Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
PPAP WORKBOOK
DONALDSON EMEA
CORP SQADOC 004 SUPPLIER PPAP WORKBOOK Rev. 15 dd 04/09/2015
Front page
Index
Revision sheet
PPAP Manual
1
Inform you about the PPAP level requested by our purchase department
2
Fix / locate the communication channels. (the Donaldson ppap team)
5 Only with all required sheets completed plus ppap approval from the
Donaldson ppap team, you are allowed to supply production parts.
6 All RPN's must be <150. All severities ≥ 8 RPN need to be <100.
All critical dimensions or and key characteristics in notes or dimension
7 should have SPC. You will show evidence in your control plan including
sample quantity.
If material spec's can't be met or you can't give evidence that materials
10 are at spec, you should have raised this shortcoming during the RFQ
process, not at time you have to submit a ppap
11 The supplier is allowed to use his own PPAP document format as long as
these documents are covering the same content as the templates in this
workbook and are in accordance with the AIAG PPAP standard. In all
cases the supplier should respect bullet 12 from this manual.
Submit
Submit
Submit
Submit
Submit
Retention
Submit
Submit
Submit
Submit
Submit
Submit
Submit
dd 04/09/2015
Donaldson Europe Document
PART SUBMISSION WARRANT
CORP QEHSDOC 018
SUBMISSION RESULTS
The results for: Dimensional measurement Material & Functional tests
Appearance Criteria Statistical Process Package
These results meet all drawing and specifications requirements: Yes No
If “No”, explanation required:
Mold / Cavity / Production Process:
DECLARATION
I affirm that the samples represented by this warrant are representative of our parts, have been made to the applicable drawings and specifications.
I further warrant these samples were produced at the production rate of: / hours (written approval)
I have noted any deviations from this declaration below.
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS:
Appearance Evaluation
Pre-Texture Donaldson Representative
Supplier Sourcing and Texture Information Evaluation signature and Date
Approved to Texture
Color Evaluation
Color
Color Master Master Material Material Metallic Part
Tristimulus Data Hue Value Chroma Gloss Shipping
Suffix Number Date Type Source Brilliance Disposition
Suffix
DL* Da* Db* DE CMC Red Yel Grn Blu Light Dark Gray CleanHigh Low High Low
Comments:
Note 1:
For any saleable product, part or component, there will only be one record, regardless
of who has design-responsibility. The design record may reference other documents
making them part of the design record.
Note 2:
A single design record can represent multiple part or assembly configurations, e.g., a
sub-frame assembly with various hole configurations for different applications.
Note 3:
For parts identified as black box, the design record specifies the interface and
performance requirements.
Note 4:
For parts identified as catalog parts, the design record may consist only of a functional
specification or a reference to a recognized industry standard.
Note 5:
For bulk materials, the design record may include identification of raw materials,
formulations, processing steps and parameters, and final product specifications or
acceptance criteria. If dimensional results do not apply, then CAD/CAM requirements
are also not applicable.
A. SUPPLIER INFORMATION:
Supplier Name:
Supplier City/Country: 0
Donaldson Assigned Supplier Number: 0
Originator Name:
B. SCOPE OF CHANGE:
1. Affected Part Number(s) sold to Donaldson:
Donaldson
4. Drawing Revision:
4. Financial impact details (include cost savings calculations & cost reduction model)
4. PSW released?
Signature Block
Supplier Engineering Manager Plant Engineering Manager
Name Name
Signature Signature
A. SUPPLIER INFORMATION:
Supplier Name: 0
Supplier City/Country: 0
Donaldson Assigned Supplier Number: 0
Originator Name:
B. SCOPE OF CHANGE:
1. Affected Part Number(s) sold to Donaldson:
4. Drawing Revision:
4. Financial impact details (include cost savings calculations & cost reduction model)
4. PSW released?
Signature Block
Supplier Engineering Manager Product Engineering Manager
Name Name
Signature Signature
Part Number
Supplier 0
0
Outside
Laboratory Name Name of Laboratory Part Name
In-
of Laboratory laboratory
house if appl.
0
testing
Type of Spec. Quant
Dimensional specification Supplier Test Results
Test limits tested
Signature Title
Revision Level
0
OK Not OK
Date
Prepared By : Approved By :
Signature : Signature :
CORP SQADOC 004 SUPPLIER PPAP WORKBOOK Book Rev. 15 dd 04/09/2015
Calibration Status
Book Rev. 15 dd 04/09/2015
Production Part Approval - Material Results
Part Number
Supplier 0
0
Outside
Laboratory Name Name of Laboratory Part Name
In-
of Laboratory laboratory
house if appl.
