4th Comp. Cases Consti

SEPARATION OF POWERS
I. Separation of Powers
B. Manner/form of conferment of power
2. Implied powers: the doctrine of necessary implication
Angara v. Electoral Commission

G.R. No. L-45081
FACTS:
In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo
and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly in the first district of Tayabas.
The petitioner was proclaimed member-elect for the said district for receiving the
most number of votes and thereafter took his oath in office. A Motion of Protest was filed
by Ynsua against the election of the petitioner.
The petitioner countered this with a Motion to Dismiss the Protest which was
denied by the Electoral Commission.
ISSUES:
1.Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the controversy; and
2.Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed over the election of herein
petitioner.
HELD:
The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its
consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of
certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, its power to determine what courts other than the
Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds
for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent.
The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. The
Judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
2. Implied powers: the doctrine of necessary implication
Arnault v. Nazareno
G.R. No. L-3820
July 18,1950
Facts:
The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of 2 estates. Petitioner
was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase
was effected and the price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. The Senate adopted
Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the validity of the purchase
and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate investigation,
petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered.
Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt
for contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-
arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the
Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000
and to answer questions pertinent thereto.
It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the
Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from
the Philippine Trust Company and by virtue of the recession of the contract through which
Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate. An intriguing question which the committee
sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity of the Government's
paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the
two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The
committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were
delivered to him; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks;
one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc.,
with PNB, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
Hence, this petition on following grounds:
a) Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any
intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.
b) Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May
18, 1950.
c) Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the
name of the person
ISSUE:
Whether or not either House of Congress has the power to punish a person not a member
for contempt
Ruling:
YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness
to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by
the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the
investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to
the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a
question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. Note that, the fact that
the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude
judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.
It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded
to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is
that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
As to the self-incrimination issue, as against witness's inconsistent and unjustified
claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and
truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment
of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under the Constitution.
The resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's
power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted
as in the present case. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing
body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved.
3. Inherent Powers
In re R. McCULLOCH DICK.
G.R. No. L-13862
April 15, 1918
Facts:
R.McCulloch Dick, is the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free press, a
periodical published weekly in the city of Manila. There was a publication of certain
articles in that paper which tends to obstruct the Government of the Philippines Islands
in policies inaugurated for the prosecution of the war between the United States and the
German Empire, and other articles which have tended to create a feeling of unrest and
uneasiness in the community.
He is being detained because the Governor-General of the Philippines ordered
his deportation but before the Governor General gave his order, there was an
investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code.
Petitioner, filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from
detention by the acting chief of police of the City of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the Governor –general could exercise the deportation power in
the absence of statutory authority?
Rulings:
Yes, the Governor-General has the power to institute and maintain deportation
proceedings.
The discretionary power to deport” undesirable aliens whose continued presence
in the Philippine Islands is a menace to the peace and safety of the community,’ as an
act of state, having been conferred upon the Governor-General, to be exercised by him
upon his own opinion as to whether the facts disclosed by an investigation had in
accord with Sec. 69 of the administrative code justify of necessitate deportation in a
particular case, he is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and
no other tribunal is at liberty to re- examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence
on which he acted.
SECTION 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. – A subject of a
foreign power residing in the (Philippine Islands) Philippines shall not be
deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own
country by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines except upon prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground
upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned
shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed
not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the
right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf,
and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.
3. Inherent Powers
In Re Sotto
January 21, 1949
Facts:
Atty. Vicente Sotto was required to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt in connection with his written statement of the Supreme Court's decision in the
matter of Angel Parazo's case, which was published in Manila Times and in other
newspapers in the locality.
Sotto was given ten days more besides the five originally given him to file his
answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time given
him the said answer was admitted. He does not deny the authenticity of the statement as
it has been published. He however, contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, the Supreme Court has has no power to
impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and it can only impose fines and
imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval
of the Chief Executive. He also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom
of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the
press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of
the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the
Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any
one.”
Issue:
Whether or not Sotto is guilty of contempt.
HELD:
The Court finds that the respondent Sotto knowingly published false imputations
against its members. He accused them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders
and injustices deliberately." He has maliciously branded them to be incompetent, narrow-
minded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite
of those who were the honor and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to be needing a lesson
in law, to be rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by better
qualified justices.
Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his
slanderous imputations, and no single word can be found in his answer showing that he
ever believed that the imputations are based on fact.
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct.
CONTEMPT; POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT is INHERENT IN ALL
COURTS OF SUPERIOR JURISDICTION.—That the power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts of superior jurisdiction independently of any special’ expression of
statute, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last
resort in the United States, which is applicable in this .jurisdiction since our Constitution
and courts of justice are patterned after those of that country.
3. Inherent Powers
In Re Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(Not Docketed)
January 9, 1973
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT;

COURT OF THE VIEW THAT IT MAY INTEGRATE THE PHILIPPINE BAR IN THE
EXERCISE OF ITS POWER UNDER ARTICLE VIII, SEC. 13 OF THE CONSTITUTION
TO PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF
LAW. — The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise
of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that" the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither
confers a new power nor restricts the Court’s inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNIFICATION OF THE BAR, CONSTITUTIONAL; BASIS. — Resolution

of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional —
hinges on the effects of Bar integration of the lawyer’s constitutional rights of freedom of
association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR PERFECTLY CONSTITUTIONAL AND

LEGALLY UNOBJECTIONABLE. — The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report
of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippines Bar is
"perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," and, within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
Facts:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report
dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation"…. that "this Honorable
Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the
adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the
integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible
and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor."
This law provides as follows:1
Issues
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar
integration:
"Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law
and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
"The term ‘Bar’ refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll
of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
"Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do

so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority
of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer
as an officer of the court.
"Designed to improve the Position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the
Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
Rulings
1. the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of
its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules
1
"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
"SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be
included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
"SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
The Report of the Commission abounds with arguments on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual
data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opin ions,
sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the
Court’s constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic
Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court’s inherent power,
but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote
public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively."
2. whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effect
of Bar integration on the lawyer’s constitutional rights of freedom of association
and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law. 2
"1. Freedom of Association.

"To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).
XXX
"Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free
to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues.
"Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay
dues in reasonable amount.3
XXX
"Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of
the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of
legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme
Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
"2. Regulatory Fee.

"For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that
the Court levies a tax.
"A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the
purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it
follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
2
" — The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties
not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
" — Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to
assure compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities,
" — These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no collective action without an organized
body; no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to
3
The issue, therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other
aspect.
purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program
without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied
powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.4
"3. Freedom of Speech.

"A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any
manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the
Unified Bar.
XXX
"The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a ‘free
speech’ issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry
us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance
of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or
immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the
powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.
"4. Fair to All Lawyers.

"Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of
the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by
proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and
discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have
been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid
exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all
lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is
a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not
unequal, it is not unfair."
3. The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and
the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission
on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly
constitutional and legally unobjectionable," and, within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article

VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in
accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
4
"The only limitation upon the State’s power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden.
The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might
result from his required payment of annual dues.
3. Inherent Powers
SANTIAGO vs VASQUEZ
GR NO 99289, January 29, 1993
DOCTRINE:
MANNER or FORM OF CONFERMENT OF POWER; INHERENT POWER
INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS - Courts possess certain inherent
powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to
those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are
necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of
justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their
granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court’s jurisdiction and render it
effective in behalf of the litigants.
INHERENT POWER OF THE COURT TO MAKE INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
NECESSARY TO PROTECT ITS JURISDICTION. - Such being the case, with more
reason may a party litigant be subject to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a
proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the opposing party, the result of which is
that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends
upon the particular circumstances.
FACTS:
An information was filed against the petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), thereafter an order of
arrest was issued against the petitioner with bail for the release of the accused.
On the same day: The petitioner file an “Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago”, The Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional liberty
without need for her physical appearance a certain date, unless by that time her condition
does not yet permit her physical appearance before said court.
In a motion, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be
allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
The Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment.
Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure order against Santiago by reason of
the announcement she made, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast
media, that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard University.
She directly filed a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold
Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction" with the SC.
She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had
not acquired jurisdiction over her person as she has neither been arrested nor has she
voluntarily surrendered.
The hold departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing.
She likewise argued that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right
to travel and freedom of speech.
ISSUE:
WoN the Sandiganbayan erred when it issued the hold departure order without any
motion from the prosecution and without notice and hearing?
Note: there are other issues but this is the one that is related to the topic.
HELD:
NO.The ex parte issuance of a hold-departure order was a valid exercise of the
presiding court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary
to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation,
implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject
to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within
the scope of its jurisdiction.
The Court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail an opportunity to
Leave the Philippines. This is the consequence of the bond.
Petitioner, since a case is pending should have applied for permission to leave the
country from the courts.
3. Inherent Powers
G.R. No. 132601

October 12, 1998
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS:
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law
spouse’s ten year old daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time
the constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death
penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court finding no reason
to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements
for its imposition.
RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA
7659. The mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The
Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and
directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of
Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that
RA 8177 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge
of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded
to enjoin them from setting a date of execution.
On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the
parties to mantain status quo. Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo
and to request for TRO until resolution of the petition.
The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the
RA in question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention.
CHR filed a motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging
that the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics
showing how other countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have
become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel,
degrading, inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
ISSUE:
(a) WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for being
an undue delegation of legislative power.
(b) WON the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order on
the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been
rendered.
HELD:
(a) THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO.
8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government
and each department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas
delegata non delegari potest.” (what has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There
are however exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized exceptions is "Delegation
to Administrative Bodies".
The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations
on the subject of lethal injection.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing
complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability
of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill
in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete
in itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
or determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode
of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what
job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark
its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.
(b) NO, THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS POWER. The respondents cited Sec 19,
Art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts
to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. The powers of the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal
and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
3. Inherent Powers
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

