CIVIL REVIEW CASE DIGEST – 4th until 6th WEEKS|1

FOURTH WEEK CASE SUMMARY: Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio refused to live

with his wife, Erlinda Ilusorio for personal reasons. One day,
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES after a meeting, he did not come to their home in Antipolo
City and instead lived in a condominium in Makati. The
General rule and exceptions petitioner was barred from visiting her husband so she files
a petition for habeas corpus.
1. ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO GR No. L-17014,
August 11, 1921 42 Phil 54
FACTS:
FACTS:
11 JUL 1942, ERLINDA KALAW, petitioner, and Atty.
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were
Potenciano Ilusorio, contracted marriage. They had 6
married in 1910 and have lived together as man and wife
children,namely, Ramon Ilusorio, ERLINDA ILUSORIO-
until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their
BILDNER, Maximo Ilusorio, Sylvia Ilusorio, Marietta Ilusorio, &
common home with the intention of living separate from
Shereen Ilusorio. The spouses lived together for 30 years.
her husband. Mariano’s efforts to induce her to resume
marital relations were all in vain. Thereafter, Mariano
1972, the spouses separated from bed and board
initiated an action to compel her to return to the
(separated legally) for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano
matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife.
Dolores averred by way of defense and cross-complaint then lived in a condominium in Urdaneta, Makati, when he
is in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
that she had been compelled to leave because of the
Club, when he’s in Baguio City. On the other hand,
cruel treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed that a
ERLINDA lived in a house in Antipolo City.
decree of separation be declared and the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate
30 DEC 1997, upon Potenciano’s return from the US, he
maintenance.
stayed with ERLINDA for 5 months in Antipolo City.Their
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before
daughters, Sylvia and Erlinda(Lin), alleged that during this
him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more
time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200
to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment
mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft an anti-depressant drug
of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment
prescribed by his doctor in New York, US.,which in turn
of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of
effected his health deterioration.
marital relations with him.
25 FEB 1998, ERLINDA filed with the RTC-Antipolo, a petition
ISSUE:
for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to his old age, frail health, poor eye-sight,
Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses
and impaired judgment.
to cohabit with each other
31 MAY 1998, after attending a meeting in Baguio,
HELD: NO.
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo and instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati.
It is not within the province of the courts of this country to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with,
and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where 11 MAR 1999, ERLINDA filed a petition before the CA for
the property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action writ of habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano
alleging that the respondents refused petitioner’s
for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
demands to see and visit her husband and barred
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order,
Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to
compel the restitution of the purely personal rights
5 APR 1999, after due hearing, DENIED the petition for writ
of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for
of habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention
no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under
but GRANTED visitation rights to ERLINDA.
the same roof; and the experience of these countries
where the court of justice have assumed to compel the
11 OCT 1999, filed an appeal via certiorari, asserting that
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of
he never refused to see her.
the practice is extremely questionable.
ISSUE:
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in
this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute W/N the wife, ERLINDA ILUSORIO, may secure a writ of
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, habeas corpus to compel Potenciano to live with her, NO
which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint;
though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial HELD:
declaration that his wife has presented herself without
sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in corpus caters only to involuntary and or illegal restraint.
respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it
is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented According to the evidence, there was no actual and
herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty
she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff that would justify the issuance of the writ.
is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs of either instance. a. The fact that Potenciano is about 86 years of age
or under medication does not necessarily render him
2. ILUSORIO v. BILDNER (GR No 139789) mentally incapacitated – soundness of mind does not
12 MAY 2000, G.R. No. 139789 hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of
the individual to discern his actions. Potenciano was of
DOCTRINE: No court is empowered as a judicial authority sound and alert mind having answered all relevant
to compel a husband to live with his wife for private questions asked by the court hence, he posses the
reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any capacity to make choices. He also made it clear that he
penalty attached to the exercise of right. was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing
people.
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The CA,
a. Exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation
rights in a petition for habeas corpus where ERLINDA never
even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with
the finding of subject’s insanity.
b. Missed the fact that the case did not involve the
right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife
to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his
wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without the
threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of
choice, Potentciano may not be the subject of visitation
right against his free choice because such shall deprive
him of his right to privacy.
Joint Obligation to Support
SSS v. GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 164790, August 29, 2008
DOCTRINE:
An estranged wife who was not dependent upon her
deceased husband for support is not qualified to be his
beneficiary.
FACTS:
Antonio de los Santos and respondent Gloria de
los Santos, both Filipinos, were married on April 29,
1964 in Manila. Less than one year after, Gloria left
Antonio and contracted another marriage with a certain
Domingo Talens in Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1969, Gloria
went back to Antonio and lived with him until 1983. They
had three children: Alain Vincent, Arlene, and Armine.
In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went to the United States.
Later on, she filed for divorce against Antonio in California
and executed a document waiving all her rights to their
conjugal properties and other matters. The divorce was
granted on November 5, 1986.
In 1987, Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in Camalig,
Albay. Their union produced one child, May-Ann N. de
los Santos. On the other hand, Gloria married Larry
Thomas Constant, an American citizen, on July 11, 1987, in
the US.
In 1989, Antonio amended his records at SSS and changed
his beneficiaries from Mrs. Margarita de los Santos to Cirila
de los Santos; from Gloria de los Santos to May-Ann de
los Santos; and from Erlinda de los Santos to Armine de
los Santos. Antonio retired from his employment in 1996,
and from then on began receiving monthly pension.
Antoio died of respiratory failure on May 15, 1999. Upon his
death, Cirila applied for and began receiving
his SSS pension benefit, beginning December 1999.
On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for Antonio’s
death benefits with the SSS. Her claim was denied
because she was not a qualified beneficiary of Antonio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is still qualified as a primary
beneficiary of the deceased SSS member Antonio?
RULING:
As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce
obtained by respondent against the deceased Antonio
was not binding in this jurisdiction. Under Philippine law,
only aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are
valid according to their national law. The divorce was
obtained by respondent Gloria while she was still a Filipino
citizen and thus covered by the policy against absolute
divorces. It did not sever her marriage ties with Antonio.
However, although respondent was the legal spouse of
the deceased, We find that she is still disqualified to be his
primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the
requirement of dependency upon her deceased husband
Antonio.
Social Security System v. Aguas is instructive in determining
the extent of the required “dependency” under the SS
Law. In Aguas, the Court ruled that although a husband
and wife are obliged to support each other, whether one
is actually dependent for support upon the other cannot
be presumed from the fact of marriage alone.
Further, Aguas pointed out that a wife who left her family
until her husband died and lived with other men,
was not dependent upon her husband for support,
financial or otherwise, during the entire period.
Said the Court:
In a parallel case involving a claim for benefits under the
GSIS law, the Court defined a dependent as “one who
derives his or her main support from another. Meaning,
relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able
to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without
the will, power, or aid of someone else.” It should be
noted that the GSIS law likewise defines a dependent
spouse as “the legitimate spouse dependent for support
upon the member or pensioner.” In that case, the Court
found it obvious that a wife who abandoned the family for
more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with
other men, was not dependent on her husband for
support, financial or otherwise, during that entire
period. Hence, the Court denied her claim for death
benefits.
The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already
separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to
be “dependent for support” upon the husband, absent
any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that
the husband and wife were still living together at the time
of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was
dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown
that she is capable of providing for herself.
Respondent herself admits that she left the conjugal
abode on two (2) separate occasions, to live with two
different men. The first was in 1965, less than one year after
their marriage, when she contracted a second marriage
to Domingo Talens. The second time she left Antonio was
in 1983 when she went to the US, obtained a divorce, and
later married an American citizen.
In fine, these uncontroverted facts remove her from
qualifying as a primary beneficiary of her deceased
husband.
Related rights/obligations
REPUBLIC v. CA and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 and
begot a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and
a father since 1) he preferred to spend more time with his
peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; 2)
he depended on his parents for aid and assistance; and 3)
he was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
When Reynaldo was relieved from his job, Roridel had
been the sole breadwinner of the family. In October 1986
the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged. In March 1987, Roridel
 CIVIL REVIEW CASE DIGEST – 4th until 6 th WEEKS|3
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City. A few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
longer live together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were
due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage;
(2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties
such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances. On 16 August 1990,
Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel
consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends,
a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present
any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference. RTC declared the marriage void. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s
decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity on the part of
Reynaldo has been established
RULING:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and
remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity
is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities. It is indispensable that the parties
must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilities and duties due to some
psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the
marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would
comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The
evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and
her husband cannot get along with each other and had
not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert
testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as
psychological incapacity.
8 Guidelines (Psychological Incapacity)
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state.
FIFTH WEEK
PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES
A. Marriage settlements,
Form & registration requirement
VALENCIA v. LOCQUIAO G.R. No. 122134 October 3, 2003
FACTS:
On May 22, 1944, spouses Locquiao executed a deed of
donation propter nuptias in favor of their son, respondent
Benito and his prospective bride, respondent Mara. After
the death of spouses Locquiao, Benito registered the
donation with the ORD. On March 18, 1973, the heirs of the
Locquiao spouses, including respondent Benito and
petitioner Romana, executed a Deed of Partition with
Recognition of Rights, wherein they distributed among only
three (3) of them. Later on, disagreements among five (5)
heirs or groups of heirs, including petitioner Romania.
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Constancia filed an action for
annulment of title against the respondents but was
dismissed. Respondent Benito filed with the MTC a
Complaint seeking the ejectment of petitioner Constancia
from the subject property, ordering the petitioner to
vacate.
The court issued an Order suspending the proceedings in
the ejectment case until it shall have decided the
ownership issue in the title annulment case.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint for annulment of title on the grounds of
prescription and laches. It likewise ruled that the donation
is a valid public document which transmitted ownership
over the subject land to the respondents. With the dismissal
of the complaint and the confirmation of the respondents’
title over the subject property, the RTC affirmed in toto the
decision of the MTC in the ejectment case.
ISSUE:
Whether acceptance of the donation by the donees is
required; if so, in what form should the acceptance
appear, and; whether the action is barred by prescription
and laches.
RULING:
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must
be made in a public instrument in which the property
donated must be specifically described. However, Article
1330 of the same Code provides that "acceptance is not
necessary to the validity of such gifts". In other words, the
celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary
couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed
form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter
nuptias under the Old Civil Code.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article
127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter
nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article
1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds
requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need
be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided
in Article 129, express acceptance "is not necessary for the
validity of these donations." Thus, implied acceptance is
sufficient.
The pivotal question, therefore, is which formal
requirements should be applied with respect to the
 CIVIL REVIEW CASE DIGEST – 4th until 6th WEEKS|4
donation propter nuptias at hand. Those under the Old
Civil Code or the New Civil Code?
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the
execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not
later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to
have retroactive effect.46 As a consequence, applying
Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of
the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter
whether or not the donees had accepted the donation.
The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case.
Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be
applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse just the
same. As earlier shown, even implied acceptance of a
donation propter nuptias suffices under the New Civil
Code.51
Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an action for
recovery of the title to, or possession of, real property, or
an interest therein, can only be brought within ten years
after the cause of such action accrues.53 Thus, petitioners’
action, which was filed on December 23, 1985, or more
than forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of
donation on May 22, 1944, was clearly time-barred.
Donations propter nuptias
1. SOLIS v. SOLIS G.R. No. L-27939 October 30, 1928
FACTS:
The spouses Juan and Maxima Lambino begot three
children named Alejo, Eugenia and Marciana Lambino.
On June 2, 1919 said spouses made a donation of propter
nuptias of the lands described in the complaint in favor of
their son Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis in a private
document in consideration of the marriage which the
latter were about to enter into. One of the conditions of
this donation is that in case of the death of one of the
donees, one-half of these lands thus donated would revert
to the donors while the surviving donee would retain the
other half. On August 3, 1919 donee Alejo Lambino died.
In the same year donor Juan Lambino also died. After the
latter's death, his wife, Maxima Barroso, recovered
possession of the donated lands.
The surviving donee Fortunata Solis filed the action, which
is the subject matter of this appeal, against the surviving
donor Maxima Barroso and Eugenia and Marcelina
Lambino, heirs of the deceased donor Juan Lambino, with
their respective husbands, demanding of the defendants
the execution of the proper deed of donation according
to law, transferring one-half of the donated property, and
moreover, to proceed to the partition of the donated
property and its fruits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was valid.
RULING:
The donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did
not create any right, since it was not made in a public
instrument. Article 633 provides that in order that a
donation of real property may be valid, it must be made
in a public instrument. l.net
The lower court insists that, by the fact that this is a
donation propter nuptias, it is based upon the marriage as
a consideration, and must be considered onerous. Neither
is this opinion well founded. In donations propter nuptias,
the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense
of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. This may
be clearly inferred from article 1333, which makes the fact
that the marriage did not take place a cause for the
revocation of such donations, thus taking it for granted
that there may be a valid donation propter nuptias, even
without marriage, since that which has not existed cannot
be revoked. And such a valid donation would be forever
valid, even if the marriage never took place, if the proper
action for revocation were not instituted, or if it were
instituted after the lapse of the statutory period of
prescription. This is, so because the marriage in a donation
propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as
such, presupposes the existence of the obligation which
may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition
necessary for the birth of the obligation.
2. MATEO v. LAGUA G.R. No. L-26270 October 30, 1969
FACTS:
Cipriano Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public
instrument, donated the two parcels of land to their son
Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the latter’s marriage
to Bonifacia Mateo. The couple took possession of the
properties, but the Certificates of Title remained in the
donor’s name. Cipriano Lagua later executed a deed
of sale of the same two parcels of land in favor of his
younger son, Gervasio. A TCT were issued to Gervasio.
Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter, Anatalia, sought the
annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua
and for recovery of possession of the properties which was
granted by the court. The decision became
final, and Bonifacia Mateo, and her daughter, Anatalia
Lagua, were installed in possession of the land.
Gervasio Lagua and Cipriano Lagua, filed a complaint
for annulment of the donation of the two lots, insofar as
one-half portion thereof was concerned claiming that
in donating the two lots, said plaintiff not only neglected
leaving something for his own support but also prejudiced
the legitime of his forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio Lagua.
While the cases were pending, plaintiff Cipriano Lagua
died. The Court of Appeals held that the donation to
Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots prejudiced the legitime of
Cipriano’s other heir, Gervasio Lagua. The donation was
thus declared inofficious, and defendants-appellees were
ordered to reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio Lagua a portion
of
494.15 square meters to be taken from any convenient
part of the lots.
ISSUE:
Is the court of appeals ruling on the inofficiousness of the
donation proper?
RULING:
No. ART. 908 of the civil code provides that to determine
the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of
the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts, and
charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall
be added the value of all donations by the testator that
are subject to collation, at the time he made them. In
other words, before any conclusion about the legal share
due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary
that
certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent
must be ascertained, by deducting a payable obligations
and charges from the value of the property owned by
the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations
subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible
estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory
 CIVIL REVIEW CASE DIGEST – 4th until 6th WEEKS|5
heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it
be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced
the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be
reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the
value of the donated property exceeds that of the
disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as legitime
in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can
hardly be said that, with the evidence then before the
court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of
the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and
reconveyance of the deducted portion to the
respondents.
Void donations by the spouses
1. G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA
CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND
WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION
AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP.
— While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage",
policy considerations of the most exigent character as well
as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A
1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista,
(50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil
Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in
the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes
of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue
and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se
engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han
de consuno,’ [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl,
LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore
invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De
donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to
apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials.
For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of
one party over the other, so that the danger that the law
seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as
already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr.
1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist
lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn
out to be better. So long as marriage remains the
cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike
demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should
likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING
SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW.
— The lack of validity of the donation made b~ the
deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the
disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena,
the relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is
therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as
the surviving sister to the other half.
FACTS:
The stipulated facts agreed upon by both the plaintiff and
the defendant assisted by their respective counsels, are:
1. The deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in
question;
2. Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter
vivos (referring to a transfer or gift made during one's
lifetime, as opposed to a testamentary transfer which is a
gift that takes effect on death) in favor of defendant,
Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on
February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by
defendant;
3. The donation of the land to Petronila (defendant) which
took effect immediately was made during the common
law relationship as husband and wife, they were married
on March 28, 1962;
4. The deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on
September 13, 1962;
5. The plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the
only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased
by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
her in 1962 and had the land declared in her name and
paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon.
Cornelia (plaintiff-appellant), sister of Felix
Matabuena maintains that the donation made by Felix to
Petronila Cervantes (defendant-appellee) was void
because they were living without the benefit of marriage
(common law marriage). This is in pursuant to Article 133 of
Civil Code which provides "Every donation between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void. On 23
November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the
donation as it was made before Cervantes’ marriage to
the donor. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the ban on a donation between the spouses during
a marriage applies to a common-law relationship
RULING:
YES
While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage,"
policy considerations of the most exigent character as well
as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights
of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso (for an undivided
part). The case is remanded to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the above
opinion.
RATIO:
It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within
the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written.
If there is ever any occasion where the principle of
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of it as what is written, then such
would be it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in
such codal provision would not be attained.
A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v.
Bautista, interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil
Code says clearly that if the policy of the law is (in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of
that Court) "to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue
and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law then there is
every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons living together as husband and wife without
benefit of nuptials.
2. G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994
NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and LUIS FAUSTINO C.
CAMACHO, respondents.
FACTS:
 CIVIL REVIEW CASE DIGEST – 4th until 6th WEEKS|6
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on
October 3, 1942. On February 6, 1962, without his marriage
to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho
contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C.
Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since
1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio
Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on May 22, 1961.
The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where
Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage
when, because of their quarrels, one or the other left the
dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita
stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City,
Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who
had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio
courted her and apparently won her heart because from
June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived
with her, the last time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout
Delgado Street, Quezon City. Petitioner's daughter,
Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who
lived with them for about a year in 1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on
Delgado Street in which they were staying from the
owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca.
In the deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in
his name, Aurelio was described as single.
On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale
of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in
consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in
petitioner's name on January 11, 1985.
Between 1985 and 1987 Nenita and Luisita came to know
each other. How they did is the subject of conflicting
versions. Luisita claims that Nenita called her (Luisita's)
residence several times, looking for Aurelio because the
latter had allegedly left their dwelling place. Petitioner,
according to Luisita, introduced herself as Mrs. Nenita
Camacho.
On the other hand petitioner claims it was the other way
around — that it was respondent Luisita who had called
up their residence many times, also looking for Aurelio to
urge him to file an application for American citizenship.
On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola
Life Plan and Aurelio's account in the PCI Bank, took care
of the funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then
in the United States with respondent Chito, having gone
there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order
to look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could
follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of the death of
Aurelio she and her son Chito came home on May 30,
1988. She had the remains of Aurelio transferred from the
Loyola Memorial Chapels, first to the St. Ignatius Church
and later to the Arlington Memorial Chapels. Luisita paid
for the funeral services.
Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines as the surviving spouse of
Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and
lot on Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita had been
living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but
efforts to settle their dispute failed.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought
this case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking
the annullment of the sale of the property to petitioner and
the payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the
deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was
executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
In answer petitioner claimed that she and the late Aurelio
had purchased the property in question using their joint
funds which they had accumulated after living together
for fourteen years, that the sale of the property by the late
Aurelio to her was with respondent Luisita's consent; and
that she was a purchaser in good faith.
RTC: rendered a decision upholding the sale of the
property to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of
Luisita.
On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared respondents to be
the owners of the house and lot in dispute. Although Luisita
had admitted that as early as 1985 she knew that Nenita
had been staying in the premises, the appellate court held
that respondents' action was not barred by laches
because Luisita allegedly did not know that Nenita had
obtained title to the property. On the merit, the Court of
Appeals ruled that in the absence of proof to the contrary,
Aurelio's first wife must be presumed to have been absent
for seven years without Aurelio having news of her being
alive when Aurelio contracted a second marriage. On this
premise, it held (1) that the property in dispute belonged
to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita and (2)
that the sale of the property to Nenita was void for the
same reason that donations between persons who are
guilty of concubinage or adultery are declared void under
Art. 739 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
1. WON the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita is void
2. WON the sale of property to Nenita is void
RULING:
1. YES. The marriage of Aurelio and Luisita is void.
Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee
being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time
of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the
three cases until declared null and void by a competent
court.
As this Court has already explained, the general rule is that
stated in the first sentence of this provision: "Any marriage
subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime
of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance." The exceptions are those stated in
paragraphs 1 and 2. The burden is on the party invoking
any of the exceptions. 4
 CIVIL REVIEW CASE DIGEST – 4th until 6th WEEKS|7
Paragraph 2 mentions three cases when the subsequent
marriage will not be considered void: (1) when the absent
spouse has not been heard from for seven consecutive
years and the present spouse has no news that he/she is
alive; (2) when, although he/she has been absent for less
than seven years, the absent spouse is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be by the spouse
present; and (3) when he/she is presumed to be dead
after four years from the occurrence of any of the events
enumerated in art. 3915 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents
to show that Luisita and Aurelio's marriage falls under any
of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They
failed to discharge this burden. Instead the contrary
appears.
It has been held that the first exception refers to the
subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not
the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the period of
seven years had lapsed.6 This exception cannot be
invoked in this case in order to sustain the validity of
Aurelio's marriage to Luisita because apparently it was
Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the time of his second
marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had already been living
together as husband and wife for five years. In fact the
couple begot a child, in 1961, even before their marriage
in 1962.
What applies in this case, therefore, is the general rule, i.e.,
since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo
Velaso, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was
void for being bigamous.
2. No. the sale of property to Nenita is VALID.
Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the
property in question was property of the conjugal
partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there
was no such partnership in the first place.
The Court of Appeals held that the sale of the property to
Nenita is void on the principle embodied in Art. 739(1) of
the Civil Code which declares donations made between
persons who are guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of the donation to be void. In the first place, an action
for declaration of the nullity of such donations can only be
brought by the innocent spouse, perhaps in this case by
the first wife, but certainly not by Luisita whose marriage to
Aurelio is itself void. The last paragraph of Art. 739 clearly
provides:
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration
of nullify may be brought by the spouse of the donor or
donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be
proved by preponderance of evidence in the same
action.
In the second place, until otherwise shown in an
appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be
presumed. Petitioner's ownership is evidenced by a deed
of absolute sale7 executed with all the solemnity of a
public document and by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
326681 issued in due course in her name.8 Petitioner is in
possession of the property. It was error for the Court of
Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of one
whose marriage to the seller is void.
3. G.R. No. 106060 June 21, 1999
EMILIE T. SUMBAD and BEATRICE B. TAIT, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARD OKOREN, OLIVIA T.
AKOKING, EVELYN W. SACLANGEN, assisted by her
husband Julio Saclangen, MARY ATIWAG assisted by her
husband Arthur Atiwag, JAIME T. FRONDA, BARBARA
TALLONGEN, JULIA PIYES, assisted by her husband Edward
Pives, GLEN PAQUITO and FELICITAS ALINAO, respondents.
FACTS:
Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agata’s husband,
George Tait, Sr., lived in a common-law marriage with
Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a certain parcel of
unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc. George died in
1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria Tait sold lots included within
the Sum-at property in favor of the private respondents
who purchased the lots on the strength of a Tax
Declaration over the Sum-at property showing the seller,
Maria, to be the owner of the property in question.
In 1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait
brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds
of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against
private respondents, alleging that they are the children
and compulsory heirs of George and Agata. They claim
that after the death of their mother, their father sold the
Otucan property and used the proceeds thereof to
purchase a residential lot in Sum-at, Bontoc and that from
1982 to 1983, Maria sold lots included within the Sum-at
property to private respondents without their knowledge
and consent. They further alleged that although the
private respondents were warned that the Sum-at
property did not belong to Maria they still purchased the
lots from Maria and that Maria had no right to sell the Sum-
at property so the deeds of sale are null and void and did
not transfer title to private respondents. During the trial,
petitioners and defense presented several witnesses.
ISSUES:
1. WON the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with respect
to the forgery of the deed of donation should be
given credence.
No. The court agreed with the trial and appellate
court’s decision that Eillenger’s testimony is “vague
and incredible” and incapable of impugning the
validity of the public document. Forgery should be
proven by clear and convincing evidence, and
whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the
same. Not only is Shirley Eillenger’s testimony difficult
to believe, it shows is had been rehearsed as she
anticipated the questions of petitioner’s counsel.
Petitioner’s should have presented handwriting
experts to support their claim that George’s
signature on the deed of donation was indeed a
forgery.
2. WON the deed of donation is invalid under Art. 749
of the Civil Code, which requires a public instrument
as a requisite for the validity of donations of
immovable property.
No. Petitioners contend that the person who
notarized the deed had no authority to do so.
