BERNARDINA P.

BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent of adoptee as beneficiary

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was
enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an
accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus,
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the
parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who
qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the
parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor
in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in
favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left
to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
 The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the
provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of
the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and
the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a
tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession
tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of
an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision
on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and
those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that
certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the
Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their
minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner
of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given
Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then
the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein
petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.
Grande v. Antonio

GR. No. 206248, 18 February 2004

FACTS:

Respondent [the father] filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two
children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to
Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial
conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s
surname as Antonio citing the “best interest of the child”. Respondent’s petition was granted by RTC
and modified by the CA. In CA’s decision, it reversed the granting of the custody of the two children to
the respondent but affirmed the surname change to of the same to Antonio. Aggrieved, wife filed
petition for certiorari in SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the father can exercise parental authority and consequently, custody, over his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.

Wether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children
upon his recognition of their filiation.

RULING:

On the first issue, no, petitioner cannot exercise custody over the children.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s
prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the
minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.

Respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected
the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors; she cannot be deprived of
her sole parental custody over their children.

On the second issue, the answer is still a no.

An acknowledged illegitimate child isunder no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father.

Even if IRR of RA 9255 provides that a surname change “shall” be necessary upon recognition of
paternity, it is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of “may” in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary governand illegitimate children are
given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known. Case is remanded to lower court to
determine the choice of said children.
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO, petitioners,vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162155. August 28,2007.

Facts:

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, the Vice President of Primetown (respondent), applied for refund of
the income tax which they have paid on 1997. According to Yap, the company accrued losses
amounting to P/ 71,879,228. These losses enabledthem to be exempt from paying income tax, which
respondent paid diligently. Respondent was therefore claiming a refund. Respondents submitted
requirements but the petitioners ignored their claim. On April 14, 2000, respondents filed a review in
the Court of Tax Appeals. The said Court, however, denied the petition stating that the petition was
filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing judicial claim for tax refund.

According to Sec 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code, “no suit or proceedings shall be filed
after the expiration of 2-yearsfrom the date of the payment of the tax regardless of any supervening
cause that may arise after payment. Respondents paid the last income tax return on April 14, 1998.
Article 13 of the New Civil Code states that a year is considered 365 days; months 30 days; days 24-
hours; and night from sunset to sunrise. Therefore, according to CTA, the date of filing a petition fell
on the 731st day, which is beyond the prescriptive period.

Issues:

Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive period ends on April 13, 2000 or April 14, 2000
considering that the last payment of tax was on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year.

Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 Chap8 Book 1 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that when a subsequent law impliedly repeals a prior law, the new law shall apply. In
the case at bar, Art 13 of the New Civil Code, which states that a year shall compose 365 days, shall
be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year shall be
composed of 12 months regardless of the number of days in a month. Therefore, the two-year
prescriptive period ends on April 14, 2000. Respondents filed petition on April 14, 2000 (which is the
last day prescribed to file a petition.