GR No. 171947-48
18 December 2008
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government
agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of
the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen
way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152. Respondents, as
plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the
RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-
government agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.
Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising
concerns about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila
Bay is not a ministerial act, which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup of
specific pollution incidents?
Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
RULING:
Issue 1:
PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought
to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is
not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding
petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot
escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila
Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Issue 2:
Yes, petitioners may be compelled.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting
up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterised as discretionary, for, as earlier
stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to
act officially according to their judgment or conscience.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion that
these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform
certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these
duties.
The petition is DENIED.
C. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction - corollary to separation of powers
COCOFED v Republic
G.R. No. 177857-58
September 17, 2009
Velasco, Jr.
Facts:
For consideration is the Urgent Motion to Approve the Conversion of the SMC
Common Shares into SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares dated July 24, 2009 (Motion)
interposed by petitioners Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc., et al.
(collectively, COCOFED).
COCOFED proposes to constitute a trust fund to be known as the "Coconut
Industry Trust Fund (CITF) for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers," with respondent
Republic, acting through the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), as trustee.
To the basic motion, respondent Republic filed its Comment questioning
COCOFED’s personality to seek the Court’s approval of the desired conversion.
Respondent Republic also disputes COCOFED’s right to impose and prescribe terms and
conditions on the proposed conversion, maintaining that the CIIF SMC common shares
are sequestered assets and are in custodia legis under Presidential Commission on Good
Government’s (PCGG’s) administration. It postulates that, owing to the sequestrated
status of the said common shares, only PCGG has the authority to approve the proposed
conversion and seek the necessary Court approval. In this connection, respondent
Republic cites Republic v. Sandiganbayan3 where the coconut levy funds were declared
as prima facie public funds, thus reinforcing its position that only PCGG, a government
agency, can ask for approval of the conversion.
On September 4, 2009, Jovito R. Salonga and four others sought leave to
intervene. Attached to the motion was their Comment/Opposition-in-Intervention,
asserting that "the government bears the burden of showing that the conversion is
indubitably advantageous to the public interest or will result in clear and material benefit.
Failure of the government to carry the burden means that the current status of the
sequestered stocks should be maintained pending final disposition of G.R. Nos. 177857-
58." They further postulate that "even assuming that the proposal to convert the SMC
shares is beneficial to the government, it cannot pursue the exchange offer because it is
without power to exercise acts of strict dominion over the sequestered shares." Lastly,
they argue that "the proposed conversion x x x is not only not advantageous to the public
interest but is in fact positively disadvantageous."
Issues:
1. WON the COCOFED have the authority to seek permission to the court regarding
the conversion of the SMC funds.
2. WON the SMC shares are prima facie public funds.
Ruling:
1. No, the COCOFED does not have the authority to seek the permission of the court
but the PCGG. The court held that:
Having shown that the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest, but
are in fact prima facie public funds, this Court believes that the government should be
allowed to vote the questioned shares, because they belong to it as the prima facie
beneficial and true owner. As stated at the beginning, voting is an act of dominion that
should be exercised by the share owner. One of the recognized rights of an owner is the
right to vote at meetings of the corporation. The right to vote is classified as the right to
control. Voting rights may be for the purpose of, among others, electing or removing
directors, amending a charter, or making or amending by laws. Because the subject
UCPB shares were acquired with government funds, the government becomes their
prima facie beneficial and true owner.
Ownership includes the right to enjoy, dispose of, exclude and recover a thing without
limitations other than those established by law or by the owner. x x x And the right to vote
shares is a mere incident of ownership. In the present case, the government has been
shown to be the prima facie owner of the funds used to purchase the shares. Hence, it
should be allowed the rights and privileges flowing from such fact.
2. Yes, the SMC shares are prima facie public funds. The court held that:
Coconut Levy Funds Are Prima Facie Public Funds
To avoid misunderstanding and confusion, this Court will even be more categorical and
positive than its earlier pronouncements: the coconut levy funds are not only affected with
public interest; they are, in fact, prima facie public funds.
Public funds are those moneys belonging to the State or to any political subdivision of the
State; more specifically, taxes, customs duties and moneys raised by operation of law for
the support of the government or for the discharge of its obligations. Undeniably, coconut
levy funds satisfy this general definition of public funds, because of the following reasons:
1. Coconut levy funds are raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of
the State.
2. They are levies imposed by the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and
its farmers.
3. Respondents have judicially admitted that the sequestered shares were
purchased with public funds.
xxxx
6. The very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public character. 8
xxxx
2. Coconut Funds Are Levied for the Benefit of the Coconut Industry and Its
Farmers.
xxxx
II. Checks and Balances
B. Checks and Balances
3. Between the Executive and Congress, and the Judiciary
c. Congress may also pass a law reorganizing the judiciary, but it should not
undermine the security of tenure of the members of the
judiciary (Article VI, §2)
De la lana v Alba
G.R. No. L-57883
March 12, 1982
FACTS:
Batas Pambansa 129 was enacted, titled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds therefor and for Other Purposes.” De la Llana is a judge that would
be removed from his position because of this law, so he assailed the validity of this law,
because according to him, it goes against the constitutional provision on the security of
tenure of incumbent justices and judges.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not (BP 129) the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the
security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7
of the Constitution.
CONST. (1973) art. X

The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold
office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have
the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
Members, order their dismissal.
RULING:
No, it does not undermine the security of tenure of the members of the judiciary.
Cabinet Bill #42 was the basis for BP 129. The Bill alleged that its enactment would
result in:
1. more efficiency in the disposal of cases,
2. improvement in the quality of justice, and
3. the reform would fit the court system to the exigencies of present- and
future- Philippine society. The deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa amounted
to 590 pages; this means that much discussion and research went into this law
The petition’s lack of merit is made even clearer because the abolition of offices
as stated in BP 129 is done in good faith.
The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. reiterated such a
doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or
separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition
of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule
also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ...
And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to
hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As
well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal
of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in
good faith."
Removal is distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of office. After
abolition of office, there is in law no occupant, while in removal, there is an occupant who
could lose his position. THIS IS AN ISSUE OF ABOLITION OF OFFICE. In this case, the
question of security of tenure does not arise. In the case of abolition of an inferior court
(as in the case at bar), there is no difference between removal and abolition of office. In
the choice of alternatives between two constructions where one would save and another
would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
The Batasang Pambansa has express authority to reorganize inferior courts and
in the process to abolish existing ones
4. The role of the judiciary
a. judicial power
3) Review of the factual basis of Martial Law (Sec. 18, Art. VII)
Lagman v Executive Secretary

G.R. 231658
July 4, 2017
FACTS:
 Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
 Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216.
 The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with
rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing
of time.
Lagman’s petition are as follows;

- there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao.
It argues that acts of terrorism ih Mindanao do not constitute rebellion 12
since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part
thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory. 13 It labels
the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other outlying
areas as mere propaganda1 1 4 and not an open attempt to remove such
areas from the allegiance to t Philippine Government and deprive the Chief
Executive of the assertion an exercise of his powers and prerogatives
therein.
- The Lagman Petition also avers that L~. Gen. Salvador Mison, Jr. himself
admitted that the current armed conflict in Marawi City was precipitated or
initiated by the government in its bid to capture Hapilon.
- That all the acts of terrorism found in the report of Duterte are fake
- the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no
sufficient factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did
not consult the military establishment or any ranking officiai27 before
making the proclamation.
- Based on the review by senate, there was absence of any hostile plan by
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of foreign fighters allied
with ISIS was "undetermined"28 which indicates that there are only a
meager number of foreign fighters who can lend support to the Maute Group
- In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations,
and falsities in the Report of the President to Congress.
Government’s petition:
- The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests
the Court with the authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the declaration of martial law.60 The OSG, however, posits that
although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the exercise of such
authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the
vehicle, mode or remedy through which the "appropriate proceeding"
mentioned therein may be resorted to.
- Sufficiency of facts in the proclamation should be reviewed under the lens
of grave abuse of discretion Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency
of the factual basis musk be assessed from the trajectory or point of view of
the President and base on the facts available to him at the time the decision
was made.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the power to review by the court is independent on the power to
review by the legislature
2. Whether or not the power to review by the court calibrates the power of the
president.
Ruling:
1. Yes, it is entirely independent from the review conducted by Congress.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the/ extraordinary
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said
presidential action. In particular, the President' extraordinary powers of suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to
the veto powers of the Court1 and Congress.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack 01 sufficient factual basis. On
the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation o~ suspension,
the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior
to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings."106 On the other hand, Congress may take
into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening
the declaration. Unlike the Court I which does not look into the absolute
correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe
deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a
petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress'
review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it , may be activated by Congress
itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are
not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although
concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can
be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest
the Court and Congress with veto powers independently from each other
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if the Members are detained, can
immediately be applied for, and the Supreme Court shall also review the factual
basis
By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own
power and surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its
bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered' itself just on stand-by,
waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress "defaults." It is an
aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in this
proceeding.
We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review
with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any
perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the
Court of its power to review.
2. No, it does not calibrate the President’s power vested by the Constitution
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign
and involves ordinary police action. 114 The President may resort to this
extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to
the President;"115 the only limitations being that he acts within permissible
constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of
discretion.116 In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces
is xx x not subject to judicial review.
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion
or rebellion, and public safety requires it.
Limitations of martial law and or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus: (1) time limit of 60 days, (2) review and possible revocation of congress,
(3) review and possible nullification of SC
The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of tle writ of habeas
corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights a d individual freedom.
Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the
Executive Department has called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of
law and order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of
arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more difficult to
restore order and enforce t e law.122 As such, their exercise requires more
stringent safeguards by the Congress, and review by the Court. Statement before
the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that under a valid
declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the
"(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies;
(c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and ( d) issuance
of Presidential Decrees
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform
do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during
martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation o civil courts or legislative
assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under th Bill of Rights remain in place
during its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is also suspended, sue suspension applies only to those judicially charged
with rebellion or offense connected with invasion.
GRADUATION OF POWERS
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in-,. Chief, a
'sequence' of 'graduated power[s]'.
It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based
on scope and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement,
or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so called "graduation of
powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides
which power to choose.
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President
as Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and
prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the
calling out power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also
lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose, initially, which
among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a
judgment call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are
broad enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that
endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State. 132
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to
calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail
given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion
into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative
that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior
concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that
judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which
of his graduated powers be availed of in a given situation.
It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations
In necessitating the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege I of
the writ of habeas corpus. It was precisely this time element that prompted the
Constitutional Commission to eliminate the requirement of concurrence of the
Congress in the initial imposition by the President of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when
public safety requires it, and is no longer under threat or in imminent danger
thereof, there is a necessity and urgency for the President to act quickly to protect
the country.138 The Court, as Congress does, must thus accord the President the
same leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively by the
Constitution to the Executive Department.
b. Supreme Court: the governmental organ that allocates constitution
boundaries
Angara vs. Electoral Commission
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position
of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the
provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National
Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect,
fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other
things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that
the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission
adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.
Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National
Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and
the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the
affirmative,
(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution
of the National Assembly
RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It
obtains not through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.
In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectability, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and
function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances and subject to
the specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.
The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature
is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of government.
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does
a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand,
and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not
be interfered with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of its authority, it does not follow
that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and
that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate
cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent
of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission

The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain errors
of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in
its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary
authority in the performance and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned to
it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it
is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction
upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests instructed to its
cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time
and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests.
When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming
the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not
yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of
confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide
election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature
cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to
its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing
of said election protests.
Summarizing, they conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory
of separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties
often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies
thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency
of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect,
each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by
the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full,
clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain
the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said
contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones
Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act
No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing
contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse
party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of
contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of
a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against
whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive
the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which
protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
HELD:
The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner
toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as
the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
c. Supreme Court ruling on constitutional issues cannot be undone, or in effect
reversed, by Congress
Endencia vs David
G.R. No. L-6355-56
August 31 1953
FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges
Endencio and Jugo’s salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII
Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax
from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the said
judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in
judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of
the Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance of
their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer of
the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in
contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.
d. judicial power does not include the power to rewrite the Constitution
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v Comelec

G.R. No. 203766
April 2, 2013
Facts:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions with the Supreme
Court in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the COMELEC disqualifying them from
the May 2013 party-list race. The COMELEC, in its assailed resolutions issued in October,
November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and
organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their
nominees did not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some
of the organizations or groups were not truly representative of the sector they intend to
represent in Congress.
Issues:
1. Whether COMELEC committed grave abused of discretion in disqualifying petitioners
from participating in the May 2013 party-list election.
Ruling:
NO. COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, cases were remanded back to the COMELEC because
petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
In determining who may participate in the party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organization, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do
not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either “be marginalized and
underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority
of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,”
or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.
e. political v. justiciable questions
1. Political questions
Baker et al. v. Carr et al.
Case Summary of Baker v. Carr:

A Tennessee resident brought suit against the Secretary of State claiming that the
failure to redraw the legislative districts every ten years, as outlined in the
state constitution, resulted in rural votes holding more votes than urban votes.
The state claimed redistricting was a political question and non-justiciable.
Baker petitioned to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court held that an equal protection challenge to malapportionment
of state legislatures is not a political question because is fails to meet any of the six
political question tests and is, therefore, justiciable.
Procedural History:
Baker claimed the malapportionment of state legislatures is justiciable and the

state of Tennessee argued such an issue is a political question not capable of being
decided by the courts. Baker petition to the United States Supreme Court.
Issue and Holding:
Is an equal protection challenge to a malapportionment of state legislatures considered

non-justiciable as a political question? No.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
A challenge brought under the Equal Protection Clause to malapportionment of state

legislatures is not a political question and is justiciable.
Judgment:
Remanded to the District Court for consideration on the merits.
Reasoning:
The current case is different than Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849), because it is brought
under the Equal Protection Clause and Luther challenged malapportionment under the
Constitution’s Guaranty Clause.
An issue is considered a non-justiciable political question when one of six tests are met:
1.Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to another political branch;

2.Lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue;
3.Impossibility of deciding the issue without making an initial policy determination of a
kind not suitable for judicial discretion;
4.Lack of respect for the other branches of government in undertaking independent
resolution in the case;
5.Unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
6.Potential for embarrassment for differing pronouncements of the issue by different
branches of government.
This claim does not meet any of the six tests and is justiciable. There are no textually
demonstrable commitments present regarding equal protection issues by other branches
of government. Judicial standards are already in place for the adjudication of like claims.
Since Baker is an individual bringing suit against the state government, no separation of
power concerns result.
Political question doctrine "essentially a function of the separation of powers"
Concurring and Dissenting opinions:
Concurring (Douglas):
Since the right to vote is inherent in the Constitution, each vote should hold equal weight.
The design of a legislative district which results in one vote counting more than another
is the kind of invidious discrimination the Equal Protection Clause was developed to
prevent.
Concurring (Stewart):
The dissenting and concurring opinions confuse which issues are presented in this case.
The majority’s three rulings should be no more than whether:
The jurisdiction is proper over the subject matter,

Baker states a justiciable cause of action under which he should be entitled to relief, and
Baker has standing to challenge Tennessee’s apportionment statutes.
In addition, the proper place for this trial is the trial court, not here.
Dissenting (Frankfurter and Harlan):
The majority’s decision fails to base its holding on both history and existing precedent.
Such failure violates both judicial restraint and separation of powers concerns under the
Constitution. Prior cases involving the same subject matter have been decided as
nonjusticiable political questions. The difference between challenges brought under the
Equal Protection Clause and the Guaranty Clause is not enough to decide against
existing precedent.
In addition, the majority’s analysis is clouded by too many indirect issues to focus on the
real issue at hand. The issue in the case is whether or not the complaint sufficiently
alleged a violation of a federal right to the extent a district court would have jurisdiction.
The complaint does not state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not suggest legislatures must
intentionally structure their districts to reflect absolute equality of votes. The complaint
also fails to adequately show Tennessee’s current system of apportionment is so arbitrary
and capricious as to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Significance:
Baker v. Carr outlined that legislative apportionment is a justiciable non-political question.

It established the right of federal courts to review redistricting issues, when just a few
years earlier such matter were categorized as “political questions” outside the jurisdiction
of the courts.
Alejandrino V.S. Quezon

46 Phil. 83
(1924)
Facts:
The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus and injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a
Senator appointed by the Governor General to represent the 12th Senatorial District. A
resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators. On
February 1924, depriving Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments
of his office for the period of one year from 1/24 having been declared guilty of disorderly
conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously
assaulted Sen. de Vera on the occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter in
the course of the debate regarding the credentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of
petitioner's complaint is that the resolution is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction may annul the
suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in
his official position
Held:
No. The Philippine Legislature nor a branch, can be directly controlled in the
exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court lacks jurisdiction to
consider the petition. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or
its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which
therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control.
The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power.
Precedents have held that where a member has been expelled by the legislative body,
the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to
issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.
JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-543
August 31, 1946
Political Questions:
1. A ‘political question’ is one the resolution of which has been vested by the
Constitution exclusively in either the people, in the exercise of their sovereign capacity,
or in which full discretionary authority has been delegated to a co-equal branch of the
Government.
2. Thus, while courts can determine questions of legality with respect to governmental
action, they cannot review government policy and the wisdom thereof, for these questions
have been vested by the Constitution in the Executive and Legislative Departments.
FACTS:
Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the
Congress of the Philippines a report regarding the national elections held the previous
month. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the
province of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not
reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.
During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum
resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno
and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator
receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections –
shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of
the of the protest lodged against their election.
Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues
responsible for the resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling respondents
to permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial prerogative. They
also allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over contests relating to their
election, returns and qualifications. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum
resolution.
ISSUES:
1.Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not
votes cast in the said provinces are valid.
2.Whether administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose
Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against
their elections.
RULING:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of
powers, holding that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed the inherent right of the
legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to
compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore
pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The
courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. So it has
been held that where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts
have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a
mandate to compel his reinstatement
Under our form of government the judicial department has no power to revise even
the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof,
taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the
constitution.
the Senate resolved that the Justice issuing the writ had "unlawfully invaded the
constitutional privileges and prerogatives of the Senate of the United States and of three
Senators; and was without jurisdiction to grant the rule, and Senators are directed to make
no appearance in response thereto."
Case dismissed.
Mabanag vs. Vito

GR L-1123
5 March 1947
En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate

opinions, 1 filed separate opinion
Facts:
Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote
of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in
the elections held on 23 April 1946.
The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the
first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in
their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in
the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been formally suspended.
A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House
when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three senators and
eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional resolution,
designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of
the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of
the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in
either branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement
of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The
members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor
General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight senators,
17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and
the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue:
Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
Held:
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political
questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to
deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of
powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities.
The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political
question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities
are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the
courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government. If a
political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments,
a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born
of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which
leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other
in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory
process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of
(only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching
political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to
amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The
exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If
on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard
public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then
into that of ratification.
Dissent of Justice Perfecto:

POLITICAL QUESTIONS
The majority enunciates the proposition that "political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary," except "by express constitutional or statutory provision" to the
contrary. Then argues that "a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under
the 'enrolled bill rule' out of respect to the political departments."
The doctrine is predicated "on the principle of the separation of powers."
This question of separation of powers is the subject of discussion in the case of Vera vs.
Avelino, supra. We deem unnecessary to repeat what we have already said in our opinion
in said case, where we have elaborated on the question.
Although the majority maintains that what they call the doctrine that political questions are
not within the province of the judiciary is "too well-established to need citation of
authorities," they recognize the difficulty "in determining what matters fall under the
meaning of political questions."
This alleged doctrine should not be accepted at its face value. We do not accept it even
as a good doctrine. It is a general proposition made without a full comprehension of its
scope and consequences. No judicial discernment lies behind it.
The confession that the "difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning
of political question" shows conclusively that the so-called doctrine has recklessly been
advanced.
This allegedly "well-established" doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of the confessed
difficulty in determining what matters fall within the designation of political question. The
majority itself admits that the term "is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents
and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the acts of the political department of the
government."
Doctrine is that "what is taught; what is held; put forth as true, and supported by a teacher,
a school, or a sect; a principle or position, or the body of principles, in any branch of
knowledge; tenet; dogma; principle of faith. "It is a synonym of principle, position, opinion,
article, maxim, rule, and axiom. in its general sense, doctrine applies to any speculative
truth or working principle, especially as taught to others or recommended to their
acceptance. Therefore, to be true, it should be expressed on simple and self-evident
terms. A doctrine in which one of the elemental or nuclear terms is the subject of an
endless debate is a misnomer and paradox.
A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an established truth, as a starting point for