However, the acknowledgment clause states that
the person who notarized it was the deputy clerk of
court who acted “for and in the absence of the
clerk of court who is authorized, under Sec. 21 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended
by C.A. Nos. 270 and 641, to administer oaths. In
accordance with the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed, it is to be presumed
that the deputy clerk of court who notarized the
deed of donation in this case was duly authorized
by the clerk of court.
3. WON deed of donation contravenes Art 133, CC
 CIVIL REVIEW CASE DIGEST – 4th until 6 th WEEKS|8
No. Art 133 provides that “every donation between
spouses during the marriage shall be void. This
prohibition does not apply when the donation takes
effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this
prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the
spouses may give each other on the occasion of
any family rejoicing.” This prohibition extends to
common-law relations (Matabuena v. Cervantes).
In fact, Art 87, FC provides that “every donation or
grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect,
between the spouses during the marriage shall be
void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may
give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.” However, this point is being raised for the
first time in the SC. Litigants cannot raise an issue for
the first time on appeal as this would contravene
the basic rules of fair play and justice.
Even assuming that they are not thus precluded,
petitioners were unable to present evidence in
support of such a claim. The evidence on record
does not show whether George was married to
Maria and, if so, when the marriage took place. If
Maria was not married to George, evidence should
have been presented to show that at the time the
deed of donation was executed, George and
Maria were still maintaining common-law relations.
Beatrice tait’s (one of the witnesses presented)
testimone is only to the effect that in 1941, Maria
became their stepmother. There is no evidence on
record that George and Maria continuously
maintained common-law relations until the date
when the donation was made (April 2, 1974)
4. WON the petitioners’ claim that they only learned of
the sales to the private respondents in 1988 when
they visited Maria because she was seriously ill is
admissible
No. Petitioners waited for twelve years before
claiming their inheritance and are thus guilty of
laches which precludes them from assailing the
donation made by their father in favor of Maria.
Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which, by exerting due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier.
5. WON Lanoy Takayeng’s testimony that Georde
gave Fani-is money to purchase the Sum-at
property means that the money came from the
proceeds of the sale of the Otucan property.
No. Lanoy could not state with certainty when the
alleged meeting took place, the amount of money
given by George to Fani-is and when the purchase
took place or if the sale was consummated in
accordance with George’s instructions.
4. G.R. No. L-21642 July 30, 1966
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner-appellee, vs.
CANDELARIA D. DAVAC, ET AL., respondents;
LOURDES Tuplano, respondent-appellant.
FACTS:
The late Petronilo Davac, a former employee of Lianga
Bay, became a member of the SSS. He designated
Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and indicated his
relationship to her as that of "wife". He died then each of
the respondents (Candelaria Davac and Lourdes Tuplano)
filed their claims for death benefit with the SSS. The
deceased contracted two marriages, the first, with
claimant Lourdes Tuplano and the second with
Candelaria Davac. The processing was withheld. The SSS
filed this petition praying that the two parties be required
to litigate their claims.
The SSS issued the resolution naming Davac as the valid
beneficiary. Not satisfied with the resolution, Lourdes
Tuplano brought the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Social Security Commission acted
correctly in declaring respondent Candelaria Davac as
the person entitled to receive the death benefits in
question.
RULING:
Yes. SSS resolution affirmed.
Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161, provides: Upon the
covered employee's death or total and permanent
disability under such conditions as the Commission may
define, …his beneficiaries, shall be entitled to the following
benefit…
The beneficiary "as recorded" by the employee's employer
is the one entitled to the death benefits.
The appellant contends that the designation made in the
person of the second and bigamous wife is null and void,
because (1) it contravenes the provisions of the Civil Code,
and (2) it deprives the lawful wife of her share in the
conjugal property as well as of her own and her child's
legitime in the inheritance.
As to the first point, appellant argues that a beneficiary
under the Social Security System partakes of the nature of
a beneficiary in life insurance policy and, therefore, the
same qualifications and disqualifications should be
applied. Article 739 and 2012 of the civil code prohibits
persons whoi cannot receive donations from being
beneficiaries of a policy.
The provisions mentioned in Article 739 are not applicable
to Candelaria Davac because she was not guilty of
concubinage, there being no proof that she had
knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband
Petronilo.
Regarding the second point raised by appellant, the
benefits accruing from membership in the Social Security
System do not form part of the properties of the conjugal
partnership of the covered member. They are disbursed
from a public special fund created by Congress in
pursuance to the declared policy of the Republic "to
develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security
system which ... shall provide protection against the
hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."
The sources of this special fund are from salary
contributions.
Under other provisions, if there is a named beneficiary and
the designation is not invalid, it is not the heirs of the
employee who are entitled to receive the benefits (unless
they are the designated beneficiaries themselves). It is only
when there is no designated beneficiaries or when the
designation is void, that the laws of succession are
applicable. The Social Security Act is not a law of
succession.
5. G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA.
DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C.
TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C.
TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE,
and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
FACTS:
 CIVIL REVIEW CASE DIGEST – 4th until 6 th WEEKS|9
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana
became the registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga
del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his
mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share
of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in
his name. Having no children to take care of him after his
retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s
cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take
care of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the
relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that
the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same
room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that
Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she
was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an
instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in
which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house
to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same
instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being
made in consideration of the “faithful services she had
rendered over the past ten years.” Thereafter, Francisco
died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila
for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who
are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of
Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of
Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article
87 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed
by the late Francisco Comille be declared void under
Article 87 of the Family Code.
RULING:
Yes. The donation made was void under Article 87 of
theFamily Code. he court in this case considered a
sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein
donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the
testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing
the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for
business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate
of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her
wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver
–employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse,
especially when one of the parties is already old and may
no longer be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women
holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila
is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
6. G.R. No. 165879 November 10, 2006
MARIA B. CHING, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH C. GOYANKO, JR.,
EVELYN GOYANKO, JERRY GOYANKO, IMELDA GOYANKO,
JULIUS GOYANKO, MARY ELLEN GOYANKO AND JESS
GOYANKO, Respondents.
In line with the policy of the State, the law emphatically
prohibits the sale of properties between spouses.
FACTS:
Respondents Joseph Goyanko et al. filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of
property and damages against Maria Ching, praying for
the nullification of the deed of sale and of transfer
certificate and the issuance of a new one. Goyanko et al.
aver that they are the real owners of the property involved.
They further contend that it was after their father‘s death
that they found out that a contract of sale involving the
same property has been executed by their father and
common-law wife Ching. However, Ching claimed that
she is the actual owner of the property as it was she who
provided its purchase price. The RTC dismissed the
complaint against Ching, declaring that there is no valid
and sufficient ground to declare the sale as null and void,
fictitious and simulated.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court and declared null and void the questioned
deed of sale and TCT No. 138405.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract of sale and TCT No. 138405, in
favor of the Maria Ching, was null and void for being
contrary to morals and public policy
RULING:
The subject property having been acquired during the
existence of a valid marriage between Joseph Sr. and
Epifania dela Cruz-Goyanko, is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership. Moreover, while this presumption in
favor of conjugality is rebuttable with clear and
convincing proof to the contrary, the court find no
evidence on record to conclude otherwise. The record
shows that while Joseph Sr. and his wife Epifania have
been estranged for years and that he and defendant-
appellant Maria Ching, have in fact been living together
as common-law husband and wife, there has never been
a judicial decree declaring the dissolution of his marriage
to Epifania nor their conjugal partnership. It is therefore
undeniable that the property located at Cebu City
belongs to the conjugal partnership. Assuming that the
subject property was not conjugal, still the court cannot
sustain the validity of the sale of the property by Joseph,
Sr. to defendant-appellant Maria Ching, there being
overwhelming evidence on records that they have been
living together as common-law husband and wife.
The court therefore finds the contract of sale in favor of the
defendant-appellant Maria Ching null and void for being
contrary to morals and public policy. The purported sale,
having been made by Joseph Sr. in favor of his concubine,
undermines the stability of the family, a basic social
institution which public policy vigilantly protects.
Absolute community of property (ACP)
1. G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA
BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner, vs. HELMUT
MULLER, Respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Doctrine: Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public
policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must
do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands.
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent
Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on
September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a
house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 10
this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany
from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for
the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the
cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house
amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was
registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent
filed a petition 6 for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the
regime of absolute community of property between the
petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation
of properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the
marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court
held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was purchased in
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
The CA held that respondent merely prayed for
reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property,
and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also
considered petitioner’s ownership over the property in trust
for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of
Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution
which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. Thus,
respondent Elena Buenaventura Muller is hereby ordered
to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for
the acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in
Antipolo, Rizal, or in the alternative to SELL the house and
lot in the event respondent does not have the means to
reimburse the petitioner out of her own money and from
the proceeds thereof, reimburse the petitioner of the cost
of the land and the house deducting the expenses for its
maintenance and preservation spent by the respondent.
Should there be profit, the same shall be divided in
proportion to the equity each has over the property.
ISSUE: WON Respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the
funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.
RULING: NO.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they
are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. 9 The
primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition
and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this
Court.11 He declared that he had the Antipolo property
titled in the name of petitioner because of the said
prohibition. 12His attempt at subsequently asserting or
claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust
was created and resulted by operation of law in view of
petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the
exception provided in cases of hereditary succession,
respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the
Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is
allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation
of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision,
no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the
fraud. 13 To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of
the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law
but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been
held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public
policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He who seeks equity
must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim
which is also expressed in the principle that he who has
done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a
litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the
ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy
in issue. 15
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of
ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile
exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement
would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise
proscribed by law.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 of terminating the
regime of absolute community between the petitioner
and respondent, decreeing a separation of property
between them and ordering the partition of the personal
properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
2. G.R. No. 175303 April 11, 2012
PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN), Petitioner, vs. EIJI*
YANAGISAWA, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
DOCTRINE: An undertaking not to dispose of a property
pending litigation, made in open court and embodied in
a court order, and duly annotated on the title of the said
property, creates a right in favor of the person relying
thereon. The latter may seek the annulment of actions that
are done in violation of such undertaking.
FACTS: Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanese
national, and Evelyn F. Castañeda (Evelyn), a Filipina,
contracted marriage in the City Hall of Manila.4
Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter townhouse unit
located at Bo. Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila
(Parañaque townhouse unit).5 The Registry of Deeds for
Parañaque issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
99791 to "Evelyn P. Castañeda, Filipino, married to Ejie
Yanagisawa, Japanese citizen[,] both of legal age."6
Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy (nullity of
marriage case) before the Makati RTC. During the
pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the Issuance
of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application
for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction. He asked that Evelyn
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 11
be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of the
properties registered in her name. At the hearing on the
said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook
not to dispose of the properties registered in her name
during the pendency of the case, thus rendering Eiji’s
application and motion moot.
On the basis of said commitment, the Makati RTC issued
an Order that the properties registered in the name of the
defendant would not be disposed of, alienated or
encumbered in any manner during the pendency of the
petition. The said order was annotated on the title of the
Parañaque townhouse unit or TCT No. 99791.
Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of
₱500,000.00 from petitioner Pacific Ace Finance Ltd.
(PAFIN).9To secure the loan, Evelyn executed on August 25,
1998 a real estate mortgage (REM)10 in favor of PAFIN over
the Parañaque townhouse unit covered by TCT No. 99791.
The instrument was submitted to the Register of Deeds of
Parañaque City for annotation on the same date.11
At the time of the mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of
marriage case was pending before the CA.12 The Makati
RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage,13 and had
ordered the liquidation of their registered properties,
including the Parañaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds
to be divided between the parties.14 The Decision of the
Makati RTC did not lift or dissolve its October 2, 1996 Order
on Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber
the properties registered in her name.
Eiji learned of the REM upon its annotation on TCT No.
99791. Deeming the mortgage as a violation of the Makati
RTC’s Order, Eiji filed a complaint for the annulment of REM
(annulment of mortgage case) against Evelyn and
PAFIN.15
For its defense, PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the Order
against Evelyn. It admitted, however, that it did not
conduct any verification of the title with the Registry of
Deeds of Parañaque City "because x x x Evelyn was a
good, friendly and trusted neighbor."16 PAFIN maintained
that Eiji has no personality to seek the annulment of the
REM because a foreign national cannot own real
properties located within the Philippines.17
Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the
Order.18 Evelyn asserted that she paid for the property with
her own funds19 and that she has exclusive ownership
thereof. 20
The Parañaque RTC explained that Eiji, as a foreign
national, cannot possibly own the mortgaged property.
Without ownership, or any other law or contract binding
the defendants to him, Eiji has no cause of action that may
be asserted against them.23
The CA noted that the Makati RTC ruled on Eiji’s and
Evelyn’s ownership rights over the properties that were
acquired during their marriage, including the Parañaque
townhouse unit. The appellate court determined that the
Parañaque RTC’s Decision was improper because it
violated the doctrine of non-interference. Courts of equal
jurisdiction, such as regional trial courts, have no appellate
jurisdiction over each other.28 For this reason, the CA
annulled and set aside the Parañaque RTC’s decision to
dismiss Eiji’s complaint.29 The CA noted that Eiji anchored
his complaint upon Evelyn’s violation of her commitment
to the Makati RTC and to Eiji that she would not dispose of,
alienate, or encumber the properties registered in her
name, including the Parañaque townhouse
unit.1âwphi1 This commitment created a right in favor of
Eiji to rely thereon and a correlative obligation on Evelyn’s
part not to encumber the Parañaque townhouse unit. The
CA determined that PAFIN was a mortgagee in bad
faith.32 Thus, the CA annulled the REM executed by Evelyn
in favor of PAFIN.
Issues: WON respondent has cause of action in seeking
annulment of the REM.
RULING: YES
Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the
Parañaque RTC to rule on the ownership issue because it
was essential for the determination of the validity of the
REM.45
The Court disagrees. A review of the complaint shows that
Eiji did not claim ownership of the Parañaque townhouse
unit or his right to consent to the REM as his bases for
seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji invoked his right to rely
on Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber
the property (as confirmed in the October 2, 1996 Order of
the Makati RTC), and the annotation of the said
commitment on TCT No. 99791.
It was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Eiji’s incapacity to own
real property as their defense to the suit.1âwphi1They
maintained that Eiji, as an alien incapacitated to own real
estate in the Philippines, need not consent to the REM
contract for its validity. But this argument is beside the point
and is not a proper defense to the right asserted by Eiji. This
defense does not negate Eiji’s right to rely on the October
2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and to hold third persons,
who deal with the registered property, to the annotations
entered on the title. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the
complaint based on this defense.
Petitioner did not question the rest of the appellate court’s
ruling, which held that Evelyn and PAFIN executed the REM
in complete disregard and violation of the October 2, 1996
Order of the Makati RTC and the annotation on TCT No.
99791. It did not dispute the legal effect of the October 2,
1996 Order on Evelyn’s capacity to encumber the
Parañaque townhouse unit nor the CA’s finding that
petitioner is a mortgagee in bad faith.
The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyn’s
commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property,
is akin to an injunction order against the disposition or
encumbrance of the property. Jurisprudence holds that all
acts done in violation of a standing injunction order are
voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who are
not in good faith.46 The party, in whose favor the injunction
is issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of
the offending actions.47 The following is instructive:
An injunction or restraining order must be obeyed while it
remains in full force and effect until the injunction or
restraining order has been set aside, vacated, or modified
by the court which granted it, or until the order or decree
awarding it has been reversed on appeal. The injuction
must be obeyed irrespective of the ultimate validity of the
order, and no matter how unreasonable and unjust the
injunction may be in its terms.48
3. G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, vs. AVELINA
AMORES, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 12
DOCTRINE: It is well-established that equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
FACTS: Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a
Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the
RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of
their marriage in the Decision5 dated November 10, 2000
on the basis of the former’s psychological incapacity as
contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership6 dated December 14, 2000 praying
for the distribution of the following described properties
claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of
their marriage, to wit:
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 &
2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, including a residential
house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, including a
residential house constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 &
2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre.
By way of inheritance:
e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, (the area
that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45
sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered
by TCT No. 23575 (the area that appertains to the conjugal
partnership is 24 sq.m.).7
In defense,8 respondent averred that, with the exception
of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she
and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties
during their marriage, the truth being that she used her
own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4
out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by
way of inheritance.9 She submitted a joint affidavit
executed by her and petitioner attesting to the fact that
she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon
using her own money.10 Accordingly, respondent sought
the dismissal of the petition for dissolution.
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845
and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these
properties were acquired with the money he received from
the Dutch government as his disability benefit12 since
respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their
acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City
was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence,
invalid.13
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used
for the purchase of the lots came exclusively from her
personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling
jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and
Tupperware.14 She further asserted that after she filed for
annulment of their marriage in 1996, petitioner transferred
to their second house and brought along with him certain
personal properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine,
grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and
equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00.15
RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its Decision,
dissolving the parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding all
the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal
properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner
as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on
Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.
CA promulgated a Decision20 affirming in toto the
judgment rendered by the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch
34. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-
aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire
lands in the Philippines."21 Hence, he cannot invoke equity
to support his claim for reimbursement.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement.
RULING: NO
In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real
source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels
of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to
have previously executed a joint affidavit that
respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot
1,28 he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds
were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these
inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner
has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now
precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of
equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties
by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-
established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will
not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly.29 Surely, a contract
that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void,
vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no
legal effect at all.30 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of
the Civil Code,31 petitioner cannot have the subject
properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the
money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will
not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them.32 Indeed, one
cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional
transaction knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for
reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment.33 As held
in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner
seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on
purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust
enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by
the Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New
Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance
by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.1âwphi1
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM
ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An
action for recovery of what has been paid without just
cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This
provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is
proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the
pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the
petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the
subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid
for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the
early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a
contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and
the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 13
the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general
principles of policy, which the defendant has the
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him
and the plaintiff."34(Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice
based on his foreign citizenship.35 Precisely, it is the
Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens
and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the
constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to
ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements
built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1
and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned
by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the
purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national
patrimony36 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-
bound to protect.
What is excluded from ACP?
1. Abrenica v Abrenica, G.R. No. 180572, June 18, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Erlando Abrenica and respondent Joena
Abrenica were law firm partners. One day, Respondent
filed a case against Petitioner to return the partnership
funds representing profits from a sale of a parcel of land
and sought to recover from Petitioner, the retainer fees
that he received from 2 clients of the firm and the balance
of the cash advance that he obtained.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging the
Sheriff as having levied on properties belonging to his
children and his wife. Joena, then filed an Affidavit of Third
Party alleging that she and her stepchildren owned a
number of personal properties owned to be levied.
A sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, was issued on January 3, 2008
in favor of the law firm for the petitioner’s properties. P had
been previously married to another woman and whose
marriage was dissolved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joena had the right to the claim?
HELD:
NO.
Two of these stepchildren were already of legal age
when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to one of the children,
parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent
any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to
represent Erlando’s children, her claim cannot be
sustained.
Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the
community property the property acquired before the
marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by
a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any,
of that property. Thus, neither these two vehicles nor the
house and lot belong to the second marriage.
2. Muñoz v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010
DOCTRINE:
Property acquired during marriage by gratuitous title by
either spouse is excluded from the community property;
When the value of the paraphernal property is
considerably more than the conjugal improvement, said
paraphernal property does not
become conjugal property.
FACTS:
The residential lot in the subject property was registered in
the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos
(respondents). On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal
Revenue employee, mortgaged said lot, with
Erlinda’s consent, to the GSIS to secure a P136,500.00
housing loan, payable within twenty (20) years, through
monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66. The respondents
then constructeda thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-story
residential house on the lot. On July 14, 1993, the title to the
subject property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed
by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a
stated consideration of P602,000.00.
On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint
with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of absolute
sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage
transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the
petitioner’s name were falsified. The respondents
presented the results of the scientific examination
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation of
Eliseo’s purported signatures in the Special Power of
Attorney dated April 29, 1992 and the Affidavit of waiver
of rights dated April 29, 1992, showing that they were
forgeries. The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced
evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject
property since it was registered in Erlinda’s name.
The RTC ruled for petitioner finding that the property is
paraphernal and consequently, the NBI finding that
Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of attorney and in
the affidavit were forgeries was immaterial because
Eliseo’s consentto the sale was not necessary. The CA
reversed and held that pursuant to the second paragraph
of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v.
Hon. Fortun, the subject property, originally Erlinda’s
exclusive paraphernal property,
became conjugal property when it was used
as collateral for a housing loan that was paid
through conjugal funds – Eliseo’s monthly
salary deductions.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal
HELD:
The property is paraphernal property of Erlinda.
RATIO:
As a general rule, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or
both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved. In the present case, clear evidence
that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption
of conjugal ownership pursuant to Articles 92and 109 of
the Family Code. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s
exclusive paraphernal property.
Moreover, we cannot subscribe to the CA’s misplaced
reliance on Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-
Canullas. As the respondents were married during
theeffectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions
on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189)
should have governed their property relations. However,
with the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989,
the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains,
including Article 158, have been superseded by those
found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to 133).
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article
158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in determining
the ownership of the improvements that are made on the
separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 14
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
spouses. Applying the said provision to the present case,
we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan
through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989 to
April 30, 1992, Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, not the
entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since
the petitioner advanced the P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda
to cancel the mortgage in 1992. Considering the
P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly
reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot
is considerably more than theP60,755.76 amount paid
by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions. Thus, the
subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal
property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the
petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction
was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures
in the special power of attorney and affidavit were
forgeries was immaterial.
Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA apparently failed to
consider the real nature of the contract between the
parties (where the SC found that the contract is an
equitable mortgage and not one of sale).
Charges upon ACP
1. Security Bank and Trust Company v. Mar Tierra
Corporation, G.R. No. 143382, November 29, 2006, 508
SCRA 419;
FACTS:
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president,
Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit
accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust
Company. Petitioner approved the application and
entered into a credit line agreement with Respondent
Corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement
executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez,
Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound
themselves jointly and severally with Respondent
Corporation for the payment of the loan.
Respondent Corporation was not able to pay all its debt
balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually
ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent corp and individual respondents.
RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal
properties of Respondent Corporation and individual
respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot
of the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the
benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the
attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses
Martinez.
Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC decision.
Petitioned to SC.
ISSUE:
WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an
indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to
accommodate a third party
HELD:
No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil
Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for “all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.”
The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that,
in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband
does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as
the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.
In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if the husband himself is
the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct
recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his
own business or profession, the transaction falls within the
term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.” In other words, where the husband contracts
an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a
legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to
another person or entity and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be
deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and
not for the surety or his family.
In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line
agreement between petitioner and Respondent
Corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The
accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under
which individual respondent Martinez assumed the
obligation of a surety for Respondent Corporation was
similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden
of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to
discharge that burden.
2. ALFREDO CHING v. CA, GR No. 124642, 2004-02-23
FACTS:
The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI)
obtained a loan
As added security for the said loan, on September 28,
1978, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Tañedo and
Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with...
the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally
guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing
the ABC to the extent of P38,000,000.00.[6] The loan was
subsequently renewed on various dates, the last renewal
having been made on December 4,... 1980.[7] The PBMCI
defaulted in the payment of all its loans.
ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a
writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI
Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were
Alfredo Ching, Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their
capacity as sureties of the PBMCI.
Its supporting affidavit stated, inter alia, that the
"[d]efendants... have removed or disposed of their
properties, or [are] ABOUT to do so, with intent to defraud
their creditors."[13]... granted the ABC's application... for a
writ of preliminary attachment on a bond of P12,700,000.
The trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment
PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a petition for
suspension of payments.
Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo
Ching,... She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of
stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and
her husband during their... marriage out of conjugal funds
after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established
in 1974.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse of its
discretion... amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed orders.
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 15
RULING:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the
properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife.
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in
the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp
Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its
corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband
when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14,
1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage
of the petitioner-spouses.
The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal
partnership property of the petitioners. The private
respondent failed to adduce evidence that the...
petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive
money.[55] The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks
were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp
Investment Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-
husband does not constitute... proof that the petitioner-
husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the
same.[56] The private respondent's reliance on the rulings
of this Court in Maramba v. Lozano[57] and Associated
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Banzon[58] is misplaced. In
the Maramba case, we held that where there is no
showing as to when the property was acquired, the fact
that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative of
the ownership of the property. The principle was...
reiterated in the Associated Insurance case where the
uncontroverted evidence showed that the shares of stocks
were acquired during the marriage of the petitioners.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that
should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a
showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.
Principles:
Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2 and
3][60] of the Family Code of the Philippines) provides:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
Subsidiary liabilities
Buado vs. CA, G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009
FACTS:
Civil case for damages that arose from slander filed by the
spouses Buado against Erlinda Nicol.
