Intrinsic Extrinsic Mere Cambridge' Change Lewis Francescotti

1
‘Mere Cambridge’ Test
A ‘Mere Cambridge’ Test to Demarcate Extrinsic from Intrinsic

Properties
(Pre-print of article available as 'Online First':
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12136-017-0336-1
please cite published version.)
Abstract
I argue that a ‘mere Cambridge’ test can yield a mutually exclusive, jointly
exhaustive, partition of properties between the intrinsic and the extrinsic.
Unlike its rivals, this account can be extended to partition 2nd and higher
order properties of properties. A property F is intrinsic, I claim, iff the same
relation of resemblance holds between all and only possible instances of F.
By contrast, each possible bearer of an extrinsic property has a determinate
relation to some independently contingent concrete object(s). Such a
relation can hold for concrete and abstract objects, of objects which are not
remotely duplicates, and can vary from one possible duplicate to another. I
compare this with accounts which do not allow extension to 2nd and higher
order properties and give preliminary rebuttals for some main difficulties
raised for the account advocated.
Intrinsic; extrinsic; ‘mere Cambridge’ change; Lewis; Francescotti.
1. Preamble
I defend and explain an account of intrinsicality which can be summarised as: –
Those properties are intrinsic which are stable across all possible
worlds. Where possessed by concrete objects, they are possessed by
all possible duplicates of those objects. Their possession by properties
and abstract objects signals the stable identities of those properties
and abstract objects across all possible worlds. Intrinsic properties
are united in being stable in virtue of their lack of any disqualifying
dependence on any relation1 to independently contingent concrete
things which are wholly distinct2 from their bearers and whose
existence and/or character varies from one possible world to another.
Properties which do depend on such a relation are subject to possible
variations which are ‘mere Cambridge changes’ to the bearers of
those properties that vary in this manner, and are consequently
extrinsic.

I am indebted to an anonymous referee for many helpful comments which have enabled me
hopefully to clarify the claims that follow.
1
For this I depend on the insight developed in detail by Francescotti 1999b in his characterisation
of ‘d-relational’ properties, of which more below.
2
I.e. having no part in common.
2
In brief, the rationale for the account advocated here is as follows.
To begin with, I take the ways in which objects may resemble or be distinct from
one another to be properties, and I take abstract objects, such as properties and
numbers to be ‘real’ enough to possess such 2nd and higher order properties as
intrinsic and even. I take ‘duplication preserving’ properties to be those shared
by every possible duplicate of their instances, where duplicates are objects which
could not be more alike. I will argue that talk of possibility depends on assuming
the stability of properties as outlined above.
The criterion for intrinsicality rests on Geach’s3 contrast between ‘real’ and ‘mere
Cambridge’ change of which Weatherson & Marshall 2013 write (1.1):
Geach noted that we can distinguish between real changes, such as what occurs in
Socrates when he dies, from mere changes in which predicates one satisfies, such
as occurs in Xanthippe when Socrates dies. The latter he termed ‘mere Cambridge’
change. There is something of a consensus that an object undergoes real change
in an event iff there is some intrinsic property they satisfied before the event but
not afterwards.
Note that Geach does not thereby contrast ‘real’ with unreal change (ask
any widow, as Humberstone 1996 notes). Rather, Geach contrasts a
change to what x is like with a change to some other wholly distinct
object(s) which merely alters x’s relations – i.e. a change to x itself, in
contrast to a change to e.g. x’s surroundings.
I argue that this yields a way of fixing the identity of an intrinsic or an extrinsic
property that is more ‘fine-grained’ than necessary co-extensiveness. Namely,
that the characteristic relations in which their bearers participate fix the identities
of both intrinsic and extrinsic properties: i.e.
 for any intrinsic property FI, the same relation of resemblance holds
between all and only possible instances of FI;
 for any extrinsic property FE, each of its possible bearers has a
determinate relation to some wholly distinct independently
contingent concrete object(s).
Thus, an intrinsic property FI of a concrete object x is possessed by all possible
duplicates of its instances. By contrast, an extrinsic property FE of x is one that x
has in virtue of a relation to some wholly distinct, independently contingent
concrete object(s) in which x participates, such as next to me, having the same
owner as, being the tallest tree in the forest, etc. Many very different kinds of
things may participate in the same relation on which FE depends. FE can
consequently hold of objects which are not remotely duplicates, and vary from
one possible duplicate to another just as the wholly distinct independently
contingent concrete relata, on which it depends, can vary from world to possible
world. A ‘mere Cambridge change’ to a concrete thing x is a change to the
extrinsic properties of x which makes no difference to what x is like. By the
3
Geach 1969.
3
same token, extrinsic properties are those which can vary between possible
duplicates of their bearers.
The ‘mere Cambridge’ test that I propose is that an extrinsic property is one that
may be lost through a ‘mere Cambridge’ change, while intrinsic properties are
just those that cannot. A ‘mere Cambridge’ property is, by contrast, a more
restrictive category: these properties can only be lost through a ‘mere Cambridge’
change and make no difference to what their bearers are like (e.g. in London, next
to me, having the same owner, etc.) So, all ‘mere Cambridge’ properties are
extrinsic, but not vice-versa. We cannot take only4 ‘mere Cambridge’ properties
to be extrinsic because, if FE is e.g. having the same mass5 as one’s own son, then
FE can be gained or lost by a parent through
 a ‘mere Cambridge’ change to the parent (the son gains or loses mass) or
through
 an intrinsic, ‘real’ change (the parent gains or loses mass).
Such properties, while they may make a difference to what their bearers are like,
are still extrinsic by the test proposed: they may be lost through a ‘mere
Cambridge’ change, which does not make a difference to what their bearers are
like, and, consequently, they can vary between possible duplicates of their bearers,
even though they may also be lost through an intrinsic, ‘real change’ to their
bearers. In §6. I argue that all properties like having the same mass as one’s own
son are intrinsic/extrinsic compounds which can be resolved into wholly intrinsic
and wholly extrinsic (mere Cambridge) disjuncts or conjuncts. Take, e.g.
concrete6 superlatives: T can cease to be the tallest tree in the forest either if
another tree grows taller (a ‘mere Cambridge’ change to T) or if T is felled (a real
change to T). ‘T is the tallest tree in the forest’ = ‘T is H metres high (intrinsic to
T) and T belongs to set of trees F (extrinsic to T) such that every other member of
F is less than H metres high’.
The cross-world stability of intrinsic properties of concrete objects arises, I shall

argue, because, for every intrinsic property F of concrete objects, there is no
possible concrete F thing which does not resemble all other actual and possible F
things in being F – i.e. for an intrinsic property F the same relation of resemblance
holds between all and only possible instances of F. However, if ‘intrinsic’ is an
epithet properly applicable to properties of concrete objects, then properties
themselves may7, in turn, be the bearers of 2nd and higher order intrinsic or
4
Discussed in Francescotti 1999a, who raises the difficulty discussed here, previously raised by
Humberstone 1996, which I hope I rebut below in §6.
5
See Hoffmann-Kolss 2010
6
By contrast, 2nd order superlatives, true of properties, numbers, shapes etc. are intrinsic: e.g.
Platonic solid with the fewest faces.
7
I write ‘may’ since it is possible to, and some do, disallow or restrict the application of 2 nd and
higher order properties. The costs of doing so are discussed in Cowling 2017. He argues that
neither theories of tropes nor of universals can be developed without invoking 2 nd order
intrinsicality. While noting that 2nd order intrinsicality poses problems for many current criteria
4
extrinsic properties – intrinsic itself being a case in point. It is intrinsic to

magnetism that magnetism is an intrinsic property, but magnetism can, in turn,
have the extrinsic property investigated by Faraday. If so, no account of
intrinsicality/extrinsicality can be given by a criterion applicable solely to the (1st
order) properties of concrete objects – a drawback for all those criteria whose
genealogy can be traced back to Kim’s 1982 suggestion (see §2 below) that
intrinsic properties are those whose possession is compatible with loneliness8,
since it does not seem that properties can be lonely.
The account I advocate here has an advantage over very many of the criteria
proposed in the literature to distinguish intrinsic, since these are applicable only to
the properties of concrete objects (see §2.). I am after a criterion that applies
equally to 2nd and higher order properties of properties, like intrinsic itself. The
stability of intrinsic properties of properties and abstract objects arises, I shall
argue, because for every intrinsic property GI of a property or abstract object F,
there is no possible world at which property F does not possess GI. This is so
irrespective of what may vary from one possible world to another, including those
in which F has no instances (because e.g. red is required to specify the intrinsic
character of possible world W~R which contains no red thing9).
By contrast, I will argue, an abstract object F can have an extrinsic property

