Problem:

The accused Layag was convicted for 2 counts of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault,
and 1 count of Acts of Lasciviousness.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
An Entry of Judgment was issued on October 14, 2015 declaring the Resolution dated
August 3, 2015 had already become final and executory. However, the Supreme
Court received a letter dated July 18, 2016 from the Bureau of Corrections that the
accused appellant died on July 30, 2015 as evidenced by the Certificate of Death
attached thereto.

Q. Can the case be reopened without violating the doctrine of immutability of

final judgment? Explain.

Yes. In the case of People vs. Layag, the SC held that it is constrained to reopen the
case despite the finality of August 3, 2015 Resolution. In Bigler v. People, the Court
explained that it has the power to relax the doctrine of immutability of judgment if, inter
alia, there exists a special or compelling circumstance warranting the same.

Under the doctrine of finality or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of
the land. Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule
as the Court has the power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the
demands of substantial justice considering:
a. Matters of life, liberty, honor, or property;
b. The existence of special or compelling circumstances;
c. The merits of the case;
d. A cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of the rules;
e. The lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; and
f. That the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

In this case, Layag’s death which occurred prior to the promulgation of the Resolution
dated August 3, 2015 clearly shows that there indeed exists a special or compelling
circumstance warranting the re-examination of the case despite its finality. Thus, there
is a need to reconsider and set aside said Resolution and enter a new one dismissing
the criminal cases against Layag.
Problem:

Sometime in 2014, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude was killed in Celzone Lodge, Ramon
Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year old US Marine L/CPL Joseph
Scott Pemberton. A complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S.
Laude, against Pemberton before the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor.
Sometime in October 22, 2014, Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo, the
general headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

On December 15, 2014, the Public Prosecutor filed an Information for murder against
Pemberton before the RTC in Olongapo City. The case was raffled to Judge Ginez-
Jabalde. Thereafter, a warrant of arrest against Pemberton was issued on December
16, 2014.

Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Ginez-Jabalde on December 19, 2014

and he was then arraigned.

On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the AFP to
surrender Custody of the Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow
Media Coverage. However, Laude failed to comply with the three-day notice rule on
motion and they did not also secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. The judge
denied the motion.

Q. Is the prior conformity of the public prosecutor necessary in the motion?

Yes. In Laude vs. Ginez-Jabalde, the SC held that: the conformity of the Public
Prosecutor to the Urgent Motion to Compel the AFP to surrender Custody of the
Accused to the Olongapo City jail is not a mere superfluity. In Jimenez vs. Sorongon,
the SC held that in criminal cases, the People is the real-party-in-interest, which
means that allowing a private complainant to pursue a criminal action on his own is a
rare exception:

Procedural law basically mandated that all criminal actions commenced

by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of a public prosecutor. In appeal of criminal cases before the CA and the
SC, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People.

The People is the real-party-in-interest in a criminal case and only the

OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in
this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and
continues to be the controlling doctrine.

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be
allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a
denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the
preset case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect
of the case i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to
protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause
the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the
right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the
OSG.

In this case, the petitioners have not shown why the Motion may be allowed to fall
under the exception. The alleged grave abuse of discretion of the Public Prosecutor
was neither clearly pleaded nor argued. The duty and authority to prosecute the
criminal aspects of this case, including the custody issue, are duly lodged in the Public
Prosecutor. Her refusal to give her conforme to the Motion is an act well within the
bounds of her position.
Problem:

The second paragraph of the Information reads:

“That the accused had performed all the acts of execution which would have
produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his own will.”

Q: Can the accused be convicted for the crime of frustrated murder based on
these statements in the Information?

Yes. The rule is that the allegations of the information on the nature of the offense
charged, not the nomenclature given to it by the Office of the Public Prosecutor, are
controlling in the determination of the offense charged. Accordingly, considering that
the information stated in its first paragraph that the accused, armed with a gun, with
intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, conspiring together and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and shot are Engr. Mario Paleg y Ballad, inflicting upon the latter gunshot
wound, the accused can be properly found guilty of frustrated murder, a crime
sufficiently averred in the Information.
Problem:

Delfin and Dexter Lee, Sagun and Alvarez were charged with syndicated estafa, along
with Cristina Salagan, on the basis of the findings of the DOJ that Globe Asiatique
had violated its warranties under the Funding Commitment Agreements (FCAs) and
the July 13, 2009 MOA; that Globe Asiatique had submitted spurious and
questionable documents concerning the qualification of its buyers; that Globe
Asiatique had employed fictitious buyers to obtain funds from the Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF); and that Globe Asiatique had failed to remit to the HDMF the
monthly housing loan amortizations of its buyers in the Xevera Project in Pampanga.