0
testing
Type of Spec. Quant
Specification Supplier Test Results
Test limits tested
Signature Title
Revision Level
0
OK Not OK
Date
Inspect
Item #
Item #
Move
Store Operation Description Key Product Characteristics Key Control Chatacteristics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
Inspect
Item #
Item #
Move
Store
1 Incoming inspecion 33GFPA6 1.0 P567677 material spec 33% GF PA6 1.0 Polyprom 33GFPA6 mat sertificate
2 Move
3 Storage 3.0 Standard S1001 2.0 Standard S1001
4 Move
5 Move Tool
6 Install Tool (Mold) 6.0 Cooling, Alignment, Temperature, Pressur6.0 P676767 setup sheet
7 6.1 P676767 checklist
8 Move material P567677 material spec 33% GF PA6 P676767 control sheet
9 F.O.T. sample 9.0 Surface F.O.T. initial sample test
10 Flatness 0.5 P676767 control sheet
11 D=23.7 +/- 0.4
12 L=123 +/- 0.2
13 Release production 13 Surface 13 P676767 control sheet
14 Flatness 0.5
15 D=23.7 +/- 0.4
16 L=123 +/- 0.2
17 Move
18 Inspection last out of tool 18 Surface 18 P676767 control sheet
19 Release for shipping Flatness 0.5
20 D=23.7 +/- 0.4
21 L=123 +/- 0.2
CORP SQADOC 004 SUPPLIER PPAP WORKBOOK Book Rev. 15 dd 04/09/2015
DONALDSON EUROPE DOCUMENT
DESIGN PROCESS FMEA NUMBER: 0 ORIGINAL DATE: CURRENT REVISION: REVISION DATE:
Subsystem / Name:
Design/Process Responsibility: Suppliers and Plants affected:
Core Team: Model/Part:
Prepared by: Engineering Release Date:
Current Design/ Process Controls Action Results
Special Characteristics Recommended Action
O D
S
c e
e
c t
R Rules: v
u e
i * Continuously work on the e
Item / Process Function Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of Failure Severity
Potential Cause(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure Mode
Prevention Occurence
s
Detection Detection
RPN Area/Ind. Responsible
Actions
& Target
TakenCompletion
/ EffectiveDate
Dater r c RPN
reduction of the highest RPN e t
k numbers. i
n i
* Pay special attention to the t
c o
RPNs where the Severity Score y
e n
is ≥ 8, regardless of the total
RPN.
Product Process
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
O D
S
c e
e
c t
R Rules: v
u e
i * Continuously work on the e
Item / Process Function Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of Failure Severity
Potential Cause(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure Mode
Prevention Occurence
s
Detection Detection
RPN Area/Ind. Responsible
Actions
& Target
TakenCompletion
/ EffectiveDate
Dater r c RPN
reduction of the highest RPN e t
k numbers. i
n i
* Pay special attention to the t
c o
RPNs where the Severity Score y
e n
is ≥ 8, regardless of the total
RPN.
Product Process
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
Hazarduous with Potential failure mode effects safe Failure may endanger operator (machine or Hazarduous with Potential failure mode effects safe Failure may endanger operator (machine or
warning operation and/or non-compliance assembly) with warning. warning operation and/or non-compliance assembly) with warning.
with governement regulations. 9 with governement regulations. 9
Failure will occur with warning. Failure will occur with warning.
Very High Item inoperable (loss of primary Major disruption to production line. Very High Item inoperable (loss of primary Major disruption to production line.
function). 100% of product may function). 100% of product may
have to be scrapped, or repaired with repair 8 have to be scrapped, or repaired with repair 8
time more than 1 hour. time more than 1 hour.
High Item operable but at reduced level of Minor disruption to production line. High Item operable but at reduced level of Minor disruption to production line.
performance. Product may have to performance. Product may have to
Customer very dissatisfied. be sorted, less than 100 % scrap, or reparation 7 Customer very dissatisfied. be sorted, less than 100 % scrap, or 7
with repair time between 0,5h & 1h . reparation with repair time between 0,5h & 1h .
Moderate Item operable but comfort/ Minor disruption to production line. Moderate Item operable but comfort/ Minor disruption to production line.
convenience item(s) inoperable. No sorting, les than convenience item(s) inoperable. No sorting, les than
100% may have to be scrapped or repaired 6 100% may have to be scrapped or repaired 6
Customer dissatisfied. with repair time less than 30 minutes Customer dissatisfied. with repair time less than 30 minutes
Low Item operable but Minor disruption to production line. Low Item operable but Minor disruption to production line.
comfort/convenience operable at 100 % may have to be comfort/convenience operable at 100 % may have to
reduced level of performance. reworked or repaired off-line (not in repair 5 reduced level of performance. be reworked or repaired off-line (not in repair 5
Customer somewhat department). Customer somewhat department).
dissatisfied. dissatisfied.
