DOLORES VILLAR, ROMEO PEQUITO, DIONISIO RAMOS, BENIGNO
TUMIWALAG bilang kasaping Unyon ng Philippine
MAMARALDO, ORLANDO ACOSTA, RECITACION BERNUS, ANSELMA
ANDAN, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN and RITA LLAGAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of
Labor, AMIGO MANUFACTURING INCORPORATED and PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
Petition for review by certiorari to set aside the Order dated February 15,
1979 of respondent Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong affirming the Decision
of the OIC of Regional Office No. 4 dated October 14, 1978 which jointly
resolved RO4-Case No. T-IV-3549-T and RO4-Case No. RD 4-4088-77-T.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a duly
registered labor organization which, at the time of the present dispute, was
the existing bargaining agent of the employees in private respondent Amigo
Manufacturing, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company). The Company and
the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU had a collective bargaining agreement
governing their labor relations, which agreement was then about to expire on
February 28, 1977. Within the last sixty (60) days of the CBA, events
transpired giving rise to the present dispute.
On January 5, 1977, upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees
in the company, including the petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal
(hereinafter referred to as FUR) filed a petition for certification election with
the Med-Arbiter's Office, Regional Office No. 4 of the Ministry of Labor and
Employment. The petition was, however, opposed by the Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (hereinafter referred to as PAFLU) with
whom, as stated earlier, the Amigo Employees Union was at that time
affiliated. PAFLU's opposition cited the "Code of Ethics" governing inter-
federation disputes among and between members of the Trade Unions
Congress of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as TUCP). Consequently,
the Med-Arbiter indorsed the case to TUCP for appropriate action but before
any such action could be taken thereon, the petitioners disauthorized FUR
from continuing the petition for certification election for which reason FUR
withdrew the petition.
On February 7, 1977, the same employees who had signed the petition filed
by FUR signed a joint resolution reading in toto as follows:
Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan
1.
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) at kaalinsabay
nito, inaalisan namin ang PAFLU ng kapangyarihan na
katawanin kami sa anumang pakikipagkasundo (CBA) sa
Pangasiwaan ng aming pinapasukan at kung sila man ay
nagkasundo o magkakasundo sa kabila ng pagtitiwalag na
ito, ang nasabing kasunduan ay hindi namin pinagtitibay at
tahasang aming itinatakwil/tinatanggihan;
2. BINABAWI namin ang aming pahintulot sa Federation of
Unions of Rizal (FUR) na katawanin kami sa Petition for
Certification Election (RO4-MED Case No. 743-77) at/o sa
sama-samang pakikipagkasundo sa aming patrons;
3. PANATILIHIN na nagsasarili (independent) ang aming
samahan, AMIGO EMPLOYEES' UNION, alinsunod sa
Artikulo 240 ng Labor Code;
4. MAGHAIN KAAGAD ang aming Unyong nagsasarili, sa
pamumuno ng aming pangsamantalang Opisyal na
kinatawan, si Ginang DOLORES VILLAR, ng Petition for
Certification Election sa Department of Labor, para kilalanin
ang aming Unyong nagsasarili bilang Tanging kinatawan ng
mga manggagawa sa sama-samang pakikipagkasundo
(CBA);
5. BIGYAN ng kopya nito ang bawa't kinauukulan at ang
mga kapasiyahang ito ay magkakabisa sa oras na
matanggap ng mga kinauukulan ang kani-kanilang sipi nito.1
Immediately thereafter or on February 9, 1977, petitioner Dolores Villar,
representing herself to be the authorized representative of the Amigo
Employees Union, filed a petition for certification election in the Company
before Regional Office No. 4, with the Amigo Employees Union as the
petitioner. The Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU intervened and moved for
the dismissal of the petition for certification election filed by Dolores Villar,
citing as grounds therefor, viz: (a) the petition lacked the mandatory requisite
of at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit; (2) Dolores Villar had
no legal personality to sign the petition since she was not an officer of the
union nor is there factual or legal basis for her claim that she was the
authorized representative of the local union; (3) there was a pending case for
the same subject matter filed by the same individuals; (4) the petition was
barred by the new CBA concluded on February 15, 1977; (5) there was no
valid disaffiliation from PAFLU; and (6) the supporting signatures were
procured through false pretenses.
Finding that the petition involved the same parties and causes of action as
the case previously indorsed to the TUCP, the Med-Arbiter dismiss the
petition filed by herein petitioner Villar, which dismissal is still pending appeal
before the Bureau of Labor Relations.
In the meantime, on February 14, 1977, the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU called a special meeting of its general membership. A Resolution
was thereby unanimously approved which called for the investigation by the
PAFLU national president, pursuant to the constitution and by-laws of the
Federation, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, for
"continuously maligning, libelling and slandering not only the incumbent
officers but even the union itself and the federation;" spreading 'false
propaganda' that the union officers were 'merely appointees of the
management', and for causing divisiveness in the union.
Pursuant to the Resolution approved by the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU, the PAFLU, through its national President, formed a Trial Committee
to investigate the local union's charges against the petitioners for acts of
disloyalty inimical to the interest of the local union, as well as directing the
Trial Committee to subpoena the complainants (Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU) and the respondents (herein petitioners) for investigation, to conduct
the said investigation and to submit its findings and recommendations for
appropriate action.
And on the same date of February 15, 1977, the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU and the Company concluded a new CBA which, besides granting
additional benefits to the workers, also reincorporated the same provisions of
the existing CBA, including the union security clause reading, to wit:
ARTICLE III
UNION SECURITY WITH RESPECT TO PRESENT
MEMBERS
All members of the UNION as of the signing of this
Agreement shall remain members thereof in good standing.
Therefore, any members who shall resign, be expelled, or
shall in any manner cease to be a member of the UNION,
shall be dismissed from his employment upon written
request of the UNION to the Company. 2
Subsequently, petitioners were summoned to appear before
the PAFLU Trial Committee for the aforestated investigation
of the charges filed against them by the Amigo Employees
Union-PAFLU. Petitioners, however, did not attend but
requested for a "Bill of Particulars" of the charges, which
charges were stated by the Chairman of the committee as
follows:
1. Disaffiliating from PAFLU and affiliating with the
Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR).
2. Filling petition for certification election with the Bureau of
Labor Relations and docketed as Case No. R04-MED-830-
77 and authorizing a certain Dolores Villar as your
authorized representative without the official sanction of the
mother Federation- PAFLU.
3. Maligning, libelling and slandering the incumbent officers
of the union as well as of the PAFLU Federation.
4. By spreading false propaganda among members of the
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU that the incumbent union
officers are 'merely appointees' of the management.
5. By sowing divisiveness instead of togetherness among
members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
6. By conduct unbecoming as members of the Amigo
Employees Union- PAFLU which is highly prejudicial to the
union as well as to the PAFLU Federation.
All these charges were formalized in a resolution of the
incumbent officers of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU
dated February 14, 1977. 3
Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction over their case, petitioners again
refused to participate in the investigation rescheduled and conducted on
March 9, 1979. Instead, petitioners merely appeared to file their Answer to
the charges and moved for a dismissal.
Petitioners contend in their Answer that neither the disaffiliation of the Amigo
Employees Union from PAFLU nor the act of filing the petition for certification
election constitute disloyalty as these are in the exercise of their
constitutional right to self-organization. They further contended that PAFLU
was without jurisdiction to investigate their case since the charges, being
intra-union problems within the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, should be
conducted pursuant to the provisions of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of
the local union's constitution and by-laws.
The complainants, all of whom were the then incumbent officers of the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU, however, appeared and adduced their evidence
supporting the charges against herein petitioners.
Based on the findings and recommendations of the PAFLU trial committee,
the PAFLU President, on March 15, 1977, rendered a decision finding the
petitioners guilty of the charges and disposing in the last paragraph thereof,
to wit,
Excepting Felipe Manlapao, the expulsion from the AMIGO
EMPLOYEES UNION of all the other nine (9) respondents,
Dionisio Ramos, Recitation Bernus, Dolores Villar, Romeo
Dequito, Rolando de Guzman, Anselma Andan, Rita Llagas,
Benigno Mamaradlo and Orlando Acosta is hereby ordered,
and as a consequence the Management of the employer,
AMIGO MANUFACTURING, INC. is hereby requested to
terminate them from their employment in conformity with the
security clause in the collective bargaining agreement.
Further, the Trial Committee is directed to investigate Felipe
Manlapao when he shall have reported back for duty. 4
Petitioners appealed the Decision to the PAFLU, citing the same grounds as
before, and in addition thereto, argued that the PAFLU decision cannot
legally invoke a CBA which was unratified, not certified, and entered into
without authority from the union general membership, in asking the Company
to terminate them from their employment. The appeal was, likewise, denied
by PAFLU in a Resolution dated March 28, 1977.
After denying petitioner's appeal, PAFLU on March 28, 1977 sent a letter to
the Company stating, to wit,
We are furnishing you a copy of our Resolution on the
Appeal of the respondent in Administrative Case No. 2,
Series of 1977, Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU vs. Dionisio
Ramos, et al.
In view of the denial of their appeal and the Decision of
March 15, 1977 having become final and executory we
would appreciate full cooperation on your part by
implementing the provision of our CBA on security clause by
terminating the respondents concerned from their
employment.5
This was followed by another letter from PAFLU to the Company dated April
25, 1977, reiterating the demand to terminate the employment of the
petitioners pursuant to the security clause of the CBA, with a statement
absolving the Company from any liability or damage that may arise from
petitioner's termination.
Acting on PAFLU's demand, the Company informed PAFLU that it will first
secure the necessary clearances to terminate petitioners. By letter dated
April 28, 1977, PAFLU requested the Company to put petitioners under
preventive suspension pending the application for said clearances to
terminate the petitioners, upon a declaration that petitioners' continued stay
within the work premises will "result in the threat to the life and limb of the
other employees of the company."6
Hence, on April 29, 1977, the Company filed the request for clearance to
terminate the petitioners before the Department of Labor, Regional Office No.
4. The application, docketed as RO4-Case No. 7-IV-3549-T, stated as cause
therefor, "Demand by the Union Pursuant to the Union Security Clause," and
further, as effectivity date, "Termination-upon issuance of clearance;
Suspension-upon receipt of notice of workers concerned." 7 Petitioners were
then informed by memorandum dated April 29, 1977 that the Company has
applied for clearance to terminate them upon demand of PAFLU, and that
each of them were placed under preventive suspension pending the
resolution of the said applications. The security guard was, likewise, notified
to refuse petitioners entry into the work premises. 8
In an earlier development, on April 25, 1977, or five days before petitioners
were placed under preventive suspension, they filed a complaint with
application for preliminary injunction before the same Regional Office No. 4,
docketed as RO4-Case No. RD-4-4088-77-T, praying that after due notice
and hearing, "(1) A preliminary injunction be issued forthwith to restrain the
respondents from doing the act herein complained of, namely: the dismissal
of the individual complainants from their employment; (2) After due hearing
on the merits of the case, an Order be entered denying and/or setting aside
the Decision dated March 15, 1977 and the Resolution dated March 28,
1977, issued by respondent Onofre P. Guevara, National President of
respondent PAFLU; (3) The Appeal of the individual complainants to the
General Membership of the complainant AMIGO EMPLOYEES UNION,
dated March 22, 1977, pursuant to Sections 2, 3, 4 & 5, Article XI in relation
of Section 1, Article XII of the Union Constitution and By-Laws, be given due
course; and (4) Thereafter, the said preliminary injunction be made
permanent, with costs, and with such further orders/reliefs that are just and
equitable in the premises."9
In these two cases filed before the Regional Office No. 4, the parties adopted
their previous positions when they were still arguing before the PAFLU trial
committee.
On October 14, 1977, Vicente Leogardo, Jr., Officer-in-Charge of Regional
Office No. 4, rendered a decision jointly resolving said two cases, the
dispositive portion of which states, to wit,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered granting the application of the Amigo
Manufacturing, Inc., for clearance to terminate the
employment of Dolores D. Villar, Dionisio Ramos, Benigno
Mamaraldo, Orlando Acosta, Recitacion Bernus, Anselma
Andan, Rolando de Guzman, and Rita Llagas. The
application of oppositors, under RO4-Case No. RD-4-4088-
77, for a preliminary injunction to restrain the Amigo
Manufacturing, Inc. from terminating their employment and
from placing them under preventive suspension, is hereby
DISMISSED. 10
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners appealed to the Office of the
Secretary of Labor. By Order dated February 15, 1979, the respondent
Amado G. Inciong, Deputy Minister of Labor, dismissed their appeal for lack
of merit. 11
Hence, the instant petition for review, raising the following issues:
A. Is it not error in both constitutional and statutory law by
the respondent Minister when he affirmed the decision of the
RO4-Officer-in-Charge allowing the preventive suspension
and subsequent dismissal of petitioners by reason of the
exercise of their right to freedom of association?
B. Is it not error in law by the respondent Minister when he
upheld the decision of the RO4 OIC which sustained the
availment of the respondent PAFLU's constitution over that
of the local union constitution in the settlement of intra-union
dispute?
C. Is it not error in law amounting to grave abuse of
discretion by the Minister in affirming the conclusion made
by the RO4 OIC, upholding the legal applicability of the
security clause of a CBA over alleged offenses committed
earlier than its conclusion, and within the 60-day freedom
period of an old CBA? 12
The main thrust of the petition is the alleged illegality of the dismiss of the
petitioners by private respondent Company upon demand of PAFLU which
invoked the security clause of the collective bargaining agreement between
the Company and the local union, Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
Petitioners contend that the respondent Deputy Minister acted in grave
abuse of discretion when he affirmed the decision granting the clearance to
terminate the petitioners and dismissed petitioners' complaint, and in support
thereof, allege that their constitutional right to self-organization had been
impaired. Petitioner's contention lacks merit.
It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It
is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. 13 But
this Court has laid down the ruling that a closed shop is a valid form of union
security, and such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a
restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the
Constitution. 14
In the case at bar, it appears as an undisputed fact that on February 15,
1977, the Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU entered into a
Collective Bargaining Agreement with a union security clause provided for in
Article XII thereof which is a reiteration of the same clause in the old CBA.
The quoted stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal and it leaves
no room for doubt that the employer is bound, under the collective bargaining
agreement, to dismiss the employees, herein petitioners, for non- union
membership. Petitioners became non-union members upon their expulsion
from the general membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU on
March 15, 1977 pursuant to the Decision of the PAFLU national president.
We reject petitioners' theory that their expulsion was not valid upon the
grounds adverted to earlier in this Decision. That PAFLU had the authority to
investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-employees in the local
union and after finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of
membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU is clear under the
constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union was affiliated. And
pursuant to the security clause of the new CBA, reiterating the same clause
in the old CBA, PAFLU was justified in applying said security clause. We find
no abuse of discretion on the part of the OIC of Regional Office No. 4 in
upholding the validity of the expulsion and on the part of the respondent
Deputy Minister of Labor in sustaining the same. We agree with the OIC's
decision, pertinent portion of which reads:
Stripped of non-essentials, the basic and fundamental issue
in this case tapers down to the determination of WHETHER
OR NOT PAFLU HAD THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE
OPPOSITORS AND, THEREAFTER, EXPEL THEM FROM
THE ROLL OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMIGO
EMPLOYEES UNION-PAFLU.
Recognized and salutary is the principle that when a labor
union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by the
laws and regulations of the parent organization. Thus, the
Honorable Secretary of Labor, in the case of Amador
Bolivar, et al. vs. PAFLU, et al., NLRC Case No. LR-133 &
MC-476, promulgated on December 3, 1973, declared-
When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or
mother union, or accepts a charter from a superior body, it
becomes subject to the laws of the superior body under
whose authority the local union functions. The constitution,
by-laws and rules of the parent body, together with the
charter it issues pursuant thereto to the subordinate union,
constitute an enforceable contract between the parent body
and the subordinate union, and between the members of the
subordinate union inter se. (Citing Labor Unions, Dangel and
Shriber, pp. 279-280).
It is undisputable that oppositors were members of the
Amigo Employees Union at the time that said union affiliated
with PAFLU; hence, under the afore-quoted principle,
oppositors are bound by the laws and regulations of PAFLU.
Likewise, it is undeniable that in the investigation of the
charges against them, oppositors were accorded 'due
process', because in this jurisdiction, the doctrine is deeply
entrenched that the term 'due process' simply means that
the parties were given the opportunity to be heard. In the
instant case, ample and unmistakable evidence exists to
show that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to
present their evidence, but they themselves disdained or
spurned the said opportunity given to them.
PAFLU, therefore, correctly and legally acted when,
pursuant to its Constitution and By-Laws, it conducted and
proceeded with the investigation of the charges against the
oppositors and found them guilty of acts prejudicial and
inimical to the interests of the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU, to wit: that of falsely and maliciously slandering the
officers of the union; spreading false propaganda among the
members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU; calling the
incumbent officers as mere appointees and robots of
management; calling the union company-dominated or
assisted union; committing acts unbecoming of the members
of the union and destructive of the union and its members.
Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that
matter, is the right of self-preservation. When members of a
labor union, therefore, sow the seeds of dissension and strife
within the union; when they seek the disintegration and
destruction of the very union to which they belong, they
thereby forfeit their rights to remain as members of the union
which they seek to destroy. Prudence and equity, as well as
the dictates of law and justice, therefore, compelling
mandate the adoption by the labor union of such corrective
and remedial measures in keeping with its laws and
regulations, for its preservation and continued existence; lest
by its folly and inaction, the labor union crumble and fall.
Correctly and legally, therefore, the PAFLU acted when,
after proper investigation and finding of guilt, it decided to
remove the oppositors from the list of members of the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU, and thereafter, recommended to
the Amigo Manufacturing, Inc.; the termination of the
employment of the oppositors. 15
We see no reason to disturb the same.
The contention of petitioners that the charges against them being intra-union
problems, should have been investigated in accordance with the constitution
and by-laws of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU and not of the PAFLU, is
not impressed with merit. It is true that under the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code, in case of intra-union disputes, redress must
first be sought within the organization itself in accordance with its constitution
and by-laws. However, it has been held that this requirement is not absolute
but yields to exception under varying circumstances. Thus, in Kapisanan ng
mga Manggagawa sa MRR vs. Hernandez, 20 SCRA 109, We held:
In the case at bar, noteworthy is the fact that the complaint
was filed against the union and its incumbent officers, some
of whom were members of the board of directors. The
constitution and by-laws of the union provide that charges for
any violations thereof shall be filed before the said board.
But as explained by the lower court, if the complainants had
done so the board of directors would in effect be acting as
respondent investigator and judge at the same time. To
follow the procedure indicated would be a farce under the
circumstances, where exhaustion of remedies within the
union itself would practically amount to a denial of justice or
would be illusory or vain, it will not be insisted upon,
particularly where property rights of the members are
 involved, as a condition to the right to invoke the aid of a
court.
The facts of the instant petition stand on all fours with the aforecited case
that the principle therein enunciated applies here as well. In the case at bar,
the petitioners were charged by the officers of the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU themselves who were also members of the Board of Directors of the
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Thus, were the petitioners to be charged
and investigated according to the local union's constitution, they would have
been tried by a trial committee of three (3) elected from among the members
of the Board who are themselves the accusers. (Section 2, Article 11,
Constitution of the Local Union). Petitioners would be in a far worse position
had this procedure been followed. Nonetheless, petitioners admit in their
petition that two (2) of the six (6) charges, i.e. disaffiliation and filing a petition
for certification election, are not intra-union matters and, therefore, are
cognizable by PAFLU.
Petitioners insist that their disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition for
certification election are not acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their right to
self-organization. They contend that these acts were done within the 60-day
freedom period when questions of representation may freely be raised.
Under the peculiar facts of the case, We find petitioners' insistence
untenable.
In the first place, had petitioners merely disaffiliated from the. Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU, there could be no legal objections thereto for it
was their right to do so. But what petitioners did by the very clear terms of
their "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" was to disaffiliate the Amigo Employees
Union-PAFLU from PAFLU, an act which they could not have done with any
effective consequence because they constituted the minority in the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU.
Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners numbering ten (10), were
among the ninety-six (96) who signed the "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan"
whereas there are two hundred thirty four (234) union members in the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU. Hence, petitioners constituted a small minority for
which reason they could not have successfully disaffiliated the local union
from PAFLU. Since only 96 wanted disaffiliation, it can be inferred that the
majority wanted the union to remain an affiliate of PAFLU and this is not
denied or disputed by petitioners. The action of the majority must, therefore,
prevail over that of the minority members. 16
Neither is there merit to petitioners' contention that they had the right to
present representation issues within the 60-day freedom period. It is true, as
contended by petitioners, that under Article 257 of the Labor Code and
Section 3, Rule 2, Book 2 of its Implementing Rules, questions of exclusive
bargaining representation are entertainable within the sixty (60) days prior to
the expiry date of an existing CBA, and that they did file a petition for
certification election within that period. But the petition was filed in the name
of the Amigo Employees Union which had not disaffiliated from PAFLU, the
mother union. Petitioners being a mere minority of the local union may not
bind the majority members of the local union.
Moreover, the Amigo Employees Union, as an independent union, is not duly
registered as such with the Bureau of Labor Relations. The appealed
decision of OIC Leogardo of Regional Office No. 4 states as a fact that there
is no record in the Bureau of Labor Relations that the Amigo Employees
Union (Independent) is registered, and this is not disputed by petitioners,
notwithstanding their allegation that the Amigo Employees Union is a duly
registered labor organization bearing Ministry of Labor Registration
Certification No. 5290-IP dated March 27, 1967. But the independent union
organized after the "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" executed February 7,
1977 could not have been registered earlier, much less March 27, 1967
under Registration Certificate No. 5290-IP. As such unregistered union, it
acquires no legal personality and is not entitled to the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the
certificate of registration. Article 234 of the New Labor Code specifically
provides:
Art. 234. Requirements of Registration.—Any applicant labor
organization, association, or group of unions or workers shall
acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights
and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration.
....
In Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Sec. of Labor, 27 SCRA 40, We
had occasion to interpret Section 23 of R.A. No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act)
requiring of labor unions registration by the Department of Labor in order to
qualify as "legitimate labor organization," and We said:
The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No.
875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis.
The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said
section 17 is not a limitation to the right of assembly or
association, which may be exercised with or without said
registration. The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for
the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations,
associations or unions and the possession of the 'rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations.'
 The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and
privileges, much less said personality, which are mere
statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which
registration is required to protect both labor and the public
against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers,
although not truly accredited agents of the union they purport
to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the
police power, because the activities in which labor
organizations, associations and union or workers are
engaged affect public interest, which should be protected.
Simply put, the Amigo Employees Union (Independent) Which petitioners
claim to represent, not being a legitimate labor organization, may not validly
present representation issues. Therefore, the act of petitioners cannot be
considered a legitimate exercise of their right to self-organization. Hence, We
affirm and reiterate the rationale explained in Phil Association of Free Labor
Unions vs. Sec. of Labor case, supra, in order to protect legitimate labor and
at the same time maintain discipline and responsibility within its ranks.
The contention of petitioners that the new CBA concluded between Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU and the Company on February 15, 1977
containing the union security clause cannot be invoked as against the
petitioners for offenses committed earlier than its conclusion, deserves scant
consideration. We find it to be the fact that the union security clause provided
in the new CBA merely reproduced the union security clause provided in the
old CBA about to expire. And since petitioners were expelled from Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU on March 28, 1982 upon denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision expelling them, the CBA of February 15,
1977 was already applicable to their case. The "closed-shop provision" in the
CBA provides:
All members of the UNION as of the signing of this
Agreement shall remain members thereof in good standing.
Therefore, any members who shall resign, be expelled, or
shall in any manner cease to be a member of the UNION,
shall be dismissed from his employment upon written
request of the UNION to the Company. (Art. III)
A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and a provision therefor in a
collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution. (Manalang, et al. vs. Artex
Development Co., Inc., et al., L-20432, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 561).
Where in a closed-shop agreement it is stipulated that union members who
cease to be in good standing shall immediately be dismissed, such dismissal
does not constitute an unfair labor practice exclusively cognizable by the
Court of Industrial Relations. (Seno vs. Mendoza, 21 SCRA 1124).
Finally, We reject petitioners' contention that respondent Minister committed
error in law amounting to grave abuse of discretion when he affirmed the
conclusion made by the RO4 OIC, upholding the legal applicability of the
security clause of a CBA over alleged offenses committed earlier than its
conclusion and within the 60-day freedom period of an old CBA. In the first
place, as We stated earlier, the security clause of the new CBA is a
reproduction or reiteration of the same clause in the old CBA. While
petitioners were charged for alleged commission of acts of disloyalty inimical
to the interests of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU in the Resolution of
February 14, 1977 of the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU and on February
15, 1977 PAFLU and the Company entered into and concluded a new
collective bargaining agreement, petitioners may not escape the effects of
the security clause under either the old CBA or the new CBA by claiming that
the old CBA had expired and that the new CBA cannot be given retroactive
enforcement. To do so would be to create a gap during which no agreement
would govern, from the time the old contract expired to the time a new
agreement shall have been entered into with the union. As this Court said
in Seno vs. Mendoza, 21 SCRA 1124, "without any agreement to govern the
relations between labor and management in the interim, the situation would
well be productive of confusion and result in breaches of the law by either
party. "
The case of Seno vs. Mendoza, 21 SCRA 1124 mentioned previously needs
further citation of the facts and the opinion of the Court, speaking through
Justice Makalintal who later became Chief Justice, and We quote:
It appears that petitioners other than Januario T. Seno who
is their counsel, were members of the United Seamen's
Union of the Philippines. Pursuant to a letter-request of the
Union stating that they 'had ceased to be members in good
standing' and citing a closed shop clause in its bargaining
agreement with respondent Carlos A. Go Thong & Co., the
latter dismissed said petitioners. Through counsel,
petitioners requested that they be reinstated to their former
positions and paid their backwages, otherwise they would
picket respondents' offices and vessels. The request was
denied on the ground that the dismissal was unavoidable
under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. ...
We, therefore, hold and rule that petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate
from their union and form a new organization of their own, must, however,
suffer the consequences of their separation from the union under the security
clause of the CBA.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU, AL FAJARDO
AND ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS
and THE REGISTRAR OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioners pray for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondents,
the Secretary of Labor, the Director of Labor Relations and the Registrar of
Labor Organizations, from enforcing an order of cancellation of the
registration certificate of the Social Security System Employees Association
— hereinafter referred to as the SSSEA — which is affiliated to the Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions — hereinafter referred to as PAFLU — as
well as to annul all proceedings in connection with said cancellation and to
prohibit respondents from enforcing Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875.
Petitioners, likewise, pray for a writ of preliminary injunction pending the final
determination of this case. In their answer, respondents traversed some
allegations of fact and the legal conclusions made in the petition. No writ of
preliminary injunctionpendente lite has been issued.
It appears that on September 25, 1963, the Registration of Labor
Organizations — hereinafter referred to as the Registrar — issued a notice of
hearing, on October 17, 1963, of the matter of cancellation of the registration
of the SSSEA, because of:
1. Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations with copies of the
reports on the finances of that union duly verified by affidavits which
its treasurer or treasurers rendered to said union and its members
covering the periods from September 24, 1960 to September 23,
1961 and September 24, 1961 to September 23, 1962, inclusive,
within sixty days of the 2 respective latter dates, which are the end of
its fiscal year; and
2. Failure to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and
non-subversive affidavits of the officers of that union within sixty days
of their election in October (1st Sunday), 1961 and 1963, in
conformity with Article IV (1) of its constitution and by-laws.
in violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875. Counsel for the SSSEA
moved to postpone the hearing to October 21, 1963, and to submit then a
memorandum, as well as the documents specified in the notice. The motion
was granted, but, nobody appeared for the SSSEA on the date last
mentioned. The next day, October 22, 1963, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant
Secretary of the SSSEA filed with the Office of the Registrar, a letter dated
October 21, 1963, enclosing the following:
1. Joint non-subversive affidavit of the officers of the SSS
Employees' Association-PAFLU;
2. List of newly-elected officers of the Association in its general
elections held on April 29, 1963; and
3. Copy of the amended constitution and by-laws of the Association.
Holding
1. That the joint non-subversive affidavit and the list of officers
mentioned in the letter of Mr. Manuel Villagracia were not the
documents referred to in the notice of hearing and made the subject
matter of the present proceeding; and
2. That there is no iota of evidence on records to show and/or
warrant the dismissal of the present proceeding.
on October 23, 1963, the Registrar rendered a decision cancelling the
SSSEA's Registration Certificate No. 1-IP169, issued on September 30,
1960. Soon later, or on October 28, 1963, Alfredo Fajardo, president of the
SSSEA moved for a reconsideration of said decision and prayed for time, up
to November 15, within which to submit the requisite papers and data. An
opposition thereto having been filed by one Paulino Escueta, a member of
the SSSEA, upon the ground that the latter had never submitted any financial
statement to its members, said motion was heard on November 27, 1963.
Subsequently, or on December 4, 1963, the Registrar issued an order
declaring that the SSSEA had "failed to submit the following requirements to
wit:
1. Non-subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso
Atienza, Rodolfo Zalameda, Raymundo Sabino and Napoleon
Pefianco who were elected along with others on January 30, 1962.
2. Names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of all the
officers who were supposedly elected on October (1st Sunday), of its
constitution and by-laws.
and granting the SSSEA 15 days from notice to comply with said
requirements, as well as meanwhile holding in abeyance the resolution of its
motion for reconsideration.
Pending such resolution, or on December 16, the PAFLU, the SSSEA,
Alfredo Fajardo "and all the officers and members" of the SSSEA
commenced the present action, for the purpose stated at the beginning of
this decision, upon the ground that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875
violates their freedom of assembly and association, and is inconsistent with
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; that it unduly delegates judicial
power to an administrative agency; that said Section 23 should be deemed
repealed by ILO-Convention No. 87; that respondents have acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating,
on November 19, 1963, its decision dated October 22, 1963, beyond the 30-