RTC ruled that Erlinda is liable and ordered her to pay for
damages, which was affirmed by the CA and SC.
Court issued a writt of execution, directing the sheriff to
collect indemnification from Erlinda.
Finding out that Erlinda’s personal properties are
insufficient, sheriff designed to issue a notice of levy on real
property on execution, and thereafter a notice of sheriff’s
sale was issued.
Two days prior the bidding, a third party claim was
received at the Sheriff’s Office from one Arnulfo Fulo,
prompting spouses Buado to put up a sheriff’s indemnity
bond. Sale proceeded with the spouses Buado emerging
as the highest bidder.
A year after the sale, Romulo Nicol, husband of Erlinda
Nicole, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of
sale and damages with preliminary injunction against
petitioners and the department sheriff, alleging that the
property was directly levied upon without exhausting the
personal properties of Erlinda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from
her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.
HELD:
NO. Erlinda Nicol’s liability is not chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. Unlike in the system of absolute
community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by
reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the
absolute community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-
spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the
system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
partnership of gains has no duty to make advance
payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Petitioners
argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her
criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
The Supreme Court does not agree to the contention of
Mr. and Mrs. Buado. In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court
held that the car which was claimed by the third party
complainant to be conjugal property was being levied
upon to enforce “a judgment for support” filed by a third
person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper since the
obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable
not on the conjugal property but on his separate property.
Hence, the filing of a separate action by Romulo Nicol was
proper. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Administration and enjoyment of ACP
DAR VS LEGASTO G.R. No. 143016, August 30, 2000
FACTS:
The petitioner spouses were sued by the respondent in
an unlawful detainer case.
The petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari
and mandamus.
Only one of them signed the petition.
They contend that since what is involved in the instant
case is their common rights and interest to abode under
the system of absolute community of property, either of
the spouses can sign the petition.
CA: dismissed the petition for review and mandamus
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that a petition signed by
only by one of the spouses is inadmissible forviolation of the
Rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping requiring all
petitioners to certify it under oath?
HELD:
YES. The petition should have been considered.
Revised Circular No. 28-91 applies to and governs the filing
of petitions in the SC and CA and is intended to prevent
the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the
same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of
forum shopping.
With respect to the contents of the certification which the
pleader may prepare, the rule of substantial compliance
may be availed of.
While this section requires that it be strictly complied with,
it merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot
be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded but it does not thereby prevent
substantial compliance on this aspect of its provisions
under justifiable circumstances.
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 16
The CA should have taken into consideration the fact that
the petitioners were sued jointly, or as Mr.and Mrs. over a
property in which they have a common interest. Such
being the case, the signing of one of them in the
certification substantially complies with the rule on
certification of non-forum shopping.
Disposition and encumbrance
Matthews vs. Taylor, GR 164584, June 22, 2009
PRINCIPLES: Aliens, whether individuals or corporations,
have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional
provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private
lands.[19] The primary... purpose of this constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national
patrimony.[20] Our fundamental law cannot be any
clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is
reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least...
sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
FACTS:
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages.
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor
(Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor
(Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina.
On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting,
Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294... square-
meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of
P129,000.00.
The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the... latter's funds,
constructed improvements thereon and eventually
converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort
known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.
All required permits and licenses for the operation of the
resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino,
Joselyn's sister.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and
Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992,
Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in
favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell,
lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract...
with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip
Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of
Lease[10] (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for
a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of
P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by... the parties
and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter
took possession of the property and renamed the resort as
Music Garden Resort.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it
was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin's)
consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages[11] against
Joselyn and the petitioner.
Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the
acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property,
and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn's husband,
any transaction involving said property required his
consent.
No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and
the petitioner in default.
On March 14, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment by default
declaring the Agreement null and void.
The decision was, however, set aside by the CA...
petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with
Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the
Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the
consent of Benjamin.
As appearing in the Agreement,... Benjamin signed as a
witness to the contract, indicating his knowledge of the
transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the
agreement entered into by his wife. Benjamin was,
therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of the
Agreement.
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community
property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the
spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving
the property.
Although the Agreement was evidenced by a public
document, the trial court refused to consider the alleged
participation of Benjamin in the questioned transaction
primarily because his signature appeared... only on the last
page of the document and not on every page thereof.
CA affirmed the conclusions made by the RTC.
If, indeed, Benjamin was a willing... participant in the
questioned transaction, the parties to the Agreement
should have used the phrase "with my consent" instead of
"signed in the presence of."
CA noted that Joselyn already prepared an SPA in favor
of Benjamin involving the Boracay property; it was...
therefore unnecessary for Joselyn to participate in the
execution of the Agreement.
These circumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion
that the contract was null and void having been entered
into by Joselyn without the consent of Benjamin.
ISSUE: MARITAL CONSENT OF RESPONDENT BENJAMIN
TAYLOR IS NOT REQUIRED IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE
THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT OF
LEASE IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF JOCELYN C. TAYLOR,
A FILIPINO CITIZEN,
RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay
property in 1989. Said acquisition was evidenced by a
Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee.
The property was also declared for taxation purposes
under her name.
When Joselyn leased the property to... petitioner, Benjamin
sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds:...
first, that he was the actual owner of the property since he
provided the funds used in purchasing the same;...
second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract
involving the... subject property without his consent.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:[18]
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not
allowed to acquire public or private lands in the
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 17
Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized
exceptions.
There is no rule more settled than this constitutional
prohibition, as more... and more aliens attempt to
circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through
another.
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold
that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of
Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from
acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines.
Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the
Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership
thereto.
This is true even if we sustain Benjamin's claim that he
provided the funds for such acquisition.
By entering into such contract... knowing that it was illegal,
no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement
for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can
be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses.
He had and has no capacity... or personality to question
the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife
on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising
the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property.
Dissolution of ACP
Death
HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO and GO
G.R. No. 157537, [September 7, 2011]
FACTS:
Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract of sale
of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under
oath that it was his father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta
Go) who purchased the said property. Subsequently,
Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of
the property to herein respondent Ester Servacio. On
March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the
property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand;
hence this case for the annulment of sale of the property.
The contention of the petitioner was that following
Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that the sale of the
property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the
community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was
null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code.
Servacio and Rito countered that Article 130 of the Family
Code was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation
prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because
the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was
finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale
did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs,
considering that what the sale disposed of was within the
aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were
entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was
the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the
exclusive property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC
affirmed the validity of the sale of the property. Aggrieved,
the petitioners went all the way up to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.
RULING:
The appeal lacks merit.
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family
Code, any disposition of the conjugal property after
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made
only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was
dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and
an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among
Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to
her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending
a liquidation following its liquidation.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his
children in respect of Marta’s share in
the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title
to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by
agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had
was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share.
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share;
hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell
and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest
of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr.
and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-
owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling
co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making
the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. Article
105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the
applicability of the rules on dissolution of
the conjugal partnership is “without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.”
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification
of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing
owned in common from the third person who substituted
the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but
the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed
and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the
meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of
the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that
might not be validly sold to her.
Judicial separation of property
G.R. No. 130623, February 29, 2008
LOREA DE UGALDE, Petitioner vs JON DE YSASI, Respondent
FACTS:
Lorea De Ugalde and Jon De Ysasi got married both
before the church and a judge where they were blessed
with a child. During the said ocassions the couple did not
execute any ante-nuptial agreement. Sometime in 1957,
the couple decided to separate and the respondent
contracted another marriage to Victoria Eleanor Smith.
The petitioner filed for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains on the allegation that the respondent
and Smith had been acquiring and disposing the real and
personal properties to the petitioner’s prejudice as the
lawful wife. Further, the petitioner alleged that she had
been defrauded of the total gains of their conjugal
properties. The respondent contended that both of them
already entered in an agreement to dissolve their conjugal
partnership. Pursuant to this, an Amicable Settlement was
filed before the CFI of Negros which was approved by the
said court.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Trial Court’s
Decision which dismissed the action for dissolution of
conjugal partnership of gains?
RULING:
No. Since the marriage of the couples in this case was in
February 15, 1951, Civil Code is the applicable law in this
instance. Under Article 175, the conjugal partnership of
gains ceases during the following circumstances to wit:
1.Upon the death of the other spouse
2.When there is a degree of legal separation
3.When the marriage is annulled
4.In the case of judicial separation of property under Art.
191
The finality of the Amicable Settlement approving the
parties’ separation of property resulted in the termination
of the conjugal partnership gains in accordance
with Art.175 of the Civil Code. Hence when the trial Court
decided on the petition for the said dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains (S.P. No.3330) The conjugal
partnership between petitioner and respondent was
already dissolved. The amicable settlement had become
final between the parties when it was approved by CFI on
June 6 ,1961. Its approval resulted in the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains between the petitioner and
respondent on even date.
Effects of dissolution
Liquidation procedure
QUIAO V. QUIAO G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]
DOCTRINES: Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon
dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the absolute community
and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and
obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the
absolute community's assets and if the community's
properties are insufficient, the separate properties of each
of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be
delivered to each of them.
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation
against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered
a decision declaring the legal separation thereby
awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of
Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of
the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by
the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children because Brigido is the offending
spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and
appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than
nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,
asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes
“the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse
and the debts.” It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the offending spouse does
not have any right to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family
Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it
applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article
102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies
because there is no other provision under the Family Code
which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a
result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community
or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is
applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights
over½of the properties in the conjugal partnership– NO.
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in
the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute
community? NO.
RATIO:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the
promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is
that in the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’
marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the
same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in
so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code
in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations
between the spouses is governed by the regime
of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the
petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties
of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article
143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of
the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by
the husband and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he
may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right
to due process. First, he was well-aware that the
respondent prayed in her complaint that all of
the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his
Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divides
the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after
the accounting and inventory of all the community
properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for
legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never
questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial
court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of
the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of
absolute community, the husband and the wife become
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 19
joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever
property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those
acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form
the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when
the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved,
that common mass is divided between the spouses, or
their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the
parties have established, irrespective of the value each
one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable,
since it has been established that the spouses have no
separate properties, what will be divided equally between
them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal
separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the
net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still
be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime
of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of
the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place
in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally,
upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing
provision, each of the couple has his and her own property
and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or
merger of those debts or properties between the spouses.
Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the
trial court that the spouses have no separate properties,
there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed
properties above are considered part of
the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in
the above-listed properties should be divided equally
between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.
However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children,
pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we
be confused, like in the absolute community regime,
nothing will be returned to the guilty party in
the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no
separate property which may be accounted for in the
guilty party’s favor.
Termination due to death
1. DIÑO V. DIÑO G.R. No. 178044, [January 19, 2011]
DOCTRINE: Neither party can encumber or dispose by
acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
FACTS: Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L.
Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January 1998 before
Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological
report establishing that respondent was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable
and deeply ingrained in her system since her early
formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time
of the celebration of the marriage and declared their
marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of
petitioner, modified its decision holding that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification.
Decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued
upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for
the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry,
and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent
of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants.
In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to
the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
2. YU V. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU G.R. No. 189207,
[June 15, 2011]
DOCTRINE: It is more proper to rule first on the declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of each party’s
psychological incapacity to perform their respective
marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the
parties’ respective petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both
of the parties’ psychological incapacity, then the parties
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 20
shall proceed to comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of
marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on the
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court
finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with the
reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and
property relations, since these are mere incidents of the
nullity of the parties’ marriage.
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez
on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial
offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted
for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked.
But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity
of the marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12,
2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution,
considering that the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations (incidental issues) were mere
consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on
declaration of nullity cannot be resolved without
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations. Eric added that the
incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity
can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC
ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the
case was re-raffled to another branch presided by Judge
Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge
Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking
the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as
codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the
declaration on nullity be already submitted for
resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not
simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying
that the main cause of action is the declaration of nullity
of the marriage and the incidental issues are
merely ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-
Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule
65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUES:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be
submitted for resolution first before the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues)
RULING:
No. It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or
what are alleged to have been exercised with grave
abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An
interlocutory order is one which “does not finally dispose of
the case, and does not end the Court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by
the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the assailed orders were
issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were
patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that
would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail
an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the
proper recourse for petitioner should have been an
appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on
the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow
the presentation of evidence on the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed
orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the
reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and
property relations. And the trial judge’s decision was not
without basis.
SIXTH WEEK
Conjugal partnership of gains
1. G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner, vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C.
QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented
by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation
against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). The RTC
granted the petition. The remaining conjugal properties of
the spouses was equally divided between them. However,
Brigido’s share on the net profits earned by conjugal
properties was forfeited in favor of the common children.
Brigido asked RTC what comprises “net profits.” In defining
net profits, RTC applied Family Code.
Brigido argued that since their marriage was celebrated in
1977, Civil Code shall apply and the application of Family
Code impaired his vested rights when the net profits was
forfeited in favor of the common children. Moreover, in
defining net profits, Brigido contended that the applicable
law under the Family Code is Art. 102 not Art. 129.
ISSUE:
What is the applicable provision?
RULING:
ART. 129 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the
respondent's marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the
applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129
of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. The latter provision is applicable because
according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other law.
ISSUE:
WON Brigido’s vested right was impaired
RULING:
NO.
While one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he
may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right
to due process. First, he was well-aware that the
respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the
conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 21
Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the
community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after
the accounting and inventory of all the community
properties of the parties. Second, when the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner
never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the
trial court termed as "net profits," pursuant to Article 129(7)
of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of
the petitioner's "vested right" is one founded, not only in the
provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil
Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family
Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the
conjugal partnership profits.
ISSUE:
What is net profits?
RULING:
Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property
relations of the parties. In other words, the computation
and the succession of events will follow the provisions
under Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the
definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer to Article
102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that
for purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2),
Article 102(4) applies. Thus, without any iota of doubt,
Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute
community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code,
and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime
under Article 129 of the Family Code.
Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case
for purposes only of defining "net profit." As earlier
explained, the definition of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of
the Family Code applies to both the absolute community
regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for
under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the
provisions on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal
partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code,
"the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits
of their separate property and income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage." From the foregoing provision, each of the
couple has his and her own property and debts. The law
does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those
debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it
establishes a complete separation of capitals.
2. G.R. No. 178611 January 14, 2013
ESTRELLA ADUAN ORPIANO, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
ANTONIO C. TOMAS and MYRNA U. TOMAS, Respondents.
FACTS:
Estrella was declared presumptively dead after her
husband, Alejandro petitioned the same. Alejandro sold a
conjugal property to SPS Tomas. Alejandro filed a
collection case for the unpaid balance of SPS Tomas.
Alejandro died during the pendency of the case.
Alejandro’s heirs substituted him, including Estrella. Estrella
filed a motion to amend the complaint (from collection to
annulment) and to drop her in the collection case. RTC
denied the motion. Estrella, then, filed for the annulment of
the sale as her consent was not obtained by Alejandro. SPS
Tomas moved for the dismissal of the annulment case on
the ground of forum shopping.
ISSUE:
What is the status of the sale?
RULING: VOID.
The absence of the consent of one spouse to a sale
renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion
of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who
contracted the sale.
ISSUE:
May the annulment case prosper?
RULING: NO.
Undoubtedly, Estrella had the right to maintain the
annulment case as a measure of protecting her conjugal
share. There thus exists a just cause for her to be dropped
as party plaintiff in the collection case so that she may
institute and maintain the annulment case without
violating the rule against forum shopping. Unless this is
done, she stands to lose her share in the conjugal property.
But the issue of whether the sale should be annulled is a
different matter altogether.
While Estrella correctly made use of the remedies
available to her – amending the Complaint and filing a
motion to drop her as a party – she committed a mistake
in proceeding to file the annulment case directly after
these remedies were denied her by the collection court
without first questioning or addressing the propriety of
these denials. While she may have been frustrated by the
collection court’s repeated rejection of her motions and its
apparent inability to appreciate her plight, her proper
recourse nevertheless should have been to file a petition
for certiorari or otherwise question the trial court’s denial of
her motion to be dropped as plaintiff, citing just reasons
which call for a ruling to the contrary. Issues arising from
joinder or misjoinder of parties are the proper subject of
certiorari.
What is included in the CPG
Presumption of CPG
1. G.R. No. 169548 March 15, 2010
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and MARTHA S. DAVID,
Respondents.
FACTS: Manuel and Martha were married in 1957. They
acquired a property in 1970 which was registered in the
name of “MARTHA DAVID, married to Manuel David.”
Martha and Manuel separated in fact. Manuel discovered
that Martha sold said property to Titan Construction Corpo.
Manuel filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale
and reconveyance of property as it was sold without his
knowledge and consent.
Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for
value, that the property was Martha’s paraphernal
property because Manuel failed to present proof of
income in 1970 which would prove that he has contributed
to the acquisition of the property.
ISSUE:
WON the property is Martha’s paraphernal property
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 22
RULING:
NO.
The Civil Code of the Philippines,21 the law in force at the
time of the celebration of the marriage between Martha
and Manuel in 1957, provides:
Article 160. All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.
Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal
in that "[a]ll property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved."
We are not persuaded by Titan’s arguments that the
property was Martha’s exclusive property because
Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his
income in 1970, hence he could not have had the
financial capacity to contribute to the purchase of the
property in 1970; and that Manuel admitted that it was
Martha who concluded the original purchase of the
property. In consonance with our ruling in Spouses Castro
v. Miat, Manuel was not required to prove that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership.
Rather, the presumption applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does not appear. Here,
we find that Titan failed to overturn the presumption that
the property, purchased during the spouses’ marriage,
was part of the conjugal partnership.
In the absence of Manuel’s consent, the Deed of Sale is
void.
Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal
partnership, the sale to Titan required the consent of both
spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides
that "the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership". Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains
that "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
without the husband’s consent, except in cases provided
by law".
Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must
have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise,
such disposition is void.
2. G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010
EVANGELINE D. IMANI,* Petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK
& TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.
FACTS:
Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing
Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P. Dazo,
Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo,
Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-
sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay
Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery,
Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos
(₱6,000,000.00).
CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank
made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to
no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit
against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner.
One of the properties of Imani was levied and sold by
public action.
Imani asserted that the subject property belongs to the
conjugal partnership. As such, it cannot be made to
answer for her obligation with Metrobank.
ISSUE:
WON the property is a conjugal property
RULING:
NO.
Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the party
who invokes it must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during
the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation
of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.
Francisco v. CA is instructive, viz.:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife." However, the party who invokes this
presumption must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage.
Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
The party who asserts this presumption must first
prove said time element. Needless to say, the
presumption refers only to the property acquired
during the marriage and does not operate when
there is no showing as to when property alleged
to be conjugal was acquired.
To support her assertion that the property belongs to the
conjugal partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit35
of Crisanto Origen, attesting that petitioner and her
husband were the vendees of the subject property, and
the photocopies of the checks allegedly issued by Sina
Imani as payment for the subject property.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly
be considered sufficient evidence to prove her claim that
the property is conjugal.
3. ELENITA DEWARA vs. SPS. LAMELA
G.R. No. 179010 April 11, 2011
DOCTRINE:
Presumption of CPG:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the
name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy
this presumption. The separation-in-fact between the
husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not
affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal
nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership
applies even when the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds
is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.
FACTS:
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 23
Sps. Dewara were married before the enactment of the
Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their marital
relations. They were separated-in-fact because Elenita
worked in California, United States of America, while
Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep
registered in the name of Elenita, hit respondent Ronnie
Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence against
Eduardo before the MTCC which found Eduardo guilty of
the charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day to (3)
months, and to pay civil indemnity of ₱62,598.70 as actual
damages and P10,000 as moral damages.
The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on
Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied because he had
no property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff,
respondent Stenile Alvero, to levy on a 1,440 sqm lot
registered under ELENITA M. DEWARA married to Eduardo,
to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of Eduardo. The
City Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the
lot and subsequently sold the lot in a public auction. In the
execution sale, there were no interested buyers other than
Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a certificate of sale to
spouses Ronnie and Gina Lamela to satisfy the civil liability
in the decision against Eduardo.9 Ronnie then caused the
consolidation of title in a Cadastral Proceeding before the
RTC, which ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-80054 in
the name of Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate
of title in the name of respondent spouses.10
The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of
certificate of sale, and cancellation of title of the lot in the
name of Elenita were done while Elenita was working in
California.11 Thus, Elenita, represented by her attorney-in-
fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of
sale and for damages against respondent spouses and ex-
officio sheriff Stenile Alvero before the RTC of Bacolod City.
Petitioner claimed that the levy on execution of Lot No.
234-C was illegal because the said property was her
paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made
to answer for the personal liability of her husband.
Furthermore, as the registered owner of the property, she
received no notice of the execution sale. She sought the
annulment of the sale and the annulment of the issuance
of the new TCT in the name of respondent spouses.12
On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that the
subject lot was the conjugal property of petitioner Elenita
and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was
acquired by Elenita during her marriage to Eduardo; that
the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo
because, at the time of the acquisition of the property,
Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in the
accident was registered in the name of petitioner; and
that Elenita did not interpose any objection pending the
levy on execution of the property.13
RTC held judgment in favor of Elenita and declared the
public auction and consolidation of TCT null and void.
The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in
nature. It arrived at this conclusion by tracing how Elenita
acquired the subject property. Based on the documentary
evidence submitted, Elenita’s grandfather, Exequiel
Magallanes, originally owned Lot No. 234-C. Upon his
demise, his children, Jesus (Elenita’s father), Salud, and
Concepcion, inherited the property, each entitled to a
share equal to one-third (1/3) of the total area of the land.
They were issued a new title (TCT No. T-17541) for the
property. On July 6, 1966, petitioner’s aunt, Salud,
executed a waiver of rights duly registered with the Office
of the Register of Deeds under Entry No. 76392, thereby
waiving her rights and participation over her 1/3 share of
the property in favor of her siblings, Jesus and
Concepcion. The two siblings then became the owners of
the property, each owning one-half (1/2) of the property.
Jesus subsequently sold his share to his daughter, Elenita,
for the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00),
Having declared that the property was the paraphernal
property of Elenita, the RTC ruled that the civil liability of
Eduardo, which was personal to him, could not be
charged to the exclusive property of his wife.17
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive
al property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo.
RULING:
SC set aside the CA decision and reinstated the RTC
decision with modification holding the conjugal properties
liable for the civil liability of Eduardo.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.21 Registration in
the name of the husband or the wife alone does not
destroy this presumption.22 The separation-in-fact
between the husband and the wife without judicial
approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot
retains its conjugal nature.23Moreover, the presumption of
conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does not appear. The
use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement
for the presumption to arise.24
There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired
by spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. It is
also undisputed that their marital relations are governed
by the conjugal partnership of gains, since they were
married before the enactment of the Family Code and
they did not execute any prenuptial agreement as to their
property relations. Thus, the legal presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property applies to the lot in
question. The presumption that the property is conjugal
property may be rebutted only by strong, clear,
categorical, and convincing evidence—there must be
strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.25
However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is
the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it
does not necessarily follow that it may automatically be
levied upon in an execution to answer for debts,
obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses.
Before debts and obligations may be charged against the
conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were
contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have
redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the
husband or the wife, as a rule, may not be charged to the
partnership. However, if the spouse who is bound should
have no exclusive property or if the property should be
insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be enforced
upon the partnership assets only after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been
covered.
In this case, it is just and proper that Ronnie be
compensated for the serious physical injuries he suffered.
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 24
It should be remembered that even though the vehicle
that hit Ronnie was registered in the name of Elenita, she
was not made a party in the said criminal case. Thus, she
may not be compelled to answer for Eduardo’s liability.
Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership property may be
held accountable for it since Eduardo has no property in
his name. The payment of indemnity adjudged by the RTC
of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 7155 in favor of
Ronnie may be enforced against the partnership assets of
spouses Elenita and Eduardo after the responsibilities
enumerated under Article 161 of the Civil Code have
been covered. This remedy is provided for under Article
163 of the Civil Code, viz.:
Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before the marriage shall not be charged to
the conjugal partnership.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before the marriage, and that of fines
and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 161 have been covered, if the
spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or
if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation
of the partnership such spouse shall be charged for what
has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.28
Article 161 of the Civil Code enumerates the obligations
which the conjugal partnership may be held answerable.
The enumeration should first be complied with before the
conjugal partnership may be held to answer for the liability
adjudged against Eduardo.
Finally, the indemnity imposed against Eduardo shall earn
an interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum, in
accordance with our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals.