Very Low Fit & Finish item does not conform. Minor disruption to production line. Very Low Fit & Finish item does not conform. Minor disruption to production line.
Product to be sorted, Product to be sorted,
Defect noticed by most customers. with no scrap, less than 100% to be reworked. 4 Defect noticed by most customers. (> with no scrap, less than 100% to be reworked. 4
(> 75%) 75%)
Minor Fit & Finish item does not conform. Minor disruption to production line. Minor Fit & Finish item does not conform. Minor disruption to production line.
Less than 100% may Less than 100% may
Defect noticed by 50% of customers. have to be reworked, with no scrap, on line but 3 Defect noticed by 50% of customers. have to be reworked, with no scrap, on line but 3
out of station out of station. out of station out of station.
Very Minor Fit & Finish item does not conform. Minor disruption to production line. Very Minor Fit & Finish item does not conform. Minor disruption to production line.
Less than 100% may 2 Less than 100% may 2
Defect noticed by discriminating have to be reworked with no scrap, on-line but Defect noticed by discriminating have to be reworked with no scrap, on-line but
customer (< 25%) in station. customer (< 25%) in station.
None None
Slight inconvenience to operation or operator, Slight inconvenience to operation or operator,
No discernible effect 1 No discernible effect 1
or no effect. or no effect.
Moderate: Moderate:
Occasional failures 5 per thousand items >= 0,94 Weekly 6 Occasional failures
2 per thousand items >= 1,00 5 1 per 100 If applicable 1.00 Weekly 5
Remote: Failure is
unlikely < 0,010 per thousand items >= 1,67 Never 1 Never 1
Probability of Probability of
PROCESS Ranking PROCESS Ranking
detection detection
Inspection Type Inspection Type
DESIGN DESIGN
A B C A B C
Error-Proofed Gauging Manual Insp. Error-Proofed Gauging Manual Insp.
Control will not or can not detect a Control will not or can not detect a
Absolutely potential cause and subsequent X Absolutely potential cause and subsequent X
10 10
Impossible failure mode.Or there is no control. Control can not detect or there is no control Impossible failure mode.Or there is no control. Control can not detect or there is no control
Current control will probably not Current control will probably not
detect potential cause and X detect potential cause and X
Very Remote 9 Very Remote 9
subsequent failure mode. Control is achieved with random checks only subsequent failure mode. . Control is achieved with random checks only
Current control has poor chance of Current control has poor chance of
detection. X detection. X
Remote 8 Remote 8
Visual inspection only. Visual inspection only.
Very low chance current control will Very low chance current control will
detect potential cause and X detect potential cause and X
Very low 7 Very low 7
subsequent failure mode. Double visual inspection only. subsequent failure mode. Double visual inspection only.
Low chance current control will Low chance current control will
detect potential cause and X X detect potential cause and X X
Low 6 Low 6
subsequent failure mode. Control is achieved with charting methods subsequent failure mode. Control is achieved with charting methods
(SPC). (SPC).
Moderate chance current control will Moderate chance current control will
detect potential cause and X detect potential cause and X
Moderate Control is based on variable gauging after 5 Moderate Control is based on variable gauging after 5
subsequent failure mode. subsequent failure mode.
parts have left the station parts have left the station
Controls have a good chance to Controls have a good chance to
detect. X X detect. X X
Moderately High Error detection in subsequent operations or 4 Moderately High Error detection in subsequent operations or 4
gauging performed on setup & first piece gauging performed on setup & first piece
High chance current control will check. High chance current control will check.
detect potential cause and X X detect potential cause and X X
High Error detection in-station or in subsequent 3 High Error detection in-station or in subsequent 3
subsequent failure mode. subsequent failure mode.
operations by multiple layers of acceptance. operations by multiple layers of acceptance.
Very high chance current control will Very high chance current control will
detect potential cause and X X detect potential cause and X X
Very High Error detection in station. Automatic gauging. 2 Very High Error detection in station. Automatic gauging. 2
subsequent failure mode. subsequent failure mode.
Cannot pass discrepant part. Cannot pass discrepant part.
Design control will almost certainly Design control will almost certainly
detect potential cause and X detect potential cause and X
Almost certain Discrepant parts cannot be made because 1 Almost certain Discrepant parts cannot be made because 1
subsequent failure mode. subsequent failure mode.
error-proofed by process/product design. error-proofed by process/product design.