day period provided in Section 23(c) of Republic Act No. 875; that "there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law"; that the decision complained of had not been approved by the
Secretary of Labor; and that the cancellation of the SSSEA's certificate of
registration would cause irreparable injury.
The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly
curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights is devoid of factual basis. The registration prescribed in paragraph (b)
of said section 1 is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association,
which may be exercised with or without said registration. 2 The latter is merely
a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor
organizations, associations or unions and the possession of the "rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations". The Constitution
does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said personality,
which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which
registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses,
fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly accredited
agents of the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid
exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor
organizations, associations and union of workers are engaged affect public
interest, which should be protected. 3 Furthermore, the obligation to submit
financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation of a certificate of
registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the members of the
organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds or
membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge
amounts of money due to them or to the organization. 4
For the same reasons, said Section 23 does not impinge upon the right of
organization guaranteed in the Declaration of Human Rights, or run counter
to Articles 2, 4, 7 and Section 2 of Article 8 of the ILO-Convention No. 87,
which provide that "workers and employers, ... shall have the right to
establish and ... join organizations of their own choosing, without previous
authorization"; that "workers and employers organizations shall not be liable
to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority"; that "the
acquisition of legal personality by workers' and employers' organizations, ...
shall not be made subject to conditions of such a character as to restrict the
application of the provisions" above mentioned; and that "the guarantees
provided for in" said Convention shall not be impaired by the law of the land.
In B.S.P. v. Araos, 5 we held that there is no incompatibility between Republic
Act No. 875 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the other
hand, the cancellation of the SSSEA's registration certificate would not entail
a dissolution of said association or its suspension. The existence of the
SSSEA would not be affected by said cancellation, although its juridical
personality and its statutory rights and privileges — as distinguished from
those conferred by the Constitution — would be suspended thereby.
To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor
organization, association or union of workers must file with the Department of
Labor the following documents:
(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization
together with a list of all officers of the association, their addresses
and the address of the principal office of the organization;
(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization,
association or union to the effect that they are not members of the
Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization
which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any
illegal or unconstitutional method; and
(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or
more years, a copy of its last annual financial report.
Moreover, paragraph (d) of said-Section ordains that:
The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization shall be
cancelled by the Department of Labor, if the Department has reason
to believe that the labor organization no longer meets one or more of
the requirements of paragraph (b) above; or fails to file with the
Department Labor either itsfinancial report within the sixty days of
the end of its fiscal year or the names of its new officers along with
their non-subversive affidavits as outlined in paragraph (b) above
within sixty days of their election; however, the Department of Labor
shall not order the cancellation of the registration and permit without
due notice and hearing, as provided under paragraph (c) above and
 the affected labor organization shall have the same right of appeal to
the courts as previously provided.6
The determination of the question whether the requirements of paragraph (b)
have been met, or whether or not the requisite financial report or non-
subversive affidavits have been filed within the period above stated, is not
judicial power. Indeed, all officers of the government, including those in the
executive department, are supposed, to act on the basis of facts, as they see
the same. This is specially true as regards administrative agencies given by
law the power to investigate and render decisions concerning details related
to the execution of laws the enforcement of which is entrusted thereto.
Hence, speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) had occassion to
say:
The objections of the appellees to the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 2056, not only as an undue delegation of judicial power to
the Secretary of Public Works but also for being unreasonable and
arbitrary, are not tenable. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056)
merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions
or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private
person was anyway entitled to make because the bed of navigable
streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable
by adverse possession
(Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil., 449).
It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act
necessarily involves the determination of some question of fact, such
as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character;
but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely
incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear
navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments,
and authorities are clear that they are validly conferable upon
executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to
be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section
2.7
It should be noted also, that, admittedly, the SSSEA had not filed the non-
subversive affidavits of some of its officers — "Messrs. Sison, Tolentino,
Atienza, Zalameda, Sabino and Pefianca" — although said organization
avers that these persons "were either resigned or out on leave as directors or
officers of the union", without specifying who had resigned and who were on
leave. This averment is, moreover, controverted by respondents herein.
Again, the 30-day period invoked by the petitioners is inapplicable to the
decision complained of. Said period is prescribed in paragraph (c) 8 of
Section 23, which refers to the proceedings for the "registration" of labor
organizations, associations or unions not to the "cancellation" of said
registration, which is governed by the abovequoted paragraph (d) of the
same section.
Independently of the foregoing, we have repeatedly held that legal provisions
prescribing the period within which a decision should be rendered are
directory, not mandatory in nature — in the sense that, a judgment
promulgated after the expiration of said period is not null and void, although
the officer who failed to comply with law may be dealt with administratively, in
consequence of his delay 9 — unless the intention to the contrary is manifest.
Such, however, is not the import of said paragraph (c). In the language of
Black:
When a statute specifies the time at or within which an act is to be
done by a public officer or body, it is generally held to be directory
only as to the time, and not mandatory, unless time is of the essence
of the thing to be done, or the language of the statute contains
negative words, or shows that the designation of the time was
intended as a limitation of power, authority or right. 10
Then, again, there is no law requiring the approval, by the Secretary of
Labor, of the decision of the Registrar decreeing the cancellation of a
registration certificate. In fact, the language of paragraph (d) of Section 23,
suggests that, once the conditions therein specified are present, the office
concerned "shall" have no choice but to issue the order of cancellation.
Moreover, in the case at bar, there is nothing, as yet, for the Secretary of
Labor to approve or disapprove, since petitioners, motion for reconsideration
of the Registrar's decision of October 23, 1963, is still pending resolution. In
fact, this circumstance shows, not only that the present action is
premature, 11 but, also, that petitioners have failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to them. 12 Indeed, they could ask the
Secretary of Labor to disapprove the Registrar's decision or object to its
execution or enforcement, in the absence of approval of the former, if the
same were necessary, on which we need not and do not express any
opinion.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition herein should be, as it is hereby
dismissed, and the writs prayed for denied, with costs against the petitioners.
It is so ordered.
UNITED SEAMEN'S UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
DAVAO SHIPOWNERS ASSOCIATION, ANGTIONG SONS and/or
RICARDO ANG, owner-manager; ANGLIONGTO SONS and COMPANY,
GARCIA WATER TRANSPORTATION, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, ET AL., respondents.
Carlos E. Santiago for petitioner.
M. B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
C.E. Niturrada for respondent Davao Shipowners Association.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondent Maravilla.
Primo L. Ocampo for respondent Garcia Navigation Co.
A. R. Dominguez for other respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations.
The material facts are not disputed. On August 4, 1959 petitioner United
Seamen's Union of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as USUP)
presented a set of demands to respondent Davao Shipowners Association
(hereinafter referred to as Shipowners) representing respondent shipping
companies, for union recognition, union security, standardization of wages
and other benefits. In its answer, the Shipowners invited USUP's attention to
the existence of a collective bargaining agreement with the Davao Marine
Association (hereinafter referred to as Association), to which all the crewmen
of their launches belonged. Since the Shipowners were bound by said
collective bargaining agreement until the end of that year (1959), it
suggested that USUP first take the necessary steps to be certified as the
collective bargaining agent of the employees before they could negotiate in
connection with its proposals.
However, even before receiving the Shipowners' answer to its set of
demands, USUP had filed with Regional Office No. 8 of the Department of
Labor of Davao City a notice of strike against all the individual shipowners.
The Chief of the Labor Operations Section of the Davao Regional Office
requested USUP and the Shipowners to a conference with a view to settling
the conflict. On August 20, 1959 the USUP, the Shipowners and the
Association reached an agreement and executed the following covenant:
A. We, the undersigned representatives of the United Seamen's
Union of the Philippines (USUP) hereby withdraw the notice to strike
against any and all members of the group known as the Davao
Shipowners Association that we filed on or about August 6, 1959;
B. We, the USUP, further undertake to preserve and observe the
status quo with reference to the normal and original operation
practices of loading, unloading, departures, manning and the
performance of any and/or all jobs incident to the businesses of the
members of the said Shipowners' Association here in Davao City and
in the outports of Davao province which are their ports of call or may
travel to and conduct their businesses;
C. We, the Davao Marine Association, hereby undertake to
cooperate with the Davao Shipowners' Association and the USUP in
the observation and preservation of such practices and conduct of
the Shipowners' businesses, and in view of this covenant will
withdraw our complaint against the USUP, its officers, agents and
other representatives which is now Civil Case No. 3106 before
Branch I of the Davao Court of First Instance;
D. That the USUP hereby announces and binds itself that it will
respect the contract between the Davao Shipowner's Association
and the Davao Marine Association until its expiry date and will not in
any manner cause the same to be impaired or disturbed, but will file
a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations for certification
election to determine the issue of union representation of the
Shipowners' workers, and if we, the USUP, will be the one certified,
we will commence to bargain with Shipowner's Association after the
said contract shall be expired;
E. We, the Davao Shipowner's Association gladly give our conformity
to the agreement of both parties to observe and preserve the status
quo on the above mentioned contract's operation and the
commitment of the USUP to have the CIR determine the issue of
union representation.1äwphï1.ñët
As stipulated, USUP filed with the Court of Industrial Relations a petition for
certification election to determine the sole collective bargaining
representative of all the workers and employees of respondent shipping
companies.
Meanwhile, subsequent to the covenant of August 20, the respondent
shipping companies separately served notices of termination of service upon
sixty-four(64) employees, effective December 31, 1959, for reasons ranging
from stoppage of operations due to the death of a partner to business losses
and reversals.
Because of these notices of termination of service upon USUP members
(who, admittedly, were also members of the Association), USUP reported the
matter to Regional Office No. 8 of the Department of Labor in Davao City and
requested at the same time the assistance of said office. The Regional Office
thereupon called the parties to a conference, but apparently it did not do
much good, for in a letter dated December 29, 1959 USUP formally notified
the Regional Office, Department of Labor, the City Mayor of Davao, the Chief
of Police, the Philippine Constabulary, the Bureau of Customs and the
general public that they would declare a strike on January 1, 1960.
On February 11, 1960 the respondent shipping companies filed a petition for
a writ of injunction (Case No. 3-INJ-DB) with the court a quo, alleging that a
restraining order was necessary "to forestall substantial and irreparable
damage to petitioners' (now respondents') properties and public weal," citing
specific acts of coercion, violence and illegal picketing being committed by
defendants (now petitioners).
On February 24, 1960 USUP filed an unfair labor practice case against
herein respondents (Case No. 49-ULP-DB), alleging that "while its petition for
certification election is still pending consideration before this Honorable
Court, respondents herein by their respective officers interfered with and
have been interfering with their employees' guaranteed right to self-
organization and discriminated and have been discriminating against their
respective employees, who are members of the complainant, in regard to
hire or tenure of office or condition of employment in order to deter
organizational activity amongst employees, to induce those already
organized to drop from the rank, disrupt union morale and ultimately to break
up the complainant union . . .". The unfair labor case was apparently
predicated upon the dismissal of the USUP members from employment. The
petition then proceeded to enumerate the various acts of respondents which
were claimed to be violations of section 4(a), sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) of
Republic Act 875.1
After the respondent companies had filed their respective answers, the
petition for injunction filed by the Shipowners and the unfair labor case filed
by the USUP were heard and tried jointly. On October 31, 1960 the court a
quo issued the appealed order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the USUP
complaint for unfair labor practice (Case No. 49-ULP-DB) dated
February 24, 1960, against the respondent Shipowners is hereby
DISMISSED, while on the other hand, respondents' claim for moral
damages are also dismissed for want of jurisdiction together with
other compensatory reliefs for lack of sufficient substantial proof
thereof. As the strike declared on December 31, 1959 is held illegal
and unjustified, dismissal of all the active participants thereof is
hereby decreed. And as a consequence thereof, permanent
injunction is hereby granted. For its implementation, respondent
USUP, Alvaro Trinidad, Vivencio Quilong-Quilong, Fernando
Bantillan, together with their agents and representatives, are
permanently enjoined and restrained from:
(1) Coercing or causing to be coerced, by means of violence, force,
threat or intimidation any employee or laborer of the petitioners
herein, so as to prevent him, her or them from entering Petitioners'
properties at Sta. Ana Wharf, Davao City, with the view of operating
the vessels of petitioners, to put petitioners' business in normal
operations;
(2) Instilling or causing to be instilled fear into the officials,
supervisors, agents, employees, guards and laborers of the herein
petitioners or any person desiring to work for or deal in business with
petitioners;
(3) Unlawful impeding, obstructing, hampering or interfering with the
business of petitioners, particularly the loading and unloading of
cargoes from and to their vessels;
(4) Molesting and harassing or causing to be molested or harassed
the officials of petitioners and their agents in protecting and
conducting petitioners' properties and businesses;
(5) Barricading or in any way obstructing with odds and ends the
gate and pathway leading to and from the premises where the
properties and vessels of petitioners are docked.
The Chief of Police of Davao City and the Commanding Officer of the
Philippine Constabulary and/or their authorized representatives are
hereby directed to enforce this DECISION upon receipt thereof
without the least delay.
The principal question to be determined, resolution of which will actually
dispose of the other incidental issues presented, is: Did the Court of
Industrial Relations gravely abuse its discretion, as claimed, in declaring the
strike staged by the members of the USUP unjustified and illegal?
The lower Court found that the strike staged by the USUP and the
subsequent unfair practice case it filed against the respondent companies
were the culmination of a series of drastic moves designed to compel
respondents to recognize USUP as the employees' collective bargaining
agent to the exclusion of the Association with whom the Shipowners had an
existing collective bargaining agreement. In other words, they were the direct
offshoot of a losing effort to have the USUP recognized as the sole collective
bargaining agent of the employees, an effort which suffered legal infirmities
from its inception. A number of circumstances strongly support this finding:
First, it must be noted that USUP filed its Notice of Strike even before it
received the Shipowners' answer to its set of demands. It seems that
regardless of whether the Shipowners would be willing to negotiate with
USUP or not, USUP was already predisposed to go on with the strike. There
could only be one reason for USUP to anticipate the Shipowners' negative
stand: USUP was aware of the existence of a valid collective bargaining
agreement between the Shipowners and the Association which would
operate as a legal bar for the Shipowners to entertain USUP's demands.
Knowing as it did that its demands could not be entertained by the
Shipowners, USUP at that early stage could not have had any legitimate
excuse for seeking recognition as the sole collective bargaining agent of the
employees.
Second, in open contravention of the August 20 covenant, USUP completely
disturbed and impaired the status quo by going on strike pending resolution
of its petition for certification election. That status quoreferred expressly "to
the normal and original operating practices of loading, unloading, departures,
manning, and the performance of any and/or all jobs incident to the
businesses of the members of the said Shipowners Association." By striking,
USUP had impaired or disturbed the existing collective bargaining agreement
between the Shipowners and the Association which recognized "the right of
the Employer to hire, promote and transfer and for legal cause suspend, lay-
off or discharge employees subject to the right of the union (referring to the
Association) to notification and to ask reconsideration of any action of the
Employer in the premises." It should be remembered in this connection that
those who took part in the strike and picketing were also members of the
Association and hence were bound by the collective bargaining agreement.
In seeking to justify their action, USUP asserts that the strike it staged was a
matter of "self-defense" and/or "union survival", claiming that the respondent
shipping companies were the first to violate the covenant to preserve and
observe the status quo by a concerted action in sending out notices of
dismissal or separation, all effective December 31, 1959 to the 64 USUP
members.
It is at least doubtful that the Shipowners could have violated the covenant of
August 20 for the simple reason that it was not an active nor a principal party
thereto. As the court a quo observed:
Perusal of the covenant of August 20, 1959 evidently shows that the
fulfillment of all the commitments and faithful observance of all the
terms thereof fall upon the United Seamen's Union of the Philippines
(USUP) and the Davao Marine Association, who are the active and
principal parties thereto . . . the Davao Shipowners Association never
made any specific and categorical commitment except to, in the
language of the covenant, "gladly give our conformity to the
agreement of both parties to observe and preserve the status quo on
the above-mentioned contract's operation and the commitment of the
USUP to have the CIR determine the issue of union representation".
In effect, the covenant is bilateral and not tripartite. It imposes no
definite binding obligation to the Shipowners. The burden lies heavily
upon the USUP . . .
Even assuming arguendo that the shipping companies were also bound by
the covenant, still the termination of services of the affected employees could
not be considered a violation of the covenant. Sustained by the court a quo,
in specific cases, was the companies' contention that the dismissals made
were predicated on legitimate reasons. After hearing and receiving the
exhaustive testimony and evidence of both sides, the lower court ruled:
Re: ANGTIONG SONS
It is completely established by the evidence that, with the exception
of the crewmen of the vessel MERCURY who received their
termination notices on November 12, 1959 due to sustained losses
in the operating of the same, no tying up of the other vessels nor
dismissal of their respective crews were effected by respondent
Antiong Sons. With respect to the MERCURY, it is very evident from
the termination notice that it was directed to the individual crewmen
of the same, as members of the (Association) and at the bottom
thereof, it is noted that copies of the same have been furnished the
president of the Davao Marine Association and the Department of
Labor. In fact and in law, therefore the laying off was directed to the
crewmen of MERCURY as members of the Davao Marine
Association and not as unionists of the (USUP). As the Association
was the one vitally affected for the mass laying off of said crewmen
with the substantial reduction of its membership and the respective
collection of check-off dues, it should have been the militant
complaining party, had it been convinced that the total laying-off of
its members in the MERCURY was anti-union, unreasonable and
unjustified under the circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
The decommissioning of the MERCURY followed by the
announcement of its sale and finally its disposal by purchase, fully
negate complainant's charge of unfair labor practice against
respondent. It can be construed as a legitimate exercise of its rights
and prerogative under the "Management of Labor Force" provision of
 the collective bargaining agreement dated December 28, 1957
between the Shipowners and the Association providing as follows:
"The operation and direction of working forces and the
management of the business shall be vested exclusively in
the EMPLOYER, including the right to hire, promote, and
transfer and for legal cause, to suspend, lay-off or discharge
employees. The UNION shall be notified in case of
suspension, lay-off, or discharge of any of its members.
Should the UNION consider the suspension, lay-off or
discharge unlawful, it may seek reconsideration from the
EMPLOYER and should the latter maintain its stand, the
matter maybe taken up with the court so vested with
jurisdiction to settle the controversy."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, complainant's particular charges of unfair labor
practice against Antiong Sons are hereby dismissed.
With respect to Southern Navigation Company, the court a quo found that the
strike declared against it was a sympathy strike; that the crew and officers of
the EMPRESS OF DAVAO and the ANHAI were given termination notices
because the company was dissolved after the death of one of its principal
partners; and that the cessation of the operation of the two vessels was not
motivated by any anti-union feeling. As in the Antiong case, the notice of
termination was addressed not to the USUP but to the Association, by virtue
of the collective bargaining agreement with it.
As to Vicente Yu Water Transportation, the court a quo observed that "the
contents of said termination notices clearly state that the planned cessation
of operation (of the (M/L WATSON and M/L RIZAL) . . . are (sic) but
temporary in character, aside from the fact that said notices were addressed
to all the crewmen and officers as members of the Association and not of
USUP." Accordingly, the same conclusion as in the above stated cases was
reached.
With respect to Joyce Enterprises, Anglionto Sons & Co., Garcia Water
Transportation and Garcia Navigation, the court a quo correctly analyzed the
situation, thus:
If it was really true that respondents had any abiding hostility against
the USUP or any intention to bust the same by dismissing or locking-
out their respective personnel who joined said union, investigation
should have been done after USUP sent its demand letter on August
4, 1959 manifesting its majority representation and requesting for
recognition and bargaining rights to negotiate for its items of demand
contained therein, or after it filed its Notice of Strike with the Regional
Office of the Department of Labor in Davao on August 6, 1959, or, by
natural reaction the Shipowners should have dismissed all
Association members (who were also USUP members) who refused
to work on their vessels from August 13, 1959, through the
instigation of USUP, which was charged of contempt of court for
violating the Injunction order dated August 16, 1959. That was the
most opportune moment for the Shipowners to rightly charge
Association members of violating their contractual duties and
obligations under the Collective Bargaining Agreement of December
28, 1957 and of dismissing them without notice and without recourse
in the exercise of its managerial powers and prerogatives under said
contract and under the law. In spite of such affront and clear violation
of their rights, none such retaliatory acts were done by any of the
respondent Shipowners . . .
We find no urgent reason to take issue with the conclusions reached by the
court a quo, considering that petitioner does not now question the veracity of
the facts on which the conclusions are based.
Third, the existence of a collective bargaining agreement should have been
sufficient to deter USUP from acts tending to force the issue of union
recognition. The pertinent provisions of said agreement read:
VI — GRIEVANCE AND HEARING COMMITTEE
A "Grievance Committee" shall be created, composed of three (3)
members of the UNION, one of whom shall be in the service of the
EMPLOYER, the names of whom shall be furnished to the said
employer. All grievance of UNION members in the service of the
EMPLOYER shall be coursed through the aforementioned grievance
committee, which shall take up the same with a "Hearing Committee"
composed of three members to be chosen by the EMPLOYER.
Any grievance or dispute which cannot be settled by a conference of
both grievance and hearing committees, shall be referred to the
Court of Industrial Relations or any other Court of competent
jurisdiction for final determination. Pending such determination it is
agreed by the parties that no strike, slow down of work or lockout
shall be declared by either the UNION or the EMPLOYER.
Undoubtedly, the parties adopted a graduated procedure in the settlement of
their labor disputes because of their desire to maintain harmonious relations
and prevent as much as possible the declaration of a strike, which in the last
analysis works adversely to both capital and labor.
The employees concerned who after all were bound by the collective
bargaining agreement, as members of the Association, totally disregarded,
the procedure laid down therein by immediately going on strike without
coursing their complaints through the grievance committee for possible
settlement. Having failed to take advantage of a legal right granted them
under the agreement, they are in no position to demand relief from the
consequences of their own impulsive acts.
The authorities are numerous which hold that strikes held in violation
of the terms contained in a collective bargaining agreement are
illegal, specially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses.
These agreements must be strictly, adhered to and respected if their
ends have to be achieved. (Liberal Labor Union vs. Phil. Can Co., 91
Phil. 72, 78).
The unlicensed crew-members contravened the collective bargaining
agreement not because they affiliated with the USUP but because they were
remiss in complying with their obligations and duties as members of the
Association, the employees' collective bargaining representative.
Fourth, even assuming again that the purpose for which the strike was
staged was valid, still the fact remains that the means employed were far
from legitimate. In the hearing of the injunction case (Case No. 3-INJ-DB),
the factual findings of the court a quo reveal the following:
The USUP struck at about 8:00 in the evening of December 31,
1959. Led by Alvaro Trinidad and other respondents, some 300
strikers formed a human cordon alongside the Sta. Ana wharf and
blocked all ways and approaches to the launches and vessels of
Petitioners. The loading and unloading of some boats of the
Petitioners, then docked at the Sta. Ana wharf, were obstructed by
the strikers, not only by the employment of human fence but also by
acts of violence and coercion. At the inception of the strike, some
boats were already loaded with perishable commodities destined for
the gulf and coastal towns of Davao, which departure was also
rendered impossible due to the impregnability of the human wall
placed by the strikers blocking the egress and ingress to the said
vessels. . . .
the strikers, thru force and coercion, took possession of the
Shipowners' vessels on several occasions. The "lanchita" of the M/V
ALFONSO, vessel belonging to Angliong to Sons & Co., was taken
by the strikers on January 4, 1960 without the owner's consent and
used it to ferry themselves to the M/L MA. LUISA, launch of Joyce
Enterprises, at the midstream where they remained and refused to
leave in spite of appeals made by the owner and officers of said
vessel. . . . Also on January 7, 1960, some of the strikers took
possession of the M/L COLUMBIAN, launch owned by Joyce
Enterprises, that was anchored upstream sans prior permission from
its owner. . . . Again, on January 18, 1960, thirteen (13) identified
strikers were caught red-handed in possession of the "bote" of the
M/V ISABEL, also of the Joyce Enterprises, without authority from its
owner. . . .
Acts of intimidation, coercion and violence punctuated the conduct of
the strike. On January 2, 1960, when about 19 stevedores, led by
Celestino Cañete, attempted to install a 2 by 9 feet gang-plank on
the M/V ISABEL to unload its cargoes, strikers grabbed the gang-
plank and pushed it against the bodies of said stevedores who fell to
the ground and suffered physical injuries, thereby preventing the
unloading of the cargoes. . . .
On January 4, 1960, as the "lanchita" theft, committed by the
strikers, was being investigated at the wharf by Captain Mumungan,
P.C. in-charge of the strike area, at the instance of William Joyce,
one of the shipowners, Alvaro Trinidad challenged frontally William
Joyce to a fight in the presence of said peace officer supposedly to
settle the strike. . . . On January 14, 1960, Blas Nicase and the crew
of the M/L MALITA, Garcia Navigation's launch, were prevented
against their will from performing their duties. As they were waiting
for the "bote" of that launch to come alongside the pier to take them
and the crew aboard, the men on the "bote" who were non-strikers
were subjected to scurrilous remarks and were warned that if they
come nearer, they (the strikers) would get hold of the "bote" and
submerge them into the water. Fearing physical harm the "bote"
withdrew. Nicase and his co-workers were themselves surrounded
and rendered immobile by the husky and menacing strikers. The rest
of the crew, greatly outnumbered and intimidated, were blocked by a
human wall and were not able to get into the "bote". . . .
Benedicto Erespe, the patron of the M/L MARIA LUISA corroborated
the above testimony of Mr. Joyce and further testified that when he
was about to board that boat on the night of January 8, 1960, the
respondent union president and his confederates, aided by some
husky men, surrounded him and stopped him from going aboard. He
was threatened with bodily harm if be persisted in going up the boat
so that he had to desist from complying with his job-duties and
reported to the police. However, the perpetrators of the said illegal
acts whom he clearly identified and who are always in the vicinity of
the Sta. Ana Wharf have not been apprehended by the police.
Celso Villodres and Eliodoro Cervantes, Chief mate and marine
engineer, respectively, of the motor launch COLUMBIAN were
prevented, in the same manner as Captain Erespe was prevented
from performing his work, against their will. They were warned by Mr.
Trinidad and his confederates that something evil will befall them if
they insisted on boarding the vessels. Alvaro Trinidad on that
occasion shouted at Captain Erespe while shaking clenched fists at
the latter that he was a bootlicker and that something will surely
happen to him if he boarded the vessel. As they were encircled by
strikers, they refrained from insisting to do their work and reported
these threats, coercion and intimidation to the police who have done
nothing up to the present time.
To crown the already mentioned commission of acts of threats,
intimidation, coercion and invasion of shipowners' property rights, in
the evening of January 13, 1960, Pablo Sisa, a non-striker,
employee of the M/V ALFONSO was mauled by six husky strikers
upon orders of Alvaro Trinidad. It appears that Pablo Sisa was
ordered by management of the Angliongto to pull and tie the rope of
the M/V APOLLO, Antiong Sons' at about 6:30 p.m. While aboard, he
was told by Alvaro Trinidad in the presence of his husky men, to go
down or else something evil will happen to him. Angered by Sisa's
stand, Trinidad made a sign with his head to his men, then around
him to follow Sisa on his way out of the pier. On his way home, along
Uyanguren St., Sisa was intercepted by six men. His hands were
pinned, legs were grabbed tight and was socked on the left side of
the nose, left cheek bone, left ear and left collar bone and kicked
while lying prostrate on the pavement. His blue shirt and
handkerchief were smeared with blood oozing from his nose. During
the incident no people were around neither were there peace officers
within the vicinity. He was hospitalized. The local public hospital
physician identified the victim in favor of whom the medical certificate
was issued.
Similar acts to the aforementioned continued to be perpetrated by
the strikers, their agents and representatives after the expiration of
the January 31, 1960 temporary injunction, whenever opportunities
were afforded them.
On January 31, 1960, when the M/L MALITA was unloading its
cargoes at Talomo Beach, which is around 8 kms. from the heart of
the City of Davao, a truck-load of strikers and their agents led by
Trinidad, numbering around eighty, resumed picketing. Strikers
wading in the water at waist-line deep, in several groups, took turns
in pushing the "bote" of the M/L MALITA away from the beach in as
many times as there were attempts to approach the beach to unload
cargoes. It was during this occasion that the strikers untied the
launch's anchor causing the vessel to drift into the gulf thus
successfully prevented the unloading. This occasion was also the
setting of the incident wherein Manuel Garcia, owner of the above-
cited launch, was physically pushed by the elbows of husky strikers
within sight of Alvaro Trinidad and P.C. Captain Mumungan who did
nothing to arrest the culprits.
On February 3, 1960, several attempts of Manuel Garcia, owner of
petitioner Garcia Water Transportation and Cañete together with his
stevedores, to install the gangplank from the Sta. Ana pier on M/L
MALITA preparatory to the unloading of its cargoes, were blocked by
the respondents and their agents. The one hundred fifty strikers
more or less formed one long unbroken line on the edge of the pier,
from bow to stern of the above launch, and a horde of men, three to
four men deep marched to and fro in close formation to insure that
no person or object would ever get to the vessel despite the pleas of
Cañete and his twenty five (25) odd men to allow them to unload the
launch. The strikers grabbed the gangplank, carried by some
stevedores and pushed this hard twice against the latter causing
injuries to two stevedores, namely, Tecson and Vargas who in turn
were hospitalized. This treatment by a government physician is
evidenced by Exhibits AA and BB, respectively. Dr. Renato
Montenegro, after identifying the documents and the victims, testified
that only an exterior force could possibly cause the physical injuries
on the two patients. . . .
Aside from these acts, the strikers not only shouted slanderous and
scurrilous words against the owner of the vessels but also hurled
threatening remarks at the non-strikers. Fear was instilled in the
minds of non-strikers and owners of the vessels.
To the above continuously perpetrated illegal acts and activities of
the strikers, their agents and representatives, several witnesses
gave corroborative testimonies including the City Fiscal, P.C.
Captain in-charge of the strike-bound area and several police officers
and men of the Sta. Ana district.
Respondents' witnesses and other evidence available miserably
failed to offset and discredit the more credible testimonies of the City
Fiscal and the peace officers called upon by the court to shed light
on the conduct and manner the strike was prosecuted.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record,
and petitioner itself does not question their veracity. Besides, they are
matters which involve the credibility and weight of the evidence and which
are primarily address to the appreciation of the trial court.