4. DELA PENA vs AVILA G.R. No. 187490 Feb. 8, 2012
FACTS:
The suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of residential
land, together with the improvements thereon, situated in
Marikina City and previously registered in the name of
petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia), "married to
Antegono A. Dela Peña" (Antegono). On 7 May 1996,
Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a
loan in the sum of ₱250,000.00 which, pursuant to the
Promissory Note the former executed in favor of the latter,
was payable on or before 7 July 1996, with interest pegged
at 5% per month.5 On the very same day, Antonia also
executed in favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over the property, for the purpose of
securing the payment of said loan obligation.
Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over
the property in favor of respondent Gemma Remilyn C.
Avila (Gemma), for the consideration of ₱600,000.00.
Gemma sought registration of the lot under her name.
Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over said
parcel in favor of respondent Far East Bank and Trust
Company [now Bank of the Philippine Islands] (FEBTC-BPI),
to secure a loan facility with a credit limit of ₱1,200,000.00.
In the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds
of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to the effect,
among others, that she was the true and lawful owner of
the property which had been titled in the name of
Gemma; and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma
utilized in procuring her title was simulated. As a
consequence, Antonia’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim was
inscribed on the TCT. In view of Gemma’s failure to pay the
principal as well as the accumulated interest and
penalties on the loans she obtained, on the other hand,
FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage constituted over the property. As the
highest bidder at the public auction conducted in the
premises, FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over
the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name.
On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin John
B. Dela Peña (Alvin), filed against Gemma the complaint
for annulment of deed of sale docketed before Branch
272 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City as Civil
Case No. 98-445-MK. Claiming that the subject realty was
conjugal property, the Dela Peñas alleged, among other
matters, that the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not
consented to by Antegono who had, by then, already
died.
RTC went on to render a Decision finding that the subject
property was conjugal in nature and that the 4 November
1997 Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor of
Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation
required under Article 130 of the Family Code. Brushing
aside FEBTC-BPI’s claim of good faith.
CA reversed the RTC decision and held (a) the property
was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peñas to
prove that the same was acquired during Antonia’s
marriage to Antegono; (b) having misled Gemma into
believing that the property was exclusively hers, Antonia is
barred from seeking the annulment of the 4 November
1997 Deed of Absolute Sale; (c) Antonia’s claim that her
signature was forged is belied by her admission in the
pleadings that she was misled by Gemma into executing
said Deed of Absolute Sale and by NBI Questioned
Document Report No. 482-802; and, (d) FEBTC-BPI is a
mortgagee in good faith and for value since Gemma’s 26
November 1997 execution of the real estate mortgage in
its favor predated Antonia’s 3 March 1998 Affidavit of
Adverse Claim and the 10 December 1999 annotation of
a Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. 337834.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in holding the lot as conjugal property of
Sps. Dela Pena? No.
RULING:
The CA ruling was affirmed.
Doctrine: Pursuant to Article 160 of the NCC, all property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to
prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case of Francisco
vs. Court of Appeals, the Court said that the party who
invokes the presumption under Art. 160 of the NCC, must
first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The
party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time
element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to
the property acquired during the marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 25
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only
with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be
a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality, the
Dela Peñas did not even come close to proving that the
subject property was acquired during the marriage
between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonia’s bare
and uncorroborated assertion that the property was
purchased when she was already married, the record is
bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of
acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.
In the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, the phrase “married
to” is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and
cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a
registered owner. Because it is likewise possible that the
property was acquired by the wife while she was still single
and registered only after her marriage, neither would
registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that
the same was acquired during the marriage and, for said
reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. “Since there is
no showing as to when the property in question was
acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife
alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e.,
belonging exclusively to said spouse.”
As such, the nature of the property is paraphernal and the
CA correctly ruled that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying
Antonia’s sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the
liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code.
Furthermore, Antonia treated the realty as her own
exclusive property may, in fact, be readily gleaned from
her utilization thereof as security for the payment of the
P250,000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila.
What are included in CPG
1. PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and PACITA
VILLANUEVA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF
EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA
G.R. No. 143286 April 14, 2004
DOCTRINE:
If the properties are acquired during the marriage, the
presumption is that they are conjugal.19 The burden of
proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal,
by clear and convincing evidence.
FACTS:
Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant
Nicolas Retuya, having been married to the latter on
October 7, 1926. They begot five (5) children: Natividad,
Angela, Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya
resided at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage
they acquired 22 real properties with improvements
situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu.
Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in
Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban
Retuya and Balbina Solon for approximately eight (8)
parcels of land in Mandaue City.
Some of these properties above-mentioned earn income
from coconuts and the other lands/houses are leased to
various corporations.
In 1945, defendant Nicolas cohabited with Pacita
Villanueva. They begot an illegitimate son, Procopio
Villanuev. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received
the income of the above-mentioned properties. While
Pacita Villanueva had no occupation and no properties
of her own from which she could derive income.
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and could no longer talk
and walk. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical
condition of her father because they visited him at the
hospital. From the time Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke on
January 27, 1985 and until the present, Procopio has been
receiving the income of these properties. Natividad
Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time
their father Nicolas was already senile and had a childlike
mind. Procopio claimed it was not yet time to negotiate.
They sought the Barangay captain for
reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached.
Hence, the said official issued a certification to file action.
The trial court applied Art. 116 of the Family Code and
rendered its Decision on 16 February 1994 in favor of
Eusebia. Declaring the properties listed in paragraph 2 of
the amended complaint as conjugal properties of the
spouses plaintiff Eusebia Retuya and the defendant
Nicolas Retuya.
Eusebia died on 23 November 1996 pending appeal.
Thereafter, Eusebia’s heirs substituted her. Court of
Appeals eventually upheld the Decision of the trial court,
finding that Pacita failed to rebut the presumption under
Art. 116. CA denied MR. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred? WON the subject properties are
conjugal?
RULING:
The petition lacks merit. The CA decision was affirmed.
The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships
govern the property relations between Nicolas and
Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of
Family Code.17 Article 10518 of the Family Code explicitly
mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before the Family Code without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil
Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the marriage, the
presumption is that they are conjugal.19 The burden of
proof is on the party claiming that they are not
conjugal.20 This is counter-balanced by the requirement
that the properties must first be proven to have been
acquired during the marriage before they are presumed
conjugal.21Petitioners argue that Eusebia failed to prove
this pre-requisite. We disagree.
The question of whether the subject properties were
acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a
factual issue. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed
that the subject properties were in fact acquired during
the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.22 The tax
declarations23 covering the subject properties, along with
the unrebutted testimony of Eusebia’s witnesses, establish
this fact. We give due deference to factual findings of trial
courts,24 especially when affirmed by the appellate court.
A reversal of this finding can only occur if petitioners show
sufficient reason for us to doubt its correctness. Petitioners
in the present case have not.
Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152 is conjugal or not, the
answer came from petitioners themselves. Nicolas and
Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and
Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23
November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16
December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No.
152 was purchased on 4 October 1957.25 The date of
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 26
acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were
acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all
these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The
burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject
properties are not conjugal. The presumption in Article 116,
which subsists "unless the contrary is proved," stands as an
obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. The
burden of proving that a property is exclusive property of
a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence
required must be clear and convincing.26 Petitioners failed
to meet this standard.
Petitioners point out that the deed of sale, the transfer
certificate of title and the tax declaration of Lot No. 152
are all in the name of Pacita. Petitioners maintain that this
can only mean that Pacita is the real owner of Lot No. 152.
We disagree. The totality of the evidence reveals that this
was merely just one of the several schemes Nicolas
employed to deprive Eusebia of their conjugal property.
Ironically, petitioners themselves submitted in evidence a
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch IV, in Civil Case No. R-960227 involving the
acquisition of Lot No. 152.
Petitioners also point out that all the other tax declarations
presented before the trial court are in the name of Nicolas
alone. Petitioners argue that this serves as proof of Nicolas’
exclusive ownership of these properties. Petitioners are
mistaken. The tax declarations are not sufficient proof to
overcome the presumption under Article 116 of the Family
Code. All property acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, regardless in whose name the property is
registered, is presumed conjugal unless proved
otherwise.30The presumption is not rebutted by the mere
fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax
declaration is in the name of one of the spouses
only.31 Article 116 of the Family Code expressly provides
that the presumption remains even if the property is
"registered in the name of one or both of the spouses."
The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even
for a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage.33Otherwise, the law would be giving a
stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and
immoral. What petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and
Pacita’s cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of
Eusebia, the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that
Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all property
acquired from 7 October 1926, the date of Nicolas and
Eusebia’s marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of
Eusebia’s death, are still presumed conjugal. Petitioners
have neither claimed nor proved that any of the subject
properties was acquired outside or beyond this period.
Finally, petitioners reliance on Article 148 of the Family
Code34 is misplaced. A reading of Article 148 readily shows
that there must be proof of "actual joint contribution" by
both the live-in partners before the property becomes co-
owned by them in proportion to their contribution. The
presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the
absence of proof of their proportionate contributions,
subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is
proven first. Simply put, proof of actual contribution by
both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal sharing. Petitioners failed to
show proof of actual contribution by Pacita in the
acquisition of Lot No. 152. In short, petitioners failed to
prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her own money,
or that she actually contributed her own money to acquire
it.
2. Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154
FACTS:
Ponciano and Julia were married in 1915. The properties in
question consisting of Lots 5 and 6, were bought on
installment basis. Thus, the spouses jointly obtained a loan
to pay their balance. The corresponding deed of absolute
sale was executed where the vendee named is 'Julia de
Reyes'. Her signatures appear over the caption vendee
and those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital
consent. As a result of these sales, TCTs were issued in the
name of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES."
While Ponciano was absent attending his farm in
Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question Efren
V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees,
without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. At the
same time the spouses were living separately and were
not in speaking terms.
Ponciano filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed
of sale of two parcels of land contending that said
properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife
and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself"
and without his knowledge or consent.
Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties were
paraphernal properties of Julia and that they had
purchased the same in good faith and for adequate
consideration. Julia testified that she bought the two
parcels of land on installment basis and that the first
payment came from her personal funds. The CFI declared
the properties exclusive and paraphernal properties of
Julia and ruled that she could validly dispose of the same
without the consent of her husband.
ISSUE:
WON the disputed properties are conjugal properties.
HELD:
Yes. The deed of sale is declared null and void with respect
to one- half share of Ponciano.
Article 153 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage
at the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
It is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage in order that the same may be
deemed conjugal property. There is no question that the
disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage.
Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by
the spouses. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts
and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of
the partnership.
Julia’s claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the Income
Tax Returns which she herself prepared and filed in behalf
of the conjugal partnership wherein she made the
statement that the rentals paid to her were income of the
conjugal partnership, and she made to appear the
properties in question as capital assets of the conjugal
partnership.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be
conjugal and the fact that the land is later registered in the
name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its
conjugal nature. If the fact that property acquired during
marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 27
does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does
registration in the name of the wife.
3. Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011
FACTS:
Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for
the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal
proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch
before the CFI of Ilocos Norte.
The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner)
obtained a loan of P115,000 from ONB and executed a
real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land as security
thereof. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as
a result, PNB initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
on the said property. After which, the lot was sold to PNB
as the highest bidder. Petitioner claims that she had no
knowledge of the loan incurred by her husband nor did
she consent to the mortgage instituted on their conjugal
property. She then filed a complaint to annul the
proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property (after the lapse of 1 year).
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners
but was later reversed by the appellate court upon
appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the property is considered as redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
HELD: Yes. Petition denied.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal
real property without the consent, express or implied, of
the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to
question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.
However, the same article does not guarantee that the
courts will declare the annulment of the contract.
Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the
wife did not give her consent.
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the
signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit
from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in
the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to
the conjugal partnership.
4. De La Pena v Avila, Feb. 2012 G.R. No. 187490, [February
08, 2012]
FACTS:
Antonia Dela Pena (Antonia) obtained from A.C.Aguila &
Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of P250,000.00 with
interest pegged at 5% per month. Antonia executed a
promissory note and a notarized Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over a 277 square meter parcel of residential
land, together with the improvements thereon, situated in
Marikina City and previously registered in the name of
petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia), “married to
Antegono A. Dela Peña” (Antegono) under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-32315 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal.[to secure the payment of the loan
obligation.
Antonia executed another notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale over the property in favor of Gemma Remilyn C. Avila
(Gemma), for the stated consideration of P600,000.00. As
such Gemma caused the transfer of the aforesaid
property to her name. Gemma also constituted a real
estate mortgage over same property in favor of FEBTC-BPI,
to secure a loan facility with a credit limit of P1,200,000.00.
Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim, that she was the true and lawful
owner of the property and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale
Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated. The
Register of Deeds inscribed the adverse claim.
FEBTC-BPI caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage constituted over the property due to
Gemma’s failure to pay the loan. As the highest bidder at
the public auction conducted in the premises, FEBTC-BPI
later consolidated its ownership over the realty and
caused the same to be titled in its name under TCT No.
415392 of the Marikina registry.
Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin Dela Peña (Alvin),
filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of
deed of sale as the subject realty was conjugal property,
and that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia
executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by
Antegono who was already dead by that time. Gemma
specifically denied the material allegations, maintaining
that the realty was the exclusive property of Antonia who
misrepresented that her husband was still alive.
RTC held that the subject property was conjugal in nature
and that the Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed in
favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the
liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code.
CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that the property
was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peñas to
prove that the same was acquired during Antonia’s
marriage to Antegono. Furthermore, that the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Avila and the subsequent sale on
auction of the subject property to FEBTC-BPI are upheld as
valid and binding. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding
the house and lot covered by TCT No. N-32315 conjugal
property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Peña.
HELD:
No, petition is denied. CA decision affirmed in toto.
Pursuant to Article 160 of the NCC, all property ofthe
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to
prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case of Francisco
vs. Court of Appeals, the Court said that the party who
invokes the presumption under Art. 160 of the NCC, must
first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The
party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time
element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to
the property acquired during the marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only
with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be
a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 28
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality, the
Dela Peñas did not even come close to proving that the
subject property was acquired during the marriage
between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonia’s bare
and uncorroborated assertion that the property was
purchased when she was already married, the record is
bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of
acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.
In the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, the phrase “married
to” is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and
cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a
registered owner. Because it is likewise possible that the
property was acquired by the wife while she was still single
and registered only after her marriage, neither would
registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that
the same was acquired during the marriage and, for said
reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. “Since there is
no showing as to when the property in question was
acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife
alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e.,
belonging exclusively to said spouse.”
As such, the nature of the property is paraphernal and the
CA correctly ruled that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying
Antonia’s sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the
liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code.
Furthermore, Antonia treated the realty as her own
exclusive property may, in fact, be readily gleaned from
her utilization thereof as security for the payment of the
P250,000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila.
5. G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, vs. AVELINA AMORES,
Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina,
married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of
Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage in the
Decision dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of the
former’s psychological incapacity as contemplated in
Article 36 of the Family Code. Consequently, petitioner
filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
dated December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of
the properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage. In defense, respondent
averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential
houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not
acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage.
During trial, petitioner testified that the properties were
registered in the name of respondent, these properties
were acquired with the money he received from the
Dutch government as his disability benefit since
respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their
acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City
was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence,
invalid. For her part, respondent maintained that the
money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively
from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from
selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and
Tupperware. On February 28, 2007, the RTC dissolved the
parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of
land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the
tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive
properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142
as co-owned by the parties. The personal properties, i.e.,
tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which
were brought out by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are
hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the
petitioner. The two houses are hereby declared to be co-
owned by the petitioner and the respondent since these
were acquired during their marital union and since there is
no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and
residential units. Petitioner and respondent are, thereby,
directed to subject this court for approval their project of
partition on the two houses aforementioned. On appeal,
petitioner insisted that the money used to purchase the
foregoing properties came from his own capital funds and
that they were registered in the name of his former wife
only because of the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of
one-half (1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the
purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in
favor of his estranged ex-wife. CA affirmed. The CA
stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the
constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the
Philippines." Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his
claim for reimbursement.
ISSUE:
W/N the foreigner Beumer can seek reimbursement of the
value of purchased parcels of Philippine land in the
petition for separation of his properties and his wife’s on
the ground that he bought the parcels using his own
disability fund
RULING:
No.
It held petitioner cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition
against foreign ownership of Philippine land24 enshrined
under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which reads:Section 7. Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred
or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands.
Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be
accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by
a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful. In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding
the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject
parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While
admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that
respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase the
properties he likewise claimed that his personal disability
funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these
inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner
has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now
precluded from seeking any equitable refuge. In any
event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity,
grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired
no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue
of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that
equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that
to be done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates
the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights,
creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for
reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As held
in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner
seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on
purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust
enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by
the Constitution. Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on
Article 22 of the New Civil Code.
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 29
What is excluded from CPG
1. G.R. No. L-16991 March 31, 1964
ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
RAMON L. KATIGBAK, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT
No.57626 as separate or paraphernal property of Evelina
Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with this
finding reiterating that its improvements and income are
conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak. When the
spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought
properties unto the marriage. Ramon’s occupation
rendered him a monthly income of P200.00. The property
in question was registered in the name of “Evelina Kalaw-
Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak”. The latter declared
that her mother was the one who bought the property for
her and had placed it only in her name as the practice of
her mother in buying properties and placing them directly
in the names of her children. The husband having no
interest with the property only signed the document for the
purpose of assisting his wife. In August 1950, the Laperals
filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the
Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to
P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay such amount. A month
after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint
against her husband for judicial separation of property
and separate administration which was granted by the
court and was sought for annulment by the Laperals.
ISSUE:
WON the property in question constitutes the paraphernal
property of Evelina.
RULING:
All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed
conjugal. It is however not conclusive but merely
rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belong
exclusively to the husband and wife. In the case at bar, the
deed of the land is under the name of the wife. At the time
it was purchased, the property was of substantial value
and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have
afforded to buy considering the singular source of income.
Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is considered a
paraphernal property of the wife.
2. G.R. No. L-8715 October 24, 1914
MARIANO VELOSO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LUCIA
MARTINEZ, personally and as administratrix of the estate of
Domingo Franco, deceased-appellee.
FACTS:
Lucia Martinez is the widow of Domingo Franco. Domingo
borrowed money from Mariano Veloso in the amount of
4,500.00 secured by a jewelry belonging to Lucia on April
7, 1911. Domingo died and shortly thereafter Mariano
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Cebu to recover from Lucia, personally and as
administratrix of the estate of Domingo, deceased, the
possession of a certain parcel of land particularly
described in the second paragraph of the complaint,
together with the sum of P125 per month, from the 1st day
of June, 1911. Lucia raised a special defense that a certain
jewelry, of the value of P6,000, particularly described in her
answer was in the possession of the plaintiff. During the trial,
Mariano attempted to show that the jewels in question
were pawned to him by Domingo, with the full knowledge
and consent of Lucia. Lucia on the other hand positively
denies that she knew that her husband had pawned her
jewels which she acquired from her mother or that she
promised to redeem the same by paying the amount due.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucia has the right to posses the jewelry.
RULING:
YES. Lucia has the right to possess the jewelry. The record
shows that the jewels, acquired from her mother were the
sole and separate property of Lucia, and in the absence
of further proof, the Court presumed that they constituted
a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal
property she exercised dominion over the same as
provided under Article 1382, Civil Code. Further, the Court
declared that Lucia had the exclusive control and
management of the same, until and unless she had
delivered it Domingo, before a notary public, with the
intent that Domingo might administer it properly as
sanctioned by Article 1384, Civil Code. There is no proof in
the record that she had ever delivered the same to
Domingo, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being
true, Lucia could not be deprived of the same by any act
of her husband, without her consent, and without
compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above
cited thus she is entitled to the possession of said jewels, or
to their value, amounting to P6,000.
3. Berciles v. GSIS,128 SCRA 53, cf. FC 115
Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities,
usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules
on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in
each case. (n)
FACTS:
Judge Pascual G. Berciles of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu died in oKce on August 21, 1979 at the age of sixty-
six years, death caused by "cardiac arrest due to cerebral
vascular accident." Having served the government for
more than thirty-four (34) years, twenty-six (26) years in the
judiciary, the late Judge Berciles was eligible for retirement
under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act
No. 5095 so that his heirs were entitled to survivors beneAts
amounting to P311,460.00 under Section 2 of said Act.
The return of retirement premiums paid by the retiree in the
amount of P9,700.00 to be paid by the GSIS. Such beneAts
are now being claimed by two families, both of whom
claim to be the deceased's lawful heirs. Iluminada Ponce
of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, and her four children, Ilona, Ellery,
England and Ione, Aled with Us an application for survivors
beneAts under Republic Act 910, as amended by R.A. No.
5095 effective August 21, 1979 as the legal spouse and
legitimate children of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles,
duly supported by the required documents.
The other set of claimants are Flor Fuentebella, and her
four children, namely Pascual Voltaire, Maria Luisa, Mercy
and Rhoda, all surnamed Berciles. No such evidence was
submitted by the Fuentebellas. Accordingly, it was
recommended in said Memorandum that "the alleged
marital relationship between the late Judge Berciles and
Ms. Flor Fuentebella Berciles has no leg to stand on. It
should be stated in this connection that there was no
marriage contract submitted by Miss Rhoda F. Berciles in
her claim-letter, dated October 29, 1979, nor was there
any certiAcation from the Local Civil Registrar certifying to
the fact that the deceased Judge was actually married to
Miss Flor Fuentebella. It can, therefore, be assumed that
Miss Flor Fuentebella was not legally married to the late
Judge Pascual Berciles. Necessarily, it follows that the
innocent children that came into being out of the alleged
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 30
marital union of the deceased Judge and Ms. Flor
Fuentebella Berciles are spurious and have no established
family Aliation with the said Judge.
The evidence presented and submitted in favor of Mrs.
Iluminada Ponce Berciles as sufficient to establish the fact
that she is the lawfully wedded wife of the deceased
Judge Berciles.
The amount of P60,817.52 was paid to Iluminada Ponce
and her four children on April 2, 1981. On April 23, 1981, Flor
Fuentebella and her four children, Pascual Voltaire, Ma.
Luisa, Mercy, and Rhoda, through counsel, Aled a Motion
for Reconsideration Upon the recommendation of Court
Administrator Lorenzo Relova and Deputy Court
Administrator Leo D. Medialdea, the said amount of
P60,817.52 was paid to Iluminada Ponce and her four
children.
There is no question that Iluminada Ponce was married to
Pascual Berciles, alias Paquito, on January 20, 1941 at
Bocaue, Bulacan. From this union, they begot the following
children, namely: Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione. "The
evidence for claimant Flor Fuentebella Berciles and her
children may also be brieNy described as follows: She
claims to have been married to the late Judge Pascual
Berciles on March 28, 1937 in Iloilo City before Justice of the
Peace Jose Vicente Mapa. In other words, she professes
to be the Arst wife of the deceased Judge. Flor
Fuentebella was, however, not able to present her
marriage contract or certiAcate of marriage. Instead she
submitted a certiAcation of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City (Exh. "1") attesting to the loss or destruction of the
records of marriage for the year 1944 and previous years
and another certiAcation issued by the OKce of Civil
Registrar General of the National Census and Statistics
OFFIce (Exh. "2") stating the non-availability of the record
of marriage between Pascual Berciles and Flor
Fuentebella.
The Committee believes that there is no sufficient
evidence that Pascual Berciles and Flor Fuentebella were
married to each other on March 28, 1937 in Iloilo City;
however, certain relationship did exist and from such
relationship were begotten the following children, namely:
Pascual Voltaire Berciles, Maria Luisa Berciles, Mercy
Berciles and Rhoda Berciles.
ISSUE:
W/N the retirement premiums totalling P9,700.00, the same
is can be presumed conjugal property?
HELD:
YES. Accordingly, the disposition made by respondent GSIS
of the retirement benefits due the heirs of the late Judge
Pascual G. Berciles is consequently erroneous and not in
accordance with law. Petitioners are the lawful heirs
entitled to the distribution of the beneAts which shall
accrue to the estate of the deceased Judge Berciles and
will be distributed among the petitioners as his legal heirs
in accordance with the law on intestate succession.
As to the retirement premiums totalling P9,700.00, the same
is presumed conjugal property, there being no proof that
the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the
deceased Judge (Article 160, New Civil Code). Such being
the case, onehalf of the amount belongs to the wife as her
property in the conjugal partnership and the other half
shall go to the estate of the deceased Judge which shall
in turn be distributed to his legal heirs. With respect to the
terminal leave pay, unpaid salary and allowances
accruing to the deceased, since petitioners are the only
lawful heirs of the deceased Judge, only they are entitled
to share thereto.