Special Characteristics
Customer specific requirements may identify special product or process characteristic symbols and their usage.
A characteristic designated in the design record as special without an associated design failure mode identified in
the DFME is an indication a a weakness in the design process.
Part / Process F
Enter the function(s) of the item(s) or interface(s) being analyzed which are necessaty to meet the design intent
based on customer requirements and the team's discussion. If the item(s) or interface has more than one function
with different potential modes of failure, it is highly recommended that each of these functions and associated
failure mode(s) islisted separately.
Potential Failur
Potential failure mode is defined as the manner in which a component, subsystem, or system could potentially fail to
meet or deliver the intended function described in the item column.
Identify the potential failure mode(s) associated with the function(s)/requirement(s). Potential failure modes should
be described in technical terms, and not necessarily as a symptom noticeable by the customer.
Each function may have multiple failure modes. A large number of failure modes identified for a single function may
indicate that the requirement is not well defined.
The assumption is made that the failure could occur, but may not necessarily occur, consequently the use of the
word "potential".
Potential failure modes that could occur only under certain operating conditions (i.e., hot, cold, dry, dusty, etc.) and
under certain iusage conditions (i.e., above-average mileage, rough terrain, city driving only, etc.) whould be
considered.
After determining all the failure moders, a validation of the completeness of the analysis can be made through a
review of past things-gone-wrong, concerns, reports, and group brainstrorming.
The potential failure mode may also be the cause of a potential failure mode in a higher level subsystem or system,
or lead to the effect of one in a lower level compoenent.
Potential Effects
Potential effects of failure are defined as the effects of the failure mode, as perceived by the customer(s).
Describe the effects of the failure in terms of what the customer might notice or experience, remembering that the custom
safety or non-compliance to regulations.
The effects should always be stated in terms of the specific system, subsystem, or component being analyzed.
Remember that a hierarchical relationship exists between the component, subsystem, and system levels. For
example, a part could fracture, which may cause the assembly to vibrate, resulting in an intermittend system
operation. The intermittent system operation could cause performance to degrade and ultimately lead to customer
dissatisfaction. The intent is to predict the potential failure effects to the team's level of knowledge.
Typical failure effects should be stated in terms of product or system performance.
Severity
Severity is the value associated with the most serous effect for a given failure code. Severity is a relative ranking within the
The team should agree on evaluation criteria and a ranking system and apply them consistently, even if modified for individ
It is not recommended to modify criteria ranking values of 9 and 10. Failure modes with a rank of severity 1 should not be a
Potential Cause(s)/Mechanis
In the development of the FMEA, the identification of all potential causes of the failure mode is key to subsequent
analysis. Although varied techniques (such as brainstorming) can be used to determine the potential cause(s) of the
failire mode, it is recommended that the team should focus on an understanding of the failure mechanism for each
failure mode.
A failure mechanism is the physical, chemical, electrical, thermal, or other process that results in the failure mode. It
is important to make the distinction that a failure mode is an "observed" or "external" effect so as not to confuse
failure mode with failure mechanism, the actual physical phenomenon behind the failure mode or the process of
degradation or chain of events leading to and resulting in a particular mode.
To the extent possible, list every potential mechanism for each failure mode. The mechanism should be listed as
concisely and completely as possible.
For a system, the failure mechanism is the process of error propagation following a component failure which leads
to a system failure.
A product or a process can have several failure modes which are correlated to each other because of a common
failure mechanism behind them.
Ensure that process effects are considered as part of the DFMEA process.
Potential cause of failure is defined as an indication of how the design process could allow the failure to occur,
described in terms of something that can be corrected or can be controlled. Potential cause of failure may be an
indication of a design weakness, the consequence of which is the failure mode.
Causes ate the ciscumstances that induce or activate a failure mechanism.
In identifying potential causes of failure, use concise descriptions of the specific causes of failures, e.g., specified
bold plating allows for hydrogen embrittlement. Ambiguous phrases such as, poor design of improper design, should
not be used.
Investigation of causes needs to focus on the failure mode and not the effect(s). In determining the cause(s), the
team should assume the existence of the cause under discussion will result in the failure mode (i.e., the failure
mode does not require multiple causes to occur).
Typically, there may be several causes each of which can result in the failure mode. This results in multiple lines
(cause branches) for the failure mode.
To the extent possible, list every potential cause for each failure mode/failure mechanism. The cause should be
listed as concisely and completely as possible. Separating the causes will result in a focused analysis for each cause
and may yield different measurement, controls, and action plans.