GE in virtue of a relation F has to some independently contingent concrete
object(s) wholly distinct from bearers of F – e.g. the same colour as a
tomato, investigated by Faraday, entertained by Descartes, etc. This can
vary from one possible world to another just as those wholly distinct relata
vary (tomatoes might have been blue, Faraday might have been a botanist,
Descartes an empiricist and so on, and each might not exist). Moreover,
many very different kinds of abstracta may participate in the same relation
on which GE depends, so no single relation of resemblance holds between all
and only possible instances of GE (Faraday might have investigated all sorts
of different properties). A ‘mere Cambridge change’ to any property or
abstract object F is a change to an extrinsic property GE of F which makes
no difference to what any possible instance of F is like, or to the cross-world
identity of the property or abstract object F.
The requirement on intrinsic properties to be stable across all possible worlds

provides an overall rationale uniting the ‘duplication preserving’ and ‘non-
relational’ criteria for intrinsicality. It mitigates both the apparent circularity of
the former – Lewis’s worry in his 1983 – (“duplicates are objects which are alike
proposed to mark the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction he does not directly address the question of a
criterion that will suffice.
8
‘Loneliness’ is an object’s existing as the sole object in some possible world.
9
One might argue that possible worlds merely need to be characterised positively by
exhaustively listing those properties which its contents do display. Against this, I say that,
so long as the actual world cannot be characterised in this way (who knows all the
properties actual things possess?), nor can those deviations from the actual world we
specify by adding or subtracting properties.
5
in all their intrinsic properties; intrinsic properties are those which are unchanged
between duplicates”) and the apparent arbitrariness of the latter in proscribing
some but not all relational properties. (After all, likeness is a relation that
instances of any intrinsic property bear to one another.)
The justification for both lies in the need for a class of properties picking out
resemblance classes stable across all possible worlds in order to frame
comparisons between such worlds. So, making comparisons between possible
worlds does not explain the necessity that, for every intrinsic property FI – say
triangular – there is no possible abstract or concrete triangular thing which does
not resemble all other actual and possible triangular things in being triangular.
Rather, it is a condition which must be met before any such comparisons between
worlds can possibly succeed in explaining possibility and necessity, namely that,
for any intrinsic property FI, the same relation of resemblance holds between all
and only possible instances of FI.
Let’s expand on and hopefully justify this cryptic beginning. If being possessed
by all possible duplicates of its instances makes F intrinsic, then F is intrinsic in
every possible world; and being intrinsic is like unique, which is (and unlike
extended, which is not) among those properties which exemplify themselves.
The reason the property intrinsic is an intrinsic 2nd order property of red cannot be
because it is made intrinsic by its being possessed by all possible duplicates of its
instances: as a property, red seems not to have duplicates10. A duplication
preservation criterion for intrinsic needs to be supplemented to account for the
intrinsicality of 2nd order properties such as intrinsic itself. Francescotti’s
account of d-relations does just this.
Weatherson and Marshall 2013 outline four alternative styles of criterion

distinguishing intrinsic from non-intrinsic properties11:
I. Non-Relational vs. Relational Properties
(citing Francescotti’s analysis of those disqualifying d-relations that
preclude intrinsicality)
II. Duplication Preserving vs. Duplication Non-Preserving Properties
(which they broadly characterise with the ‘platitude’
“F is intrinsic iff F never differs between duplicates.”)
10
Unless taken to be tropes, but see §2.1
11
Though I assume this, below, not everyone takes all non-intrinsic properties to be extrinsic, see
e.g. Lewis 1986). Lewis consequently needs an independent account of extrinsicality. He takes
external relations to be exclusively (analogically) spatio-temporal in character and must declare
many properties to be neither intrinsic nor extrinsic – e.g. being an uncle, having the same owner,
being thought of by John, not being accompanied by a talking donkey – yet their loss or gain
would be ‘mere Cambridge’ changes, they depend on d-relations, are lost by ‘lonely duplicates’
and, intuitively, they seem plainly to be extrinsic.
6
III. Interior vs. Exterior Properties

“Being F is an intrinsic property iff, necessarily, anything that is F is
F in virtue of the way it itself, and nothing wholly distinct from it,
is.”)
IV. Local vs. Non-Local Properties
“F is an intrinsic property iff, necessarily, for any x, an ascription of
F to x is entirely about how that thing and its parts are, and not at all
about how things wholly distinct from it are.”)
They note that no single consistent analysis fits all that writers have taken
‘intrinsic’ to mean (endorsing Humberstone 1996).
It is worse than they make out. Thesaurus.com lists many purported

‘synonyms’ of ‘intrinsic’ but includes no instances of I. & II. It mostly
inclines towards III. & IV. but includes a cluster of further terms broadly
meaning ‘essential’, ‘inherent’ or ‘endogenous’, which Weatherson and
Marshall do not discuss, though some philosophers appeal to them (e.g.
Figdor 2008). Given all this, it is not surprising to find ‘intuitive’
counterexamples proposed to any consistent putative account of the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction.
The view I defend combines what I. & II. suggest, namely that, if duplicates
are concrete objects that could not be more alike, then ‘duplication
preserving’ (intrinsic) properties of concrete objects are shared by every
possible duplicate of their instances; while ‘non-duplication preserving’
(extrinsic) properties are not so shared because they depend on some
disqualifying (external12) relation which fails to hold of all possible
(duplicates of their)13 instances. This yields an account which, I claim,
gives fewest hostages to competing philosophical positions.
It also decouples intrinsic – an intrinsic property of properties, from

inherent, essential, endogenous etc. which are 2nd order extrinsic adverbial
properties of the instantiation of 1st order properties in some but not all
cases: green sometimes is inherent, essential, endogenous or whatever but
not always, while always being an intrinsic property stable across every
possible world.
12
This relation is not necessarily symmetrically external – see §3.4 – but is a relation external to
the bearer of the extrinsic property.
13
‘Duplicates’ and ‘counterparts’ in brackets are included because the arguments to follow
aim to be neutral as between counterpart theory + 4dimensionalism as opposed to trans-
world individuals + endurance. Also, the requisite sorts of ‘disqualifying relations’ can
hold of properties, too, whether or not these have duplicates.
7
For, despite not having14 duplicates, properties themselves, e.g. magnetism,

seem to have 2nd order properties: intrinsic is one; investigated by Faraday
is another. Moreover, being extrinsic is, itself, an 3rd order intrinsic feature
of the 2nd order property investigated by Faraday, which is how we know
that investigated by Faraday would unfailingly be an extrinsic property of
any property or object that Faraday might possibly investigate. The nature
of the relation to Faraday fixes the identity of the extrinsic property – a
relation that is not stable from one possible world to another.
I.e. both a concrete historic apparatus, and the property magnetism can have
the extrinsic property investigated by Faraday in virtue of such a
disqualifying relation. Both can have such a relation to some wholly
distinct independently contingent concrete object(s) – in this instance,
(counterparts of) Faraday. This will apply even if properties have no
duplicates15, so absence-of-a-disqualifying-relation is a putative criterion
for intrinsicality appropriate both for properties of contingent concrete
objects and for 2nd and higher order properties of properties. The question
remains ‘Why, and under what circumstances, does this kind of relation
disqualify a 2nd (or higher) order property from being intrinsic?
After all, we can’t proscribe all relations to wholly distinct things. If x has
an intrinsic property F, then x must bear the relation resemblance to all
other actual or possible bearers of F. So which relations of x are proscribed,
and for what reason? The short answer is
‘Those relations of x that change as possible alterations occur to

relata which are independently contingent object(s) wholly
distinct from x but occur without altering what x is like –
relations such as its location, ownership, being accompanied,
being thought of, etc.’
These are ‘mere Cambridge’ changes. Intrinsic properties, by contrast, are

bona fide respects of resemblance, both between concrete and abstract
objects, and, unlike extrinsic properties, are independent of any contingent
disqualifying relation. So, object x having a relation to wholly distinct,
independently contingent relata, which can vary independently of what x is
like, allows properties dependent on such a relation to vary between
possible duplicates of x, and, thus, disqualifies such dependent properties
from being intrinsic. Likewise, property F having a relation to wholly
distinct, independently contingent relata, which can vary independently of
the cross-world identity of F, allows properties dependent on such a relation
(e.g. investigated by Faraday) to vary between the same property F in
different possible worlds, and, thus, disqualifies such dependent properties
from being intrinsic.
14
15
8
I elaborate on these claims further in §3., but begin, in §2., with some
schematic considerations which count against its rivals, III. & IV.
§2. Shortcomings of Supposing that a Property’s Being Intrinsic Turns

on the Way it is Instantiated.
The intuitions regarding intrinsicality embodied in III. & IV. have been
surprisingly difficult to formulate precisely. These continuing vicissitudes
are surveyed in Weatherson and Marshall 2013. Let me give some cursory
justification for failing to discuss them at length. I think there were always
reasons not to venture so far with this project.
§2.1
III. & IV., along with ‘inherent’, ‘endogenous’, ‘essential’ and the like,
initially concern a feature of the instantiation16 of a property by a particular
concrete object that makes it ‘locally’17 intrinsic, inherent, endogenous,
essential etc. to that object, when the same property might not be so to some
other object. So, ‘locally’ intrinsic is a 2nd order extrinsic adverbial
property (being possessed by x intrinsically) that a property may possess in
relation to some (but not necessarily all) of its concrete instances, in the
same way being inherent, endogenous, essential etc. can be.
Thus, it might seem that green can be ‘intrinsic’ to one thing while not to
another, which is just green because it is under a green light, or a magnetic
field can be ‘intrinsic’ to a ‘permanent’ magnet but not to an electro-magnet
in which it is only present when a current flows. This sort of ‘local’
intrinsicality is a feature of the relation a property has to its bearer, by
contrast with a 2nd order intrinsic feature of the properties green and
magnetic themselves, namely, that in all possible worlds they should
unfailingly be the same property – i.e. ‘globally’ intrinsic. Consequently I
don’t think ‘intrinsic’ is used in the same sense when we speak of ‘locally’
and ‘globally’ intrinsic properties.
It seems we can generalise from ‘local’ to ‘global’ intrinsicality if we follow

a principle from Humberstone that
the intrinsic properties are precisely those which are locally intrinsic to all their
[possible18] possessors
adapted by Weatherson and Marshall as
16
Figdor 2008 points this out by distinguishing ‘intrinsic’ from ‘intrinsically’.
17
‘Locally’ as opposed to ‘globally’, not ‘local’ as contrasted in IV. with ‘non-local’.
My interpolation – Humberstone makes clear earlier that he intends to generalise across possible
18
worlds, not just within the actual world.