4. Plata v. Yatco, 12 SCRA 718
FACTS:
Amalia Plata, in 1954, had purchased a parcel of land (Lot
23, Block 4-M, of Subdivision plan PSD-59) in Caloocan,
Rizal, for which the Provincial Register of Deeds issued
Torrens CertiHcate of Title (Transfer) No. 25855 in the name
of Amalia Plata, single, Filipino citizen. On 13 February 1958,
she sold the property to one Celso Saldaña, who obtained
TCT No. 40459 therefor; but seven months afterwards, on
24 September 1958, Saldaña resold the same property to
"Amalia Plata, married to Gaudencio Begosa.
On the same date, 24 September 1958, "Amalia Plata of
legal age, Filipino, married to Gaudencio Begosa", in
consideration of a loan of P3,000, mortgaged to Cesarea
Villanueva married to Gregorio Leaño, the identical
property.
For failure to pay the mortgage, the same was
extrajudicially foreclosed. Subsequently, the respondent,
Villanueva, sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal
detainer.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner, Amalia Plata, is bound by the
detainer judgment against Gaudencio?
RULING:
NO. We are constrained to uphold as meritorious the
petitioner's stand. Granting that the evidence before us
against the marriage of petitioner Amalia Plata to
Gaudencio Begosa is weak, considering her admissions of
married status in public documents; the well-known
presumption that persons openly living together as
husband and wife are legally married to each other.
Respondents Villanueva could not ignore the paraphernal
character of the property in question, which had been
unquestionably acquired by Plata while still single, as
shown by Transfer CertiHcate of Title No. 25855 of Rizal (Art.
148 of the New Civil Code). The subsequent conveyance
thereof to Celso Saldaña, and the reconveyance back to
her several months afterward of the same property, did
not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property,
there being no proof that the money paid to Saldaña
came from common or conjugal funds (Civ. Code, Art.
153). The deed of mortgage in favor of respondents
Villanueva actually recites that the petitioner was the
owner of the tenement in question and so does the
conveyance of it by Saldaña to her.
It is true that Gaudencio Begosa signed the mortgage
(Exh. 4) as a comortgagor; but by itself alone that
circumstance would not suFFIce to convert the land into
conjugal property, considering that it was paraphernal in
origin.
The illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone
can not bind nor affect the wife's possession of her
paraphernal, which by law she holds and administers
independently, and which she may even encumber or
alienate without his knowledge or consent.
5. Francisco v CA, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio
Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage. Private
respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and
Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first
marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10,
1962, she and Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a
sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an
apartment house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay
Balite, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a
house and lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal.
Petitioner further avers that these properties were
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 31
administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on
account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer,
thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them. Petitioner
also claims that private respondents succeeded in
convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney
which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the
house and lot together with the apartments situated in
Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner Cled a suit for damages
and for annulment of said general power of attorney, and
thereby enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to
be declared as the administratrix of the properties in
dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment
in favor of private respondents. It held that the petitioner
failed to adduce proof that said properties were acquired
during the existence of the second conjugal partnership,
or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence,
the court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to
Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to administer them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals aLrmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible
error in affirming the trial court's ruling that the properties,
subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the
capital properties of Eusebio exclusively.
RULING:
NO. Indeed, Articles 158 5 and 160 6 of the New Civil Code
have been repealed by the Family Code of the Philippines
which took effect on August 3, 1988. The aforecited articles
fall under Title VI, Book I of the New Civil Code which was
expressly repealed by Article 254 7 (not Article 253 as
alleged by petitioner in her petition and reply) of the
Family Code. We shall therefore resolve the issue of the
nature of the contested properties based on the provisions
of the New Civil Code.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife". However, the party who
invokes this presumption must Crst prove that the property
in controversy was acquired during the marriage. 12 Proof
of acquisition during the coverture is condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership.
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence
to show that the properties which she claimed to be
conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.
With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez,
Rizal, petitioner failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio
that he inherited the same from his parents. Whether
Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to
his second marriage is inconsequential. The property
should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a
matter of law, pursuant to Article 148 16 of the New Civil
Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to
the marriage, and brought to the marriage, is considered
his or her separate property.
As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, It must
be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no
way prove that the improvements were acquired during
the second marriage. And the fact that one is the
applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to
whether or not the property is conjugal or not. Neither is it
plausible to argue that the sari-sari store constructed on
the land of Eusebio Francisco has thereby become
conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition
that it was constructed at the expense of their partnership.
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal,
private respondents assert that their father purchased it
during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner
claims ownership over said property inasmuch as the title
thereto is registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco,
married to Teresita Francisco."
It must be stressed that the certiCcate of title upon which
petitioner anchors her claim is inadequate. The fact that
the land was registered in the name of "Eusebio
Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that
the property was acquired during the spouses coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different
acts. 21 It is well settled that registration does not confer
title but merely confirms one already existing.
Now, insofar as the administration of the subject properties
is concerned, it follows that Eusebio shall retain control
thereof considering that the assets are exclusively his
capital.
Administration of exclusive property
By the other spouse
Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil 255
FACTS:
Plaintiff commenced an action to recover of the
defendant the possession of a certain parcel of land
together with the sum of P125 per month.
Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim for services
rendered by the deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of
certain jewelry alleged to be in the possession in the
plaintiff.
The jewels in question before the possession of the same
was given to the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant
personally and that she had inherited the same from her
mother.
Defendant Lucia is the widow of Domingo Franco and
after the death of her husband she was appointed as the
administratrix.
A short time before the death of Domingo he borrowed
from plaintiff money and gave as security the jewelry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not jewelry is conjugal property
RULING: NO
It was contended that the jewelry was never delivered to
Plaintiff. It was shown that the key to the box where the
jewelry was kept remained with the deceased.
Defendant now denies that she knew that her husband
had pawned her jewels or that she promised to redeem
the same by paying the amount due.
Record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate
property of the wife acquired from her mother. It is part of
her paraphernal property. As such she exercised dominion
over the same.
She had the exclusive control and management of the
same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband,
before a notary public, with the intent that the husband
might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.)
There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 32
the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any
purpose.
Encumbrance/disposition of exclusive property
Wong et al. v. IAC 200 SCRA 792
FACTS:
Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6,
1964 they had been most of the time living separately.
During the marriage or on January 6, 1971, Romarico
bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land, in June 1972,
Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan who
consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at
199,895 Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95. Katrina failed to
return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period
agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their
value.
Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against
Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for
collection of a sum of money. Trial court promulgated a
decisions 9 in favor of the Wongs. A writ of execution was
thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots in Angeles
City all in the name of Romarico Henson ... married to
Katrina Henson. Lots were sold September 9, 1977.
August 8, 1 978, Romarico filed an action for the
annulment of the decision because he was "not given his
day in court”, the court, finding that there was no basis for
holding the conjugal partnership liable for the personal
indebtedness of Katrina, ruled in favor of reconveyance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for
collection of a sum of money may be nullified on the
ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at
public auction are the alleged exclusive properties of a
husband who did not participate in his wife's business
transaction from which said action stemmed
HELD:
Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when
Katrina entered into a business deal with Anita Wong. Thus,
the business transaction involved the personal dealings of
his estranged wife. Writ of execution cannot be issued
against Romarico since he was not represented in court.
On the matter of ownership of the properties involved,
having been acquired during the marriage, they are still
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership even
though Romarico and Katrina had been living separately
but the conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding,
Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with them her
obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be
one of the charges against the conjugal partnership.
Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with them her
obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be
one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. In
addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are
merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority
to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the
complaint and proven at the trial.
Under the Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases things necessary for
the support of the family or when she borrows money for
the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support
of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum;
when the administration of the conjugal partnership is
transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband and
when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.
Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances
occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to
answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them.
If property bought by installments
1. Jovellanos v CA, G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992
DOCTRINE:
It is the conjugal partnership of the marriage that is
subsisting at the time of the issuance of the deed of
absolute sale over the property, and not the marriage
subsisting when the deed tantamount to a contract to sell
was issued, where the property in question will belong to.
Pursuant to Article 118 of the Family Code, any amount
advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses
shall be reimbursed by the owner/s upon liquidation of the
partnership
FACTS:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine American Life Insurance
Company (PhilamLife) entered into a contract which was
denominated as a lease and conditional sale on
September 2, 1955 over Lot 8, Block 3 and the bungalow
therein in QC. During this time, Daniel was still married to
Leonor Dizon. The petitioners in this case are their 3 children
(Wilhelmina, Mercy and Jose). Leonor later on died. Daniel
allowed Mercy and her husband, Gil, to build a house on
the back portion of the premises.
Daniel married respondent Annette Jovellanos on May 30,
1967. The other co-respondents in this case are their 2
children.
On January 8, 1975, the lease amounts for the property
were fully paid by Daniel so Philamlife executed a deed of
absolute sale. The next day, Daniel donated to petitioners
all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow.
Thus, Mercy and Gil took over for the payment of the
property.
Annette filed a claim stating that the aforesaid property
was acquired by her deceased husband while their
marriage was subsisting, because the deed of absolute
sale of 1975 was executed when they were married
already. Thus, it should form part of the conjugal
partnership of the 2nd marriage.
Petitioners contend that that the beneficial and equitable
title to the property was acquired during the subsistence
of the 1st marriage pursuant to the lease and conditional
sale agreement contract of 1955.
Lower court ruled for Annette but declared that the
amounts advanced by the partnership of the first marriage,
by Daniel’s own capital, and those paid by Mercy and Gil,
should be reimbursed by the conjugal partnership of the
2nd marriage. Thus, Annette will own ½ of the property and
she and her children will have 1/6 pro indiviso shares on the
other half of the property. CA affirmed lower court, but
only modified the ruling to now be based on Art. 118 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property should belong to the conjugal
partnership of the first or second marriage? Second
marriage.
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 33
RULING:
The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife over
the property involved a lease period of 20 years at a
monthly rental of P288.87, by virtue of which the former, as
lessee-vendee, had only the right of possession over the
property. The contract also provided that if the lessee-
vendee fully complied with the obligations therein, the
lessor-vendor shall immediately sell, transfer and convey to
the lessee-vendee the subject property. Thus showing that
what was involved here was in the nature of a contract to
sell. Even viewed as a lease contract or a contract to sell,
what was only vested by the contract was the beneficial
title to the property. Daniel’s monthly payments would be
considered as amortization payments to be applied to the
predetermined price of the said property. Thus, he only
acquired ownership only upon fully payment of the said
amount, which was in 1975, when Philamlife executed the
deed of absolute sale in his favor.
This is bolstered by the fact that the lease contract had
stipulations showing restrictions on how Daniel could make
use of the property (cannot sublease, cannot use it for
business or profession, cannot make any alterations
without the consent of Philamlife, etc.).
Since the deed of absolute sale was executed in 1975 by
Philamlife, it was only then that full ownership was vested
in Daniel. Since, as early as 1967, he was already married
to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily
belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second
wife.
As found by the lower court, the payments for the property
were acquired from different sources: (a) from the
conjugal property of first marriage, (b) from capital of
Daniel, (c) from conjugal funds of the second marriage,
and (d) from Mercy and Gil’s partnership. Both lower court
and CA were right in ordering reimbursements be made in
line with Article 118 of the Family Code.
OTHER FAMILY CODE RELATED ISSUE:
As to petitioner’s contention that the Family Code should
not be given retroactive effect because it impairs their
vested right, pursuant to Art. 256 of the Family Code, the
court does not agree.
The right of Daniel to the property was merely an inchoate
and expectant right which would ripen into a vested right
only upon his acquisition of ownership. Ffor a property right
to be vested, there must be a transition from the potential
or contingent to the actual, and the proprietary interest
must have attached to a thing; it must have become fixed
or established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy. Thus, no vested rights were impaired here and
the Family Code could be given retroactive effect
2. Tarrosa vs. De Leon, GR 185063, July 23, 2009
FACTS:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC)
entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the
purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City.
On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They
had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June 22, 1970,
PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio
upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on
February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, “single.” On
January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and
her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear
the written consent and signature of Anita. On February
29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of
Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit
allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands.
Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them
was his exclusive property because he was still single when
he acquired it from PHHC. They further alleged that they
were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and
Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that
the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio
and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on
installment before the marriage although some
installments were paid during the marriage would be
considered conjugal property
RULING:
Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and
covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only
transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita.
The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after
he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This
full payment was made more than 2 years after his
marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect, the property
was acquired during the existence of the marriage.
Hence, ownership to the property is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership.
Improvements on CPG property
[G.R. No. 156125. August 25, 2010.]
FRANCISCO MUÑOS, JR., petitioner, vs. ERLINDA RAMIREZ
and ELISEO CARLOS, respondents.
FACTS:
Subject of the present case is a seventy-seven (77)-
square meter residential house and lot located at 170 A.
Bonifacio Street, Mandaluyong City(subject property),
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7650 of
the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City in the name
of the petitioner. 6
The residential lot in the subject property was previously
covered by TCT No. 1427, in the name of Erlinda Ramirez,
married to Eliseo Carlos(respondents). 7
On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue
employee, mortgaged TCT No. 1427, with Erlinda's
consent, to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan,
payable within twenty (20) years, through monthly salary
deductions of P1,687.66. 8 The respondents then
constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-story
residential house on the lot.
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was
transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed by Erlinda,
for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated
consideration of P602,000.00. 9 HCITAS
On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a
complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of
absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a
mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring
the title to the petitioner's name were falsified.
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 34
The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner
granted them a P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a first
mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the petitioner gave Erlinda a
P200,000.00 10 advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage,
and made her sign a document purporting to be the
mortgage contract; the petitioner promised to give the
P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda surrenders TCT No.
1427 with the GSIS mortgage cancelled, and submits an
affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his
rights to the subject property; with the P200,000.00
advance, Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27 11 to cancel the
GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427; 12 in May 1992, Erlinda
surrendered to the petitioner the clean TCT No. 1427, but
returned Eliseo's affidavit, unsigned; since Eliseo's affidavit
was unsigned, the petitioner refused to give the
P402,000.00 balance and to cancel the mortgage, and
demanded that Erlinda return the P200,000.00 advance;
since Erlinda could not return the P200,000.00 advance
because it had been used to pay the GSIS loan, the
petitioner kept the title; and in 1993, they discovered that
TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the petitioner's name,
cancelling TCT No. 1427 in their name.
The petitioner countered that there was a valid contract
of sale. He alleged that the respondents sold the subject
property to him after he refused their offer to mortgage
the subject property because they lacked paying
capacity and were unwilling to pay the incidental
charges; the sale was with the implied promise to
repurchase within one year, 13 during which period (from
May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993), the respondents would
lease the subject property for a monthly rental of
P500.00; 14 when the respondents failed to repurchase
the subject property within the one-year period despite
notice, he caused the transfer of title in his name on July
14, 1993; 15 when the respondents failed to pay the
monthly rentals despite demand, he filed an ejectment
case 16 against them with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, on
September 8, 1993, or sixteen days before the filing of the
RTC case for annulment of the deed of absolute sale.
During the pendency of the RTC case, or on March 29,
1995, the MeTC decided the ejectment case. It ordered
Erlinda and her family to vacate the subject property, to
surrender its possession to the petitioner, and to pay the
overdue rentals. 17
In the RTC, the respondents presented the results of the
scientific examination 18 conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation of Eliseo's purported signatures in
the Special Power of Attorney 19 dated April 29, 1992 and
the Affidavit of waiver of rights dated April 29,
1992, 20 showing that they were forgeries.
The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced evidence
on the paraphernal nature of the subject property since it
was registered in Erlinda's name; the residential lot was
part of a large parcel of land owned by Pedro Ramirez
and Fructuosa Urcla, Erlinda's parents; it was the subject
of Civil Case No. 50141, a complaint for annulment of
sale, before the RTC, Branch 158, Pasig City, filed by the
surviving heirs of Pedro against another heir, Amado
Ramirez, Erlinda's brother; and, as a result of a
compromise agreement, Amado agreed to transfer to
the other compulsory heirs of Pedro, including Erlinda,
their rightful shares of the land. 21
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property was Erlinda's
exclusive paraphernal property that was inherited from
her father?
RULING:
Yes, the subject property remained the exclusive
paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she
contracted with the petitioner. As a general rule, all
property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved. 34
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited
the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted
this presumption of conjugal ownership. 35 Pursuant to
Articles 92 36 and 109 37 of the Family Code, properties
acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the
marriage, shall be excluded from the community
property and be the exclusive property of each
spouse. 38 The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda's
exclusive paraphernal property.
The CA, however, held that the residential lot became
conjugal when the house was built thereon through
conjugal funds, applying the second paragraph of Article
158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas. 39 Under
the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, a
land that originally belonged to one spouse becomes
conjugal upon the construction of improvements thereon
at the expense of the partnership. We applied this
provision inCalimlim-Canullas, 40 where we held that
when the conjugal house is constructed on land
belonging exclusively to the husband, the land ipso
factobecomes conjugal, but the husband is entitled to
reimbursement of the value of the land at the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership.
The CA misapplied Article 158 of the Civil
Code and Calimlim-Canullas
We cannot subscribe to the CA's misplaced reliance on
Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-
Canullas. ISTCHE
As the respondents were married during the effectivity of
the Civil Code, its provisions on conjugal partnership of
gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have governed their
property relations. However, with the enactment of
the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil
Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains,
including Article 158, have been superseded by those
found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to 133). Article 105
of the Family Codestates:
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as
provided in Article 256.
Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property,
we refer to the provisions of the Family Code, and not the
Civil Code, except with respect to rights then already
vested.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article
158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in
determining the ownership of the improvements that are
made on the separate property of the spouses, at the
expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts
of either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 35
cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in
value are more than the value of the property at the time
of the improvement, the entire property of one of the
spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject
to reimbursement of the value of the property of the
owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise,
said property shall be retained in ownership by the
owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the
cost of the improvement. 41
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion
only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions.
From April 6, 1989 42 to April 30, 1992, 43 Eliseo paid about
P60,755.76, 44 not the entire amount of the GSIS housing
loan plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the
P176,445.27 45paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in
1992. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS
housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the
value of the residential lot is considerably more than the
P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary
deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive
paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she
contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of
Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI
finding that Eliseo's signatures in the special power of
attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.
Charges upon and obligations of CPG
1. [G.R. No. 118305. February 12, 1998.]
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and
ABELARDO
MAGSAJO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING, respondents.
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM)
obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). As added
security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent
Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President ofPBM, executed
security agreements on December 10, 1980 and on March
20, 1981 making himself jointly and severally answerable
with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC
filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch VIII,
entitled "Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation vs. Philippine Blooming Mills and Alfredo
Ching," docketed as Civil Case No. 42228.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally
pay AIDC the principal amount ofP50,300,000.00 with
interests.
Pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 42228,
upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a
writ of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's putting
up of an P8,000,000.00 bond, a writ of execution dated
May 12, 1982 was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo
Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff
in Civil Case No. 42228, caused the issuance and service
upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale
dated May 20, 1982 on three (3) of their conjugal
properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction
sale of the properties levied.
On June 9, 1982, private respondents filed a
case of injunction against petitioners with the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XIII, to
enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot
enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership
levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan
did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. 2 Upon application of private respondents,
the lower court issued a temporary restraining order to
prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the
sale of the said properties at public auction.
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, 3 questioning the order of the
lower court enjoining the sale.
Respondent Court ofAppeals issued a Temporary
Restraining Order on June 25, 1982, enjoining the
lower court 4 from enforcing its Order of June 14, 1982,
thus paving the way for the scheduled auction
sale of respondents-spouses conjugal properties.
On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being
the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale by
petitioner Magsajo, which was registered on July 2, 1982.
Upon expiration of the redemption period, petitioner
sheriff issued the final deed of sale on August 4, 1982 which
was registered on August 9, 1983.
In the meantime, the respondent court, on August 4, 1982,
decided CA-G.R. SP No. 14404, in this manner:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is
granted and the challenged order of the respondent
Judge dated June 14, 1982 in Civil Case No. 46309 is
hereby set aside and nullified. The same petition insofar as
it seeks to enjoin the respondent Judge from proceeding
with Civil Case No. 46309 is, however, denied. No
pronouncement is here made as to costs. . . ." 5
On September 3, 1983, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for injunction filed before Branch XIII of the
CFI of Rizal (Pasig) on the ground that the same had
become moot and academic with the
consummation of the sale. Respondents filed their
opposition to the motion arguing, among others, that
where a third party who claims ownership of the property
attached or levied upon, a different legal situation is
presented; and that in this case, two (2) of the real
properties are actually in the name of Encarnacion Ching,
a non-party to Civil Case No. 42228.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, trial
on the merits proceeded. Private respondents presented
several witnesses. On the other hand, petitioners did not
present any evidence.
On September 18, 1991, the trial court promulgated its
decision declaring the sale on execution null and void.
Petitioners appealed to the respondentcourt, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29632.
On April 14, 1994, the respondent court promulgated the
assailed decision, affirming the decision of the regional
trial court. It held that:
"The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was
for the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming
Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of petitioners-appellees.
As to the applicable law, whether it is Article 161 of the
New Civil Code or Article 1211 of the Family Code-suffice
it to say that the two provisions are substantially the same.
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 36
Nevertheless, We agree with the trial court that the Family
Code is the applicable law on the matter . . .
Article 121 of the Family Code provides that 'The conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: . . . (2) All debts and
obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains . . .' The burden of proof that
the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant
AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted by
appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains."
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered DISMISSING the appeal. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto." 6
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the respondent court in a Resolution dated
November 28, 1994. 7
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner contends that the
"respondent court erred in ruling that the conjugal
partnership of private respondents is not liable for the
obligation by the respondent-husband."
ISSUE:
Whether or not THE OBLIGATION INCURRED BY RESPONDENT
HUSBAND DID NOT REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT?
RULING:
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the
respondent family would reasonably anticipate were the
following:
(a) The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching
would be prolonged and he would be entitled to his
monthly salary of P20,000.00 for an extended
length of time because of the loan he guaranteed;
(b) The shares of stock of the members of his family would
appreciate if the PBM could be rehabilitated through the
loan obtained;
(c) His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced
and his career would be boosted should PBM survive
because of the loan.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by
Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one
directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-
product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
In all our decisions involving accommodation
contracts of the husband, 18 we underscored the
requirement that: "there must be the requisite showing . .
. of some advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses" or "benefits to his family" or "that
such obligations are productive of some benefit to the
family." Unfortunately, the petition did not present any
proof to show: (a) Whether or not the corporate
existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many
months or years; and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM was
saved by the loan and its shares of stock appreciated, if
so, how much and how substantial was the holdings of the
Ching family.
Such benefits (prospects of longer employment and
probable increase in the value of stocks) might have been
already apparent or could be anticipated at the time the
accommodation agreement was entered into. But would
those "benefits" qualify the transaction as one of the
"obligations . . . for the benefitof the conjugal partnership"?
Are indirect and remote probable benefits, the ones
referred to in Article 161 of the Civil Code?
The Court of Appeals in denying the motion for
reconsideration, disposed of these questions in the
following manner:
"No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit extended
by respondents-appellants is purely a corporate debt
granted to PBM, with petitioner-appellee-husband merely
signing as surety. While such petitioner-appellee-husband,
as such surety, is solidarily liable with the principal debtor
AIDC, such liability under the Civil Code provisions is
specifically restricted by Article 122 (par. 1) of the Family
Code, so that debts for which the husband is liable may
not be charged against conjugal partnership properties.
Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit — 'The
payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or
the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family.'
Respondents-appellants insist that the corporate debt in
question falls under the exception laid down in said Article
122 (par. one). We do not agree. The loan procured from
respondent-appellant AIDC was for the sole
advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills
and not for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of petitioners-appellees.
. . . appellee-husband derives salaries, dividends benefits
from Philippine Blooming Mills (the debtor corporation),
only because said husband is an employee of said PBM.
These salaries and benefits, are not the 'benefits'
contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code.
The 'benefits' contemplated by the exception in Article 122
(Family Code) is that benefit derived directly from the
use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate
loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by
petitioner-appellee-husband or his family. The alleged
benefit, if any, continuously harped by respondents-
appellants, are not only incidental but also
speculative." 19
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
PROPERTIES; WHEN MAY BE LIABLE FOR CONTRACTED
OBLIGATIONS. — This court does not agree that is a
difference between the terms "redounded to the
benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand; and "for
the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and the same
thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121
(2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use
the term "for the benefit of". On the other hand, Article
122 of the Family Code provides that "The
payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family." As can be seen, the terms are
used interchangeably. From jurisprudential
rulings of this Court, the following conclusions can be
derived: (A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor
in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term ". . .
