedly
received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at; a brief
description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks and commissions were
received; the approximate dates of receipt of the alleged kickbacks and
commissions from the identified projects; the name of Napoles’ non-government
organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged “recipients and/or target
implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects;” and the government agencies to whom
Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs – renders it unnecessary to require
the prosecution to submit further particulars on the allegations
contained under paragraph (b) of the Information.
Simply put, the particular overt acts alleged to constitute the combination or
27 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
series required by the crime of plunder, coupled with a specification of the other
non-evidentiary details stated above, already answer the question of how Enrile
took undue advantage of his position, authority, relationships, connections and
influence as Senator to unjustly enrich himself.
We also point out that the PDAF is a discretionary fund intended solely for public
purposes. Since the Information stated that Enrile, as “Philippine Senator,”
committed the offense “in relation to his office,” by “repeatedly receiving
kickbacks or commissions” from Napoles and/or her representatives through
projects funded by his (Enrile’s) PDAF, then it already alleged how undue
advantage had been taken and how the Filipino people and the Republic had
been prejudiced. These points are fairly deducible from the allegations in the
Information as supplemented by the required particulars.
E. The Grave Abuse of Discretion
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayan’s
denial of the petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars, on the ground
that the details sought to be itemized or specified are all evidentiary –
without any explanation supporting this conclusion – constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that must be
alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The
Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be
specified, and made the necessary determination of whether each detail was an
ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the
“desired details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the
prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the
presence of these desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of
unearthing from these voluminous documents what the desired details are. The
remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made available by the Rules to enable
an accused to positively respond and make an intelligent defense.
Justice Carpio’s reference to the voluminous 144-page Ombudsman’s resolution
(which found probable cause to indict the petitioner and his co-accused not only
of the crime of plunder, but also for violations of several counts of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practice Act) to justify his argument that Enrile was already aware
of the details he seeks in his motion for a bill of particulars, all the more
strengthens our conclusive position that the Information for plunder filed against
Enrile was ambiguous and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a proper
plea and to prepare for trial. We reiterate, to the point of being repetitive, that
the purpose of the bill of particulars in criminal cases is to supply vague facts or
allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused to properly
plead and prepare for trial.
Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation does not amount
to nor does it serve the purpose of a bill of particulars.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise
by restricting the scope of the proof;106it limits the evidence to be
presented by the parties to the matters alleged in the Information as
supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure of an accused to
move for a bill of particulars deprives him of the right to object to evidence
which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more
or less general terms which sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite
crime.
The record on preliminary investigation, in comparison, serves as the written
account of the inquisitorial process when the fiscal determined the existence
of prima facie evidence to indict a person for a particular crime. The record of
the preliminary investigation, as a general rule, does not even form part of the
records of the case.107 These features of the record of investigation are
significantly different from the bill of particulars that serves as basis, together
with the Information, in specifying the overt acts constituting the offense that
the accused pleaded to during arraignment.
Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal acts.
To prove plunder, the prosecution must weave a web out of the six ways
of illegally amassing wealth and show how the various acts reveal a
combination or series of means or schemes that reveal a pattern of
criminality. The interrelationship of the separate acts must be shown and be
established as a scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
P50 million.
Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous
transactions and schemes that span a period of time. Naturally, in its
prosecution, the State possesses an “effective flexibility” of proving a
predicate criminal act or transaction, not originally contemplated in the
Information, but is otherwise included in the broad statutory definition, in light
of subsequently discovered evidence. The unwarranted use of the flexibility is
what the bill of particulars guards against.
Justice Carpio further argues that the ponencia transformed the nature
of an action from an accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense to an initiatory pleading alleging a cause of action.
We see nothing wrong with such treatment, for a motion for a bill of particulars
28 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
in criminal cases is designed to achieve the same purpose as the motion for a
bill of particulars in civil cases. In fact, certainty, to a reasonable extent, is an
essential attribute of all pleadings, both civil and criminal, and is more especially
needed in the latter where conviction is followed by penal
consequences.108redarclaw
Thus, even if the Information employs the statutory words does not mean that it
is unnecessary to allege such facts in connection with the commission of the
offense as will certainly put the accused on full notice of what he is called upon
to defend, and establish such a record as will effectually bar a subsequent
prosecution for that identical offense.109redarclaw
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital
punishment; for this reason, more process is due, not less. When a
person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and property language
recognized in the due process clause – is at stake in the proceeding, all
measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental rights.
As we emphasized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,110 “the administration of
justice is not a matter of guesswork. The name of the game is fair play, not
foul play. We cannot allow a legal skirmish where, from the start, one of the
protagonists enters the arena with one arm tied to his back.”
Finally, we find no significance in Justice Carpio’s argument that Atty. Estelito
Mendoza did not previously find vague the Information for plunder filed against
President Joseph Estrada in 2001.
Under the amended Information111 against Estrada, et al., each overt act that
constituted the series or combination and corresponding to the predicate acts
under Section 1(d) had been averred with sufficient particularity so that there
was no doubt what particular transaction was referred to.
We point out that unlike in the Information against Enrile, the following matters
had been averred with sufficient definiteness, viz: the predicate acts that
constitute the crime of plunder; the breakdown of how the alleged amount of
P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, had been arrived at; the participants involved
in each transaction; and the specific sources of the illegal wealth amassed.
At any rate, that Atty. Mendoza did not previously question the indictment of
President Estrada via a motion for bill of particulars does not ipso facto mean
that the present Information for plunder filed against Enrile is not vague and
ambiguous.
 Sandiganbayan Ground #2:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That Enrile’s cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds previously
raised
Enrile does not deny that the arguments he raised in his supplemental
opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information and in his motion for bill of particulars were identical. He argues,
however, that the mere reiteration of these grounds should not be a ground for
the denial of his motion for bill of particulars, since “the context in which
those questions were raised was entirely different.”
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of
particulars involved the right of an accused to due process, the enumeration of
the details desired in Enrile’s supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant
of arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of
particulars are different viewed particularly from the prism of their
respective objectives.
In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not state a
crime for which he can be convicted; thus, the Information is void; he alleged a
defect of substance. In the latter, he already impliedly admits that the
Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in details that
would allow him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially
alleged here a defect of form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure
to state the nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while the details
desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are required to be
specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in the Information are
vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not allow Enrile to
adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are made.
That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the
Information does not preclude the accused from requesting for more
specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged to have
committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of
particulars.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause
and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for
purposes of enabling him to properly plead and prepare for trial.
We likewise find no complete congruence between the grounds invoked and the
29 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
details sought by Enrile in his motion for bill of particulars, and the grounds
invoked in opposing the warrant for his arrest issued, so that the
Sandiganbayan’s action in one would bar Enrile from essentially invoking the
same grounds.
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The
judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice.112 Simply put, the judge determines whether the necessity exists
to place the accused under immediate custody to avoid frustrating the ends of
justice.
On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure grants the accused
the remedy of a bill of particulars to better inform himself of the specifics or
particulars concerning facts or matters that had not been averred in the
Information with the necessary clarity for purposes of his defense.
Its purpose is to better acquaint the accused of the specific acts and/or
omissions in relation with the crime charged, to limit the matters and the
evidence that the prosecution may otherwise be allowed to use against him
under a more or less general averment, and to meet the charges head on and
timely object to evidence whose inadmissibility may otherwise be deemed
waived.
Based on these considerations, the question of whether there is probable cause
to issue a warrant of arrest against an accused, is separate and distinct from the
issue of whether the allegations in the Information have been worded with
sufficient definiteness to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare his
defense. While the grounds cited for each may seemingly be the same, they are
submitted for different purposes and should be appreciated from different
perspectives, so that the insufficiency of these grounds for one does not
necessarily translate to insufficiency for the other. Thus, the resolution of the
issue of probable cause should not bar Enrile from seeking a more detailed
averment of the allegations in the Information.
The Sandiganbayan grossly missed these legal points and thus gravely abused
its discretion: it used wrong and completely inapplicable considerations
to support its conclusion.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and SET
ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which denied
Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars and his motion for reconsideration of this
denial.

b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-

extendible period of fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision, with
copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing the facts sought that we
herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill of particulars shall specifically
contain the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or
series of overt criminal acts” charged in the Information.

2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions”

allegedly received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was
arrived at.

3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or

commissions were received.

4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of

the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the identified projects. At
the very least, the prosecution should state the year when the
kickbacks and transactions from the identified projects were received.

5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which

were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s
PDAF projects.”

6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed

Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each government agency
who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

30 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
G.R. No. 176033
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ, Petitioners,
vs.
REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO B. JOSON, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision dated August 11,
1 informed by Aguinaldo that she merely leased the vehicles from LEDC Rent-a-
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its December 4, 2006 Resolution in 2 Car.
CA-G.R. SP No. 92094. The CA dismissed for lack of merit the Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioners Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin
Perez, praying for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the public respondent
Judge Felixberto T. Olalia from implementing the Orders dated May 16, 2005
and August 23, 2005; (2) the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari to annul the said
Orders, and (3) the dismissal of the estafa case against them for having been
prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action.
The procedural antecedents are as follows:
On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B.
Joson filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa against petitioners Aguinaldo and
3
Perez before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila. Claiming to be
business partners in financing casino players, private respondents alleged that
sometime in March and April 2002, petitioners connived in convincing them to
part with their Two Hundred Sixty Thousand (P260,000.00) Pesos in
consideration of a pledge of two motor vehicles which the latter had
misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo, but turned out to be owned by one
Levita De Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car.
On January 15, 2003, Perez filed his Counter-Affidavit, denying the accusation
4
against him, and claiming that his only participation in the transaction between
31 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
private respondents and Aguinaldo was limited to having initially introduced
them to each other.
On January 22, 2003, private respondents filed their Reply-Affidavit, asserting
5
that Perez was the one who showed them photocopies of the registration
paper of the motor vehicles in the name of Aguinaldo, as well as the one who
personally took them out from the rent-a-car company.
On January 29, 2003, Perez filed his Rejoinder-Affidavit, stating that neither
6
original nor photocopies of the registration was required by private
respondents to be submitted to them because from the very start, they were
On February 25, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Renato F. Gonzaga
issued a Resolution recommending both petitioners to be indicted in court for
7
estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). He
also noted that Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit any controverting
evidence despite the subpoena.
On July 16, 2003, an Information (I.S. No. 02L-51569) charging petitioners
8
with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-
216182, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and
Benjamin Perez," the case was raffled to the public respondent.
On July 31, 2003, Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for
Reduction of Bail to be Posted in Cash, which the public respondent granted in
an Order of even date. 9
On the same day, petitioners filed through counsel a Very Urgent Motion to
Recall or Quash Warrants of Arrest, alleging that the Resolution dated
10
February 25, 2003 has not yet attained finality, and that they intended to file a
motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 2003, petitioners jointly filed with the OCP of Manila their "Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the Information
Prematurely Filed With the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of DOJ is resolved with finality. Petitioners reiterated the same prayer in their
Manila." Citing the Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez,
11
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated March 15, 2004.
20

Aguinaldo asserted, among others, that no deceit or false pretenses was

committed because private respondents were fully aware that she does not On April 16, 2004, the public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to
own the pledged motor vehicles. cancel arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion for
reconsideration. 21

On August 6, 2003, the public respondent issued an Order granting the

12

motion for withdrawal of information, and directing the recall of the arrest On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapeña and
warrant only insofar as Aguinaldo was concerned, pending resolution of her Associates, filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of
motion for reconsideration with the OCP. Arrest. De Castro alleged that she was the private complainant in the estafa
22

case that had been ordered archived. Petitioners filed an Opposition with
On August 9, 2003, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Motion to Expunge, alleging that De Castro is not a party to the said case,
23

Arraignment, pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed with which is in active file, awaiting the resolution of their petition for review before
the OCP of Manila. Upon the prosecution's motion, the public respondent
13
the DOJ.
ordered the proceedings to be deferred until the resolution of petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.14
On October 15, 2004, De Castro filed a Manifestation informing the public
24

respondent that the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution dated

On December 23, 2003, the public respondent ordered the case archived September 6, 2004 denying petitioners' petition for review in I.S. No. 02G-
pending resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration with the OCP of 29349 & 02G-28820 for estafa, entitled "Levita De Castro v. Felilibeth
Manila.15
Aguinaldo." 25

On January 16, 2004, the OCP of Manila, through ACP Antonio M. Israel, filed On May 16, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion
a Motion to Set Case for Trial, considering that petitioners' motions for
16
to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, thus:
reconsideration and for withdrawal of the information have already been
denied for lack of merit. Pending with this Court are (1) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant
of Arrest against accused Aguinaldo filed by private prosecutor with conformity
On February 27, 2004, petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a of the public prosecutor. x x x
petition for review in I.S. No. 02L-51569 for estafa, entitled "Benjamin Perez
17

and Felilibeth Aguinaldo v. Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson." It appears from the records that:

Acting on the prosecution's recommendation for the denial of petitioners' (1)the warrant of arrest issued against accused Aguinaldo was recalled
motions for reconsideration and withdrawal of the information, and its motion to pending resolution of the Petition for Review filed with the DOJ; x x x
set the case for trial, the public respondent issued an Order dated March 15,
18

2004 directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo and the (2)the Petition for Review was subsequently dismissed
setting of the case for arraignment.
xxx
On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment
and Suspend Further Proceedings, until their petition for review before the
19

(3)accused Aguinaldo has not yet posted bail bond.