9
(GTL) If F is an intrinsic property, then it is necessary that every x that has F has F in an
intrinsic fashion
(LTG) If it is necessary that every x that has F has F in an intrinsic fashion, then F is an
intrinsic property
But, on this account, necessary ‘local’ intrinsicality is plainly not a feature
of the contingent relation a property has to its bearer which can vary from
bearer to bearer as green and magnetic do above, i.e. as any 2nd order
extrinsic adverbial property does. The necessity “that every x that
has F has F in an intrinsic fashion” has become, instead, a 2nd order intrinsic
feature of every intrinsic property. It leaves out of account all those cases
where it is contingent whether an x that has F has F in an intrinsic fashion.
So, though I have no space to justify this here, I effectively reserve

‘intrinsic’ to describe those properties that are the respects in which all
actual and possible resemblances obtain, so as not to treat it as a synonym
for ‘inherent’ and its cognates, which cluster round the altogether different
2nd order extrinsic adverbial notion.
In any case, the criterion ‘being shared by every duplicate of its instances’
needs to be supplemented to account for the intrinsicality of 2nd order
properties such as intrinsic, as it is neither necessary nor sufficient for some
F2 to be a 2nd order intrinsic property, at least not in so far as properties and
abstract objects are necessarily singular and have no duplicates.
(Perhaps they do if tropes are invoked to account for properties, but I started
by assuming that properties are ‘real’ enough to possess such 2nd and
higher order properties as intrinsic. If we invoke tropes, to avoid taking
properties to be universals, it seems we abolish the bearers of the 2nd order
property intrinsic as a ‘global’ attribute of properties. Tropes, as (albeit
abstract) particulars, could have duplicates, but not because they shared all
their intrinsic properties, because tropes do not have 1st order properties – it
is precisely the brute resemblance between distinct tropes that supposedly
allows us to do without reifying 1st order properties that retain their
identities across possible worlds. Moreover, because tropes are particulars,
their having duplicates can have no bearing on the intrinsicality of 2nd and
higher order properties of properties, which is presently at issue.
A related problem is that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction appears to be

required before tropes can be invoked to avoid reifying those ‘properties’
whose instances resemble one another. If our initial domain of ‘properties’
contains ‘mere Cambridge’ properties which are wholly extrinsic, then,
characteristically, if FMC is such a property, objects can possess FMC
irrespective of any resemblance between them: existing before I was born,
outside the orbit of Venus, not anticipated by Newton etc. are all examples.
Before an account can be given which invokes resemblances between tropes
to block the reification of properties as universals, a partition of properties is
10
needed to distinguish those which do from those which do not attribute

resemblance between their instances and to disentangle the respective
components of those compound properties like tallest tree in the forest – the
aim of this essay.)
It seems, moreover, to be a 3rd order intrinsic feature of the 2nd order

extrinsic character of the 1st order property next to me that it is unfailingly
extrinsic: things next to me have possible duplicates both far from me and in
possible worlds from which I am absent, and many disparate things can be
next to me, so being next to me is a ‘mere Cambridge’ property and can be
no part of what those things are like, in any possible world, since all true
duplicates of instances of being next to me could not be more alike,
irrespective of whether they are next to me or not19.
So, intrinsicality/extrinsicality seem to be properties which need to be

intrinsic features of any property to which they are ascribed. I.e. both are
‘global’ features of the 1st or higher order properties they characterise. So,
intrinsicality is unlike both being inherent, which varies from one concrete
bearer of a property to another, and investigated by Faraday, which is an
extrinsic feature of magnetism, the property, which it does not have in
worlds without Faraday.
§2.2
The idea behind III. & IV., however, is that ‘intrinsically’ (‘in an intrinsic
fashion’) should impose further requirements for F to be an intrinsic
property of concrete objects, over and above every duplicate of every
instance of F needing to have F, because this seems circular e.g. to Lewis in
his 1983. But III. & IV. can supply no criterion for the intrinsicality of 2nd
order properties of properties. Let’s see why not.
In an indicative statement of the intuition underlying III. & IV., Yablo 1999,
writes:
You know what an intrinsic property is: it’s a property that a thing has (or lacks)
regardless of what may be going on outside of itself. To be intrinsic is to possess
the second-order feature of stability-under-variation-in-the-outside-world.
But what is it that must “possess the second-order feature of stability-under-
variation-in-the-outside-world” in order to be intrinsic? You’d think that 2nd
order stability would have to be a condition satisfied by the property, not by
the bearer of that property. Why, otherwise, is it “2nd order”? We’ve seen
that the 2nd order feature stability of the property is just what I. & II do
demand and is, I will argue, both the necessary and sufficient requirement
19
This claim is open to a major objection: namely that things often seem to be alike in virtue of
extrinsic properties, e.g. coming from Yorkshire or having a common ancestor. I hope to rebut
this objections in §5.
11
for a property to be intrinsic, so I need to indicate how ‘stability of the

bearer’ adds nothing.
Most proponents of III. & IV. try to capture what is involved in being “a
property that a thing has (or lacks) regardless of what may be going on
outside of itself”, by attempting to capture how it is that the bearer rather
than the property, exhibits the required stability. The notion, originating
with Kim 1982, is that, if F is an intrinsic property, then any bearer x that
has F does so irrespective of what anything else is like, of what else there is
and even of whether there is anything else. Indicative expressions of this
intuition are also found in Lewis 1983, Vallentyne 1997, the ‘indifference to
loneliness’ criterion proposed in Langton and Lewis 1998, and Weatherson
2001, who writes (p. 369):
It is a platitude that a property F is intrinsic iff whether an object is F does not
depend on the way the rest of the world is.
However this may be formulated precisely, Cameron 2008 argues that all
such formulations imply that, for a property to be intrinsic, all its possible
bearers must have a possible ‘lonely duplicate’. Perhaps, ‘interiority’ and
‘locality’ of properties that are possessed intrinsically might be articulated
so as not to require the possibility of a ‘lonely duplicate’ of the bearer.
Even so it is hard to see how the quasi-spatial metaphors invoked by the
interior/exterior and local/non-local contrasts between properties of concrete
objects can apply to 2nd order intrinsic properties of properties or abstract
objects, since these have no location to which a property might be, or not be
“interior” or “local”.
(Though it is envisaged by friends of tropes that these are abstract

particulars precisely located in space/time, their spatiotemporal locations are
not obviously 2nd order properties of the property green – they are, rather, 1st
order extrinsic properties of this or that greenness token. If there can be
2nd order properties of properties or numbers – the oddness of 13, say – it is
hard to see how these can be analysed as spatiotemporally located abstract
particulars.)
The larger part of recent literature on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction has

focussed on III. & IV. It has sought to progress Lewis’s metaphysical
project, generally requiring intrinsic to reflect ‘Hume’s dictum’ – that there
are no necessary connections between ‘distinct existences’. I think
‘intrinsic’ need not carry this neo-Humean burden. Wilson 2010 discusses
this knot of issues and notes that a criterion for intrinsic that rests on ‘non-
relationality’ does not have to be compatible with Hume’s dictum, while her
2015 documents the centrality of his notion of the intrinsic to Lewis’s entire
project. I will argue below that true attribution of every physical property
allows us to infer something about the ambient conditions of its bearer and
that all are ‘causal’ properties in the relatively ‘weak’ sense that their
12
instantiation complies with specific laws of nature holding in those worlds

in which they have instances.
§2.3
The first indication that III. & IV add nothing comes when we ask what
distinguishes any 2nd order intrinsic feature of a property F from an extrinsic
feature. Intrinsic is itself a putative 2nd order intrinsic property of
magnetism, while, I maintain, investigated by Faraday is not – the latter is a
2nd order extrinsic property of magnetism. For any F2 to be a globally
intrinsic 2nd order property of F, all that is needed is for it to be a feature of
every possible instance of F, in every possible world. If intrinsic being
unfailingly possessed by every possible instance of F is enough to make
intrinsic a 2nd order intrinsic property of F, (as the complementarity of
Weatherson and Marshall’s (GTL)&(LTG) above suggests) then a criterion
concerning how F is individually possessed by its concrete bearers can add
nothing further.
It cannot be that ‘stability of the bearer’ distinguishes a 2nd order intrinsic

property: F is a property, not a concrete object, and thus, arguably, has no
duplicate, ‘lonely’ or otherwise. I argued, in 2.1, that invoking tropes to
account for properties allows ‘duplicate tropes’, but, only for properties
already identified as intrinsic. Moreover, if tropes are spatially located
particulars, it remains problematic to envisage how properties or abstract
objects can have, as 2nd order properties, properties they share with concrete
objects, like symmetry, investigated by Faraday and so forth.
The disqualification of investigated by Faraday arises, I claim, because