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that
the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the
signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 37
from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in
the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound
to the benefit ofthe conjugal partnership. (B) On the other
hand, if the money or services are given to another person
or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters
into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement,
it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must
be presented to establish benefit redounding to the
conjugal partnership. In all our decisions involving
accommodation contracts of the husband, we
underscored the requirement that: "there must be the
requisite showing . . . of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses" or "benefits to his
family" or "that such obligations are productive of some
benefit to the family."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE FOR THE RESTRICTIONS ON
LIABILITY. — The provisions of the Family Code highlight the
underlying concern of the law for the conservation of the
conjugal partnership; for the husband's duty to protect
and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it. This is the
underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the
obligations entered into by one of the spouses must be
those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that
the measure of the partnership's liability is to "the extent
that the family is benefited." (Article 121, Nos. 2 & 3, Family
Code.) These are all in keeping with the spirit and
intent of the other provisions of the Civil Code which
prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey
gratuitously any part of the conjugal property. (Article 174,
Civil Code.)
3. ID.; ID.; CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP; SIGNING AS A SURETY, WHEN
NOT AN EXERCISE OF AN INDUSTRY OR PROFESSION; CASE
AT BAR. — The respondent court correctly observed that:
"Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, hence the cited cases of Cobb-
Perez vs. Lantin; Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger & Galinger; G-
Tractors, Inc. vs. CA do not apply in the instant case.
Signing as a surety is not embarking in a business," We are
likewise of the view that no matter how often an executive
acted or was persuaded to act, as a surety for his own
employer, this should not be taken to mean that he had
thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or
guaranty. This is not to say, however, that we are unaware
that executives are often asked to stand as surety for their
company's loan obligations. This is especially true if the
corporate officials have sufficient property of their own;
otherwise, their spouses' signatures are required in order to
bind the conjugal partnerships. The fact that on several
occasions the lending institutions did not require the
signature of the wife and the husband signed alone does
not mean that being a surety became part ofhis
profession. Neither could he be presumed to have acted
for the conjugal partnership. Article 121, paragraph
3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the
payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or
the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent
that they redounded to the benefit of the family. Here, the
property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan
is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety
is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor
an act of administration for the benefit of the family.
2. [G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004.]
ALFREDO CHING and
ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION,respondents.
FACTS:
On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills
Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00
from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this
loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President
Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the said
amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an
interest rate of 14%per annum. 5 As added security for the
said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, together
with Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a
continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to
jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the
PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the
extent of P38,000,000.00. 6 The loan was subsequently
renewed on various dates, the last renewal having been
made on December 4, 1980. 7
Earlier, on December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another
loan to the PBMCI in the amount of P13,000,000.00
payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As
in the previous loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching,
executed a promissory note to evidence the loan
maturing on June 29, 1981. 8This was renewed once for a
period of one month. 9
The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence,
on August 21, 1981, the ABC filed a complaint for
sum of money with prayer for a writ ofpreliminary
attachment against the PBMCI to collect the
P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other
bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the
complaint were Alfredo Ching, Emilio Tañedo and Chung
Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 142729 in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XVIII. 10 In its
application for a writ of preliminary attachment, the ABC
averred that the "defendants are guilty of fraud in
incurring the obligations upon which the present action is
brought 11 in that they falsely represented themselves to
be in a financial position to pay their obligation upon
maturity thereof." 12 Its supporting affidavit stated, inter
alia, that the "[d]efendants have removed or
disposed of their properties, or [are] ABOUT to do so, with
intent to defraud their creditors." 13
On August 26, 1981, after an ex-parte hearing, the
trial court issued an Order denying the ABC's application
for a writ of preliminary attachment. The
trial court decreed that the grounds alleged in the
application and that of its supporting affidavit "are all
conclusions of fact and of law" which do not warrant the
issuance of the writ prayed for. 14 On motion for
reconsideration, however, the trial court, in an Order
dated September 14, 1981, reconsidered its previous order
and granted the ABC's application for a writ of preliminary
attachment on a bond of P12,700,000. The order, in
relevant part, stated:
With respect to the second ground relied upon for the
grant of the writ of preliminary attachment ex-parte,
which is the alleged disposal of properties by the
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 38
defendants with intent to defraud creditors as provided in
Sec. 1(e) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the affidavits can
only barely justify the issuanceof said writ as against the
defendant Alfredo Ching who has allegedly bound
himself jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the defendant
corporation's obligation to the plaintiff as a surety thereof.
WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary attachment issue as
against the defendant Alfredo Ching requiring the
sheriff of this Court to attach all the properties of said
Alfredo Ching not exceeding P12,612,972.82 in value,
which are within the jurisdiction of this Court and not
exempt from execution upon, the filing by plaintiff of a
bond duly approved by this Court in the sum of Twelve
Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P12,700,000.00)
executed in favorof the defendant Alfredo Ching to
secure the payment by plaintiff to him of all the costs
which may be adjudged in his favor and all damages he
may sustain by reason of the attachment if the court shall
finally adjudge that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto.
SO ORDERED. 15
Upon the ABC's posting of the requisite bond, the
trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment.
Subsequently, summonses were served on the
defendants, 16 save Chung Kiat Hua who could not be
found.
Meanwhile, on April 1, 1982, the PBMCI and
Alfredo Ching jointly filed a petition for
suspension of payments with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), docketed as SEC Case No. 2250, at the
same time seeking the PBMCI's rehabilitation. 17
On July 9, 1982, the SEC issued an Order placing the
PBMCI's business, including its assets and liabilities, under
rehabilitation receivership, and ordered that "all actions for
claims listed in Schedule "A" of the petition pending before
any court or tribunal are hereby suspended in whatever
stage the same may be until further orders from the
Commission." 18 The ABC was among the PBMCI's
creditors named in the said schedule.
Subsequently, on January 31, 1983, the PBMCI and
Alfredo Ching jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or
motion to suspend the proceedings in Civil Case No.
142729 invoking the PBMCI's pending application for
suspension of payments (which Ching co-signed) and
over which the SEC had already assumed
jurisdiction. 19 On February 4, 1983, the ABC filed its
Opposition thereto. 20
In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the
trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common
shares of Citycorp stocks in the nameof Alfredo Ching. 21
Thereafter, in an Order dated September 16, 1983, the
trial court partially granted the aforementioned motion by
suspending the proceedings only with respect to the
PBMCI. It denied Ching's motion to dismiss the
complaint/or suspend the proceedings and pointed out
that P.D. No. 1758 only concerns the
activities of corporations, partnerships and associations
and was never intended to regulate and/or control
activities of individuals. Thus, it directed the individual
defendants to file their answers. 22
Instead of filing an answer, Ching filed on January 14, 1984
a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the same
ground of the pendency of SEC Case No. 2250. This
motion met the opposition from the ABC. 23
On January 20, 1984, Tañedo filed his Answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim. 24 Ching eventually filed
his Answer on July 12, 1984. 25
On October 25, 1984, long after submitting their
answers, Ching filed an Omnibus Motion, 26 again praying
for the dismissal of the complaint or suspension of the
proceedings on the ground of the July 9, 1982 Injunctive
Order issued in SEC Case No. 2250. He averred that as a
surety of the PBMCI, he must also necessarily benefit from
the defenses of his principal. The ABC opposed Ching's
omnibus motion.
Emilio Y. Tañedo, thereafter, filed his own Omnibus
Motion 27 praying for the dismissal of the complaint,
arguing that the ABC had "abandoned and waived" its
right to proceed against the continuing guaranty by
its act of resorting to preliminary attachment.
On December 17, 1986, the ABC filed a Motion to Reduce
the amount of his preliminary attachment bond from
P12,700,000 to P6,350,000. 28 AlfredoChing opposed the
motion, 29 but on April 2, 1987, the court issued an Order
setting the incident for further hearing on May 28, 1987 at
8:30 a.m. for the parties to adduce evidence on the actual
value of the properties of Alfredo Ching levied on by the
sheriff. 30
On March 2, 1988, the trial court issued an Order granting
the motion of the ABC and rendered the attachment
bond of P6,350,000. 31
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by
her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the
levy on attachment. She allegedinter alia that the 100,000
shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by
her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal
funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was
established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness
covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive
suretyship contract executed by petitioner
Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. She, likewise,
alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a
third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the
release of the properties. 32 She attached therewith a
copy ofher marriage contract with Alfredo Ching. 33
The ABC filed a comment on the motion to quash
preliminary attachment and/or motion to expunge
records, contending that:
2.1 The supposed movant, Encarnacion T. Ching, is not a
party to this present case; thus, she has no personality to
file any motion before this Honorable Court;
2.2 Said supposed movant did not file any Motion for
Intervention pursuant to Section 2, Rule 12 of the
Rules of Court;
2.3 Said Motion cannot even be construed to be in the
nature of a Third-Party Claim conformably with Sec. 14,
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
3. Furthermore, assuming in gratia argumenti that the
supposed movant has the required personality, her Motion
cannot be acted upon by this Honorable Court as the
above-entitled case is still in the archives and the
proceedings thereon still remains suspended. And there is
no previous Motion to revive the same. 34
The ABC also alleged that the motion was barred by
prescription or by laches because the shares of stocks
were in custodia legis.
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 39
During the hearing of the motion, Encarnacion
T. Ching adduced in evidence her marriage contract to
Alfredo Ching to prove that they were married on January
8, 1960; 35 the articles of incorporation of Citycorp
Investment Philippines dated May 14, 1979; 36 and, the
General Information Sheet of the corporation showing
that petitioner Alfredo Ching was a member of the
Board of Directors of the said corporation and was
one of its top twenty stockholders.
On December 10, 1993, the Spouses Ching filed their
Reply/Opposition to the motion to expunge records.
Acting on the aforementioned motion, the
trial court issued on December 15, 1993 an Order 37 lifting
the writ of preliminary attachment on the sharesof stocks
and ordering the sheriff to return the said stocks to the
petitioners. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion to Quash Preliminary
Attachment, dated November 9, 1993, is hereby granted.
Let the writ of preliminary attachment subject
matter of said motion, be quashed and lifted with respect
to the attached 100,000 common
shares of stock of Citycorp Investment Philippines in the
name of the defendant Alfredo Ching, the said
shares of stock to be returned to him and his movant-
spouse by Deputy Sheriff Apolonio A. Golfo who effected
the levy thereon on July 26, 1983, or by whoever may be
presently in possession thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner-wife had the right to file the
said motion, although she was not a party in Civil Case No.
142729.
RULING:
The petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said
relief. In Ong v. Tating, 49 we held that the sheriff may
attach only those properties of the defendant against
whom a writ of attachment has been issued by the court.
When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and
seizes the property of a third person in which the said
defendant holds no right or interest, the superior
authority of the court which has authorized the execution
may be invoked by the aggrieved third person in the same
case. Upon application ofthe third person, the court shall
order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining
whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the
performanceof his duties in the execution of the
writ of attachment, more specifically if he has indeed
levied on attachment and taken hold of property not
belonging to the plaintiff. If so, the court may then order
the sheriff to release the property from the erroneous levy
and to return the same to the third person. In resolving the
motion of the third party, the court does not and cannot
pass upon the question of the title to the property with any
character of finality. It can treat the matter only insofar as
may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted
correctly or not. If the claimant's proof does not persuade
the court of the validity of the title, or right of possession
thereto, the claim will be denied by the court. The
aggrieved third party may also avail himself of the
remedy of"terceria" by executing an affidavit of his title or
right of possession over the property levied on attachment
and serving the same to the office making the levy and
the adverse party. Such party may also file an action to
nullify the levy with damages resulting from the unlawful
levy and seizure, which should be a totally separate and
distinct action from the former case. The abovementioned
remedies are cumulative and any one of them may be
resorted to by one third-party claimant without
availing of the other remedies. 50
In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside
the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in
the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said
shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable
for the account of her husband under his continuing
guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The
petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said relief.
3. G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, Petitioner, vs.
MIGUELA C. DAILO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the
spouses purchased a house and lot.The Deed of Absolute
Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of
his wife. On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one
Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan
from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be
secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in San Pablo
City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in
the amount of ₱300,000.00 from petitioner. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of
the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the
knowledge and consent of respondent.4Upon maturity,
the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. Claiming that Meguela had no
knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject
property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent
instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San
Pablo City, Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real
Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the
payment of the loan obtained by the late marcelino dailo,
jr. the same having redounded to the benefit of the family.
RULING:
NO.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations
contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited; . . . ." For the subject property to be held liable,
the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of
some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of
the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership
respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband
alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of
the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.22The
burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the
creditor-party litigant claiming as such.23 Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove).24 Petitioner’s sweeping
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 40
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units
without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family,
without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this
Court. Other than petitioner’s bare allegation, there is
nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding
that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held
liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
4. G.R. No. 184007 February 16, 2011
PAQUITO V. ANDO, Petitioner, vs.
ANDRESITO Y. CAMPO, ET AL., Respondents.
FACTS:.
Petitioner was the president of Premier Allied and
Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor
contractor. Respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or
haulers tasked to manually carry bags of sugar from the
warehouse of Victorias Milling Company and load them
on trucks.4 In June 1998, respondents were dismissed from
employment. They filed a case for illegal dismissal and
some money claims with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI,
Bacolod City. To answer for the monetary award, NLRC
Acting Sheriff Romeo Pasustento issued a Notice of Sale on
Execution of Personal Property10 over the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140167
in the name of "Paquito V. Ando x x x married to Erlinda S.
Ando.This prompted petitioner to file an action for
prohibition and damages with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 50, Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed
that the property belonged to him and his wife, not to the
corporation, and, hence, could not be subject of the
execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the
judgment debtor, execution should be made on the
latter’s properties.11
ISSUE:
Whether or not property of petitioner can be the subject
of sale and execution
RULING:
NO.
The TCT28 of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs
to petitioner and his wife. Thus, even if we consider
petitioner as an agent of the corporation – and, therefore,
not a stranger to the case – such that the provision on third-
party claims will not apply to him, the property was
registered not only in the name of petitioner but also of his
wife. She stands to lose the property subject of execution
without ever being a party to the case. This will be
tantamount to deprivation of property without due
process.
Moreover, the power of the NLRC, or the courts, to
execute its judgment extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone.29 A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach the
property of any person except that of the judgment
debtor.30 Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever
tried to execute on the properties of the corporation.
In sum, while petitioner availed himself of the wrong
remedy to vindicate his rights, nonetheless, justice
demands that this Court look beyond his procedural
missteps and grant the petition.
5. G.R. No. 143382 November 29, 2006
SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs.
MAR TIERRA CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C. MARTINEZ,
MIGUEL J. LACSON and RICARDO A. LOPA, Respondents.
FACTS:
On May 7, 1980, respondent Mar Tierra Corporation,
through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a
₱12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner
Security Bank and Trust Company.. It was secured by an
indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents
Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa
who bound themselves jointly and severally with
respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.
Respondent corporation was not able to pay its
obligations as it suffered business reversals, eventually
ceasing operations in 1984.Unable to collect the balance
of the loan, petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of
money. The RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and
personal properties of respondent corporation and
individual respondent Martinez. As a consequence, the
conjugal house and lot of the spouses Wilfrido and
Josefina Martinez in Barrio Calaanan, Caloocan City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 49158 was
levied on.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal partnership be held liable for
an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to
accommodate a third party.
RULING:
Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code,8 the conjugal
partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." But when are debts and obligations
contracted by the husband alone considered for the
benefit of and therefore chargeable against the conjugal
partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation
contract entered into by the husband in favor of his
employer within the contemplation of the said provision?
We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de
Garcia9 that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another,
the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third
party.
In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,10 we ruled that, if the husband himself is
the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct
recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his
own business or profession, the transaction falls within the
term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." In other words, where the husband contracts
an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a
legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.11
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to
another person or entity and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be
deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.12 It is for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family. No presumption is raised
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 41
that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish
the benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.13 In
the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an
indemnity agreement executed by the husband to
accommodate a third party.14
In this case, the principal contract, the credit line
agreement between petitioner and respondent
corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The
accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under
which individual respondent Martinez assumed the
obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was
similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden
of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to
discharge that burden.To hold the conjugal partnership
liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone
defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the
solidarity and well being of the family as a unit.15 The
underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the
conjugal partnership.16 Hence, it limits the liability of the
conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
6. Ravina v Villa-Abrille, GR No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009
DOCTRINE: Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of
conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124
of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be
void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband
and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the
authority of the court.
FACTS:
In 1982, during the marriage of respondent Mary Ann
Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro, Villa Abrille, they acquired a
parcel of land (Lot 7) registered in their names. This lot is
adjacent to another land (Lot 8) which Pedro acquired
when he was still single, and which is registered solely
under his name.
Subsequently, the spouses obtained a loan from DBP and
built a house on the two lots + improvements. When Pedro
had a mistress in 1991 and neglected his family, Mary Ann
sold/mortgaged their movables to support the family and
the studies of her children. Pedro, by himself, offered to sell
the house and the two lots to petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann
objected and notified the petitioners of such objection,
but in June 1991, Pedro still sold the house and lots without
her consent (Mary Ann did not sign her name in the Deed
of Sale). Later, Pedro transferred all their belongings from
the house to an apartment. Mary Ann and her children
were also stopped from entering the house.
Mary Ann and her children (respondents) filed a complaint
for Annulment of Sale, among other actions against Pedro
and the petitioners. During trial Pedro claimed that the
house was built with his own money.
Petitioners assert that Lot 7 was Pedro’s exclusive property,
acquired by him through barter or exchange (Pedro and
his sister agreed to exchange their exclusive lots; later,
Pedro sold Lot 7 to another person and purchased the
property of Carmelita using the proceeds of the sale)
ISSUES
(1) Whether the Lot 7 is an exclusive property of Pedro or
conjugal property
(2) Whether the sale of Lot 7 was valid considering the
absence of Mary Ann’s consent
(3) Whether the petitioners are buyers in good faith,
hence, entitled to reimbursement of their payment
RULING
1. Conjugal
Lot 7 was acquired in 1982 during Pedro and Mary Ann’s
marriage. No evidence was adduced to show that the
property was acquired through exchange or barter. The
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists
in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that
the subject property is exclusively owned by
Pedro. Likewise, the house built on Lot 7 is conjugal
property, having been constructed through the joint
efforts of the spouses, who had obtained a loan from DBP
to construct the house.
2.) Sale was VOID
Under Art. 124 of the FC, disposition of a conjugal property
is void if done a) without the consent of both the husband
and wife, or b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the
authority of the court.
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the
wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance
was not carried over to the Family Code. Thus, the
alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership
property by the husband without the consent of the wife is
null and void. Hence, just like the rule in absolute
community of property, if the husband, without
knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal
property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the
knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby
resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the
instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the
date the contract implementing the decision of the
husband to institute the case.
Here, Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of
sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and
execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the
sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does
not include the lot covered by Lot 8, a property exclusively
belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely
without Mary Ann’s consent.
3.) Buyers in bad faith; no reimbursement
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right
to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price
for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he
has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in
the property. For a person dealing with land registered in
the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity
is restricted, such as Arts. 166/173/124 of the FC, to establish
status as a buyer in GF, he must show that he inquired into
the latter’s capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a
buyer for value in good faith. Here, petitioners were
apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her objection to the sale
and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property
without Mary Ann’s written consent. Moreover, the
respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public
possession of the property at the time the transaction was
being made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew
that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject
properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 42
the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke
the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith.
Article 449 of the NCC which provides that ““(h)e who
builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity”, is applicable in this case  No reimbursement.
7. Hernandez v Mingoa, G.R. No. 146548, Dec. 18, 2009
DOCTRINE: Marriage; disposition of conjugal property. The
husband’s first act of disposition of the subject property
occurred in 1963 when he executed the SPA and the Deed
of Transfer of Rights in favor of Dolores Camisura. Thus, the
right of action of the petitioners accrued in 1963, as Article
173 of the Civil Code provides that the wife may file for
annulment of a contract entered into by the husband
without her consent within ten (10) years from the
transaction questioned. Petitioners filed the action for
reconveyance in 1995. Even if we were to consider that
their right of action arose when they learned of the
cancellation of TCT No. 107534 and the issuance of TCT No.
290121 in Melanie Mingoa’s name in 1993, still, twelve (12)
years have lapsed since such discovery, and they filed the
petition beyond the period allowed by law. Moreover,
when Sergia Hernandez, together with her children, filed
the action for reconveyance, the conjugal partnership of
property with Hernandez, Sr. had already been terminated
by virtue of the latter’s death on April 16, 1983. Clearly,
therefore, petitioners’ action has prescribed.
The failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an
action for annulment of the contract during the marriage
and within ten (10) years from the transaction necessarily
barred her from questioning the sale of the subject
property to third persons.
FACTS:
The subject matter of the action is a parcel of land with an
area of 520.50 square meters situated in Diliman, Quezon
City registered in the name of Domingo B. Hernandez, Sr.
married to Sergia V. Hernandez. Later, the TCT issued to the
spouses was cancelled and a new one was issued in
favour of Melanie Mingoa.
Domingo apparently owned the property from an award
by the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation in
1958. Title to the property was only issued in 1966 after
Domingo paid in full to PHHC. However, Domingo never
took possession of the property. Respondents took
possession of the property since 1966. A Deed of Transfer
of Rights was executed by Domingo in favour of Dolores
Camisura, expressly stating that the former, in
consideration of the amount of PHP6,500.00, transfers his
rights over the subject property to the latter. Although
entitled as an SPA, this was in reality an alienation of the
subject property. It is now being questioned by petitioners
on whether the sale was valid since the property, being
conjugal in nature, the consent of the wife Sergia must be
obtained first. However, the wife’s signature on the SPA
was falsified.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the property was valid despite
the falsity of the wife’s signature in the SPA.
RULING:
Sergias lack of consent to the sale did not render the
transfer of her share invalid.
The husband’s first act of disposition of the subject property
occurred in 1963 when he executed the SPA and the Deed
of Transfer of Rights in favor of Dolores Camisura. Thus, the
right of action of the petitioners accrued in 1963, as Article
173 of the Civil Code provides that the wife may file for
annulment of a contract entered into by the husband
without her consent within ten (10) years from the
transaction questioned. Petitioners filed the action for
reconveyance in 1995. Even if we were to consider that
their right of action arose when they learned of the
cancellation of TCT No. 107534 and the issuance of TCT No.
290121 in Melanie Mingoa’s name in 1993, still, twelve (12)
years have lapsed since such discovery, and they filed the
petition beyond the period allowed by law. Moreover,
when Sergia Hernandez, together with her children, filed
the action for reconveyance, the conjugal partnership of
property with Hernandez, Sr. had already been terminated
by virtue of the latter’s death on April 16, 1983. Clearly,
therefore, petitioners’ action has prescribed.
The failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an
action for annulment of the contract during the marriage
and within ten (10) years from the transaction necessarily
barred her from questioning the sale of the subject
property to third persons.
8. Fuentes v Roca, GR No. 178902, April 21, 2010
DOCTRINE:
1. A forged affidavit of consent is void. Thus, anything
based on such instrument is likewise void.
The husband of a wife who no longer lives with him sold a
conjugal property without her consent as the affidavit of
consent was forged. After their death, their children
questioned the sale. It must be emphasized that their
marriage was contracted under the Civil Code, but the
sale was executed under the Family Code. Ruling that the
Family Code applies, the High Court held that the sale
could be made by the husband without the consent of the
wife.
2. Even if the marriage took place under the Civil, the
validity of sales of community or conjugal property is still
governed by the Family Code.
When the spouses got married, the Civil Code put in place
the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their
property relations. While its Article 165 made the husband
the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article
166 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real
property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same
without his wife’s consent, the sale is not void but merely
voidable. Article 173 gave the wife the right to have the
sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the
date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may
demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value
of the property that the husband fraudulently sold.
The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter
4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded
Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations
Between Husband and Wife. The Family Code provisions
were also made to apply to already existing conjugal
partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. Thus:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply
to conjugal partnerships of gains already established
between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided
in Article 256. (n)
FACTS:
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 43
Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar,Zamboanga City
and she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano)
under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988,
Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and
Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They met in the
office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to
prepare the documents of sale and signed an agreement
to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared. It expressly stated that
the sale was to take effect in six months. Within six months,
Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants
and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario
Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale.
Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the
Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay
him an additional pay besides the downpayment,
depending on whether or not he succeeded in
demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was
unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes
spouses would become owners of the lot without any
further formality and payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata
who then worked on the other requirements of the sale.
According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of
his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent.
After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the
spouses who immediately constructed a building on the
lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife
Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and
Rosario, namely, respondents(collectively, the Rocas),
filed an action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance
of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC.
The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void
since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to
it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been
forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed
to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes
spouses paid Tarciano.
The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They
presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally
saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence. He
admitted, however,that he notarized the document in
Zamboanga City four months later. All the same, the
Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was
personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides,
the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on
ground of fraud had already lapsed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Rosario’s signature on the document of
consent to her husband Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal
land to the Fuentes spouses was forged?
