EN BANC already practically blind and that the consideration given seems
unconscionably small for the properties, there was likelihood that a case
[G.R. No. L-26615. April 30, 1970.]
REV. FATHER LUCIO V. GARCIA, ANTONIO JESUS DE PRAGA, MARIA
NATIVIDAD DE JESUS AND DR. JAIME ROSARIO, Petitioners, v. HON.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch and CONSUELO GONZALES VDA. DE PRECILLA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-26884. April 30, 1970.]
REV. FATHER LUCIO V. GARCIA, ANTONIO JESUS DE PRAGA, MARIA
NATIVIDAD DE JESUS AND DR. JAIME ROSARIO, Petitioners, v. HON.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch V, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA, and CONSUELO GONZALES
VDA. DE PRECILLA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-27200. April 30, 1970.]
TESTATE ESTATE OF GLICERIA A. DEL ROSARIO, deceased CONSUELO S.
GONZALES VDA. DE PRECILLA, petitioner administratrix, v. SEVERINA
NARCISO, ROSA NARCISO, JOSEFINA NARCISO, VICENTE MAURICIO, DELFIN
MAURICIO, REMEDIOS NARCISO, ENCARNACION, NARCISO, MARIA
NARCISO, EDUARDO NARCISO, FR. LUCIO V. GARCIA, ANTONIO JESUS DE
PRAGA, MARIA NATIVIDAD DE JESUS, DR. JAIME DEL ROSARIO, ET AL.,
NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO-SARMIENTO and PASCUALA NARCISO-
MANAHAN, Oppositors-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION, WILLS; PROBATE OF WILLS; GROUND FOR
DISALLOWANCE; TESTATRIX’S DEFECTIVE EYESIGHT AS UNABLING HER TO
READ THE PROVISIONS OF LATER WILL.— The declarations in court of the
opthalmologist as to the condition of the testatrix’s eyesight fully establish
the fact that her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not
for reading print; that she was, at the time of the execution of the second
will on December 29, 1960, incapable of reading and could not have read
the provisions of the will supposedly signed by her.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IRREGULARITIES IN THE EXECUTION OF THE WILL;
CASE AT BAR.— Upon its face, the testamentary provisions, the attestation
clause and acknowledgment were crammed together into a single sheet of
paper, apparently to save on space. Plainly, the testament was not
prepared with any regard for the defective vision of Dña. Gliceria, the
typographical errors remained uncorrected thereby indicating that the
execution thereof must have been characterized by haste. It is difficult to
understand that so important a document containing the final disposition
of one’s worldly possessions should be embodied in an informal and untidy
written instrument; or that the glaring spelling errors should have escaped
her notice if she had actually retained the ability to read the purported will
and had done so.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTION OF WILLS; REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY; ART. 808,
NEW CIVIL CODE — READING OF THE WILL TWICE TO A BLIND TESTATOR;
PURPOSE.— The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to
the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself is to make
the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if
they are not in accordance with his wishes.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN INSTANT CASE.— Where
as in the 1960 will there is nothing in the record to show that the requisites
of Art. 808 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that "if the testator is blind,
the will shall be read to him twice," have not been complied with, the said
1960 will suffer from infirmity that affects its due execution.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS;
ADMINISTRATORS; GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL; ACQUISITION OF INTEREST
ADVERSE TO THAT OF THE ESTATE MAKES THE ADMINISTRATOR
UNSUITABLE TO DISCHARGE THE TRUST; CASE AT BAR.— Considering that
the alleged deed of sale was executed when Gliceria del Rosario was
Page 1 of 28
for annulment might be filed against the estate or heirs of Alfonso Precilla.
And the administratrix being the widow and heir of the alleged transferee,
cannot be expected to sue herself in an action to recover property that may
turn out to belong to the estate. This, plus her conduct in securing new
copies of the owner’s duplicate of titles without the court’s knowledge and
authority and having the contract bind the land through issuance of new
titles in her husband’s name, cannot but expose her to the charge of
unfitness or unsuitability to discharge the trust, justifying her removal from
the administration of the estate.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS; ACTION MUST AFFECT "THE
TITLE OR THE RIGHT OF POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY." — On the matter
of lis pendens, the provisions of the Rules of Court are clear: notice of the
pendency of an action may be recorded in the office of the register of deeds
of the province in which the property is situated, if the action affects "the
title or the right of possession of (such) real property."cralaw virtua1aw
library
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO INSTANT CASE.— The issue in
controversy here is simply the fitness or unfitness of said special
administratrix to continue holding the trust, it does not involve or affect at
all the title to, or possession of, the properties covered by TCT Nos. 81735,
81736 and 81737. Clearly, the pendency of such case (L-26615) is not an
action that can properly be annotated in the record of the titles to the
properties.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
G.R. No. L-27200 is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No. 62618) admitting to probate the alleged last will
an, testament of the late Gliceria Avelino del Rosario dated 29 December
1960. G.R. Nos. L-26615 and L-2684 are separate petitions for mandamus
filed by certain alleged heirs of said decedent seeking (1) to compel the
probate court to remove Consuelo S. Gonzales-Precilla as special
administratrix of the estate, for conflict of interest, to appoint a new one in
her stead; and (2) to order the Register of Deeds of Manila to annotate
notice of lis pendens in TCT Nos. 81735, 81736 ,and 81737, registered in
the name of Alfonso Precilla, married to Consuelo Gonzales y Narciso, and
said to be properly belonging to the estate of the deceased Gliceria A. del
Rosario.
Insofar as pertinent to the issues involved herein, the facts of these cases
may be stated as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried in the City of Manila on 2
September 1965, leaving no descendents, ascendants, brother or sister. At
the time of her death, she was said to be 90 years old more or less, and
possessed of an estate consisting mostly of real properties.
On 17 September 1965, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, a niece of
the deceased, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for probate
of the alleged last will and testament of Gliceria A. del Rosario, executed
on 29 December 1960, and for her appointment as special administratrix
of the latter’s estate, said to be valued at about P100,000.00, pending the
appointment of a regular administrator thereof.
The petition was opposed separately by several groups of alleged heirs: (1)
Rev. Fr. Lucio V. Garcia, a legatee named in an earlier will executed by
Gliceria A. del Rosario on 9 June 1956; (2) Jaime Rosario and children,
relatives and legatees in both the 1956 and 1960 wills; Antonio Jesus de
Praga and Marta Natividad de Jesus, wards of the deceased and legatees in
the 1956 and 1960 wills; (3) Remedios, Encarnacion, and Eduardo, all
surnamed Narciso; (4) Natividad del Rosario-Sarmiento; (5) Maria Narciso;
(6) Pascuala Narciso de Manahan; (7) Severina, Rosa and Josefa, surnamed
Narciso, and Vicente and Delfin, surnamed Mauricio, — the latter five
groups of persons all claiming to be relatives of Doña Gliceria within the
fifth civil degree. The oppositions invariably charged that the instrument
executed in 1960 was not intended by the deceased to be her true will; that
the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will was procured through
undue and improper pressure and influence the part of the beneficiaries
and/or other persons; that the testatrix did not know the object of her
bounty; that the instrument itself reveals irregularities in its execution, and
that the formalities required by law for such execution have not been
complied with.
Oppositor Lucio V. Garcia, who also presented for probate the 1956 will of
the deceased, joined the group of Dr. Jaime Rosario in registering
opposition to the appointment of petitioner Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de
Precilla as special administratrix, on the ground that the latter possesses
interest adverse to the estate. After the parties were duly heard, the
probate court, in its order of 2 October 1965, granted petitioner’s prayer
and appointed her special administratrix of the estate upon a bond for
P30,000.00. The order was premised on the fact the petitioner was
managing the properties belonging to the estate even during the lifetime
of the deceased, and to appoint another person as administrator or co
administrator at that stage of the proceeding would only result in further
confusion and difficulties.
On 30 September 1965, oppositors Jaime Rosario, Et. Al. filed with the
probate court an urgent motion to require the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank
to report all withdrawals made against the funds of the deceased after 2
September 1965. The court denied this motion on 22 October 1965 for
being premature, it being unaware that such deposit in the name of the
deceased existed. 1 aforesaid proceedings, preferably in an independent action, to secure the
On 14 December 1965, the same sets of oppositors, Dr. Jaime Rosario and
children, Antonio Jesus de Praga, Natividad de Jesus and Fr. Lucio V. Garcia,
petitioned the court for the immediate removal of the special
administratrix. It was their claim that the special administratrix and her
deceased husband, Alfonso Precilla, 2 had caused Gliceria A. del Rosario to
execute a simulated and fraudulent deed of absolute sale dated 10 January
1961 allegedly conveying unto said spouses for the paltry sum of
P30,000.00 ownership of 3 parcels of land and the improvements thereon
located on Quiapo and San Nicolas, Manila, with a total assessed value of
P334,050.00. Oppositors contended that since it is the duty of the
administrator to protect and conserve the properties of the estate, and it
may become necessary that, an action for the annulment of the deed of
sale land for recovery of the aforementioned parcels of land be filed against
the special administratrix, as wife and heir of Alfonso Precilla, the removal
of the said administratrix was imperative.
On 17 December 1965, the same oppositors prayed the court for an order
directing the Special Administratrix to deposit with the Clerk of Court all
certificates of title belonging to the estate. It was alleged that on 22
October 1965, or after her appointment, petitioner Consuelo Gonzales
Vda. de Precilla, in her capacity as special administratrix of the estate of the
deceased Gliceria A. del Rosario, filed with Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Manila a motion for the issuance of new copies of the owner’s
duplicates of certain certificates of title in the name of Gliceria del Rosario,
supposedly needed by her "in the preparation of the inventory" of the
properties constituting the estate. The motion having been granted, new
copies of the owner’s duplicates of certificates appearing the name of
Gliceria del Rosario (among which were TCT Nos. 66201, 66202 and 66204)
were issued on 15 November 1965. On 8 December 1965, according to the
oppositors, the same special administratrix presented to the Register of
Deeds the deed of sale involving properties covered by TCT Nos. 66201,
66202 and 66204 supposedly executed by Gliceria del Rosario on 10
January 1961 in favor of Alfonso Precilla, and, in consequence, said
certificates of title were cancelled and new certificates (Nos. 81735, 81736
and 81737) were issued in the name of Alfonso Precilla, married to
Consuelo S. Gonzales y Narciso.
On 25 August 1966, the Court issued an order admitting to probate the
1960 will of Gliceria A. del Rosario (Exhibit "D"). In declaring the due
execution of the will, the probate court took note that no evidence had
been presented to establish that the testatrix was not of sound mind when
the will was executed; that the fact that she had prepared an earlier will
did not, prevent her from executing another one thereafter; that the fact
that the 1956 will consisted of 12 pages whereas the 1960 testament was
Page 2 of 28
contained in one page does not render the latter invalid; that, the erasures
and alterations in the instrument were insignificant to warrant rejection;
that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the instrumental witnesses
which were noted by the oppositors are even indicative of their
truthfulness. The probate court, also considering that petitioner had
already shown capacity to administer the properties of the estate and that
from the provisions of the will she stands as the person most concerned
and interested therein, appointed said petitioner regular administratrix
with a bond for P50,000.00. From this order all the oppositors appealed,
the case being docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-27200.
Then, on 13 September 1966, the probate court resolved the oppositors’
motion of 14 December 1965 for the removal of the then special
administratrix, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It would seem that the main purpose of the motion to remove the special
administratrix and to appoint another one in her stead, is in order that an