developing new propositions, as a guiding principle in the solution of many problems. It
is a groundwork for the building of an intellectual system. It is the basis of a more or less
complex legal structure. If not the cornerstone, it should at least be one of the main
columns of an architectonic construction. If that groundwork, cornerstone or column is
supported by a thing whose existence still remains in dispute, it is liable to fall.
We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a pseudo-doctrine which is based on
the unsettled meaning of political question. The general proposition that "political
questions are not within the province of the judiciary" is just one of the many numerous
general pronouncements made as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or
uncourageous tribunals to refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to them.
It belongs to the category of that much-vaunted principle of separation of powers, the
handful of sand with which judicial ostriches blind themselves, as if self-inflicted blindness
may solve a problem or may act as a conjuration to drive away a danger or an evil.
We agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution and the process
to make it effective, as provided in Article XV of the Constitution, are matters of political
nature, but we cannot agree with their conclusion that a litigation as to whether said article
has been complied with a violated is beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunals, because to
arrive at this conclusion we must accept as a major premise the pseudo-doctrine which
we have precisely exposed as erroneous and false.
Is there anything more political in nature than the Constitution? Shall all questions relating
to it, therefore, betaken away from the courts? Then, what about the constitutional
provision conferring the Supreme Court with the power to decide "all cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty or a law?"
Arnault v. Balagtas
G. R. No. L-6749
July 30,1995
Labrador, J.
Facts
Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in the negotiations for the purchase of some
properties by the Government of the Philippines.
The Senate issued a resolution creating a Special Committee to determine
“whether the said purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved
in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, any other facts the
Committee may deem proper in the premises."
In the investigation conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution,
petitioner-appellee was asked to whom a part of the purchase price was delivered.
Petitioner-appellee refused to answer this question.
The Committee resolved on May 15, 1950, to order his commitment to the custody
of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison
in Rizal until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate or to the Special Committee
the name of the person who received the purchase price and to answer questions
pertinent thereto.
Petitioner-appellee contended that the Senate has no authority to punish him for
contempt beyond the term of the legislative session.
This an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance, declaring that the
continued detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault in the new Bilibid Prison, in
pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952, is illegal, for the
reason that the Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance erred in reviewing the findings in Senate
Resolution No. 114.
Ruling
Yes. The controversy in question has political complexion, over which the Judiciary
has no jurisdiction.
The court held: “. . . There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action
that the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings
of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their
proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process.
The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of departmental
discretion in the means used to accomplish legitimate legislative ends. . . These the
judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to do, much in
the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the
ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known
as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental
principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution.”
Osmena vs Pendatun
G.R. No. L-17144
October 28, 1960
FACTS:
Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their
capacity as member of the Special Committee created by House Resolution # 59.
Specifically, petitioner asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of
infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and asked the member of the Special
Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59, requiring the
petitioner to substantiate his charges against the President during his privilege speech
entitled “A Message to Garcia” wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the
President’s administration selling pardons. For refusing to provide evidence as the basis
of his allegations, Osmena was suspended for 15 months for the serious disorderly
behavior.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s words constitute disorderly behaviour or conduct a
political or justiciable question.
HELD:
The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because
the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. The theory
of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a
prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. The principle is well
established that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an
interference by the judicial department with the legislature since each department is
equally independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. The gist as
applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction
to interfere.
De Castro v. Committee on Justice,

G.R. No. L-71688,
September 3, 1985
FACTS:
In G.R. No. L-71688 filed on August 17, 1985, Arturo M. de Castro and Perfecto
L. Cagampang, claiming to be members of good standing of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and taxpayers, filed a petition with this Court for certiorari to annul
the resolution of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government, the very same resolution subject of the present petition, dismissing
the complaint for the impeachment of the President of the Philippines signed by
the petitioners in the present case, and mandamus to compel said Committee on
Justice and the Batasan, represented by its Speaker, to give due course to said
complaint for
ISSUES:
1. Has this Court jurisdiction to order the Committee on Justice, Human Rights
and Good Government to recall from the Archives and report out the resolution
and complaint for impeachment? 2. Can this court, assuming said resolution and
complaint for impeachment are recalled from the Archives, order the Batasan to
conduct a trial on the charges contained in said resolution and complaint for
impeachment?
RULING:
1. It is up to the Batasan to enact its own rules of procedure in said impeachment
proceedings, which it had already done, The interpretatioqn and application of
said rules are beyond the powers of the Court to review. The powers of the
Batasan to dismiss a petition for impeachment which in its judgment it finds not
meritorious or defective in form and substance are discretionary in nature and,
therefore, not subject to judicial compulsion. 2. Under the doctrine of separation
of Powers as interpreted by the decisions of the Court, mandamus will not he
from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to compel
performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility. More
specifically, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the Batasan to
compel it to give due course to the complaint for impeachment. 3. the provisions
of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, more specifically
Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 pursuant to which the Batasan Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government had dismissed Resolution No. 644 and the
complaint for the impeachment attached thereto are unconstitutional, implying
thereby that the Batasan or the Committee thereof had, in the exercise of powers
vested upon it by the Constitution, transgressed or violated the Constitution,
certainly a justiciable question.
Philippine Bar Asssociation v. Comelec

G.R. No. 72915
December 20, 1985
Facts:
Petitions were filed questioning the validity of BP 883, calling a special election
for President and Vice-President on February 7, 1986.
The law was enacted following the letter of President Marcos to the BP that he
was "irrevocably vacating the position of President effective only when the election is
held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as Pres. by taking his oath of office
ten days after his proclamation."
The principal ground for the challenge to the validity of the statute was that the
conditional resignation of the President did not create a vacancy required by Article VII,
Sec. 9 which authorized the calling of a special election.
Related Laws:
PB 883 / Cabinet Bill 7: Calls for national elections on Febuary 7, 1986 for the office of
President and Vice-President of the Philippines.
Art 7 Sec 9: In case of permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation
of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired
term. The Batasang Pabansa shall by law provide for the cases mentioned by the
President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then become President and
Vice-President or the manner in which one shall be selected. In case vacancy in the
office of the President occurs before the elections of the 1987, the speaker of the
Batasang Pambansa shall act as president until a President and Vice-President or
either od them shall have been elected and shall have qualified. Their term of office
shall commence of noon of the 10th day following proclamation, and shall end at noon
on the 13th day of June of the 6th year thereafter.
Issue:
Whether the BP 883 is unconstitutional and the court should stop and prohibit the
elections.
Ruling:
No. After deliberating, 7 Justices voted to dismiss. On the other hand, 5 Justices
voted to declare the statute unconstitutional. The Court failed to have 10 votes to
declare B.P. Blg. 883 unconstitutional. Whereas the original issue on B.P. Blg. 883’s
constitutionality, the issue has now transformed into a political question where only the
sovereign people can decide in a fair, clean and honest election. Thus, it is outside the
ambit of the courts. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide
through their ballot, either to the give the incumbent president a new mandate or elect a
new president. As such, the Court dismissed the petitions and denied their prayers of
prohibition.
Tehankee, J., concurring:

The real issue at bar has thus veered from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned
constitutionality of the Act due to the lack of an actual vacancy in the office of President
and transformed itself into a political question that can only be truly decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity in a fair, clean and honest election. (Javellana vs.
Exec. Secretary, 50 SCRA 30).
The cancellation of the elections can only aggravate the prevailing crisis and the
President may find it difficult to govern effectively. Political system that calls an election
and then calls it off after the momentum has built up will not be received kindly by the
people. An election should be treated with respect and the majesty it deserved. It gives
meaning to the central directing principle of the Constitution that all sovereignty
emanates from the people.
Plana, J.:
The narrow legal issue involved in these petitions is whether Batas Pambansa Blg. 883
which provides for a "snap" election on February 7, 1986 violates the Constitution. An
examination of the Constitution, particularly Article VII, Section 9, does not yield the
conclusion that B.P. Blg. 883 is offensive to its provisions. What is clear is that the
Constitution does not prohibit the President from tendering a resignation that is not
immediately effective. Indeed, there is no provision whatsoever regarding such kind of
resignation. Not being prohibited, a Presidential resignation in futuro is allowed. And in
such a case, the Batasang Pambansa is not obliged to sit and wait for the actual
vacancy to arise before enacting necessary legislation. That would be an unreasonable
and absurd interpretation of the Constitution, which is to be eschewed. Quite apart from
the foregoing, there is a strong presumption that a law is constitutional, which is fortified
by the rule that all reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.
Hence, in assessing the constitutionality of a law, "to doubt is to sustain." This approach
is dictated by a healthy respect of the courts for a co-equal department, the Legislature,
and the latter's assumed wisdom within the area of its competence. This principle is
doubly applicable as regards B.P. Blg. 883 which is the product of the joint action of the
executive and legislative departments.
Romulo v Yniguez
G.R. No. 71908
February 4, 1986
Facts
Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan, filed
with the Batasan on August 13, 1985 Resolution No. 644 calling for the impeachment of
President Marcos together with a verified complaint for impeachment. Said resolution and
complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government. The Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and
substance to warrant its further consideration and disapproved Resolution No. 644 and
dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached thereto on August 14, 1985.
It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives.
On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying
for the recall from the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint attached
thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan.
Hence, this petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Sections
4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and
mandamus to compel the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government to recall from the archives and report out the resolution together with the
verified complaint for the impeachment of the President of the Philippines
ISSUE
Whether or not the Supreme Court should order the Committee on Justice to recall from
the Batasan archives the impeachment resolution and complaint against President
Marcos and the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges contained therein.
Ruling
The court ruled citing that The 1973 Constitution has vested in the Batasan
Pambansa the exclusive power to initiate, try and decide all cases of impeachment. The
action of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan to whom the complaint for the
impeachment of the President had been referred dismissing said petition for being
insufficient in form and substance involves a political question not cognizable by the
Courts. The dismissal of said petition is within the ambit of the powers vested exclusively
in the Batasan by express provision of Sec. 2, Article XIII of the Constitution and it is not
within the competence of this Court to inquire whether in the exercise of said power the
Batasan acted wisely.
The powers of the Batasan to dismiss a petition for impeachment which in its
judgment it finds not meritorious or defective in form and substance are discretionary in
nature and, therefore, not subject to judicial compulsion.
Garcia vs. Drilon
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
FACTS:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her
minor children, a verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner),
pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against
the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO
effective for thirty (30) days.
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to
faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and
their children, private respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex
parte.
The RTC issued a TPO, effective for thirty (30) days.
Petitioner filed before the CA challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for
being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of
the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being “an unwanted product of an invalid
law.”
The CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional
issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with
jurisdiction to resolve the same.
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC
of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and
jurisdiction that is “inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Family Court has jurisdiction on the issue of constitutionality of a
statute.
RULING:
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same
level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts
Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
of domestic violence against women and children. In accordance with said law, the
Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least
one Family Court in each of several key cities identified.
To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now
provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women
and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where
the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where
the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains
possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of
cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve
the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in the general definition
of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of
their conformity to the fundamental law.” The Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA that,
“plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in
cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of
final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in
issue.” Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the

law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts
in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A.