Findings of Probable Cause for Syndicated Estafa by the DOJ

The respondents may be charged with the crime of syndicated estafa as

they within the legal definition of a syndicate. A syndicate is defined as
consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme and the defraudation
results in the misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperative, samahang nayon or famer’s association,
or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.

Having earlier established respondents’ commission of estafa, it is pristine

clear that the 1st and 2nd elements of the offense of syndicated estafa has
already been satisfied in the instant case. Relative to the 3rd element, we believe
that HDMF falls under the entities listed in PD 1689 that can be victimized under
such law, as the provision specifically includes entities which solicited funds
from the general public.

Disposition of the DOJ

The DOJ’s considered view that HDMF is, in all respect, a corporation that
solicited funds from the general public, which respondents defrauded through
the execution of their illegal scheme. Respondents Delfin and Dexter Lee’s
argument is childish that the PAG-IBIG fund is a mandatory contribution and
does not fall under the term solicited funds from the public. It bears to highlight
that P.D. 1689 does not distinguish whether the solicited fund is a voluntary or
mandatory contribution. Rather, the essential point is that the funds used by
HDMF came from the general public.

Findings of Probable Cause of RTC, Pampanga for the issuance of warrant of arrest

On its part, the RTC of Pampanga found probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest against the respondents.
Disposition of RTC, Pampanga

The records would show a huge amount of money that was transferred
from the coffers of the PAG-IBIG FUND and released to the GLOBE
ASIATIQUE through a complex scheme involving fraudulent buyers at a scale
and over a period of time that could only have been accomplished by and
through the sustained supervision and action in concert of a group of persons
for the attainment of the same criminal objective. Hence, the Court finds
probable cause for the existence of a syndicated estafa.

Q: Is the DOJ correct in finding probable cause for the filing of the Information
and the RTC of Pampanga for the issuance of warrant of arrest with no bail due
to syndicated estafa under PD No. 1689 against all accused?

No. Both the DOJ and RTC of Pampanga are NOT CORRECT. In the case of HDMF
PAGIBIG FUND vs. Sagun, the SC said that:

The concept of probable cause has been discussed in Napoles vs De Lima, as

follows:
1. Preliminary Investigation for purposes of filing an information is an executive
function.

During preliminary investigation, the prosecutor determines the existence of

probable cause for filing an information in court or in dismissing the criminal
complaint. As worded in the Rules of Court, the prosecutor determines during
preliminary investigation whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. At this stage, the determination of
probable cause is an executive function. Absent grave abuse of discretion, this
determination cannot be interfered with by the courts. This is consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers.

2. Determination of Probable Cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest is a

judicial function.

On the other hand, if done to issue an arrest warrant, the determination of

probable cause is a judicial function. No less than the Constitution commands
that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This requirement of
personal evaluation by the judge is reaffirmed in Rule 112, Section 5 (a) of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Therefore, the determination of probable cause for filing an information in court

and that for issuance of an arrest warrant are different. Once the information is filed
in court, the trial court acquires jurisdiction and any disposition of the case as to its
dismissal or the conviction of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
 Thus, in order to settle whether or not the CA correctly reversed the August 10,
2011 Review Resolution of the DOJ insofar as it found probable cause to charge
Sagun with syndicated estafa, and whether or not the warrants of arrest issued
against the respondents should be quashed, it is imperative to discuss the nature of
syndicated estafa.