In cases not falling within the prohibition against strikes, the legality
or illegality of a strike depends first, upon the purpose for which it is
maintained, and, second, upon the means employed in carrying it on.
Thus, if the purpose which the laborers intend to accomplish by
means of a strike is trivial, unreasonable or unjust (as in the case of
the National Labor Union vs. Philippine Match Co., 70 Phil. 300), or if
in carrying on the strike the strikers should commit violence or cause
injuries to persons or damage to property (as in the case of National
Labor Union, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 68 Phil.
732), the strike, although not prohibited by injunction, may be
declared by the court illegal, with the adverse consequences to the
strikers." (Luzon Marine Dept. Union vs. Roldan, 86 Phil. 507, 513).

Where, "in carrying out the strike, coercion, force, intimidation, violation with
physical injuries, sabotage and the use of unnecessary and obscene
language or epithets were committed by the top officials and members of the
union in an attempt to prevent the other willing laborers to go to work," it was
held that "a strike hold under those circumstances cannot be justified in a
regime of law for that would encourage abuses and terrorism and could
subvert the very purpose of the law which provides for arbitration and
peaceful settlement of labor disputes." (Liberal Labor vs. Phil. Can, supra).

A labor organization is wholesome if it serves its legitimate purpose of

promoting the interests of labor without unnecessary labor disputes. That is
why it is given personality and recognition in concluding collective bargaining
agreements. But if it is made use of as a subterfuge, or as a means to
subvert valid commitments, it defeats its own purpose, for it tends to
undermine the harmonious relations between management and labor. The
situation does not deserve any approving sanction from the Court.

In view of our conclusion that the strike staged by petitioner USUP was illegal
and unjustified and that the permanent injunction issued by the lower court
was proper, we deem it unnecessary to consider the other incidental issues
presented by petitioner. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and UNIVERSITY OF
PANGASINAN, respondents.
Tanopo & Serafica for petitioner.
Hermogenes S. Decano for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In the instant petition for mandamus and certiorari, petitioner union seeks to
enjoin the respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to
resolve, or direct the Labor Arbiter to hear and decide, the merits of three of
petitioner's unresolved complaints, and to annul and set aside the resolution
of the NLRC affirming the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter dismissing
the petitioner's complaints for violation of certain labor standards laws but
requiring respondent university to integrate the cost of living allowance into
the basic pay of the covered employees and reminding it to pay its
employees at intervals not exceeding sixteen (16) days.
The uncontroverted facts show that on various dates, petitioner filed the
following complaints against the University of Pangasinan (University for
brevity) before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Dagupan City:
1. October 14, 1980: for nonpayment of benefits under P.D.
No. 1713 and emergency cost of living allowance (ecola) to
part-time teachers, and for prompt and accurate computation
of benefits under P.D. No. 451 and the payment of ecolas;
2. November 7, 1980: for nonpayment of all ecolas to
instructors from October 18-31, 1980;
3. November 20, 1980: for nonpayment of ecolas under P.D.
Nos. 525, 1123, 1614, 1634, 1678 and 1713 for November
1-15, 1980, and extra loads during typhoons "Nitang" and
"Osang" on July 21 and 25, 1980, respectively;
4. April 13, 1981: for violation of P.D. No. 1751 and
nonpayment of extra loads on February 12-13, 1980
(Anniversary celebration);
5. April 27, 1981: for nonpayment of all ecolas for April 1-15,
1981 to faculty members who were also members of the
union;
6. May 21, 1981: for violation of Wage Order No. 1 and
delayed payment of salaries; and
7. June 17, 1981: for nonpayment of salary differentials for
summer under P.D. No. 451.1
The Regional Director in San Fernando, La Union certified six (6) of these
complaints to Labor Arbiter Pedro Fernandez of the Dagupan City District
Office of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment for compulsory
arbitration. 2 According to the petitioner, it was made to understand by
Fernandez that the seventh complaint should also be discussed in its
position paper. Accordingly, petitioner filed a position paper discussing the
merits of all the seven complaints. On the other hand, the University limited
its discussion to only four: the complaints filed on April 13, 1981, April 27,
1981, May 21, 1981 and June 17, 1981. Petitioner was of the view that
Executive Labor Arbiter Sotero L. Tumang adopted the stand of the
University on the four complaints and accordingly dismissed them in his
decision of January 25, 1982.3
Observing that in its position paper, the petitioner included matters which
were "beyond the scope of the issues alleged in the complaints," said Labor
Arbiter discussed the four complaints individually. On the April 13, 1981
complaint, he ruled that because at the time P.D. No. 1123 took effect on
May 1, 1977, the University had not increased its tuition fees, there was of
"nothing to integrate."4 However, from June 16, 1979 when the University
increased its tuition fees, it was obligated to cause the integration of the
across-the-board increase of P60.00 in emergency allowance into the basic
pay as mandated by P.D. Nos. 1123 and 1751.
On the alleged nonpayment of extra loads handled by the employees on
February 12 and 13, 1981 when classes were suspended, Tumang stated
that Consuelo Abad, the petitioner's president, had no cause to complain
because her salary was fully paid and that, since there were "no
complainants for the alleged nonpayment of extra loads for two days," the
issue had become academic.
With respect to the April 27, 1981 complaint, Tumang said that since the
salary paid to Consuelo Abad and other faculty members for the April 1-15,
1981 period had been earned "as part of their salary for the ten-month
period," she was no longer entitled to an emergency cost of living allowance.
He added that "payment of emergency cost of living allowance is based on
actual work performed except when they (employees) are on leave with pay."
Hence, because classes ended in March 1981, the teachers who did not
report for work could not be considered on leave with pay and, therefore,
they were not entitled to an emergency cost of living allowance.
As regards the May 21, 1981 complaint alleging violation of Wage Order No.
1, Tumang found that the University had actually implemented the additional
living allowance of P2.00 a day required therein. On the alleged delay in the
payment of salaries of the employees, he rationalized that delays could not
be avoided but he reminded the University to pay its employees on time.
The June 17, 1981 complaint was also resolved in favor of the University.
Stating that P.D. No. 451 which mandates salary increases is dependent on
enrollment and allowable deductions, Tumang ruled that, again, Consuelo
Abad had no cause to complain as she had been paid out of the allowable
12.74% for distribution which was a "substantial compliance with P.D. No.
451." 5 The dispositive portion of the decision states:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION,
the above-entitled cases are dismissed for lack of merit.
Respondent however, is required to integrate the allowance
of P60.00 under P.D. 1123 into the basic pay of the covered
employees if the same has not as yet been complied with.
Respondent is also reminded to pay the employees at
intervals not exceeding sixteen (16) days pursuant to Article
102 of the Labor Code.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner appealed the said decision to the NLRC. In its resolution of
June 20, 1993, the NLRC affirmed the decision of Executive Labor Article
Tumang. Hence, the instant petition for mandamus and certiorari with the
following prayer:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is
respectfully prayed that this petition be given due course and
that judgment issue:
1. Declaring petitioner as possessed with capacity to
represent its members in the complaints it filed thru its
president, Miss Consuelo Abad, against private respondent,
and the complaints are pertaining to the members who are
entitled under the law to the claims sought herein, not to
Miss Abad alone;
2. Annulling and setting aside the appealed resolution
insofar as the issues of nonpayment of Ecola for April 1-15,
1981 and nonpayment of salary differentials for summer of
1981 under P.D. No. 451 are concerned;
3. Ordering private respondent to pay covered members of
petitioner their Ecola for April 1-15, 1981 and their salary
differentials for summer of 1981 pursuant to the mandate of
P.D. 451;
4. Enjoining public respondent to resolve on the merits the
issues of nonpayment of extra loads of February 12-13,
1980 and violation of Wage Order No. 1 which were properly
brought on appeal to said office;
5. Enjoining public respondent to resolve on the merits the
issues or grievances alleged in the complaints filed on
October 14, November 7 and November 20, all in 1980,
which were not resolved by the labor arbiter but nonetheless
appealed to public respondents, or
6. Enjoining public respondent to order or direct the labor
arbiter to resolve on the merits the said issues or grievances
alleged in the complaints mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph;
7. Attorney's fee in such amount as this Honorable Tribunal
may deem just and reasonable in the premises;
8. Ordering private respondent to pay costs of suit, including
this appeal.
Petitioner further prays for safeguards and/or measures to
insure the correct computation of the amount of claims
herein sought due to each covered member of petitioner,
and for such other reliefs just and equitable in the premises. 6
We shall first deal with the propriety of the special civil action of mandamus.
In this regard, petitioner contends that the NLRC should have, in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, resolved the issues raised in the three (3)
complaints filed on October 14, November 7 and November 20, 1980 or, in
the alternative, ordered the Labor Arbiter to hear and decide the
aforementioned three (3) complaints, it having the power of supervision over
Labor Arbiters.
Sec. 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Petition for Mandamus. — When any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to
do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
As succinctly provided in this section, anyone who wishes to avail of the
remedy of mandamus must state in a verified petition "the facts with
certainty." On account of this requirement, mandamus is never issued in
doubtful cases and showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the
petitioner is required. 7 Indeed, while the labor arbiter is duty bound to
resolve all complaints referred to him for arbitration and, therefore, he may
be compelled by mandamus to decide them (although not in any particular
way or in favor of anyone),8we find that the peculiar circumstances in this
case do not merit the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
Petitioner admits that only six of the complaints were certified to Labor
Arbiter Fernandez for compulsory arbitration. It failed, however, to allege why
this was the case or whether it had exerted any effort to include the
remaining complaint in the certification. What it stresses is the alleged
assurance of Labor Arbiter Fernandez that the seventh complaint may be
discussed in its position paper. It turned out, however, that, according to the
unrebutted allegation of the Solicitor General, Labor Arbiter Fernandez
inhibited himself from handling the cases referred to him as he was teaching
at the University. Hence, Labor Arbiter Fernandez forwarded the complaints
to the Assistant Director for Arbitration in Regional Office No. 1 in San
Fernando, La Union for appropriate action. He should have forwarded all of
the complaints to the said Assistant Director, but it appears that Fernandez
turned over only four of them. In turn, the Assistant Director referred only
complaints Nos. 5, 6 and 7, which had been docketed as RBI-C-24-81, LS-
42-81 and LS-43-81, to Executive Labor Arbiter Sotero L. Tumang for
compulsory arbitration. However, while only these three docket numbers
appear on the caption of the decision, the same actually resolved four
complaints, as earlier mentioned. 9
From these facts, one may infer that there must have been a mishandling of
the complaints and/or the records of the cases. However, the petitioner failed
to substantiate by evidence such negligence on the part of the public
respondents as to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus. 10 Its officials
even neglected the simple act of verifying from the MOLE office in Dagupan
City whether the records of all the cases filed had been forwarded to the
proper official who should resolve them. 11 Infact, nowhere in its
pleadings 12 is there an allegation to that effect.
On the contrary, the petitioner took Fernandez' words seriously and allowed
the proceedings to reach its inevitable conclusion. When it received a copy of
the decision, the petitioner should have taken note of Executive Labor Arbiter
Tumang's observation therein that it had discussed matters "beyond the
scope of the issues alleged in the complaints." In its memorandum of appeal,
it should have prayed for the inclusion of the three complaints inasmuch as in
labor cases, an appeal may be treated as a motion for reconsideration or
vice-versa. 13 The fact that three complaints had been omitted did not escape
the attention of the NLRC which stated in its resolution that "since those
cases were not consolidated it is now too late to consolidate them" with the
four decided cases. 14 We agree with the NLRC that the said complaints
should proceed separately as long as their resolution would not conflict with
the resolved
cases.15 It should be added that under Art. 217(b) of the Labor Code, the
NLRC has "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the
Labor Arbiters." Needless to say, the NLRC could not have acted on matters
outside of the cases appealed to it.
Petitioner's contention that the cases filed by Consuelo Abad as its president
should affect, not only herself, but all the other union members similarly
situated as she was, is well taken. The uncontroverted allegation of the
petitioner is that it is the holder of Registration Certificate No. 9865-C, having
been registered with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment on February
16, 1978. As such, petitioner possessed the legal personality to sue and be
sued under its registered name.16 Corollarily, its president, Consuelo Abad,
correctly filed the complaints even if some of them involved rights and
interest purely or exclusively appertaining to individual employees, it
appearing that she signed the complaints "for and in behalf of the University
of Pangasinan Faculty Union."17
The University's contention that petitioner had no legal personality to institute
and prosecute money claims must, therefore, fail. To quote then Associate
Justice Teehankee in Heirs of Teodelo M. Cruz v. CIR,18 "[w]hat should be
borne in mind is that the interest of the individual worker can be better
protected on the whole by a strong union aware of its moral and legal
obligations to represent the rank and file faithfully and secure for them the
best wages and working terms and conditions. . . . Although this was stated
within the context of collective bargaining, it applies equally well to cases,
such as the present wherein the union, through its president, presented its
individual members' grievances through proper proceedings. While the
complaints might not
have disclosed the identities of the individual employees claiming monetary
benefits,19 such technical defect should not be taken against the claimants,
especially because the University appears to have failed to demand a bill of
particulars during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
On the merits of the petition, the NLRC did not abuse its discretion in
resolving the appeal from the decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Tumang
except for the disallowance of the emergency cost of living allowance to
members of the petitioner. The Rules Implementing P.D. No. 1713 which
took effect on August 18, 1980 provide:
Sec. 6. Allowances of full-time and part-time employees. —
Employees shall be paid in full the monthly allowance on the
basis of the scales provided in Section 3 hereof, regardless
of the number of their regular working days if they incur no
absences during the month. If they incur absences without
pay, the amounts corresponding to the absences may be
deducted from the monthly allowance provided that in
determining the equivalent daily allowance of such
deduction, the applicable monthly allowance shall be divided
by thirty (30) days.
xxx xxx xxx
contemplates a "no work" situation where the employees
voluntarily absent themselves. Petitioners, in the case at bar,
certainly do not, ad voluntatem absent themselves during
semestral breaks. Rather, they are constrained to take
mandatory leave from work. For this, they cannot be faulted
nor can they be begrudged that which is due them under the
law. To a certain extent, the private respondent can specify
dates when no classes would be held. Surely, it was not the
intention of the framers of the law to allow employers to
withhold employee benefits by the simple expedient of
unilaterally imposing "no work" days and consequently
avoiding compliance with the mandate of the law for those
days.
As interpreted and emphasized in the same case, the law granting
emergency cost of living allowances was designed to augment the income of
the employees to enable them to cope with the rising cost of living and
inflation. Clearly, it was enacted in pursuance of the State's duty to protect
labor and to alleviate the plight of the workers. To uphold private
respondent's interpretation of the law would be running counter to the intent
of the law and the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. The
decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that
private respondent University of Pangasinan shall pay its regular and fulltime
teachers and employees emergency cost of living allowance for the period
April 1-15, 1981. Costs against private respondent.