32 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
In view of the foregoing, (the) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant
of Arrest is GRANTED. Let this case be REINSTATED and let warrant of arrest
be issued against accused Aguinaldo.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. 26
On May 30, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Quash Warrant of Arrest. 27
On August 23, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest,
and setting petitioners' arraignment, as the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure (or Rules of Court) allows only a 60-day period of suspension of
arraignment. Citing Crespo v. Mogul, he also ruled that the issuance of the
28
warrant of arrest is best left to the discretion of the trial court. He also noted
that records do not show that the DOJ has resolved the petition for review,
although photocopies were presented by De Castro.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent in issuing the Orders
dated May 16, 2005 and August 23, 2005. On August 11, 2006, the CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution dated December 4,
29
2006. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT
THE MOTION TO REINSTATE THE CASE AND ISSUE A WARRANT OF
ARREST WAS FILED BY ONE LEVITA DE CASTRO WHO IS NOT A PARTY
TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182.
II.
33 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
A PROCEDURAL TECHINICALITY THAT THE SUSPENSION ALLOWED FOR
ARRAIGNMENT IS ALREADY BEYOND THE 60- DAY PERIOD MAY BE
RELAXED IN THE INTEREST OF AN ORDERLY AND SPEEDY
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
III.
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE I.S. NO. 02L-51569
(CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182) BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF MANILA HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED. 30
On the first issue, petitioners argue that the public respondent erred in issuing
the Order dated May 16, 2005 reinstating the case and issuing an arrest
warrant against Aguinaldo. They point out that the Motion to Reinstate the
Case and to Issue a Warrant of Arrest against Aguinaldo was filed by De
Castro who is not a party in Criminal Case No. 03-216182, entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez," instead of private
complainants Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson. They also assert that
said motion was erroneously granted based on the purported denial of their
petition for review by the DOJ, despite a Certification showing that their actual
petition in I.S. Number 02L-51569, entitled "Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth
Aguinaldo," has not yet been resolved and is still pending with the DOJ.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the provision of Section 11, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty
(60) days is merely directory; thus, it cannot deprive petitioners of their
procedural right to due process, as their petition for review has not yet been
resolved by the DOJ.
On the third issue, petitioners take exception that even before they could
receive a copy of the DOJ resolution denying their petition for review, and thus
move for its reconsideration, the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-216182
had already been filed with the RTC on July 16, 2003. They contend that such
precipitate filing of the Information and issuance of a warrant of arrest put
petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary investigation
having been completed because they were not afforded their right to file a
motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. In support of their contention,
they raise the following arguments: that the right to preliminary investigation is
a substantive, not merely a procedural right; that an Information filed without
affording the respondent his right to file a motion for reconsideration of an
adverse resolution, is fatally premature; and, that a denial of a complete
preliminary investigation deprives the accused of the full measure of his right to
due process and infringes on his constitutional right to liberty.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
On the first issue, petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to
Reinstate the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest was filed by one Levita De
31
Castro who is not a party to Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records show that
De Castro is not even a private complainant, but a mere witness for being the
owner of the vehicles allegedly used by petitioners in defrauding and
convincing private respondents to part with their P260,000.00. Thus, the public
respondent should have granted petitioners' motion to expunge, and treated
De Castro's motion as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect, as it was filed
by one who is not a party to that case.
Petitioners are also correct in noting that De Castro's motion was granted
based on the purported dismissal of their petition for review with the DOJ. In
reinstating the case and issuing the arrest warrant against Aguinaldo, the
public respondent erroneously relied on the DOJ Resolution dated September
6, 2004 dismissing the petition for review in a different case, i.e., I.S. No. 02G-
29349 & 02G-28820, entitled "Levita De Castro v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo, for two
(2) counts of estafa." As correctly noted by petitioners, however, their petition
for review with the DOJ is still pending resolution. In particular, Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Miguel F. Guido, Jr. certified that based on available records
of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, their petition for review filed in I.S.
Number 02L-51569, entitled "Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo"
for estafa, is still pending resolution as of May 27, 2005. It bears stressing that
32
their petition stemmed from Criminal Case No. 03-216812, entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez" wherein the public
respondent issued the interlocutory orders assailed before the CA, and now
before the Court.
On the second issue, the Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the
provision of Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the
33
suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, the
estafa case against them cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their petition
for review with finality.
34 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
In Samson v. Judge Daway, the Court explained that while the pendency of a
34
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited
provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days
reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. 35
In Diño v. Olivarez, the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite
36
suspension of the proceedings in the trial court. Its reliance on the reviewing
authority, the Justice Secretary, to decide the appeal at the soonest possible
time was anchored on the rule provided under Department Memorandum
Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which mandates that the period for the
disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall be seventy- five (75) days. 37
In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that in a long line of
38
decisions, it has repeatedly held that while rules of procedure are liberally
construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. After all,
rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the litigants, and they
are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience of
invoking "substantial justice." Relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or
the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by compelling
reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it. 39
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, and there being no such reasons
shown to warrant relaxation of procedural rules in this case, the CA correctly
ruled, thus:
In the case at bar, the petitioners' petition for review was filed with the
Secretary of Justice on February 27, 2004. As early as April 16, 2004, upon the
petitioners' motion, the arraignment of the petitioners herein was ordered
deferred by the public respondent. We believe that the period of one year and
one month from April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005 when the public respondent
ordered the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of petitioner Aguinaldo, was
more than ample time to give the petitioners the opportunity to obtain a
resolution of their petition for review from the DOJ. The petitioners though
submitted a Certification from the DOJ dated May 30, 2005 stating that their
petition for review is pending resolution by the Department as of May 27, 2005.
However, such delay in the resolution does not extend the period of 60 days
prescribed under the afore-quoted Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Besides, the petitioners may be faulted for the
delay in the resolution of their petition. According to their counsel, she received
the letter dated April 15, 2004 from the DOJ requiring her to submit the
pertinent pleadings relative to petitioners' petition for review; admittedly,
however, the same was complied with only on October 15, 2004. We therefore
find that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed orders.40
On the third issue, the Court is likewise unconvinced by petitioners' argument
that the precipitate filing of the Information and the issuance of a warrant of
arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary
investigation having been completed because they were not afforded their right
to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is a
substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in arguing that
the Information filed, without affording the respondent his right to file a motion
for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally premature. In
support of their argument, petitioners cite Sales v. Sandiganbayan wherein it
41
was held that since filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of
the preliminary investigation proper, an Information filed without first affording
the accused his right to a motion for reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial
of the right itself to a preliminary investigation.
The Court finds petitioners' reliance on Sales as misplaced. A closer look into
42
said case would reveal that the accused therein was denied his right to move
for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a
preliminary investigation under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman
before the filing of an Information. In contrast, petitioners in this case were
afforded their right to move for reconsideration of the adverse resolution in a
preliminary investigation when they filed their "Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion for the Withdrawal of Information Prematurely Filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila," pursuant to Section 3 of the 2000
43
National Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal) and Section 56 of the
44
Manual for Prosecutors .45
35 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July 16,
2003, the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to quash warrant of
arrest, and setting their arraignment, pending the final resolution of their
petition for review by the DOJ. The Court believes that the period of almost
one (1) year and seven (7) months from the time petitioners filed their petition
for review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004 to September 14, 2005 when 46
the trial court finally set their arraignment, was more than ample time to give
petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition. In fact, the
public respondent had been very liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11
(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which limits the suspension of arraignment
to a 60-day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than
eleven (11) years having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and
petitioners have yet to be arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of
the trial on the merits in the criminal case below, as the 60-day period counted
from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ had long lapsed.
On whether petitioners were accorded their right to a complete preliminary
investigation as part of their right to due process, the Court rules in the
affirmative. Having submitted his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder- Affidavit to
the OCP of Manila before the filing of Information for estafa, Perez cannot be
heard to decry that his right to preliminary investigation was not completed. For
her part, while Aguinaldo was not personally informed of any notice of
preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the Information, she was
nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such investigation. In
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the February 25, 2003 Resolution of
47
ACP Gonzaga, Aguinaldo relied mostly on the Counter- Affidavit and
Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez to assail the recommendation of the prosecutor to
indict her for estafa. Since the filing of such motion for reconsideration was
held to be consistent with the principle of due process and allowed under
Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors, she cannot complain denial of her
48
right to preliminary investigation.
Both petitioners cannot, therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete
preliminary investigation as part of their right to due process. After all, "[d]ue
process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied
when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy. Where an opportunity to be heard either
through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process." 49
In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing the May 16,
2005 Order granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of
Arrest, as it was filed by one who is not a party to the case, and it was based
on the DOJ's dismissal of a petition for review in a different case.
Nevertheless, the Court upholds the CA ruling that the public respondent
committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the August 23, 2005
Order denying petitioners' motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their
arraignment, despite the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ. For
one, the public respondent had been very liberal in applying Section 11 (c),
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which allows suspension of arraignment for a
period of 60 days only. For another, records show that petitioners were given
opportunity to be heard during the preliminary investigation of their estafa
case.
Considering that this case had been held in abeyance long enough without
petitioners having been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case to
the trial court for trial on the merits with strict observance of Circular No. 38-98
dated August 11, 1998, or the "Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act
No. 8493, entitled 'An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All Criminal Cases
Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.'" In this regard,
suffice it to state that petitioners cannot invoke violation of their right to speedy
trial because Section 9 (3) of Circular No. 38-98 excludes in computing the
time within which trial must commence the delay resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the CA
and the Court.
Finally, in order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition
for review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously
36 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
issued because the quashal of a warrant of arrest may only take place upon
the finding that no probable cause exists. Moreover, judges should take note of
the following:
1.If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for reinvestigation
of the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court may suspend the
proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court should set the
arraignment of the accused and direct the public prosecutor to submit the
resolution disposing of the motion on or before the period fixed by the court,
which in no instance could be more than the period fixed by the court counted
from the granting of the motion to suspend arraignment, otherwise the court
will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
2.If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may
suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court
should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the DOJ to submit the
resolution disposing of the petition on or before the period fixed by the Rules
which, in no instance, could be more than sixty (60) days from the filing of the
Petition for Review before the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the
arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated August 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated
December 4, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92094, are AFFIRMED. Considering
that the proceedings in this criminal case had been held in abeyance long
enough, let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court which is
hereby DIRECTED to try the case on the merits with dispatch in accordance
with the Court's Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015
ABS-CBN CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
FELIPE GOZON, GILBERTO R. DUAVIT, JR., MARISSA L. FLORES,
JESSICA A. SORO, GRACE DELA PENA-REYES, JOHN OLIVER T.
MANALASTAS, JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The main issue in this case is whether there is probable cause to charge
respondents with infringement under Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known
as the Intellectual Property Code. The resolution of this issue requires
clarification of the concept of "copyrightable material" in relation to material that
is rebroadcast live as a news story. We are also asked to rule on whether
criminal prosecution for infringement of copyrightable material, such as live
rebroadcast, can be negated by good faith.
ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN) filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari to
assail the November 9, 2010 Decision and the March 3, 2011 Resolution of
2 3
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reinstated the Department of
Justice Resolution dated August 1, 2005 that ordered the withdrawal of the
Information finding probable cause for respondents’ violation of Sections
177 and 211 of the Intellectual Property Code. Respondents are officers and
4 5 6 Network (CNN). It received a live video feed of the coverage of Angelo dela
employees of GMA Network, Inc. (GMA-7). They are: Felipe Gozon (Gozon),
GMA-7 President; Gilberto R. Duavit, Jr. (Duavit, Jr.), Executive Vice-
President; Marissa L. Flores (Flores), Vice-President for New and Public
Affairs; Jessica A. Soho (Soho), Director for News; Grace Dela Peña-Reyes
(Dela Peña-Reyes), Head of News and Public Affairs; John Oliver Manalastas
(Manalastas), Program Manager; and others.
The controversy arose from GMA-7’s news coverage on the homecoming of
Filipino overseas worker and hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz on July 22,
2004. As summarized by the Court of Appeals:
37 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
Overseas Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants
and as a condition for his release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of
Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he was released by his captors and
was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July 2004.
Occasioned by said homecoming and the public interest it generated, both . . .
GMA Network, Inc. . . . and [petitioner] made their respective broadcasts and
coverage of the live event. 7
ABS-CBN "conducted live audio-video coverage of and broadcasted the arrival
of Angelo dela Cruz at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and the
subsequent press conference." ABS-CBN allowed Reuters Television Service
8
(Reuters) to air the footages it had taken earlier under a special embargo
agreement. 9
ABS-CBN alleged that under the special embargo agreement, any of the
footages it took would be for the "use of Reuter’s international subscribers
only, and shall be considered and treated by Reuters under ‘embargo’ against
use by other subscribers in the Philippines. . . . [N]o other Philippine subscriber
of Reuters would be allowed to use ABS-CBN footage without the latter’s
consent."10
1
GMA-7, to which Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, Soho, Dela Peña-Reyes, and
Manalastas are connected, "assigned and stationed news reporters and
technical men at the NAIA for its live broadcast and non-live news coverage of
the arrival of dela Cruz." GMA-7 subscribes to both Reuters and Cable News
11
Cruz’s arrival from Reuters. 12
GMA-7 immediately carried the live news feed in its program "Flash Report,"
together with its live broadcast. Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive any notice or
13
was not aware that Reuters was airing footages of ABS-CBN. GMA-7’s news
14
control room staff saw neither the "No Access Philippines" notice nor a notice
that the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS-CBN. 15
On August 13, 2004, ABS-CBN filed the Complaint for copyright infringement
under Sections 177 and 211 of the Intellectual Property Code.
16 17 18
On December 3, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo Venturanza issued the
Resolution finding probable cause to indict Dela Peña-Reyes and
19
Manalastas. Consequently, the Information for violation of the Intellectual
20 21
Property Code was filed on December 17, 2004. It reads:
That on or about the 22nd of July 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
each other, being the Head of News Operations and the Program Manager,
respectively, for the News and Public Affairs Department of GMA Network, Inc.,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use and broadcast the
footage of the arrival of Angelo [d]ela Cruz at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport of which ABS-CBN holds the exclusive ownership and copyright by then
and there using, airing, and broadcasting the said footage in its news program
"FLASH REPORT" without first obtaining the consent or authority of said
copyright owner, to their damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law. 22
On January 4, 2005, respondents filed the Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice. In the Resolution (Gonzalez Resolution) dated August
23
1, 2005, Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez (Secretary
Gonzalez) ruled in favor of respondents and held that good faith may be raised
as a defense in the case. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
24
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BY GMA-7 in I.S. No.
04-10458 is considered meritorious and is hereby GRANTED. This case is
hereby Dismissed, the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City is
hereby reversed and the same is ordered to withdraw the information if any
and report action taken to this office within ten (10) days. (Emphasis in the
25
original)
Both parties moved for reconsideration of the Gonzalez Resolution. 26
Meanwhile, on January 19, 2005, the trial court granted the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings filed earlier by Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas. The trial court
27
Order reads:
38 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
Perusing the motion, the court finds that a petition for review was filed with the
Department of Justice on January 5, 2005 as confirmed by the public
prosecutor. Under Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
once a petition for review is filed with the Department of Justice, a suspension
of the criminal proceedings may be allowed by the court.
Accordingly, to allow the Department of Justice the opportunity to act on said
petition for review, let the proceedings on this case be suspended for a period
of sixty (60) days counted from January 5, 2005, the date the petition was filed
with the Department of Justice. The arraignment of the accused on February 1,
2005 is accordingly cancelled. Let the arraignment be rescheduled to March 8,
2005 at 8:30 a.m. The accused through counsel are notified in open court.
SO ORDERED. 28
On June 29, 2010, Department of Justice Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra
(Secretary Agra) issued the Resolution (Agra Resolution) that reversed the
Gonzalez Resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela Peña-Reyes