action may be filed against the special administratrix for the annulment of
the deed of sale executed by the decedent on January 10, 1961. Under
existing documents, the properties sold pursuant to the said deed of
absolute sale no longer forms part of the estate. The alleged conflict of
interest is accordingly not between different claimants of the same estate.
If it is desired by the movants that an action be filed by them to annul the
aforesaid deed absolute sale, it is not necessary that the special
administratrix be removed and that another one be appointed to file such
action. Such a course of action would only produce confusion and
difficulties in the settlement of the estate. The movants may file the
nullity of the deed of absolute even without leave of this court:"
As regard the motion of 17 December 1965 asking for the deposit in court
of the titles in the name of the decedent, the same was also denied, for the
reason that if the movants were referring to the old titles, they could no
longer be produced, and if they meant the new duplicate copies thereof
that were issued at the instance of the special administratrix, there would
be no necessity therefor, because they were already cancelled and other
certificates were issued in the name of Alfonso Precilla. This order
precipitated the oppositors’ filing in this Court of a petition for mandamus
(G.R. No. L-26615, Rev. Fr. Lucio V. Garcia, Et. Al. v. Hon. Judge Conrado M.
Vasquez, Et. Al.), which was given due course on 6 October 1966.
On 15 December 1965, with that motion for removal pending in the court,
the oppositors requested the Register of Deeds of Manila to annotate a
notice of lis pendens in the records of TCT Nos. 81735, 81736, and 81737
in the name of Alfonso Precilla. And when said official refused to do so,
they applied to the probate court (in Sp. Proc. No. 62618) for an order to
compel the Register of Deeds to annotate a lis pendens notice in the
aforementioned titles contending that the matter of removal and
appointment of the administratrix, involving TCT Nos. 81735, 81736, and
81737, was already before the Supreme Court. Upon denial of this motion
on 12 November 1966, oppositors filed another mandamus action, this
time against the probate court and the Register of Deeds. The case was
docketed and given due course in this Court as G.R. No. L-26864.
Foremost of the questions to be determined here concerns the correctness
of the order allowing the probate of the 1960 will.
The records of the probate proceeding fully establish the fact that the
testatrix, Gliceria A. del Rosario, during her lifetime, executed two wills: one
on 9 June 1956 consisting of 12 pages and written in Spanish, a language
that she knew and spoke, witnessed by Messrs. Antonio Cabrera, Jesus Y.
Ayala and Valentin Marquez, and acknowledged before notary public Jose
Ayala; and another dated 29 December 1960, consisting of 1 page and
written in Tagalog, witnessed by Messrs. Vicente Rosales, Francisco
Decena, and Francisco Lopez and acknowledged before notary public
Remigio M. Tividad.
Called to testify on the due execution of the 1960 will, instrumental
witnesses Decena, Lopez and Rosales uniformly declared that they were
individually requested by Alfonso Precilla (the late husband of petitioner
special administratrix) to witness the execution of the last will of Doña
Gliceria A. del Rosario; that they arrived at the house of the old lady at No.
2074 Azcarraga, Manila, one after the other, in the afternoon of 29
December 1960; that the testatrix at the time was apparently of clear and
sound mind, although she was being aided by Precilla when she walked; 3
that the will, which was already prepared, was first read "silently" by the
testatrix herself before she signed it; 4 that he three witnesses thereafter
signed the will in the presence of the testatrix and the notary public and of
one another. There is also testimony that after the testatrix and the
witnesses to the will acknowledged the instrument to be their voluntary
act and deed, the notary public asked for their respective residence
certificates which were handed to him by Alfonso Precilla, clipped together;
5 that after comparing them with the numbers already written on the will,
the notary public filled in the blanks in the instrument with the date, 29
January 1960, before he affixed his signature and seal thereto. 6 They also
testified that on that occasion no pressure or influence has been exerted
by any person upon the testatrix to execute the will.
Of course, the interest and active participation of Alfonso Precilla in the
signing of this 1960 will are evident from the records. The will appeared to
have been prepared by one who is not conversant with the spelling of
Tagalog words, and it has been shown that Alfonso Precilla is a Cebuano
who speaks Tagalog with a Visayan accent. 7 The witnesses to the will, two
of whom are fellow Visayans, 8 admitted their relationship or closeness to
Precilla. 9 It was Precilla who instructed them to go to the house of Gliceria
del Rosario on 29 December 1960 to witness an important document, 10
and who took their residence certificates from them a few days before the
will was signed. 11 Precilla had met the notary public and witnesses Rosales
and Lopez at the door of the residence of the old woman; he ushered them
to the room at the second floor where the signing of the document took
place; 12 then he fetched witness Decena from the latter’s haberdashery
shop a few doors away and brought him to, the house the testatrix. 13 And
when the will was actually executed Precilla was present. 14
The oppositors-appellants in the present case, however, challenging the
correctness of the probate court’s ruling, maintain that on 29 December
1960 the eyesight of Gliceria del Rosario was so poor and defective that she
could not have read the provisions of the will, contrary to the testimonies
of witnesses Decena, Lopez and Rosales.
On this point, we find the declarations in court of Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis very
material and illuminating. Said ophthalmologist, whose expertise was
admitted by both parties, testified, among other things, that when Doña
Gliceria del Rosario saw him for consultation on 11 March 1960 he found
her left eye to have cataract (opaque lens), 15 and that it was "above
normal in pressure", denoting a possible glaucoma, a disease that leads to
blindness 16 As to the conditions of her right eye, Dr. Tamesis declared:
[INSERT TSN]
The foregoing testimony of the ophthalmologist who treated the deceased
and, therefore, has first hand knowledge of the actual condition of her
eyesight from August, 1960 up to 1963, fully establish the fact that
notwithstanding the operation and removal of the cataract in her left eye
and her being fitted with aphakic lens (used by cataract patients), her vision
remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print. Thus,
the conclusion is inescapable that with the condition of her eyesight in
August, 1960, and there is no evidence that it had improved by 29
December 1960, Gliceria del Rosario was incapable f reading, and could not
have read the provisions of the will supposedly signed by her on 29
December 1960. It is worth noting that the instrumental witnesses stated
that she read the instrument "silently" (t.s.n., pages 164-165). which is a
conclusion and not a fact.
Against the background of defective eyesight of the alleged testatrix, the
appearance of the will, Exhibit "D", acquires striking significance. Upon its
face, the testamentary provisions, the attestation clause and
acknowledgment were crammed together into a single sheet of paper, to
much so that the words had to be written very close on the top, bottom
and two sides of the paper, leaving no margin whatsoever; the word "and"
had to be written by the symbol" &", apparently to save on space. Plainly,
the testament was not prepared with any regard for the defective vision of
Doña Gliceria. Further, typographical errors like "HULINH" for "HULING"
(last), "Alfonsa" ;or "Alfonso", "MERCRDRS" for MERCEDES", "instrumental"
for "Instrumental", and "acknowledged" for "acknowledge’’, remained
Page 3 of 28
uncorrected, thereby indicating that execution thereof must have been
characterized by haste. It is difficult to understand that so important a
document containing the final disposition of one’s worldly possessions
should be embodied in an informal and untidily written instrument; or that
the glaring spelling errors should have escaped her notice if she had
actually retained the ability to read the purported will and had done so. The
record is thus convincing that the supposed testatrix could not have
physically read or understood the alleged testament, Exhibit "D", and that
its admission to probate was erroneous and should be reversed.
That Doña Gliceria should be able to greet her guests on her birthday,
arrange flowers and attend to kitchen tasks shortly prior to the alleged
execution of the testament Exhibit "D", as appears from the photographs,
Exhibits "E" to "E-1", in no way proves; that she was able to read a closely
typed page, since the acts shown do not require vision at close range. It
must be remembered that with the natural lenses removed, her eyes had
lost the power of adjustment to near vision, the substituted glass lenses
being rigid and uncontrollable by her. Neither is the signing of checks
(Exhibits "G" to "G-3") by her indicative of ability to see at normal reading
distances. Writing or signing of one’s name, when sufficiently practiced,
becomes automatic, so that one need only to have a rough indication of
the place where the signature is to be affixed in order to be able to write
it. Indeed, a close examination of the checks, amplified in the photograph,
Exhibit "O", et seq., reinforces the contention of oppositors that the alleged
testatrix could not see at normal reading distance: the signatures in the
checks are written far above the printed base, lines, and the names of the
payees as well as the amounts written do not appear to be in the
handwriting of the alleged testatrix, being in a much firmer and more fluid
hand than hers.
Thus, for all intents and purpose of the rules on probate, the deceased
Gliceria del Rosario was, as appellant oppositors contend, not unlike a blind
testator, and the due execution of her will would have required observance
of the provisions of Article 808 of the Civil Code.
"ART. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once,
by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before
whom the will is acknowledged."cralaw virtua1aw library
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if
he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate),
18 is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able
to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the
law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated
to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly
reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will should
be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two different persons, and
that the witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testator’s) other
senses. 19
In connection with the will here in question, there is nothing in the records
to show that the above requisites have been complied with. Clearly, as
already stated, the 1960 will sought to be probated suffers from infirmity
that affects its due execution.
We also find merit in the complaint of oppositors Lucio V. Garcia, Et Al.,
against the denial by the probate court of their petition for the removal of
Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla as special administratrix of the estate
of the deceased Doña Gliceria (Petition, G.R. No. L-26615, Annex "B").
The oppositors’ petition was based allegedly on the existence in the special
administratrix of an interest adverse to that of the estate. It was their
contention that through fraud her husband had caused the deceased
Gliceria del Rosario to execute a deed of sale, dated 10 January 1961, by
virtue of which the latter purportedly conveyed unto said Alfonso D.
Precilla, married to Consuelo Gonzales y Narciso, the ownership of 3
parcels of land and the improvements thereon, assessed at P334,050.00,
for the sum of P30,000.00.
In denying the petition, the probate court, in its order of 13 September
1966 (Annex "P", Petition) reasoned out that since the properties were
already sold no longer form part of the estate. The conflict of interest
would not be between the estate and third parties, but among the different
claimants of said properties, in which case, according to the court, the appealed order is set aside and the court below is ordered to remove the
participation of the special administratrix in the action for annulment that administratrix, Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, and appoint one of the
may be brought would not be necessary. heirs intestate of the deceased Doña Gliceria Avelino del Rosario as special
administrator for the purpose of instituting action on behalf of her estate
The error in this line of reasoning lies in the fact that what was being to recover the properties allegedly sold by her to the late Alfonso D.
questioned was precisely the validity of the conveyance or sale of the Precilla. And in Case G.R. No. L-26864, petition is dismissed. No costs.
properties. In short, if proper, the action for annulment would have to be
undertaken on behalf of the estate by the special administratrix, affecting
as it does the property or rights of the deceased. 20 For the rule is that only
where there is no special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased may the legal heirs commence an action arising out of a right
belonging to their ancestor. 21