(Emphasis supplied).

This Section, which is a virtual reproduction of Section 12 of the old Rules

Implementing P.D. No. 1123, has been interpreted by this Court as requiring
that the full amount of the cost of living allowance mandated by law should
be given monthly to each employee if the latter has worked continuously for
each month, regardless of the number of the regular working days.20 But
more apropos is the ruling of this Court in University of Pangasinan Faculty
Union v. University of Pangasinan and NLRC,21 a case involving the same
parties as in the instant petition and dealing with a complaint filed by the
petitioner on December 18, 1981 seeking, among others, the payment of
emergency cost of living allowances for November 7 to December 5, 1981, a
semestral break. The Court held therein:

. . . The "No work, no pay" principle does not apply in the

instant case. The petitioner's members received their regular
salaries during this period. It is clear from the . . . law that it
MACTAN WORKERS UNION and TOMAS FERRER, as President
thereof, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DON RAMON ABOITIZ, President, Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works,
Inc.; EDDIE LIM, as Treasurer; JESUS DIAGO, Superintendent of the
aforesaid corporation; WILFREDO VIRAY, as Resident Manager of the
Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc.; and the CEBU SHIPYARD &
ENGINEERING WORKS, INC., defendants-appellees; ASSOCIATION
LABOR UNION, intervenor-appellant.
Andales Law Office for plaintiffs-appellees.
Pedro B. Uy Calderon for defendants-appellees.
Seno, Mendoza & Associates for intervenor-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The dispute in this appealed decision from the Court of First Instance of
Cebu on questions of law is between plaintiff Mactan Workers Union1 and
intervenor Associated Labor Union. The former in its complaint on behalf of
seventy-two of its members working in defendant corporation, Cebu Shipyard
and Engineering Works, Inc.2 did file a money claim in the amount of
P4,035.82 representing the second installment of a profit-sharing agreement
under a collective bargaining contract entered into between such business
firm and intervenor labor union as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of its workers. The plaintiff was successful both in the City
Court of Lapulapu where such complaint was first started as well as in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. It is from the decision of the latter court,
rendered on February 22, 1968, that this appeal was interposed by
intervenor Associated Labor Union. It must have been an awareness on
appellant's part that on the substantive aspect, the claim of plaintiff to what
was due its members under such collective bargaining agreement was
meritorious that led it to rely on alleged procedural obstacles for the reversal
sought. Intervenor, however, has not thereby dented the judgment. As will be
more fully explained, there are no applicable procedural doctrines that stand
in the way of plaintiff's suit. We affirm.
The facts are not in dispute. According to the decision: "From the evidence
presented it appears that the defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering
Works, Inc. in Lapulapu City is employing laborers and employees belonging
to two rival labor unions. Seventy-two of these employees or laborers whose
names appear in the complaint are affiliated with the Mactan Workers Union
while the rest are members of the intervenor Associated Labor Union. On
November 28, 1964, the defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc.
and the Associated Labor Union entered into a 'Collective Bargaining
Agreement' ... the pertinent part of which, Article XIII thereof, [reads thus]: '...
The [Company] agrees to give a profit-sharing bonus to its employees and
laborers to be taken from ten per cent (10%) of its net profits or net income
derived from the direct operation of its shipyard and shop in Lapulapu City
and after deducting the income tax and the bonus annually given to its
General Manager and the Superintendent and the members of the Board of
Directors and Secretary of the Corporation, to be payable in two (2)
installments, the first installment being payable in March and the second
installment in June, each year out of the profits in agreement. In the
computation of said ten per cent (10%) to [be] distributed as a bonus among
the employees and laborers of the [Company] in proportion to their salaries
or wages, only the income derived by the [Company] from the direct
operation of its shipyard and shop in Lapulapu City, as stated herein-above-
commencing from the earnings during the year 1964, shall be included. Said
profit-sharing bonus shall be paid by the [Company] to [Associated Labor
Union] to be delivered by the latter to the employees and laborers concerned
and it shall be the duty of the Associated Labor Union to furnish and deliver
to the [Company] the corresponding receipts duly signed by the laborers and
employees entitled to receive the profit-sharing bonus within a period of sixty
(60) days from the date of receipt by [it] from the [Company] of the profit-
sharing bonus. If a laborer or employee of the [Company] does not want to
accept the profit-sharing bonus which the said employee or laborer is entitled
under this Agreement, it shall be the duty of the [Associated Labor Union] to
return the money received by [it] as profit-sharing bonus to the [Company]
within a period of sixty (60) days from the receipt by the [Union] from the
[Company] of the said profit-sharing bonus.'"3 The decision went on to state:
"In compliance with the said collective bargaining agreement, in March, 1965
the defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. delivered to the ALU
for distribution to the laborers or employees working with the defendant
corporation to the profit-sharing bonus corresponding to the first installment
for the year 1965. Again in June 1965 the defendant corporation delivered to
the Associated Labor Union the profit-sharing bonus corresponding to the
second installment for 1965. The members of the Mactan Workers Union
failed to receive their shares in the second installment of bonus because they
did not like to go to the office of the ALU to collect their shares. In
accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining after 60 days, the
uncollected shares of the plaintiff union members was returned by the ALU to
the defendant corporation. At the same time the defendant corporation was
advised by the ALU not to deliver the said amount to the members of the
Mactan Workers Union unless ordered by the Court, otherwise the ALU will
take such step to protect the interest of its members ... . Because this
warning given by the intervenor union the defendant corporation did not pay
to the plaintiffs the sum of P4,035.82 which was returned by the Associated
Labor Union, but instead, deposited the said amount with the Labor
Administrator. For the recovery of this amount this case was filed with the
lower court."4
The dispositive portion of such decision follows: "[Wherefore], judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the defendants to deliver to the Associated Labor
Union the sum of P4,035.82 for distribution to the employees of the
defendant corporation who are members of the Mactan Workers Union; and
ordering the intervenor Associated Labor Union, immediately after receipt of
the said amount, to pay the members of the Mactan Workers Union their
corresponding shares in the profit-sharing bonus for the second installments
for the year 1965."5
It is from such a decision that an appeal was taken by intervenor Associated
Labor Union. As is quite apparent on the face of such judgment, the lower
court did nothing except to require literal compliance with the terms of a
collective bargaining contract. Nor, as will be hereafter discussed, has any
weakness thereof been demonstrated on the procedural questions raised by
appellant. To repeat, we have to affirm.
1. The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the
law between the parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its
provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the
aggrieved party has the right to go to court for redress. 6 Nor does it suffice as
a defense that the claim is made on behalf of non-members of intervenor
Associated Labor Union, for it is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a
collective bargaining agreement extend to the laborers and employees in the
collective bargaining unit, including those who do not belong to the chosen
bargaining labor organization.7Any other view would be a discrimination on
which the law frowns. It is appropriate that such should be the case. As was
held in United Restauror's Employees and Labor Union v. Torres,8 this Court
speaking through Justice Sanchez, "the right to be the exclusive
representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining
unit is vested in the labor union 'designated or selected' for such purpose 'by
the majority of the employees' in the unit concerned."9 If it were otherwise,
the highly salutory purpose and objective of the collective bargaining scheme
to enable labor to secure better terms in employment condition as well as
rates of pay would be frustrated insofar as non-members are concerned,
deprived as they are of participation in whatever advantages could thereby
be gained. The labor union that gets the majority vote as the exclusive
bargaining representative does not act for its members alone. It represents
all the employees in such a bargaining unit. It is not to be indulged in any
attempt on its part to disregard the rights of non-members. Yet that is what
intervenor labor union was guilty of, resulting in the complaint filed on behalf
of the laborers, who were in the ranks of plaintiff Mactan Labor Union.
The outcome was not at all unexpected. The right being clear all that had to
be done was to see to its enforcement. Nor did the lower court in the decision
now on appeal, require anything else other than that set forth in the collective
bargaining agreement. All that was done was to have the covenants therein
contained as to the profit-sharing scheme carried out and respected. It would
be next to impossible for intervenor Associated Labor Union to point to any
feature thereof that could not in any wise be objected to as repugnant to the
provisions of the collective bargaining contract. Certainly the lower court, as
did the City Court of Lapu-lapu, restricted itself to compelling the parties to
abide by what was agreed upon. How then can the appealed decision be
impugned?
2. Intervenor Associated Labor Union, laboring under such a predicament
had perforce to rely on what it considered procedural lapses. It would assail
the alleged lack of a cause of action, of jurisdiction of the City Court of
Lapulapu and of personality of the Mactan Workers Union to represent its
members. There is no merit to such an approach. The highly sophisticated
line of argument followed in its brief as appellant does not carry a persuasive
ring. What is apparent is that intervenor was hard put to prop up what was
inherently a weak, not to say an indefensible, stand. The impression given is
that of a litigant clutching at straws.
How can the allegation of a lack of a cause of action be taken seriously when
precisely there was a right violated on the part of the members of plaintiff
Mactan Workers Union, a grievance that called for redress? The assignment
of error that the City Court of Lapulapu was bereft of jurisdiction is singularly
unpersuasive. The amount claimed by plaintiff Mactan Workers Union on
behalf of its members was P4,035.82 and if the damages and attorney's fees
be added, the total sum was less than P10,000.00. Section 88 of the
Judiciary Act in providing for the original jurisdiction of city courts in civil
cases provides: "In all civil actions, including those mentioned in Rules fifty-
nine and sixty-two (now Rules 57 and 60) of the Rules of Court, arising in his
municipality or city, and not exclusively cognizable by the Court of First
Instance, the municipal judge and the judge of a city court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the value of the subject matter or amount
of the demand does not exceed ten thousand pesos, exclusive of interests
and costs." 10 It is true that if an element of unfair labor practice may be
discerned in a suit for the enforcement of a collective bargaining contract,
then the matter is solely cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations. 11 It
is equally true that as of the date the lower court decision was rendered, the
question of such enforcement had been held to be for the regular courts to
pass upon. 12 Counsel for intervenor Associated Labor Union was precisely
the petitioner in one of the decisions of this Court, Seno v .
Mendoza, 13 where such a doctrine was reiterated. In the language of Justice
Makalintal, the ponente: "As the issue involved in the instant case, although
arising from a labor dispute, does not refer to one affecting an industry which
is indispensable to the national interest and certified by the President to the
Industrial Court, nor to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law, nor to
hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, nor to an unfair labor
practice, but seeks the enforcement of a provision of the collective bargaining
agreement, ..., jurisdiction pertains to the ordinary courts and not to the
Industrial Court." 14 There was only a half-hearted attempt, if it could be
called that, to lend credence to the third error assigned, namely that plaintiff
Mactan Workers Union could not file the suit on behalf of its members. That
is evident by intervenor Associated Labor Union devoting only half a page in
its brief to such an assertion. It is easy to see why it should be thus. On its
face, it certainly appeared to be oblivious of how far a labor union can go, or
is expected to, in the defense of the rights of its rank and file. There was an
element of surprise, considering that such a contention came from a labor
organization, which under normal condition should be the last to lay itself
open to a charge that it is not averse to denigrating the effectiveness of labor
unions.

3. This brings us to one last point. It is quite understandable that labor unions
in their campaign for membership, for acquiring ascendancy in any shop,
plant, or industry would do what lies in their power to put down competing
groups. The struggle is likely to be marked with bitterness, no quarter being
given or expected on the part of either side. Nevertheless, it is not to be
forgotten that what is entitled to constitutional protection is labor, or more
specifically the working men and women, not labor organizations. The latter
are merely the instrumentalities through which their welfare may be promoted
and fostered. That is the raison d'etre of labor unions. The utmost care
should be taken then, lest in displaying an unyielding, intransigent attitude on
behalf of their members, injustice be committed against opposing labor
organizations. In the final analysis, they alone are not the sole victims, but
the labor movement itself, which may well be the recipient of a crippling blow.
Moreover, while it is equally understandable that their counsel would take
advantage of every legal doctrine deemed applicable or conjure up any
defense that could serve their cause, still, as officers of the court, there
should be an awareness that resort to such a technique does result in
clogged dockets, without the least justification especially so if there be
insistence on flimsy and insubstantial contentions just to give some
semblance of plausibility to their pleadings. Certainly, technical virtuosity, or
what passes for it, is no substitute for an earnest and sincere desire to
assure that there be justice according to law. That is a creed to which all
members of the legal profession, labor lawyers not excluded, should do their
best to live by.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of February 22, 1968 is