Faraday is not found in every possible world containing instances of
magnetism and so cannot be unfailingly possessed by every possible
duplicate of any instance of magnetism. Investigated by Faraday depends,
as, I say, all extrinsic properties do, on its bearer’s relation to one or more
wholly distinct concrete objects whose character and existence are
independently contingent. It is this that disqualifies it from being intrinsic,
because investigated by Faraday lacks the cross-world stability required of
an intrinsic property: it can vary between possible duplicates and between
the same properties in worlds with or without Faraday.
In short, at least some intrinsic and extrinsic properties are instantiated by

both concrete and abstract objects. This requires a criterion both for what
makes some F an intrinsic or extrinsic property of a concrete object and for
what makes some F2 an intrinsic or an extrinsic 2nd order property of any
number or property. Moreover, there must be a requirement that the 1st &
2nd order property terms ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ both be univocal to some
degree – i.e. the way in which magnetism is an intrinsic feature of physical
objects must at least resemble the way in which intrinsic is an intrinsic
feature of the property magnetism; and, by the same token, the way in which
13
investigated by Faraday is an extrinsic feature of a coil of copper wire must

resemble the way in which investigated by Faraday is an extrinsic feature of
the property magnetism. I will argue in §3. that the presence or absence of
a disqualifying external d-relation does the trick.
§2.4
There are problems, too, posed by the 2nd order property intrinsic, for the
notion that properties are nothing more than the cross-world sets of their
concrete instances (an aspiration of the neo-Humean framework within
which the intrinsic is widely discussed). Intrinsic could, indeed, be
identified with such a cross-world set, namely the set of all possible sets of
possible instances of the intrinsic properties. However, nothing in any
possible world has no intrinsic properties, so the membership of the cross-
world set intrinsic is nothing short of everything there could possibly be.
By the same token, nothing in any possible world lacks extrinsic properties:
they all, at least, are either lonely or accompanied20. So, if the membership
of the putative cross-world set extrinsic is the set of all possible sets of
possible instances of the extrinsic properties – it is, again, nothing short of
everything there could possibly be. Prima facie, it seems that the theory
that properties are cross-world sets of their concrete instances must forbid
an intrinsic/extrinsic distinction between properties, because, unavoidably,
intrinsic and extrinsic have the very same cross-world extension.
Alternatively, we could conclude that, unsurprisingly, this theory cannot
cope with hyperintensional 2nd order properties of properties, numbers and
the like.
§2.5
A further reason not to pursue III. & IV. is that there do not seem to be any
properties21 “that a thing has (or lacks) regardless of what may be going on
outside of itself”, for any concrete object. Detonate a nuclear bomb, be on
hand for a supernova or drop into a black hole as thought-experiments to
test this. Such considerations apply without exception to all the properties
attributed by the descriptive vocabulary of the natural sciences22, including
sortal terms and the identities of the 3- or 4-dimensional objects they
individuate. The attribution of any physical property consequently always
allows us to infer something about the ambient conditions of the bearer of
that property. Consequently, attributing any physical property to its bearer
is neither
entirely about how that thing and its parts are, and not at all about how things
wholly distinct from it are
20
Point clarified thanks to referee.
21
A point I have already laboured elsewhere (Ref 2.).
22
These considerations are strengthened in e.g. Earman & Roberts 2005 by appealing to
quantum entanglement.
14
nor true
in virtue of the way it itself, and nothing wholly distinct from it, is.
III. & IV both, therefore, imply that no physical property can be intrinsic.
III. & IV imply, too, that no properties can be intrinsic that are ‘causal’, i.e.
whose instantiation complies with specific laws of nature holding in those
worlds in which they have instances and thus allow inferences about
physical circumstances in which they are possessed, yet this is a universal
feature of the physical properties science ascribes to the world.
§2.6
Indeed, contra III. & IV., there is a strong independent reason to hold that
‘causal’ properties must be intrinsic. Suppose that ‘our’ laws of nature are
nothing more than the exceptionless regularities that characterise the actual
world, and that other possible worlds can resemble this actual world by
sharing the same laws of nature. In that case, laws of nature are, by any
criterion (indeed, by III. & IV. themselves) an intrinsic feature of those
worlds in which they obtain, since they:
 do not obtain in virtue of a relation that a possible world has to
any other wholly distinct thing (complying with I.);
 are shared by every possible duplicate of that world (complying
with II.) (every possible world W has, as duplicates, proper parts
of slightly larger possible worlds with the same laws plus one or
more items more than W contains – unless extrinsic differences
between the contents of different possible worlds engender
intrinsic differences between the containing worlds – in which
case those worlds’ properties could not be intrinsic by any
criterion that entailed their having ‘lonely duplicates’);
 obtain of any given possible world “in virtue of the way it itself,
and nothing wholly distinct from it, is” (complying with III.);
 are “entirely about how that thing and its parts are, and not at all
about how things wholly distinct from it are” (complying with
IV.)
It is difficult, then, to find a criterion that allows one to argue that the causal
features of any given possible world are not intrinsic features of that world
and all it contains. Consequently, I suggest that there are good enough
prima facie reasons to allow that causal properties can be as intrinsic as the
laws with which their instantiations comply, and to reject ‘interiority’ (III.)
and ‘locality’ (IV.) as incapable of providing plausible criteria to distinguish
the intrinsic.
§2.7
15
Finally, objecting to a ‘duplicate preservation’ criterion for intrinsic,

Weatherson & Marshall 2013 (2.4) write:
Say that a has b as a part, and consider the event whereby b is replaced in a by c,
which happens to be a duplicate of b. This event seems to constitute a real change
in a, not merely a Cambridge change, but it does not constitute a change in
qualitative properties, and hence does not constitute a change in duplication
preserving properties.
But we saw that Geach’s ‘real change’ is a term of art. It does not contrast
‘change which is real’ with the unreal ones. Substitution of a duplicate
part is no more unreal than becoming a widow, but each is a ‘mere
Cambridge’ change because neither meets Weatherson & Marshall’s own
necessary and sufficient condition to be a so-called ‘real’ change in Geach’s
sense, since we saw above that they write (note the biconditional – my
italics):
…an object undergoes real change in an event iff there is some intrinsic property
they satisfied before the event but not afterwards
and, in this case, there is not, because b and c are duplicates and have
exactly the same intrinsic properties.
It has been suggested23 that having part c rather than part b involves an
intrinsic change to a because, despite being duplicates, b and c have
different ‘identity properties’ or haecceities. I do not take such properties
to be intrinsic because I argue (in §4.) that identity cannot be intrinsic if
duplicates are possible which share all their intrinsic properties, since
neither identity nor haecceities can be shared.
§3. Central Argument for Stability of The Property

3.1 Overview
In this section, I try to show, both for concrete objects, and for properties
and abstract objects (for whose identity there is no ‘numerical/qualitative’
distinction), how the ‘mere Cambridge’ criterion identifies, as extrinsic,
properties that can change while making no difference to what their relata
are like. This test reconciles non-relationality and duplication-preservation
criteria (as far as each goes) in taking stability of the intrinsic property to
explain why absence-of-a-disqualifying-relation allows both that intrinsic
properties must be shared by all concrete duplicates of their instances and
that they are just those retained by that property, number etc. in every
possible world, including those in which it has no instances. The detailed
task of identifying the nature of this ‘disqualifying relation’ I take to have
largely been accomplished by Francescotti’s 1999b account of d-relations.
In order not to slow this section’s central exposition, I will return, in §§4 –
6, hopefully to rebut some difficulties that arise as I proceed.
23
Amongst the comments from the referee.
16
3.2 Stability of Intrinsic Properties