There is no doubt that to settle the question of the due execution and
validity of the deed of sale, an ordinary and separate action would have to
be instituted, the matter not falling within the competence of the probate
court. 22 Considering the facts then before it, i.e., the alleged deed of sale
having been executed by Gliceria del Rosario on 10 January 1961, when she
was already practically blind; and that the consideration of P30,000.00
seems to be unconscionably small for properties with a total assessed value
of P334,050.00, there was likelihood that a case for annulment might
indeed be filed against the estate or heirs of Alfonso Precilla. And the
administratrix, being the widow and heir of the alleged transferee, cannot
be expected to sue herself in an action to recover property that may turn
out to belong to the estate. 22 Not only this, but the conduct of the special
administratrix in securing new copies of the owner’s duplicates of TCT Nos.
66201, 66202, and 66204, without the court’s knowledge or authority, and
on the pretext that she needed them in the preparation of the inventory of
the estate, when she must have already known by then that the properties
covered therein were already "conveyed" to her husband by the deceased,
being the latter’s successor, and having the contract bind the land through
issuance of new titles in her husband’s name cannot bu t expose her to the
charge of unfitness or unsuitableness to discharge the trust, justifying her
removal from the administration of the estate.

With respect to the orders of the court a quo denying (1) the oppositors’
motion to require the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to report all
withdrawals made against the funds of the deceased after 2 September
1965 and (2) the motion for annotation of a lis pendens notice on TCT Nos.
81735, 81736 and 81737, the same are to be affirmed.

The probate court pointed out in its order of 22 October 1965 (Annex "H")
that it could not have taken action on the complaint against the alleged
withdrawals from the bank deposits of the deceased, because as of that
time the court had not yet been apprised that such deposits exist.
Furthermore, as explained by the special administratrix in her pleading of
30 October 1965, the withdrawals referred to by the oppositors could be
those covered by checks issued in the name of Gliceria del Rosario during
her lifetime but cleared only after her death. That explanation, which not
only appears plausible but has not been rebutted by the petitioners-
oppositors, negates any charge of grave abuse in connection with the
issuance of the order here in question.

On the matter of lis pendens (G.R. No. L-26864), the provisions of the Rules
of Court are clear: notice of the pendency of an action may be recorded in
the office of the register of deeds of the province in which the property is
situated, if the action affects "the title or the right of possession of (such)
real property." 23 In the case at bar, the pending action which oppositors
seek to annotate in the records of TCT Nos. 81735, 81736, and 81737 is the
mandamus proceeding filed in this Court (G.R. No. L-26615). As previously
discussed in this opinion, however, that case is concerned merely with the
correctness of the denial by the probate court of the motion for the
removal of Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla as special administratrix of
the estate of the late Gliceria del Rosario. In short, the issue in controversy
there is simply the fitness or unfitness of said special administratrix to
continue holding the trust; it does not involve or affect at all the title to, or
possession of, the properties covered by said TCT Nos. 81735, 81736 and
81737. Clearly, the pendency of such case (L-26615) is not an action that
can properly be annotated in the record of the titles to the properties.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of the court below allowing to
probate the alleged 1960 will of Gliceria A. del Rosario is hereby reversed
and set aside. The petition in G.R. No. L-26615 being meritorious, the

Page 4 of 28
 G.R. No. 74695 September 14, 1993
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the
Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, Petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON
G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and
HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate
Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, Respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 1986 1 of the First
Civil Cases Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 19832 of the Regional
Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting to probate the last will and
testament 3 with codicil 4 of the late Brigido
Alvarado.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial
will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son
(petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will
at the time awaiting probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of
sta. Cruz, Laguna.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and
by private respondent who were present at the execution, the testator did
not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as
the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in
the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the
notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own
respective copies previously furnished
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review
with the following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time
his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness, the
reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with when
both documents were read aloud to the testator with each of the three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with
their respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then
concluded that although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was
substantial compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator
the contents of the drafted will was
served.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind
for purpose of Art, 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were
executed? If so, was the double-reading requirement of said article
complied with?chanrobles virtual law library
Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido
Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were
executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers
at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he had been suffering
from for several years and even prior to his first consultation with an eye
specialist on
14 December 1977.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify
Brigido as a "blind" testator under Art. 808 which reads:
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by
one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before
whom the will is acknowledged.

Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to

Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the
probate on 9 December 1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil
will and codicil were executed, he can be so considered within the scope of
entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa
the term as it is used in Art. 808. To support his stand, petitioner presented
Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was
before the trial court a medical certificate issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda,
executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash
Director of the Institute of Opthalmology (Philippine Eye Research
for the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma.
Institute), 6 the contents of which were interpreted in layman's terms by Dr.
But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the
Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted by private respondent. 7 Dr.
case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft
Roasa explained that although the testator could visualize fingers at three
of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his
(3) feet, he could no longer read either printed or handwritten matters as
presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as
of 14 December 1977, the day of his first consultation. 8chanrobles virtual
those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading
law library
using their own copies.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical
testimony, held that the testator could still read on the day the will and the
A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the
codicil were executed but chose not to do so because of "poor
testator's death on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as executor with
eyesight." 9 Since the testator was still capable of reading at that time, the
the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan,
court a quo concluded that Art. 808 need not be complied
Laguna. 5 Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the following grounds:
with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
that the will sought to be probated was not executed and attested as
required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise mentally
incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to senility and We agree with petitioner in this
old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear and respect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
threats; that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share
Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still
of the testator's estate; and lastly, that the signature of the testator was
capable of reading at the time his will and codicil were prepared, the fact
procured by fraud or trick.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do
library
so because of his "poor," 10 "defective," 11 or "blurred" 12 vision making it
necessary for private respondent to do the actual reading for
When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
upon in the Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from
which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust of the
The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez 13 provides an insight
appeal was that the deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at
into the scope of the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit:
the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto was executed;
that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly
not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the
have been denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is
illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may
be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes . . .

Page 5 of 28
Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators was read to him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his
but also to those who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading instructions), were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten
the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final documents. This is especially true when we consider the fact that the three
drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution instrumental witnesses were persons known to the testator, one being his
due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other physician (Dr. Evidente) and another (Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known
course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope to him since childhood.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read library
to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who
drafted the will and codicil did so confortably with his instructions. Hence,
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although
to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential
there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the
that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied
law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections
with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which,
when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will. 17chanrobles
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will virtual law library
shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again,
by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose
As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's
is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the
Probate Order and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we quote the
document before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if
following pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, 18 to wit:
anything is contrary to his
instructions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close
the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution of wills and
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws
public and an instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent)
on the subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
who drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of
requires.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures
such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of
and that the single reading suffices for purposes of the law. On the other the testator's will, must be disregarded (emphasis supplied).
hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance or compliance to
the letter and since it is admitted that neither the notary public nor an
Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable
instrumental witness read the contents of the will and codicil to Brigido,
terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto. We are
probate of the latter's will and codicil should have been
unwilling to cast these aside fro the mere reason that a legal requirement
disallowed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
intended for his protection was not followed strictly when such compliance
had been rendered unnecessary by the fact that the purpose of the
We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the petition must law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the
be denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library draft of his will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial
compliance suffices where the purpose has been
served.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is
acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason
being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of
to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never respondent Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering
intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary the length of time that this case has remained pending, this decision is
privilege. 14chanrobles virtual law library immediately executory. Costs against
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil
aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and SO ORDERED.
the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed,
upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his
instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place.
There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents
of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated
to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the
day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the
truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted
testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that
the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to
5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence
precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the
draft. 15chanrobles virtual law library

Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on
5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three
instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently.
Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O.
Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the testator's
physician) asked the testator whether the contents of the document were
of his own free will. Brigido answered in the affirmative. 16 With four
persons following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can
be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what

Page 6 of 28
 G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND
BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE
JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR., respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon.
Jose C. Colayco, Presiding Judge Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XXI disallowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus.
The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this petition are undisputed.
After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus,
Special Proceeding No. 81503 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate
of Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner
Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed
administrator. After Letters of Administration had been granted to the
petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be
the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On May 26,
1973, respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the probate of the
holographic Win on July 21, 1973.
Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as
administrator, he found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R.
de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win
addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in the
handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is
dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my win which I want to be respected
although it is not written by a lawyer. ...
The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of
Pedro Roxas de Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that
the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their deceased mother,
Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both recognized the handwriting of their mother and
positively Identified her signature. They further testified that their
deceased mother understood English, the language in which the
holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the date when
said Will was executed by their mother.
Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition
to probate" assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus
because a it was not executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed
through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and
improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix acted by mistake and/or
did not intend, nor could have intended the said Will to be her last Will and
testament at the time of its execution.
On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order
allowing the probate of the holographic Will which he found to have been
duly executed in accordance with law.
Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration alleging
inter alia that the alleged holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana R. de
Jesus was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She
contends that the law requires that the Will should contain the day, month
and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with.
On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier
order and disallowed the probate of the holographic Will on the ground
that the word "dated" has generally been held to include the month, day,
and year. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
Page 7 of 28
WHEREFORE, the document purporting to be the
holographic Will of Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, is hereby
disallowed for not having been executed as required
by the law. The order of August 24, 1973 is hereby
set aside.
The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid
compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will
which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and
Article 688 of the Old Civil Code require the testator to state in his
holographic Win the "year, month, and day of its execution," the present
Civil Code omitted the phrase Año mes y dia and simply requires that the
holographic Will should be dated. The petitioners submit that the liberal
construction of the holographic Will should prevail.
Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the purported
holographic Will is void for non-compliance with Article 810 of the New
Civil Code in that the date must contain the year, month, and day of its
execution. The respondent contends that Article 810 of the Civil Code was
patterned after Section 1277 of the California Code and Section 1588 of
the Louisiana Code whose Supreme Courts had consistently ruled that the
required date includes the year, month, and day, and that if any of these is
wanting, the holographic Will is invalid. The respondent further contends
that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article 810 of the
Civil Code because statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in
the execution of holographic Wills are strictly construed.
We agree with the petitioner.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal
application of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of
Wills. We should not overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in the
manner of execution of Wills, the purpose of which, in case of doubt is to
prevent intestacy —
The underlying and fundamental objectives
permeating the provisions of the law on wigs in this
Project consists in the liberalization of the manner
of their execution with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes,
but with sufficien safeguards and restrictions to
prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon
the testator.
This objective is in accord with the modem tendency
with respect to the formalities in the execution of
wills. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 103)
In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs of Raymundo Castro v.
Bustos (27 SCRA 327) he emphasized that:
xxx xxx xxx
... The law has a tender regard for the will of the
testator expressed in his last will and testament on
the ground that any disposition made by the
testator is better than that which the law can make.
For this reason, intestate succession is nothing more
 than a disposition based upon the presumed will of WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is
the decedent. REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.
Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal
requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without SO ORDERED.
undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege Icasiano v.
Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will has been executed in substantial
compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith
and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Win should be admitted
to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus,

xxx xxx xxx

... More than anything else, the facts and

circumstances of record are to be considered in the
application of any given rule. If the surrounding
circumstances point to a regular execution of the
wilt and the instrument appears to have been
executed substantially in accordance with the
requirements of the law, the inclination should, in
the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery
or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate,
although the document may suffer from some
imperfection of language, or other non-essential
defect. ... (Leynez v. Leynez 68 Phil. 745).

If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the
requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective
or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained
by the form followed by the testator.

The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been
expounded by this Court in Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, where we
ruled that:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the

execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. ...

In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such

contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or
of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed
(Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.

We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence
of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of
Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by
the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no
question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the children of the
testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother
and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of
said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz
Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date
"FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance
with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be
entertained.

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day,
month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar,
there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure
and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether
or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic
Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

Page 8 of 28
 G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990
JOSE RIVERA petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were
there two?
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named
Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only
surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over Venancio's estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076,
this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was
the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and
did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic wills.1
On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, a petition for the probate of the holographic wills.
Docketed as SP No. 1091, this petition was in turn opposed by Jose Rivera,
who reiterated that he was the sole heir of Venancio's intestate estate. 2
On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J.
Rivera was later appointed special administrator. After joint trial, Judge
Eliodoro B. Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent
but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The
Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria
Jocson, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had
no claim to this estate because the decedent was not his father. The
holographic wills were also admitted to probate. 3
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the then
Intermediate Appellate Court. 4 Its decision is now the subject of this
petition, which urges the reversal of the respondent court.
In support of his claim that he was the sole heir of the late Venancio Rivera,
Jose sought to show that the said person was married in 1928 to Maria
Vital, who was his mother. He submitted for this purpose Exhibit A, the
marriage certificate of the couple, and Exhibit B, his own baptismal
certificate where the couple was indicated as his parents. The petitioner
also presented Domingo Santos, who testified that Jose was indeed the son
of the couple and that he saw Venancio and Jose together several
times. 5 Jose himself stressed that Adelaido considered him a half-brother
and kissed his hand as a sign of respect whenever they met. He insisted
that Adelaido and his brothers and sisters were illegitimate children, sired
by Venancio with Maria Jocson. 6
Adelaido, for his part, maintained that he and his brothers and sisters were
born to Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson, who were legally married and
lived as such for many years. He explained that he could not present his
parents' marriage certificate because the record of marriages for 1942 in
Mabalacat were destroyed when the town was burned during the war, as
certified by Exhibit 6. 7 He also submitted his own birth certificate and
those of his sisters Zenaida and Yolanda Rivera, who were each described
therein as the legimitate children of Venancio Rivera and Maria
Jocson. 8 Atty. Regalado P. Morales, then 71 years of age, affirmed that he
knew the deceased and his parents, Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los
Reyes, and it was during the Japanese occupation that Venancio introduced
to him Maria Jocson as his wife. 9 To prove that there were in fact two
persons by the same name of Venancio Rivera, Adelaido offered Venancio
Rivera's baptismal certificate showing that his parents were Magno Rivera
and Gertrudes de los Reyes, 10 as contrasted with the marriage certificate
submitted by Jose, which indicated that the Venancio Rivera subject
thereof was the son of Florencio Rivera and Estrudez Reyes. 11 He also
denied kissing Jose's hand or recognizing him as a brother. 12
We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera.
Page 9 of 28
It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents' marriage certificate
because, as he explained it, the marriage records for 1942 in the Mabalacat
civil registry were burned during the war. Even so, he could still rely on the
presumption of marriage, since it is not denied that Venancio Rivera and
Maria Jocson lived together as husband and wife for many years, begetting
seven children in all during that time.
According to Article 220 of the Civil Code:
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family. Thus every intendment of
the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the
legitimacy of children, ... .
The Rules of Court, in Rule 131, provides:
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.
By contrast, although Jose did present his parents' marriage certificate,
Venancio was described therein as the son of Florencio Rivera. Presumably,
he was not the same Venancio Rivera described in Exhibit 4, his baptismal
certificate, as the son of Magno Rivera. While we realize that such
baptismal certificate is not conclusive evidence of Venancio's filiation
(which is not the issue here) it may nonetheless be considered to
determine his real identity. Jose insists that Magno and Florencio are one
and the same person, arguing that it is not uncommon for a person to be
called by different names. The Court is not convinced. There is no evidence
that Venancio's father was called either Magno or Florencio. What is more
likely is that two or more persons may live at the same time and bear the
same name, even in the same community. That is what the courts below
found in the cases at bar.
What this Court considers particularly intriguing is why, if it is true that he
was the legitimate son of Venancio Rivera, Jose did not assert his right as
such when his father was still alive. By his own account, Jose supported
himself — and presumably also his mother Maria Vital — as a gasoline
attendant and driver for many years. All the time, his father was residing in
the same town — and obviously prospering — and available for support.
His alleged father was openly living with another woman and raising
another family, but this was apparently accepted by Jose without protest,
taking no step whatsoever to invoke his status. If, as he insists, he and
Venancio Rivera were on cordial terms, there is no reason why the father
did not help the son and instead left Jose to fend for himself as a humble
worker while his other children by Maria Jocson enjoyed a comfortable life.
Such paternal discrimination is difficult to understand, especially if it is
considered — assuming the claims to be true — that Jose was the oldest
and, by his own account, the only legitimate child of Venancio Rivera.
And there is also Maria Vital, whose attitude is no less incomprehensible.
As Venancio's legitimate wife — if indeed she was — she should have
objected when her husband abandoned her and founded another family
by another woman, and in the same town at that. Seeing that the children
of Maria Jocson were being raised well while her own son Jose was
practically ignored and neglected, she nevertheless did not demand for him
at least support, if not better treatment, from his legitimate father. It is
unnatural for a lawful wife to say nothing if she is deserted in favor of
another woman and for a caring mother not to protect her son's interests
from his wayward father's neglect. The fact is that this forsaken wife never
demanded support from her wealthy if errant husband. She did not file a
complaint for bigamy or concubinage against Venancio Rivera and Maria
Jocson, the alleged partners in crime and sin. Maria Vital was completely
passive and complaisant.