affirmed. Costs against Associated Labor Union.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, Department of Labor and Employment, and THE ALL U.P.
WORKERS' UNION, represented by its President, Rosario del
Rosario, respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In this special civil action of certiorari the University of the Philippines seeks
the nullification of the Order dated October 30, 1990 of Director Pura Ferrer-
Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations holding that "professors, associate
professors and assistant professors (of the University of the Philippines) are .
. rank-and-file employees . . ;" consequently, they should, together with the
so-called non-academic, non-teaching, and all other employees of the
University, be represented by only one labor organization. 1 The University is
joined in this undertaking by the Solicitor General who "has taken a position
not contrary to that of petitioner and, in fact, has manifested . . that he is not
opposing the petition . . ." 2
The case 3 was initiated in the Bureau of Labor Relations by a petition filed
on March 2, 1990 by a registered labor union, the "Organization of Non-
Academic Personnel of UP" (ONAPUP). 4 Claiming to have a membership of
3,236 members — comprising more than 33% of the 9,617 persons
constituting the non-academic personnel of UP-Diliman, Los Baños, Manila,
and Visayas, it sought the holding of a certification election among all said
non-academic employees of the University of the Philippines. At a
conference thereafter held on March 22, 1990 in the Bureau, the University
stated that it had no objection to the election.
On April 18, 1990, another registered labor union, the "All UP Workers'
Union," 5 filed a comment, as intervenor in the certification election
proceeding. Alleging that its membership covers both academic and non-
academic personnel, and that it aims to unite all UP rank-and-file employees
in one union, it declared its assent to the holding of the election provided the
appropriate organizational unit was first clearly defined. It observed in this
connection that the Research, Extension and Professional Staff (REPS), who
are academic non-teaching personnel, should not be deemed part of the
organizational unit.
For its part, the University, through its General Counsel, 6 made of record its
view that there should be two (2) unions: one for academic, the other for non-
academic or administrative, personnel considering the dichotomy of interests,
conditions and rules governing these employee groups.
Director Calleja ruled on the matter on August 7, 1990. 7 She declared that
"the appropriate organizational unit . . should embrace all the regular rank-
and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching, of the University of the
Philippines, including all its branches" and that there was no sufficient
evidence "to justify the grouping of the non-academic or administrative
personnel into an organization unit apart and distinct from that of the
academic or teaching personnel." Director Calleja adverted to Section 9 of
Executive Order No. 180, viz.:
Sec. 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the
employer unit consisting of rank-and-file employees, unless
circumstances otherwise require.
and Section 1, Rule IV of the Rules Implementing said EO 180 (as
amended by SEC. 2, Resolution of Public Sector Labor Management
Council dated May 14, 1989, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
For purposes of registration, an appropriate organizational
unit may refer to:
xxx xxx xxx
d. State universities or colleges, government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
She went on to say that the general intent of EO 180 was "not to
fragmentize the employer unit, as "can be gleaned from the definition
of the term "accredited employees' organization," which refers to:
. . a registered organization of the rank-and-file employees
as defined in these rules recognized to negotiate for the
employees in an organizational unit headed by an officer
with sufficient authority to bind the agency, such as . . . . . .
state colleges and universities.
The Director thus commanded that a certification election be "conducted
among rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching" in all four
autonomous campuses of the UP, and that management appear and bring
copies of the corresponding payrolls for January, June, and July, 1990 at the
"usual pre-election conference . . ."
At the pre-election conference held on March 22, 1990 at the Labor
Organizational Division of the DOLE, 8 the University sought further
clarification of the coverage of the term, "rank-and-file" personnel, asserting
that not every employee could properly be embraced within both teaching
and non-teaching categories since there are those whose positions are in
truth managerial and policy-determining, and hence, excluded by law.
At a subsequent hearing (on October 4, 1990), the University filed a
Manifestation seeking the exclusion from the organizational unit of those
employees holding supervisory positions among non-academic personnel,
and those in teaching staff with the rank of Assistant Professor or higher,
submitting the following as grounds therefor:
1) Certain "high-level employees" with policy-making, managerial, or
confidential functions, are ineligible to join rank-and-file employee
organizations under Section 3, EO 180:
Sec. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally
considered as policy-making or managerial or whose duties
are of a highly confidential nature shall not be eligible to join
the organization of rank-and file government employees;
2) In the University hierarchy, not all teaching and non-teaching personnel
belong the rank-and file: just as there are those occupying managerial
positions within the non-teaching roster, there is also a dichotomy between
various levels of the teaching or academic staff;
3) Among the non-teaching employees composed of Administrative Staff and
Research personnel, only those holding positions below Grade 18 should be
regarded as rank-and-file, considering that those holding higher grade
positions, like Chiefs of Sections, perform supervisory functions including that
of effectively recommending termination of appointments or initiating
appointments and promotions; and
4) Not all teaching personnel may be deemed included in the term, "rank-
and-file;" only those holding appointments at the instructor level may be so
considered, because those holding appointments from Assistant Professor to
Associate Professor to full Professor take part, as members of the University
Council, a policy-making body, in the initiation of policies and rules with
respect to faculty tenure and promotion. 9
The ONAPUP quite categorically made of record its position; that it was not
opposing the University's proferred classification of rank-and file employees.
On the other hand, the "All UP Workers' Union" opposed the University's
view, in a Position Paper presented by it under date of October 18, 1990.
Director Calleja subsequently promulgated an Order dated October 30, 1990,
resolving the "sole issue" of "whether or not professors, associate professors
and assistant professors are included in the definition of high-level
employee(s)" in light of Rule I, Section (1) of the Implementing Guidelines of
Executive Order No. 180, defining "high level employee" as follows:
1. High Level Employee — is one whose functions are
normally considered policy determining, managerial or one
whose duties are highly confidential in nature. A managerial
function refers to the exercise of powers such as:
1. To effectively recommend such
managerial actions;
2. To formulate or execute management
policies and decisions; or
3. To hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
dismiss, assign or discipline employees.
The Director adjudged that said teachers are rank-and-file employees
"qualified to join unions and vote in certification elections." According to her
—
A careful perusal of the University Code . . shows that the
policy-making powers of the Council are limited to academic
matters, namely, prescribing courses of study and rules of
discipline, fixing student admission and graduation
requirements, recommending to the Board of Regents the
conferment of degrees, and disciplinary power over
students. The policy-determining functions contemplated in
the definition of a high-level employee pertain to managerial,
executive, or organization policies, such as hiring, firing, and
disciplining of employees, salaries, teaching/working hours,
other monetary and non-monetary benefits, and other terms
and conditions of employment. They are the usual issues in
collective bargaining negotiations so that whoever wields
these powers would be placed in a situation of conflicting
interests if he were allowed to join the union of rank-and-file
employees.
The University seasonably moved for reconsideration, seeking to make the
following points, to wit:
1) UP professors do "wield the most potent managerial powers: the power to
rule on tenure, on the creation of new programs and new jobs, and
conversely, the abolition of old programs and the attendant re-assignment of
employees.
2) To say that the Council is "limited to (acting on) academic matters" is
error, since academic decisions "are the most important decisions made in a
University . . (being, as it were) the heart, the core of the University as a
workplace.
3) Considering that the law regards as a "high level" employee, one who
performs either policy-determining, managerial, or confidential functions, the
Director erred in applying only the "managerial functions" test, ignoring the
"policy-determining functions" test.
4) The Director's interpretation of the law would lead to absurd results, e.g.:
"an administrative officer of the College of Law is a high level employee,
while a full Professor who has published several treatises and who has
distinguished himself in argument before the Supreme Court is a mere rank-
and-file employee. A dormitory manager is classified as a high level
employee, while a full Professor or Political Science with a Ph. D. and
several Honorary doctorates is classified as rank-and-file." 10
The motion for reconsideration was denied by Director Calleja, by Order
dated November 20, 1990.
The University would now have this Court declare void the Director's Order of
October 30, 1990 as well as that of November 20, 1990. 11 A temporary
restraining order was issued by the Court, by Resolution dated December 5,
1990 conformably to the University's application therefor.
Two issues arise from these undisputed facts. One is whether or not
professors, associate professors and assistant professors are "high-level
employees" "whose functions are normally considered policy determining,
managerial or . . highly confidential in nature." The other is whether or not,
they, and other employees performing academic functions, 12 should
comprise a collective bargaining unit distinct and different from that
consisting of the non-academic employees of the University, 13 considering
the dichotomy of interests, conditions and rules existing between them.
As regards the first issue, the Court is satisfied that it has been correctly
resolved by the respondent Director of Bureau Relations. In light of Executive
Order No. 180 and its implementing rules, as well as the University's charter
and relevant regulations, the professors, associate professors and assistant
professors (hereafter simply referred to as professors) cannot be considered
as exercising such managerial or highly confidential functions as would justify
their being categorized as "high-level employees" of the institution.
The Academic Personnel Committees, through which the professors
supposedly exercise managerial functions, were constituted "in order to
foster greater involvement of the faculty and other academic personnel in
appointments, promotions, and other personnel matters that directly affect
them." 14 Academic Personnel Committees at the departmental and college
levels were organized "consistent with, and demonstrative of the very idea of
consulting the faculty and other academic personnel on matters directly
affecting them" and to allow "flexibility in the determination of guidelines
peculiar to a particular department or college." 15
Personnel actions affecting the faculty and other academic personnel should,
however, "be considered under uniform guidelines and consistent with the
Resolution of the Board (of Regents) adopted during its 789th Meeting (11-
26-69) creating the University Academic Personnel Board." 16 Thus, the
Departmental Academic Personnel Committee is given the function of
"assist(ing) in the review of the recommendations initiated by the Department
Chairman with regard to recruitment, selection, performance evaluation,
tenure and staff development, in accordance with the general guidelines
formulated by the University Academic Personnel Board and the
implementing details laid down by the College Academic Personnel
Committee;" 17 while the College Academic Personnel Committee is
entrusted with the following functions: 18
1. Assist the Dean in setting up the details for the
implementation of policies, rules, standards or general
guidelines as formulated by the University Academic
Personnel Board;
2. Review the recommendation submitted by the DAPCs
with regard to recruitment, selection, performance
evaluation, tenure, staff development, and promotion of the
faculty and other academic personnel of the College;
3. Establish departmental priorities in the allocation of
available funds for promotion;
4. Act on cases of disagreement between the Chairman and
the members of the DAPC particularly on personnel matters
covered by this Order;
 5. Act on complaints and/or protests against personnel
actions made by the Department Chairman and/or the
DAPC.
The University Academic Personnel Board, on the other hand, performs the
following functions: 19
1. Assist the Chancellor in the review of the
recommendations of the CAPC'S.
2. Act on cases of disagreement between the Dean and the
CAPC.
3. Formulate policies, rules, and standards with respect to
the selection, compensation, and promotion of members of
the academic staff.
4. Assist the Chancellor in the review of recommendations
on academic promotions and on other matters affecting
faculty status and welfare.
From the foregoing, it is evident that it is the University Academic Personnel
Committee, composed of deans, the assistant for academic affairs and the
chief of personnel, which formulates the policies, rules and standards
respecting selection, compensation and promotion of members of the
academic staff. The departmental and college academic personnel
committees' functions are purely recommendatory in nature, subject to
review and evaluation by the University Academic Personnel Board.
In Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines vs. Trajano, 20 this Court
reiterated the principle laid down in National Merchandising Corp. vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, 21 that the power to recommend, in order to qualify an
employee as a supervisor or managerial employee "must not only
be effective but the exercise of such authority should not be merely of a
routinary or clerical nature but should require the use of independent
judgment." Where such recommendatory powers, as in the case at bar, are
subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and
other higher executives of the company, the same, although present, are not
effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.
Significantly, the personnel actions that may be recommended by the
departmental and college academic personnel committees must conform
with the general guidelines drawn up by the university personnel academic
committee. This being the case, the members of the departmental and
college academic personnel committees are not unlike the chiefs of divisions
and sections of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority whom this
Court considered as rank-and-file employees in National Waterworks &
Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 22 because "given
ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe for their
execution, . . . they have little freedom of action, as their main function is
merely to carry out the company's orders, plans and policies."
The power or prerogative pertaining to a high-level employee "to effectively
recommend such managerial actions, to formulate or execute management
policies or decisions and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss,
assign or discipline employees" 23 is exercised to a certain degree by the
university academic personnel board/committees and ultimately by the Board
of Regents in accordance with Section 6 of the University
Charter, 24 thus:
(e) To appoint, on the recommendation of the President of
the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other
employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours
of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may
deem proper; to grant them in its discretion leave of absence
under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to
remove them for cause after investigation and hearing shall
have been had.
Another factor that militates against petitioner's espousal of managerial
employment status for all its professors through membership in the
departmental and college academic personnel committees is that not all
professors are members thereof. Membership and the number of members in
the committees are provided as follows: 25
Sec. 2. Membership in Committees. — Membership in
committees may be made either through appointment,
election, or by some other means as may be determined by
the faculty and other academic personnel of a particular
department or college.
Sec. 3. Number of Members. — In addition to the Chairman,
in the case of a department, and the Dean in the case of a
college, there shall be such number of members
representing the faculty and academic personnel as will
afford a fairly representative, deliberative and manageable
group that can handle evaluation of personnel actions.
Neither can membership in the University Council elevate the professors to
the status of high-level employees. Section 6 (f) and 9 of the UP Charter
respectively provide: 26
Sec. 6. The Board of Regents shall have the following
powers and duties . . . ;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To approve the courses of study and rules of discipline
drawn up by the University Council as hereinafter provided; .
..
Sec. 9. There shall be a University Council consisting of the
President of the University and of all instructors in the
university holding the rank of professor, associate professor,
or assistant professor. The Council shall have the power to
prescribe the courses of study and rules of discipline, subject
to the approval of the Board of Regents. It shall fix the
requirements for admission to any college of the university,
as well as for graduation and the receiving of a degree. The
Council alone shall have the power to recommend students
or others to be recipients of degrees. Through its president
or committees, it shall have disciplinary power over the
students within the limits prescribed by the rules of discipline
approved by the Board of Regents. The powers and duties
of the President of the University, in addition to those
specifically provided in this Act shall be those usually
pertaining to the office of president of a university.
It is readily apparent that the policy-determining functions of the University
Council are subject to review, evaluation and final approval by the Board of
Regents. The Council's power of discipline is likewise circumscribed by the
limits imposed by the Board of Regents. What has been said about the
recommendatory powers of the departmental and college academic
personnel committees applies with equal force to the alleged policy-
determining functions of the University Council.
Even assuming arguendo that UP professors discharge policy-determining
functions through the University Council, still such exercise would not qualify
them as high-level employees within the context of E.O. 180. As correctly
observed by private respondent, "Executive Order No. 180 is a law
concerning public sector unionism. It must therefore be construed within that
context. Within that context, the University of the Philippines represents the
government as an employer. 'Policy-determining' refers to policy-
determination in university mattes that affect those same matters that may be
the subject of negotiation between public sector management and labor. The
reason why 'policy-determining' has been laid down as a test in segregating
rank-and-file from management is to ensure that those who lay down policies
in areas that are still negotiable in public sector collective bargaining do not
themselves become part of those employees who seek to change these
policies for their collective welfare." 27
The policy-determining functions of the University Council refer to academic
matters, i.e. those governing the relationship between the University and its
students, and not the University as an employer and the professors as
employees. It is thus evident that no conflict of interest results in the
professors being members of the University Council and being classified as
rank-and-file employees.
Be that as it may, does it follow, as public respondent would propose, that all
rank-and-file employees of the university are to be organized into a single
collective bargaining unit?
A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. 28
Our labor laws do not however provide the criteria for determining the proper
collective bargaining unit. Section 12 of the old law, Republic Act No. 875
otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act, simply reads as follows: 29
Sec. 12. Exclusive Collective Bargaining Representation for
Labor Organizations. — The labor organization designated
or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of all
the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment; Provided,
That any individual employee or group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer.
Although said Section 12 of the Industrial Peace Act was subsequently
incorporated into the Labor Code with minor changes, no guidelines were
included in said Code for determination of an appropriate bargaining unit in a
given case. 30 Thus, apart from the single descriptive word "appropriate," no
specific guide for determining the proper collective bargaining unit can be
found in the statutes.
Even Executive Order No. 180 already adverted to is not much help. All it
says, in its Section 9, is that "(t)he appropriate organizational unit shall be the
employer unit consisting of rank-and-file employees, unless circumstances
otherwise require." Case law fortunately furnishes some guidelines.
When first confronted with the task of determining the proper collective
bargaining unit in a particular controversy, the Court had perforce to rely on
American jurisprudence. In Democratic Labor Association vs. Cebu
Stevedoring Company, Inc., decided on February 28, 1958, 31 the Court
observed that "the issue of how to determine the proper collective bargaining
unit and what unit would be appropriate to be the collective bargaining
agency" . . . "is novel in this jurisdiction; however, American precedents on
the matter abound . . (to which resort may be had) considering that our
present Magna Carta has been patterned after the American law on the
subject." Said the Court:
. . . Under these precedents, there are various factors which
must be satisfied and considered in determining the proper
constituency of a bargaining unit. No one particular factor is
itself decisive of the determination. The weight accorded to
any particular factor varies in accordance with the particular
question or questions that may arise in a given case. What
are these factors? Rothenberg mentions a good number, but
the most pertinent to our case are: (1) will of the employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unit of employees' interest,
such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity
of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as
temporary, seasonal probationary employees. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
An enlightening appraisal of the problem of defining an
appropriate bargaining unit is given in the 10th Annual
Report of the National Labor Relations Board wherein it is
emphasized that the factors which said board may consider
and weigh in fixing appropriate units are: the history, extent
and type of organization of employees; the history of their
collective bargaining; the history, extent and type of
organization of employees in other plants of the same
employer, or other employers in the same industry; the skill,
wages, work, and working conditions of the employees; the
desires of the employees; the eligibility of the employees for
membership in the union or unions involved; and the
relationship between the unit or units proposed and the
employer's organization, management, and operation. . . .
. . In said report, it is likewise emphasized that the basic test
in determining the appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit,
to be appropriate, must affect a grouping of employees who
have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working
conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining (citing
Smith on Labor Laws, 316-317; Francisco, Labor Laws,
162). . . .
The Court further explained that "(t)he test of the grouping is community or
mutuality of interests. And this is so because 'the basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights' (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, 490)." Hence, in
that case, the Court upheld the trial court's conclusion that two separate
bargaining units should be formed, one consisting of regular and permanent
employees and another consisting of casual laborers or stevedores.
Since then, the "community or mutuality of interests" test has provided the
standard in determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining
unit. In Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Company, et al. vs.
Alhambra Employees' Association (PAFLU), 107 Phil. 23, the Court, noting
that the employees in the administrative, sales and dispensary departments
of a cigar and cigarette manufacturing firm perform work which have nothing
to do with production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw lead
(malalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing (precintera) and engineering and garage
departments, authorized the formation of the former set of employees into a
separate collective bargaining unit. The ruling in the Democratic Labor
Association case, supra, was reiterated in Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Unit
vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 110 Phil. 176, where casual employees
were barred from joining the union of the permanent and regular employees.
Applying the same "community or mutuality of interests" test, but resulting in
the formation of only one collective bargaining units is the case of National
Association of Free Trade Unions vs. Mainit Lumber Development Company
Workers Union-United Lumber and General Workers of the Phils., G.R. No.
79526, December 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 598. In said case, the Court ordered
the formation of a single bargaining unit consisting of the Sawmill Division in
Butuan City and the Logging Division in Zapanta Valley, Kitcharao, Agusan
Norte of the Mainit Lumber Development Company. The Court reasoned:
 Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the
employees of the Sawmill Division and the Logging Division.
Their functions mesh with one another. One group needs the
other in the same way that the company needs them both.
There may be difference as to the nature of their individual
assignments but the distinctions are not enough to warrant
the formation of a separate bargaining unit.
professors, instructors, and the research, extension and professorial staff,
who may, if so minded, organize themselves into a separate collective
bargaining unit; and that, therefore, only said non-academic rank-and-file
personnel of the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Manila, Los Baños
and the Visayas are to participate in the certification election.

In the case at bar, the University employees may, as already suggested,

quite easily be categorized into two general classes: one, the group
composed of employees whose functions are non-academic, i.e., janitors,
messengers, typists, clerks, receptionists, carpenters, electricians, grounds-
keepers, chauffeurs, mechanics, plumbers; 32 and two, the group made up of
those performing academic functions, i.e., full professors, associate
professors, assistant professors, instructors — who may be judges or
government executives — and research, extension and professorial
staff. 33 Not much reflection is needed to perceive that the community or
mutuality of interests which justifies the formation of a single collective
bargaining unit is wanting between the academic and non-academic
personnel of the university. It would seem obvious that teachers would find
very little in common with the University clerks and other non-academic
employees as regards responsibilities and functions, working conditions,
compensation rates, social life and interests, skills and intellectual pursuits,
cultural activities, etc. On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the
dissimilarity in the nature of the work and duties as well as in the
compensation and working conditions of the academic and non-academic
personnel dictate the separation of these two categories of employees for
purposes of collective bargaining. The formation of two separate bargaining
units, the first consisting of the rank-and-file non-academic personnel, and
the second, of the rank-and-file academic employees, is the set-up that will
best assure to all the employees the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights. These special circumstances, i.e., the dichotomy of interests and
concerns as well as the dissimilarity in the nature and conditions of work,
wages and compensation between the academic and non-academic
personnel, bring the case at bar within the exception contemplated in Section
9 of Executive Order No. 180. It was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Labor Relations Director to have ruled otherwise, ignoring plain and
patent realities.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of October 30, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED

in so far as it declares the professors, associate professors and assistant
professors of the University of the Philippines as rank-and-file employees.
The Order of August 7, 1990 is MODIFIED in the sense that the non-
academic rank-and-file employees of the University of the Philippines shall
constitute a bargaining unit to the exclusion of the academic employees of
the institution — i.e., full professors, associate professors, assistant
MECHANICAL DEPARTMENT LABOR UNION SA PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and SAMAHAN NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA CALOOCAN SHOPS, respondents.
Sisenando Villaluz for petitioner.
Gregorio E. Fajardo for respondent Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Caloocan Shops.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petition by the "Mechanical Department Labor Union sa PNR" for a review of
an order of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 1475-MC,
directing the holding of a plebiscite election to determine whether the
employees at the Caloocan Shops desire the respondent union, "Samahan
ng mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops", to be separated from the
Mechanical Department Labor Union, with a view to the former being
recognized as a separate bargaining unit.
The case began on 13 February 1965 by a petition of the respondent
"Samahan ng mga Manggagawa, etc." calling attention to the fact that there
were three unions in the Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways:
the "Samahan", the "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad
Company", and the Mechanical Department Labor Union; that no certification
election had been held in the last 12 months in the Caloocan shops; that both
the "Samahan" and the Mechanical Department Labor Union had submitted
different labor demands upon the management for which reason a
certification election was needed to determine the proper collective
bargaining agency for the Caloocan shop workers.
The petition was opposed by the management as well as by the Mechanical
Department Labor Union, the latter averring that it had been previously
certified in two cases as sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
employees and laborers of the PNR'S mechanical department, and had
negotiated two bargaining agreements with management in 1961 and 1963;
that before the expiration of the latter, a renewal thereof had been negotiated
and the contract remained to be signed; that the "Samahan" had been
organized only in 21 January 1965; that the Caloocan shops unit was not
established nor separated from the Mechanical Department unit; that the
"Samahan" is composed mainly of supervisors who had filed a pending case
to be declared non-supervisors; and that the purpose of the petition was to
disturb the present smooth working labor management relations.
By an order of 18 August 1967, Judge Arsenio Martinez, after receiving the
evidence, made the following findings:.1äwphï1.ñët
The Court, after a cursory examination of the evidence presented
made the following findings: That petitioner union is composed of
workers exclusively at the Caloocan shops of the Philippine National
Railways charged with the maintenance of rolling stocks for repairs;
major repairs of locomotive, engines, etc. are done in the Caloocan
shops while minor ones in the Manila sheds; workers in the
Caloocan shops do not leave their station unlike Manila shop
workers who go out along the routes and lines for repairs; workers
both in the Caloocan shops and Manila sheds are exposed to
hazards occasioned by the nature of their work; that with respect to
wages and salaries of employees, categories under the Job
Classification and Evaluation Plan of the company apply to all
workers both in the Caloocan Shops and Manila sheds;
administration over employees, members of petitioner union as well
as oppositor is under the Administrative Division of the company;
that from the very nature of their work, members of petitioner union
and other workers of the Mechanical Department have been under
the coverage of the current collective bargaining agreement which
was a result of a certification by this Court of the Mechanical
Department Labor union, first in 1960 and later in 1963.
Subsequently, when the latter contract expired, negotiations for its
renewal were had and at the time of the filing of this petition was
already consummated, the only act remaining to be done was to affix
the signatures of the parties thereto; that during the pendency of this
petition, on June 14, 1965, the aforesaid collective bargaining
agreement was signed between the Philippine National Railways and
the Mechanical Department Labor Union sa Philippine National
Railways (Manila Railroad Company).
The main issue involved herein is: Whether or not a new unit should
be established, the Caloocan shops, separate and distinct from the
rest of the workers under the Mechanical Department now
represented by the Mechanical Department Labor Union.
The Caloocan Shops, all located at Caloocan City have 360 workers
more or less. It is part and parcel of the whole Mechanical
Department of the Philippine National Railways. The department is
composed of four main divisions or units, namely: Operations, Manila
Area and Lines; Locomotive Crew; Motor Car Crew; and the Shops
Rolling Stocks Maintenance. (Exhibits "D" and "D-1").
The Locomotive crew and Motor Car Crew, though part of the
Mechanical Department, is a separate unit, and is represented by the
 Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros Y Motormen. The workers under
the other two main units of the departments are represented by the
Mechanical Department Labor Union. The workers of the Shops
Rolling Stocks Maintenance Division or the Caloocan Shops now
seek to be separated from the rest of the workers of the department
and to be represented by the "Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa
Caloocan Shops." .
There is certainly a community of interest among the workers of the
Caloocan Shops. They are grouped in one place. They work under
one or same working condition, same working time or schedule and
are exposed to same occupational risk.
Though evidence on record shows that workers at the Caloocan
Shops perform the same nature of work as their counterparts in the
Manila Shed, the difference lies in the fact that workers at the
Caloocan Shops perform major repairs of locomotives, rolling stocks,
engines, etc., while those in the Manila Shed, works on minor
repairs. Heavy equipment and machineries are found in the
Caloocan Shops.
The trial judge then reviewed the collective bargaining history of the
Philippine National Railways, as follows: 1äwphï1.ñët
On several similar instances, this Court allowed the establishment of
new and separate bargaining unit in one company, even in one
department of the same company, despite the existence of the same
facts and circumstances as obtaining in the case at bar.
The history of the collective bargaining in the Manila Railroad
Company, now the Philippine National Railways shows that
originally, there was only one bargaining unit in the company,
represented by the Kapisanan Ng Manggagawa sa MRR. Under
Case No. 237-MC, this Court ordered the establishment of two
additional units, the engine crew and the train crew to be
represented by the Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros, Ayudante Y
Motormen and Union de Empleados de Trenes, respectively. Then in
1961, under Cases Nos. 491-MC, 494-MC and 507-MC three new
separate units were established, namely, the yard crew unit, station
employees unit and engineering department employees unit,
respectively, after the employees concerned voted in a plebiscite
conducted by the court for the separation from existing bargaining
units in the company. Then again, under Case No. 763-MC, a new
unit, composed of the Mechanical Department employees, was
established to be represented by the Mechanical Department Labor
Union. Incidentally, the first attempt of the employees of the
Mechanical Department to be separated as a unit was dismissed by
this Court of Case No. 488-MC.
In the case of the yard crew, station employees and the Engineering
Department employees, the Supreme Court sustained the order of
this Court in giving the employees concerned the right to vote and
decide whether or not they desire to be separate units (See G.R.
Nos. L-16292-94, L-16309 and L-16317-18, November, 1965).
In view of its findings and the history of "union representation" in the railway
company, indicating that bargaining units had been formed through
separation of new units from existing ones whenever plebiscites had shown
the workers' desire to have their own representatives, and relying on the
"Globe doctrine" (Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 294) applied in
Democratic Labor Union vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., L-10321, 28 February
1958, Judge Martinez held that the employees in the Caloocan Shops should
be given a chance to vote on whether their group should be separated from
that represented by the Mechanical Department Labor Union, and ordered a
plebiscite held for the purpose. The ruling was sustained by the Court en
banc; wherefore, the Mechanical Department Labor Union appealed to this
Court questioning the applicability under the circumstances of the "Globe
doctrine" of considering the will of the employees in determining what union
should represent them.
Technically, this appeal is premature, since the result of the ordered
plebiscite among the workers of the Caloocan shops may be adverse to the
formation of a separate unit, in which event, as stated in the appealed order,
all questions raised in this case would be rendered moot and academic.
Apparently, however, the appellant Mechanical Department Labor Union
takes it for granted that the plebiscite would favor separation.
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the ruling under
appeal as would justify our interfering with it. Republic Act No. 875 has
primarily entrusted the prosecution of its policies to the Court of Industrial
Relations, and, in view of its intimate knowledge concerning the facts and
circumstances surrounding the cases brought before it, this Court has
repeatedly upheld the exercise of discretion of the Court of Industrial
Relations in matters concerning the representation of employee groups
(Manila Paper Mills Employees & Workers' Association vs. C.I.R. 104 Phil.
10; Benguet Consolidated vs. Bobok Lumber Jack Association, 103 Phil.
1150).
Appellant contends that the application of the "Globe doctrine" is not
warranted because the workers of the Caloocan shops do not require
different skills from the rest of the workers in the Mechanical Department of
the Railway Company. This question is primarily one of facts. The Industrial
Court has found that there is a basic difference, in that those in the Caloocan
shops not only have a community of interest and working conditions but
perform major repairs of railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and
machineries found in said shops, while the others only perform minor repairs.
It is easy to understand, therefore, that the workers in the Caloocan shops
require special skill in the use of heavy equipment and machinery sufficient
to set them apart from the rest of the workers. In addition, the record shows
that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the appellant union
have been in existence for more than two (2) years; hence, such agreements
can not constitute a bar to the determination, by proper elections, of a new
bargaining representative (PLDT Employees' Union vs. Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Co., 51 Off. Gaz., 4519).

As to the charge that some of the members of the appellee, "Samahan Ng

Manggagawa", are actually supervisors, it appears that the question of the
status of such members is still pending final decision; hence, it would not
constitute a legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite. At any rate, the
appellant may later question whether the votes of those ultimately declared
to be supervisors should be counted.