In preparing the DFMEA, assume that the design will be manufactured and assembled to the design intent.
Exception can be made at the team's discretion where historical data indicate defifiencies in the manufacturing
process.
Occurren
Occurrence is the likelihood that a specific cause/mechanism will occur resulting in the failure mode within the design life.
The likelihood of the occurrence ranking number has a relative meaning rather than an absolute value.
A consistent occurrence ranking system should be used to ensure continuity. The occurrence number is a relative ranking w
The team should agree on evaluation criteria and a ranking system and apply them consistenly, even if modified for individ
In determining this estimate, questions such as the following should be considered:
* What is the service history and field experience with similar components, subsystems, or systems?
* Is the item a carryover or similar to a previous level item?
* How significant are changes from a previous level item?
* Is the item radically different from a previous level item?
* Is the item completely new?
* What is the application or what are the environmental changes?
* Has an engineering analysis (e.g., reliability) been used to estimate the expected comparable
occurrence rate for the application?
* Have preventive controls been put in place?
Current Design/Pro
Current Design Controls are those activities conducted as part of the design process that have been completed or committ
consideration.
There are two types of design controls to consider:
Prevention: Eliminate (prevent) the cause of the mechanism of failure or the failure mode from occuring, or reduce its rate
Detection: identify (detect) the existence of a cause, the resulting mechanism of failure or the failure mode, either by analy
The preferred approach is to first use prevention controls, if possible. The initial occurrence rankings will be affected by the
Detection control should include identification of those activiteis which detect the failure mode as well as those that detec
The team should consider analysis, testing, reviews, and other activities that will assure the design/process adequacy such
Prevention Controls
* Benchmarking studies
* Fail-safe designs
* Design and Material standards (internal and external)
* Documentation - records of best practices, lessons learned, etc.
* Simulation studies - analysis of concepts to establish design requirements
* Error-proofing
Detection Controls
* Design reviews
* Prototype testing
* Validation testing
* Simulation studies - validation of design
* Desugn of Experiments; including reliability testing
* Mock-up using similar parts
Preventing the causes of the failure mode though a design change or design process change is the only way a reduction in
Detectio
Detection is the rank associated witht the best detection control listed in the Current Design Control Detection column. Wh
as part of the description of the control. Record the lowest ranking value in the Detection column.
A suggested approach to Current Design Control Detection is to assume the failure has occurred and then assess the capab
Do not automatically presume that the detection ranking is low because the occurrence is low. It is important to assess the
in the design release process.
Detection is a relative ranking within the scope of the individual FMEA. In order to achieve a lowe ranking, generally the de
The team should agree on evaluation criteria and a ranking system and apply them consistently, even if modified for individ
Detection
The ranking value of one (1) is reserved for failure prevention through proven design solutions.
The initial focus of the team should be oriented towards failure modes with the highest severity rankings. When the severit
or recommended actions (as documented in FMEA).
For failure modes with severities 8 or below the team should consider causes having higherst occurrence or detaction rank
how to best prioritize the risk reduction efforts that best serve their organization and customers.
Recommended
In general, prevention actions (i.e., reducing the occurrence) are preferable to detection actions. An example of this is the u
The intent of recommended actions is to improve the design. Identifying these actions should consider reducing rankings in
* To reduce severity ranking: only a design revision can bring about a reductin in the severity ranking.
For maximum effectiveness and efficiency of this approach, changes to the product and process design should be impleme
* To reduce occurrence ranking: A reduction in the occurrence raning can be accefted by removing or controlling one or m
but not limited to, the following should be considered:
o Error proof the design to eliminate the failure mode
o Revised design geometry and tolerances
o Revised design to lower the stress or replace weak (high failure probability) components
o Add redundancy
o Revised material specification
* To reduce detection ranking: the preferred method is the use of error/mistake proofing. An increase in design validation/
specific part may be required to increase the likelihood of detection (i.e., reduce the ditection ranking). Additionally, the fo
o Desing of Experiments (particularly when multiple or interactive causes of a failure more are present)
o Revised test plan
If the assessment leads to no recommended actions for a specific failure mode/cause/control combination, indicate this by
case of high severity.
For design actions consider using the following:
* Results of DOE or reliability testing
* Design analysis (reliability, structural or physics of failure) that would confirm that the solution is
effective and does not introduce new potential failure modes
* Drawing, schematics, or model to confirm physical change of targeted feature
* Results from a design review
* Changes to a fiven Engineering Standards or Design Guidelines
* Reliability analysis results
Responsibility & Target
Enter the name of the individual and organization responsible for completing each recommended action including the targ
recommended have been implemented or adequately addressed.