Based on the said elements of syndicated estafa, the SC holds that the CA did
not err in reversing the August 10, 2011 Review Resolution of the DOJ insofar as
Sagun was concerned and in quashing the warrants of arrest issued against
respondents. In the same manner, the Court find and so hold that the CA erred in
upholding the propriety of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against Salagan.
Problem:

Senator William Halili was the former Secretary of the Department of Justice and the
Commissioner of the Commission on Human Rights of the Banana Republic. During
his term, there were many politicians whom he entangled with and cases were filed
against them. As Commissioner of CHR, he conducted an investigation against Mayor
Tago Walo for the alleged extrajudicial killings in the City of Samat. According to
reports, the Mayor has his own SDS (Samat Death Squad). From thereon, he got the
ire of Mayor Tago Walo. In the meantime, the Mayor was elected as President of the
Banana Republic.

Considering that Senator Halili did not stop his criticisms against now President Tago
Walo, several cases involving violations of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 were filed against him. The DOJ conducted the preliminary
investigation now headed by Secretary Antonio Cabanez. Senator Halili did not
participated in the Preliminary Investigation on the premise that the DOJ has no
jurisdiction over him as he has a salary grade higher than 27.

Several witnesses, who were convicted for different heinous crimes and presently
serving sentence at the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP), were presented. They testified
that the Senator received drug money from the drug lords inside the NBP, through his
driver, to finance the candidacy as Senator. Thus, several Informations were filed
against him for violations of RA 9165, raffled to different branches of the RTC of Iliyan,
where the NBP is based. The alleged offenses were non-bailable.

Some of the Informations were raffled to the sala of Judge Primitiva Pribado, who has
just returned from her travel abroad. Senator Halili filed a Motion to Quash the
Informations. Nonetheless, the judge issued an Order finding probable cause against
Senator Halili and the corresponding warrant of his arrest. Pending Resolution of the
Motion to Quash, Senator Halili went immediately to the SC via petition for certiorari
and prohibition with application for TRO/SQA/Injunction, ratiocinating that Judge
Pribado gravely abused her discretion when the latter issued the Order and the
corresponding warrant of arrest without first resolving the Motion to Quash.

Q: Was there grave abuse of discretion committed by Judge Pribado when she
issued the warrant of arrest without first resolving the Motion to Quash filed by
Senator Halili? Explain.

No. In De Lima vs. Guerrero, it was held that there was no abuse of discretion, which
is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law.

The respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to Quash before
issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to
support the petitioner’s claim. Rather, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
required the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor’s resolution and its
supporting evidence within a limited period of only 10 days.
Q: Was it correct for Senator Halili to claim that the respondent judge deviated
from the usual procedure in the determination of probable cause before issuing
the warrant of arrest?

No. There is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion
to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of
arrest. As such, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed Order even before resolving petitioner’s Motion to Quash. There is
certainly no indication that respondent judge deviated from the usual procedure in
finding probable cause to issue the petitioner’s arrest. It is not required that the
complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and examined by the judge. The SC do not intend to unduly burden trial
courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time
simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather,
is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.
Problem:

Laurence Buelo is the President of the University of Timbukto in the City of Iraga. He
filed a case of Estafa against Serafia Luna, the former Credit and Collection Officer of
the University with the Office of the University with the Office of the Iraga City
Prosecutor.

After the preliminary investigation, the Investigating Prosecutor Nimfa Arciaga

recommended the filing of 2 Information for estafa against Ms. Luna which was
approved by City Prosecutor Lamberto Magno. The 2 Information for estafa were filed
with the RTC of Iraga. Luna filed the following motions: (a) motion for bill of particulars
alleging that both Informations were deficient because they simply state that the
estafa was committed during the period from June 2001 to May 31, 2002 withouth
specifying when she received the money; and (b) supplemental motion for re-
investigation. On January 17, 2005 and January 27, 2005, the RTC issued Orders
directing the prosecution to amend said Informations and state therein the particulars
sought for by Luna, as well as to conduct investigation of the charges against her.
This notwithstanding, the OCP-Iraga issued 2 Resolutions, both dated June 30, 2006,
holding that there is no cogent reason to alter, modify, or reconsider its earlier
resolutions finding probable cause against Luna for estafa and, accordingly, ordered
the elevation of the case back to the RTC.

Due to the OCP-Iraga’s insistence of the sufficiency of its Informations, the RTC
issued an Order dated August 9, 2006, dismissing the 2 criminal cases without
prejudice to their re-filing. Such Order attained finality on September 2, 2006.

Due to setback, the OCP of Iraga reviewed the evidence and issued 2 supplemental
resolutions and recommended the filing of 21 Informations for Estafa against Ms.
Luna.