9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition
for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine
the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Metrobank v Tobias
G.R. No. 177780
January 25, 2012
Bersamin, J.
Facts:
Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam
Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six months later, Tobias applied for a loan from
METROBANK, which in due course conducted trade and credit verification of Tobias that
resulted in negative findings. The property consisted of four parcels of land located in
Malabon City, Metro Manila.
His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he
again defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to
METROBANK as the lone bidder.
When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds
of Malabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry
vault. Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) concluded that TCT No.
M-16751 and the tax declarations submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF
recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint for estafa through
falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315, in relation to Articles
172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa
through falsification of public documents. Tobias filed a motion for reinvestigation, which
was granted. Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still
found probable cause against Tobias, and recommended his being charged with estafa
through falsification of public document. Tobias appealed to the DOJ and then Acting
Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued a resolution directing the
withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. On November 18, 2005, Secretary of
Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied METROBANK's motion for reconsideration. Hence,
METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions. METROBANK maintains that what the
Secretary of Justice did was to determine the innocence of the accused, which should not
be done during the preliminary investigation; and that the CA disregarded such lapse.
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals err in dismissing metrobank’s petition.
Ruling:
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive
Branch of the Government.
The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of

determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial. At a preliminary
investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines
whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Probable
cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. There is no
definitive standard by which probable cause is determined except to consider the
attendant conditions; the existence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the
public prosecutor conducting the examination, who is called upon not to disregard the
facts presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the clear dictates
of reason.
We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in
real property, had the duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and
condition of the realty as well as the validity and integrity of the documents bearing on the
realty. Its duty included the responsibility of dispatching its competent and experienced
representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of
investigating who was its real owner. Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently
perform a thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had
offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected
to exercise greater care and prudence than others in their dealings because their
business is impressed with public interest. Their failure to do so constitutes negligence
on its part. DENIED.
Spouses Balangauan v. CA,

G. R. No. 174350,
August 13, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Katherene was a Premier Customer Services Representative (PCSR) of
respondent bank, HSBC. As a PCSR, she managed the accounts of HSBC depositors
with Premier Status. One such client and/or depositor handled by her was Roger Dwayne
York (York).
York maintained several accounts with respondent HSBC. Sometime in April 2002,
he went to respondent HSBC's Cebu Branch to transact with petitioner Katherene
respecting his Dollar and Peso Accounts. Petitioner Katherene being on vacation at the
time, York was attended to by another PCSR. While at the bank, York inquired about the
status of his time deposit in the amount of P2,500,000.00. The PCSR representative who
attended to him, however, could not find any record of said placement in the bank's data
base. York adamantly insisted, though, that through petitioner Katherene, he made a
placement of the aforementioned amount in a higher-earning time deposit. York further
elaborated that petitioner Katherene explained to him that the alleged higher-earning time
deposit scheme was supposedly being offered to Premier clients only. Upon further
scrutiny and examination, respondent HSBC's bank personnel discovered that: (1) on 18
January 2002, York pre-terminated a P1,000,000.00 time deposit; (2) there were cash
movement tickets and withdrawal slips all signed by York for the amount of
P1,000,000.00; and (3) there were regular movements in York's accounts, i.e., beginning
in the month of January 2002, monthly deposits in the amount of P12,500.00 and
P8,333.33 were made, which York denied ever making, but surmised were the regular
interest earnings from the placement of the P2,500,000.00.
It was likewise discovered that the above-mentioned deposits were transacted
using petitioner Katherene's computer and work station using the code or personal
password "CEO8." The significance of code "CEO8," according to the bank personnel of
respondent HSBC, is that, "it is only Ms. Balangauan who can transact from the computer
in the work station CEO-8, as she is provided with a swipe card which she keeps sole
custody of and only she can use, and which she utilizes for purposes of performing bank
transactions from that computer."
Bank personnel of respondent HSBC likewise recounted in their affidavits that prior
to the filing of the complaint for estafa and/or qualified estafa, they were in contact with
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene. Petitioner Bernyl supposedly met with them on two
occasions. At first he disavowed any knowledge regarding the whereabouts of York's
money but later on admitted that he knew that his wife invested the funds with Shell
Company. He likewise admitted that he made the phone banking deposit to credit York's
account with the P12,500.00 and the P8,333.33 using their landline telephone. With
respect to petitioner Katherene, she allegedly spoke to the bank personnel and York on
several occasions and admitted that the funds were indeed invested with Shell Company
but that York knew about this. So as not to ruin its name and goodwill among its clients,
respondent HSBC reimbursed York the P2,500,000.00.
Based on the foregoing factual circumstances, respondent HSBC, through its
personnel, filed a criminal complaint for Estafa and/or Qualified Estafa before the Office
of the City Prosecutor, Cebu City. Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene submitted their joint
counter-affidavit basically denying the allegations contained in the affidavits of the
aforenamed employees of respondent HSBC as well as that made by York. They argued
that the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavits were pure fabrications.
Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP)
Victor C. Laborte, Prosecutor II of the OCP, Cebu City, in a Resolution dated 21 February
2003, found no probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand
trial for the criminal complaint of estafa and/or qualified estafa, particularly Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the ACP recommended the dismissal of
respondent HSBC's complaint.
On 1 July 2003, respondent HSBC appealed the above-quoted resolution and
foregoing comment to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a Petition for Review. In a
Resolution dated 6 April 2004, the Chief State Prosecutor, Jovencito R. Zuato, for the
Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the petition. Respondent HSBC's Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality by the DOJ in a lengthier Resolution
dated 30 August 2004.
Respondent HSBC then went to the Court of Appeals by means of a Petition for
Certiorari. On 28 April 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision granting
respondent HSBC's petition, thereby annulling and setting aside the twin resolutions of
the DOJ and ordered the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to file the appropriate Information
against the private respondents.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene's motion for reconsideration proved futile, as it
was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 29 June 2006. Hence, this
Petition for Certiorari. Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene filed the present petition on the
argument that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing and
setting aside the resolutions of the DOJ.
The Court of Appeals found fault in the DOJ's failure to identify and discuss the
issues raised by the respondent HSBC in its Petition for Review filed therewith. And, in
support thereof, respondent HSBC maintains that it is incorrect to argue that "it was not
necessary for the Secretary of Justice to have his resolution recite the facts and the law
on which it was based," because courts and quasi-judicial bodies should faithfully comply
with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that decisions rendered by them
should state clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on which the decision
is based.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, joined by the Office of the Solicitor General, on
the other hand, defends the DOJ and assert that the questioned resolution was complete
in that it stated the legal basis for denying respondent HSBC's Petition for Review - "that
after an examination of the petition and its attachment [it] found no reversible error that
would justify a reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the law and
evidence on the matter."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary investigation; and the
DOJ, in reviewing the findings of the public prosecutor, both perform adjudicatory
functions, in such a way that their finding of no probable cause to hold petitioners liable
to stand for trial, have the same effect as judgements of a court
RULING:
No. It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of
probable cause.
The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the
courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a
preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like
quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising
powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body
is an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects
the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial
agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of
parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the
case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable
cause to file an Information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the
Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former's order or resolutions. In this case, since the
DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution finds no
application. Be that as it may, the DOJ rectified the shortness of its first resolution by
issuing a lengthier one when it resolved respondent HSBC's motion for reconsideration.
Anent the substantial merit of the case, whether or not the Court of Appeals'
decision and resolution are tainted with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable
cause, this Court finds the petition dismissible.
RATIO: A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court and
other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such
that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect
as judgments of a court.
2. Justiciable questions
Avelino vs. Cuenco

G.R. No. L-2821
March 4, 1949 (Decision)
March 14, 1949 (Resolution)
FACTS
 In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañadare
quested that his right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to
formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved.
His request was approved.
 On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Tañada
and Senator Tañada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of
the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President
and ordering the investigation thereof.
 Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the
Senate session hall at the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was
already in his office, said petitioner delayed his appearance at the session hall
until about 11:35 A.M.
 Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes,
Senator Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour
privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding, continuosly ignored him; and
when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being
recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest
of any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but
all the while, tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was
continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter
would ask for recognition of Senator Tañada.
 At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by
pre-arrangement. At about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of
the petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for
adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned
conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tañada.chanr
 Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly
walked out of the session hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco,
Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the senators remained.
Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by
those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing
Secretary, because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had
followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the
session.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
 Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to
deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete
text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof
and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the
respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled
"Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated
the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the
said resolution was unanimously approved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
 Senator Cuenco took the oath.ch
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare
him the rightful President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.
ISSUES
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
2. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
3. Should the petition be granted?
RULINGS
1. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation
of powers, the political nature of the controversy. And the constitutional
grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to
take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the
suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A
fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding
officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition
must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall - not in the Supreme
Court.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the
respondent makes it advisable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely
enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature.
2. The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of
the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with
twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there
a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it
useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do, that
the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other
four on those four on those sub-questions.5
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly
constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the
transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say
there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such
session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez,
and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor
twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute
a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the
members constitute "the House". There is a difference between a majority of "the House",
the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all
5Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session
under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten
senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a
resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had
the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate
for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the
twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of
the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then,
and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be
eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.6
3. As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the
petition. Without costs.
Concurrence of J. Perfecto on March 14, 1949 (Resolution)