and Manalastas for violation of the Intellectual Property Code. Secretary Agra
29
also found probable cause to indict Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho for the
same violation. He ruled that:
30
[w]hile good faith may be a defense in copyright infringement, the same is a
disputable presumption that must be proven in a full-blown trial. Disputable
presumptions may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Thus, a
full-blown trial is the proper venue where facts, issues and laws are evaluated
and considered. The very purpose of trial is to allow a party to present
evidence to overcome the disputable presumptions involved. 31
The dispositive portion of the Agra Resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
(a) The Motion for Reconsideration filed by appellees ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN) of our Resolution promulgated
on August 1, 2005 (Resolution No. 364, Series of 2005) and the
Petition for Review filed by complainant-appellant ABS-CBN in I.S. No.
04-10458 on April10, 2006, are GRANTED and the City Prosecutor of
 Quezon City is hereby ordered to file the necessary Information for
violation of Section 177 and 211 of Republic Act No. 8293 against
GMA-7. Felipe L. Gozon, Gilberto R. Duavit, Jr., Marissa L.Flores,
Jessica A. Soho, Grace Dela Pena-Reyes, John Oliver T. Manalastas[.]
....
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
32
Respondents assailed the Agra Resolution through the Petition for Certiorari
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction on September 2, 2010 before the Court of Appeals. In
the Resolution dated September 13, 2010, the Court of Appeals granted the
temporary restraining order preventing the Department of Justice from
enforcing the Agra Resolution. 33
On November 9, 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision granting
the Petition and reversing and setting aside the Agra Resolution. The Court of
34
Appeals held that Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Resolution. Resolving the issue of copyright infringement, the Court of
Appeals said:
Surely, private respondent has a copyright of its news coverage. Seemingly, for
airing said video feed, petitioner GMA is liable under the provisions of the
Intellectual Property Code, which was enacted purposely to protect copyright
owners from infringement. However, it is an admitted fact that petitioner GMA
had only aired a five (5) second footage of the disputed live video feed that it
had received from Reuters and CNN as a subscriber. Indeed, petitioners had
no notice of the right of ownership of private respondent over the same.
Without notice of the "No Access Philippines" restriction of the live video feed,
petitioner cannot be faulted for airing a live video feed from Reuters and CNN.
Verily, as aptly opined by Secretary Gonzalez in his earlier Resolution, the act
of petitioners in airing the five (5) second footage was undeniably attended by
good faith and it thus serves to exculpate them from criminal liability under the
Code. While the Intellectual Property Code is a special law, and thus generally
categorized as malum prohibitum, it bears to stress that the provisions of the
Code itself do not ipso facto penalize a person or entity for copyright
39 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
infringement by the mere fact that one had used a copyrighted work or
material.
Certainly so, in the exercise of one’s moral and economic or copyrights, the
very provisions of Part IV of the Intellectual Property Code provide for the
scope and limitations on copyright protection under Section 184 and in fact
permit fair use of copyrighted work under Section 185. With the aforesaid
statutory limitations on one’s economic and copyrights and the allowable
instances where the other persons can legally use a copyrighted work, criminal
culpability clearly attaches only when the infringement had been knowingly and
intentionally committed. (Emphasis supplied)
35
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED and the assailed Resolution dated 29 June 2010 REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the earlier Resolution dated 1 August 2005, which
ordered the withdrawal of the Information filed, if any, against the petitioners for
violation of Sections 177 and 211 of the Intellectual Property Code, is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
36
ABS-CBN’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. It then filed its Petition for
37
Review before this court assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals. 38
The issues for this court’s consideration are:
First, whether Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction in the Resolution
dated June 29, 2010 and, therefore, whether a petition for certiorari was the
proper remedy in assailing that Resolution;
Second, whether news footage is copyrightable under the law;
Third, whether there was fair use of the broadcast material;
Fourth, whether lack of knowledge that a material is copyrighted is a defense
against copyright infringement;
Fifth, whether good faith is a defense in a criminal prosecution for violation of
the Intellectual Property Code; and
Lastly, whether the Court of Appeals was correct in overturning Secretary
Agra’s finding of probable cause.
I We clarify that the suspension of the arraignment should always be within the
The trial court granted respondents’ Motion to Suspend Proceedings and
deferred respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment for 60
days in view of the Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice.
Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows
the suspension of the accused’s arraignment in certain circumstances only:
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.–Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the
court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President;
provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days
counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. (12a)
(Emphasis supplied)
In Samson v. Daway, this court acknowledged the applicability of Rule 116,
39
Section (c) in a criminal prosecution for infringement under the Intellectual
40 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
Property Code. However, this court emphasized the limits of the order of
deferment under the Rule:
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the
arraignment, the . . . provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a
period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court
is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. 40
limits allowed by law. In Crespo v. Judge Mogul, this court outlined the effects
41
of filing an information before the trial court, which includes initiating a criminal
action and giving this court "authority to hear and determine the case": 42
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of
the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the
criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the
Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once
the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal
may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court, the only qualification is that the action of the Court
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People
to due process of law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a
motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the
merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss
filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be
a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot
possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that
there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the
prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of
Justice. The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all
know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction
of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the
contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence
of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own
independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or
acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for
the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less
should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a
private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The
least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution
although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private
prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. (Emphasis
43
supplied, citations omitted)
The doctrine in Crespo was reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. Court of
Appeals, where this court reminded the Department of Justice Secretary to
44
refrain from entertaining petitions for review when the case is already pending
with this court:
[I]n order to avoid a situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
41 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in the Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court. 45
The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and
Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition
for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It was only on
September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the
Court of Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case
during the interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. As Judge
Mogul reasoned in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed
with the arraignment "disregards the requirements of due process [and] erodes
the Court’s independence and integrity." 46
II
According to ABS-CBN, the Court of Appeals erred in finding that: a motion for
reconsideration was not necessary before a petition for certiorari could be filed;
the Department of Justice Secretary committed errors of jurisdiction since the
Agra Resolution was issued within its authority and in accordance with settled
laws and jurisprudence; and respondents were not liable for copyright
infringement.
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals found that respondents
committed a procedural error when they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration before filing the Petition for Certiorari. However, the Court of
Appeals held that a motion for reconsideration was unnecessary since the
Agra Resolution was a patent nullity and it would have been useless under the
circumstances: Given that a reading of the assailed Resolution and the instant
records readily reveals errors of jurisdiction on the part of respondent
Secretary, direct judicial recourse is warranted under the circumstances. Aside
from the fact that said Resolution is a patent nullity having been issued in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the filing
of a motion for reconsideration is evidently useless on account of the fact that
the issues and arguments before this Court have already been duly raised and
accordingly delved into by respondent Secretary in his disposition of the
petition a quo. (Emphasis in the original)
47
In Elma v. Jacobi, this court ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
48
the Rules of Court is proper when assailing adverse resolutions of the
Department of Justice stemming from the determination of probable
cause. However, grave abuse of discretion must be alleged.
49 50
In Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, this court stressed the prosecutor’s role in
51
determining probable cause. Judicial review will only lie when it is shown that
the prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction:
A prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish
probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information against the
respondent. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where
respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse
of discretion. Otherwise stated, such review is appropriate only when the
prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross
enough to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law. (Citations omitted)
52
Grave abuse of discretion refers to:
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law. 53
Resorting to certiorari requires that there be there be "no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[,]" such as a
54
motion for reconsideration. Generally, "a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being
to grant an opportunity for the [tribunal or officer] to correct any error attributed
to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case." However, exceptions to the rule exist:
55
42 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the Court a quo had no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by
the trial Court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised
is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (Emphasis in the
56
original, citations omitted)
As argued by respondents, "[a] second motion for reconsideration would have
been useless and futile since the D[epartment] [of] J[ustice] had already
passed upon the same issues twice." Equally pressing under the
57
circumstances was the need to resolve the matter, as the Information’s filing
would lead to respondents’ imminent arrest. 58
Moreover, Department of Justice Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, or the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal, provides that no second motion for
reconsideration of the Department of Justice Secretary’s resolution shall be
entertained:
SECTION 13. Motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party may file a
motion for reconsideration within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt of the resolution on appeal, furnishing the adverse party and the
Prosecution Office concerned with copies thereof and submitting proof of such
service. No second or further motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
The Agra Resolution was the result of respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration
assailing the Gonzalez Resolution. To file a motion for reconsideration of the
Agra Resolution would be superfluous. Respondents were, therefore, correct in
filing the Petition for Certiorari of the Agra Resolution before the Court of
Appeals.
 III
The Court of Appeals ruled that Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction,
which then required the grant of the writ of certiorari:
So viewed, by ordering the filing of information without proof that probable
cause exists to charge petitioners with a crime, respondent Secretary clearly
committed an error of jurisdiction thus warranting the issuance of the writ of
certiorari. Surely, probable cause cannot be had when the very provisions of
the statute exculpates criminal liability in cases classified as fair use of
copyrighted materials. The fact that they admittedly used the Reuters live video
feed is not, as a matter of course, tantamount to copyright infringement that
would justify the filing of an information against the petitioners.59
Error of jurisdiction must be distinguished from error of judgment:
A line must be drawn between errors of judgment and errors of jurisdiction. An
error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders an order or judgment void or
voidable. Errors of jurisdiction are reviewable on certiorari; errors of judgment,
only by appeal. 60
In People v. Hon. Sandiganbayan : 61
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdictionis one where the act complained of was
issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not
be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of
the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions
of law. (Emphasis supplied)
62
This court has adopted a deferential attitude towards review of the executive’s
finding of probable cause. This is based "not only upon the respect for the
63
investigatory and [prosecutorial] powers granted by the Constitution to the
executive department but upon practicality as well." Review of the Department
64
43 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
of Justice Secretary’s decision or resolution will be allowed only when grave
abuse of discretion is alleged:
The full discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary
investigation to ascertain sufficient ground for the filing of information rests with
the executive branch. Hence, judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice is limited to a determination whether there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Courts cannot
substitute the executive branch’s judgment.
....
It is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that the Court of
Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals decision may
then be appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on
certiorari. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
65
In this case, it must be shown that Secretary Agra exceeded his authority when
he reversed the findings of Secretary Gonzalez. This court must determine
whether there is probable cause to file an information for copyright
infringement under the Intellectual Property Code.
IV
Probable cause pertains to "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof." Preliminary investigation is the inquiry or proceeding
66
to determine whether there is probable cause. 67
In Webb v. De Leon, this court ruled that determination of probable cause
68
during preliminary investigation does not require trial-like evaluation of
evidence since existence of probable cause does not equate to guilt:
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average
man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our
technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on
the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an
abundance.
....
. . . A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It
is not a pronouncement of guilt. 69
In Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., finding probable cause is not
70
equivalent to finding with moral certainty that the accused committed the crime:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the
rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. 71
During preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor does not adjudicate on the
parties’ rights, obligations, or liabilities.
72
In the recent case of Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., we reiterated
73
Webb on the determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation
and traced the history of probable cause as borrowed from American
jurisprudence:
The purpose in determining probable cause is to make sure that the courts are
not clogged with weak cases that will only be dismissed, as well as to spare a
person from the travails of a needless prosecution.
....
. . . In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable
cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:
44 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal
with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what
must be proved.
"The substance of all the definitions" of probable cause "is a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt." McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. St. 63, 69, quoted with
approval in the Carroll opinion. 267 U. S. at 161. And this "means less than
evidence which would justify condemnation" or conviction, as Marshall, C. J.,
said for the Court more than a century ago in Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch
339, 348. Since Marshall’s time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than
bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances
within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being
committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162.
These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and
unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime.
They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s
protection. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of
executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for
some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable
men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The
rule of probable cause is a practical, non technical conception affording the
best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often
opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To
allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’
whim or caprice.
In the Philippines, there are four instances in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure where probable cause is needed to be established:
(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating officer, to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A preliminary
investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information
 for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four
years, two months and one day without regard to the fine;
(2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge, to determine whether
a warrant of arrest or a commitment order, if the accused has already
been arrested, shall be issued and that there is a necessity of placing
the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice;
(3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113:By a peace officer or a private person
making a warrantless arrest when an offense has just been committed,
and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge, to determine whether a
search warrant shall be issued, and only upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which
may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In all these instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause is
based only on the likelihood, or probability, of guilt.
74
Estrada also highlighted that a "[p]reliminary investigation is not part of the
criminal action. It is merely preparatory and may even be disposed of in certain
situations."
75
To determine whether there is probable cause that respondents committed
copyright infringement, a review of the elements of the crime, including the
existing facts, is required.
V require registration of the work to fully recover in an infringement suit.
ABS-CBN claims that news footage is subject to copyright and prohibited use
of copyrighted material is punishable under the Intellectual Property Code. It
45 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
argues that the new footage is not a "newsworthy event" but "merely an
account of the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz in the Philippines — the latter being
the newsworthy event": 76
To be clear, it is the event itself or the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz which is not
copyrightable because that is the newsworthy event. However, any footage
created from the event itself, in this case the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz, are
intellectual creations which are copyrightable. Thus, the footage created by
ABS-CBN during the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz, which includes the
statements of Dindo Amparo, are copyrightable and protected by the laws on
copyright. 77
On the other hand, respondents argue that ABS-CBN’s news footage of Angelo
dela Cruz’s arrival is not copyrightable or subject to protection:
Certainly, the arrival of Angelo [d]ela Cruz, which aroused public attention and
the consciousness of the Filipino people with regard to their countrymen,
OFWs working in foreign countries and how the Philippine government
responds to the issues concerning them, is "news". There is no ingenuity or
inventiveness added in the said news footage. The video footage of this
"news" is not copyrightable by any legal standard as facts of everyday life
depicted in the news and items of press information is part of the public
domain. (Emphasis in the original)
78
The news footage is copyrightable.
The Intellectual Property Code is clear about the rights afforded to authors of
various kinds of work. Under the Code, "works are protected by the sole fact of
their creation, irrespective of their mode or form of expression, as well as of
their content, quality and purpose." These include "[a]udiovisual works and
79
cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to
cinematography or any process for making audiovisual recordings." 80
Contrary to the old copyright law, the Intellectual Property Code does not
81
Nevertheless, both copyright laws provide that copyright for a work is acquired
by an intellectual creator from the moment of creation. 82
It is true that under Section 175 of the Intellectual Property Code, "news of the or embodied in such work. Thus, the new INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE
day and other miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press OF THE PHILIPPINES provides:
information" are considered unprotected subject matter. However, the Code
83