The ‘stability of the property’ thesis parallels the notion that intrinsic properties
are those that are rigidly designated as necessarily the same property in all
possible worlds. The latter is a thesis about the reference of terms rather than
about the character of properties and some24 have argued that the apparatus of
rigid designation is unnecessary for property terms so long as ‘magnetism’ has the
same meaning no matter in which world we attribute it. I will just use terms in
italics – e.g. magnetism – to refer to properties, without asking how that is
accomplished.
The central rationale for this account is that it is a necessary condition for
any comparisons between possibilities (or possible worlds, of whatever
stripe25) that there should be a class of properties that are stable (i.e.
properties that are the same at each of those possible worlds) so that,
between possibilities (across possible worlds), like can be compared with
like and unlike. If e.g. red, charge, fluid etc. are each not the same property
at each possible world26, then it would be futile to attempt to compare
possibilities (possible worlds) where things and their properties are
differently distributed from one to another.
So, I claim intrinsic properties to be those that exhibit this stability and are
responsible for all actual and possible genuine resemblance. (I argue against
objections to this specific claim at greater length in §5.) The stability of
the intrinsic property FI consists in the same relation of resemblance holding
between all and only the possible instances of FI.
Let’s take the existence of, and resemblances between concrete objects to be
contingent,27 so that, for any possible such concrete object x, it is contingent
whether there is:
 any object exactly like x;
 one sole object exactly like x;
 more than one object exactly like x.
24
See LaPorte 2016 §4.2
25
Considerations derived from theories of possible worlds impinge on many discussions of
intrinsicality. Perhaps they should not, for without the prior stability of properties no comparisons
between possible worlds can serve to explain necessity in the first place.
26
Perhaps there are possible worlds where things have properties – frumious and slithy, say –
which no actual things possess, but I am not sure that we can know anything beyond this about
them.
27
Apart from necessary concrete beings. The anonymous referee took me to task for assuming
there were none. Whatever these are like, if any exist, no possible world can differ in its
necessary concrete contents. Regarding all necessary objects (abstract or concrete), I argue below
(§3.4) that only contingent accompaniment is extrinsic.
17
No specific ‘metric’ of similarity is needed to support the notion that

duplicates are objects that could not be more alike. We merely need to note
that things can be more or less alike: a raven is not very like a writing desk,
but it is very much more like another raven. Resemblance must also be
reflexive: each thing cannot help but be exactly like itself. So exact
duplicates of concrete objects must always be possible. Because any x is
exactly like itself, so some y, too, can possibly be exactly like x, because
exactly like x must be a way things may possibly be, since this how x itself
possibly is. Plainly, then, yet other things can be less than exactly like x.
The ‘mere Cambridge’ test precisely distinguishes the intrinsic properties

from the extrinsic properties of concrete things just because the latter are not
shared by every possible duplicate of their instances and so may change
between possible duplicates, i.e. while not changing what their bearers are
like (since they remain duplicates) – these are ‘mere Cambridge’ changes.
This chimes with Lewis’s 1986 (p.62) designation of resemblance as an

internal relation, namely a relation that supervenes on the intrinsic
properties of its relata. However, if 2nd order properties are also considered,
we have a case like those Lewis discusses (1986 pp. 14 – 17) where
supervenience cannot be readily understood with reference to possible
worlds.
This is because, for every intrinsic property FI, there is no possible FI thing
which does not resemble all other actual and possible FI things in being FI.
Put ‘red’, ‘100grams’, ‘silver’ etc. for ‘FI’, and it becomes clear that red,
100grams, silver must each be the same property of a concrete object at
every world, so intrinsic is, in turn, an intrinsic property of the properties
red, 100grams, silver, etc. Put ‘intrinsic’ (the 2nd order property) for FI and
its bearers – properties – are not differently distributed across possible
worlds in the way that their concrete instances are so as to ‘explain’ why,
necessarily, all FI things must be alike in being FI.
Indeed, the boot is on the other foot: the thesis of the stability of intrinsic
properties is a profoundly important principle because it explains why the
way things are distributed across possible worlds may be used to explain 1st
order necessity and possibility. Such comparisons across possible worlds
could gain no explanatory ‘purchase’ without this stability. It also
delineates, by exclusion, extrinsic properties as those that do not only turn
on resemblances between their bearers, because extrinsic properties can vary
while making no difference to what their (concrete or abstract) bearers are
like. (Unless there are relations which are neither internal nor external,
which Lewis claims but I argue there are not.)
The ‘stability of the property’ thesis says that an intrinsic property FI – e.g.
magnetism – retains its identity – is the very same property – at all possible
18
worlds (including those which are characterised by its absence – i.e. by its
having no instances in those worlds): for any 1st order intrinsic property FI
the same relation of resemblance holds between all and only possible
instances of FI. So, if magnetism being an intrinsic property of concrete
magnetic objects entails that magnetism is shared by every possible
duplicate of its instances, then magnetism’s having that character is, in turn,
intrinsic to the property magnetism, so magnetism is globally intrinsic –
intrinsic in every possible world – while magnetism’s having been
investigated by Faraday is a property it only has in those worlds which
contain (a counterpart of) Faraday and in which he investigated magnetism.
Whether it was investigated by Faraday makes no difference to what the

property magnetism is like, which has to be the same at every world
including those in which Faraday does not appear. (Equally irrelevant to the
identity and intrinsic character of magnetism is whether it is inherent, as
with a permanent magnet, or depends on the flow of a current, like an
electromagnet. Faraday’s great discoveries arose precisely from his
recognising this identity.)
The relevance of the intrinsic properties of an abstract object to its self-

identity is a crucial difference between concrete and abstract objects. Apart,
possibly, from tropes (but see §2.1), abstract objects like properties,
numbers, sets with actual and possible members, shapes etc. are necessarily
singular, can have no duplicates, so they do not have a ‘numerical’ as
distinct from a ‘qualitative’ identity. Instead they are ‘present’ at (if not in)
every possible world (if ‘present’ at any), even at those where they have no
instances/members.
Abstract objects are causally inert and do not change. Only in so far as
properties are immutable and uniform across times and worlds can they
explain how worlds and times can be distinct but comparable in respect of
the number and intrinsic character of their contents; and, because their
cross-world identities turn on their intrinsic properties, these are, effectively,
the essential properties of abstract objects, too.
So, for abstract objects, exact resemblance is identity and, as a corollary, so long
as identity is necessary, every intrinsic property belonging to a shape, property,
number or any other abstract object is essential to it, as are the internal relations
which supervene on those intrinsic properties. Another corollary is that only
concrete objects can possibly have duplicates or have ‘accidental intrinsics’ (my
cat is essentially carnivorous, but accidentally black). One might argue, too, that
abstracta instantiate their properties in a wholly different manner from concrete
objects, if they instantiate them at all, since 1st order instantiation seems to
involve spatio-temporal location.
19
3.3 Extrinsic Properties Not Shared by All Possible Duplicates

Those 2nd order properties of properties like investigated by Faraday, which
vary from one possible world to another, play no part in fixing the identity
of the property magnetism by characterising what it is like at every possible
world. Their being extrinsic (like being intrinsic) is a 3rd order intrinsic
feature of 1st order property magnetism’s 2nd order extrinsic property
investigated by Faraday. It is this you understand when you see that there
is no possible world in which investigated by Faraday is intrinsic to
anything, because it is true of magnetism, and true of other properties or
things and their duplicates, in only some and not in all possible worlds.
This has the consequence that a wholly extrinsic ‘mere Cambridge’ property
FE cannot be a respect in which its bearers resemble one another28, because
it is not shared by every possible duplicate of its concrete instances, which
could not be more alike, nor is it shared in every possible world by its
abstract instances. This follows for any x where x is the concrete bearer of
a ‘mere Cambridge’ property FMC because x then has a duplicate y which
does not possess FMC, yet y’s lacking FMC does not make y any less like its
duplicate x which has FMC.
It further follows, for any property or abstract object F where F is an

abstract bearer of extrinsic property FE, that FE cannot be a 2nd order
property that any abstract object must have at every possible world in order
to be that very abstract object. It cannot because there are possible worlds
in which F does not have FE yet remains that very property F, and no less
like other properties that F resembles. E.g. 7 is (intrinsically) a prime at
every world, but (extrinsically) lucky only in some. Were it to change to
being even, if would no longer be 7.
This allows an extrinsic property FE to be identified by the ‘mere

Cambridge’ test:
 if a concrete object x can lose FE, and this does not change what x is
like, then a ‘mere Cambridge’ change to x has affected something
other than x’s intrinsic character, and, hence, other than the internal
relations of x itself, namely some external relation RE x has that,
unlike resemblance, does not supervene on its intrinsic properties.
An external relation such as RE obtains, instead, between x and one
or more things (duplicates of) which do not necessarily accompany
(duplicates) of x.
28
There are extrinsic properties like weight which look like resemblances, but only so long as
some extrinsic condition (in this case) distance from a massive body is held constant. The real
resemblance is in respect of mass – see §6.
20
 if an abstract object F loses FE, then this does not impinge on the
cross-world identity of F because a ‘mere Cambridge’ change29 to F
affects something other than F’s intrinsic character, and, hence, other
than the identity and internal relations, of F itself, namely some
external relation RE that F has which, unlike resemblance, does not
supervene on F’s intrinsic properties. An external relation such as
RE obtains, instead, between F and one or more things which, unlike
F itself, are not found at every possible world.
In neither case does it supervene on the intrinsic properties of any concrete
or abstract relatum, because RE is a relation F or x has to some actual or
possible wholly distinct object(s) whose character and existence are
independently contingent. Consequently, (duplicates of) these actual or
possible wholly distinct object(s) do not accompany30 F or x or its
duplicates in all possible worlds containing them.
The ‘dependence’ of extrinsic properties on external d-relations is