Whether or not the agreement negotiated by the appellant union with the
employer, during the pendency of the original petition in the Court of
Industrial Relations, should be considered valid and binding on the workers
of the Caloocan shops is a question that should be first passed upon by the
Industrial Court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order appealed from is affirmed, with

costs against appellant Mechanical Department Labor Union sa Philippine
National Railways.
GOLDEN FARMS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR and THE PROGRESSIVE
FEDERATION OF LABOR, respondents.
J.V. Yap Law Office for petitioner.
PUNO, J.:
The sole issue for resolution in this Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order is whether or not
petitioner's monthly paid rank-and file employees can constitute a bargaining
unit separate from the existing bargaining unit of its daily paid rank-and-file
employees.
Petitioner Golden Farms, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the production and
marketing of bananas for export. On February 27, 1992, private respondent
Progressive Federation of Labor (PFL) filed a petition before the Med-Arbiter
praying for the holding of a certification election among the monthly paid
office and technical rank-and-file employees of petitioner Golden Farms.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition on three (3) grounds. First,
respondent PFL failed to show that it was organized as a chapter within
petitioner's establishment. Second, there was already an existing collective
bargaining agreement between the rank-and-file employees represented by
the National Federation of Labor (NFL) and petitioner. And third, the
employees represented by PFL had allegedly been disqualified by this Court
from bargaining with management in Golden Farms, Inc., vs. Honorable
Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 78755, July 19, 1989. 1
Respondent PFL opposed petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. It countered that
the monthly paid office and technical employees should be allowed to form a
separate bargaining unit because they were expressly excluded from
coverage in the Collecting Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner
and NFL. It also contended that the case invoked by petitioner was
inapplicable to the present case.
In its reply, petitioner argued that the monthly paid office and technical
employees should have joined the existing collective bargaining unit of the
rank-and-file employees if they are not manegerial employees.
On April 18, 1991, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition and ordered that a
certification election be conducted, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition
filed by the Progressive Federation of Labor, for certification
election among the office and technical employees of
Golden Farms, Inc., is, as it is hereby, GRANTED with the
following choices:
1. Progressive Federation of Labor (PFL);
2. No. union.
The designated representation officer is hereby directed to
call the parties to a pre-election conference to thresh out the
mechanics of the election and to conduct and supervise the
same within twenty (20) days from receipt by the parties of
this Order. The "Masterlist of Office and Technical
Employees" shall be the basis in determining the employees
qualified to vote during the certification election.
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioner seasonably appealed to public respondent Secretary of Labor. On
August 6, 1991, respondent Secretary of Labor issued the assailed Decision
denying the appeal for lack of merit. 3 Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was also denied on September 13, 1991.
Thus, this petition for certiorari interposing two (2) issues.
I
THE CREATION OF AN ADDITIONAL BARGAINING UNIT
FOR CERTAIN RANK AND FILE EMPLOYEES WILL NOT
ONLY SPLIT THE EXISTING ONE BUT WILL ALSO
NEGATE THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA.
II
THE PROGRESSIVE FEDERATION OF LABOR BEING
THE EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING AGENT OF THE
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES IS DISQUALIFIED FROM
REPRESENTING THE OFFICE AND TECHNICAL
EMPLOYEES.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The monthly paid office and technical rank-and-file employees of petitioner
Golden Farms enjoy the constitutional right to self-organization and collective
bargaining. 4 A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees
of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of
the law. 5 The community or mutuality of interest is therefore the essential
criterion in the grouping. "And this is so because 'the basic test of an
asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally
the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights.' 6
In the case at bench, the evidence established that the monthly paid rank-
and-file employees of petitioner primarily perform administrative or clerical
work. In contradistinction, the petitioner's daily paid rank-and-file employees
mainly work in the cultivation of bananas in the fields. It is crystal clear the
monthly paid rank-and-file employees of petitioner have very little in common
with its daily paid rank-and-file employees in terms of duties and obligations,
working conditions, salary rates, and skills. To be sure, the said monthly paid
rank-and-file employees have even been excluded from the bargaining unit
of the daily paid rank-and-file employees. This dissimilarity of interests
warrants the formation of a separate and distinct bargaining unit for the
monthly paid rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. To rule otherwise
would deny this distinct class of employees the right to self-organization for
purposes of collective bargaining. Without the shield of an organization, it will
also expose them to the exploitations of management. So we held
in University of the Philippines vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 7 where we sanctioned the
formation of two (2) separate bargaining units within the establishment, viz:
[T]he dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in the nature of
the work and duties as well as in the compensation and
working conditions of the academic and non-academic
personnel dictate the separation of these two categories of
employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The
formation of two separate bargaining units, the first
consisting of the rank-and-file non-academic employees, and
the second, of the rank-and-file academic employees, is the
set-up that will best assure to all the employees the exercise
of their collective bargaining rights.
Petitioner next contends that these monthly paid office and technical
employees are managerial employees. They allegedly include those in the
accounting and personnel department, cashier, and other employees holding
positions with access to classified information.
We are not persuaded. Article 212, paragraph (m) of the Labor Code, as
amended, defines as managerial employee as follows:
"Managerial employee" is one who is vested with power or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies
and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are
those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively
recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such
authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not
falling within any of the above definitions are considered
rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.
Given this definition, the monthly paid office and technical
employees, accountants, and cashiers of the petitioner are not
managerial employees for they do not participate in policy-making
but are given cut out policies to execute and standard practices to
observe. 8 In the main, the discharge of their duties does not involve
the use of independent judgment. As factually found by the Med-
Arbiter, to wit:
A perusal of the list of the office and technical employees
sought to be represented in the instant case, with their
corresponding designation does not show that said Office
and Technical employees exercises supervisory or
managerial functions.
The office believes and so hold that the employees whose
names appear in the "Masterlist of Office and Technical
Employees" submitted during the hearing are eligible to
join/form a labor organization of their own choice. 9
Our decision in Golden Farms, Inc., vs. Honorable Pura Ferrer-Calleja, op.
cit., does not pose any obstacle in holding a certification election among
petitioner's monthly paid rank-and-file employees. The issue brought to fore
in that case was totally different, i.e., whether or not petitioner's confidential
employees, considering the nature of their work, should be included in the
bargaining unit of the daily paid rank-and-file employees. In the case at
bench, the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of petitioner are
being separatedas a bargaining unit from its daily paid rank-and-file
employees, on the ground that they have different interest to protect. The
principle of res judicata is, therefore, inapplicable.

The second assigned error which was not raised in the proceedings below
must necessarily fail. The alleged error involves a question of fact which this
Court cannot resolve. Petitioner submitted this contention only in its
Memorandum dated February 12, 1993.10 In this Memorandum, petitioner
cited LRD Case No. OXI-UR-70 for Direct Recognition/Certification Election.
But even a side glance of the cited case will reveal that it involves a petition
for direct certification among the rank-and-file office and technical employees
of the Golden Farms Inc., (not supervisory employees) under the House of
Investment, Ladislawa Village, Buhaning, Davao City filed by the National
Federation of Labor (not the respondent Progressive Federation of Labor).
The averment of petitioner is baseless and its recklessness borders the
contemptuous.

Finally, we note that it was petitioner company that filed the motion to dismiss
the petition for election. The general rule is that an employer has no standing
to question a certification election since this is the sole concern of the
workers. 11 Law and policy demand that employers take a strick, hands-off
stance in certification elections. The bargaining representative of employees
should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of management. A
labor bargaining representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty to the
employees alone and to no other.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. With costs

against petitioner.
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS and KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI,
ASSISTANT, MANGGAGAWA AT KONPIDENSIYAL SA
PHILTRANCO, respondents.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioner.
Lily S. Dayaon for KASAMA KO .
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the order of the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) dated September 5, 1988. The dispositive portion of
the order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 4
April 1988 is hereby set aside and vacated and a new one entered ordering
the conduct of a certification election among regular rank-and-file
professional, technical, administrative and confidential employees of
respondent company, with the following choices:
1. Kapisanan ng mga Kawani, Assistant Manggagawa at
Konpidensyal sa Philtranco (KASAMA KO)
2. No Union.
Let, therefore the records of the case be remanded to the
Office of origin for the immediate conduct of the election.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 33)
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. is a land transportation
company engaged in the business of carrying passengers and freight. The
company employees included field workers consisting of drivers, conductors,
coach drivers, coach stewards and mechanics and office employees like
clerks, cashiers, programmers, telephone operators, etc.
On February 15, 1988, the Kapisanan ng mga Kawani, Assistant,
Manggagawa at Konpidensyal sa Philtranco (KASAMA KO), a registered
labor organization filed a petition for certification election with the Department
of Labor and Employment, alleging among others that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Petitioner desires to represent all professional, technical,
administrative, and confidential employees personnel of
respondent at its establishments in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao for purposes of collective bargaining;
4. The aforementioned employees were always expressly
excluded from participating in the certification election
conducted among the rank and file employees (drivers,
conductors, coach drivers, coach stewards, and mechanics)
of respondent and are excluded from the bargaining unit
covered by the CBA between respondent and its rank and
file employees. In addition, there exist substantial differences
in the terms and conditions of employment between the
above-mentioned employees, hence, the former are covered
by another appropriate bargaining unit which is separate and
distinct from that of the rank and file employees of
respondent and; which has been recognized by the Bureau
of Labor Relations and upheld by the Honorable Supreme
Court. Attached hereto as Annex 'A' and Annex 'B' are
copies of the decision of the BLR and the Supreme Court in
support thereof;
xxx xxx xxx
6. The petition is supported by the signatures of more than
twenty percent (20%) of all covered employees as provided
for by law and which shall be presented during the initial
hearing;
xxx xxx xxx
8. There has been no Consent Election or Certification
Election held and conducted by this Honorable Office for the
past three (3) years prior to the filing of this petition in the
bargaining unit petitioner sought to represent, the last
Certification Election having been held last November 27,
1984. Attached hereto as Annex "C" is a copy of the Order
issued by this Honorable Office relative to the result of the
last certification election. (Rollo, pp. 4-5)
On February 24, 1988, the National Mines and Allied Workers Union
(NAMAWU-MIF) filed a motion for intervention alleging that it is the
bargaining agent of the workers at Philtranco and as such it has a substantial
interest in the outcome of the petition.
On February 26, 1988, Arbiter Paterno Adap called the parties to a hearing.
Philtranco and NAMAWU were ordered to submit their respective position
papers and KASAMA KO was given the opportunity to submit a reply.
On April 4, 1988, a resolution was rendered with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, this
petition is, as it is hereby ordered DISMISSED. If there are
still individual members of the herein petitioner eligible to join
a labor organization, it is hereby directed that all should be
included/incorporated in the existing bargaining unit.
Parties are further directed/enjoined to device a mechanism
for the implementation of the matter herein treated. (Rollo,
pp. 29-30)
KASAMA KO appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) On
September 5, 1988 the BLR reversed the resolution of the Med-Arbiter. A
motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated October 10, 1988.
As prayed for by the petitioner, a temporary restraining order was issued by
this Court on November 7, 1988 restraining the BLR from enforcing and/or
carrying out the decision dated September 5, 1988 and the order dated
October 10, 1988.
The Labor Code recognizes two (2) principal groups of employees, namely,
the managerial and the rank and file groups. Thus, Art. 212 (k) of the Code
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(k) Managerial employee' is one who is vested with powers
or prerogatives to lay down and execute management
policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively
recommend such managerial actions. All employees not
falling within this definition are considered rank and file
employees for purposes of this Book.
In implementation of the aforequoted provision of the law, Section 11 of Rule
II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code did away with
existing supervisors' unions classifying the members either as managerial or
rank and file employees depending on the work they perform. If they
discharge managerial functions, supervisors are prohibited from forming or
joining any labor organization. If they do not perform managerial work, they
may join the rank and file union and if none exists, they may form one such
rank and file organization. This rule was emphasized in the case of Bulletin
Publishing Corp. v. Sanchez, (144 SCRA 628 [1986]).
It, therefore, follows that the members of the KASAMA KO who are
professional, technical, administrative and confidential personnel of
PHILTRANCO performing managerial functions are not qualified to join,
much less form a union. This rationalizes the exclusion of managers and
confidential employees exercising managerial functions from the ambit of the
collective bargaining unit. As correctly observed by Med-Arbiter Adap:
... managerial and confidential employees were expressly
excluded within the operational ambit of the bargaining unit
for the simple reason that under the law, managers are
disqualified to be members of a labor organization.
On the other hand, confidential workers were not included
because either they were performing managerial functions
and/or their duties and responsibilities were considered or
may be categorized as part and parcel of management as
the primary reason for their exclusion in the bargaining unit.
The other categorized employees were likewise not included
because parties have agreed on the fact that the
aforementioned group of workers are not qualified to join a
labor organization at the time the agreement was executed
and that they were classified as outside the parameter of the
bargaining unit. (Rollo, pp. 28-29)
The respondents, on the other hand, aver that the members of the
respondent union are rank and file employees qualified to form a union. In
fact their status as rank and file employees was allegedly recognized by this
Court in the case of Pantranco South Express, Inc. v. NAMAWU, (G.R. No.
67475, July 30, 1984).
The reliance on the Pantranco South Express, Inc. case is misplaced. The
petition filed by Pantranco South Express Inc. simply asked for a ruling that
certain employees were performing managerial functions. We denied the
petition for lack of merit in a minute resolution. There was absolutely no
discussion on the recognition of another separate rank and file union in
addition to the existing bargaining unit.
There is no conflict. The employees of Philtranco have been appraised and
their functions evaluated. Managers by any name may not join the rank and
file union. On the other hand, those who are rank and file workers may join
the existing bargaining unit instead of organizing another bargaining unit and
compelling the employer to deal with it.
We are constrained to disallow the formation of another union. There is no
dispute that there exists a labor union in the company, herein intervenor, the
NAMAWU-MIF which is the collective bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees in PHILTRANCO.
Article 2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between PHILTRANCO and
NAMAWU-MIF under the sub-title Appropriate Bargaining Unit provides:
Section 1 -The appropriate bargaining unit covered by this
agreement consists of all regular rank- and file employees of
the company. Managerial, confidential, casuals, temporary,
probationary and contractual employees as well as trainees,
apprentices, security personnel and foreman are excluded
from the bargaining unit and therefore, not covered by this
AGREEMENT. The job description outside the bargaining
unit are enumerated in the list hereto attached as Annex '1'
and made an integral part hereof (Emphasis supplied; Rollo,
p. 27)
We see no need for the formation of another union in PHILTRANCO. The
qualified members of the KASAMA KO may join the NAMAWU-MIF if they
want to be union members, and to be consistent with the one-union, one-
company policy of the Department of Labor and Employment, and the laws it
enforces. As held in the case of General Rubber and Footwear Corp. v.
Bureau of Labor Relations (155 SCRA 283 [1987]):
... It has been the policy of the Bureau to encourage the
formation of an employer unit 'unless circumstances
otherwise require. The proliferation of unions in an employer
unit is discouraged as a matter of policy unless there are
compelling reasons which would deny a certain class of
employees the right to self-organization for purposes of
collective bargaining. This case does not fall squarely within
the exception. (Emphasis supplied).
There are no compelling reasons in this case such as a denial to the
KASAMA KO group of the right to join the certified bargaining unit or
substantial distinctions warranting the recognition of a separate group of rank
and file workers. Precisely, NAMAWU-MIF intervened to make it clear it has
no objections to qualified rank and file workers joining its union.
It is natural in almost all fairly sized companies to have groups of workers
discharging different functions. No company could possibly have all
employees performing exactly the same work. Variety of tasks is to be
expected. It would not be in the interest of sound labor-management
relations if each group of employees assigned to a specialized function or
section would decide to break away from their fellow-workers and form their
own separate bargaining unit. We cannot allow one unit for typists and
clerks, one unit for accountants, another unit for messengers and drivers,
and so on in needless profusion. Where shall the line be drawn? The
questioned decision of the public respondent can only lead to confusion,
discord and labor strife.
The respondents state that this case is an exception to the general rule
considering that substantial differences exist between the office employees
or professional, technical, administrative and confidential employees vis-a-vis
the field workers or drivers, conductors and mechanics of the petitioner.
Against this contention, we find that the "substantial differences" in the terms
and conditions of employment between the private respondent's members
and the rest of the company's rank and file employees are more imagined
than real. We agree with the petitioner that the differences alleged are not
substantial or significant enough to merit the formation of another union.
PHILTRANCO is a large bus company engaged in the business of carrying
passengers and freight, servicing Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Certainly
there is a commonality of interest among filing clerks, dispatchers, drivers,
typists, and field men. They are all interested in the progress of their
company and in each worker sharing in the fruits of their endeavors equitably
and generously. Their functions mesh with one another. One group needs
the other in the same way that the company needs them all. The drivers,
mechanics and conductors are necessary for the company but technical,
administrative and office personnel are also needed and equally important for
the smooth operation of the business. There may be differences as to the
nature of their individual assignments but the distinctions are not enough to
warrant the formation of separate unions. The private respondent has not
even shown that a separate bargaining unit would be beneficial to the
employees concerned. Office employees also belong to the rank and file.
There is an existing employer wide unit in the company represented by
NAMAWU-MIF. And as earlier stated, the fact that NAMAWU-MIF moved to
intervene in the petition for certification election filed by KASAMA KO
negates the allegations that "substantial differences" exist between the
employees concerned. We find a commonality of interest among them. There
are no compelling reasons for the formation of another union.

We quote with favor Med-Arbiter Adap's rationale, to wit:

... It is against the policy of the Department of Labor to

dismember the already wide existing bargaining unit
because of its well established goal towards a single
employer wide unit which is more to the broader and greater
benefit of the employees working force.

The philosophy is to avoid fragmentation of the bargaining

unit so as to strengthen the employees bargaining power
with the management. To do otherwise, would be contrary,
inimical and repugnant to the objectives of a strong and
dynamic unionism. Let there be a unified whole rather than a
divisive one, let them speak as one in a clear resonant voice
unmarred by dissension towards progressive unionism.
(Rollo, p. 29)