does not state that expression of the news of the day, particularly when it SEC. 175. Unprotected Subject Matter.—Notwithstanding the provisions of
underwent a creative process, is not entitled to protection. Sections 172 and 173, no protection shall extend, under this law, to any idea,
procedure, system, method or operation, concept, principle, discovery or mere
An idea or event must be distinguished from the expression of that idea or data as such, even if they are expressed, explained, illustrated or embodied in
event. An idea has been likened to a ghost in that it "must be spoken to a little a work; news of the day and other miscellaneous facts having the character of
before it will explain itself." It is a concept that has eluded exact legal
84
mere items of press information; or any official text of a legislative,
definition. To get a better grasp of the idea/expression dichotomy, the
85
administrative or legal nature, as well as any official translation thereof.
etymology of the term "idea" is traced:
What then is the subject matter of petitioners’ copyright? This Court is of the
The word "idea" is derived from a Greek term, meaning "a form, the look or opinion that petitioner BJPI’s copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each
appearance of a thing as opposed to its reality, from idein, to see." In the episode of Rhoda and Me, as falling within the class of works mentioned in
Timaeus, Plato saw ideas as eternal paradigms, independent objects to which P.D. 49, §2(M),to wit:
the divine demiurge looks as patterns in forming the world. This was later
modified to the religious conception of ideas as the thoughts of God. "It is not a Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to
very long step to extend the term ‘idea’ to cover patterns, blueprints, or plans in cinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings;
anyone's mind, not only in God’s." The word entered the French and English
vernacular in the 1600s and possessed two meanings. The first was the The copyright does not extend to the general concept or format of its dating
Platonic meaning of a perfect exemplar or paradigm. The second, which game show. Accordingly, by the very nature of the subject of petitioner BJPI’s
probably has its origin with Descartes, is of a mental concept or image or, more copyright, the investigating prosecutor should have the opportunity to compare
broadly, any object of the mind when it is active. Objects of thought may exist the videotapes of the two shows.
independently. The sun exists (probably) before and after you think of it. But it
is also possible to think of things that have never existed, such as a unicorn or
Mere description by words of the general format of the two dating game shows
Pegasus. John Locke defined ideas very comprehensively, to include: all
is insufficient; the presentation of the master videotape in evidence was
objects of the mind. Language was a way of translating the invisible, hidden
indispensable to the determination of the existence of probable cause. As aptly
ideas that make up a person’s thoughts into the external, perceptible world of
observed by respondent Secretary of Justice:
articulate sounds and visible written symbols that others can
understand. (Citations omitted) There is no one legal definition of "idea" in this
86

