ROBERTO LACEDA, SR., vs. RANDY L.

LIMENA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Laceda, Sr., and Limena were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay. Limena filed a petition for disqualification and/or
declaration as an ineligible candidate against Laceda before the COMELEC, contending that Laceda had already served as Punong
Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for three consecutive terms since 1994, and was thus prohibited from running for the fourth time.
Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for three consecutive terms. However, he asserted that when
he was elected for his first two terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that when he served his third term, the Municipality
of Sorsogon had already been merged with the Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the City of Sorsogon, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 8806. Thus, he argued that his third term was actually just his first in the new political unit and that he was
accordingly entitled to run for two more terms.
Laceda likewise argued that assuming he had already served three consecutive terms, Rep. Act No. 9164 which imposes the three-
term limit, cannot be made to apply to him as it would violate his vested right to office. He alleged that when he was elected in
1994 the prohibition did not exist. Had he known that there will be a law preventing him to run for the fourth time, he would not
have run for office in 1994 as he was looking forward to the election in 2007.
The COMELEC declared Laceda disqualified. Laceda moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Issue: Whether the 3 term limit rule will apply
Ruling:
Laceda insists that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its decision on the requisites enunciated
in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections for the application of the three-term prohibition in Section 43 of the Local Government
Code. Laceda argues that said case is inapplicable since it involved the position of municipal mayor while the instant case
concerned the position of Punong Barangay. He likewise insists that he served his third term in a new political unit and therefore
he should not be deemed already to have served a third term as Punong Barangay for purposes of applying the three-term limit.
In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted
into a city thereby abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be said that for the purpose
of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality
of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City, is the same as before the conversion.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their
Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held power and authority as their Punong Barangay.
Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Laceda's term.
Latasa vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 154829 Dec 10, 2003)
A mayor for 3 consecutive term of a municipality which became a city in the said mayor’s last term is barred from running in the
next preceding election if the said new city has the same territorial jurisdiction when it was still a municipality.

Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998.During
petitioner’s third term, the Municipality of Digos was became a component city. On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefore,
and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now
running for the first time for the position of city mayor. On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M.Sunga, also a candidate
for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein that
petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos
Citysince petitioner had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from
1992 to 2001. On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer, arguing t h a t h e d i d n o t m a k e a n y
f a l s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n h i s certificate of candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had served as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate
of candidacy for the May14, 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.

Issue:

WON Latasa is barred from running as mayor of the newly created city of Digos being the mayor of Digos
for 3consecutive term when it was still a municipality.

Held:

Yes, Latasa is barred from running. An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same
local government post, unless two conditions concur:
1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and
2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the present case, petitioner argued that a city and a municipality have
separate and distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment
consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he has
already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor. However, he asserts that when Digos was converted
from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridicalpersonality. Therefore, when he filed
his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post. True, the
new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however,
that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed
as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the
City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are
the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be
their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority
as their chief executive for nine years. The delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an
inch the land area previously covered by the
Municipalityo f D i g o s . T h e f r a m e r s o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y included an exception to the
people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To
allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the p o s i t i o n o f c i t y m a y o r a f t e r h a v i n g s e r v e d f o r t h r e e
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be
possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen
consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
TOPIC: Term Limits
DOCTRINE: Voluntary renunciation of office is grounds for disqualitifcation; involuntary renunciation is not
CASE Number (including date): GR No. 147927, Feb 4, 2002
CASE Name: Adormeo vs. Commission on Elections
Ponente Quisumbing J.

FACTS
Petition for certiorari on COMELEC ruling that qualifies Ramon Talaga to run for mayor
 Petitioner (Raymundo Adormeo) and privae respondent (Ramon Talaga) were the only ones who filed for candidacy for
mayor in Lucena city on the elections to be held on 9 May 2001.
 Talaga served to consecutive terms (1992-1998). He was defeated in the 1998 elections to Bernard Tagarao but he won
the recall elections in 12 May 2000 and served the unexpired term until 30 june 2001.
 Adormeo filed a petition to deny due course and cancel certificate of candidacy to Talaga for it is violative of Sec 8 Art.
X of 1987 Constitution.
o Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected (emphasis mine).
 20 April 2001 – COMELEC 1st division disqualified Talaga for having served 3 consecutive terms.
 27 April 2001 – Talaga filed motion for reconsideration stating that he did not serve 3 consecutive terms of office which
must amount to nine consecutive years.
 2 May 2001 – Adormeo filed opposition to motion saying serving an unexpired term counts as serving a full term.
 9 May 2001 – COMELEC en banc ruled the disqualification must be lifted because of he was not elected for three terms
o He was only installed as mayor because of the recall elections
o His loss in 1998 did not count in the 3 term rule
o He did not fully serve 3 terms

ISSUES
1. Whether or not Talaga was disqualified to run for mayor or Lucena city

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

 NO: Sec. 8 Art X of the 1987 constitution clearly states that a person must have served three consecutive terms in
office. It cited Borja jr vs COMELEC where the Court ruled that an official must have served and must have been ELECTED
for three consecutive times. The court highlights the last sentence of sec. 8 which states that voluntary renunciation
does not count as interruption. Talaga’s loss in the 1998 elections does not count as voluntary renunciation. He was
removed from office because of an expiring term and an electoral defeat. He did not serve a full ELECTED term.

RULING:
Wherefore the petition is denied
Lonzanida vs. COMELEC
July 28, 1999 | Gonzaga-Reyes

Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again
proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by
his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest. In 1997, the RTC of Zambales declared a failure of elections. After a
revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots, COMELEC declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
and ordered petitioner to vacate the post.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again ran for mayor. His opponent Eufemio Muli filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida
from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the
same post.

COMELEC: Lonzanida's assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before
the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution
and the Local Government Code.

Issue:
WON petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be
considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials –
NO.

Held:
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of
the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from running for the same
position after serving three consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of
massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The
delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to
infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. The
drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some local government officials run for office before they reach forty
years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the
people of qualified candidates to choose from. As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official
should be barred from running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again
run for the same office.

In Borja vs. COMELEC, the Court sets two conditions which must concur in order to disqualify elective local officials from serving
more than three consecutive terms: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In this case, the two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the
COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous
proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason
of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. A proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and
while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve
a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely
assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality
that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post
before the expiration of the term. He did not fully serve three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated
his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process
of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity
of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

The delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years
cannot serve as basis to bar petitioner’s right to be elected.

The petitioner's contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was
proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998
elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioner's proclamation. Proclamation nor the assumption of office of
a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of
jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification
filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will
unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition
until after he has been proclaimed.
Borja vs Comelec Case Digest

Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September
2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected
and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor
of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s
disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence,
he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but
the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and
proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is
considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco
was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but
simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service,
interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is
more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term
limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political dynasties but
also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution
reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of
the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have
served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also
to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. (Borja vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133495,
September 3, 1998)

Borja vs COMELEC [295 SCRA 157; GR 133495, September 3, 1998]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification, Succession – Exception to the 3 term limit)

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the
next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the
theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore
be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco
disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority overturned the
original decision.

Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?

Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that “…the term of office of elective local officials… …shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that “…no local elective official
shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected….”

The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.” The purpose of this provision is to
prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving
a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be
considered to have fully served the term not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.