Ms. Luna filed a complaint against Laurence Buelo, ACP Nimfa Arciaga and CP
Lamberto Magno with the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019. However, the OMB dismissed the case for lack of probable cause.

Q: Is the dismissal of the case by the Ombudsman for lack of probable cause
correct? Explain.

Yes. In Ciron vs. Gutierrez, the Supreme Court sustained the Ombudsman dismissal
of the case for lack of probable cause. It was held that at the outset, it must be stressed
that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether an
Information should be filed. In this relation, it is settled that the Ombudsman has the
full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed.
Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action
when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic
manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.

Q: Is the remedy resorted to by Ms. Serafia Luna in filing a case for violation of
Section 3 (e) against Buelo, ACP Arciaga and CP Magno correct? Explain.

No. The Ombudsman correctly found that Arciaga and Magno’s acts of issuing the
Supplemental Resolutions and filing of new Informations before the RTC, even
without Buelo filing a new complaint before the OCP-Iraga, is in accordance with
prevailing rules and jurisprudence and, thus, were not tainted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.

The Court emphasizes that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor, which
is the Office of the Ombudsman in this case, exercises wide latitude of discretion in
determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court. Courts cannot interfere
with the Ombudsman’s discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations and in
the determination of probable cause where the Ombudsman’s discretion prevails over
judicial discretion except when there is grave abuse of discretion, which does not
obtain in this case.
Problem:

John Lawrence, alias “UTOY”, went to the house of Malvino to pay the debt of his wife
in the amount of P 5,000.00. He requested Moymoy, alias “PALABOY”, to accompany
him. Based solely on a tip from a reliable informant that there was an on-going illegal
gambling in the house, SPO1 PALABAN and PO1 NANINILIP were at a distance of
20 meters from the house of Malvino.

While Utoy was giving the money to Malvino as payment of his wife’s debt, SPO1
PALABAN and PO1 NANINILIP barged into the house of Malvino. They confiscated
a calculator, a polletos, and P 5,000.00. Utoy, Palaboy and Malvino were charged
with illegal gambling in violation of PD No. 1602 as amended by RA No. 9287. They
were convicted by the RTC and on appeal to the CA, the conviction was affirmed.

The case was brought to the SC, raising the issue on admissibility of evidence
considering that the accused was not arrested in flagrante delicto. However, they
failed to raise the illegality of the arrest during the trial.

Q: If you are the Justice in-charge or the ponente, how would you rule?

The conviction of the accused should be REVERSED. According to the SC, any
question regarding the legality of a warrantless arrest must be raised before
arraignment. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to question the legality
of the arrest especially when the accused actively participated during trial. However,
it was clarified that such waiver is only confined to the defects of the arrest and not on
the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal arrest.

In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the acts that constitutes the
offense of illegal gambling as a collector or an agent under Section 3(c), and a as
coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3 (d) of RA 9287. The prosecution
merely relied on the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia found and confiscated
inside the house of Banaobra and not on the specific overt acts that constitute the
offense. All told, the evidence purportedly seized from the Banaobra compound is
inadmissible in evidence since it was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. Since the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very
corpus delicti of the crime charge, the Court acquits the petitioners.

In People vs. Racho, the SC held that an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of
appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his
active participation in the trial of the case. The legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal,
warrantless arrest does not carry with a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
Problem:

Basagolero and Mamano were arrested and detained on a Friday at the Criminal
Investigation and Detention Unit of General Santos City. They were charged with
Frustrated Murder, punishable by reclusion temporal, the penalty lower by one degree
than that provided for consummated murder. Since they want to be released
immediately pending posting of bail on the next working day, their counsel went to the
house of the Judge to file Petition for Bail. The Judge ordered the City Prosecutor to
comment which the latter immediately complied and stated the recommended amount
of bail. The two accused immediately posted their bail. Thereafter, the Judge issued
the Temporary Release Order. The petition for bail and the bail were only received by
the OCC on the next working day, which is a Monday.

Q: Was the issuance of the Temporary Release Order valid?