jurisdiction. The term "idea" is mentioned only once in the Intellectual Property A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it
Code. In Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon, a television format (i.e., a dating show format)
87 88 involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no
is not copyrightable under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 49; it is a
89 similarity or dissimilarity may be found by merely describing the general
mere concept: copyright/format of both dating game shows. (Emphasis supplied, citations
90

omitted)
P.D. No. 49, §2, in enumerating what are subject to copyright, refers to finished
works and not to concepts. The copyright does not extend to an idea, Ideas can be either abstract or concrete. It is the concrete ideas that are
91

procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or generally referred to as expression:
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
46 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
The words "abstract" and "concrete" arise in many cases dealing with the
idea/expression distinction. The Nichols court, for example, found that the
defendant’s film did not infringe the plaintiff’s play because it was "too
generalized an abstraction from what plaintiff wrote . . . only a part of her
ideas." In Eichel v. Marcin, the court said that authors may exploit facts,
experiences, field of thought, and general ideas found in another’s work,
"provided they do not substantially copy a concrete form, in which the
circumstances and ideas have been developed, arranged, and put into shape."
Judge Hand, in National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.
said that "no one infringes, unless he descends so far into what is concrete as
to invade. . . ‘expression.’"
These cases seem to be distinguishing "abstract" ideas from "concrete"
tangible embodiments of these abstractions that may be termed expression.
However, if the concrete form of a work means more than the literal expression
contained within it, it is difficult to determine what is meant by "concrete."
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language provides
several meanings for the word concrete. These include: "having a material,
perceptible existence; of, belonging to, or characterized by things or events
that can be perceived by the senses; real; actual;" and "referring to a
particular; specific, not general or abstract."
92
In Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporated v. Shoemart, Incorporated, this court,
93
citing the American case of Baker v. Selden, distinguished copyright from
patents and illustrated how an idea or concept is different from the expression
of that idea:
In the oft-cited case of Baker vs. Selden, the United States Supreme Court
held that only the expression of an idea is protected by copyright, not the idea
itself. In that case, the plaintiff held the copyright of a book which expounded
on a new accounting system he had developed. The publication illustrated
blank forms of ledgers utilized in such a system. The defendant reproduced
forms similar to those illustrated in the plaintiff’s copyrighted book. The US
Supreme Court ruled that:
"There is no doubt that a work on the subject of book-keeping, though only
explanatory of well known systems, may be the subject of a copyright; but,
then, it is claimed only as a book. x x x But there is a clear distinction between
the books, as such, and the art, which it is, intended to illustrate. The mere
47 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
statement of the proposition is so evident that it requires hardly any argument
to support it. The same distinction may be predicated of every other art as well
as that of bookkeeping.
A treatise on the composition and use of medicines, be they old or new; on the
construction and use of ploughs or watches or churns; or on the mixture and
application of colors for painting or dyeing; or on the mode of drawing lines to
produce the effect of perspective, would be the subject of copyright; but no one
would contend that the copyright of the treatise would give the exclusive right
to the art or manufacture described therein. The copyright of the book, if not
pirated from other works, would be valid without regard to the novelty or want
of novelty of its subject matter. The novelty of the art or thing described or
explained has nothing to do with the validity of the copyright. To give to the
author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no
examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise
and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters patent, not of
copyright. The claim to an invention of discovery of an art or manufacture must
be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office before an exclusive right
therein can be obtained; and a patent from the government can only secure it.
The difference between the two things, letters patent and copyright, may be
illustrated by reference to the subjects just enumerated. Take the case of
medicines. Certain mixtures are found to be of great value in the healing art. If
the discoverer writes and publishes a book on the subject (as regular
physicians generally do), he gains no exclusive right to the manufacture and
sale of the medicine; he gives that to the public. If he desires to acquire such
exclusive right, he must obtain a patent for the mixture as a new art,
manufacture or composition of matter. He may copyright his book, if he
pleases; but that only secures to him the exclusive right of printing and
publishing his book. So of all other inventions or discoveries.
The copyright of a book on perspective, no matter how many drawings and
illustrations it may contain, gives no exclusive right to the modes of drawing
described, though they may never have been known or used before. By
publishing the book without getting a patent for the art, the latter is given to the
public.
....
Now, whilst no one has a right to print or publish his book, or any material part
thereof, as a book intended to convey instruction in the art, any person may
practice and use the art itself which he has described and illustrated therein.
The use of the art is a totally different thing from a publication of the book
explaining it. The copyright of a book on bookkeeping cannot secure the
exclusive right to make, sell and use account books prepared upon the plan
set forth in such book. Whether the art might or might not have been patented,
is a question, which is not before us. It was not patented, and is open and free
to the use of the public. And, of course, in using the art, the ruled lines and
headings of accounts must necessarily be used as incident to it.
The plausibility of the claim put forward by the complainant in this case arises
from a confusion of ideas produced by the peculiar nature of the art described
in the books, which have been made the subject of copyright. In describing the
art, the illustrations and diagrams employed happened to correspond more
closely than usual with the actual work performed by the operator who uses
the art. x x x The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit
of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The
object of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may
be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can be secured at
all, by letters patent." (Emphasis supplied)
94
News or the event itself is not copyrightable. However, an event can be
captured and presented in a specific medium. As recognized by this court in
Joaquin, television "involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video
and audio." News coverage in television involves framing shots, using
95
images, graphics, and sound effects. It involves creative process and
96
originality. Television news footage is an expression of the news.
In the United States, a line of cases dwelt on the possibility of television
newscasts to be copyrighted. Most of these cases focused on private
97
individuals’ sale or resale of tapes of news broadcasts. Conflicting decisions
were rendered by its courts. Noteworthy, however, is the District Court’s
pronouncement in Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, which involves a News
98
Monitoring Service’s videotaping and sale of WXIA-TV’s news broadcasts:
It is axiomatic that copyright protection does not extend to news "events" or the
facts or ideas which are the subject of news reports. Miller v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981); Wainwright Securities, Inc.
48 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1014, 98 S.Ct. 730, 54 L.Ed.2d 759 (1978). But it is equally well-
settled that copyright protection does extend to the reports themselves, as
distinguished from the substance of the information contained in the reports.
Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 95; International News Service v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211 (1918); see Chicago Record-Herald
Co. v. Tribune Assn., 275 F. 797 (7th Cir.1921); 1 Nimmer on Copyright §
2.11[B] (1983). Copyright protects the manner of expression of news reports,
"the particular form or collocation of words in which the writer has
communicated it." International News Service, 248 U.S. at 234, 39 S.Ct. at 70.
Such protection extends to electronic news reports as well as written reports.
See17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (5), (6), and (7); see also Iowa State University
Research Foundations, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61
(2d Cir. 1980). (Emphasis supplied)
99
The idea/expression dichotomy has long been subject to debate in the field of
copyright law. Abolishing the dichotomy has been proposed, in that non-
protectibility of ideas should be re-examined, if not stricken, from decisions and
the law:
If the underlying purpose of the copyright law is the dual one expressed by
Lord Mansfield, the only excuse for the continuance of the idea-expression test
as a judicial standard for determining protectibility would be that it was or could
be a truly useful method of determining the proper balance between the
creator’s right to profit from his work and the public's right that the "progress of
the arts not be retarded."
. . . [A]s used in the present-day context[,] the dichotomy has little or no
relationship to the policy which it should effectuate. Indeed, all too often the
sweeping language of the courts regarding the non-protectibility of ideas gives
the impression that this is of itself a policy of the law, instead of merely a
clumsy and outdated tool to achieve a much more basic end. 100
The idea/expression dichotomy is a complex matter if one is trying to
determine whether a certain material is a copy of another. This dichotomy
101
would be more relevant in determining, for instance, whether a stage play was
an infringement of an author’s book involving the same characters and setting.
In this case, however, respondents admitted that the material under review —
which is the subject of the controversy — is an exact copy of the original.
Respondents did not subject ABS-CBN’s footage to any editing of their own.
The news footage did not undergo any transformation where there is a need to
track elements of the original.
Having established the protectible nature of news footage, we now discuss the
concomitant rights accorded to authors. The authors of a work are granted
several rights in relation to it, including copyright or economic rights:
SECTION 177. Copyright or Economic Rights. — Subject to the provisions of
Chapter VIII, copyright or economic rights shall consist of the exclusive right to
carry out, authorize or prevent the following acts:
177.1. Reproduction of the work or substantial portion of the work;
177.2. Dramatization, translation, adaptation, abridgment, arrangement
or other transformation of the work;
177.3. The first public distribution of the original and each copy of the
work by sale or other forms of transfer of ownership;
177.4. Rental of the original or a copy of an audiovisual or
cinematographic work, a work embodied in a sound recording, a
computer program, a compilation of data and other materials or a
musical work in graphic form, irrespective of the ownership of the
original or the copy which is the subject of the rental; (n)
177.5. Public display of the original or a copy of the work;
177.6. Public performance of the work; and
177.7. Other communication to the public of the work.(Sec. 5, P. D. No.
49a) (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 211 of the Intellectual Property Code, broadcasting
organizations are granted a more specific set of rights called related or
neighboring rights:
49 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
SECTION 211. Scope of Right. — Subject to the provisions of Section 212,
broadcasting organizations shall enjoy the exclusive right to carry out,
authorize or prevent any of the following acts:
211.1. The rebroadcasting of their broadcasts;
211.2. The recording in any manner, including the making of films or
the use of video tape, of their broadcasts for the purpose of
communication to the public of television broadcasts of the same; and
211.3. The use of such records for fresh transmissions or for fresh
recording. (Sec. 52, P.D. No. 49) (Emphasis supplied)
Section 212 of the Code provides:
CHAPTER XV
LIMITATIONS ON PROTECTION
Section 212. Limitations on Rights. - Sections 203, 208 and 209 shall not apply
where the acts referred to in those Sections are related to:
212.1. The use by a natural person exclusively for his own personal
purposes;
212.2. Using short excerpts for reporting current events;
212.3. Use solely for the purpose of teaching or for scientific research;
and
212.4. Fair use of the broadcast subject to the conditions under
Section 185. (Sec. 44, P.D. No. 49a)
The Code defines what broadcasting is and who broadcasting organizations
include:
202.7. "Broadcasting" means the transmission by wireless means for
the public reception of sounds or of images or of representations
 thereof; such transmission by satellite is also "broadcasting" where the
means for decrypting are provided to the public by the broadcasting
organization or with its consent;
202.8. "Broadcasting organization" shall include a natural person or a
juridical entity duly authorized to engage in broadcasting[.]
Developments in technology, including the process of preserving once
ephemeral works and disseminating them, resulted in the need to provide a
new kind of protection as distinguished from copyright. The designation
102
"neighboring rights" was abbreviated from the phrase "rights neighboring to
copyright." Neighboring or related rights are of equal importance with
103
copyright as established in the different conventions covering both kinds of
rights.
104
Several treaties deal with neighboring or related rights of copyright. The most
105
prominent of these is the "International Convention for the Protection of
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations"
(Rome Convention). 106
The Rome Convention protects the rights of broadcasting organizations in
relation to their broadcasts. Article XIII of the Rome Convention enumerates
the minimum rights accorded to broadcasting organizations:
Article 13
Minimum Rights for Broadcasting Organizations
Broadcasting organisations shall enjoy the right to authorize or prohibit:
(a) the rebroadcasting of their broadcasts;
(b) the fixation of their broadcasts;
(c) the reproduction:
(i) of fixations, made without their consent, of their broadcasts;
50 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
(ii) of fixations, made in accordance with the provisions of
Article 15, of their broadcasts, if the reproduction is made for
purposes different from those referred to in those provisions;
(d) the communication to the public of their television broadcasts if
such communication is made in places accessible to the public against
payment of an entrance fee; it shall be a matter for the domestic law of
the State where protection of this right is claimed to determine the
conditions under which it may be exercised.
With regard to the neighboring rights of a broadcasting organization in this
jurisdiction, this court has discussed the difference between broadcasting and
rebroadcasting:
Section 202.7 of the IP Code defines broadcasting as "the transmission by
wireless means for the public reception of sounds or of images or of
representations thereof; such transmission by satellite is also ‘broadcasting’
where the means for decrypting are provided to the public by the broadcasting
organization or with its consent."
On the other hand, rebroadcasting as defined in Article 3(g) of the International
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations, otherwise known as the 1961 Rome Convention,
of which the Republic of the Philippines is a signatory, is "the simultaneous
broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another
broadcasting organization."
....
Under the Rome Convention, rebroadcasting is "the simultaneous
broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another
broadcasting organization." The Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat of
the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights defines broadcasting
organizations as "entities that take the financial and editorial responsibility for
the selection and arrangement of, and investment in, the transmitted
content." (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
107
Broadcasting organizations are entitled to several rights and to the protection
of these rights under the Intellectual Property Code. Respondents’ argument
that the subject news footage is not copyrightable is erroneous. The Court of
Appeals, in its assailed Decision, correctly recognized the existence of ABS-
CBN’s copyright over the news footage:
Surely, private respondent has a copyright of its news coverage. Seemingly, for
airing said video feed, petitioner GMA is liable under the provisions of the
Intellectual Property Code, which was enacted purposely to protect copyright
owners from infringement. 108
News as expressed in a video footage is entitled to copyright protection.
Broadcasting organizations have not only copyright on but also neighboring
rights over their broadcasts. Copyrightability of a work is different from fair use
of a work for purposes of news reporting.
VI
ABS-CBN assails the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the footage shown by GMA-
7 falls under the scope of Section 212.2 and 212.4 of the Intellectual Property
Code:
The evidence on record, as well as the discussions above, show that the
footage used by[respondents] could hardlybe characterized as a short excerpt,
as it was aired over one and a half minutes.
Furthermore, the footage used does not fall under the contemplation of Section
212.2 of the Intellectual Property Code. A plain reading of the provision would
reveal that copyrighted material referred to in Section 212 are short portions of
an artist’s performance under Section 203, or a producer’s sound recordings
under Sections 208 and 209. Section 212 does not refer to actual use of video
footage of another as its own.
The Angelo dela Cruz footage does not fall under the rule on Section 212.4 of
the Intellectual Property Code on fair use of the broadcast.
....
51 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
In determining fair use, several factors are considered, including the nature of
the copyrighted work, and the amount and substantiality of the person used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.
In the business of television news reporting, the nature of the copyrighted work
or the video footages, are such that, footage created, must be a novelty to be a
good report. Thus, when the . . . Angelo dela Cruz footage was used by
[respondents], the novelty of the footage was clearly affected.
Moreover, given that a substantial portion of the Angelo dela Cruz footage was
utilized by GMA-7 for its own, its use can hardly be classified as fair use.
Hence, [respondents] could not be considered as having used the Angelo dela
Cruz [footage] following the provisions on fair use.
It is also worthy to note that the Honorable Court of Appeals seem to contradict
itself when it relied on the provisions of fair use in its assailed rulings
considering that it found that the Angelo dela Cruz footage is not copyrightable,
given that the fair use presupposes an existing copyright. Thus, it is apparent
that the findings of the Honorable Court of Appeals are erroneous and based
on wrong assumptions. (Underscoring in the original)
109
On the other hand, respondents counter that GMA-7’s use of ABS-CBN’s news
footage falls under fair use as defined in the Intellectual Property Code.
Respondents, citing the Court of Appeals Decision, argue that a strong
statutory defense negates any finding of probable cause under the same
statute. The Intellectual Property Code provides that fair use negates
110
infringement.
Respondents point out that upon seeing ABS-CBN’s reporter Dindo Amparo on
the footage, GMA-7 immediately shut off the broadcast. Only five (5) seconds
passed before the footage was cut. They argue that this shows that GMA-7
had no prior knowledge of ABS-CBN’s ownership of the footage or was notified
of it. They claim that the Angelo dela Cruz footage is considered a short
excerpt of an event’s "news" footage and is covered by fair use. 111
Copyright protection is not absolute. The Intellectual Property Code provides
112
the limitations on copyright:
 CHAPTER VIII
LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT
Section 184. Limitations on Copyright. - 184.1. Notwithstanding the provisions
of Chapter V, the following acts shall not constitute infringement of copyright:
....
184.2. The provisions of this section shall be interpreted in such a way as to
allow the work to be used in a manner which does not conflict with the normal
exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the right holder's
legitimate interests.
....
CHAPTER XV
LIMITATIONS ON PROTECTION
Section 212. Limitations on Rights. - Sections 203, 208 and 209 shall not apply
where the acts referred to in those Sections are related to:
....
212.2. Using short excerpts for reporting current events;
....
212.4. Fair use of the broadcast subject to the conditions under Section 185.
(Sec. 44, P.D. No. 49a) (Emphasis supplied)
The determination of what constitutes fair use depends on several factors.
Section 185 of the Intellectual Property Code states:
SECTION 185. Fair Use of a Copyrighted Work. —
185.1. The fair use of a copyrighted work for criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching including multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship,
52 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
research, and similar purposes is not an infringement of copyright. . . . In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is fair use,
the factors to be considered shall include:
a. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
b. The nature of the copyrighted work;
c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
d. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. Respondents allege that the news footage was only
five (5) seconds long, thus falling under fair use. ABS-CBN belies this
contention and argues that the footage aired for two (2) minutes and 40
seconds. According to the Court of Appeals, the parties admitted that
113
only five (5) seconds of the news footage was broadcasted by GMA-
7.114
This court defined fair use as "aprivilege to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without the consent of the copyright owner or as copying
the theme or ideas rather than their expression." Fair use is an exception to
115
the copyright owner’s monopoly of the use of the work to avoid stifling "the
very creativity which that law is designed to foster." 116
Determining fair use requires application of the four-factor test. Section 185 of
the Intellectual Property Code lists four (4) factors to determine if there was fair
use of a copyrighted work:
a. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
b. The nature of the copyrighted work;
c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
 d. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
First, the purpose and character of the use of the copyrighted material must fall
under those listed in Section 185, thus: "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching including multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, research,
and similar purposes." The purpose and character requirement is important in
117
view of copyright’s goal to promote creativity and encourage creation of works.
Hence, commercial use of the copyrighted work can be weighed against fair
use.
The "transformative test" is generally used in reviewing the purpose and
character of the usage of the copyrighted work. This court must look into
118
whether the copy of the work adds "new expression, meaning or message" to
transform it into something else. "Meta-use" can also occur without
119
necessarily transforming the copyrighted work used. 120
Second, the nature of the copyrighted work is significant in deciding whether its
use was fair. If the nature of the work is more factual than creative, then fair
use will be weighed in favor of the user.
Third, the amount and substantiality of the portion used is important to
determine whether usage falls under fair use. An exact reproduction of a
copyrighted work, compared to a small portion of it, can result in the conclusion
that its use is not fair. There may also be cases where, though the entirety of
the copyrighted work is used without consent, its purpose determines that the
usage is still fair. For example, a parody using a substantial amount of
121
copyrighted work may be permissible as fair use as opposed to a copy of a
work produced purely for economic gain. Lastly, the effect of the use on the
copyrighted work’s market is also weighed for or against the user. If this court
finds that the use had or will have a negative impact on the copyrighted work’s
market, then the use is deemed unfair.
The structure and nature of broadcasting as a business requires assigned
values for each second of broadcast or airtime. In most cases, broadcasting
organizations generate revenue through sale of time or timeslots to
advertisers, which, in turn, is based on market share: Once a news broadcast
122
has been transmitted, the broadcast becomes relatively worthless to the
station. In the case of the aerial broadcasters, advertising sales generate most
53 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
of the profits derived from news reports. Advertising rates are, in turn,
governed by market share. Market share is determined by the number of
people watching a show at any particular time, relative to total viewers at that
time. News is by nature time-limited, and so re-broadcasts are generally of little
worth because they draw few viewers. Newscasts compete for market share
by presenting their news in an appealing format that will capture a loyal
audience. Hence, the primary reason for copyrighting newscasts by
broadcasters would seem to be to prevent competing stations from
rebroadcasting current news from the station with the best coverage of a
particular news item, thus misappropriating a portion of the market share.
Of course, in the real world there are exceptions to this perfect economic view.
However, there are also many caveats with these exceptions. A common
exception is that some stations rebroadcast the news of others. The caveat is
that generally, the two stations are not competing for market share. CNN, for
example, often makes news stories available to local broadcasters. First, the
local broadcaster is often not affiliated with a network (hence its need for more
comprehensive programming), confining any possible competition to a small
geographical area. Second, the local broadcaster is not in competition with
CNN. Individuals who do not have cable TV (or a satellite dish with decoder)
cannot receive CNN; therefore there is no competition. . . . Third, CNN sells
the right of rebroadcast to the local stations. Ted Turner, owner of CNN, does
not have First Amendment freedom of access argument foremost on his mind.
(Else he would give everyone free cable TV so everyone could get CNN.) He is
in the business for a profit. Giving away resources does not a profit
make. (Emphasis supplied)
123
The high value afforded to limited time periods is also seen in other media. In
social media site Instagram, users are allowed to post up to only 15 seconds of
video. In short-video sharing website Vine, users are allowed a shorter
124 125
period of six (6) seconds per post. The mobile application 1 Second Everyday
takes it further by capturing and stitching one (1) second of video footage
taken daily over a span of a certain period.126
Whether the alleged five-second footage may be considered fair use is a
matter of defense. We emphasize that the case involves determination of
probable cause at the preliminary investigation stage. Raising the defense of
fair use does not automatically mean that no infringement was committed. The
investigating prosecutor has full discretion to evaluate the facts, allegations,
and evidence during preliminary investigation. Defenses raised during
preliminary investigation are subject to further proof and evaluation before the
trial court. Given the insufficiency of available evidence, determination of
whether the Angelo dela Cruz footage is subject to fair use is better left to the
trial court where the proceedings are currently pending. GMA-7’s rebroadcast
of ABS-CBN’s news footage without the latter’s consent is not an issue. The
mere act of rebroadcasting without authority from the owner of the broadcast
gives rise to the probability that a crime was committed under the Intellectual
Property Code.
VII
Respondents cannot invoke the defense of good faith to argue that no
probable cause exists.
Respondents argue that copyright infringement is malum in se, in that
"[c]opying alone is not what is being prohibited, but its injurious effect which
consists in the lifting from the copyright owners’ film or materials, that were the
result of the latter’s creativity, work and productions and without authority,
reproduced, sold and circulated for commercial use to the detriment of the
latter."
127
Infringement under the Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum. The
Intellectual Property Code is a special law. Copyright is a statutory creation:
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new
or independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing right
regulated by the statute. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the
statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the
subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the
statute.128
The general rule is that acts punished under a special law are malum
prohibitum. "An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal
129
intent is completely immaterial."130
In contrast, crimes mala in seconcern inherently immoral acts:
54 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason
that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to
determine". In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of
the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes
mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to
wit:
It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact
that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the
act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not,
however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in their being positively prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
[These] guidelines nonetheless proved short of providing a clear cut solution,
for in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it
cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist
by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There
are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and
there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In
the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately
a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding
the violation of the statue. (Emphasis in the original)
131
"Implicit in the concept of mala in se is that of mens rea." Mens reais defined
132
as "the nonphysical element which, combined with the act of the accused,
makes up the crime charged. Most frequently it is the criminal intent, or the
guilty mind[.]"
133
Crimes mala in sepre suppose that the person who did the felonious act had
criminal intent to do so, while crimes mala prohibita do not require knowledge
or criminal intent:
In the case of mala in se it is necessary, to constitute a punishable offense, for
the person doing the act to have knowledge of the nature of his act and to
have a criminal intent; in the case of mala prohibita, unless such words as
"knowingly" and "willfully" are contained in the statute, neither knowledge nor
criminal intent is necessary. In other words, a person morally quite innocent
and with every intention of being a law abiding citizen becomes a criminal, and
liable to criminal penaltes, if he does an act prohibited by these Civil copyright infringement does not require culpability and employs a strict
statutes. (Emphasis supplied) Hence, "[i]ntent to commit the crime and intent
134
liability regime where "lack of intention to infringe is not a defense to an
144

to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have action for infringement."145

consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act,

and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself[.]" When an act is
135
prohibited by a special law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the
performance of the prohibited act is the crime itself. 136
Volition, or intent to commit the act, is different from criminal intent. Volition or
voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done. On the other hand,
criminal intent — which is different from motive, or the moving power for the
commission of the crime — refers to the state of mind beyond voluntariness.
137
It is this intent that is being punished by crimes mala in se.
Unlike other jurisdictions that require intent for a criminal prosecution of
copyright infringement, the Philippines does not statutorily support good faith
as a defense. Other jurisdictions provide in their intellectual property codes or
relevant laws that mens rea, whether express or implied, is an element of
In the Philippines, the Intellectual Property Code, as amended, provides for the
prosecution of criminal actions for the following violations of intellectual
property rights: Repetition of Infringement of Patent (Section 84); Utility Model
(Section 108); Industrial Design (Section 119); Trademark Infringement
(Section 155 in relation to Section 170); Unfair Competition (Section 168 in
relation to Section 170); False Designations of Origin, False Description or
Representation (Section 169.1 in relation to Section 170); infringement of
copyright, moral rights, performers’ rights, producers’ rights, and broadcasting
rights (Section 177, 193, 203, 208 and 211 in relation to Section 217); and
other violations of intellectual property rights as may be defined by law.
The Intellectual Property Code requires strict liability for copyright infringement
whether for a civil action or a criminal prosecution; it does not require mens rea
or culpa:146

criminal copyright infringement. 138

SECTION 216. Remedies for Infringement. —

In Canada, criminal offenses are categorized under three (3) kinds: "the full
mens rea offence, meaning the accused’s actual or subjective state of mind 216.1. Any person infringing a right protected under this law shall be
has to be proved; strict liability offences where no mens rea has to be proved liable:
but the accused can avoid liability if he can prove he took all reasonable steps
to avoid the particular event; [and] absolute liability offences where Parliament a. To an injunction restraining such infringement. The court may
has made it clear that guilt follows proof of the prescribed act only." Because
139
also order the defendant to desist from an infringement, among
of the use of the word "knowingly" in Canada’s Copyright Act, it has been held others, to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce of
that copyright infringement is a full mens rea offense. 140
imported goods that involve an infringement, immediately after
customs clearance of such goods.
In the United States, willful intent is required for criminal copyright
infringement. Before the passage of the No Electronic Theft Act, "civil
141

copyright infringements were violations of criminal copyright laws only if a

defendant willfully infringed a copyright ‘for purposes of commercial advantage
or private financial gain.’" However, the No Electronic Theft Act now allows
142

criminal copyright infringement without the requirement of commercial gain.