straightforward31: whether a concrete or an abstract object is an instance of
an extrinsic property, each token of an extrinsic property must be identical
to a token of the relation on which it ‘depends’: e.g.
 the external relation x is next to y obtains iff x has the extrinsic
property next to y iff y has the extrinsic property next to x.32
 the external relation magnetism was investigated by Faraday obtains
iff magnetism has the extrinsic property investigated by Faraday iff
Faraday has the intrinsic33 property investigator of magnetism.
For any concrete object, number, property or whatever that may be the
bearer of a putative intrinsic property F, F is intrinsic iff the same relation of
resemblance holds between all and only possible instances of F. F is
extrinsic if that is not so. The ‘mere Cambridge’ test highlights when loss
of F by any bearer makes no difference to what that bearer is like.
29
‘Properties are immutable’ you might object. But F’s being no longer thought important,
does not alter what F is like: it is a ‘mere Cambridge’ change to F (that I hope befalls some
properties I discuss here!).
30
Or do not fail to accompany F or x, because intrinsic and extrinsic are closed under negation.
31
This answers the criticism, from Hoffmann-Kolss 2010, that Francescotti has a problem
with the relation ‘consist in’ between d-relational properties and the relations on which they
depend. Contra Weatherson & Marshall 2013, too, ‘iff’ can be employed between two
expressions without invoking ‘states of affairs’, ‘events’ or whatever, whose equivalence
relations are more obscure than ‘– iff –’ simpliciter.
32
They are necessarily coextensive. However, a more fine-grained identity criterion for
properties and relations must be employed in even raising the hyperintensional question to
which this is the answer, since the question how extrinsic properties ‘depend’ on external
relations could not arise if these properties were not hyperintensionally discriminable from
the relations on which they depend.
33
D-relationality need not be symmetrical – see shortly.
21
So, unlike an internal relation, an external relation RE does not supervene on

any intrinsic properties of its relata, because not all possible duplicates of its
concrete relata participate in RE and because no abstract relatum participates
in RE in all possible worlds. The identities of both intrinsic and extrinsic
properties can be fixed by the characteristic relations in which their bearers
participate. For any extrinsic property FE, each of its possible bearers has a
determinate relation to some wholly distinct, independently contingent
concrete object(s).
This analysis is sufficient to establish mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive

distinctions demarcating intrinsic from extrinsic properties and internal from
external relations both for concrete objects and for properties or abstract
objects.
3.4 The Disqualifying Relata of D-relations

In short, extrinsic properties depend on a sort of relation which disqualifies
them from being intrinsic, while intrinsic properties do not, so any property
that does not depend on such a disqualifying relation is intrinsic. This is the
insight developed in detail by Francescotti 1999b in his detailed
characterisation of disqualifying ‘d-relational’ properties, which fleshes out
my simplistic characterisation of an extrinsic property F as depending upon
a relation F has to some actual or possible wholly distinct concrete object(s)
whose character and existence are independently contingent.
I have adopted two amendments to his account for which I argued in Ref.1.,
namely:
 d-relations can only hold towards independently contingent concrete
objects;
 d-relations must hold towards possible as well as actual
independently contingent concrete objects.
Francescotti does not require that the other wholly distinct relata of d-relations
should be independently contingent or concrete, since he allows numbers to fulfil
this role. One reason why these two amendments are needed (and have been
assumed so far) is that only the independently contingent variability of these relata
between possible worlds can explain why extrinsic properties are those which
vary between possible duplicates and between the same property, number etc.
from one possible worlds to another.
There are also independent reasons to take this view. Let’s look first at
why only contingent accompaniment might be extrinsic. In Ref 1. I argued
that, if d-relations held towards abstract objects such as numbers, then
measurements would be d-relations and could not be intrinsic, yet these
must be shared by every possible duplicate of their instances. In his 2014
Francescotti argues that one way in which measurements could be intrinsic
would be if numbers did not ‘exist’ as wholly distinct objects: if they do not,
22
then accompanied by 21 would not be a d-relation to a wholly distinct

object.
However, my argument regarding measurement does not show why other

sorts of abstracta cannot be the wholly distinct relata of d-relations. I need
a rationale to explain why, more generally, it cannot be an extrinsic property
of a concrete object that it coexists with any abstract objects because, if they
do exist, abstract objects accompany the contents of every possible world.
I claim that, because being accompanied by any necessary object (abstract
or concrete) is a property shared by every possible duplicate of every object,
and never lost in a ‘mere Cambridge’ change, this consequently makes it
trivially intrinsic. I need to justify this.
This the problem of Indiscriminately Necessary Properties (INPs) discussed

by Weatherson and Marshall 2013 and Francescotti 2014. One way is to
start from the requirement to distinguish those objects and properties which
are stable across all possible worlds from those that are not. INPs are,
while changes to those properties which are not, constitute ‘mere
Cambridge’ changes to their bearers. This provides the rationale for
choosing which relational properties to proscribe as incapable of being
intrinsic – namely those where the bearer has that property in virtue of a
relation to an independently contingent, wholly distinct object whose
existence or character is, consequently, not constant for every possible
duplicate of that bearer. That possibility of change rules out the stability
across all possible worlds of such relational properties, and allows them to
be identified by the ‘mere Cambridge’ test. INPs all come out as intrinsic
on this test.
For the existence and character of abstract objects (and necessary concrete
objects, if there are any) is constant for every possible duplicate of the
bearer of a property possessed in virtue of its relation to a necessary object.
That guarantees the stability across all possible worlds of such relational
properties, and means they evade the ‘mere Cambridge’ test. If there needs
to be a rationale to pick out those relational properties incapable of being
intrinsic, then stability of the property provides this, and restricts d-
relational properties to those a bearer has in virtue of a relation to an
independently contingent, wholly distinct object whose existence or
character is, consequently, not constant for every possible duplicate of the
bearer.
However, despite being part of a coherent scheme, that claim may seem to
beg the question in the absence of some independent arguments. Here are
two. The first is simple. If there are necessary objects present in every
possible world, then their presence is a characteristic (set of INPs) shared by
every possible world. Their necessary presence is, by any criterion, an
intrinsic feature of those worlds in which they obtain, since they
23
 do not obtain in virtue of a relation that a possible world has to

any other wholly distinct thing (they are each part of the worlds
in which they are necessary) (complying with I.);
 are shared by every possible duplicate of that world (complying
with II);
 obtain of any given possible world “in virtue of the way it itself,
and nothing wholly distinct from it, is” (complying with III.)
(they would obtain of world W even if it were the only one);
 are “entirely about how that thing and its parts are, and not at all
about how things wholly distinct from it are” (complying with
IV.) (they would obtain of world W even if it were the only one).
(However, another INP concerns the ubiquity of the property of self-
identity. Criteria III. & IV. (and ‘intuition’) make identity intrinsic I do
not, because there could be no intrinsic duplicates if it were. I return to this
in §4.)
The second argument is a little more involved. It is that accompaniment

only seems extrinsic when it is taken to be contingent (as in e.g. coincidence
in space/time). 21 is necessarily accompanied by every other number, but,
unless we seriously doubt mathematical knowledge, relations between
numbers cannot be extrinsic, they are, rather, necessary and intrinsic. If the
relation of accompaniment 5 has to 21 does not confer a d-relational
property on 5 or 21, why should my being accompanied by 21 confer a d-
relational property on me? If the answer is that it is because I am not a
number, then does the relation that red has to 21 confer a d-relational
property on red?
A relation 21 has to me (e.g. older than 21 years) does confer a d-relational

property on 21, but not on me. This because d-relationality is not
necessarily symmetrical. My age > 21 years is intrinsic to me but extrinsic
to 21. This is allowed by the account of the internality/externality of
relations I outlined, that turns on which relations do and which do not
supervene on the intrinsic properties of their relata34. I have argued for the
externality of any d-relation that fails to hold of every duplicate of the
bearer of an extrinsic property and so fails to supervene on the intrinsic
properties of its relata. If a-R-b is a relation it could supervene on
1. the intrinsic properties of both a and b;
2. the intrinsic properties of neither a nor b;
3. the intrinsic properties either of a or of b.
Option 1. makes R internal to both a and b, option 2. makes R external to

both a and b, while option 3 allows representation of a relation like
34
A departure from Lewis’s account of external relations.
24
father/son as internal (necessary and intrinsic) to sons but external

(contingent and extrinsic) to fathers. All sons have fathers, but not all
fathers have sons, so father/son supervenes on the intrinsic properties of
sons, but not on those of fathers: having a father is an intrinsic property of
any son, while having a son is an extrinsic property of every father who
does not have only daughters. Indeed, supervenience itself is asymmetrical
in the manner of 3. above: it is internal to the supervening items but external
to those supervened upon. By the same token, accompanied by me can be
extrinsic to 21, while accompanied by 21 is intrinsic to me, and
accompanied by every number but itself is intrinsic to every number.
The case for my second amendment – that d-relations must hold towards
possible as well as actual independently contingent concrete objects – is less
involved or controversial. Amongst the negative extrinsic properties that I
possess are those that depend on relations I do not have to possible objects:
e.g. I do not own a talking donkey; I am not the father of a son; I do not fly
in my own aeroplane. It would be a ‘mere Cambridge’ change to me
should I beget a possible son I do not have or acquire a plane or talking
donkey. Equally, intrinsic uniqueness is an extrinsic property of any x in
virtue of the relation x has to its non-existent possible duplicates. For some
x to gain or lose its uniqueness through the destruction or production of
possible duplicates is clearly a ‘mere Cambridge’ change.
§4. Identity
Some35 consider identity and, with it, all haecceitistic properties, to be
intrinsic, yet the ‘mere Cambridge’ test does not pick concrete object
identity out as intrinsic. Indeed, intrinsic duplicates are only possible if it is
not (which they must be since there are very many actual objects
‘numerically’ but not ‘qualitatively’ distinct from one another). Duplicates
which could not be more alike one another cannot be intrinsically distinct
from one another, but must be separated from one another by extrinsic
differentia alone, so duplicates of x must be externally related to one another
and the intrinsic uniqueness of concrete objects must be contingent.
The claim that identity is intrinsic is prompted by intuitions III. & IV.
quoted in §1. For it is undoubtedly the case that any x is self-identical “in
virtue of the way it itself, and nothing wholly distinct from it, is.”, and an
ascription of identity to x “is entirely about how that thing and its parts are,
and not at all about how things wholly distinct from it are”. However, I
discussed in §2. reasons why III. & IV. might not be a good guide to the
intrinsic. In ref. 1. I gave the following additional reasons why identity
might not be intrinsic:
35
E.g. Francescotti 1999b
25
1. The relation non-identity is a ‘d-relation’ that any x must have with