Significantly, as noted by the respondent court, Maria Vital was not even
presented at the trial to support her son's allegations that she was the
decedent's lawful wife. Jose says this was not done because she was
already old and bedridden then. But there was no impediment to the taking
of her deposition in her own house. No effort was made toward this end
although her testimony was vital to the petitioner's cause. Jose dismisses
such testimony as merely "cumulative," but this Court does not agree.
Having alleged that Maria Jocson's marriage to Venancio Rivera was null
and void, Jose had the burden of proving that serious allegation.

We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err
in holding that the Venancio Rivera who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was
not the same person who married Maria Vital, Jose's legitimate mother, in
1928. Jose belonged to a humbler family which had no relation whatsoever
with the family of Venancio Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more
prosperous and prominent. Except for the curious Identity of names of the
head of each, there is no evidence linking the two families or showing that
the deceased Venancio Rivera was the head of both.

Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid
because it found them to have been written, dated and signed by the
testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held
there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under
Article 811 because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.

The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills
were questioned by Jose Rivera. In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he
declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in SP No. 1091, he denied
the existence of the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for
probate. In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills
submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were spurious.
Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court should have applied
Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:

In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be

necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly
declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested,
at least three of such witnesses shall be required.

The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose

Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in
question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest
the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of
requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio
Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed
by their father, was sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is

AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Page 10 of 28
 G.R. No. L-14003 August 5, 1960 The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce
more than one witness because the will's authenticity was not questioned;
and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production
FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant,
of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a
vs.
holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse
CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee.
party.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect:

This appeal, taken on points of law from a decision rendered on 15 January

ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be
1958 by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in its Special Proceedings
necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting
No. Q-2640, involves the determination of the quantity of evidence
and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and
required for the probate of a holographic will.
the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is
contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
The established facts are thus summarized in the decision appealed from
(Rec. App. pp. 22-24):
In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in the
preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary,
"Briefly speaking, the following facts were established by the expert testimony may be resorted to. (691a).
petitioner; that on September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de
Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, known to be the last
We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not
residence of said testatrix; that Francisco Azaola, petitioner
contested, he was not required to produce more than one witness; but
herein for probate of the holographic will, submitted the said
even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of
holographic will (Exh. C) whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was
the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be interpreted
made the sole heir as against the nephew of deceased Cesario
as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify
Singson; that witness Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the
the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate
holographic will (Exh. C) one month, more or less, before the
denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a
death of the testatrix, as the same was handed to him and his
holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it
wife; that the witness testified also that he recognized all the
becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite
signatures appearing in the holographic will (Exh. C) as the
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not
handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce said statement,
merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must
witness presented the mortgage (Exh. E), the special power of
be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and
the attorney (Exh. F), and the general power of attorney (Exh.
who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express)
F-1), besides the deeds of sale (Exhs. G and G-1) including an
"that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator".
affidavit (Exh. G-2), and that there were further exhibited in
There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so
court two residence certificates (Exhs. H and H-1) to show the
familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.
signatures of the testatrix, for comparison purposes; that said
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become
witness, Azaola, testified that the penmanship appearing in the
an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of
aforesaid documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the
Article 811 prescribes that —
testatrix as well as the signatures appearing in the aforesaid
documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as
well as the signatures appearing therein are the signatures of in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the
the testatrix; that said witness, in answer to a question of his preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary,
counsel admitted that the holographic will was handed to him expert testimony may be resorted to.
by the testatrix. "apparently it must have been written by her"
(t.s.n., p. 11). However, on page 16 on the same transcript of
As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness
the stenographic notes, when the same witness was asked by
may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent
counsel if he was familiar with the penmanship and handwriting
witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and
of the deceased Fortunata Vda. de Yance, he answered
provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
positively in the affirmative and when he was asked again
whether the penmanship referred to in the previous answer as
appearing in the holographic will (Exh. C) was hers (testatrix'), It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be
he answered, "I would definitely say it is hers"; that it was also presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was
established in the proceedings that the assessed value of the derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (cf. Cabang vs.
property of the deceased in Luskot, Quezon City, is in the Delfinado, 45 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). But it can
amount of P7,000.00. not be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in
the case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least
three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential
The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of
to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need
the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on
be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses
the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not
must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was
actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on
November 20, 1956 as appears on the will. Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by
the words "if the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law
deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the will's
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil
authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and
Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that
the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may
the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if
being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the
no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing,
proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written
the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The
in the handwriting of the testatrix."
duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the
state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the
testator be carried into effect.

Page 11 of 28
Commenting on analogous provisions of Article 691 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889, the noted Commentator, Mucuis Scaevola (Vol. 12, 2nd Ed.,
p.421), sagely remarks:

La manera como esta concebida la redaccion del ultimo

apartado de dicho precepto induce la conclusion de que
siempre o por lo menos, en la mayor parte de los casos, el Juez
debe acudir al criterio pericial para que le ilustre acerca de la
autenticidad del testamento olografo, aunque ya esten insertas
en los autos del expediente las declaraciones testificales. La
prudencia con que el Juez debe de proceder en resoluciones de
transcendencia asi lo exige, y la indole delicada y peligrosa del
testamento olografo lo hace necesario para mayor garantia de
todos los interes comprometidos en aquel.

En efecto, el cotejo pericial de letras puede ser una

confirmacion facultativa del dicho profano de los testigos y un
modo de desvanecer las ultimas dudas que pudieran ocurrir al
Juez acerca de la autenticidad que trata de averigaur y declarar.
Para eso se ha escrito la frase del citado ultimo apartado,
(siempre que el Juez lo estime conveniente), haya habido o no
testigos y dudaran o no estos respecto de los extremos por que
son preguntados.

El arbitrio judicial en este caso debe formarse con

independencia de los sucesos y de su significacion, para
responder debidamente de las resoluciones que haya de dictar.

And because the law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed,
no unfavourable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer
expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with
the testimony of the lay witnesses.

Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the
Civil Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.

Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has
been called upon to construe the import of said article, the interest of
justice would be better served, in our opinion, by giving the parties ample
opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert witnesses,
should the Court deem them necessary.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the
records ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to hold
a new trial in conformity with this opinion. But evidence already on record
shall not be retaken. No costs.