The infringing act may or may not be for profit. 143

There is a difference, however, between the required liability in civil copyright

infringement and that in criminal copyright infringement in the United States.
55 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
 b. Pay to the copyright proprietor or his assigns or heirs such
actual damages, including legal costs and other expenses, as
he may have incurred due to the infringement as well as the
profits the infringer may have made due to such infringement,
and in proving profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove
sales only and the defendant shall be required to prove every
element of cost which he claims, or, in lieu of actual damages
and profits, such damages which to the court shall appear to be
just and shall not be regarded as penalty.
c. Deliver under oath, for impounding during the pendency of
the action, upon such terms and conditions as the court may
prescribe, sales invoices and other documents evidencing
sales, all articles and their packaging alleged to infringe a
copyright and implements for making them.
d. Deliver under oath for destruction without any compensation
all infringing copies or devices, as well as all plates, molds, or
other means for making such infringing copies as the court may
order.
e. Such other terms and conditions, including the payment of
moral and exemplary damages, which the court may deem
proper, wise and equitable and the destruction of infringing
copies of the work even in the event of acquittal in a criminal
case.
216.2. In an infringement action, the court shall also have the power to
order the seizure and impounding of any article which may serve as
evidence in the court proceedings. (Sec. 28, P.D. No. 49a)
SECTION 217. Criminal Penalties. — 217.1. Any person infringing any right
secured by provisions of Part IV of this Actor aiding or abetting such
infringement shall be guilty of a crime punishable by:
a. Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years plus a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000) to One hundred
fifty thousand pesos (₱150,000) for the first offense.
56 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
b. Imprisonment of three (3) years and one (1) day to six (6)
years plus a fine ranging from One hundred fifty thousand
pesos (₱150,000) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000)
for the second offense.
c. Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9)
years plus a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000) to One million five hundred thousand pesos
(₱1,500,000) for the third and subsequent offenses.
d. In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency.
217.2. In determining the number of years of imprisonment and the
amount of fine, the court shall consider the value of the infringing
materials that the defendant has produced or manufactured and the
damage that the copyright owner has suffered by reason of the
infringement.
217.3. Any person who at the time when copyright subsists in a work
has in his possession an article which he knows, or ought to know, to
be an infringing copy of the work for the purpose of: a. Selling, letting
for hire, or by way of trade offering or exposing for sale, or hire, the
article;
b. Distributing the article for purpose of trade, or for any other
purpose to an extent that will prejudice the rights of the
copyright owner in the work; or
c. Trade exhibit of the article in public, shall be guilty of an
offense and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment and
fine as above mentioned. (Sec. 29, P.D. No. 49a) (Emphasis
supplied)
The law is clear. Inasmuch as there is wisdom in prioritizing the flow and
exchange of ideas as opposed to rewarding the creator, it is the plain reading
of the law in conjunction with the actions of the legislature to which we defer.
We have continuously "recognized the power of the legislature . . . to forbid
certain acts in a limited class of cases and to make their commission criminal
without regard to the intent of the doer. Such legislative enactments are based
on the experience that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency
upon proof of the dealer’s knowledge or of his intent are of little use and rarely
accomplish their purposes." 147
Respondents argue that live broadcast of news requires a different treatment
in terms of good faith, intent, and knowledge to commit infringement. To argue
this point, they rely on the differences of the media used in Habana et al. v.
Robles, Columbia Pictures v. Court of Appeals, and this case:
Petitioner ABS-CBN argues that lack of notice that the Angelo dela Cruz was
under embargo is not a defense in copyright infringement and cites the case of
Columbia Pictures vs. Court of Appeals and Habana et al. vs. Robles(310
SCRA 511). However, these cases refer to film and literary work where
obviously there is "copying" from an existing material so that the copier knew
that he is copying from an existing material not owned by him. But, how could
respondents know that what they are "copying was not [theirs]" when they
were not copying but merely receiving live video feed from Reuters and CNN
which they aired? What they knew and what they aired was the Reuters live
video feed and the CNN feed which GMA-7 is authorized to carry in its news
broadcast, it being a subscriber of these companies[.]
It is apt to stress that the subject of the alleged copyright infringement is not a
film or literary work but live broadcast of news footage. In a film or literary
work, the infringer is confronted face to face with the material he is allegedly
copying and therefore knows, or is presumed to know, that what he is copying
is owned by another. Upon the other hand, in live broadcast, the alleged
infringer is not confronted with the fact that the material he airs or re-
broadcasts is owned by another, and therefore, he cannot be charged of
knowledge of ownership of the material by another. This specially obtains in
the Angelo dela Cruz news footage which GMA-7 received from Reuters and
CNN. Reuters and CNN were beaming live videos from the coverage which
GMA-7 received as a subscriber and, in the exercise of its rights as a
subscriber, GMA-7 picked up the live video and simultaneously re-broadcast it.
In simultaneously broadcasting the live video footage of Reuters, GMA-7 did
not copy the video footage of petitioner ABS-CBN[.] (Emphasis in the original)
148
Respondents’ arguments must fail.
57 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
Respondents are involved and experienced in the broadcasting business. They
knew that there would be consequences in carrying ABS-CBN’s footage in
their broadcast. That is why GMA-7 allegedly cut the feed from Reuters upon
seeing ABS-CBN’s ogo and reporter. To admit a different treatment for
broadcasts would mean abandonment of a broadcasting organization’s
minimum rights, including copyright on the broadcast material and the right
against unauthorized rebroadcast of copyrighted material. The nature of
broadcast technology is precisely why related or neighboring rights were
created and developed. Carving out an exception for live broadcasts would go
against our commitments under relevant international treaties and agreements,
which provide for the same minimum rights. 149
Contrary to respondents’ assertion, this court in Habana, reiterating the ruling
150
in Columbia Pictures, ruled that lack of knowledge of infringement is not a
151
valid defense. Habana and Columbia Pictures may have different factual
scenarios from this case, but their rulings on copyright infringement are
analogous. In Habana, petitioners were the authors and copyright owners of
English textbooks and workbooks. The case was anchored on the protection of
literary and artistic creations such as books. In Columbia Pictures, video tapes
of copyrighted films were the subject of the copyright infringement suit.
In Habana, knowledge of the infringement is presumed when the infringer
commits the prohibited act:
The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in
order to underscore its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof.
Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and
occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and
infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this
connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the
owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by
statute on the owner of the copyright.
....
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that
the pirate, in such cases, did not know whether or not he was infringing any
copyright; he at least knew that what he was copying was not his, and he
copied at his peril.
 ....
In cases of infringement, copying alone is not what is prohibited. The copying
must produce an "injurious effect". Here, the injury consists in that respondent
Robles lifted from petitioners’ book materials that were the result of the latter’s
research work and compilation and misrepresented them as her own. She
circulated the book DEP for commercial use and did not acknowledge
petitioners as her source. (Emphasis supplied)
152
Habana and Columbia Pictures did not require knowledge of the infringement
to constitute a violation of the copyright. One does not need to know that he or
she is copying a work without consent to violate copyright law. Notice of fact of
the embargo from Reuters or CNN is not material to find probable cause that
respondents committed infringement. Knowledge of infringement is only
material when the person is charged of aiding and abetting a copyright
infringement under Section 217 of the Intellectual Property Code. 153
We look at the purpose of copyright in relation to criminal prosecutions
requiring willfulness: Most importantly, in defining the contours of what it
means to willfully infringe copyright for purposes of criminal liability, the courts
should remember the ultimate aim of copyright. Copyright is not primarily about
providing the strongest possible protection for copyright owners so that they
have the highest possible incentive to create more works. The control given to
copyright owners is only a means to an end: the promotion of knowledge and
learning. Achieving that underlying goal of copyright law also requires access
to copyrighted works and it requires permitting certain kinds of uses of
copyrighted works without the permission of the copyright owner. While a
particular defendant may appear to be deserving of criminal sanctions, the
standard for determining willfulness should be set with reference to the larger
goals of copyright embodied in the Constitution and the history of copyright in
this country.
154
58 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
In addition, "[t]he essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in
conceptual terms in order to underscore its gravity by an appropriate
understanding thereof. Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private
domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore,
protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a
synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person,
without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to
do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright." 155
Intellectual property rights, such as copyright and the neighboring right against
rebroadcasting, establish an artificial and limited monopoly to reward creativity.
Without these legally enforceable rights, creators will have extreme difficulty
recovering their costs and capturing the surplus or profit of their works as
reflected in their markets. This, in turn, is based on the theory that the
possibility of gain due to creative work creates an incentive which may improve
efficiency or simply enhance consumer welfare or utility. More creativity
redounds to the public good.
These, however, depend on the certainty of enforcement. Creativity, by its very
nature, is vulnerable to the free rider problem. It is easily replicated despite the
costs to and efforts of the original creator. The more useful the creation is in
the market, the greater the propensity that it will be copied. The most creative
and inventive individuals are usually those who are unable to recover on their
creations.
Arguments against strict liability presuppose that the Philippines has a social,
historical, and economic climate similar to those of Western jurisdictions. As it
stands, there is a current need to strengthen intellectual property protection.
Thus, unless clearly provided in the law, offenses involving infringement of
copyright protections should be considered malum prohibitum. It is the act of
infringement, not the intent, which causes the damage. To require or assume
the need to prove intent defeats the purpose of intellectual property protection.
Nevertheless, proof beyond reasonable doubt is still the standard for criminal
prosecutions under the Intellectual Property Code.
VIII
Respondents argue that GMA-7’s officers and employees cannot be held liable
for infringement under the Intellectual Property Code since it does not
expressly provide direct liability of the corporate officers. They explain that "(i)
a corporation may be charged and prosecuted for a crime where the penalty is
fine or both imprisonment and fine, and if found guilty, may be fined; or (ii) a
corporation may commit a crime but if the statute prescribes the penalty
therefore to be suffered by the corporate officers, directors or employees or
other persons, the latter shall be responsible for the offense." 156
Section 217 of the Intellectual Property Code states that "any person" may be
found guilty of infringement. It also imposes the penalty of both imprisonment
and fine:
Section 217. Criminal Penalties. - 217.1. Any person infringing any right
secured by provisions of Part IV of this Act or aiding or abetting such
infringement shall be guilty of a crime punishable by:
(a) Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years plus a fine ranging
from Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000) to One hundred fifty thousand
pesos (₱150,000) for the first offense.
(b) Imprisonment of three (3) years and one (1) day to six (6) years
plus a fine ranging from One hundred fifty thousand pesos (₱150,000)
to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000) for the second offense.
(c) Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9) years plus
a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000) to One
million five hundred thousand pesos (₱1,500,000) for the third and
subsequent offenses.
(d) In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency.
(Emphasis supplied) Corporations have separate and distinct
personalities from their officers or directors. This court has ruled that
157
corporate officers and/or agents may be held individually liable for a
crime committed under the Intellectual Property Code: 158
Petitioners, being corporate officers and/or directors, through whose act,
default or omission the corporation commits a crime, may themselves be
59 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
individually held answerable for the crime. . . . The existence of the corporate
entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and
intentionally caused the corporation to commit a crime. Thus, petitioners
cannot hide behind the cloak of the separate corporate personality of the
corporation to escape criminal liability. A corporate officer cannot protect
himself behind a corporation where he is the actual, present and efficient
actor.
159
However, the criminal liability of a corporation’s officers or employees stems
from their active participation in the commission of the wrongful act:
The principle applies whether or not the crime requires the consciousness of
wrongdoing. It applies to those corporate agents who themselves commit the
crime and to those, who, by virtue of their managerial positions or other similar
relation to the corporation, could be deemed responsible for its commission, if
by virtue of their relationship to the corporation, they had the power to prevent
the act. Moreover, all parties active in promoting a crime, whether agents or
not, are principals. Whether such officers or employees are benefited by their
delictual acts is not a touchstone of their criminal liability. Benefit is not an
operative fact. (Emphasis supplied) An accused’s participation in criminal
160
acts involving violations of intellectual property rights is the subject of
allegation and proof. The showing that the accused did the acts or contributed
in a meaningful way in the commission of the infringements is certainly
different from the argument of lack of intent or good faith. Active participation
requires a showing of overt physical acts or intention to commit such acts.
Intent or good faith, on the other hand, are inferences from acts proven to have
been or not been committed.
We find that the Department of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
when it resolved to file the Information against respondents despite lack of
proof of their actual participation in the alleged crime.
Ordering the inclusion of respondents Gozon, GMA-7 President; Duavit, Jr.,
Executive Vice-President; Flores, Vice-President for News and Public Affairs;
and Soho, Director for News, as respondents, Secretary Agra overturned the
City Prosecutor’s finding that only respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and
Manalastas are responsible for the crime charged due to their duties. The
161
Agra Resolution reads:
Thus, from the very nature of the offense and the penalty involved, it is
necessary that GMA-7’s directors, officers, employees or other officers thereof
responsible for the offense shall be charged and penalized for violation of the
Sections 177 and 211 of Republic Act No. 8293. In their complaint for libel,
respondents Felipe L Gozon, Gilberto R. Duavit, Jr., Marissa L. Flores, Jessica
A.Soho, Grace Dela Pena-Reyes, John Oliver T. Manalastas felt they were
aggrieved because they were "in charge of the management, operations and
production of news and public affairs programs of the network" (GMA-7). This
is clearly an admission on respondents’ part. Of course, respondents may
argue they have no intention to infringe the copyright of ABS-CBN; that they
acted in good faith; and that they did not directly cause the airing of the subject
footage, but again this is preliminary investigation and what is required is
simply probable cause. Besides, these contentions can best be addressed in
the course of trial. (Citation omitted)
162
In contrast, the Office of the City Prosecutor, in the Resolution dated
December 3, 2004, found that respondents Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and
Soho did not have active participation in the commission of the crime charged:
This Office, however, does not subscribe to the view that respondents Atty.
Felipe Gozon, Gilberto Duavit, Marissa Flores and Jessica Soho should be
held liable for the said offense. Complainant failed to present clear and
convincing evidence that the said respondents conspired with Reyes and
Manalastas. No evidence was adduced to prove that these respondents had
an active participation in the actual commission of the copyright infringement or
they exercised their moral ascendancy over Reyes and Manalastas in airing
the said footage. It must be stressed that, conspiracy must be established by
positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. (Emphasis supplied,
163
citations omitted)
The City Prosecutor found respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas
liable due to the nature of their work and responsibilities. He found that:
[t]his Office however finds respondents Grace Dela Peña-Reyes and John
Oliver T. Manalastas liable for copyright infringement penalized under Republic
Act No. 8293. It is undisputed that complainant ABSCBN holds the exclusive
ownership and copyright over the "Angelo [d]ela Cruz news footage". Hence,
any airing and re-broadcast of the said footage without any consent and
60 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
authority from ABS-CBN will be held as an infringement and violation of the
intellectual property rights of the latter. Respondents Grace Dela Peña-Reyes
as the Head of the News Operation and John Oliver T. Manalastas as the
Program Manager cannot escape liability since the news control room was
under their direct control and supervision. Clearly, they must have been aware
that the said footage coming from Reuters or CNN has a "No Access
Philippines" advisory or embargo thus cannot be re-broadcast. We find no
merit to the defense of ignorance interposed by the respondents. It is simply
contrary to human experience and logic that experienced employees of an
established broadcasting network would be remiss in their duty in ascertaining
if the said footage has an embargo. (Emphasis supplied)
164
We agree with the findings as to respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and
Manalastas. Both respondents committed acts that promoted infringement of
ABS-CBN’s footage. We note that embargoes are common occurrences in and
between news agencies and/or broadcast organizations. Under its
165
Operations Guide, Reuters has two (2) types of embargoes: transmission
embargo and publication embargo. Under ABS-CBN’s service contract with
166
Reuters, Reuters will embargo any content contributed by ABS-CBN from other
broadcast subscribers within the same geographical location:
4a. Contributed Content
You agree to supply us at our request with news and sports news stories
broadcast on the Client Service of up to three (3) minutes each for use in our
Services on a non-exclusive basis and at a cost of US$300.00 (Three Hundred
United States Dollars) per story. In respect of such items we agree to embargo
them against use by other broadcast subscribers in the Territory and confirm
we will observe all other conditions of usage regarding Contributed Content, as
specified in Section 2.5 of the Reuters Business Principles for Television
Services. For the purposes of clarification, any geographical restriction
imposed by you on your use of Contributed Content will not prevent us or our
clients from including such Contributed Content in online transmission services
including the internet. We acknowledge Contributed Content is your copyright
and we will not acquire any intellectual property rights in the Contributed
Content. (Emphasis supplied)
167
Respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas merely denied receiving the
advisory sent by Reuters to its clients, including GMA-7. As in the records, the
advisory reads:
ADVISORY - - +++LIVE COVER PLANS+++
PHILIPPINES: HOSTAGE RETURN
**ATTENTION ALL CLIENTS**
PLEASE BE ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING LIVE COVER
PLANNED FOR THURSDAY, JULY 22:
....
SOURCE: ABS-CBN
TV AND WEB RESTRICTIONS: NO ACCESS PHILIPPINES. 168
There is probable cause that respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas
directly committed copyright infringement of ABS-CBN’s news footage to
warrant piercing of the corporate veil. They are responsible in airing the
embargoed Angelo dela Cruz footage. They could have prevented the act of
infringement had they been diligent in their functions as Head of News
Operations and Program Manager.
Secretary Agra, however, committed grave abuse of discretion when he
ordered the filing of the Information against all respondents despite the
erroneous piercing of the corporate veil. Respondents Gozon, Duavit, Jr.,
Flores, and Soho cannot be held liable for the criminal liability of the
corporation.
Mere membership in the Board or being President per se does not mean
knowledge, approval, and participation in the act alleged as criminal. There
must be a showing of active participation, not simply a constructive one.
Under principles of criminal law, the principals of a crime are those "who take a
direct part in the execution of the act; [t]hose who directly force or induce
others to commit it; [or] [t]hose who cooperate in the commission of the offense
by another act without which it would not have been accomplished." There is
169
61 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it": 170
Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself,
the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While1âwphi1
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred
from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to
show the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential
that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the
product of intentionality on the part of the cohorts.
It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a
direct or indirect contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The
overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy
over the other co-conspirators[.] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
171
In sum, the trial court erred in failing to resume the proceedings after the
designated period. The Court of Appeals erred when it held that Secretary Agra
committed errors of jurisdiction despite its own pronouncement that ABS-CBN
is the owner of the copyright on the news footage. News should be
differentiated from expression of the news, particularly when the issue involves
rebroadcast of news footage. The Court of Appeals also erroneously held that
good faith, as. well as lack of knowledge of infringement, is a defense against
criminal prosecution for copyright and neighboring rights infringement. In its
current form, the Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum and
prescribes a strict liability for copyright infringement. Good faith, lack of
knowledge of the copyright, or lack of intent to infringe is not a defense against
copyright infringement. Copyright, however, is subject to the rules of fair. use
and will be judged on a case-to-case basis. Finding probable cause includes a
determination of the defendant's active participation, particularly when the
corporate veil is pierced in cases involving a corporation's criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The Department of Justice
Resolution dated June 29, 2010 ordering the filing of the Information is hereby
REINSTATED as to respondents Grace Dela Pena-Reyes and John Oliver T.
Manalastas. Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to
continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-04-131533.