Action Res
This section identifies the results of any completed actions and their effect on Severity, Occurrence and Detection rankings
Severity, Occurrence, De
After the preventive/corrective action has been completed, determine and record the resulting severity, occurrence, and d
Calculate and record the resulting action RPN.
All revised rankings should be reviewed. Actions alone do not guarantee that the problem was solved (i.e., cause addressed
necessary, repeat the analysis. The focus should always be on continuous improvement.
Item / Process Step
haracteristics (Requirements)
Severity
anking within the scope of the individual FMEA.
odified for individual process analysis.
1 should not be analyzed further.
relative ranking within the scope of the FMEA and may not reflect the actual likelihood of occurrence.
odified for individual process analysis. Occurrence should be estimated using a 1 to 10 scale.
nt Design/Process Controls
leted or committed to and that will assure the design adequacy for the design functional and reliability requirements under
Detection
ction column. When more than one control is identified, it is recommended that the detection ranking of each control be included
assess the capabilities of the current design controls to detect this failure mode.
tant to assess the capability of the design controls to detect low frequency failure modes or reduce the risk of them going further
When the severity is 9 or 10, it is imperative that the team must ensure that the risk is addressed through existing design controls
or detaction rankings. It is the team's responsibility to look at the information identified, decide upon an approach, and determine
ecommended Actions
ple of this is the use of proven design standard or best practice rather than product verification/validation after design freeze.
design validation/verification actions should result in a reduction of the detection ranking only. In some cases, a design change to a
dditionally, the following should be considered:
n, indicate this by entering "None" in this column. It may be useful to also include a rationale if "None" is entered, especially in
ility & Target Completion Date
ncluding the target completion date. The design-responsible engineer/team leader is responsible for ensuring that all actions
Action Results
etection rankings and RPN.
, cause addressed), thus an appropriate analysis or test should be completed as verification. If further action is considered
For Process FMEA
em / Process Step
Enter the identification of the process step or operation being analyzed, based on the numbering process and
terminology. Process numbering scheme, sequencing, and terminology used should be consistent with those used in
the process flow diagram to ensure tracibility and relationship to other documents. Repair and repork operations
should also be included.
aracteristics (Requirements)
List the requirements for each process function of the process step or operation being analyzed. Requirements are
thus inputs to the process specified to meet design intent and other customer requirements. If there are multiple
requirements with respect to a given function, each should be aligned on the form with the respective associated
failure modes in order to facilitate the analysis.
t / Process Function
List the process function that corresponds to each process step or operation being analyzed. The process function
describes the purpose or intent of the operation. A risk analysis recommended in order to limit the number of steps
to be included to only those that add value or otherwise are seen as likely to have a negative impact on the product.
If there are multiple process functions being analyzed with respect to a given operation, each should be aligned on
the form with its respective "Requirements" to aid in the development of the associated failure modes.
Assume that the failure could occur but may not necessarily occur. Potential failure modes should be described in
technical terms, not as s symptom noticeable by the customer.
If the requirements have been well defined, then the potential failure mode is readily identifiable by determining
the condition when a specific requirement is not met. Each requirement may have multiple failure modes. A large
number of failure modes identified for a single requirement usually indicates that the requirement is not well
defined.
The assumption is made that the failure could occur but may not necessarily occur - consequently the used of the
word "potential".
Verification of completeness of the potential failure modes can be made through a review of past things-gone-
wrong, concerns, reports, and group brainstrorming. Sources for this should also include a comparison of similar
processes and a review of customer (End User and subsequent operation) claims relating to similar components.
The product effects in the PFMEA should be consistent with those in the corresponding DFMEA.
For the End User, the effects should be stated in terms of product or system performance. If the customer is the next
operation or subsequent operation(s)/location(s), the effects should be stated in terms of process/operation
performance.
In order to determine the Potential Effect(s), the following questions should be asked:
1. Does the Potential Failure Mode physically prevent downstream processing or cause potential harm to
equipment or operators? (The location, station or operation at which the effect occures should be identified. If at a
customer's facility, this should be stated).
2. What is the potential impact on the End User?
3. What would happen if an effect was detected prior to reaching the End User?
Severity
king within the scope of the individual FMEA.
ified for individual process analysis.
should not be analyzed further.
To the extent possible, identify and document every potential cause for each failure mode. The cause should be
detailed as concisely and completely as possible. Separating the causes will result in a focused analysis for each and
may yield different measurements, controls, and action plans. There may be one or more causes that can result in
the failure mode being analyzed.
In preparing the PFMEA, the team should assume that the incoming part(s)/material(s) are correct.