2. Whether the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity
of that sale to the spouses already prescribed?
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was
not had, could bring the action to annul that sale?
HELD:
1. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s
signature on the document of consent had been forged.
For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave
her consent to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land
would render the other issues merely academic. The SC
agreed with the CA that the signature was forged.
While a defective notarization will merely strip the
document of its public character and reduce it to a
private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with
the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such
document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the sale of the
land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the
notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent does not
matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.
2. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law
that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil
Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses
on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in
place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their
property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the
sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166
prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property
without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without
his wife’s consent, the sale is merely voidable. Article 173
gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the
marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing
in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of
the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano
fraudulently sold.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code
on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further,
the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to
already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to
vested rights.
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply
to conjugal partnerships of gains already established
between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided
in Article 256.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of
the Family Code does not provide a period within which
the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s
sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the
other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing
the sale, the same would be void.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts,
a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from
the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that
are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the
case of a sale of conjugal property without the other
spouse’s written consent. But, although a void contract
has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside,
when any of its terms have been performed, an action to
declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of
what has been given under it. This action, according to
Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes
spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and re-conveyance
of the real property that Tarciano sold without their
mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time
did not erode the right to bring such an action.
3. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning.
Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano
and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they
passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs,
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 44
9. Aguete v PNB, GR 170166, April 6, 2011
DOCTRINE: If the husband himself is the principal obligor in
the contract, that contract falls within the term "x x x x
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that
the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the
contract. Where the husband contracts obligations on
behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly
so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed acomplaint for
annulment against PNB before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal.
Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of
P115,000.00 from PNB and as security, a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land with TCT. No. T-9646 was
executed. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and
an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged
property was instituted by PNB. After the lapse of a year,
the property was consolidated and registered in the name
of PNB.
Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of the
said loan nor the mortgage constituted on the land which
is part of their conjugal property, contested the
transactions and filed for an annulment of the
proceedings. She interposed in her defense that the
signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that
the proceeds of the loan did not redound to the benefit of
the family.
RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may during
their marriage and within ten years from the transaction
mentioned, may ask the court for an annulment of the
case. On notice of appeal by PNB, Court of Appeals
reversed this ruling and found for PNB, stating that forgery
was concluded without adequate proof. It also found that
the loan was used in the expansion of the family business.
Hence, this petition
ISSUES:
1. WON the debt contracted by Jose is chargeable
against the conjugal partnership of gains. – YES
2. How is the benefit to the family proven so as to render
the loan contracted by the husband binding upon the
conjugal property?
RULING:
1. The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the
mortgage. The property, acquired during Ros and
Aguete’s marriage, is thus considered part of the CPG.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal
real property without the consent, express or implied, of
the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable under Art. 173 of CC. But, annulment will be
declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her
consent.
In this case, the document disavowed by Aguete was
acknowledged before a notary public, hence they are
public documents. The execution of a document that has
been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved
by the mere denial of the alleged signer.
2. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
contract, that contract falls within the term “x x x x
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that
the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the
contract. Where the husband contracts obligations on
behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly
so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
Annulment of the contract will only be granted upon a
finding that the wife did not give her consent to the
transaction. Even as Aguete disavows the documents
supposedly acknowledged before the notary public, the
document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon
it with respect to its due execution. It has in its favor the
presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by
evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to the falsity of the certificate.
Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such
as a handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare
that Aguete’s signatures were really forged.
In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in
such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it
prospered. Debts contracted by the husband for and in
the exercise of the industry or profession by which he
contributes to the support of the family cannot be
deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed, such may still be charged against the
conjugal property of the spouses.
10. Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201
FACTS:
Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others
were accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia
and another person was found guilty and was sentenced
to the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the
victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and
damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased,
the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the
levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and
Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of
sale on execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ
of execution, claiming that the levied properties were
conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and
Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the
satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal properties
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
upon them be charged to the partnership.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the
spouses may be enforced against the partnership assets if
the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient.
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 45
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia
has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies.
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case
imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of
the Family Code have been covered.
Ownership, administration and enjoyment
1. HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C.
DAILO, G.R. No. 153802 March 11, 2005
FACTS:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on
August 8, 1967. During their marriage the spouses
purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from
a certain Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax
assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however,
was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to
obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and
Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and
lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo
obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor,
Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate
Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of
petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including
the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took
place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale
thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of
petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year
without the property being redeemed, petitioner
consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her
visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that
petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean
its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed
because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the
premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage
constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in
nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City
a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership,
Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the
latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
property in question was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered
a Decision declaring the said documents null and void
and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey
the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to
pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car
which was burned, the attorney’s fees, moral and
exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Decision, but
deleted the award for damages and attorney’s fees for
lack of basis. Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE
MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-
OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE
PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO
DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT
OF THE FAMILY.
HELD:
The petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court
declared that the absence of the consent of one renders
the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the husband who
contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on
August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains governed the property relations between
respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made
applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
established before its effectivity unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the
property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino
even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal
partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where
the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
properties and those acquired by either or both spouses
through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership
apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership
shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership
in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined
in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the
spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property
relations of respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily,
by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of
conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code
provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code
is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime,
without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino
constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject
property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership.
By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in
the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the
other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to
the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 46
encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-
ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where
the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate
court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate
mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent’s
consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, “[T]he
conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have been benefited; . . . .”
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a
liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil
Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and
well-being of the family as a unit.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the
creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion
that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance
the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held
liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
2. SPOUSES ONESIFORO and ROSARIO
ALINAS, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA
ALINAS, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Onesiforo Alinas (Onesiforo) and respondent
Victor Alinas (Victor) are brothers. Petitioners allege that
they entrusted their properties to Victor and Elena Alinas
(respondent spouses) with the agreement that any
income from rentals of the properties should be remitted
to the Social Security System (SSS) and to the Rural Bank of
Oroquieta City (RBO), as such rentals were believed
sufficient to pay off petitioners' loans with said institutions.
Lot 896-B-9-A with the bodega was mortgaged as security
for the loan obtained from the RBO, while Lot 896-B-9-B
with the house was mortgaged to the SSS. Onesiforo
alleges that he left blank papers with his signature on them
to facilitate the administration of said properties.
Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots
were already titled in the name of respondent spouses.
Records show that after Lot 896-B-9-A was extra-judicially
foreclosed, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
118533 covering said property was issued in the name of
mortgagee RBO on November 13, 1987. On May 2, 1988,
the duly authorized representative of RBO executed a
Deed of Installment Sale of Bank's Acquired
Assets4 conveying Lot 896-B-9-A to respondent spouses.
RBO's TCT over Lot 896-B-9-A was then cancelled and on
February 22, 1989, TCT No. T-126645 covering said lot was
issued in the name of respondent spouses.
Lot 896-B-9-B was also foreclosed by the SSS and on
November 17, 1986, the Ex-Oficio City Sheriff of Ozamis City
issued a Certificate of Sale6 over said property in favor of
the SSS. However, pursuant to a Special Power of
Attorney7 signed by Onesiforo in favor of Victor, dated
March 10, 1989, the latter was able to redeem, on the
same date, Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS for the sum
of P111,110.09. On June 19, 1989, a Certificate of
Redemption8 was issued by the SSS.
Onesiforo's signature also appears in an Absolute Deed of
Sale9 likewise dated March 10, 1989, selling Lot 896-B-9-B to
respondent spouses. The records also show a notarized
document dated March 10, 1989 and captioned
Agreement10 whereby petitioner Onesiforo
acknowledged that his brother Victor used his own money
to redeem Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS and, thus, Victor
became the owner of said lot. In the same Agreeement,
petitioner Onesiforo waived whatever rights, claims, and
interests he or his heirs, successors and assigns have or may
have over the subject property. On March 15, 1993, by
virtue of said documents, TCT No. 1739411 covering Lot 896-
B-9-B was issued in the name of respondent spouses.
ISSUE:
WON THE SALE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE WIFE IS VOID
RULING:
YES.
In the present case, the Court does not see how applying
Article 124 of the Family Code would lead to injustice or
absurdity. It should be noted that respondent spouses
were well aware that Lot 896-B-9-B is a conjugal property
of petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being
made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as
they knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale
documents do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario.
The fact that Onesiforo had to execute two documents,
namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989
and a notarized Agreement likewise dated March 10,
1989, reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe
infirmities of the sale. As held in Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes v.
Spouses Mijares,22 "a purchaser cannot close his eyes to
facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and
still claim he acted in good faith."23 Such being the case,
no injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as they
risked transacting with Onesiforo alone despite their
knowledge that the subject property is a conjugal
property.
Verily, the sale of Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses is
entirely null and void.
However, in consonance with the salutary principle of non-
enrichment at another's expense, the Court agrees with
the CA that petitioners should reimburse respondent
spouses the redemption price paid for Lot 896-B-9-B in the
amount of P111,110.09 with legal interest from the time of
filing of the complaint.
3. G.R. No. 140153, March 28, 2001
DOCENA V. LAPESURA
DOCTRINE: The signing of the attached certificate of non-
forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
FACTS:
Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint
for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees,
petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The
spouses claimed ownership of the land based on the
occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in
issuing orders and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of
demolition.
The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the
petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 47
certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was
signed by only one of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is sufficient that the certification of non-
forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners.
RULING:
Yes, such certificate signed by Antonio Docena alone
should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance
with the rules.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal
property belongs to the husband and the wife jointly.
However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance
where the consent of both spouses is required, joint
management or administration does not require that the
husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may
validly exercise full power of management alone, subject
to the intervention of the court in proper cases as provided
under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is believed that
even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband
alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against
the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without
being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached
certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is
not a fatal defect.
The two petitioners in this case are husband and wife and
their residence is the subject property alleged to be a
conjugal property. In view of the property involved which
is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of
demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery
brought against the spouses and is clearly intended for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point
out was in the province of Samar whereas the petition was
prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules
on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husband’s
signing the certification in his behalf and that of his wife is
too harsh. Hence, petition was granted and the case was
remanded to the CA for further proceedings.
4. G.R. No. 165803, [September 1, 2010]
SPOUSES AGGABAO V. PARULAN, JR. AND PARULAN
DOCTRINE: The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after
Au-gust 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The
proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family
Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance
of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the
Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
According to Article 256 of the Family Code, the pro-
visions of the Family Code may apply retroactively
provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v.
Fernandez, 330 SCRA 718 (2000), the Court rejected the
petitioner’s argument that the Family Code did not apply
because the acquisition of the contested property had
occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and
pointed out that Article 256 pro-vided that the Family
Code could apply retroactively if the application would
not prejudice vested or ac-quired rights existing before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the
petitioners did not show any vested right in the property
acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their
situation from the retroactive application of the Family
Code.
FACTS:
In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K.Atanacio
offered 2 lots located in Parañaque to the petitioners. On
February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan
at the site of the property and showed them the following
documents: (a.) Owner’s original copy of the TCT of the 2
lots; (b.) tax declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power
of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio
authorizing Elena to sell the property. The petitioners paid
P200,000.00 as earnest money for which Elena executed a
handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money which stipulated
that the peitioners would pay an additional payment of
P130, 000.00 on February 4, 1991; P650,000.00 on or before
February 15, 1991 and P700, 000.00 on March 31, 1991
once Elena turned over the property.
On February 4, 1991, the petitioners, accompanied by the
broker, went to the Office of the Register of Deeds to verify
the TCTs shown by Elena. There they discovered that one
of the lots had been encumbered to Banco Filipino, but
that the encumbrance had been cancelled due to the full
payment of the obligation. They noticed that the loan was
effected through and SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of
Elena. The other lot on the other hand had an annotation
of an existing mortgage in favor of Los Baños Rural Bank,
with the same SPA with a court order authorizing Elena to
mortgage the lot to secure the loan.
The petitioners and the broker next inquired about the
mortgage and the court order at the Los Baños Rural Bank.
There, they met with Atty. Zarate, related that the bank
had asked for the court order because the lot involved
was conjugal property.
Following their verification, the petitioners delivered
P130,000.00 as additional down payment on February 4,
1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baños Rural Bank on
February 12, 1991, which then released the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT to them.
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final
amount of P700,000.00 to Elena, who executed a deed of
absolute sale in their favor. However, Elena did not turn
over the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that
said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then
in Hongkong. She assured them that the owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT would be turned over after a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was
issued in the name of the petitioners. Elena did not turn
over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT as promised. In
due time, the petitioners learned that the duplicate
owner’s copy of TCT had been all along in the custody of
Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA
executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both
lots. At Atanacio’s instance, the petitioners met on March
25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan at the Manila Peninsula. They
were accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca. They
recalled that Atty. Parulan “smugly demanded
P800,000.00” in exchange for the duplicate owner’s copy
of TCT, because Atty. Parulan represented the current
value of the property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer,
however, they tendered P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan
declined, giving them only until April 5, 1991 to decide.
Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan
decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed
him that they had already fully paid to Elena.
Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan,
commenced an action (Civil Case No. 91-1005 entitled
Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr., represented by Jeremy Z. Parulan,
as attorney in fact, v. Ma. Elena Parulan, Sps. Rex and
Coney Aggabao), praying for the declaration of the nullity
of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and
the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by
virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991
their own action for specific performance with damages
against the respondents. Both cases were consolidated for
trial and judgment in the RTC.
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 48
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136,
in Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale
executed in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels
of registered land the respondents owned for want of the
written consent of respondent husband Dionisio Parulan,
Jr. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article
124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the
conjugal property executed without the consent of
Dionisio?
RULING:
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal
properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code
The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the CivilCode, not
Article 124 of the Family Code, governed the property
relations of the respondents because they had been
married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; and that
the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code
should not apply because the other spouse held the
administration over the conjugal property. They argue that
notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still
held the administration of the conjugal property by virtue
of his execution of the SPA in favor of his brother; and that
even assuming that Article 124 of the Family Code properly
applied, Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. Parulan’s
counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting.
To start with, Article 25427 the Family Code has expressly
repealed several titles under the Civil Code, among them
the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property
relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included,
are found.
Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after
August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The
proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family
Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance
of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the
Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
“Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall
be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.”
Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the
provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively
provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v.
Fernandez, the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument
that the Family Code did not apply because the
acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out that
Article 256 provided that the Family Code could apply
retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested
or acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the
Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show
any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3,
1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive
application of the Family Code.
Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their
contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration
over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty.
Parulan, the administration of the property, considering
that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty.
Parulan the authority for the administration.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration
does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance,
which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to
dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer,
and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised
by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the
Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Specifically,
the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special
agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question,
and did not include or extend to the power to administer
the property.
Lastly, the petitioners’ insistence that Atty. Parulan’s
making of a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991
meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under
Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed
sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court
order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void
contract could not be ratified. On the other hand, we
agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing
offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had
the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was
withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners.
The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124
of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the
absence of the other spouse’s consent, the transaction
should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
5. G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011
FLORES V. LINDO
DOCTRINE: The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by
the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a
binding contract between the parties, making the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
FACTS:
Respondent Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Petitioner
Arturo Flores amounting to P400,000 and secured it with a
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgage covered
property in the name of Edna and her husband, co-
respondent Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna likewise signed a
Promissory Note and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as
his attorney-in-fact.
She issued three checks as partial loan payments, all of
which were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Flores
therefore filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage
with damages. The RTC ruled that petitioner was not
entitled to judicial foreclosure as the Deed was without
consent and authority of Edna’s husband. The Deed was
executed on October 31, 1995, while the Special Power of
Attorney was executed by Enrico only on November 4,
1995. Accordingly, the mortgage is void pursuant to Article
96 of the Family Code. The RTC, however, ruled that
petitioner may still recover the loan through a personal
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 49
action against Edna, but that it had no jurisdiction over the
said personal action which should be filed where plaintiff
or defendant resides.
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages. The respondents alleged that Enrico was not a
party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna
without Enrico’s signature. They also prayed for the
dismissal of the case on grounds of improper venue, res
judicata and forum-shopping. The RTC ruled that res
judicata will not apply to rights, claims or demands which,
though growing out of the same subject matter, constitute
separate or distinct causes of action.
The Court of Appeals set aside the RTC ruling. It noted that
petitioner allowed the earlier decision of the RTC to
become final and executory without asking the courts for
an alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that
petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these courts
that he could file a separate personal action and thus
failed to observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on
multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s avenue for recovery
of the loan.
ISSUE:
Whether the promissory note and deed of mortgage are
void as it was entered into without the husband's consent.
RULING:
NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall
be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal
partnership property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the
Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide
that the powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent of the other
spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the
written consent shall be void. However, both provisions
also state that “the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x
beforethe offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The
Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November
1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the
other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a
binding contract between the parties, making the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
Sole administration
Incapacity
Uy vs. CA
GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000
FACTS: Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered
him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in
RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their
conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as
her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contest that such illness of the
husband necessitated expenses that would require her to
sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet
such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending
that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that
the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on
summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that the petition made by her
mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the
person and properties of his father. As such it cannot be
prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing
special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring
procedural due process particularly the need for notice
and a hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that
Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on
“Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife”
contemplating a situation where both spouses are of
disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be
applied in their case. During the pendency of the motion,
Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in
law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the
decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke,
a cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose,
without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole
powers of administration of the conjugal property and
dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
RULING:
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary
proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to
give consent. In this case, trial court found that subject
spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose
condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of
Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole
powers of administration has the same powers and duties
as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell
real property as administrator of the conjugal property,
must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s
estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary
judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such
incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity
to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due
process.
Disposition and encumbrance
1. CHEESMAN V IAC 193 SCRA 93 G.R. No. 74833 January
21, 1991
FACTS:
This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen
(petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to annul
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 50
for lack of consent on his part the sale by his Filipino wife
(Criselda) of a residential lot and building to Estelita Padilla.
On December 4, 1970 – Thomas Cheesman and Criselda
Cheesman were married but have been separated since
February 15, 1981. On June 4, 1974, a Deed of Sale and
Transfer of Possessory Rights was executed by Armando
Altares, conveying a parcel of land in favor of “Criselda
Cheesman, married to Thomas Cheesman.” Thomas,
although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer
being made only to his wife. Tax declarations for the said
property were issued in the name of Criselda Cheesman
alone and she assumed exclusive management and
administration of the property.
On July 1, 1981 – Criselda sold the property to Estelita
Padilla without knowledge and consent of Thomas. On
July 31, 1981 – Thomas filed a suit for the annulment of the
sale on the ground that the transaction had been
executed without his knowledge and consent. Criselda
filed an answer alleging that the property sold was
paraphernal, having purchased the property from her
own money; that Thomas, an American was disqualified to
have any interest or right of ownership in the land and; that
Estelita was a buyer in good faith.
During the trial, it was found out that the transfer of
property took place during the existence of their marriage
as it was acquired on June 4, 1974. On June 24, 1982, RTC
declared the sale executed by Criselda void ab initio and
ordered the delivery of the property to Thomas as
administrator of the conjugal property. Thomas appealed
to IAC where he assailed the granting of Estelita’s petition
for relief and resolution of matters not subject of said
petition; in declaring valid the sale to Estelita without his
knowledge and consent. On January 7, 1986, IAC affirmed
summary judgment decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife can dispose of the property in
question; Whether or not Cheesman, being an American
citizen, can question the sale.
RULING:
Section 14, Art. XIV of 1973 Constitution provides that:
“save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.” Thus, assuming that it was his
intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and
his wife, he acquired no right whatsoever over the
property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, he was knowingly
violating the Constitution.
As such, the sale to him was null and void. At any rate,
Cheesman had and has NO CAPACITY TO QUESTION THE
SUBSEQUENTSALE OF THE SAME PROPERTY BY HIS
WIFE ON THE THEORY THAT IN SO DOING HEIS
MERELY EXERCISING THE PREROGATIVE OF A HUSBAND
IN RESPECT OFCONJUGAL PROPERTY. To sustain such a
theory would permit indirect controversion of the
Constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be
declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien
husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as
he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
permit him to have. Even if the wife did use conjugal funds
to make the acquisition, his recovering and holding the
property cannot be warranted as it is against the
constitution. Consequently, Estelita is a purchaser in good
faith since she knew that Thomas cannot intervene in the
sale or disposition of the said property. The Court
AFFIRMED the appealed decision.
2. FRENZEL vs. CATITO G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of
German descent who was married to Teresita Santos, a
Filipino citizen. He works as a pilot for New Guinea Airlines.
On the other hand, private respondent Ederlina P. Catito
was married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She
worked as a masseuse in the King’s Cross nightclub in
Sydney, Australia. The two met when Alfred went on a
vacation in Sydney. They met again and this time, Alfred
was able to convince Ederlina to stop working and to go
back to the Philippines. When she returned to the
Philippines, she was given money by Alfred to put up a
beauty salon. Later on, he also gave money to her to be
able to purchase a house and lot in San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City. But since he was aware that aliens
were prohibited to purchase lands, he agreed to have
Ederlina as the sole vendee. Later also, they opened two
bank accounts with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation in Kowloon, Hong Kong. Also, there were
subsequent purchases of other real and personal
properties. These were made on the anticipation on the
part of Alfred that he and Ederlina will get married soon.
However, this failed to materialize because of the fact that
Ederlina was still married to Klaus. Ederlina failed to secure
a divorce from Klaus. This exasperated Alfred and
eventually their relationship started to fade. Later on,
Alfred filed a complaint before the RTC of Davao City for
recovery of real and personal properties. He demanded
from Ederlina that she return all the money that were used
to purchase the properties and also the properties which
were bought, especially the house and lot and three other
lots. However, the complaint of Alfred was dismissed by the
RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the RTC in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alfred is entitled to recover the said
properties?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The contention
of petitioner Frenzel that to bar him from recovering the
properties would be in violation of Article 22 of the Civil
Code on unjust enrichment
did not hold water. It must be remembered that a contract
which violates the Constitution and the laws is void and
vests no rights and creates no obligations. It does not
produce any legal effect. His reliance on Article 22 is
misplaced because in this case, the action is proscribed
by the Constitution or the parties are in pari delicto. This is
founded on the general principles of public policy. It must
be remembered that Alfred knew all along that he was
disqualified from purchasing lands. His contention that he
entered into the transaction because he was expecting
that he and Ederlina will get married in the future is not a
valid one. He also knew that he cannot get married to
Ederlina because he still had a valid existing marriage with
Teresita Santos.
3. G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010 MARIO SIOCHI,
Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO GOZON, et al., Respondents. G.R.
No. 169977 INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner, vs.
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, et al., Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property)
covered by TCT No. 5357. The property is situated in
Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of
"Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 51

Regional Trial Court (Cavite RTC) a petition for legal 4. [G.R. NO. 160708 : October 16, 2009]
separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2 January
1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO
annotated on TCT No. 5357. RAVINA, Petitioners, v. MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for
On 31 August 1993, while the legal separation case was still herself and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE,
pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA
Agreement to Buy and Sell (Agreement) involving the ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE,Respondents.
property for the price of P18 million. Among the stipulations
in the Agreement were that Alfredo would secure an
Affidavit from Elvira that the property is Alfredo’s exclusive
FACTS:
property and to annotate the Agreement at the back of
TCT No. 5357, etc.
Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are
When the Court granted the legal separation of Elvira and
husband and wife. In 1982, the spouses acquired lot 7 in
Mario, their property was dissolved and liquidated. Being
Davao City with TCT T-88674 in their names. Said lot was
the offending spouse, Alfredo is deprived of his share in the
adjacent to lot 8 which Pedro acquired when he was still
net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred
single and was registered solely under his name (TCT T-
R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to Elvira.
26471). The spouses used their conjugal funds and loan
from DBP to build a house on 7 and Pedros lot.
On Oct, 26, 1994 Alfredo sold that property into Inter
Consequently, they made improvements, including a
Dimensional Realty Inc. for 18 million pesos in his favor by
poultry house and an annex.
Winnifred. And the IDRI paid it in full payment.
