ILANO v.

CA
G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994

Facts: Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano
C. Virata. Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again.
Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of
marriage, they eloped. While they were living at Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was
born Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos
and Artemio Geluz Ilano. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse
promised to return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth
certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning. During the time
that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the father of
Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report
Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods. Those signatures were both identified by Leoncia and
Merceditas because he signed them in their residence in their presence and of Elynia. Since Merceditas
started to have discernment, he was already the one whom she recognized as her Daddy. He treated her
as a father would to his child. He would bring home candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would
take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep. He also provides support to
Leoncia and Merceditas in the form of cash or checks, the signature appearing on the latter, he does not
deny and it was even confirmed by his wife. When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board
of Cavite, he gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best regards,
Temiong."
RTC ruled that Ilano is not the father
CA REVERSED RTC and recognized Merceditas as an illegitimate child

Issue: Whether Merceditas is the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of ILANO.

HELD: YES. Defendant’s testimonial and documentary evidence is too replete with details that are
coherent, logical and natural which cannot be categorized as mere fabrications of an inventive and
malicious mind of which Leoncia de los Santos was not shown to possess. The totality of the evidence, as
pointed to above, is more than sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellee is the
father of the plaintiff Merceditas Ilano. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be
withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person,
the permanence of which affects public interest. Even when the act in which it is made should be
revocable, the revocation of such act will not revoke the recognition itself. To be sure, to establish "the
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with
certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status means that the father has
treated the child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment
though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation
of paternal affection and care.
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence
indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth
that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Merceditas is not
appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long beforehand
diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total stranger to
be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures and
handwriting.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship between
Leoncia and appellee, their living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in
recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary evidence
which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his belated
denials.
Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the
other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition
is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last
paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court,
with respect to illegitimate filiatio. As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is
the spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent court
took into account the following:
The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to recover
the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand.
 CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, v.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN
G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992
Facts: Emilie Cuyugan is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of
the petitioner, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the petitioner Corito Ocampo Tayag is the known
administratrix of the real and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who
died intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983; Emilie Cuyugan has been estranged from her
husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time, she and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had
illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was
christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo; Chad,
who was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired, showered with exceptional affection,
fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable
letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are
hereunder reproduced;
. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for me all the time. As I have now I
shall save my heart to you and to Chad.
. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Niño for our sake and for the child sake.
. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.
. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my name and let
me entitle him to all what I am and what I've got.
. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.

Respondent mother of Chad D. Cuyugan averred that although her son is illegitimate he is nevertheless
entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the
surviving heirs. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and
personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with
approximate value of several millions of pesos. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been
inventoried by the defendant and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has
not likewise been ascertained. Respondent has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the
charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and
imperative that said child be extended financial support from the estate of his putative father.
Respondent prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an inventory and
accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver
the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.
Petitioner Tayag maintained by way of affirmative defenses, among others that the complaint; that the
suit as barred by prescription; Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to
compel recognition, private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since
filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of
the illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father.

Issue: 1. Whether Art. 175 of the Family Code should be applied retroactively.
2. Whether the action is premature because Chad has failed to established that he is an acknowledge
child of his putative father
3. Whether there has been a misjoinder of action

Held: 1. No. Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action for
recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child
Has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested
in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with
the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of
a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is procedural in
nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and
proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it
may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since procedure
must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises especially where
vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application
to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and,
consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the
complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the
Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.

2. NO. The court in Briz vs. Briz, et al. held:

The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can any event maintain a
complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief
in the character of heir, is one which, in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative,
provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present
in the particular case. In, other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the
action in which that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is
nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here
applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. . .

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly
to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the
doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs and the same person may intervene
in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother. In neither
of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other
persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is
appropriate to such proceedings.
 JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL v.CA
G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994
Facts: Violeta P. Esguerra, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, Claro
Antonio Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez, met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound
tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends
regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started their illicit
sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner
Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was married
until the birth of her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In
March, 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their certificates of
live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro
which also states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the
baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of
Violeta Esguerra.
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria, Dr. Milagros Villanueva, Ruby Chua
Cu, and Fr. Liberato Fernandez. The first three witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra
had, at different times,introduced the private respondent to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez,
on the other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of petitioner
Claro during the latter's baptism.

In defense, respondent Carlito Fernandez denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners.
He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was
corroborated by the testimony of his officemate and waiter during the baptismal reception. Private
respondent also declared he only learned he was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners as
their father after he was sued for support in Civil Case.

RTC ruled in favour of petitioners

CA overturned the ruling

Issue: Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish filiation between Carlito and the two children.

Held: NO. Firstly, we shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners which the
respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation. Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot
rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner
Claro. These photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro.
As explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner
Claro.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to
Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity. The baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro
naming private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private
respondent participated in its preparation. In Macandang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we
also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily
competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.

Thirdly, the certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are
not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do not show that private
respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of
the respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces v. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil.
1050 (1958). We reiterated this rule in Berciles v. Systems, 128 SCRA 53 (1984), when we held that “a
birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of
paternity.”

Lastly, petitioners capitalize on the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez who solemnized the
baptismal ceremony of petitioner Claro. However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted
that he has to be shown a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private
respondent. Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and the
private respondent which should render unquestionable his identification of the private respondent
during petitioner Claro’s baptism. In the absence of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that
Father Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the
parents of the children he has baptized.
 CABATANIA v. CA, CAMELO REGODOS
G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004
Facts: Florencia Regodos testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband
left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was
eventually hired as petitioner’s household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2,
1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual
intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after their sexual
encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion
that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to
Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her
aunt’s house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

Petitioner Camelo Cabatania’s version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a
businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course
of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work the
following morning. This displeased petitioner’s wife, hence she was told to look for another job.
In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Year’s Eve in
Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to
dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her
save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it,
he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the
child of her husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioner’s house hoping
to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioner’s wife was in need of one, she was re-hired.
However petitioner’s wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about the father of the
unborn child. She told petitioner’s wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her condition, she
was again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore.
RTC ruled in favour of Regodos
CA affirmed
Issue: Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish filiation between Cabatania and the child.

Held: NO. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or
may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record
the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. While a baptismal certificate
may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity.
The fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives
rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. In this age of
genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical
resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation
before the courts of law.