Exceptions can be made at the team's discretion where historical data indicate deficiencies in incoming part quality.
Only specific errors or malfunctions (e.g., seal not installed or seal installed inverted) should be listed, Ambiguous
phrases (e.g., operator error or seal mis-installed, etc) should not be used.
Occurrence
the design life.
ative ranking within the scope of the FMEA and may not reflect the actual likelihood of occurrence.
fied for individual process analysis. Occurrence should be estimated using a 1 to 10 scale.
Design/Process Controls
ed or committed to and that will assure the design adequacy for the design functional and reliability requirements under
Detection
on column. When more than one control is identified, it is recommended that the detection ranking of each control be included
sess the capabilities of the current design controls to detect this failure mode.
nt to assess the capability of the design controls to detect low frequency failure modes or reduce the risk of them going further
hen the severity is 9 or 10, it is imperative that the team must ensure that the risk is addressed through existing design controls
detaction rankings. It is the team's responsibility to look at the information identified, decide upon an approach, and determine
ommended Actions
e of this is the use of proven design standard or best practice rather than product verification/validation after design freeze.
sign validation/verification actions should result in a reduction of the detection ranking only. In some cases, a design change to a
tionally, the following should be considered:
ndicate this by entering "None" in this column. It may be useful to also include a rationale if "None" is entered, especially in
ty & Target Completion Date
luding the target completion date. The design-responsible engineer/team leader is responsible for ensuring that all actions
Action Results
ection rankings and RPN.
ause addressed), thus an appropriate analysis or test should be completed as verification. If further action is considered
Donaldson Europe Document
CONTROL PLAN
CORP QEHSDOC 016 (replaces old QEHSDOC 008)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Page 61 of 84
Donaldson Europe Document
CONTROL PLAN
CORP QEHSDOC 016 (replaces old QEHSDOC 008)
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
Page 62 of 84
Donaldson Europe Document
CONTROL PLAN
CORP QEHSDOC 016 (replaces old QEHSDOC 008)
39
40
41
Page 63 of 84
Donaldson Europe Document
CPK CALCULATION
CORP QUALDOC 020
Prepared by: Ed Van den Enden Rev. 0 dd 26/05/2013
Enter Dim number in this field Enter Dim number in this field
Enter Dim number in this field Enter Dim number in this field
Enter Dim number in this field Enter Dim number in this field
Enter Dim number in this field Enter Dim number in this field
1 Average #DIV/0!
2
3 Std Dev #DIV/0!
4
5 Nominal dim
6 Lower level tol
7 Upper level tol
8
9 Cp #DIV/0!
10
11 Cpo #DIV/0!
12 Cpb #DIV/0!
13
14 Cpk #DIV/0!
15
16
17 PPM Over ULT #DIV/0!
18
19 PPM Over LLT #DIV/0!
20
21 PPM total #DIV/0!
22
23
24
25 Only blue cells to fill out
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
PARTS
Appraiser/Trial #
AVG'S
Range
AVG'S
Range
AVG'S
Range
Part average
RANGE VARIATION:
Ra No. Trials D4 R x (D4) =
Rb 2 3.267 #N/A =
Rc 3 2.575 Note: LCLR is zero with < 7 trials
Max X 0.000
Min X 0.000 Note:
X Diff. 0.0000
DATE
STUDY PERFORMED BY
TV =
TV = NUMBER OF DISTINCT CATEGORIES (ndc)
ndc= 1.41(PV/R&R)
ndc= #VALUE!
Note: Guidelines for Acceptance: ndc greater then or equal to 5=
Components of variations
1200%
1000%
800% % TOTAL VARIATION (TV)
Average chart
Average
Range chart
12.000
10.000
Range
8.000
6.000
4.000
2.000
KT.158 Hidria AET d.o.o. junij 2009 file:KT.158_MSA.xls (AQ/11/02) Page 70 of 84
12.000
10.000
8.000
DONALDSON
6.000
Rev.
CORP
0 dd 11/02/2013 GAGE REPEATABILITY & REPRODUCIBILITY STUDY
4.000QEHSDOC 017
2.000
0.000
1 2 3 4 A5
Appraiser 6 7 8 9 10
Appraiser B 11 12 13 14 15 C 16
Appraiser 17 18 19UCL20 21 22 23 24
Mean 25 26 27 28 29
For information on the theory and constants used in the form see MSA Reference Manual, Third edition.
PARTS
Xa
Ra
Xb
Rb
Xc
Rc
X
RP
UCLR
#N/A
UCLX
#N/A
LCLX
#N/A
100(EV/Tol)
100(AV/Tol)
100(R&R/Tol)
#VALUE!