SO ORDERED.

62 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s

G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN,
QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA,
TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF
AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
DECISION
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of
his passport, boarding passes and other documents"10 tending to prove that a
certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to
December 19, 2009.11
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him
because he was not Butukan S. Malang.12
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page
two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November
7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about
three (3) days.13

LEONEN, J.: The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in
Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to
him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents. 14
mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and
is continuously being illegally detained.
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail
Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa,
This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals
Taguig City, where he is currently detained.15
Decision2 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig
City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang Salibo's Petition for
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent
Habeas Corpus.
Petition for Habeas Corpus16 questioning the legality of his detention and
deprivation of his liberty.17 He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo)
Malang.18
and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj
Pilgrimage.4 "While in Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of
In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a
Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah." 5 He returned to the Philippines on
Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive
December 20, 2009.6
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice). 20 The Court
of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police
the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo
Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang. 7
at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010.21
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for
Proceedings before the trial court
allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He
had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex brought
Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8
Salibo before the trial court. The Warden, however, failed to file a Return one
day before the hearing. He also appeared without counsel during the hearing. 22
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station
to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010 at
that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao
2:00 p.m.23
Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. 9

63 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ. However,
during the September 29, 2010 hearing on the Return, the Warden appeared
with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr., Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.24
Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on behalf of the
Warden and argued that only the Office of the Solicitor General has the
authority to appear on behalf of a respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding. 25
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial court reset
the hearing on the Return to October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m. 26
The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo
and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex
and argued that Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since
Salibo was charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition
for habeas corpus was "no longer availing." 27
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest,
and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S.
Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused. Reiterating that he was not
Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the
Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded the trial court to order his release from
detention.28
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged" 29 under any
resolution, information, or amended information. The Resolution, Information,
and Amended Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang
Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant
of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the
trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a
court.30
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S.
Malang charged with murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. The
National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated August 27, 2009 showed that
Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the date of the certificate. 31 A
Philippine passport bearing Salibo's picture showed the name "Datukan Malang
Salibo."32
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the
country"33 from November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009. This fact was
supported by a Certification34 from Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo's
64 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
departure from and arrival in Manila on board its flights. 35 A Flight Manifest
issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No.
0652113 also showed this fact.36
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo's
Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the trial court's Decision.38 Through its Decision dated April 19, 2011, the
Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo's
arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid Information and
Warrant of Arrest.39 Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang
named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he
orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]"40 According to the Court
of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest.41
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42 which the Court of Appeals denied in
the Resolution43 dated July 6, 2011.
Proceedings before this court
On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for
Review (With Urgent Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment, 45 after which
petitioner Salibo filed a Reply.46
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with
57 counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City.
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was
not duly charged in court. He is being illegally deprived of his liberty and,
therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas Corpus. 47
Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals.
Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial court the authority to hear
respondent Warden on the Return, the trial court's Decision should be deemed a
Decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, respondent Warden should have
directly filed his appeal before this court.48
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged
in court. Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias
Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of
a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus. 49
The issues for our resolution are:
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City
on petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of
Appeals; and Second, whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
We grant the Petition.cralawlawlibrary
I effect[.]"66 The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed
before the Court of Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed
before this court or any of its members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its
members in instances authorized by law,51 or the Regional Trial Court or any of
its presiding judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer
or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a
return of the writ.53 A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted. 54
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the
writ.55 Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ
is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of
habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the
power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas
corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the
court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court. 57
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus was filed before
this Court . . . [o]n behalf of. . . Alfredo B. Saulo [(Saulo)]." 59 This court issued
a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ. This court made the Writ
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila. 60
65 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First
Instance denied Saulo's Petition for Habeas Corpus. 61
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance heard
the Petition for Habeas Corpus "not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but
merely delegation[.]"62 Consequently, "this Court should have the final say
regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only [this court's decision] . . .
should be regarded as operative."63
This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic is more apparent
than real."64 It ruled that when a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus,
the superior court only resolves whether the respondent should be ordered to
show cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was
filed was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty. 65 However, once the
superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by the
Rules of Court, the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a
recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of
lower court, not of the superior court.
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court a
Petition for Habeas Corpus. This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. After trial on the
merits, the Court of First Instance granted Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus
and ordered that Medina be released from detention. 68
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of
Appeals.69
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals a
"Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court." The Court of Appeals,
however, denied the Motion.70
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for
Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court," citing Saulo as legal basis.71 The
Court of First Instance of Rizal, in deciding Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus,
"acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of the
case[.]"72 Consequently, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on
Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals. 73
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making
it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court
then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the
merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and
authority to determine the merits"74 of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The decision
on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court,
not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts, 75 respondent Warden
correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.cralawlawlibrary
II
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom."77 The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary78 and summary79 in
nature, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty." 80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto."81 The primary purpose of the writ "is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary,
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal." 82 "Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." 83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to
entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of
as a post-conviction remedy84 or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty
of abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied
autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution.86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of
scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in
the labyrinth of other processes.87
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario Gumabon
(Gumabon), Bias Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol), Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito),
Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno Palmares (Palmares) were convicted of the
complex crime of rebellion with murder. They commenced serving their
respective sentences of reclusion perpetua.89
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving their
sentences, this court promulgated People v. Hernandez90 in 1956, ruling that the
66 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
complex crime of rebellion with murder does not exist. 91
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and
Palmares filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus. They prayed for their release from
incarceration and argued that the Hernandez doctrine must retroactively apply
to them.92
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares
properly availed of a petition for habeas corpus.93 Citing Harris v. Nelson,94 this
court said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. . . . The scope and
flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its
ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes — have always
been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very
nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and
flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are
surfaced and corrected.95cralawlawlibrary
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,96 the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued
Resolution No. 25, Series of 1917. The Resolution ordered the Mangyans
removed from their native habitat and compelled them to permanently settle in
an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the Resolution, Mangyans who
refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao reservation were imprisoned. 97
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Rubi
and all the other Mangyans being held in the reservation. 98 Since the application
questioned the legality of deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the other Mangyans,
this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the Provincial Board of
Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ. 99
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban.100 "[T]o
exterminate vice,"101 Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila ordered the brothels in
Manila closed. The female sex workers previously employed by these brothels
were rounded up and placed in ships bound for Davao. The women were
expelled from Manila and deported to Davao without their consent. 102
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women, this
court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered Mayor Justo Lukban, among
others, to make a Return of the Writ. Mayor Justo Lukban, however, failed to
make a Return, arguing that he did not have custody of the women. 103
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a
Return of the Writ.104 As to the legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor
Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had deported to Davao of their
liberty, specifically, of their privilege of domicile. 105 It said that the women,
"despite their being in a sense lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not chattels
but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are
other citizens[.]"106 The women had the right "to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality."107
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for
the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body
of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in
the final decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its
issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ
sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of
liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for
its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]" 108 Although the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when
the public safety requires it,109 the writ itself may not be suspended.110
III
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person
allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the
court.111 The restraint then has become legal,112 and the remedy of habeas
corpus is rendered moot and academic.113 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile, elements of the Philippine Constabulary-
114
Integrated National Police arrested Atty. Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by
virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued by then Minister of National Defense,
Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan's arrest, 115 from
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp
Catitipan, where he was detained.115
67 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano). Atty.
Arellano, however, no longer left Camp Catitipan as the military detained and
arrested him based on an unsigned Mission Order. 116
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military
informed the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending
arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To verify his arrest papers, Atty.
Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano, the military did not allow
Atty. Risonar to leave. He was arrested based on a Mission Order signed by
General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander. 117
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism filed before
this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar.118
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile, Armed
Forces of the Philippines Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos
(General Ramos), and Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police
Regional Commander Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General Tan-Gatue)
to make a Return of the Writ.119 This court set the hearing on the Return on May
23, 1985.120
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue
contended that the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended as to
Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A. 121 The
lawyers, according to respondents, allegedly "played active roles in organizing
mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front."122
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the temporary
release of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar on the recognizance of their
counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice
Jose B.L. Reyes.123
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however, Minister
Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.124 They filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that
Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.
They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus for being
moot and academic.125
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism opposed the
motion. According to them, no preliminary investigation was conducted before
the filing of the Information. Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were deprived
of their right to due process. Consequently, the Information was void. 126
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it became moot
and academic with the filing of the Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano,
and Risonar in court:127ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and
academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a
capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of
a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding
of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the
detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to
criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its
purpose.128 (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v.
Ramos.129 Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque,
Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya,
Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested without a
warrant for their alleged membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People's Army.130
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however, Informations
against them were filed before this court. The filing of the Informations,
according to this court, rendered the Petitions for habeas corpus moot and
academic, thus:131ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have
been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any
court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. 132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a
petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of
the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or
the warrant of arrest.134
At any time before a plea is entered,135 the accused may file a motion to quash
complaint or information based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
68 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information filed against him [or her] for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information."136 If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash, the
accused "hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the
information."137 "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are
not to be considered."138ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order [the]
amendment [of the complaint or information]."139 If the motion to quash is
based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do
not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution "an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."140 If after amendment, the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall
quash the complaint or information.141
IV
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was not
arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not
restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally
deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for
Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 221, Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan,
Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo,
of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule
113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a
warrantless arrest may be made:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on- personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer
Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan
S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of
Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit
an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he
might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo
without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process
of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the
"disturbing"143 case of Ilagan.144 Like petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to
Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest papers against him. Then and
there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In his dissenting opinion
in Ilagan,145 Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the lack of preliminary
investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of
his right to due process of law — a ground for the grant of a petition for habeas
corpus:146
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without preliminary
69 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
investigation falls within the exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec. 5
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again, this is erroneous premise. The
fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited rules. The petitioners are not persons
"lawfully arrested without a warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the stale and
inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would be rendered
nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one's
whim and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its
imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President himself. The
majority decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 which authorizes arrests
without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the arrestee in
flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of committing the offense. Quite obviously, the
arrest was not a citizen's arrest nor were they caught in flagrante delicto
violating the law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure have tightened and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now
requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed." This connotes
immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an
offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago. Similarly, the
arrestor must have "personal knowledge of facts indicating that the [arrestee]
has committed it" (instead of just "reasonable ground to believe that the
[arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule). Clearly, then, an information
could not just be filed against the petitioners without due process and
preliminary investigation.147 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information
apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he
alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan
Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of preliminary
investigation. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the
premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the same
person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these
processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person named Datukan Malang
Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport, 148 his
identification card from the Office on Muslim Affairs, 149 his Tax Identification
Number card,150 and clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation 151 all
bearing his picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo." None of
these government-issued documents showed that petitioner Salibo used the
alias "Butukan S. Malang."
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on
November 23, 2009 when the Maguindanao Massacre occurred.