The problem of democracy must be faced not in the abstract but as practical question, as
part of the infinitely motley aspects of human life. They cannot be considered as scientific
propositions or hypothesis independently from the actual workings of the unpredictable
flights of the spirit which seen to elude the known laws of the external world. Experience
appears to be the only reliable guide in judging human conduct. Birth and death rates and
incidence of illness are complied in statistics for the study and determination of human
behavior, and statistics are one of the means by which the teaching may render their
quota of contribution in finding the courses leading to the individual well-being and
collective happiness.
The way this case has been disposed of by the Supreme Court, upon the evidence
coming from many quarters and sectors, is provenly far from being conducive to
democratic eudaemonia. We intended to settle the controversy between petitioner and
respondent, but actually we left hanging in the air the important and, indeed, vital
questions. They posed before us in quest of enlightenment and reasonable and just in a
quandary.
We can take judicial notice that legislative work has been at a standstill; the normal and
ordinary functioning of the Senate has been hampered by the non-attendance to sessions
of about one-half of the members; warrants of arrest have been issued, openly defied,
and remained unexecuted like mere scraps of paper, notwithstanding the fact that the
persons to be arrested are prominent persons with well-known addresses and residences
and have been in daily contact with news reporters and photographers. Farce and
mockery have been interspersed with actions and movements provoking conflicts which
invite bloodshed.
It is highly complimentary to our Republic and to our people that, notwithstanding the
overflow of political passions and the irreconcilable attitude of warring factions, enough
self-restraint has been shown to avoid any clash of forces. Indeed there is no denying
that the situation, as abstaining in the upper chamber of congress, is highly explosive. It
6
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of
the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately
after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with
Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any
time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to
avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of
all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
had echoed in the House of the Representatives. It has already involved in the House of
the Representatives. It has already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation
has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected
from any quarter other then this Supreme Court, upon which the quarter other than this
Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are
pinned.7
Judicial "hands-off" policy is, in effect, a showing of official inferiority complex.
Consequently like its parallel in the psychological field, it is premised on notions of reality
fundamentally wrong. It is an upshot of distorted past experience, warping the mind so as
to become unable to have a healthy appraisal of reality in its true form.
It is futile to invoke precedents in support of such an abnormal judicial abdication. The
decision in the Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, is absolutely devoid of any authority.
It was rendered by a colonial Supreme Court to suit the imperialistic policies of the
masters. That explains its glaring inconsistencies.8
There is nothing so subversive as official abdication or walkout by the highest organs and
officers of government. If they should fail to perform their functions and duties, what is the
use for minor officials and employeesto perform theirs? The constitutional question of
quorum should not be leftunanswered.
Respondent's theory that twelve (12) senators constitute the majority requiredfor the
Senate quorum is absolutely unacceptable. The verbal changes made in the
constitutional amendment, upon the creation of Congress to replace the National
Assembly, have not affected the substance of the constitutional concept of quorum in
both the original and amended contexts. The words "all the members" used in the original,
for the determination of the quorum of the National Assembly, have been eliminated in
7
The Avelino group, composed of eleven senators almost one-half of the entire body, are unanimous in belief that
this Court should take jurisdiction of the matter and decide the merits of the case one way or another, and they
are committed to abide by the decision regardless of whether they believe it to be right or mistaken. Among the
members of the so-called Cuenco group, there are several Senators who in not remote past (see Vera vs. Avelino,
77 Phil., 192 and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) have shown their conviction that in cases analogous to the
present the Supreme Court has and should exercise jurisdiction. If we include the former attitude of the senator
who is at present abroad, we will find out that they are in all eighteen (18) senators who at one time or another
recognized the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the settlement of such momentous controversies as the one
now challenging our judicial statesmanship, our patriotism, our faith in democracy, the role of this Court as the last
bulwark of the Constitution.
In the House of Representatives unmistakable statements have been made supporting the stand of the eighteen
(18) senators, or of three-fourths (3/4) of the entire Upper Chamber, in support of the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and of the contention that we should decide this case on the merits.c
8
For the Supreme Court to refuse to assume jurisdiction in the case is toviolate the Constitution. Refusal to
exercise the judicial power vested in it is to transgress the fundamental law. This case raises vital
constitutionalquestions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should refuse to decide them. It would be
the saddest commentary to the wisdom, foresight and statesmanship of our Constitutional Convention to have
drafted a document leaving such a glaring hiatus in the organization of Philippine democracy ifit failed to entrusted
to the Supreme Court the authority to decide such constitutional questions.
of senators on strike to attend the sessions of the Senate and toperform their duties. A senatorial walkout defeats
the legislative powervested by the Constitution in Congress. Judicial walkouts are even more harmful than a
laborers' strike or a legislative impasse. Society may go on normally while laborers temporarily stop to work.
Society may not be disrupted by delay in the legislative machinery. But society is menaced with dissolution in the
absence of an effective administration of justice. Anarchy and chaos are its alternatives.
the amendment, as regards the house of Congress, because they were a mere
surplusage. The writer of this opinion, as Member of the Second National Assembly and
in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one who
proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of each House" can mean
only the majority of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the
members.9
The Senate is composed of twelve four (24) senators. The majority of said senators
cannot be less than thirteen (13). Twelve (12) do not constitute the majority in a group
composed of twelve four (24) units. This is so evident that is not necessary to have the
mathematical genius of Pythagoras, Euclid, Newton and Pascal to see it. Any elementary
school student may immediately perceive it.
No amount of mental gymnastic or juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of
the two equal number constitute a majority part of the two numbers combined. The five
(5) fingers of one hand cannot be the majorityof the combined ten (10) fingers of the two
hands. Majority is incompatiblewith equality. It implies the idea of superiority.
The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the
purpose of choosing respondent merely as Acting of the Senate, asan emergency
measure to fill the vacuum created by petitioner's desertion of the office of presiding
officer by his walked in the session of February 21, 1949, the presence of the twelve (12)
senators was enough quorum.
The Constitution provides:

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members
in such manner and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Article
VI.)10
As events have developed after the decision in this case has been rendered on March 4,
1949, the picture of the petitioner's attitude has acquired clearerand more definite form,
and that picture brings us to the conclusion that thiscase turned into a moot one.
XXX
The last statement as to allowing petitioner to preside over the sessions was made by
respondent under oath twice, and petitioner, although he refused to attend the hearing of
this case, so much so that, instead of testifying, he just signed an affidavit which, under
the rules of procedure, is inadmissible as incompetent and is as valueless as an empty
gesture, could not fail to learn about respondent's testimony, because it was given
9
The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exactmathematical meaning. A majority
means more than one-half (�). It can neverbe identified with one-half (�) or less than one-half (�). It involved
acomparative idea in which the antithesis between more and less is etched in the background of reality as a
metaphysical absolute as much as the antithesis of all opposites, and in the same way that the affirmative cannot
be confused with the negative, the creation with nothingness, existence withnon-existence, truth with falsehood.
10
The "smaller number" referred to in the above provision has to act collectively and cannot act as collective body
to perform the function specially vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by one among theirnumber. The
collective body constituted by said "smaller number" has to take measure to "compel the attendance of absent
member in such manner and underpenalties as such House may provide," so as to avoid disruption in the functions
of the respective legislative chamber. Said "smaller number" maybe twelve or even less than twelve senators to
constitute a quorum for the election of a temporary or acting president, who will have to act until normalcy is
restored.
publicity, it is recorded in the transcript, and petitioner's counsel, Senator Francisco,
would certainly not have failed to inform him about it.
His refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding respondent's commitment to allow him
to preside over them, can and should logically be interpreted as an abandonment which
entails forfeiture of office. (Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil., 14; Ortiz vs. De Guzman, 49
Phil., 371; 46 Corpus Juris p. 980-981; Wilkinson vs. City of Birmingham, 68 So. 999; 43
American Jurisprudence p. 27).
What are petitioner's reasons for refusing to attend the Senate sessions? What are his
group's reason? They say that they want a square decision on the merits of this case, for
which reason the motion for reconsideration has been filed. Although we believe that the
Supreme majority vote, to exercise jurisdiction in this case, and the inconsistency in the
position taken by some Members of the majority has only increased public bewilderment,
stronger reasons for petitioner and his group to sabotage the sessions of the Senate.
If this Court had decided this case as the four dissenters would have it, there cannot be
any doubt that the Senate impasse would have been settled many days ago and, with it,
the present national crisis hampering and armstringing the legislative machinery.
The gravity of the situation cannot be gainsaid. The showings of open defiance to
warrants of arrest are highly demoralizing. People are asking and wondering if senators
are placed above the law that they can simply ignore warrants of arrest and despite the
authority of the officers entrusted with the execution. Threats of violence pervade the air.
Congress is neglecting the public interests that demand remedial legislation.
Once petitioner had been recognized to continue to be the President of the Senate, he
would certainly have attended the Senate sessions to preside over them. Then the
sessions with senators of the Avelino group attending, would have been held with the
constitutional quorum.
Everything then would have followed the normal course. With the presence of a clear and
unquestionable quorum, petitioner and his followers would have no ground for any
complaint, and respondent could have assumed the Senate's presidency without any
hitch.
Of course, petitioner and the senators of his group might have resorted again to the same
strategy, by quorum the rump session of February 21, 1949, but it is not probable that
they would have taken the same course of action after this Court, almost unanimously
declared that petitioner's action in adjourning the session of February 21, 1949, was
arbitrary and illegal. At any rate, the Senators of the Cuenco group would have been by
then well prepared to have orders of arrest ready for immediate execution before the
striking senators could leave the building housing the session
The abnormal situation in the Senate must be stopped at once. Legislation must go on.
The serious charges filed or may be filed against petitioner, respondent and other
senators demand imperatively investigation and action to acquit the innocent and to
punish the guilty ones. Public interest cannot demand less.
Under such circumstances, petitioner has lost all title to claim the position in controversy.
This result will not legally or practically close any door for him to again seek the position
by attending the sessions of the Senate and by securing a majority that would support
him in his bid.
The motion for reconsideration should be denied.
Tañada v. Cuenco
G.R. No. L-10520
February 28, 1957
Concepcion, J.
Facts
After the General Elections, the newly elected senators-respondents assumed
their seats in the Senate. However, such election was contested by petitioners.
Petitioners instituted the case at bar against respondents alleging that:
On February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators
who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator, namely, petitioner, Lorenzo
M. Tañada, belonging to the Citizens Party;
The Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear
violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; and
“In assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the
corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without
color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution,
usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal".
Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that:
This Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action
of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal.
Moreover, respondents assail the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon
the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the
fact that the draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective political
parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission
provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy
available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the
bar of public opinion.".
Issue
Whether or not the controversy at hand is a political (or justiciable) question, which leads
to the question of whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
Ruling
Not a political question. The Court has jurisdiction.
". . . What is generally meant when it is said that a question is political, and not
judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the people in their primary political
capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular
officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.”
“. . . those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.”
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here,
we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by
the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator
Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in
the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate
that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ..
of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null
and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary
authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its
power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory
in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate [jurisdiction] of the judicial department to pass
upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
Unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77
Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it
does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to
perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that
the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate.
Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to
choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As
the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:
"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall
be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have
been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the
powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity
of an act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are
seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other
case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by
anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative."
“Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the
Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of
statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there
can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other
branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the
exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the
defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral
Commission under the original Constitution.
The court held:
“It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty,
to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.”
JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.
G.R. NO. 36142.
March 31, 1973
Facts:
 The Plebiscite Case
1. On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which
was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969,
calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines.
2. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No.
6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the
election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970,
and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June
1, 1971.
3. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President
issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
4. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President
of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino
people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating
funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of
the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
5. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on
Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said
“respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in
any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that
said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling …
of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the
prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the
voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the
Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper
submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973,
there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no
sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”
6. On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and
open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
7. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite
for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to
this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was
issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978,
be postponed until further notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover,
“suspended in the meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972, temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open
debate on the proposed Constitution.”
8. Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned
plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the
aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said
plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again,
Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular
session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential
Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to
call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably
could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the
President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of
Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more
imperative to defer its final action on these cases.
9. “In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No.   L-35948
filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible,
preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”
10. The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a
resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said
“urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16,
1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners
in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of
restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents,” praying: “… that a
restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on
Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head,
Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head,
Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee
and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and
substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task,
from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other
officials concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results
allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period
comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions
quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”
11. On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the
respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said
motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and setting the motion
for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being heard,
on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the
writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the
Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation
No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer
returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No.
L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and
the public there present that the President had, according to information
conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier
that morning.
 The Ratification Case
1. On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the
sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to
restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by
him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit,
for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana
also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of
the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.
2. Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the
said proposed constitution upon ground that the President as Commander-in-
Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without
power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election
held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and
void.
3. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102
and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and
objective.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable
question.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has
been ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without
valid ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in
force.
Rulings:
1. It is a justiciable and a non-political question.
1. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon
whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the
requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of
ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the
provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the
old constitution.
2. The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in
accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is
justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our
1935 Constitution) shall show.
2. The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the court.
1. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those
lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the
Constitution the right of suffrage.
2. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the
Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were
fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in
Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those
less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the
qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered
null and void.
3. Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the
1935 Constitution envisages with the term “votes cast” choices made on ballots –
not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is
but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had
adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely,
uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in
the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry,
when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.
4. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the
supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio
Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC
and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even
of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is
such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns
filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent
violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental
scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the “free,
orderly, and honest” expression of the people’s will. For this, the alleged
plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are
claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution
3. No majority vote has been reached by the Court.
1. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that “the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”
2. Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free expression, and
there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under
Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine
stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity
of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people
must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to
state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that
has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in
the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial
law.”
3. Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or
competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by
Justice Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of martial law, with
the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they)
have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people
have accepted the Constitution.”
4. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the
Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
1. A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition
normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another.
Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute
congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in
session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative
Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the
orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the
proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the
people’s inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a
number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of
which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto,
amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102.
The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these
conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.
2. As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well to
remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his
action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses,
concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas,
Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a
plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935
Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.
3. In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case,
petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie
showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been
acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution
is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental
Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed
Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in
accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions
of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.
5. Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect.
1. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; 4
members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have
accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, voted
that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in
force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force.
Sanidad v Comelec
G.R. No. L-44640
October 12, 1976
FACTS:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates
to the power of the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the
present Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been
convened.
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a
national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to
resolve the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of
such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by
the President of his present powers.
On 22 September 1976, the President issued another PD 1031, amending the
previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. The
President also issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses
that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly
evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections
was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite.
Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
PD 991, 1033 and 1031. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there
is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution.
The Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections,
The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the
issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of
the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise
constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue raised is justiciable.
RULING:
Justiciable. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the
legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or
validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in
the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing
amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to
assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on
the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable
question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be
a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the
interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the
authority assumed was valid or not.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and
the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the people
ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that
the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure
for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether,
therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of
inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by
the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which
includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments
have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e.,
before the submission to and ratification by the people.
Daza v Singson
GR No. 86344
December 21, 1989
FACTS:
 May 11, 1987 (After congressional elections) -- Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among
those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
 September 16, 1988 -- the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four
members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP,
thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party
to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its
representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat
occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December
5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original
members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson
as the additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to this Court on
January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments
and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for
prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary
restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent
from serving in the Commission on Appointments.
Arguments for the petitioner:
(a) he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election
thereto is
permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan.
(b) the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent
political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has
not yet attained political stability.
(4) Arguments for the respondent:
(a) the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the
jurisdiction of
this Court. (Main fact for judicial department)
(b) he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of
Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments and removed the petitioner.
(c) nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be
entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court can act on the matter at bar
Ruling:
Yes, the court can take cognizance of the case.
Here the court said, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue
presented to us is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the
wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments
as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it would
still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
We resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change
its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes
that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such
changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional
divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
Rationale:
(1) What is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may
not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality,
not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission
on Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion
explained in Tanada v. Cuenco.
... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed
to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial
department to pass upon the validity of the proceeding in connection therewith.
... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the
judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election
procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election
has been in conformity with such statute, and particularly, whether such statute has been
applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6C.J .S.,
439; emphasis supplied)
I t is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider
and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein."
(2) The case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section
1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
OTHER NOTES:
(1) Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA et al, petitioners,

vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents
G.R. No. 118295
May 2, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the
concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO
Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement
through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and
employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-
heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.
They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote
the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods” as
(1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of member-
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO
“intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly
limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which,
under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the
Philippines.
Held:
No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine
sovereignty, particularly the legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution. The
Senate was acting in the proper manner when it concurred with the President’s
ratification of the agreement.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing
on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of
nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the
country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed
in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary
to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state
power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.
After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of
their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements
between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of
naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of
conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations,
the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot
in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture:
(1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2)
limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no
nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age
of interdependence is here.”
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade
without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are
rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning
a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages
industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby
demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in
favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in
the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown
capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment,
Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino
capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
Facts:
1 .On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which
directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003
in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee
on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient
in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was
filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.”
Issues:
1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint
constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section
3, Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article
XI of the Constitution.
Rulings:
1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the
judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
.Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an
intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and
is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1.Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3
of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would
by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution
without need of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action
taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August
5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003
violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of
the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section
3 of Article XI of the Constitution
DELEGATION OF POWERS
II.) Instances of Permissible Delegation
A) Legislative Power
2) EXC: Delegation of Legislative Power
b) Instances of Delegation of Legislative Power
Delegation to Administrative bodies: the power to subordinate legislation
NIAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, respondent-
appellee.
G.R. No. L-34674
October 26, 1931
FACTS:
Petitioner sought for a permit for the landing of ten large cattle and for the slaughter
thereof. This was denied by respondent pursuant to the prohibition of the importation of
cattle from foreign counties to the Philippine Island as imposed by Act No. 3155. Petitioner
assails the said act contending, inter alia, that the power given by Act No. 3 155 to the
Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act
constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.
RULING:
NO. The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
authorities or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. It clear in
this case that the Gov. Gen. was confined not the power to make the law, but only the
authority or discretion as to its execution.
II.) Instances of Permissible Delegation
A) Legislative Power
2) EXC: Delegation of Legislative Power
b) Instances of Delegation of Legislative Power
Delegation to Administrative bodies: the power to subordinate legislation
CASE:
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN
D. SACO, respondents.
G. R. No. 76633
October 18, 1988
FACTS:
 The petitioner challenged the decision of Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration POEA on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction
over the case of Vitaliano Saco as he was not an overseas worker.
 Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed
in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985.
 His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA.
 The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable
not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed
against the State Insurance Fund.
 The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position
papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant.
 The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the
employees of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its
international flights, are not considered overseas workers.
 Moreover, the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2

itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
 The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to

the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
 What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 has violated the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power.
RULING:
 No. There were no principles violated. The authority to issue the said regulation
is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. … “The
governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).”
 It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law

cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment
of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
 The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies.
 With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar

problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the
general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate
legislation.”
 With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by “filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide.
 This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary

regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor
on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The
temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so
ordered.
NOTES:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1) Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2) Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the

law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
 Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to

the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
III.) Test of Valid Delegation
A) Completeness Test
US VS ANG TANG HO
G.R. No. 17122
February 27, 1922
Facts:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No.
2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The
said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the
necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant
to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice
should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice
to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than
that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in violation of the said Executive
Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment
plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.
Issues:
WON there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Ruling:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power
to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a
direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the
authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn
may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly
what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that
could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The
law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch
of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other
appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all
its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So
ordered.
A. Completeness Test
CASE:
The HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, in his capacity as
the Secretary of the Department of Energy, petitioner,
vs.
LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
G.R. NO. 159149 :
June 26, 2006
FACTS:
 A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Decision and Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 161, in SCA Case No. 2318,
which nullified Circular No. 2000-06-010 of the Department of Energy (DOE).
 Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding,

overpricing, adulteration, under delivery, and under filling of petroleum products,
as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of under
filled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders.
 The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000
and a maximum of P50,000.
 On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement
B.P. Blg. 33, (SEC. 4-14).
 Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to
set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE, however, denied the
request for lack of merit.
 Respondent then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the trial
court.
 After trial on the merits, the trial court nullfied the Circular on the ground that it
new offenses not included in the law.
ISSUE:
 Whether the Regional Trial Court of Pasig erred in declaring the provisions of the
Circular null and void, and prohibiting the Circular's implementation
RULING:
 The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended,
criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, under filling, hoarding, and overpricing of
petroleum products.
 Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving

petroleum products, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said
criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing
scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal,
no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing
color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, under filling LPG cylinders,
tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders.
 These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the
law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.
 The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum
pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular
contravenes the law.
 To nullify the Circular in this case would be to render inutile government efforts to
protect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of some
unscrupulous LPG traders.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Circular No. 2000-06-
010 of DOE is declared valid. The Decision and Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 161, in SCA Case No. 2318, nullifying said Circular
and prohibiting its implementation are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Delegation of Powers
B. Sufficient Standard Test
People vs Rosenthal
G.R. Nos. L-46076 and L-46077
June 12, 1939
Facts:
 Osmena and Rosenthal are organizers of the ORO Oil Company which was
engaged in mining activities.
 They are alleged to have violated the ACT 2581: BLUE SKY LAW – by selling
speculative securities without first obtaining the written permit or license from the
Insular Treasurer.
 The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially depended
upon a promise of future promotion and development of the oil business, rather
than based on actual tangible assets.
 Regional Trial Court found them guilty.
 On appeal, they assail the constitutionality of the law, that it contravenes the
constitutional provisions of the JONES ACT because the law constitutes UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS to the INSULAR TREASURER.
 Under the Blue Sky Law, all persons who offer to sell securities to the public must
obtain license from the Insular Treasurer. The license to sell is issued only
whenever the Insular Treasurer is satisfied that the applicant has complied with
the provisions of the Blue Sky Law.
 Furthermore, the Blue Sky Law provides that the Insular Treasurer shall have
authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said license
or permit.
 Osmena and Rosenthal argue however that the Blue Sky Law provides NO
STANDARD or RULE which can guide the Insular Treasurer in determining the
cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued or cancelled, thereby
making his opinion the sole criterion. Consequently, they argue, legislative powers
have been unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer.
Issues:
1. Whether the Blue Sky Law provides a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer in
reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a license or permit.
2. Whether there was undue delegation of legislative powers.
Ruling:
Supreme Court ruled that the law is valid, sufficient standard. In view of the intent
and purpose of the Blue Sky Law to protect the public against speculative schemes
which have no more basis than so many feet of Blue Sky Law, and against the Sale
of Stock by fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines.
Public Interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer.
There is no undue delegation of authority since there is a stated criterion – public interest.
It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without
any standard to guide determinations.
1. The purpose of the Act.
2. The requirements imposed, and
3. The context of the provisions
All show that there is a stated criterion. Also, the decisions of the Insular Treasurer
is appealable to the Secretary of Finance, hence the Insular Treasurer does not act and
decide without any restraining influence.
Cervantes v. Auditor General

G.R. No. L-4043,
May 26, 1942
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of a decision of Auditor General denying the
petitioner’s claim for quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca and Fibers
Corporation (NAFCO).
Cenon Cervantes (petitioner) was the manager of NAFCO in 1949 with an annual
salary of P15,000. By a resolution of the Board of Directors, he was granted quarters
allowance not exceeding P400 a month effective on the first of that month. This
allowance was DISAPPROVED by the Central Committee of the government enterprise
council on the strength of the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in by
the Auditor General,
(1)That quarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited
by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager
thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a year, and
(2)That the precarious financial condition (corporation’s finances had not
improved) of the corporation did not warrant the granting of such allowance
Petitioner asked the Control Committee to reconsider its action and approve his
claim for allowance which was again referred to the Control Committee to the Auditor
General for comment. The Committee in turned referred it to NAFCO auditor, who
REAFFIRMED his previous recommendation and emphasized the fact that the
corporation’s finances had not improved.
Hence, this petition for review.
________________________________________________________________
Background of Republic Act No. 51