Because of that Mario, filed a complaint with RTC Malabon
On 1991, the husband got a mistress and started to neglect
for specific performance and damages, annulment of
his family. The wife was forced to sell or mortgage their
donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and
movables to support the family. On his own, the husband
prohibitory injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
wanted to dispose of the house and two lots to the
petitioners Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. The wife
The Court held, the agreement between Alfredo and IDRI
opposed but the husband still sold the property without the
is null and void for their attempt of commission or
wife’s consent and signature onJuly 5, 1991.
continuance of their wrongful acts, further alienating or
disposing of the subject property. Also the agreement of
While the wife and children were out, the husband and
Alfredo and Mario is null and void, for the absence of
some CAFGU members transferred all their belongings
written consent of Elvira Gozon for her property rights to
from the house to an apartment. When they got home, the
the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property of
were prevented from entering the house. Thus, the wife
this case.
filed a complaint for the annulment of sale with damages
against the husband and the petitioners. During the trial,
ISSUE:
the husband alleged that the house was built from his
exclusive funds. The RTC ruled in favor of the wife,
Whether the sale of the conjugal property is valid
declaring that the sale of lot 8 was void, being a conjugal
property while the sale of lot 7 was valid since it was the
RULING: No.
husband’s exclusive property. The CA declared that: sale
of lot 7 to petitioners is valid but the sale of lot 8 is null and
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and
void; that the husband is ordered to return the value of the
Elvira. Since the disposition of the property occurred after
consideration for lot 8 to petitioners; that petitioners are
the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the
ordered to reconvey the house and lot to the wife.
Family Code. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
ISSUE: Whether or not the husband can sell a property
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
which is part exclusive and part conjugal
case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall
prevail, subject to the recourse to the court by the wife for
RULING: No.
a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such
Art. 160 NCC provides that all property of the marriage is
decision.
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
is proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders
the wife. Lot 7 is an exclusive property of the husband since
the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal
it was acquired prior to his marriage with the respondent.
property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the
However lot 8 was acquired in 1983 during the marriage of
sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in
the spouses. There is no evidence proving that the subject
negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s
property was acquired through exchange or barter. The
written consent to the sale is still required by law for its
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists
validity. As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement
in the absence of and convincing evidence to overcome
is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s
the presumption.
acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded
the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the
is governed by Art. 124: The administration and enjoyment
offer was already withdrawn.
of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s
the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the offending spouse would have no right to any share
the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within
of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is
five years from the date of the contract implementing
only Alfredo’s share in the net profits which is forfeited in
such decision. In the event that one spouse is
favor of Winifred.
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
Under Article 125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
the other spouse.
do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 52
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall
be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.
Unlike in the NCC which gives the wife 10 years to annul
the alienation or encumbrance, any alienation or
encumbrance under the Family Code without the consent
of both spouses is NULL AND VOID. If the husband, without
the knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal
property, the sale is void. If the sale was with knowledge
the not consent of the wife, the wife has 5 years from the
date of the contract to annul the sale.
In the present case, the wife filed within the prescribed
period. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only
to the conjugal house and lot which does not include lot 7
which is an exclusive property of the husband. The
petitioners cannot argue that they were buyers of good
faith since they knew that at the time of the sale, Pedro
was married to Mary Ann and her signature did not appear
in the deed. Even if they were to argue that the property
is an exclusive property of the husband, that they
proceeded with the sale regardless of the wife’s
contention and that the she was in actual and public
possession of the house at the time of the sale, clearly
indicates that they are not purchasers in good faith.
5. Fuentes vs. Roca G.R. No. 178902, [April 21, 2010]
FACTS:
Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar,Zamboanga City
and she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano)
under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988,
Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and
Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They met in the
office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to
prepare the documents of sale and signed an agreement
to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared. It expressly stated that
the sale was to take effect in six months. Within six months,
Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants
and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario
Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale.
Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the
Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay
him an additional pay besides the downpayment,
depending on whether or not he succeeded in
demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was
unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes
spouses would become owners of the lot without any
further formality and payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata
who then worked on the other requirementsof the sale.
According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of
his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent.
After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the
spouses who immediately constructed a building on the
lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife
Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and
Rosario, namely, respondents(collectively, the Rocas),
filed an action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance
of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC.
The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void
since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to
it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been
forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed
to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes
spouses paid Tarciano.
The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They
presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally
saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence. He
admitted, however,that he notarized the document in
Zamboanga City four months later. All the same, the
Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was
personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it.
Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the
sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity
of that sale to the spouses already prescribed?
RULING: No.
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law
that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil
Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses
on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in
place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their
property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the
sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166
prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property
without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without
his wife’s consent, the sale is merely voidable. Article 173
gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the
marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing
in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of
the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano
fraudulently sold.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code
on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further,
the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to
already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to
vested rights.
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall
also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this
Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as
provided in Article 256.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of
the Family Code does not provide a period within which
the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s
sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the
other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing
the sale, the same would be void.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts,
a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from
the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that
are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the
case of a sale of conjugal property without the other
spouse’s written consent. But, although a void contract
has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside,
when any of its terms have been performed, an action to
declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of
what has been given under it. This action, according to
Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes
spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and re-conveyance
of the real property that Tarciano sold without their
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 53
mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time
did not erode the right to bring such an action.
6. G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011
JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE, Petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG
BRANCH, Respondent.
Doctrine: If the husband himself is the principal obligor in
the contract, that contract falls within the term “x x x x
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”It is
enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the
signing of the contract. Where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed acomplaint for
annulment against PNB before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal.
Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of
P115,000.00 from PNB and as security, a
real estate mortgage over a parcel of land with TCT. No. T-
9646 was executed. Upon maturity, the loan remained
unpaid and an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on
the mortgaged property was instituted by PNB. After the
lapse of a year, the property was consolidated and
registered in the name of PNB.
Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of the
said loan nor the mortgage constituted on the land which
is part of their conjugal property, contested the
transactions and filed for an annulment of the
proceedings. She interposed in her defense that the
signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that
the proceeds of the loan did not redound to the benefit of
the family.
RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may during
their marriage and within ten years from the transaction
mentioned, may ask the court for an annulment of the
case. On notice of appeal by PNB, Court
of Appeals reversed this ruling and found for PNB, stating
that forgery was concluded without adequate proof. It
also found that the loan was used in the expansion of the
family business. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the property is considered as redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
RULING:
YES. We affirm the ruling of the appellate court.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal
real property without the consent, express or implied, of
the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to
question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.
However, the same article does not guarantee that the
courts will declare the annulment of the contract.
Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the
wife did not give her consent.
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the
signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit
from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in
the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her consent
to Ros’ loan, the appellate court ruled that the conjugal
partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds
redounded to the benefit of the family. The records of the
case reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of
the family’s business. Therefore, the debt obtained is
chargeable against the conjugal partnership.
Effect of abandonment
G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and HO HANG (with aliases JOSE JO and
CONSING), respondents.
Doctrine: For abandonment to exist, there must be an
absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights,
with the intention of perpetual separation.
FACTS:
Jose Jo, respondent, cohabited with three women and
fathered fifteen children. The first woman, petitioner Prima
Partosa-Jo claims to be his legal wife by whom he begot a
daughter.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial
separation of conjugal property and an action for support.
The complaint for support was granted by the lower court
but the judicial separation of conjugal property was never
entertained. Jo elevated the decision for support to the
CA but retain its affirmation on trial court’s ruling. When
their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties
appeal to SC for the complaint of judicial separation of
conjugal property.
The SC, through the definite findings of the trial court, holds
that the petitioner and respondent were legally married
and that the properties mentioned by the petitioner were
acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were
registered in the name of an apparent dummy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judicial separation of conjugal property
be granted to the petitioner on the ground of
abandonment.
RULING:
SC granted the petition.
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other
or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family,
the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property, of for
authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership property, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to martial, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abondoned the other when
he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any
intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal
dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within
the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no
intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may
petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abondonment by a spouse of the other without just
cause; and
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 54
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her
obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said
spouse does not leave the other spouse.
For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute
cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the
intention of perpetual separation.
The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he
had no intention of resuming their conjugal
relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide
financial support to Prima. The record shows that
respondent had already rejected the petitioner. The fact
that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too
clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal
relationship. The respondent also refuses to give financial
support to the petitioner.
Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled
with the refusal by the private respondent to give support
to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.
DISSOLUTION OF CPG
1. SPS. LITA DE LEON AND FELIX RIO TARROSA, PETITIONERS,
VERSUS ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, AND VILMA
B. DE LEON, RESPONDENTS., G.R. NO. 185063, 2009 JULY 23,
3RD DIVISION
Doctrine: The right of the husband or wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution
of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left
which can be divided between the spouses or their
respective heirs
FACTS:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC)
entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the
purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon
City. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon.
They had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June 22,
1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of
Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was
issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio,
“single.” On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his
sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale
did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita.
On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of
Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit
allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands.
Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them
was his exclusive property because he was still single when
he acquired it from PHHC. They further alleged that they
were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and
Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that
the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio
and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on
installment before the marriage although some
installments were paid during the marriage would be
considered conjugal property
WON the sale of one-half of the conjugal property without
liquidation of the partnership is void.
RULING:
1.Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and
covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only
transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita.
The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after
he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. In
other words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by
the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment
of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes
upon delivery of the thing sold.
This full payment was made more than 2 years after his
marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect, the property
was acquired during the existence of the marriage.
Hence, ownership to the property is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership.
2.YES. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is
inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a
legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a
title until it appears that there are assets in the community
as a result of the liquidation and settlement.
The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder
or “remanente liquido” (haber ganancial) resulting from
the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-
half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution
and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined
that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net
assets left which can be divided between the spouses or
their respective heirs.
Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold
his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still
theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right of the
husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does
not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
2. [G.R. No. 171260. September 11, 2009.]
AMPARO ROBLES CABREZA, petitioner,vs.CEFERINO S.
CABREZA, JR.,JUDGE PABLITO ROXAS, SHERIFF RONBERTO
VALINO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 70 PASIG
CITY, respondents.
FACTS:
Ceferino S. Cabreza, Jr. filed with the RTC,Branch 70, of
Pasig City, a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Amparo Robles Cabreza.
On January 3, 2001, the RTC granted the petition. Further,
it ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership in accordance with Article 129 of the Family
Code.
Said Decision became final and executory.
On March 7, 2003, respondent filed with the RTC a Motion
for Execution (Re: Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership). In
said motion, respondent sought to implement the order for
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, which
consisted solely in the real property located at No. 20
United Street, Bo. Capitolyo, Pasig City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17460. For this purpose, he
moved that said property be sold and the proceeds be
divided and distributed. 6
On May 26, 2003, the RTC issued an Order 7 granting
respondent's motion.
On October 2, 2003, another order was issued granting
respondent's motion which prayed for the approval of the
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 55
deed of absolute sale, for the authorization for respondent
to sign said deed in behalf of petitioner, and for an order
requiring the occupants to vacate the property. 10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning
the October 2, 2003 Order which was however denied by
the said court in an Order dated November 4, 2003. 11
On May 12, 2004, the RTC issued another order granting
respondent's prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession.
Subsequenty, on June 25, 2004, the RTC issued an
Order 13 granting a writ of possession in favor of the buyer
of the property, BJD Holdings Corporation.
On July 8, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Hold in
Abeyance the Writ of Possession and Notice to
Vacate, 16 arguing that Article 129 (9) of the New Civil
Code provides that, in the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and lot on which it is situated shall be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom majority of the
children choose to remain. Hence, since the majority of
the children, albeit of legal age, opted to stay with
petitioner, she asserted that the family home should be
given to her.
On August 4, 2004, the RTC issued an Order 17 denying the
motion of petitioner. The MR was likewise denied.
On October 4, 2004, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari 20 assailing the order of possession, writ of
possession and notice to vacate but the same was denied
as well as the MR.
ISSUE:
WON the orders concerning the sale of the property was
valid? YES.
RULING:
For clarity, the pertinent portion of the final and executory
January 3, 2001 RTC decision reads:
Further, the conjugal partnership is hereby dissolved and
must be liquidated in accordance with Art. 129 of the
Family Code,without prejudice to the prior rights of known
and unknown creditors of the conjugal partnership. 26
In addition, the pertinent portion of the May 26, 2003 RTC
Order granting respondent's motion for execution reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders that the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17460 be
sold 27 and the proceeds thereof be divided and
distributed, as follows: ...28
The May 26, 2003 Order of the RTC is already final and
executory as a necessary consequence of the Entry of
Judgment dated July 23, 2004. Said Order categorically
authorized the sale of the family home. Although the CA
may have mistakenly denominated the May 26, 2003
Order as a "judgment",the same does not detract from the
fact that the said order should be considered final and
executory, as petitioners' attempt to question the same
has already been denied by this Court.
Inescapably, this Court must consider, in the event herein
petition is granted, will the same change or vary the final
May 26, 2003 RTC Order which ordered that the family
home be sold and the proceeds be divided? This Court
finds that it does.
However, petitioner already questioned the sale of the
family home before the Court of Appeals.
Thus, the issue in herein petition of whether or not the sale
of the property varies the January 3, 2001 Decision should
no longer be litigated anew. To allow so, would permit
petitioner to indirectly reopen its failed petition in G.R. No.
162745 (CA G.R. CV No. 77506).
The May 26, 2003 Order was the first order that "varied" the
January 3, 2001 Decision, as it categorically decreed the
sale of the property. The order of possession, writ of
possession and notice to vacate, which are now assailed
by petitioner, were all implemented after the May 26, 2003
Order. Hence, petitioner should have already raised herein
argument in its first petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 77506, as the
facts on which she anchors her argument were already
operative then. She did not raise the same in CA-G.R. SP
No. 77506, and it would be unfair to allow her to raise said
argument in this petition in the guise of questioning the
subsequent implementing orders of the RTC.
In her effort to salvage her petition, petitioner contends
that the deed of sale between respondent and the BJD
Holdings Corporation is not valid because of her lack of
consent thereto. Such argument, however, deserves scant
consideration, as petitioner herself manifested that there is
a pending case involving the validity of the deed of sale
pursuant to the CA's ruling in CA-G.R CV No. 86511. The
same therefore cannot be the proper subject of herein
petition.
Anent petitioner's allegation that there is another conjugal
property other than that covered by TCT No. 17460, the
same is a question of fact which should not be the proper
subject of a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
3. [G.R. No. 157537. September 7, 2011.]
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA,
namely: LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO,
BEVERLY ANN LORRAINE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA
and ASUNCION, all surnamed GO, represented by
LEONORA B. GO, petitioners, vs. ESTER L. SERVACIO and
RITO B. GO,respondents.
FACTS:
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of
land with a total area of 17,140 square meters situated in
Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty
three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr.
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and
Waiver, 1 whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his
father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had
purchased the two parcels of land (the property).
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the
wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners. 2 On
December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go
(joined by Rito's wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the
property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L.
Servacio (Servacio) for P5,686,768.00. 3On March 2, 2001,
the petitioners demanded the return of the property, 4 but
Servacio refused to heed their demand. After barangay
proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, 5 they sued
Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City,
Southern Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the
property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.'s
renunciation, the property became conjugal property;
and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the
prior liquidation of the community property between
Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void. 6
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had
exclusively owned the property because he had
purchased it with his own money. 7
On October 3, 2002, 8 the RTC declared that the property
was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not
the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were
three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr.,
Rito, and Dina); that the participation of Rito and Dina as
vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late
Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in
effect when the property was acquired, all property
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 56
acquired by either spouse during the marriage was
conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus
acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the
wife; and that Protacio, Jr.'s renunciation was grossly
insufficient to rebut the legal presumption. 9
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the
property, holding that: ". . . As long as the portion sold,
alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to the other
heirs in the final partition of the property, or to state it
plainly, as long as the portion sold does not encroach
upon the legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is valid." 10
The RTC's denial of their motion for
reconsideration 13 prompted the petitioners to appeal
directly to the Court on a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
WON the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void
for being made without prior liquidation? NO.
RULING:
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by
death, the conjugal partnership property shall be
liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the
surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership
property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year
from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse
of the six month period no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal
partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be
void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent
marriage without compliance with the foregoing
requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations
of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of
the Family Code, viz.:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the
marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains shall govern their property relations
during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of
supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article
256. (n) [emphasis supplied]
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established
before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are
governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal
Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between
Husband and Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any
disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership must be made only after the
liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal
partnership of gains must be subsisting at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute that
Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property
relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal
partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta's
death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved,
pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, 15 and an
implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr.
and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in
the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a
liquidation following its liquidation. 16 The ensuing implied
ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of
the Civil Code, 17 to wit:
Article 493.Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
(399)
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his
children in respect of Marta's share in the conjugal
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any
specific portion of Marta's share without an actual partition
of the property being first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or
abstract quota in Marta's share. 18 Nonetheless, a co-
owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr.
had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, but not the interest of his co-
owners. 19 Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito
as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners
was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-
owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the
buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta's share.20 This result
conforms to the well-established principle that the binding
force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally
possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat
quantum valere potest). 21
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides
that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the
conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws." This provision gives another reason not to
declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a
declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had
already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the
property subject of the sale.
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the
benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any
portion that might not be validly sold to her.
[G.R. No. 130623. February 29, 2008.]
4. LOREA DE UGALDE, petitioner, vs. JON DE
YSASI, respondent.
FACTS:
On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon
de Ysasi (respondent) got married before Municipal Judge
Remigio Peña of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. On 1
March 1951, 4 Rev. Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their
church wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral in
Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute
any ante-nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon
de Ysasi III.
Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April
1957. 5 On 26 May 1964, respondent allegedly contracted
another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith (Smith)
before Judge Lucio M. Tanco of Pasay City. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent and Smith had been
acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to
her prejudice as the lawful wife. Petitioner alleged that she
had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of
their conjugal properties.
On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against
 C I V I L R E V I E W C A S E D I G E S T – 4 t h u n t i l 6 t h W E E K S | 57
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 48 (trial court). The case
was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3330. In
particular, petitioner asked for her conjugal share in
respondent's inheritance as per the settlement of the
estate of respondent's parents, Juan Ysasi 6 and Maria
Aldecoa de Ysasi, who died on 17 November 1975 and 25
February 1979, respectively. 7
Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and
petitioner entered into an agreement which provided,
among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall
be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. Pursuant to the
agreement, they submitted an Amicable Settlement in
Civil Case No. 4791 8 then pending before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental (CFI).
In its Order 10 dated 6 June 1961, the CFI approved the
Amicable Settlement.
Respondent further alleged that petitioner already
obtained a divorce from him before the Supreme Court of
Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage
with Richard Galoway (Galoway). After Galoway's death,
petitioner contracted a third marriage with Frank Scholey.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains on the
grounds of estoppel, laches, and res judicata.
In his Supplemental Affirmative Defense, respondent
alleged that the marriage between him and petitioner
was void because it was executed without the benefit of
a marriage license.
RTC- The trial court ruled that the existence of a conjugal
partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage.
Considering that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was solemnized without a marriage license,
the marriage was null and void, and no community of
property was formed between them. The trial court further
ruled that assuming that the marriage was valid, the
action was barred by res judicata. The trial court noted
that petitioner and respondent entered into an amicable
settlement which was approved by the CFI and petitioner
may no longer repudiate it.
CA- The Court of Appeals ruled that the absence of a
marriage license is fatal and made the marriage between
petitioner and respondent a complete nullity. Hence, the
trial court did not err in finding that there was no conjugal
partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that the compromise
agreement is a valid contract between the parties.
Issue:
WON the conjugal partnership of gains was dissolved? YES.
Ruling:
It must be noted that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was already judicially annulled as of 20
November 1995. Hence, the trial court had no jurisdiction
to annul again in Special Proceedings No. 3330 the
marriage of petitioner and respondent.
The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No.
4791 resulted in the dissolution of the petitioner and
respondent's conjugal partnership of gains.
Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February
1951. The applicable law at the time of their marriage
was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil
Code of the Philippines (Civil Code) which took effect on
30 August 1950. 16 Pursuant to Article 119 of the Civil Code,
the property regime of petitioner and respondent was
conjugal partnership of gains.
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation
of property results in the termination of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791
approving the parties' separation of property resulted in
the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in
accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence,
when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No.
3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and
respondent was already dissolved.
Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve
the Compromise Agreement because the case was for
custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the
parties, as also required under Article 191 of theCode.
Petitioner cannot repudiate the Compromise Agreement
on this ground. A judgment upon a compromise
agreement has all the force and effect of any other
judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and
their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not
parties to it. 17
The Amicable Settlement had become final as between
petitioner and respondent when it was approved by the
CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFI's approval of the Compromise
Agreement on 6 June 1961 resulted in the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and
respondent on even date.
5. DIÑO V. DIÑO
G.R. No. 178044, [January 19, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not
under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L.
Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January 1998 before
Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological
report establishing that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable and
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative
years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and declared their marriage
void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of
petitioner, modified its decision holding that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that
adecree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification.
Decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued
upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for
the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
elements must be present:
The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry
each other;
They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife;
and
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no
question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section
19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article
50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which
are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family
Code, which should be declared void without waiting for
the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages
are governed either by absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement
entered into before the marriage. Since the property
relations of the parties is governed by absolute community
of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties
before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not
the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not
under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the
Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The
rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the
Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is
not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in
the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
6. YU V. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU
G.R. No. 189207, [June 15, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of each party’s psychological
incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations.
If the Court eventually finds that the parties’ respective
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed
meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties’
psychological incapacity, then the parties
shall proceed to comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of
marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on the
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court
finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with the
reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and
property relations, since these are mere incidents of the
nullity of the parties’ marriage.
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez
on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial
offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted
for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked.
But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity
of the marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12,
2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution,
considering that the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations (incidental issues) were mere
consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on
declaration of nullity cannot be resolved without
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations. Eric added that the
incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity
can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC
ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the
case was re-raffled to another branch presided by Judge
Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge
Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking
the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as
codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the
declaration on nullity be already submitted for
resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not
simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying
that the main cause of action is the declaration of nullity
of the marriage and the incidental issues are
merely ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-
Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule
65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUES:
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Whether or not the main issue of nullity of marriage must
be submitted for resolution first before the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) – NO.
RULING:
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or
what are alleged to have been exercised with grave
abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An
interlocutory order is one which “does not finally dispose of
the case, and does not end the Court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by
the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the assailed orders were
issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were
patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that
would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail
an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the
proper recourse for petitioner should have been an
appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on
the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow
the presentation of evidence on the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed
orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the
reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and
property relations. And the trial judge’s decision was not
without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the
Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs.
19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations after
the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or
upon entry of judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody,
support of common children and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment
granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt
of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting
the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party,
shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including
custody, support of common children and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception
of evidence on custody, support, and property relations
but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by
this Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition
is already at hand and before a final decree is issued.
Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family
court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution, custody, support of common children, and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of
judgment granting the petition. And following the
pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what
petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family
Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous
judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive
legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date
of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in
cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by
mutual agreement judicially approved, had already
provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of
the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive
evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment
granting the petition but before the decree of nullity
or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge
Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed
orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s
assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving
evidence on the subject incidents would result in
an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly
speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal
presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh
and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio
acted in a capricious and whimsical manner, much less in
a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she
issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To
reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and
legal soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot
likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio
and in ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse of
discretion on her part.
7. QUIAO V. QUIAO
G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation
against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered
a decision declaring the legal separation thereby
awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of
Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of
the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by
the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children because Brigido is the offending
spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and
appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than
nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,
asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes
“the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse
and the debts.” It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the offending spouse does
not have any right to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family
Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it
applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article
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102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal
because there is no other provision under the Family Code separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the
which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still
result of legal separation. be left with nothing.

ISSUES: On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime

1. Whether or not Art 102 on dissolution of absolute of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of
community or Art 129 on dissolution the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place
of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
– Art 129 will govern. income from their work or industry, and divide equally,
2. Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
rights over½of the properties in the conjugal partnership– the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
NO. either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing
3. Whether or not the computation of “net profits” earned provision, each of the couple has his and her own property
in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or
computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute merger of those debts or properties between the spouses.
community? NO. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

RATIO: In the instant case, since it was already established by the

1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the
promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is
that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’
marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the
same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in
so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code
in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations
between the spouses is governed by the regime
of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the
petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties
of the ConjugalPartnership of Gains, pursuant to Article
143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of
the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by
the husband and wife.”
trial court that the spouses have no separate properties,
there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed
properties above are considered part of
the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in
the above-listed properties should be divided equally
between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.
However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children,
pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we
be confused, like in the absolute community regime,
nothing will be returned to the guilty party in
the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no
separate property which may be accounted for in the
guilty party’s favor.

While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he

may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right

to due process. First, he was well-aware that the
respondent prayed in her complaint that all of
the conjugalproperties be awarded to her. In fact, in his
Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the
community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after
the accounting and inventory of all the community
properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for
legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never
questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial
court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of
the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
deprived of his right to due process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of

absolute community, the husband and the wife become
joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever
property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those
acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form
the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when
the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved,
that common mass is divided between the spouses, or
their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the
parties have established, irrespective of the value each
one may have originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable,

since it has been established that the spouses have no
separate properties, what will be divided equally between