everything distinct from x, and is only hyper-extensionally distinct
from self-identity, and being identical with x, so the true attribution
to x of self-identity, and of the haecceity being identical with x both
depend on (‘consist in’) d-relations to everything distinct from x.
I.e. x is self-identical iff x is distinct from every other y iff x
uniquely possesses its haecceity as x.
2. The self-identity of x does not supervene on any of x’s intrinsic
properties because it can be lost through extrinsic change, e.g.
replacement of its parts by their duplicates (i.e. self-identity of x fails
the ‘mere Cambridge’ test).
3. The property self-identity has none of the characteristics that
‘intrinsic’ attributes to all the intrinsic properties an object x shares
with its actual or possible duplicates, because
 no object shares its identity and
 no likeness with any other thing obtains in virtue of x’s self-
identity, since the latter obtains irrespective of what x is like.
But, in ref.1, I suggest that philosophers who still baulk at supposing that
identity is extrinsic might follow Quine’s 1972 suggestion and take identity
to be “aloofly logical” and thus to be neither intrinsic nor extrinsic.
§5. Resemblance is Intrinsic

We have seen that the internality of the relation resemblance – the necessity
that every F thing should resemble all other actual and possible F things in
being F – cannot be explained by the way concrete objects are distributed
across possible worlds. Rather, the way things are distributed across
possible worlds itself only explains necessity and possibility if we assume
the stability of properties that retain the very same character in every
possible instance.
Resemblance is an internal relation because, for an intrinsic property F, the

same relation of resemblance holds between all and only possible instances
of F. I think the question ‘What counts as “the same relation of
resemblance”?’ can only be answered by taking resemblance to be
primitive.
This implies that Geach’s ‘mere Cambridge’ changes have no bearing on the
resemblances between concrete objects, or on the identities of their
properties from any one possible world to another, while his ‘real changes’
are simply changes in what things are like – changes that involve the loss or
gain of distinct intrinsic properties by concrete objects. If we take the
26
relation of resemblance to be ‘primitive’, we can rebut the accusation of

circularity against this account’s employing the ‘mere Cambridge’ test. To
do that, we need a ‘starting point’ – a way into the circle that cannot be
repudiated. Likeness or resemblance itself provides this.
For no one doubts that there is a bona fide relation resemblance (for which
an explanation would be nice, even though, arguably, since Plato failed, no
other philosopher has been able to provide one). No one maintains that,
for want of such an explanation, we cannot take there to be any
resemblances. So, the relation resemblance is already effectively taken to
be primitive, pro tem, while realists, nominalists and others contend,
arguably so far in vain, to provide us with the missing authoritative
explanation36.
My claim is simply, first, that likeness itself is unproblematic, that,

secondly, all likeness is intrinsic and, so, the ways in which things are alike
are their intrinsic properties, and the exact likeness shared by duplicates is
their sharing all their intrinsic properties. Then, because extrinsic
properties are not shared by all possible duplicates of their instances, their
loss or gain in a mere Cambridge change makes no difference to what their
bearers are like; and for that reason, there is no mileage in the notion of
wholly ‘extrinsic likeness’. ‘Real’ or ‘intrinsic’ changes are changes to the
resemblances between things, while ‘mere Cambridge’ changes are not.
There is no ‘circle’ here. It is entirely reasonable to take resemblance to be
primitive, since no one questions it despite our having no settled theory of
properties. (Those extrinsic properties like tallest tree in the forest and
weight, which can be lost through both ‘real’ and ‘mere Cambridge’
changes, I will argue in §6., are compounds of intrinsic and wholly extrinsic
‘mere Cambridge’ properties, which can be lost independently of one
another.)
It is important, too, to rebut another important class of counterexamples,

which I think can be done if causal properties can be intrinsic, as I argued
they must be in §2.6. Some extrinsic properties do appear to be ways that
things might be alike, e.g.
 alike in having two siblings;
36
Weatherson and Marshall 2013 write:
it is not obvious that Francescotti's account is compatible with any credible theory
of properties. In order to properly evaluate Francescotti's account, therefore,
proponents of the account need to specify what theories of properties it is
compatible with, and why we should believe that at least one of these theories is
true. This task has not yet been carried out.
If this is an objection, then it confounds not just Francescotti but the bulk of existing
philosophical theories on any topic. While we still await a “credible theory of properties”,
despite the claims made by some for the identification of properties with the cross-world
sets of their instances, it seems that any such theory, when it is presented, should, at least,
account for those features of likeness assumed to be primitive in the present account.
27
 alike in coming from Yorkshire;

 alike in having the same birth sign;
 alike in having a common ancestor.
I argue that these instances are (or are believed to be) alike in their effects,
rather than their manifest (‘categorical’) properties. If causal propensities
can be intrinsic, because the nomological laws of a possible world are
intrinsic to that world, then these and similar apparent ‘extrinsic likenesses’
are not likenesses in external relations (which I have argued cannot obtain)
but are hypothetical likenesses in causal background.
It is not that coming from Yorkshire is a simple respect of resemblance

between two people. It is rather that the same causal background Yorkshire
is taken to have a similar effect on both. People may very well have the
same birth sign, but it is very doubtful whether that is the cause of a similar
effect on each of them. We suppose that whether someone comes from
Yorkshire might make a statistically significant difference to what s/he is
like while strongly doubting that having a given birth sign will.
Expecting some actual experimental/observational result to be repeatable is

expecting a repeat of the causally relevant circumstances to be alike in their
effect in other actual times and places. The respect of apparent ‘likeness’ is
restricted to those possible worlds which share the relevant laws of nature.
The hypothesis of a causal link, in such cases, cannot be entertained unless
we refute the so called ‘null hypothesis’, namely the hypothesis that the
addition or removal of the factor we suspect to be causally relevant would
make no more difference than we could expect from mere coincidence. The
parallel with the ‘mere Cambridge test’ is striking. In a survey, variation in
birth sign, one suspects, would make no more difference to personality type
than you might expect from mere coincidence and the null hypothesis would
be upheld. In effect, unlike variations in birthplace, variation in birth sign
amounts to no more than a ‘mere Cambridge’ change between the
experimental subjects.
Apparent counterexamples of ‘extrinsic resemblance’ can therefore be recast

as alike in virtue of having two siblings, coming from Yorkshire, having the
same birth sign, having a common ancestor, etc. These features are not
categorical respects in which people are directly alike, but are, rather,
hypotheses about causes of resemblance which may or may not be
vindicated.
§6. Properties Which Can, Apparently, be Either Intrinsic or Extrinsic

or Both
Accepting resemblance as primitive, and that duplicates are objects which
could not be more alike, allows us to sidestep neo-Humean concerns about
28
the absolute ‘naturalness’ of properties of concrete objects and directly

address the difficulty that conjoined and disjunctive ‘properties’ seem to
confound criteria demarcating the intrinsic. All that is needed is to put
resemblance in the driving seat.
Weight, though apparently simple and intrinsic, was discovered to be a

conjunction of mass and proximity to a massive body (such as the Earth) and
so a complex property with intrinsic and wholly extrinsic components. If F
is blue or cubic (so F looks intrinsic) two objects with F can seemingly
share all their properties but still not be duplicates: one is blue, the other
cubic. If F is next to me or red then x can lose F by undergoing a ‘real’
(intrinsic) or a ‘mere Cambridge’ change, depending on which disjunct is
lost – x changes colour or I move.
So, let’s just say that resemblances alone are bona fide intrinsic properties
and seek the simplest resolution of compound properties into resemblances
and ‘mere Cambridge’ properties dependent solely on d-relations. Of
course, this crudely cuts the Gordian Knot, but why let it be tied?
Remember that a ‘compound property’ can always be gratuitously
concocted to confound any criterion, e.g.:
 under the bed or intrinsic by Z’s criterion;
 red and extrinsic by A’s criterion.
Such concocted ‘properties’ are very far from showing that a mutually
exclusive, jointly exhaustive intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is impossible.
Just as a change to an object is not simply an alteration to the predicates it
satisfies, so, too, it does not acquire irreducible sui generis properties in
virtue of its satisfying concocted or covertly compound predicates. Such a
distinction plainly should apply in a jointly exhaustive, mutually exclusive
fashion to the elements – conjuncts and or disjuncts – from which logical
property-forming operations yield such compound properties.
By the same token we cannot maintain that weight amounts to a bona fide
property that resists reduction to a conjunction of mass and proximity to a
massive body. We are thus justified in analysing away those properties in
which divergent types of component properties alternate or are conjoined so
that, it seems, they can be ‘had’ both intrinsically and extrinsically.
In short, the remedy for all these is a requirement to apply the ‘mere
Cambridge’ test to separate conjuncts and/or disjuncts within such
properties to discriminate the wholly extrinsic ‘mere Cambridge’ properties
from the intrinsic components, because it is these intrinsic components,
individually, and not their conjunction or disjunction, that duplicates must
share in order that they could not be more alike.
29
Because the ‘mere Cambridge’ test yields a jointly exhaustive, mutually