100(PV/Tol)
100(TV/Tol)
Average chart
A ppr
a is er A A ppr ai s er B A pprai s er C UCL Mean. LCL
Range chart
14 15 C 16
Appraiser 17 18 19UCL20 21 22 23 24
Mean 25 26 27 28 29 30
Important Note:
- Supplier needs to conduct Gage R&R study for any instrument used for validating critical dimensions
and key characteristics addressed in the control plan and submit the same in PPAP
- If same instrument is used for more than one critical or key characteristics, any one R&R study is
adequate for PPAP submission
- For other instruments, supplier can have internal plan for R&R study covering once in a year for each
instrument.
APPROVALS
Design Name
Engineer: spelled
CORP SQADOC 004 SUPPLIER PPAP WORKBOOK Book Rev. 15 dd 04/09/2015
MASTER SAMPLE
The organization shall retain a Master Sample for the same period as the production part
approval records, or:
a) Until a new Master Sample is produced for the same customer part number for customer
approval or:
b) where a Master Sample is required by the design record, Control Plan or inspection criteria,
as a reference or standard.
The Master Sample shall be identified as such, and shall show the customer approval date on
the sample.
The organization shall retain a Master Sample for each position of a multiple cavity die, mold,
tool or production process unless otherwise specified by the customer.
Note 1:
When part size, sheer volume of parts, etc. makes it difficult to store master sample, the
sample retention requirements may be modified or waived in a writing by authorized
customer representative.
The purpose of a Master Sample is to assist in defining the production standard, especially
where data is ambiguous or in insufficient detail to fully replicate the part to its original
approved state.
Note 2:
Many bulk materials properties are by their nature time dependent, and if a master sample is
required, it may consist of the manufacturing record, test results, and certificate of analysis of
key ingredients, for the approved submission sample.
CORP SQADOC 004 SUPPLIER PPAP WORKBOOK Book Rev. 15 dd 04/09/2015
SAMPLE PARTS
The supplier will provide sample products / parts as specified by
Donaldson.
Parts are submitted before or at the same time as the Documents are
submitted.
In all cases please fill out and use the PPAP label you find in this
workbook.
CORP SQADOC 004 SUPPLIER PPAP WORKBOOK Book Rev. 15 dd 04/09/2015
Level 5 Review Checklist
For Donaldson This sheet has been developed for use during a walk trough
use only for PPAP level 5
When PPAP Level 5 is required the control plan documentation should be checked at the manufacturing site.
The following checklist shows the minimum requirements for this and this must be completed by an Donaldson employee.
PPAP will not be approved while there is disagreement between the Supplier and Donaldson on any of the factors below.
Donaldson
Representative:
Part number: 0 Donaldson part number
Rev: 0 Donaldson part revision number
Date: 0 Revision date
Disagreements Completed
Item Process Comments
Y/N Date
The supplier will walk through the process on the shop floor. From Material receipt to shipment.
Donaldson representative will compare the process as documented to the physical process - noting
Process Flow any differences.
Diagrams
Any area where Donaldson representative believes there to be a quality risk will be noted on the
flow diagram.
Process FMEA will be reviewed to ensure all quality risks identified from the Process Walk Through
and any other source have been documented.
Donaldson representative will review scoring of Failure Modes with the supplier and note any
Process FMEA disagreements.
Donaldson representative will review actions driven from the FMEA and evidence of those actions
being carried out - or planned. Any disagreement about appropriate actions must be recorded.
Control Plan will be reviewed to ensure it addresses all items identified for control in the FMEA.
Control Plan will be reviewed to ensure it addresses any other concern the Donaldson
representative believes it should.
Any disagreement on what is covered in the control plan must be recorded.
Control Plan
Donaldson representative will look for evidence that actions in control plan are in place and will
be/are suitable recorded.
Any disagreement between Donaldson and the Supplier on the execution of the control plan must
be recorded.
All measuring equipment used for PPAP document will be checked for calibration date.
At least one MSA report will be reviewed by the Donaldson representative - with the supporting
document. Where possible the person who carried out the study should talk the Donaldson
representative through the process.
Measurement
System Analysis Donaldson representative will view the measurement of some key dimensions - this will be carried
Studies out by the suppliers normal inspection staff using their standard process. Any disagreement
between the Donaldson representative and the Supplier on how this is done must be recorded.
Any concerns the Donaldson representative has about the equipment, MSA or use of equipment
must be recorded.
Statistic Supplier must provide evidence of capable production processes for all part critical dimensions or
measurements from dimensions the Donaldson SQA representative is asking for.