Suit Against Public Officers
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO
Veterans Manpower v. CA
Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the
provisions under Section 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private
Security Agency Law violate the 1987 Constitution against monopolies,
unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to
favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because
it has an interest in more than one security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3,
subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License
to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the
Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos,
through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that “all private security
agencies/company security forces must register as members of any
PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are
located...”. As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in
nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against
monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade.
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief,
which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8)
hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and
P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.
Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI
of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security
services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates
provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.
Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from
PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency.
The PC-SUSIA affirmed the findings and likewise recommended the
cancellation of VMPSI’s license. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a
clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI.
VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the
findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its
license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO.
ISSUE: Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-
SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.
HELD: Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or
private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority
or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA
are being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their
official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery
may be had against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of
Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by
the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate
from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere
memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired
jurisdiction over the public respondents. Petition for review is denied and
the judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto.
Larkins v. NLRC
On August 12, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint with the
Regional Arbitration Branch No.III of the NLRC, San Fernando, Pampanga
for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages.
Charges were against petitioner T/Sgt Aldora Larkins who was a member
of the United States Air Force (USAF) assigned to oversee the dormitories
of the Third Aircraft Generation Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base,
Pampanga.,Lt. Col. Frankhauster, and Joselito Cunanan the new contractor
(JAC Maintenance Services) employed for 3 AGS.
Petitioner and Lt. Col. Frankhauser failed to answer the complaint and to
appear at the hearings. They, likewise, failed to submit their position
paper, which the Labor Arbiter deemed a waiver on their part to do so. The
case was therefore submitted for decision on the basis of private
respondents' position paper and supporting documents which therefore on
November 21, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting all the
claims of private respondents. He found both Lt. Col. Frankhauser and
petitioner "guilty of illegal dismissal" and ordered them to reinstate private
respondents with full back wages, or if that is no longer possible, to pay
private respondents' separation pay.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never
acquired jurisdiction over her person because no summons or copies of the
complaints, both original and amended, were ever served on her. In her
"Supplemental Memorandum of Appeal," petitioner argued that the
attempts to serve her with notices of hearing were not in accordance with
the provisions of the R.P. – U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947.
Issue:
Petitioner's contention that the questioned resolutions are null and void
because respondent Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction to entertain
and decide the case. Petitioner alleges that she never received nor was
served, any summons or copies of the original and amended complaints,
and therefore the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over her person under
Article XIV of the R.P. – U.S. Military Bases Agreement.
For Reference:
R.P. –U.S. Military Bases Agreement.
". . . [N]o process, civil or criminal, shall be served within any base except
with the permission of the commanding officer of such base; but should
the commanding officer refuse to grant such permission he shall forthwith
take the necessary steps . . . to serve such process, as the case may be, and
to provide the attendance of the server of such process before the
appropriate court in the Philippines or procure such server to make the
necessary affidavit or declaration to prove such service as the case may
require."
Ruling: Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case as summonses and
other processes issued by Philippine courts and administrative agencies for
United States Armed Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the
Philippines could be served therein only with the permission of the Base
Commander. If he withholds giving his permission, he should instead
designate another person to serve the process, and obtain the server's
affidavit for filing with the appropriate court. Respondent Labor Arbiter did
not follow said procedure. He instead, addressed the summons to Lt. Col.
Frankhauser and not the Base Commander.
Respondents do not dispute petitioner's claim that no summons was ever
issued and served on her. They contend, however, that they sent notices of
the hearings to her. BUT as contended notices of hearing are not
summonses. The provisions and prevailing jurisprudence in Civil Procedure
may be applied by analogy to NLRC proceedings. (Revised Rules of the
NLRC, Rule I, Sec. 3). It is basic that the Labor Arbiter cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being
served with summons (cf. Vda. de Macoy v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA
244 [1992]; Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court
, 149 SCRA 193 [1987]). In the absence of service of summons or a valid
waiver thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter
are null and void.
Petitioner, in the case at bench, appealed to the NLRC and
participated in the oral argument before the said body. This, however,
does not constitute a waiver of the lack of summons and a voluntary
submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may
have raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of jurisdiction, but
these grounds were discussed in relation to and as a result of the issue of
the lack of jurisdiction. In effect, petitioner set forth only one issue and
that is the absence of jurisdiction over her person. If an appearance before
the NLRC is precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said agency over
the person of the defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent to
service of summons (De los Santos v. Montera 221 SCRA 15 [1993]).
Be that as it may, on the assumption that petitioner validly waived
service of summons on her, still the case could not prosper. There is no
allegation from the pleadings filedthat Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner
were being sued in their personal capacities fortortious acts (United States
of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). However, private respondents
named 3 AGS as one of the respondents in their complaint.
Indeed, assuming that jurisdiction was acquired over the United
States Government and the monetary claims of private respondents
proved, such awards will have to be satisfied not by Lt. Col. Frankhauser
and petitioner in their personal capacities, but bythe United States
government ( Sandres v. Veridiano II 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).
Shauf v. CA
Facts: Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a
member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance
Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is
eminently qualified. By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint
for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against
private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony
Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her
nationality and sex. Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary
Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if
a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But
if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be
selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer.
During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position.
But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never
appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was
extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the
complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims
it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with
the applicable regulation. Shauf filed for damages and other relief in
different venues such as the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review
Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual
damages + 20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral &
exemplary damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the
damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand,
continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts
done/statements made by them in performance of their official
governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of
1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the
case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court.
They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision.
According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity
thus this is not a suit against the US government which would require
consent. Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further
claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for
criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not
part of international law.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the
US Armed Forces
Held: No they are not immune.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to
pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
Ratio: They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and
may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private
and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually
arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the
powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his
act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority
or jurisdiction
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the
State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against
the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same
tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State
officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and
property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the
State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of
state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any
arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial
judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts of discrimination
for which they should be held personally liable.
There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida
Q. Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the
defendants on account of her sex, color and origin.
She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas,
Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in
psychology?guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral
science. She has also completed all course work in human behavior and
counselling psychology for a doctoral degree. She is a civil service
eligible. More important, she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at
the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for approximately four years at
the time she applied for the same position in 1976.
In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did
not even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred
the vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not
eligible to the position.
Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall
afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the
1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race, or creed..
There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in
committing the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic
constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is
very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be
held accountable
Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of
her remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of
opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other
remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a foreign court and
under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is
entitled as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not
otherwise proscribed, which will best advance and protect her
interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in
Philippine courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious
and inconclusive representations of private respondents on that score.
Republic v. Hon. Sandoval
Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform
program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the
death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres.
Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the
purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant
recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and
wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such
recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for
damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in
the incident.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages
Held:
The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by
the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way
mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose
of the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding
of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the
event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of
the Commission does not in any way bind the State.
The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who
allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the
marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that
the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers
who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for
damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be
considered official.