Yes. Considering that the accused are not charged with an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, Basagolero and Mamano were entitled
to bail as a matter of right as guaranteed by the Constitution and pursuant to Section
4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. There is nothing in the law or the rules that
prevented a Judge from acting on the bail application submitted to him on a weekend.
Accordingly, the Judge acted in accordance with the rules in granting the application
for bail.
Problem:

Mr. Victor Dimanarig is a duly elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Iliyan, Province of Gumirikgitik. He was charged with murder and
presently detained at the municipal jail. His counsel filed a Motion for his temporary
liberty for him to attend the session of the Sangguniang Bayan. The Motion was not
set for hearing nor was the prosecution required to file its comment. According to
Judge Anthony Tavern, it is not necessary because the prosecution has no witnesses
to present. The furloughs granted to Dimaranig happened six times.

Q: Is the action taken by Judge Tavern correct? Explain.

No. Judge Tavern is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting
ex-parte motions, allowing Dimanarig’s temporary liberty without setting the same for
hearing. If hearing is indispensable in motions for bail, more so in motions for
temporary liberty. It is basic that bail cannot be allowed without prior hearing. It is also
basic that litigious motions that do not contain a notice of hearing are nothing but a
useless piece of paper which the court should not act upon. These rules are so
elementary that not to know them constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Problem:

In a Decision dated January 14, 2019, RTC Branch 123 of the City of Iraga, Province
of Ilyan, found Jess Dimas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

During the promulgation of Judgment of January 18, 2019, Atty. John Laurence Buelo,
representing Dimas, manifested in open court that they intend to file a Notice of
Appeal within 15 days from January 18, 2019 and moved that Dimas be released
under the same bond. The RTC granted the said motion in an Order issued on even
date.

Accordingly, Dimas filed a Notice of Appeal on January 22, 2019, which the RTC
granted in an Order dated January 25, 2019.

On March 15, 2019, a certain Malvino Matalino filed a Motion for the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest, praying that the warrant be issued against Dimas to enforce the
RTC Decision. Matalino averred that Dimas jumps bail.

The CA, dismissed the appeal, on the ground that Dimas jumps bail in accordance
with Section 8, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Unknown to Dimas,
his counsel Atty. Buelo abandoned him without any information as to his whereabouts.
Dimas belatedly filed a Motion for Reconsideration through a certain Atty. William
Halili, stating among others, that Dimas did not jump bail but actually a victim of
unprofessionalism of his counsel. The CA denied Dimas’ Motion for Reconsideration,
issued an Entry of Judgment and remanded the case to the court of origin in RTC
Branch 123 of the City of Iliyan for the issuance of the warrant and implementation of
the final and executory decision.

Q: Is the dismissal of the appeal correct? Explain.

No. In the similar case of Usares vs. People, the SC held that considering that Usares
has an existing cash bail bond – which the CA should have known had it reviewed
more carefully the records of this case – she cannot be considered to have jumped
bail, which thus renders erroneous the dismissal of her appeal on the said ground.

Notably, while it appears that Usares belatedly filed her motion for reconsideration
before the Ca, which resulted in the issuance of an entry of judgment against her, the
Court finds its proper to relax such technicalities in the interest of substantial justice
given that there was, in the first place, no cogent basis for the dismissal of her appeal.
Problem:

Antone was charged for 2 counts of rape of his 11-year old niece-in-law, AAA.

After the trial in the RTC, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 2 counts of
simple statutory rape, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape, and to indemnify AAA the amounts of P 50,000.00
as civil indemnity and P 30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

On appeal to the CA, it affirmed the ruling of the RTC with modification, adjusting the
award of damages in favor of AAA to P 100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P 100,000.00
as moral damages, and P 100,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest at
the rate of 6% per annum from finality of the ruling until fully paid.

Dissatisfied, Antone moved for reconsideration of the CA adverse decision but the
same was denied. He then filed an Appeal via Petition for Review in certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to the SC.

Q: Is the remedy of Antone correct? Explain.

No. In Antone vs. People, the SC held that Antone made a procedural lapse in
elevating the case before the Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Section 3 (e), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure especially provides that “except as provided in the last paragraph of
Section13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the SC shall be by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. As such, he should have filed a notice of appeal before the
CA instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari before the Court. Accordingly,
Antone’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal before the CA resulted in the latter
court’s decision and the Resolution to the Motion for reconsideration lapsing into
finality.