Page 12 of 28
 [G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999]
EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL
RAMONAL, petitioners, vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO,
and EUFEMIA PATIGAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals1 and its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:
Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and
witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators holographic
will has been established and the handwriting and signature therein
(exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate said will. Reversal of the judgment
appealed from and the probate of the holographic will in question be called
for. The rule is that after plaintiff has completed presentation of his
evidence and the defendant files a motion for judgment on demurrer to
evidence on the ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown
no right to relief, if the motion is granted and the order to dismissal is
reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his
behalf (Sec. 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment may, therefore,
be rendered for appellant in the instant case.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered
allowing the probate of the holographic will of the testator Matilde Seo
Vda. de Ramonal.2
The facts are as follows:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia
Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 18, a petition3 for probate of the holographic will of the
deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will
on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress
employed in the person of the testator, and the will was written voluntarily.
The assessed value of the decedents property, including all real and
personal property was about P400,000.00, at the time of her
death.4cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an
opposition5 to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will
was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression
that a third hand of an interested party other than the true hand of Matilde
Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on
the will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was
the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the
signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly
done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic
will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or
through fraud and trickery.
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary
evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a
demurrer6 to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish
sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of
the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
Page 13 of 28
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to
Evidence having being well taken, same is granted, and the petition for
probate of the document (Exhibit S) on the purported Holographic Will of
the late Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, is denied for insufficiency of
evidence and lack of merits.7
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal,8 and in
support of their appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the
testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2)
Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5)
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we
recite an account of their testimonies.
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,
where the special proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of
the deceased was filed. He produced and identified the. records of the
case. The documents presented bear the signature of the deceased,
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the basis for
comparison of the handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated or
admitted as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered.
Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to
produce and identify the voters affidavit of the decedent. However, the
voters affidavit was not produced for the same was already destroyed and
no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal was her aunt, and that after the death of Matildes husband, the
latter lived with her in her parents house for eleven (11) years, from 1958
to 1969. During those eleven (11) years of close association with the
deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature and handwriting as
she used to accompany her (deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal) in
collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings, and the
deceased always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness Matilde
Binanay) assisted the deceased in posting the records of the accounts, and
carried personal letters of the deceased to her creditors.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of
Matilde Vda. de Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August 30, 1978,
which was personally and entirely written, dated and signed, by the
deceased and that all the dispositions therein, the dates, and the signatures
in said will, were that of the deceased.
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of
Cagayan de Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings
and documents signed by the deceased in connection with the intestate
proceedings of her late husband, as a result of which he is familiar with the
handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature appearing in the
holographic will was similar to that of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal, but he can not be sure.
The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She
testified that she processed the application of the deceased for pasture
permit and was familiar with the signature of the deceased, since the
deceased signed documents in her presence, when the latter was applying
for pasture permit.
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had
lived with the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter.
That after a long period of time she became familiar with the signature of
the deceased. She testified that the signature appearing in the holographic
will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision9 ruling that
as follows: the appeal was meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs.
Singson, 109 Phil. 102, penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized
authority in civil law, the Court of Appeals held:
Instruction

x x x even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are

August 30, 1978
of the opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses
1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay. to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the
probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal of the holographic will, none being required by law (art. 810, new civil
code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent.
August 30, 1978 For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses;
they must be witnesses who know the handwriting and signature of the
2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikitan Street. testator and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not
express) that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. There may be no available witness acquainted with the testators
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal hand; or even if so familiarized, the witness may be unwilling to give a
positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811
August 30, 1978 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the
second paragraph of article 811 prescribes that
3. My jewelrys shall be divided among:
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be
1. Eufemia Patigas
resorted to.

2. Josefina Salcedo
As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness
may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent
3. Evangeline Calugay witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and
provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
(Sgd)Matilde Vda de Ramonal
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be
August 30, 1978 presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was
derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs.
Delfinado, 45 PHIL 291; Tolentino v. Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not
4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in case
R. Calugay of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three
witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present
(art.10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be
deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
"August 30, 1978

Again, under Art.811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the

5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of words if the court deem it necessary, which reveal that what the law deems
Evangeline R. Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta. Cruz, once I am essential is that the court should be convinced of the wills authenticity.
no longer around. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is
convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no
competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing,
the court may still, and in fact it should resort to handwriting experts. The
August 30, 1978
duty of the court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the
state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the
6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried. testator be carried into effect.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic
will were contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be interpreted as
"August 30,1978 to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of the having the probate
denied. No witness need be present in the execution of the holographic
Gene and Manuel: will. And the rule requiring the production of three witnesses is merely
permissive. What the law deems essential is that the court is convinced of
"Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully. the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry,
for the state is as much interested in the proponent that the true intention
of the testator be carried into effect. And because the law leaves it to the
Mama trial court to decide if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference
can be drawn from a partys failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless
Matilde Vda de Ramonal the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay
witnesses.10

Page 14 of 28
According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal A. My aunt.
Binanay and other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified
that the handwriting and signature in the holographic will were those of
Q. Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?
the testator herself.

A. Because I am familiar with her signature.16

Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and
witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the
authenticity of the holographic will and the handwriting and signature
therein, and allowed the will to probate.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners raise the following issues:
What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the
deceased, which she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not
declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.
Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited
the fact that the will was not found in the personal belongings of the
deceased but was in the possession of Ms. Binanay. She testified that:

(1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil.
Q. So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de
102, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, was applicable to the
Ramonal. You are merely supposing that it seems to be her signature
case.
because it is similar to the signature of the project of partition which you
have made?
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private
respondents had been able to present credible evidence to prove that the
A. That is true.30
date, text, and signature on the holographic will were written entirely in
the hand of the testatrix.
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the
will to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of
(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the
contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson,31 ruling
signatures in the holographic will of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
that the requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.

In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that the object of the
the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against
requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject
genuine signature of the testator.
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But,
on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
Code is mandatory. The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have will.
ruled that shall in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation
and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being
that the word shall, when used in a statute is
adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is
mandatory.11cräläwvirtualibräry
contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in
the handwriting of the deceased.
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or
mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with
give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is
one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased.
the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased.

So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is

to determine the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective
consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of
the testator.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents
testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of the
testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance,
Misamis Oriental, he merely identified the record of Special Proceedings
No. 427 before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that
the signature appearing in the holographic was that of the deceased.
Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was
presented to identify the signature of the deceased in the voters affidavit,
which was not even produced as it was no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:
[INSERT TSN]
Q. Showing to you this exhibit S, there is that handwritten tugon, whose
handwriting is this?
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the
handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed
by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the
cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms.
Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the
deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting
expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes
are different when compared with other documents written by the
testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not
readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30,
1978,33 and the signatures in several documents such as the application
letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980,34 and a letter dated
June 16, 1978,35 the strokes are different. In the letters, there are
continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in
writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain
that the holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

Page 15 of 28
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records
are ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow
petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the
probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 16 of 28
 G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.
BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.
RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final
determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the
probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla
and the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432,
was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza
Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla
Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the
deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within twenty days of the death of the testator as
required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will
did not contain a disposition of property after death
and was not intended to take effect after death, and
therefore it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an
alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise
it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap,
104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic
or otherwise, executed and attested as required by
law.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation
of the case with another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275).
Their motion was granted by the court in an order
dated April 4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation
of the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss
the petition for the probate of the will. They argued
that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but
merely an instruction as to the management and
improvement of the schools and colleges founded
by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be
proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to
dismiss was denied by the court in its order of
February 23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the order was
Page 17 of 28
contrary to law and settled pronouncements and
rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant
in turn filed an opposition. On July 23, 1979, the
court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and
dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original
copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof
cannot stand in lieu of the original.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the
Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of
holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to
suppose, regards the document itself as the material
proof of authenticity of said wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged
holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962
while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In
view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the
time of the execution of the will to the death of the
decedent, the fact that the original of the will could
not be located shows to our mind that the decedent
had discarded before his death his allegedly missing
Holographic Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the
Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's
petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the
ground that the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged that
the trial court committed the following assigned errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A
LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY
A COPY THEREOF;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE
MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
APPELLANT'S WILL.
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or
cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant
to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance
of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The
probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying
witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted
to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However,
if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence
is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a
comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and
the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509,
the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who
have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself
as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says
that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even
a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby
the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and
tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy
of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order
dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late
Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Page 18 of 28
 G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas,
Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming
to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the
probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will reads in full as follows:
My Last will and Testament
In the name of God, Amen.
I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa
City, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare
thus to be my last will and testament.
1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of
Lipa City. In accordance with the rights of said Church, and that my
executrix hereinafter named provide and erect at the expose of my state a
suitable monument to perpetuate my memory.
xxx xxx xxx
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the
testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA
K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will
contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article
814 of the Civil Code reading:
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation,
erasure or alteration in a holographic will the
testator must authenticate the same by his full
signature.
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be
given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September
3, 197 3, reading in part:
The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the
National Bureau of Investigation for examination.
The NBI reported that the handwriting, the
signature, the insertions and/or additions and the
initial were made by one and the same person.
Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of
the decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. The only question
is whether the win, Exhibit 'C', should be admitted
to probate although the alterations and/or
insertions or additions above-mentioned were not
authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix
pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code. The petitioner
contends that the oppositors are estopped to assert
the provision of Art. 814 on the ground that they
themselves agreed thru their counsel to submit the
Document to the NBI FOR EXAMINATIONS. This is
untenable. The parties did not agree, nor was it
Page 19 of 28
impliedly understood, that the oppositors would be
in estoppel.
The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of
Article 814 of the Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit
"C". Finding the insertions, alterations and/or
additions in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by
the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K. Kalaw,
the Court will deny the admission to probate of
Exhibit "C".
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as
the holographic will of Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED.
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since
the alterations and/or insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate
of her holographic Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary
disposition. Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2,
1973, on the ground that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being , clear and
explicit, (it) requires no necessity for interpretation."
From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the
Order dated November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this
Petition for Review on certiorari on the sole legal question of whether or
not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions
were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full
signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations
made by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his
signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only
as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.1 Manresa
gave an Identical commentary when he said "la omision de la salvedad no
anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la
sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895." 2
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir
with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full
authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that
the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing
remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the
Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming
change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be
given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required
by law by affixing her full signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions,
cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect
only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence and
validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and
alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be
determined with certitude. As Manresa had stated in his commentary on
Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814 of the new Civil
Code was derived:
... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del
Codigo (el 688) la sentencia que no declara la
nulidad de un testamento olografo que contenga
palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre renglones
no salvadas por el testador bajo su firnia segun
previene el parrafo tercero del mismo, porque, en
realidad, tal omision solo puede afectar a la validez
o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca al testamento
mismo, ya por estar esa disposicion en parrafo
aparte de aquel que determine las condiciones
 necesarias para la validez del testamento olografo,
ya porque, de admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria al
absurdo de que pequefias enmiendas no salvadas,
que en nada afectasen a la parte esencial y
respectiva del testamento, vinieran a anular este, y
ya porque el precepto contenido en dicho parrafo ha
de entenderse en perfecta armonia y congruencia
con el art. 26 de la ley del Notariado que declara
nulas las adiciones apostillas entrerrenglonados,
raspaduras y tachados en las escrituras matrices,
siempre que no se salven en la forma prevenida,
paro no el documento que las contenga, y con
mayor motivo cuando las palabras enmendadas,
tachadas, o entrerrenglonadas no tengan
importancia ni susciten duda alguna acerca del
pensamiento del testador, o constituyan meros
accidentes de ortografia o de purez escrituraria, sin
trascendencia alguna(l).

Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de excepcion

contenida en este ultimo fallo, es preciso que las
tachaduras, enmiendas o entrerrenglonados sin
salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4 alteren ni
uarien de modo substancial la express voluntad del
testador manifiesta en el documento. Asi lo advierte
la sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1916, que
declara nulo un testamento olografo por no estar
salvada por el testador la enmienda del guarismo
ultimo del año en que fue extendido3(Emphasis
ours).

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of

respondent Judge, dated September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 20 of 28
 G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive
portion of which reads;
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of
November 19, 1988 of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for
probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the instrument
submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie
Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto
and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong,
Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero,
Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for
allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of
its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under
duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to
dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting;
it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr.
Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property
could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole
owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's
holographic will to probate. It found, inter alia:
Considering then that the probate proceedings
herein must decide only the question of identity of
the will, its due execution and the testamentary
capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no
reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its
failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by
law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the
testatrix.
For one, no evidence was presented to show that
the will in question is different from the will actually
executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised
by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not
written in the handwriting of the testatrix which
properly refers to the question of its due execution,
and not to the question of identity of will. No other
will was alleged to have been executed by the
testatrix other than the will herein presented.
Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the
identity of the will presented for probate must be
accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be
Page 21 of 28
deemed to be the will actually executed by the
testatrix.
xxx xxx xxx
While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and
signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been
disputed, the petitioners, however, have
satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic
will in question was indeed written entirely, dated
and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three
(3) witnesses who have convincingly shown
knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have
been presented and have explicitly and categorically
identified the handwriting with which the
holographic will in question was written to be the
genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix.
Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement
of the law that the holographic will be entirely
written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the
testatrix has been complied with.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of
the testratix, (private respondent) Clemente Sand
himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was
completely in her sound mind when he visited her
during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around
which time the holographic will in question was
executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is
sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making
the will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed
of, the proper object of her bounty, and
the characterof the testamentary act . . . The will
itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed
knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even
identified the lot number and square meters of the
lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of her
bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And
considering that she had even written a nursing
book which contained the law and jurisprudence on
will and succession, there is more than sufficient
showing that she knows the character of the
testamentary act.
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its
due execution and the testamentary capacity of the
testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the allowance
of probate of the will submitted herein.
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show
sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein
holographic will. While it was alleged that the said
will was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of
some other person, the evidence adduced have not
shown any instance where improper pressure or
influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private
respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the
testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution
of the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth
anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also
established that she is a very intelligent person and
has a mind of her own. Her independence of
character and to some extent, her sense of
superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all
show the unlikelihood of her being unduly
influenced or improperly pressured to make the
aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue
influence or improper pressure in question herein
 only refer to the making of a will and not as to the
specific testamentary provisions therein which is the
proper subject of another proceeding. Hence, under
the circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing
reason for the disallowance of the will herein.
Considering then that it is a well-established
doctrine in the law on succession that in case of
doubt, testate succession should be preferred over
intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing
grounds were presented and proven for the
disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie
Sand, the aforesaid will submitted herein must be
admitted to probate. 3 (Citations omitted.)
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of
decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It held that
the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil
Code, which read, as follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing
in a holographic will are signed without being dated,
and the last disposition has a signature and date,
such date validates the dispositions preceding it,
whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure
or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and
undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures,
alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by
decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be
disallowed in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence
of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by
fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his
signature thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases;
(1) If the formalities required
by law have not been
complied with;
Page 22 of 28
(2) If the testator was insane,
or otherwise mentally
incapable of making a will, at
the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through
force or under duress, or the
influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by
undue and improper
pressure and influence, on
the part of the beneficiary or
of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the
testator was procured by
fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by
mistake or did not intend that
the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time
of affixing his signature
thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a
will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only
issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed,
the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the
decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were
the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of
Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were
not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is
erroneous.
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479
(1919), that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the
object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise
of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will,
must be disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities
include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements
under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures
authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the
New Civil Code, thus:
 A person may execute a holographic will which must The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not
be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of validly dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del
the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.
and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only
upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation
disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the
handwritten by the testator. case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will
that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand
(which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement
in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot
affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but
validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's
not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the
other heirs.
dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated.
Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the
disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte.
case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held:
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the
and interlineations made by the testator in a above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.
holographic Will have not been noted under his
signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
SO ORDERED.
whole, but at most only as respects the particular
words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave
an identical commentary when he said "la omission
de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla
de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de
Abril de 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)

Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions

were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's
signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes

and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and
814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for
the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be
traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the
present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as
follows:

Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the

testator writes it himself in the form and with the
requisites required in Article 688.

Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by

persons of full age.

In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on

stamped paper corresponding to the year of its
execution, written in its entirety by the testator and
signed by him, and must contain a statement of the
year, month and day of its execution.

If it should contain any erased, corrected, or

interlined words, the testator must identify them
over his signature.

Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their

own language.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only
the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and not those
found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the
probate of a holographic will.

Page 23 of 28
 G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO
PALAGANAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed
abroad by a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of
execution.
The Facts and the Case
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who
became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless.
In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her
brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had
left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another
brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his
appointment as special administrator of her estate.1 On October 15, 2003,
however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin
Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition
on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines
but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that,
assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid
nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the
testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they
claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and
Sergio, were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit,
respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their
deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties
to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Ruperta’s U.S.
will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate
Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special
administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated
in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),3arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first
time in the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,4 affirming the assailed order
of the RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will,
subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of
the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The
CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not
require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its
execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case,
said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already
probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or
procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to
this Court.
The Issue Presented
Page 24 of 28
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a
foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not
been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was
executed.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by
foreigners abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its
execution before it can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior
compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They
insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent
proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign
country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c)
the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on
probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with
the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in
the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in
our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien
who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.6
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC
of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the
settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the
executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the
same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must
show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the
names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property
of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and
(e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person
having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the
probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province.7The rules do not require proof that the
foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed
by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have
in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here.
But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed
in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is
specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to
petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will,
it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court
acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided
its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically.1âwphi1 If the
instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the
will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our
law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless
the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.8
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an
initial ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate
of Ruperta’s will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as
special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present
evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testator’s state of mind
at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required
of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial court’s directive for
Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Ruperta’s will and the
certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.

SO ORDERED.