On October 4, 1946, Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the
President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in
government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their operation.
Pursuant to this authority, the President on October 4, 1947, promulgated
Executive Order No. 93, creating the Government Enterprises Council to be composed
of the President of the Philippines as chairman, the Secretary of Commerce and
Industry as vice-chairman, the chairman of the board of directors and managing heads
of all such corporations as ex-officio members, and such additional members as the
President might appoint from time to time with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The Executive Order also provided that the council was to have a
Control Committee with the power, among others:
(1) To supervise, for and under the direction of the President, all the corporations
owned or controlled by the Government for the purpose of insuring efficiency and
economy in their operations;
(2) To pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures
approved by the respective Boards of Directors of the said corporations; and
(3) To carry out the policies and measures formulated by the Government
Enterprises Council with the approval of the President. (Sec. 3, Executive Order No.
93.)
ISSUE:
a)Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 is null and void;
b)Whether or not Republic Act No. 51 is null and void.
RULING:
No, Executive Order No. 93 and Republic Act No. 51 are not null and void. The
rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established
by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in
authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and
changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that
the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the
free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy
and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The
President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in
question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation
of legislative power.
It is also contended that the quarters allowance is not compensation and so the
granting of it to the petitioner by the NAFCO board of directors does not contravene the
provisions of the NAFCO charter that the salary of the chairman of said board who is
also to be general manager shall not exceed P15,000 per annum. But regardless of
whether quarters allowance should be considered as compensation or not, the
resolution of the board of the directors authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner
cannot be given effect since it was disapproved by the Control Committee in the
exercise of powers granted to it by Executive Order No. 93.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is dismissed, with costs.
Calalang vs. Williams

G.R. No. 47800
December 2, 1940
Petitioner: Maximo Calalang

Respondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.
Ponente: Laurel, J:
Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila
filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution
of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30 Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm;
and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one year from the date of the opening
of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in
pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said
Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication
to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of
the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on
August 10, 1940.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned
to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issue:
1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to
the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with
legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion?
2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?
Held:
1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a
menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the
said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which
should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will
fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest
good to the greatest number.”
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.
JOSE O. VERA
FACTS:
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC).
In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was referred to the Insular Probation
Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition for probation. A hearing
was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The Prosecution
opposed the petition.
Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance of
Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused like
Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law),
probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers; that the City of
Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no
designated probation officer – hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221
is unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the
laws. HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or
nor to apply the probation law – if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it
will appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed
– hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because
it gave the option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law –
however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the
executive’s power to grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a
probation law, had in effect encroached upon the executive’s power to grant pardon.
(Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by HSBC – ironic because their
main stance was the non-applicability of the probation law only in Manila while
recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution,
representing the State as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the
validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also
castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in the past without
question but is now questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative,
from questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it
had been using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is
violation of the equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option
to apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not
to install a probation officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived
of the provisions of the Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only
apply to provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided for a probation
officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient standard test)
should provincial boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law
in their province. This only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according
to its whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of
Congress to provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the President’s
power to grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress
to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the president to commute penalties.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs.
TATAD V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 124360
November 5, 1997
Facts:
In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through the
enactment of R.A. No. 7638) to control energy-related government activities. In March
1996, R.A. No. 8180 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996) was enacted in
pursuance to the deregulation of the power and energy thrust under R.A. 7638. Under the
R.A. No. 8180, any person or entity was allowed to import and market crude oil and
petroleum products, and to lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil
facilities.
The petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 since
the imposition of tariff violates the equal protection clause and bars the entry of others in
the oil industry business. Also, the inclusion of tariff violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of
the constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in
its title.
In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo,
Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc. Freedom from
Debt Coalition and Sanlakas argued that R.A. No. 8180, specifically Section 15 is
unconstitutional because it: (1) gives undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Secretary of Energy by not providing a determinate or determinable
standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry; (2) Executive Order No. 392, and order
declaring the implementation of the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, is
arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the
Oil Price Stabilization Plan – a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180; and (3) Section 15
of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow formation of a de facto cartel among Petron,
Caltex and Shell in violation of constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
Respondents, on the other hand, declares the petitions not justiciable (cannot be settled
by the court) and that the petitioners have no locus standi since they did not sustain direct
injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not E. O. No. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable.
3. Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. no. 8180 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.
4. Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power.
Rulings:
1. No. R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It violated Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition. The deregulation act only benefits Petron, Shell and Caltex, the three major
league players in the oil industry.
2. Yes. Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore
considered void. The depletion of OFSP is not one of the factors enumerated in R.A. No.
8180 to be considered in declaring full deregulation of the oil industry. Therefore, the
executive department, in its declaration of E.O. No. 392, failed to follow faithfully the
standards set in R.A. No. 8180, making it void.
3. No. Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.
A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of
provisions as long as they are not inconsistent with the foreign subject. Section 5
providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of the deregulation of the
downstream industry which is R.A. No 8180, therefore it does not violate the one title-one
subject rule.
4. No. Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
legislative power. The tests to determine the validity of delegation of legislative power are
the completeness test and the sufficiency test. The completeness test demands that the
law must be complete in all its terms and conditions such that when it reaches the
delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The sufficiency test demands an adequate guideline
or limitation in the law to delineate the delegate’s authority. Section 15 provides for the
time to start the full deregulation, which answers the completeness test. It also laid down
standard guide for the judgment of the President- he is to time it as far as practicable
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and
when the exchange rate of peso to dollar is stable- which answers the sufficiency test.
Decision:
The petitions were granted. R.A. No. 8180 was declared unconstitutional and E.O. No.
372 void.
ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST V PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715
August 14, 2008
FACTS:
The petition for prohibition was filed to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the
service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3)
terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a
system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of
rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress. Petitioners, invoking
their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a
tax reform legislation.
They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and
bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the
system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to
the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c)
of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their
revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix
the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been
delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the
President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC
personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on
the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the
law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation
in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the
President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation
of a congressional oversight committee.
HELD:
1. NO. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With
respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.
Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically
pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the
national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF.
They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentality through
which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions–taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence,
the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully
satisfy the demands of equal protection.
2. No. RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law
under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as
sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and
welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC
is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules
and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC.
On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio
and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive
function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
The petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations
of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The
constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section
13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. L-23825
December 24, 1965
Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to
129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the
present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the
Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing
in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or
any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground
that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective
January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third
paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act
or by Act of Congress.”
Issues:
Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.
Discussions:
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by
law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act
in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar
as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law
permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the
same or its officers act within the scope of their authority.
Rulings:
Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of
the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by
him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the
President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by
conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over
said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
Belciga vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
I. SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to projects located in
the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified under the MHTS-PR by the
DSWD. For this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority
list, standard or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act.
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, identified by a member of the House of Representatives outside of
his/her legislative district shall have the written concurrence of the member of the
House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary legislative district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by
legislators shall be as follows:
a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million
Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under Item A and Forty
Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the
purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1; and
b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft
programs and projects listed under Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of
which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1.
Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special
Provisions on the use and release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the foregoing
amounts may be released in the first semester and the remaining fifty percent
(50%) may be released in the second semester.
4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once.
The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor
and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and
Trade and Industry are also authorized to approve realignment from one project/scope to
another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for
infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project
category as the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the
original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator
concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment within five (5)
calendar days from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund
shall be limited within the same classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed
under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments,
modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned
shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been deposited
back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case
may be.
5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the
documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case
may be. Funds shall be released to the implementing agencies subject to the conditions
under Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed under Special Provision No. 3.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, HELD AND RATIO

A. Congressional Pork Barrel
Whether or Not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on…
1.) …separation of powers

YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment
authority (a) to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations; (b) and in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate
in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” violating the separation of powers
principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not
alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation
or enforcement of the law. Informal practices, through which legislators have effectively
intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power

YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation,
which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress.
3.) …checks and balances

YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as
a collective allocation limit. Legislators make intermediate appropriations of the PDAF
only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law. Thus, actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and are
thus put into effect without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a
budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is
forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with
his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF
Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion
would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e.
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical
materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be
subject to the President’s power of item veto.
4.) …accountability
YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking
on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to
intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to
taking undue advantage of their own office.
However, the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator’s
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter
which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while it is possible that the close operational proximity between legislators
and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment participation, may
affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics
and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such,
it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
5.) …political dynasties

NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-
executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” Therefore, since there
appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue. In any event, the above-
stated argument on this score is largely speculative since it has not been properly
demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
6.) …local autonomy

YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually
belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal.” The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the
specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a
district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding
as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
“underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that
even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-
President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional
Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF
and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs),
instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs.
The programs, policies and resolutions of LDCs should not be overridden nor duplicated
by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

WON the following phrases are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”
under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose
for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct
and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of
the law.
(
b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects”. This gives him carte blanche authority to use the
same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority”. The law does
not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves
the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a
project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could
pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to
Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law

4th Comp. Cases Consti

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SEPARATION OF POWERS

Angara v. Electoral Commission

In Re Integrated Bar of the Philippines

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT;

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNIFICATION OF THE BAR, CONSTITUTIONAL; BASIS. — Resolution

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR PERFECTLY CONSTITUTIONAL AND

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

"Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do

"1. Freedom of Association.

"2. Regulatory Fee.

"3. Freedom of Speech.

"4. Fair to All Lawyers.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article

G.R. No. 132601

MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

The petition is DENIED.

CONST. (1973) art. X

Lagman v Executive Secretary

Lagman’s petition are as follows;

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission

Summarizing, they conclude:

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v Comelec

Baker et al. v. Carr et al.

Case Summary of Baker v. Carr:

Baker claimed the malapportionment of state legislatures is justiciable and the

Issue and Holding:

Is an equal protection challenge to a malapportionment of state legislatures considered

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:

A challenge brought under the Equal Protection Clause to malapportionment of state

Remanded to the District Court for consideration on the merits.

1.Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to another political branch;

Political question doctrine "essentially a function of the separation of powers"

Concurring and Dissenting opinions:

The jurisdiction is proper over the subject matter,

Baker v. Carr outlined that legislative apportionment is a justiciable non-political question.

Alejandrino V.S. Quezon

JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners,

Mabanag vs. Vito

En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate

Dissent of Justice Perfecto:

A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an established truth, as a starting point for

De Castro v. Committee on Justice,

Philippine Bar Asssociation v. Comelec

Tehankee, J., concurring:

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A.

In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of

Spouses Balangauan v. CA,

Avelino vs. Cuenco

Concurrence of J. Perfecto on March 14, 1949 (Resolution)

The Constitution provides:

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA et al, petitioners,

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

NIAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant,

 The petitioner challenged the decision of Philippine Overseas Employment

 Moreover, the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2

 The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to

 It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law