A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo

departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines
only on December 20, 2009. A Certification153 from Saudi Arabian Airlines
attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi Arabian
Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he arrived in the Philippines
on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December 20, 2009.cralawlawlibrary

People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the
most complex case pending in our courts. The case involves 57 victims 154 and
197 accused, two (2) of which have become state witnesses. 155 As of November
23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions
for bail of which 42 have already been resolved.156 To require petitioner Salibo to
undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his liberty. Urgency
dictates that we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that
he is not Butukan S. Malang.

In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor
his innocence. However, between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally
deprived of his liberty without due process of law and the government that has
all the "manpower and the resources at [its] command" 157 to properly indict a
citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the citizen.

Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue

the proper remedies against him as provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule
that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas
Corpus must be granted.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated April 19, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, is ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo from detention.

The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court
is hereby NOTED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

70 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
G.R. No. 171222 February 18, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG.
RONALD G. MAGSINO, LTJG. GERRY P. DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B.
OPERIO, JR., and THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 174786
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, LTJG. KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, ENS.
DENNIS S. VELASCO, and the HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal liability of
fraternity members for hazing, this case presents novel questions on the extent
of liability of schools and school authorities under Republic Act No. 8049, or
the Anti-Hazing Law.
The responsibility given to an academic institution for the welfare of its
students has been characterized by law and judicial doctrine as a form of
special parental authority and responsibility. This responsibility has been
1
amplified by the enactment of the Anti-Hazing Law, in that the failure by school
authorities to take any action to prevent the offenses as provided by the law
exposes them to criminal liability as accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the
institution and its officers cannot stand idly by in the face of patently criminal
acts committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the
commensurate duty to ensure that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law
are not committed.
71 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
It was within this legal framework that the school authorities of the Philippine
Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) were criminally charged before the
Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before
they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against
2
them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal
accused and, the failure to include in the Information the material averments
required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
Consequently, this Petition was filed before this Court questioning the
Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.
THE CASE BACKGROUND
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman
at the PMMA. In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to
3
successfully complete the mandatory "Indoctrination and Orientation
Period," which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May
4 5
2001.6
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After
months of investigation, it forwarded its findings to the provincial prosecutor of
7
Zambales for the preliminary investigation and possible criminal prosecution of
those involved in the orientation and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of
2005. Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a
8
Resolution finding probable cause to charge the following as principals to the
9
crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (Alvarez), Leotharius C.Montez (Montez),
Rudence G. Reyes (Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S. Simpas (Simpas) –
collectively, Alvarez et al. A criminal case against Alvarez et al. was then filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales (RTC–Zambales).
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military the finding of probable cause to charge the following school
authorities as accomplices to hazing: Rear Admiral (RADM) Virginio R. Aris
(Aris), Lieutenant SeniorGrade (LTSG.) Dominador D. Bayabos (Bayabos),
Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG.) Gerry P. Doctor (Doctor), LTJG. Manny Ferrer
(Ferrer), LTJG. Kruzaldo Mabborang (Mabborang), LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino
(Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis Velasco (Velasco), and ENS. Dominador
Operio (Operio) – collectively, respondents. The Ombudsman Investigator
agreed with the findings of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The matter was
thus ordered re-docketed for the purpose of conducting the proper
administrative proceedings against respondents for grave misconduct and
abuse of authority. The Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed with
10
the Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents as accomplices to
the crime of hazing. 11
Meanwhile, the RTC–Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information
against the principal accused, Alvarez et al. The Order was later entered in
12
the Book of Entries of Judgment. Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and
Operio (collectively, Bayabos et al.) filed a Motion to Quash the
Information. They argued that the Information did not contain all the essential
13
elements of the offense. They also pointed out that there was no allegation that
the purported act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA,
especially considering that the victim had already been accepted in the
academy. Moreover, they stressed that there was no averment in the
Information that the PMMA was a fraternity, a sorority, or an organization. Also
underscored was the absence in the Information of any assertion that the
alleged hazing was not part of the "physical, mental, and psychological testing
and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical,
mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members."
Furthermore, they emphasized that there was no allegation that they were
given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the activity.
As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal
accused had already been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no
more principals with whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the
offense, they asserted that the case against them must be dismissed.
The Special Prosecutor opposed the motion of Bayabos et al. He insisted that
14
the Information alleged the material facts that would sufficiently establish the
presence of the essential ingredients of the crime of accomplice to hazing. He
also stressed that there was nothing in the law requiring that the principals
must be prosecuted first before a case could be filed against the accomplices.
The Comment/Opposition of the Special Prosecutor was, however, silent on
the issue of whether the Information contained an allegation that the supposed
hazing had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, and whether
72 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
the academy was considered an "organization" within the meaning of the Anti-
Hazing Law.
Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned, the Sandiganbayan
15
issued the assailed Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and
dismissing the criminal case against them. According to the court, the fact that
the charge against the principal accused Alvarez et al. was dismissed with
finality favorably carried with it the indictment against those charged as
accomplices, whose criminal responsibility was subordinate to that of the
former. It stressed that before there can be an accomplice, there must be a
principal by direct participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal
design. In this case, as there were no principal perpetrators to speak of,
necessarily, there was no one else with whom they could have cooperated in
the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the dismissal of the case
against the principals, the court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos et
al. as accomplices could no longer stand on its own.
In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information charged no
offense, and that the allegations therein were mere conclusions of law. It also
stressed that there was no averment that the alleged hazing was not part of
the "physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and
practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological
fitness of prospective regular members" of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), pursuant to Section 1 of the
law. It must be noted, though, that the Sandiganbayan did not make any
16
categorical determination that the PMMA was considered an "organization"
within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution dismissing the
criminal case against Bayabos et al., the accused Velasco surrendered and
then filed his own Motion to Quash, adopting the grounds raised by that court.
17
His arraignment was set on 14 August 2006. However, on 3 August 2006, the
18
Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution (SB Resolution II) dismissing the
case against him. According to the court, since Velasco was similarly situated
as Bayabos et al., the Information against him must likewise be quashed in
light of the reasoning laid out in SB Resolution I. In the same Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan ex proprio motu dismissed the case against Aris and
Mabborang (collectively, Velasco et al.), explaining that they, too, had been
charged under the same Information for the same offense. It is unclear from
19
the records whether the accused Aris and Mabborang surrendered or were
20
arrested, or whether the Order of Arrest was recalled prior to the dismissal of
21
the case.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed
with this Court on 13 March 2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on
16 October 2006, another Petition challenging SB Resolution II.
THE ISSUES
The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of legal issues.
After a thorough evaluation of the Petitions, however, we cull the threshold
issues needing to be addressed by this Court as follows:
I. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to
hazing can proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the
principal accused
II. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material
averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the
Anti-Hazing Law
OUR RULING
With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan
erred when it dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole
ground that the case against the purported principals had already been
dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as
accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported
principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s
acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been
established. In People v. Rafael, the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus:
22 23
"The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory
are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be
duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice
or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal." Accordingly,
so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those
charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed
73 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
independently of that of the alleged principal. We note in the present case that
24
Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of Judgment dismissing
25
the case against Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the
case was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime had been
committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the
case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply relied on
the Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason for
the dismissal of the case against the purported principals.
Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal of the
Information against respondents.
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. As a
manifestation of this constitutional right, the Rules of Court requires that the
information charging persons with an offense be "sufficient." One of the key
components of a "sufficient information" is the statement of the acts or
omissions constituting the offense charged, subject of the complaint. The 26
information must also be crafted in a language ordinary and concise enough to
enable persons of common understanding to know the offense being charged
against them. This approach is intended to allow them to suitably prepare for
27
their defense, as they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts constituting the offense they have purportedly committed. The
28
information need not be in the same kind of language used in the law relied
upon.29
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed
with the court based on the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, one of which is the claim that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. In assessing whether an information must be quashed
on that ground, the basic test is to determine if the facts averred would
30
establish the presence of the essential elements of the crime as defined in the
law. The information is examined without consideration of the truth or veracity
of the claims therein, as these are more properly proven or controverted during
the trial. In the appraisal of the information, matters aliunde are not taken into
account.
We quote the pertinent provision of the Anti-Hazing Law as follows:
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a
prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or
organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury.
The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Philippine National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer
and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training.
The physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and
practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological
fitness of prospective regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police as approved by the Secretary of National
Defense and the National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief
of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the
Philippine National Police shall not be considered as hazing for the purposes
of this Act.
Sec. 4. x x x x.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or
who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the
same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing
committed by the perpetrators. (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements
are established: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating
situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2)
these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry
into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing
it from the crimes against persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised
Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological suffering
on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct
participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is
shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the
accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to
74 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge
thereof.
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be
considered an organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the
term organization includes – but is not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities,
sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies,
cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the
AFP. Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the
31 32
PMMA is a government-owned educational institution established for the
33
primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine
officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of
34
the law.
We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the
Information was warranted for failure to allege that the purported acts were not
covered by the exemption relating to the duly recommended and approved
"testing and training procedure and practices" for prospective regular members
of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an
essential element of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that
must be properly claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution. The reason
for this rule is that the accused carry the burden of proof in establishing by
clear and convincing evidence that they have satisfied the requirements
thereof. Thus, the prosecution’s failure to point out in the Information that the
35
exception is inapplicable would not justify the quashal of that Information.
Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash
must be granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts
constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. The Information charging
respondents reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the Special
Prosecutor, hereby accuses [RADM] VIRGINIO R. ARIS, [LTSG.]
DOMINADOR D. BAYABOS,[LTJG.] MANNY G. FERRER, [LTJG.] RONALD
G. MAGSINO,[LTJG.] KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, [LTJG.] GERRY
P.DOCTOR, [ENS.] DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., and [ENS.] DENNIS S.
VELASCO, as accomplices for Violation of R.A. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law),
committed as follows:
That during the period from the 2nd of May 2001 up to the 3rd of May 2001,
inside the campus of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the
Municipality of San Narciso, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS,
President of PMMA with [Salary Grade (SG) 29]; LTSG. DOMINADOR D.
BAYABOS, Commandant of the Cadets; (LTJG.) MANNY G. FERRER, 1st
Batallion Officer; LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, Security Officer; LTJG.
KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, 2nd Battalion Officer; LTJG.GERRY P.
DOCTOR, Batl. Mast.; ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., 1st Battalion
Company Officer; and ENS. DENNIS S. VELASCO, Mess Officer, all public
officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
committing the offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their
duties as such public officers being the school authorities and/or faculty
members did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, consent or have
actual knowledge of the hazing perpetrated by the principal accused, all First
Class Midshipmen, against probationary midshipman FERNANDO BALIDOY,
JR. during the school’s Indoctrination and Orientation; and, fail to take any
action to prevent the occurrence of the hazing and the infliction of
psychological and physical injuries against said FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR.
thereby causing the instantaneous death of the latter, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. 36
As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that
psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is
no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for
admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient
would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the
accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain
reference to a technical term – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and
37
incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and
thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
expressly states that the information must include, inter alia, both "the
designation of the offense given by the statute" and "the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense." The Special Prosecutor’s belated
argument in his Petition before this Court that the successful completion of
38
the indoctrination and orientation program was used as a prerequisite for
continued admission to the academy – i.e., attainment of active midshipman
status – does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the Information
must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime
75 | C r i m P r o S e t 2 C a s e s
of accomplice to hazing. Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutor’s claim that
the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the filing of another information
or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of dismissing the case
outright. Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a
39
motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a chance to correct
the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here,
we point out that the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion
to Quash that there was no defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a
40
new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to Section 5, Rule
117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the
Information and the eventual dismissal of the case.
This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded
from filing another information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an
1âwphi1
order sustaining a motion to quash would not bar another prosecution. That is,
of course, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.
Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the
other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is
hereby DENIED and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 174786,
DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated
27 January 2006 and 3 August 2006 in Criminal Case No. 28339 are thus
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.