Page 25 of 28
 G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964
PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal by Paula de la Cerna and others from a decision of the Court of
Appeals, Sixth Division (C.A.-G.R. No. 23763-R) reversing that of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. Case No. R-3819) and ordering the dismissal
of an action for partition.
The factual background appears in the following portion of the decision of
the Court of Appeals (Petition, Annex A, pp. 2-4):
It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la
Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and
testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that "our two
parcels of land acquired during our marriage together with all
improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our
niece, whom we have nurtured since childhood, because God
did not give us any child in our union, Manuela Rebaca being
married to Nicolas Potot", and that "while each of the testators
is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two
lands aforementioned", the said two parcels of land being
covered by Tax No. 4676 and Tax No. 6677, both situated in sitio
Bucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon, province of Cebu.
Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid
will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and Manuela
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, after due
publication as required by law and there being no opposition,
heard the evidence, and, by Order of October 31, 1939; in
Special Proceedings No. 499, "declara legalizado el documento
Exhibit A como el testamento y ultima voluntad del finado
Bernabe de la Serna con derecho por parte du su viuda
superstite Gervasia Rebaca y otra testadora al propio tiempo
segun el Exhibit A de gozar de los frutos de los terranos
descritos en dicho documents; y habido consideracion de la
cuantia de dichos bienes, se decreta la distribucion sumaria de
los mismos en favor de la logataria universal Manuela Rebaca
de Potot previa prestacion por parte de la misma de una fianza
en la sum de P500.00 para responder de cualesquiera
reclamaciones que se presentare contra los bienes del finado
Bernabe de la Serna de los años desde esta fecha" (Act Esp. 499,
Testamentaria Finado Bernabe de la Serna) Upon the death of
Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the
probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was
filed on November 6, 1952, being Special Proceedings No. 1016-
R of the same Court of First Instance of Cebu, but for failure of
the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot and her attorney, Manuel
Potot to appear, for the hearing of said petition, the case was
dismissed on March 30, 1954 Spec. Proc. No. 1016-R, In the
matter of the Probate of the Will of Gervasia Rebaca).
The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the
testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of
joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil
Code of the Philippines); but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court
of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was
issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due
execution of the testament. Further, the Court of Appeals declared that:
... . It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil
Code). prohibits the making of a will jointly by two or more
persons either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a
third person. However, this form of will has long been
sanctioned by use, and the same has continued to be used; and
when, as in the present case, one such joint last will and
Page 26 of 28
testament has been admitted to probate by final order of a
Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no
alternative except to give effect to the provisions thereof that
are not contrary to law, as was done in the case of Macrohon
vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267, wherein our Supreme Court gave
effect to the provisions of the joint will therein mentioned,
saying, "assuming that the joint will in question is valid."
Whence this appeal by the heirs intestate of the deceased husband,
Bernabe de la Cerna.
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate,
entered in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator,
Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and
testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed
the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators,
reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error
thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have
been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the
probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however
erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will
is binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re
Estates of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and public policy and sound practice
demand that at the risk of occasional errors judgment of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis
set litium (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521, and other cases cited in 2
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 Ed., p. 322).
Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are
concluded by the 1939 decree admitting his will to probate. The contention
that being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks that the ultimate
decision on Whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and here
they have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this
court, the dismissal of their action for partition was correct.
But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid
future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1989 could only affect
the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not
include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was
then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the
probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could
not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a
will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.
It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife
was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de
novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Thus
regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint
will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the
deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question, for the reasons
extensively discussed in our decision in Bilbao vs. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, that
explained the previous holding in Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267.
Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her
death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir,
unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be
the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in
common usage could not make them valid when our Civil Codes
consistently invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by other
subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may prevail against their
observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines
of 1950).
WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATION, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23763-R is affirmed. No Costs.
 G.R. No. L-7647 March 27, 1914
DOMINGO CALUYA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
LUCINA DOMINGO, respondent-appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Ilocos Norte denying the probate of a will.
The learned court below based its judgment upon three grounds. The first
one was that, although the testator had signed by mark, it nowhere
appeared in the will who had written the signature or that it had been
written at his request. The second, that the witness Antonino Pandaraoan
could not really have signed the attestation clause because, at the time it
was executed, he was attending a session of the municipal council of Piddig
as a member thereof. Third: That as to the other witness, Segundino Asis,
the will mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to him by the testator, and
he being thereby an interested party his testimony could not be believed.
We do not believe that any of the objections are well founded and the
judgment refusing its probate must, therefore, be reversed.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be
valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect
the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or
by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other. . . .
It is nowhere required that, where the testator is unable to write, the fact
that his signature was written by some other person, at his request and
express direction, should appear in the body of the will itself. In the case
of Barut vs. Cabacungan (21 Phil. Rep., 461, 463) we held the following:
From these provisions it is entirely clear that, with respect to
the validity of the will, it is unimportant whether the person
who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The
important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the
testatrix was signed at her express direction in the presence of
three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her
presence and in the presence of each other. That is all the
statute requires. It may be wise as a practical matter that the
one who signs the testator's name signs also his own; but that
is not essential to the validity of the will. Whether one person
or another signed the name of the testatrix in this case is
absolutely unimportant so far as the validity of her will is
concerned. The plain wording of the statute shows that the
requirement laid down by the trial court, if it did lay it down, is
absolutely unnecessary under the law; and the reasons
underlying the provisions of the statute relating to the
execution of wills do not in any sense require such a provision.
From the standpoint of language it is an impossibility to draw
from the words of the law the inference that the person who
signs the name of the testator must sign his own name also. The
law requires only three witnesses to a will, not four.
Nor is such requirement found in any other branch of the law.
The name of a person who is unable to write may be signed by
another, by express direction, to any instrument known to the
law. There is no necessity whatever, so far as the validity of the
instrument is concerned, for the person who writes the name
of the principal in the document to sign his pen name also. As a
matter of policy it may be wise that he did so inasmuch as it
would give such intimation as would enable a person proving
Page 27 of 28
the document to demonstrate more readily the execution by
the principal. But as a matter of essential validity of the
document, it is unnecessary. The main thing to be established
in the execution of the will is the signature of the testator. If
that signature is proved, whether it be written by himself or by
another at his request, it is none the less valid, and the fact of
such signature can be proved as perfectly and as completely
when the person signing for the principal omits to sign his own
name as it can when he actually signs. To hold a will invalid for
the lack of the signature of the person signing the name of the
principal is, in the particular case, a complete abrogation of the
law of wills, as it rejects and destroys a will which the status
expressly declares is valid.
The section above quoted also provides that "the attestation clause shall
state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by
some other person, at his express direction, in the presence of the
witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in
the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation
shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed
and attested as in this section provided."
Not only does the attestation clause comply with the requirements of this
section, but it appears clearly proved in evidence that the name of the
testator was signed by another person at his request and under his
direction and in his presence and in the presence of the witnesses to the
will. Moreover, as appears from the last clause of the section, if the
attestation clause is defective, or even absent, the will is nevertheless valid
provided it is satisfactorily proved that it was in fact signed and executed
as provided by law.
As to the second objection, namely, that Antonino Pandaraoan could not
have signed the will as a witness thereto, as stated in the attestation clause,
because he was attending a meeting of the municipal council of Piddig at
the time the will is alleged to have been executed, we believe this also to
be without merit. It does not appear in the evidence of the opposition that
the witness Pandaraoan was attending a meeting of the municipal council
of Piddig from something like 10 o'clock till 12.30 o'clock of the day on
which the will was executed ands that the will was executed sometime
between 10 and 12 o'clock. To much weight, however, can not be given to
the testimony relative to the precise time of the execution of the will. The
barrio of Piddig is only a short distance from the house in which the will
was executed and it would have taken but a short time to cover the
distance. the witness Pandaraoan himself testified directly and positively
that, after having left the meeting of the municipal council, he went to the
house of the testator by appointment and there signed the will as stated in
the attestation clause. The other witnesses to the will support this
declaration. Not only this, but the notary public who drew up the will and
who translated it to the testator and who was present at the time of its
execution, declared and testified that the witnesses whose names appear
upon the will were present at the time it was executed by the testator and
that they signed the same at his request and in his presence and in the
presence of each other. All of the witnesses to the will unite in declaring
that they were there present at the time the will was executed and that
they signed as witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The mere fact that there was a session of the municipal council of Piddig
about the same time that the will was executed is not necessarily
conclusive against the fact that Antonino Pandaraoan was present and
signed as a subscribing witness as he declares. Mistakes in time are easily
made among witnesses who measure time not so much by clocks or
watches as by the sun. Antonino Pandaraoan testified that the municipal
council began its session about 10 o'clock; that in order to attend the
execution of the will, as he had agreed with the notary public he would do,
he was obliged to leave the session before it terminated; that he so left the
session, mounted a horse and arrived at the house of the testator at about
12 o'clock, in time to take part in the execution of the ill as stated in the
attestation clause.
We do not believe that the clear and positive testimony of the witnesses to
the will and of the notary public is overcome by the evidence offered in
opposition to the probate.
As to the third ground upon which the court based its decision; namely,
that the will having mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to Segundino
Asis, one of the witnesses to the will, while not rendering the will entirely
invalid, throws great doubt upon the legality of its execution and especially
the testimony of said witness relating thereto.

Section 622 provides:

If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom or to whose

wife or husband, or parent, or child, a beneficial devise, legacy,
or interest, of or affecting real or personal estate, is given by
such will, such devise, legacy, or interest shall, so far only as
concerns such person, or the wife or husband, or parent or child
of such person, or anyone claiming under such person or such
wife or husband, or parent or child, be void, unless there are
three other competent witnesses to such will, and such person
so attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such devise,
legacy, or interest had not been made or given. But a mere
charge on the real or personal estate of the testator, for the
payment of debts, shall not prevent his creditors from being
competent witnesses to his will.

As will readily be seen on reading this section, nothing in the will before us
relative to the sale of land to Segundino Asis creates such an interest
therein as falls within the provisions thereof. Indeed, no interest of any kind
was created by the will in favor of Segundino Asis, nor did it convey or
transfer of any interest to him. It simply mentioned a fact already
consummated, a sale already made. Even if, however, the will had
conveyed an interest to Segundino Asis, it would not have been for that
reason void. Only that clause of the will conveying an interest to him would
have been void; the remainder could have stood and would have stood as
a valid testament.

We are confident from a thorough examination of the record that a fair

preponderance of the evidence is in favor of the proponents, and there
being no legal impediment to the probate the court erred in refusing it.

The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the cause remanded
to the court whence it came with instructions to legalize and probate the
will in accordance with the petition.

Page 28 of 28