exclusive partition of properties, any property whose loss sometimes is, and
sometimes is not a ‘mere Cambridge’ change must be complex, with
intrinsic and extrinsic components. If the discovery regarding weight is
legitimate, then the ‘mere Cambridge’ test can pick out ‘middle level’
intrinsic properties that do not require us to identify a level of absolute
simplicity or ‘naturalness’ for an unyieldingly ‘sparse’ repertoire of
properties (as envisaged in Lewis 1986). It will suffice to appeal to our
normal judgements of resemblance.
We can then achieve mutual exclusivity merely by ‘reverse engineering’

relatively simpler properties by unpicking explicit or implicit property-
forming operations, as we do for weight, without needing to authenticate
any claim to have achieved ultimate simplicity. We only need to
disassemble complex properties until we come to conjuncts/disjuncts
sufficiently simple to support our current judgements of resemblance and be
intrinsic or wholly extrinsic ‘mere Cambridge’ properties by the ‘mere
Cambridge test’. We can then apply this to our normal or scientific
descriptive framework. Undoubtedly further discoveries will be made that
will parallel the case of weight.
Are there potential counterexamples to the strategy above? Only two routes
suggest themselves: either you construct instances like having the same
mass as one’s son or being blue or cubic using logical property-forming
operations on disparate conjuncts/disjuncts, or you discover cases, like
weight, which can only be argued to straddle the distinction if successfully
deconstructed in the way I described. Neither route undermines the
approach I propose: both confirm it.
§7. In Conclusion
I have argued that a ‘mere Cambridge’ test yields a mutually exclusive, jointly
exhaustive partition between properties which applies alike to 1st and 2nd and
higher order properties, and has a strong claim to coincide with the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction if one is guided by the
consensus that an object undergoes real change in an event iff there is some
intrinsic property they satisfied before the event but not afterwards.
It does not shoulder the ‘Humean burden’ Lewis and others would like the
intrinsic to bear.
‘Intrinsic’ has been used with many other meanings: the ‘mere Cambridge’ test
does not distinguish properties that are endogenous, essential, inherent,
inalienable or independent of their bearers’ circumstances, from those which are
not. I suggested that the term ‘intrinsic’ cannot be univocal and encompass all
these senses at once, and should be reserved for properties which are stable across
possible worlds because the same relation of resemblance holds between all and
only possible instances of such properties.
30
This account does not help with philosophically significant notions such as
‘intrinsic value’, ‘intrinsic intentionality’ and the like, but I think the claims
regarding these notions concern their being inherent in, essential to the nature of,
irreducibly present in whatever possesses them, which, I submit, requires an
independent analysis.
On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no

conflict of interest.
References
Cameron R.P. 2008 Recombination and Intrinsicality Ratio XXI
Cowling S. 2017 Intrinsic Properties of Properties Philosophical Quarterly
67: 241-262.
Earman & Roberts J.T. 2005 Contact With The Nomic 1 Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXI, No. 1,
Figdor C. 2008 Intrinsically/Extrinsically Journal of Philosophy 105
(11):691-718.
Francescotti R. 1999a Mere Cambridge Properties American Philosophical
Quarterly 36 (4):295-308
Francescotti R. 1999b How to Define Intrinsic Properties Noûs 33 no4:
n90-609.
- Francescotti R. 2014 Intrinsic/Extrinsic: A Relational Account Defended in
Companion to Intrinsic Properties, ed. Robert Francescotti, Berlin, de
Gruyter
Geach P.T., 1969, God and the Soul, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Harris, R. 2010a, How to Define Extrinsic Properties Axiomathes 20 (4):
461–478.
Harris, R. 2010b, Do Material Things Have Intrinsic Properties?
Metaphysica 11 (2):105-117
Hoffmann-Kolss V. 2010 The Metaphysics of Extrinsic Properties
Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag
Humberstone I. L. 1996 Intrinsic/Extrinsic Synthese, 108: 205–67
Kim J. 1982, Psychophysical Supervenience Philosophical Studies 41: 51-
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Langton R. and Lewis D. 1998 Defining ‘Intrinsic’ Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 58: 333–45
LaPorte, J. 2016 Rigid Designators The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/rigid-designators/>.
Lewis D. 1983, ‘Extrinsic Properties’, Philosophical Studies, 44: 197–200
reprinted in David Lewis, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 111-5
Lewis D. 1986 On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell
Quine W.V. 1972 review of Munitz M. (ed.) Identity and Individuation in
Journal of Philosophy 69 pp 488-97
Thesaurus http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/intrinsic
Vallentyne, P. 1997 Intrinsic Properties Defined Philosophical Studies
88: 209-19
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 365–80.
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/>.
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and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 – 637
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Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell. pp. 138-158.
Yablo S. 1999 Intrinsicness Philosophical Topics 26: 479-505

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1

‘Mere Cambridge’ Test

A ‘Mere Cambridge’ Test to Demarcate Extrinsic from Intrinsic

Intrinsic; extrinsic; ‘mere Cambridge’ change; Lewis; Francescotti.

In brief, the rationale for the account advocated here is as follows.

The cross-world stability of intrinsic properties of concrete objects arises, I shall

extrinsic properties – intrinsic itself being a case in point. It is intrinsic to

By contrast, I will argue, an abstract object F can have an extrinsic property

The requirement on intrinsic properties to be stable across all possible worlds

Weatherson and Marshall 2013 outline four alternative styles of criterion

III. Interior vs. Exterior Properties

It is worse than they make out. Thesaurus.com lists many purported

It also decouples intrinsic – an intrinsic property of properties, from

For, despite not having14 duplicates, properties themselves, e.g. magnetism,

‘Those relations of x that change as possible alterations occur to

These are ‘mere Cambridge’ changes. Intrinsic properties, by contrast, are

§2. Shortcomings of Supposing that a Property’s Being Intrinsic Turns

It seems we can generalise from ‘local’ to ‘global’ intrinsicality if we follow

worlds, not just within the actual world.

So, though I have no space to justify this here, I effectively reserve

A related problem is that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction appears to be

needed to distinguish those which do from those which do not attribute

It seems, moreover, to be a 3rd order intrinsic feature of the 2nd order

So, intrinsicality/extrinsicality seem to be properties which need to be

for a property to be intrinsic, so I need to indicate how ‘stability of the

(Though it is envisaged by friends of tropes that these are abstract

The larger part of recent literature on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction has

instantiation complies with specific laws of nature holding in those worlds

It cannot be that ‘stability of the bearer’ distinguishes a 2nd order intrinsic

The disqualification of investigated by Faraday arises, I claim, because

In short, at least some intrinsic and extrinsic properties are instantiated by

investigated by Faraday is an extrinsic feature of a coil of copper wire must

Finally, objecting to a ‘duplicate preservation’ criterion for intrinsic,

§3. Central Argument for Stability of The Property

3.2 Stability of Intrinsic Properties

No specific ‘metric’ of similarity is needed to support the notion that

The ‘mere Cambridge’ test precisely distinguishes the intrinsic properties

This chimes with Lewis’s 1986 (p.62) designation of resemblance as an

Whether it was investigated by Faraday makes no difference to what the

The relevance of the intrinsic properties of an abstract object to its self-

3.3 Extrinsic Properties Not Shared by All Possible Duplicates

It further follows, for any property or abstract object F where F is an

This allows an extrinsic property FE to be identified by the ‘mere

The ‘dependence’ of extrinsic properties on external d-relations is

So, unlike an internal relation, an external relation RE does not supervene on

This analysis is sufficient to establish mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive

3.4 The Disqualifying Relata of D-relations

then accompanied by 21 would not be a d-relation to a wholly distinct

However, my argument regarding measurement does not show why other

This the problem of Indiscriminately Necessary Properties (INPs) discussed

 do not obtain in virtue of a relation that a possible world has to

The second argument is a little more involved. It is that accompaniment

A relation 21 has to me (e.g. older than 21 years) does confer a d-relational

Option 1. makes R internal to both a and b, option 2. makes R external to

father/son as internal (necessary and intrinsic) to sons but external

1. The relation non-identity is a ‘d-relation’ that any x must have with

§5. Resemblance is Intrinsic

Resemblance is an internal relation because, for an intrinsic property F, the

relation of resemblance to be ‘primitive’, we can rebut the accusation of

My claim is simply, first, that likeness itself is unproblematic, that,

It is important, too, to rebut another important class of counterexamples,

 alike in coming from Yorkshire;