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations, dated

September 5, 1988 and the Order dated October 10, 1988 are hereby SET
ASIDE. The resolution of the Med-Arbiter dated April 4, 1988 is
REINSTATED. The restraining order issued by the Court on November 7,
1988 is made permanent.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION
AND ERNESTO L. PONCE, President, petitioners,
vs. HONARABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA IN HIS CAPACITY
AS UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
HONORABLE DANILO L. REYNANTE IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MED-ARBITER AND SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction seeking to reverse and set aside the Order of public
respondent, Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment,
Bienvenido E. Laguesma, dated March 11, 1993, in Case No. OS MA A-2-
70-91[1] entitled In Re: Petition for Certification Election Among the
Supervisory and Exempt Employees of the San Miguel Corporation Magnolia
Poultry Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis, San Miguel Corporation
Supervisors and Exempt Union, Petitioner. The Order excluded the
employees under supervisory levels 3 and 4 and the so-called exempt
employees from the proposed bargaining unit and ruled out their participation
in the certification election.
The antecedent facts are undisputed:
On October 5, 1990, petitioner union filed before the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Petition for District Certification or
Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the
SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
On December 19, 1990, Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an
Order ordering the conduct of certification among the supervisors and
exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of
Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis as one bargaining unit.
On January 18, 1991, respondent San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice
of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal, pointing out, among others, the
Med-Arbiters error in grouping together all three (3) separate plants, Otis,
Cabuyao and San Fernando, into one bargaining unit, and in including
supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in nature.
On July 23, 1991, the public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma,
granted respondent companys Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to
the Med-Arbiter of origin for determination of the true classification of each of
the employees sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.
Upon petitioner-unions motion dated August 7, 1991, Undersecretary
Laguesma granted the reconsideration prayed for on September 3, 1991 and
directed the conduct of separate certification elections among the
supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt
employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
On September 21, 1991, respondent company, San Miguel Corporation
filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to suspend proceedings.
On March 11, 1993, an Order was issued by the public respondent
granting the Motion, citing the doctrine enunciated in Philips Industrial
Development, Inc. v. NLRC[2] case. Said Order reads in part:
x x x Confidential employees, like managerial employees, are
not allowed to form, join or assist a labor union for purposes
of collective bargaining.
In this case, S3 and S4 and the so-called exempt employees
are admittedly confidential employees and therefore, they are
not allowed to form, join or assist a labor union for purposes
of collective bargaining following the above courts
ruling. Consequently, they are not allowed to participate in
the certification election.
WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby granted and the Decision
of this Office dated 03 September 1991 is hereby modified to
the extent that employees under supervisory levels 3 and 4
(S3 and S4) and the so-called exempt employees are not
allowed to join the proposed bargaining unit and are therefore
excluded from those who could participate in the certification
election.[3]
Hence this petition.
For resolution in this case are the following issues:
1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt
employees of the company are considered confidential
employees, hence ineligible from joining a union.
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the
three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.
On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within
the term confidential employees who may be prohibited from joining a union.
 There is no question that the said employees, supervisors and the
exempt employees, are not vested with the powers and prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend,
layoff, recall, discharge or dismiss employees. They are, therefore, not
qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under Article
245[4] of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. In the very same provision, they are not allowed membership in
a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or
form separate labor organizations of their own. The only question that need
be addressed is whether these employees are properly classified as
confidential employees or not.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations.[5] The two criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a
confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist between
the employees and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the
prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.[6]
The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal
course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to
labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the
confidential employee rule. The broad rationale behind this rule is that
employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of
interests.[7] Management should not be required to handle labor relations
matters through employees who are represented by the union with the
company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their
duties may obtain advance information of the companys position with regard
to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations
matters.[8]
There have been ample precedents in this regard, thus in Bulletin
Publishing Company v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez,[9] the Court held that if these
managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter
might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of
interest. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence
of managerial employees in Union membership. The same rationale was
applied to confidential employees in Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-
Calleja[10] and in the more recent case of Philips Industrial Development,
Inc. v. NLRC[11] which held that confidential employees, by the very nature of
their functions, assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to
confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the
field of labor relations. Therefore, the rationale behind the ineligibility of
managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union was held equally
applicable to them.[12]
An important element of the confidential employee rule is the employees
need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining the
confidentiality of certain employees, a key questions frequently considered is
the employees necessary access to confidential labor relations
information.[13]
It is the contention of respondent corporation that Supervisory
employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees come within the meaning of
the term confidential employees primarily because they answered in the
affirmative when asked Do you handle confidential data or documents? in the
Position Questionnaires submitted by the Union.[14] In the same
questionnaire, however, it was also stated that the confidential information
handled by questioned employees relate to product formulation, product
standards and product specification which by no means relate to labor
relations.[15]
Granting arguendo that an employee has access to confidential labor
relations information but such is merely incidental to his duties and
knowledge thereof is not necessary in the performance of such duties, said
access does not render the employee a confidential employee. [16] If access to
confidential labor relations information is to be a factor in the determination of
an employees confidential status, such information must relate to the
employers labor relations policies. Thus, an employee of a labor union, or of
a management association, must have access to confidential labor
information with respect to his employer, the union, or the association, to be
regarded a confidential employee, and knowledge of labor relations
information pertaining to the companies with which the union deals, or which
the association represents, will not clause an employee to be excluded from
the bargaining unit representing employees of the union or
association.[17] Access to information which is regarded by the employer to
be confidential from the business standpoint, such as financial
information[18] or technical trade secrets, will not render an employee a
confidential employee.[19]
Herein listed are the functions of supervisors 3 and higher:
1. To undertake decisions to discontinue/temporarily stop shift
operations when situations require.
2. To effectively oversee the quality control function at the
processing lines in the storage of chicken and other products.
3. To administer efficient system of evaluation of products in the
outlets.
4. To be directly responsible for the recall, holding and rejection of
direct manufacturing materials.
 5. To recommend and initiate actions in the maintenance of
sanitation and hygiene throughout the plant.[20]
It is evident that whatever confidential data the questioned employees
may handle will have to relate to their functions. From the foregoing
functions, it can be gleaned that the confidential information said employees
have access to concern the employers internal business operations. As held
in Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Board,[21] an employee may not be excluded from appropriate bargaining unit
merely because he has access to confidential information concerning
employers internal business operations and which is not related to the field of
labor relations.
It must be borne in mind that Section 3 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution mandates the State to guarantee to all workers the right to self-
organization. Hence, confidential employees who may be excluded from
bargaining unit must be strictly defined so as not to needlessly deprive many
employees of their right bargain collectively through representatives of their
choosing.[22]
In the case at bar, supervisors 3 and above may not be considered
confidential employees merely because they handle confidential data as
such must first be strictly classified as pertaining to labor relations for them to
fall under said restrictions. The information they handle are properly
classifiable as technical and internal business operations data which, to our
mind, has no relevance to negotiations and settlement of grievances wherein
the interests of a union and the management are invariably
adversarial. Since the employees are not classifiable under the confidential
type, this Court rules that they may appropriately form a bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. Furthermore, even assuming that they are
confidential employees, jurisprudence has established that there is no legal
prohibition against confidential employees who are not performing
managerial functions to form and join a union.[23]
In this connection, the issue of whether the employees of San Miguel
Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando,
and Otis constitute a single bargaining unit needs to be threshed out.
It is the contention of the petitioner union that the creation of three (3)
separate bargaining units, one each for Cabuyao Otis and San Fernando as
ruled by the respondent Undersecretary, is contrary to the one-company,
one-union policy. It adds that Supervisors level 1 to 4 and exempt employees
of the three plants have a similarity or a community of interests.
This Court finds the contention of the petitioner meritorious.
An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as a group of employees
of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of
the law.[24]
A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have
substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining.[25]
It is readily seen that the employees in the instant case have community
or mutuality of interest, which is the standard in determining the proper
constituency of a collective bargaining unit.[26] It is undisputed that they all
belong to the Magnolia Poultry Division of San Miguel Corporation. This
means that, although they belong to three different plants, they perform work
of the same nature, receive the same wages and compensation, and most
importantly, share a common stake in concerted activities.
In light of these considerations, the Solicitor General has opined that
separate bargaining units in the three different plants of the division will
fragmentize the employees of the said division, thus greatly diminishing their
bargaining leverage. Any concerted activity held against the private
respondent for a labor grievance in one bargaining unit will, in all probability,
not create much impact on the operations of the private respondent. The two
other plants still in operation can well step up their production and make up
for the slack caused by the bargaining unit engaged in the concerted
activity. This situation will clearly frustrate the provisions of the Labor Code
and the Mandate of the Constitution.[27]
The fact that the three plants are located in three different places,
namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San
Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial.Geographical location can be completely
disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not
sacrificed as demonstrated in UP v. Calleja-Ferrer where all non-academic
rank and file employees of the University of the Philippines inDiliman,
Quezon City, Padre Faura, Manila, Los Baos, Laguna and the Visayas were
allowed to participate in a certification election. We rule that the distance
among the three plants is not productive of insurmountable difficulties in the
administration of union affairs. Neither are there regional differences that are
likely to impede the operations of a single bargaining representative.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of March 11, 1993 is hereby SET
ASIDE and the Order of the Med-Arbiter on December 19, 1990 is
REINSTATED under which a certification election among the supervisors
(level 1 to 4) and exempt employees of the San Miguel Corporation Magnolia
Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis as one
bargaining unit is ordered conducted.
 BELYCA CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. DIR. PURA FERRER
CALLEJA, LABOR RELATIONS, MANILA, MINISTRY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT; MED-ARBITER, RODOLFO S. MILADO,
MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE
NO. 10 AND ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (ALU-TUCP),
MINDANAO REGIONAL OFFICE, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY, Respondents.
Soriano and Araña Law Offices for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public Respondent.
Francisco D. Alas for respondent Associated Labor Unions-
TUCP.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR CODE; COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING UNIT; PROPER CONSTITUENCY, CITED. — Among the
factors considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu
Stevedoring Co. Inc. (103 Phil 1103 [1958]) are:" (1) will of
employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employee’s
interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or
similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior
collective bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as
temporary, seasonal and probationary employees."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIC TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY. — In any
event, whether importance is focused on the employment status or
the mutuality of interest of the employees concerned "the basic
test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not
it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights
(Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. supra)
3. ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATION ELECTION; CALL IS MANDATORY
WHERE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT IS MET. — Under Art. 257 of
the Labor Code once the statutory requirement is met, the Director
of Labor Relations has no choice but to call a certification election
(Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU) PSSLU Local v. Noriel, 104
SCRA 565 [1981]; Vismico Industrial Workers Association (VIWA)
v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984]) It becomes in the language of the
New Labor Code "Mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a
certification election for the purpose of determining the
representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit
and certify the winner as the exclusive bargaining representative of
all employees in the unit." (Federacion Obrera de la Industria
Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas v. Noriel, 72 SCRA 24
[1976]; Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa v. Noriel, 77 SCRA 414
[1977]); more so when there is no existing collective bargaining
agreement. (Samahang Manggagawa Ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v.
Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]); and there has not been a
certification election in the company for the past three years (PLUM
Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers v. Noriel, 119 SCRA
299 [1982]) as in the instant case.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOUBTS AS TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF
SIGNATURE OR TO THE REQUIRED PERCENTAGE DO NOT BAR
HOLDING OF ELECTION. — Any doubt cast on the authenticity of
signatures to the petition for holding a certification election cannot
be a bar to its being granted (Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople 107
SCRA 211 [1981]). Even doubts as to the required 30% being met
warrant holding of the certification election (PLUM Federation of
Industrial and Agrarian Workers v. Noriel, 119 SCRA 299 [1982]).
In fact, once the required percentage requirement has been
reached, the employees’ withdrawal from union membership taking
place after the filing of the petition for certification election will not
affect said petition. On the contrary, the presumption arises that
the withdrawal was not free but was procured through duress,
coercion or for a valuable consideration (La Suerte Cigar and
Cigarette Factory v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, 123
SCRA 679 [1983]).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; UNTIL A DECISION ON THE STRIKE HAS
BECOME FINAL STRIKES CANNOT BE DENIED IN THE ELECTION. —
Until a decision, final in character, has been issued declaring the
strike illegal and the mass dismissal or retrenchment valid, the
strikers cannot be denied participation in the certification election
notwithstanding, the vigorous condemnation of the strike and the
fact that the picketing were attended by violence. Under the
foregoing circumstances, it does not necessarily follow that the
strikers in question are no longer entitled to participate in the
certification election on the theory that they have automatically
lost their jobs. (Barrera v. CIR, 107 SCRA 596 [1981]). For obvious
reasons, the duty of the employer to bargain collectively is nullified
if the purpose of the dismissal of the union members is to defeat
the union in the consent requirement for certification election.
(Samahang Manggagawa Ng Via Mare v. Noriel, 98 SCRA 507
[1980]).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATION ELECTION; A SOLE CONCERN OF
WORKERS, EXCEPTION. — As a general rule, a certification election
is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception is where the
employer has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to
Art. 259 of the Labor Code because the latter was requested to
bargain collectively. But thereafter the role of the employer in the
certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a
bystander (Trade Union of the Phil. and Allied Services (TUPAS) v.
Trajano, 120 SCRA 64 [1983]).
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A LITIGATION BUT A MERE INVESTIGATION
OF A NON-ADVERSARY CHARACTER. — Considering that a petition
for certification election is not a litigation but a mere investigation
of a non-adversary character to determining the bargaining unit to
represent the employees (LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians
Guild, supra; Bulakeña Restaurant & Caterer v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 45 SCRA 88 [1972]; George Peter Lines, Inc. v.
Associated Labor Union, 134 SCRA 82 [1986]; Tanduay Distillery
Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA 470 [1987]), and its only purpose
is to give the employees true representation in their collective
bargaining with an employer (Confederation of Citizens Labor
Unions (CCLU) v. Noriel, 116 SCRA 694 [1982]), there appears to
be no reason for the employer’s objection to the formation of
subject union, much less for the filing of the petition for a
certification election.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction seeking to annul or to set aside the resolution of the
Bureau of Labor Relations dated November 24, 1986 and denying
the appeal, and the Bureau’s resolution dated January 13, 1987
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned resolution dated
November 24, 1986 (Rollo, p. 4) reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Order
is affirmed and the appeal therefrom denied.
Let, therefore, the pertinent records of the case be remanded to
the office of origin for the immediate conduct of the certification
election."cralaw virtua1aw library
The dispositive portion of the resolution dated January 13, 1987
(Rollo, p. 92) reads, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent
Belyca Corporation (Livestock Agro-Division) is hereby dismissed
for lack of merit and the Bureau’s Resolution dated 24 November
1986 is affirmed. Accordingly, let the records of this case be
immediately forwarded to the Office of origin for the holding of the
certification elections.
No further motion shall hereafter be entertained."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The antecedents of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor Union
(ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization duly registered with
the Ministry of Labor and Employment under Registration
Certificate No. 783-IP, filed with the Regional Office No. 10,
Ministry of Labor and Employment at Cagayan de Oro City, a
petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of Belyca
Corporation (Livestock and Agro-Division), a duly organized,
registered and existing corporation engaged in the business of
poultry raising, piggery and planting of agricultural crops such as
corn, coffee and various vegetables, employing approximately 205
rank and file employees/workers, the collective bargaining unit
sought in the petition, or in case of doubt of the union’s majority
representation, for the issuance of an order authorizing the
immediate holding of a certification election (Rollo, p. 18).
Although the case was scheduled for hearing at least three times,
no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. During the
scheduled hearing of July 31, 1986 they, however, agreed to
submit simultaneously their respective position papers on or before
August 11, 1986 (rollo. p. 62).
Petitioner ALU-TUCP, private respondent herein, in its petition and
position paper alleged, among others, (1) that there is no existing
collective bargaining agreement between the respondent employer,
petitioner herein, and any other existing legitimate labor unions;
(2) that there had neither been a certification election conducted in
the proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months
prior to the filing of the petition nor a contending union requesting
for certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative
in the proposed bargaining unit; (3) that more than a majority of
respondent employer’s rank-and-file employees/workers in the
proposed bargaining unit or one hundred thirty-eight (138) as of
the date of the filing of the petition, have signed membership with
the ALU-TUCP and have expressed their written consent and
authorization to the filing of the petition; (4) that in response to
petitioner union’s two letters to the proprietor/General Manager of
respondent employer, dated April 21, 1986 and May 8, 1986,
requesting for direct recognition as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers, respondent
employer has locked out 119 of its rank-and-file employees in the
said bargaining unit and had dismissed earlier the local union
president, vice-president and three other active members of the
local unions for which an unfair labor practice case was filed by
petitioner union against respondent employer last July 2, 1986
before the NLRC in Cagayan de Oro City (Rollo, pp. 18;
263).chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged in its position
paper, among others, (1) that due to the nature of its business,
very few of its employees are permanent, the overwhelming
majority of which are seasonal and casual and regular employees;
(2) that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized,
signed and supported the filing of the petition (a) 14 were no
longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned after June, 1986
(c) 6 withdrew their membership from petitioner union (d) 5 were
retrenched on June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to
malicious insubordination and destruction of property and (f) 100
simply abandoned their work or stopped working; (3) that the 128
incumbent employees or workers of the livestock section were
merely transferred from the agricultural section as replacement for
those who have either been dismissed, retrenched or resigned; and
(4) that the statutory requirement for holding a certification
election has not been complied with by the union (Rollo, p. 26).
The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by
petitioner union in his order dated August 18, 1986 (Rollo, p. 62).
On February 4, 1987, respondent employer Belyca Corporation,
appealed the order of the Labor Arbiter to the Bureau of Labor
Relations in Manila (Rollo, p. 67) which denied the appeal (Rollo, p.
80) and the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 92). Thus, the
instant petition received in this Court by mail on February 20, 1987
(Rollo, p. 3).
In the resolution of March 4, 1987, the Second Division of this
Court required respondent Union to comment on the petition and
issued a temporary restraining order (Rollo, p. 95).
Respondent union filed its comment on March 30, 1987 (Rollo, p.
190); public respondents filed its comment on April 8, 1987 (Rollo,
p. 218).
On May 4, 1987, the Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and to require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice (Rollo, p. 225).
The Office of the Solicitor General manifested on June 11, 1987
that it is adopting the comment for public respondents as its
memorandum (Rollo, p. 226); memorandum for respondent ALU
was filed on June 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 231); and memorandum for
petitioner, on July 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 435).
The issues raised in this petition are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPOSED BARGAINING UNIT IS AN
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF 30% (NOW
20%) OF THE EMPLOYEES IN THE PROPOSED BARGAINING UNIT,
ASKING FOR A CERTIFICATION ELECTION HAD BEEN STRICTLY
COMPLIED WITH.
In the instant case, respondent ALU seeks direct certification as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file workers
of the livestock and agro division of petitioner BELYCA Corporation
(Rollo, p. 232), engaged in piggery, poultry raising and the
planting of agricultural crops such as corn, coffee and various
vegetables (Rollo, p. 26). But petitioner contends that the
bargaining unit must include all the workers in its integrated
business concerns ranging from piggery, poultry, to supermarts
and cinemas so as not to split an otherwise single bargaining unit
into fragmented bargaining units (Rollo, p. 435).
The Labor Code does not specifically define what constitutes an
appropriate collective bargaining unit. Article 256 of the Code
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 256. Exclusive bargaining representative. — The labor
organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be
exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee
or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer.
According to Rothenberg, a proper bargaining unit maybe said to
be a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or
less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective
interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicate to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of
the law (Rothenberg in Labor Relations, p. 482).
This Court has already taken cognizance of the crucial issue of
determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit.
Among the factors considered in Democratic Labor Association v.
Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. (103 Phil 1103 [1958]) are:" (1) will of
employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employee’s
interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or
similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior
collective bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as
temporary, seasonal and probationary employees."
Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the
importance of the fourth factor and sustained the trial court’s
conclusion that two separate bargaining units should be formed in
dealing with respondent company, one consisting of regular and
permanent employees and another consisting of casual laborers or
stevedores. Otherwise stated, temporary employees should be
treated separately from permanent employees. But more
importantly, this Court laid down the test of proper grouping, which
is community and mutuality of interest.chanrobles lawlibrary :
rednad
Thus, in a later case, (Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing
Co. Et. Al. v. Alhambra Employees’ Association 107 Phil. 28
[1960]) where the employment status was not at issue but the
nature of work of the employees concerned; the Court stressed the
importance of the second factor otherwise known as the
substantial-mutual-interest test and found no reason to disturb the
finding of the lower Court that the employees in the administrative,
sales and dispensary departments perform work which has nothing
to do with production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw
leaf, cigar, cigarette, packing and engineering and garage
departments and therefore have a community of interest which
justifies the formation or existence as a separate appropriate
collective bargaining unit.
Still later in PLASLU v. CIR Et. Al. (110 Phil. 180 [1960]) where the
employment status of the employees concerned was again
challenged, the Court reiterating the rulings, both in Democratic
Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. supra and
Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Co. Et. Al. v. Alhambra Employees’
Association (supra) held that among the factors to be considered
are: employment status of the employees to be affected, that is
the positions and categories of work to which they belong, and the
unity of employees’ interest such as substantial similarity of work
and duties.
In any event, whether importance is focused on the employment
status or the mutuality of interest of the employees concerned "the
basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether
or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to
all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights
(Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. supra)
Hence, still later following the substantial-mutual interest test, the
Court ruled that there is a substantial difference between the work
performed by musicians and that of other persons who participate
in the production of a film which suffice to show that they
constitute a proper bargaining unit. (LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine
Musicians Guild, 1 SCRA 132 [1961]).
Coming back to the case at bar, it is beyond question that the
employees of the livestock and agro division of petitioner
corporation perform work entirely different from those performed
by employees in the supermarts and cinema. Among others, the
noted difference are: their working conditions, hours of work, rates
of pay, including the categories of their positions and employment
status. As stated by petitioner corporation in its position paper, due
to the nature of the business in which its livestock-agro division is
engaged very few of its employees in the division are permanent,
the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and
not regular employees (Rollo, p. 26). Definitely, they have very
little in common with the employees of the supermarts and
cinemas. To lump all the employees of petitioner in its integrated
business concerns cannot result in an efficacious bargaining unit
comprised of constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of
interest. Undeniably, the rank and file employees of the livestock-
agro division fully constitute a bargaining unit that satisfies both
requirements of classification according to employment status and
of the substantial similarity of work and duties which will ultimately
assure its members the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights.chanrobles law library
II
It is undisputed that petitioner BELYCA Corporation (Livestock and
Agro Division) employs more or less two hundred five (205) rank-
and-file employees and workers. It has no existing duly certified
collective bargaining agreement with any legitimate labor
organization. There has not been any certification election
conducted in the proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve
(12) months prior to the filing of the petition for direct certification
and/or certification election with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, and there is no contending union requesting for
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative in
the proposed bargaining unit.
The records show that on the filing of the petition for certification
and/or certification election on June 3, 1986; 124 employees or
workers which are more than a majority of the rank-and-file
employees or workers in the proposed bargaining unit had signed
membership with respondent ALU-TUCP and had expressed their
written consent and authorization to the filing of the petition. Thus,
the Labor Arbiter ordered the certification election on August 18,
1986 on a finding that 30% of the statutory requirement under Art.
258 of the Labor Code has been met.
But, petitioner corporation contends that after June 3, 1986 four
(4) employees resigned; six (6) subsequently withdrew their
membership; five (5) were retrenched; twelve (12) were dismissed
for illegally and unlawfully barricading the entrance to petitioner’s
farm; and one hundred (100) simply abandoned their work.
Petitioner’s claim was however belied by the Memorandum of its
personnel officer to the 119 employees dated July 28, 1986
showing that the employees were on strike, which was confirmed
by the finding of the Bureau of Labor Relations to the effect that
they went on strike on July 24, 1986 (Rollo, p. 419). Earlier the
local union president, Warrencio Maputi; the Vice-president, Gilbert
Redoblado; and three other active members of the union Carmen
Saguing, Roberto Romolo and Iluminada Bonio were dismissed and
a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal etc. was filed
by the Union in their behalf on July 2, 1986 before the NLRC of
Cagayan de Oro City (Rollo, p. 415). The complaint was amended
on August 20, 1986 for respondent Union to represent Warrencio
Maputi and 137 others against petitioner corporation and Bello
Casanova President and General Manager for unfair labor practice,
illegal dismissal, illegal lockout, etc. (Rollo, p. 416)
Under Art. 257 of the Labor Code once the statutory requirement is
met, the Director of Labor Relations has no choice but to call a
certification election (Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU) PSSLU
Local v. Noriel, 104 SCRA 565 [1981]; Vismico Industrial Workers
Association (VIWA) v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984]) It becomes in
the language of the New Labor Code "Mandatory for the Bureau to
conduct a certification election for the purpose of determining the
representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit
and certify the winner as the exclusive bargaining representative of
all employees in the unit." (Federacion Obrera de la Industria
Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas v. Noriel, 72 SCRA 24
[1976]; Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa v. Noriel, 77 SCRA 414
[1977]); more so when there is no existing collective bargaining
agreement. (Samahang Manggagawa Ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v.
Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]); and there has not been a
certification election in the company for the past three years (PLUM
Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers v. Noriel, 119 SCRA
299 [1982]) as in the instant case.
It is significant to note that 124 employees out of the 205
employees of the Belyca Corporation have expressed their written
consent to the certification election or more than a majority of the
rank and file employees and workers; much more than the
required 30% and over and above the present requirement of 20%
by Executive Order No. 111 issued on December 24, 1980 and
applicable only to unorganized establishments under Art. 257, of
the Labor Code, to which the BELYCA Corporation belong (Ass.
Trade Unions (ATU) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 75321, June 20, 1988).)
More than that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to
the petition for holding a certification election cannot be a bar to its
being granted (Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople 107 SCRA 211 [1981]).
Even doubts as to the required 30% being met warrant holding of
the certification election (PLUM Federation of Industrial and
Agrarian Workers v. Noriel, 119 SCRA 299 [1982]). In fact, once
the required percentage requirement has been reached, the
employees’ withdrawal from union membership taking place after
the filing of the petition for certification election will not affect said
petition. On the contrary, the presumption arises that the
withdrawal was not free but was procured through duress, coercion
or for a valuable consideration (La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette
Factory v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, 123 SCRA 679
[1983]). Hence, the subsequent disaffiliation of the six (6)
employees from the union will not be counted against or deducted
from the previous number who had signed up for certification
elections (Vicmico Industrial Workers Association (VIWA) v. Noriel
131 SCRA 569 [1984]). Similarly, until a decision, final in
character, has been issued declaring the strike illegal and the mass
dismissal or retrenchment valid, the strikers cannot be denied
participation in the certification election notwithstanding, the
vigorous condemnation of the strike and the fact that the picketing
were attended by violence. Under the foregoing circumstances, it
does not necessarily follow that the strikers in question are no
longer entitled to participate in the certification election on the
theory that they have automatically lost their jobs. (Barrera v. CIR,
107 SCRA 596 [1981]). For obvious reasons, the duty of the
employer to bargain collectively is nullified if the purpose of the
dismissal of the union members is to defeat the union in the
consent requirement for certification election. (Samahang
Manggagawa Ng Via Mare v. Noriel, 98 SCRA 507 [1980]). As
stressed by this Court, the holding of a certification election is a
statutory policy that should not be circumvented. (George and
Peter Lines Inc. v. Associated Labor Unions (ALU), 134 SCRA 82
[1986]).
Finally, as a general rule, a certification election is the sole concern
of the workers. The only exception is where the employer has to
file a petition for certification election pursuant to Art. 259 of the
Labor Code because the latter was requested to bargain
collectively. But thereafter the role of the employer in the
certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a
bystander (Trade Union of the Phil. and Allied Services (TUPAS) v.
Trajano, 120 SCRA 64 [1983]).chanrobles law library : red
There is no showing that the instant case falls under the above
mentioned exception. However, it will be noted that petitioner
corporation from the outset has actively participated and
consistently taken the position of adversary in the petition for
direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative and/or certification election filed by respondent
Associated Labor Unions (ALU)-TUCP to the extent of filing this
petition for certiorari in this Court. Considering that a petition for
certification election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a
non-adversary character to determining the bargaining unit to
represent the employees (LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians
Guild, supra; Bulakeña Restaurant & Caterer v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 45 SCRA 88 [1972]; George Peter Lines, Inc. v.
Associated Labor Union, 134 SCRA 82 [1986]; Tanduay Distillery
Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA 470 [1987]), and its only purpose
is to give the employees true representation in their collective
bargaining with an employer (Confederation of Citizens Labor
Unions (CCLU) v. Noriel, 116 SCRA 694 [1982]), there appears to
be no reason for the employer’s objection to the formation of
subject union, much less for the filing of the petition for a
certification election.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit (b) resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated Nov.
24, 1986 is AFFIRMED; and the temporary restraining order issued
by the Court on March 4, 1987 is LIFTED permanently.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
PHILIPPINE SCOUT VETERANS SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION
AGENCY (PSVSIA), GVM SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY
(GVM) and ABAQUIN SECURITY AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC.
(ASDA), petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR RUBEN D. TORRES AND PGA
BROTHERHOOD ASSOCIATION-UNION OF FILIPINO
WORKERS, respondents.
V.E. Del Rosario & Associates for petitioners.
German N. Pascua, Jr. for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
The sole issue presented for resolution in this petition for certiorari with
prayer for preliminary injunction is whether or not a single petition for
certification election or for recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent can validly or legally be filed by a labor union in three (3) corporations
each of which has a separate and distinct legal personality instead of filing
three (3) separate petitions.
On April 6, 1989, private respondent labor union, PGA Brotherhood
Association - Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), hereinafter referred to as "the
Union " filed a petition for Direct Certification/Certification Election among the
rank and file employees of Philippine Scout Veterans Security and
Investigation Agency (PSVSIA), GVM Security and Investigations Agency,
Inc. (GVM). and Abaquin Security and Detective Agency, Inc. (ASDA). These
three agencies were collectively referred to by private respondent Union as
the "PGA Security Agency," which is actually the first letters of the corporate
names of the agencies.
On April 11, 1989, summons was issued to the management of PSVSIA,
GVM, ASDA (PGA Security Agency) at 82 E. Rodriquez Avenue, Quezon
City.
On April 11, 26, 1986, petitioners filed a single comment alleging therein that
the said three security agencies have separate and distinct corporate
personalities while PGA Security Agency is not a business or corporate entity
and does not possess any personality whatsoever; the petition was unclear
as to whether the rank-and-file employees mentioned therein refer to those of
the three security agencies collectively and if so, the labor union cannot seek
a certification election in three separate bargaining units in one petition; the
labor union included in their organization "security supervisors," in violation of
R.A. 6715; and though R.A. 6715 is already in effect, there were still no
implementing rules therefor.
On May 4, 1989, the security agencies filed a Consolidated Motion to
Dismiss on the grounds that the 721 supporting signatures do not meet the
20% minimum requirement for certification election as the number of
employees totals 2374 and that there are no implementing rules yet of R.A.
6715.
On May 8, 1989, the Union filed an Omnibus Reply to Comment and Motion
to Dismiss alleging that it is clear that it is seeking a certification election in
the three agencies; that the apparent separate personalities of the three
agencies were used merely to circumvent the prohibition in R.A. 5847, as
amended by P.D. 11 and P.D. 100, that a security agency must not have
more than 1,000 guards in its employ; that the three security agencies'
administration, management and operations are so intertwined that they can
be deemed to be a single entity; and that the security supervisors cannot be
deemed part of management since they do not meet the definition of
"supervisory employees" found in Articles 212(m), Labor Code, as amended
by Section 4, R.A. No. 6715.
On May 18, 1989, the security agencies filed a Rejoinder claiming that there
is no violation of R.A. 5487, as amended by P.D. 11 and P.D. 100 since the
three agencies were incorporated long before the decrees' issuance; that
mere duplication of incorporators does not prove that the three security
agencies are actually one single entity; and that security guard supervisors,
most especially detachment commanders, fall within the definition of the term
"supervisors."
On July 6, 1989, Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah issued an Order in favor of
the labor union finding that PSVSIA, GVM and ASDA should be deemed as a
single entity and bargaining unit for the purpose of union organizing and the
holding of a certification election. The dispositive portion of the Order reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a certification
election be conducted among the rank and file security
guards of PSVSIA, GVM and ASDA within twenty (20) days
from receipt hereof with the usual pre-election conference of
the parties. The list of eligible voters shall be based on the
security agencies' payroll three (3) months prior to the filing
of this petition with the following choices:
 a) PGA Brotherhood Association-Union of Filipino Workers
(UFW); and
b) No union.
SO ORDERED.1
On July 21, 1989, the security agencies appealed the Med-Arbiter's Order to
the Secretary of Labor and Employment claiming that said Order was issued
with grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the three security agencies
could be considered as a single bargaining entity for purposes of the holding
of a certification election.
On December 15, 1989, the Labor Secretary Franklin M. Drilon denied the
appeal for lack of merit while at the same time affirming the Med-Arbiter's
Order of July 6, 1989. He also ordered the immediate conduct of a
certification election. The dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal of
respondents Security agencies is hereby denied for lack of
merit and the Order dated 6 July affirmed.
Let therefore, the pertinent records of this case be
immediately forwarded to the Regional Office for he
immediate conduct of the certification election.
SO ORDERED. 2
On January 5, 1990, the three security agencies filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that they were denied their rights to due process
and that jurisdiction was not acquired over them by the labor authorities.
On January 26, 1990, the succeeding Labor Secretary, Ruben D. Torres,
likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and
reiterated the directive that a certification election be conducted without
further delay.
On March 14, 1990, the instant petition was filed by the three security
agencies, raising the following grounds:
I The public repondent noted the following circumstances in the La Campana
SERIOUS ERRORS IN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS.
II
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR. 3
Petitioners insist that there are three (3) corporations in this petition, each of
which has a separate and distinct corporate personality of its own with
separate registrations with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and different Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws; with separate sets of
corporate officers and directors; and no common business address except
for GVM and ASDA which are located at 1957 España corner Craig Streets,
Sampaloc, Manila.
Petitioners claim that the facts and circumstances of the case of La
Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. v. Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa La
Campana 4 which public respondent claims to be on all fours with the instant
case, are very distinct from the facts and circumstance obtaining in the case
at bar. As to form of business organization, in the La Campana case, only
one of two (2) businesses was a corporation i.e., the La Campana Coffee
Factory, Inc. and the other, the La Campana Gaugau Packing, is a "non-
entity," being merely a business name. In the case at bar, all three (3)
agencies are incorporated. Moreover, the issue involved in the instant case is
one of representation while in the La Campana case, the issue involved is
the validity of a demand for wage increases and other labor standards
benefits.
Petitioners likewise contend that it was error to hold that the three companies
should be treated as one in a single bargaining unit in one petition for
certification elections resulting in a violation of the right to due process of
each corporation as no notice of hearing and other legal processes were
served on each of said corporations. Consequently, no jurisdiction was
acquired on them by the Department of Labor and Employment.
Petitioners' arguments deserve scant consideration. The facts and
circumstances extant in the record indicate that the Med-Arbiter and
Secretaries Drilon and Torres were not mistaken in holding that the three
security companies are in reality a single business entity operating as a
single company called the "PGA Security Group" or "PGA Security Services
Group." Factual findings of labor officials are conclusive and binding on the
Court when supported by substantial evidence.5
case similar to the case at bar, as indicative of the fact that the La Campana
Coffee Factory and La Campana Gaugau Packing were in reality only one
business with two trade names: (1) the two factories occupied the same
address, wherein they had their principal place of business; (2) their
signboards, advertisements, packages of starch, delivery truck and delivery
forms all use one appellation, "La Campana Starch and Coffee Factory"; (3)
the workers in either company received their pay from a single cashier, and
(4) the workers in one company could easily transfer to the other company,
and vice-versa. This Court held therein that the veil of corporate fiction of the
coffee factory may be pierced to thwart the attempt to consider it part from
the other business owned by the same family. Thus, the fact that one of the
businesses is not incorporated was not the decisive factor that led the Court
to consider the two factories as one. Moreover, we do not find any materiality
in the fact that the La Campana case was instituted to demand wage
increases and other labor standards benefits while this case was filed by the
labor union to seek recognition as the sole bargaining agent in the
establishment. If businesses operating under one management are treated
as one for bargaining purposes, there is not much difference in treating such
businesses also as one for the preliminary purpose of labor organizing.
Indeed, the three agencies in the case at bar failed to rebut the fact that they
are managed through the Utilities Management Corporation with all of their
employees drawing their salaries and wages from said entity; that the
agencies have common and interlocking incorporators and officers; and that
the PSVSIA, GVM and ASDA employees have a single Mutual Benefit
System and followed a single system of compulsory retirement.
No explanation was also given by petitioners why the security guards of one
agency could easily transfer from one agency to another and then back again
by simply filling-up a common pro forma slip called "Request for Transfer".
Records also shows that the PSVSIA, GVM and ASDA always hold joint
yearly ceremonies such as the "PGA Annual Awards Ceremony". In
emergencies, all PSVSIA Detachment Commanders were instructed in a
memorandum dated November 10, 1988 to get in touch with the officers not
only of PSVSIA but also of GVM and ASDA. All of these goes to show that
the security agencies concerned do not exist and operate separately and
distinctly from each other with different corporate directions and goals. On
the contrary, all the cross-linking of the three agencies' command, control
and communication systems indicate their unitary corporate personality.
Accordingly, the veil of corporate fiction of the three agencies should be lifted
for the purpose of allowing the employees of the three agencies to form a
single labor union. As a single bargaining unit, the employees therein need
not file three separate petitions for certification election. All of these could be
covered in a single petition.
Petitioners' claim of alleged defect in the petition for certification election
which although addressed to the three security agencies merely alleged that
there are only 1,000 employees when the total number of employees in said
security agencies is about 2,374 (PSVSIA - 1252; GVM - 807; and ASDA -
315) thereby failing to comply with the legal requirement that at least twenty
percent (20%) of the employees in the bargaining unit must support the
petition, betrays lack of knowledge of the amendments introduced by R.A
6715 which became effective on March 21, 1989, prior to the filing of the
petition for certification election on April 6, 1989. Under the amendments,
there is no need for the labor union to prove that at least 20% of the security
guards in the three agencies supported the petition. When a duly organized
union files a petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiter has the duty to
automatically conduct an election. He has no discretion on the matter. This is
clearly the mandate of Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section
24 of R.A. 6715, which now reads:
Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any
establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a
certification election shall automatically be conducted by the
Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization.
The designation of the three agencies collectively as "PGA Security Agency"
and the service of summons to the management thereof at 82 E. Rodriguez
Avenue, Quezon City did not render the petition defective. Labor Secretary
Franklin Drilon correctly noted the fact that the affidavits executed separately
and under oath by the three managers of the three security agencies
indicated their office address to be at PSVSIA Center II, E. Rodriguez Sr.
Blvd., Quezon City. Besides, even if there was improper service of summons
by the Med-Arbiter, the three (3) security agencies voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the labor authorities. The summons were
clearly sent to and received by their lawyer who filed motions and pleadings
on behalf of the three security agencies and who always appeared as their
legal counsel. It puzzles this Court why petitioners, who claim to be separate
entities, continue to be represented by one counsel even in this instant
petition.
Finally, except where the employer has to file a petition for certification
election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to
bargain collectively, it has nothing to do with a certification election which is
the sole concern of the workers. Its role in a certification election has aptly
been described in Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) v. Trajano,6 as that of a mere by-stander. It has no legal standing in
a certification election as it cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-
Arbiter's orders related thereto. An employer that involves itself in a
certification election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a
company union.
This Court's disapprobation of management interference in certification
elections is even more forceful in Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel,7 where
we held:

On a matter that should be the exclusive concern of labor,

the choice of a collective bargaining representative, the
employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to say the
least, deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the
last agency to lend support to such an attempt at
interference with a purely internal affair of labor.

Indeed, the three security agencies should not even be adverse parties in the
certification election itself. We note with disapproval the title given to the
petition for certification election of the Union by the Med-Arbiter and the
Secretary of Labor naming the three security agencies as respondents. Such
is clearly an error. While employers may rightfully be notified or informed of
petitions of such nature, they should not, however, be considered parties
thereto with concomitant right to oppose it. Sound policy dictates that they
should maintain a strictly hands-off policy.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of the

Secretary of Labor, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER EDGARDO DELA CRUZ and
PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)-TUCP, respondents.
Beltran, Bacungan & Candoy for petitioner.
Jimenez & Associates co-counsel for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The controversy in this case centers on the requirements before a local or
chapter of a federation may file a petition for certification election and be
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the petitioner's
employees.
Petitioner Progressive Development Corporation (PDC) filed this petition
for certiorari to set aside the following:
1) Resolution dated September 5, 1990, issued by respondent Med-Arbiter
Edgardo dela Cruz, directing the holding of the certification election among
the regular rank-and-file employees of PDC:
2) Order dated October 12, 1990, issued by the respondent Secretary of
Labor and Employment, denying PDC's appeal; and
3) Order dated November 12, 1990, also issued by the respondent
Secretary, denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
On June 19, 1990, respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa
(KILUSAN) -TUCP (hereinafter referred to as Kilusan) filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification
election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner alleging that it is
a legitimate labor federation and its local chapter, Progressive Development
Employees Union, was issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153. Kilusan
claimed that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement and that
no other legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.
Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss dated July 11, 1990 contending that
the local union failed to comply with Rule II Section 3, Book V of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the submission
of: (a) the constitution and by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers
and/or members; and (c) books of accounts.
On July 16 , 1990, respondent Kilusan submitted a rejoinder to PDC's motion
to dismiss claiming that it had submitted the necessary documentary
requirements for registration, such as the constitution and by-laws of the
local union, and the list of officers/members with their addresses. Kilusan
further averred that no books of accounts could be submitted as the local
union was only recently organized.
In its "Supplemental Position Paper" dated September 3, 1990, the petitioner
insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), it
found that the alleged minutes of the organizational meeting was
unauthenticated, the list of members did not bear the corresponding
signatures of the purported members, and the constitution and by-laws did
not bear the signature of the members and was not duly subscribed. It
argued that the private respondent therefore failed to substantially comply
with the registration requirements provided by the rules. Additionally, it
prayed that Med-Arbiter Edgardo dela Cruz inhibit himself from handling the
case for the reason that he allegedly had prejudged the same.
In his September 5, 1990 resolution, Med Arbiter dela Cruz held that there
was substantial compliance with the requirements for the formation of the
chapter. He further stated that mere issuance of the charter certificate by the
federation was sufficient compliance with the rules. Considering that the
establishment was unorganized, he maintained that a certification election
should be conducted to resolve the question of representation.
Treating the motion for reconsideration filed by the PDC as an appeal to the
Office of the Secretary, Undersecretary Laguesma held that the same was
merely a "reiteration of the issues already ventilated in the proceedings
before the Med-Arbiter, specifically, the matter involving the formal
organization of the chapter." (Rollo, p. 20) PDC's motion for reconsideration
from the aforementioned ruling was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.
In an order dated February 25, 1991, the Court resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining the public respondents from carrying out the
assailed resolution and orders or from proceeding with the certification
election. (Rollo, pp. 37-39)
It is the petitioner's contention that a labor organization (such as the Kilusan)
may not validly invest the status of legitimacy upon a local or chapter through
the mere expedient of issuing a charter certificate and submitting such
certificate to the BLR (Rollo, p. 85) Petitioner PDC posits that such local or
chapter must at the same time comply with the requirement of submission
of duly subscribed constitution and by-laws, list of officers and books of
accounts. (Rollo, p. 35) PDC points out that the constitution and by-laws and
list of officers submitted were not duly subscribed. Likewise, the petitioner
claims that the mere filing of the aforementioned documents is insufficient;
that there must be due recognition or acknowledgment accorded to the local
or chapter by BLR through a certificate of registration or any communication
emanating from it. (Rollo, p. 86)
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondent, avers that there
was a substantial compliance with the requirements for the formation of a
chapter. Moreover, he invokes Article 257 of the Labor Code which
mandates the automatic conduct by the Med-Arbiter of a certification election
in any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agreement.
The Court has repeatedly stressed that the holding of a certification election
is based on a statutory policy that cannot be circumvented. (Airtime
Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA 749 [1989]; Belyca Corporation
v. Ferrer-Calleja, 168 SCRA 184 [1988]; George and Peter Lines, Inc. v.
Associated Labor Unions, 134 SCRA 82 [1986]). The workers must be
allowed to freely express their choice in a determination where everything is
open to their sound judgment and the possibility of fraud and
misrepresentation is eliminated.
But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic
conduct of a certification election in an unorganized establishment, it also
requires that the petition for certification election must be filed by a legitimate
labor organization. Article 242 enumerates the exclusive rights of a legitimate
labor organization among which is the right to be certified as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining
unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Meanwhile, Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any
labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch or
local thereof." (Emphasis supplied) Rule I, Section 1 (j), Book V of the
Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate labor organization as "any
labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch,
local or affiliate thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The question that now arises is: when does a branch, local or affiliate of a
federation become a legitimate labor organization?
Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration
with the BLR. Under Article 234 (Requirements of Registration):
Any applicant labor organization, association or group of
unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be
entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the
certificate of registration based on the following
requirements:
(a) Fifty-pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal
address of the labor organization, the minutes of the
organizational meeting and the list of the workers who
participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty
20% percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit
where it seek to operate;
(d) If the applicant has been in existence for one or more
years, copies , of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the
applicant union, the minutes of its adoption or ratification and
the list of the members who participated in it.
And under Article 235 (Action on Application)
The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within
thirty (30) days from filing.
All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under
oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as
the case may be, and attested to by its president.
Moreover, section 4 of Rule II, Book V of the Implementing Rules requires
that the application should be signed by at least twenty percent (20%) of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and be accompanied by a
sworn statement of the applicant union that there is no certified bargaining
agent or, where there is an existing collective bargaining agreement duly
submitted to the DOLE, that the application is filed during the last sixty (60)
days of the agreement.
The respondent Kilusan questions the requirements as too stringent in their
application but the purpose of the law in prescribing these requisites must be
underscored. Thus, in Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
v. Secretary of Labor, 27 SCRA 40 (1969), the Court declared:
The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No.
875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis.
The registration prescribed in Paragraph (b) of said section
is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association,
which may be exercised with or without said registration. The
latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of
legal personality by the labor organizations, associations or
unions and the possession of the "rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations." The
Constitution does not guarantee these rights and the
privileges, much less said personality, which are mere
statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of
which registration is required to protect both labor and the
public against abuses, fraud or impostors who pose as
organizers, although not truly accredited agents of the union
they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid
exercise of the police power, because the activities in which
labor organizations, associations and unions of workers are
engaged affect public interest, which should be protected.
Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial statements,
as a condition for the non-cancellation of a certificate of
registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the
members of the organization, considering that the same
generally solicits funds or membership, as well as oftentimes
collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of money
due to them or to the organization. (Emphasis supplied)
But when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter of a
federation, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration are no
longer required. The provisions governing union affiliation are found in Rule
II, Section 3, Book V of the Implementing Rules, the relevant portions of
which are cited below:
Sec. 3. Union affiliation; direct membership with national
union. — An affiliate of a labor federation or national union
may be a local or chapter thereof or an independently
registered union.
a) The labor federation or national union concerned shall
issue a charter certificate indicating the creation or
establishment of a local or chapter, copy of which shall be
submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations within thirty (30)
days from issuance of such charter certificate.
b) An independently registered union shall be considered an
affiliate of a labor federation or national union after
submission to the Bureau of the contract or agreement of
affiliation within thirty (30) days after its execution.
xxx xxx xxx
e) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union
shall have and maintain a constitution and by laws, set of
officers and books and accounts. For reporting purposes, the
procedure governing the reporting of independently
registered unions, federations or national unions shall be
observed.
Paragraph (a) refers to the local or chapter of a federation which did not
undergo the rudiments of registration while paragraph (b) refers to an
independently registered union which affiliated with a federation. Implicit in
the foregoing differentiation is the fact that a local or chapter need not be
independently registered. By force of law (in this case, Article 212[h]); such
local or chapter becomes a legitimate labor organization upon compliance
with the aforementioned provisions of Section 3.
Thus, several requirements that are otherwise required for union registration
are omitted, to wit:
(1) The requirement that the application for registration must be signed by at
least 20% of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit;
2) The submission of officers' addresses, principal address of the labor
organization, the minutes of organizational meetings and the list of the
workers who participated in such meetings;
3) The submission of the minutes of the adoption or ratification of the
constitution and by the laws and the list of the members who participated in
it.
Undoubtedly, the intent of the law in imposing lesser requirements in the
case of the branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to
encourage the affiliation of a local union with the federation or national union
in order to increase the local union's bargaining powers respecting terms and
conditions of labor.
The petitioner maintains that the documentary requirements prescribed in
Section 3(c), namely: the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books
of accounts, must follow the requirements of law. Petitioner PDC calls for the
similar application of the requirement for registration in Article 235 that all
requisite documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or
the treasurer of the organization and attested to by the president.
In the case at bar, the constitution and by-laws and list of officers submitted
in the BLR, while attested to by the chapter's president, were not
certified under oath by the secretary. Does such defect warrant the
withholding of the status of legitimacy to the local or chapter?
In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the submitted
documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer,
as the case may be, and attested to by president is apparent. The
submission of the required documents (and payment of P50.00 registration
fee) becomes the Bureau's basis for approval of the application for
registration. Upon approval, the labor union acquires legal personality and is
entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor
organization. The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it is
dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not submitted false
statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The inclusion of the
certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay these
apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false
statement and misrepresentation a ground for cancellation of registration
(see Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of
perjury.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures
against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of
protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining
unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union
funds or to use the union for dubious ends.
In the case of the union affiliation with a federation, the documentary
requirements are found in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing
Rules, which we again quote as follows:
(c) The local chapter of a labor federation or national union
shall have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of
officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the
procedure governing the reporting of independently
registered unions, federations or national unions shall be
observed. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered
unions" refers to the certification and attestation requirements contained in
Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of
officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must
likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring
the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists
in the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact
compliance with the certification and attestation requirements because, as
previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent union
registration are no longer required in the case of formation of a local or
chapter. The policy of the law in conferring greater bargaining power upon
labor unions must be balanced with the policy of providing preventive
measures against the commission of fraud.
A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only
upon submission of the following to the BLR:
1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor
federation or national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the
books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its
president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter
does not become a legitimate labor organization.
In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the
required documents under oathis fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate status.
We observe that, as borne out by the facts in this case, the formation of a
local or chapter becomes a handy tool for the circumvention of union
registration requirements. Absent the institution of safeguards, it becomes a
convenient device for a small group of employees to foist a not-so-desirable
federation or union on unsuspecting co-workers and pare the need for
wholehearted voluntariness which is basic to free unionism. The records
show that on June 16, 1990, Kilusan met with several employees of the
petitioner. Excerpts of the "Minutes of the Organizational/General
Membership Meeting of Progressive Development Employees Union (PDEU)
— Kilusan," are quoted below:
The meeting was formally called to order by Bro. Jose V.
Parungao, KILUSAN secretary for organization by explaining
to the general membership the importance of joining the
 union. He explained to the membership why they should join
a union, and briefly explained the ideology of the
Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa-TUCP as a
democratically based organization and then read the
proposed Constitution and By-Laws, after which said
Constitution and By-Laws was duly and unanimously ratified
after some clarification.
Bro. Jose Parungao was also unanimously voted by the
group to act as the chairman of the COMELEC in holding the
organizational election of officers of the union.
At this juncture, it is important to clarify the relationship between the mother
union and the local union. In the case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union
v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512 [1975]), the Court held that the
mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the status of
an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free
to serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints
imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the association. Thus, where as
in this case the petition for certification election was filed by the federation
which is merely an agent, the petition is deemed to be filed by the chapter,
the principal, which must be a legitimate labor organization. The chapter
cannot merely rely on the legitimate status of the mother union.

Bro. Jose Parungao, officially opened the table for The Court's conclusion should not be misconstrued as impairing the local
nomination of candidates after which the election of officers union's right to be certified as the employees' bargaining agent in the
followed by secret balloting and the following were the duly petitioner's establishment. We are merely saying that the local union must
elected officers. (Original Record, p. 25) first comply with the statutory requirements in order to exercise this right. Big
federations and national unions of workers should take the lead in requiring
their locals and chapters to faithfully comply with the law and the rules
The foregoing shows that Kilusan took the initiative and encouraged the
formation of a union which automatically became its chapter. On June 18, instead of merely snapping union after union into their folds in a furious bid
1990, Kilusan issued a charter certificate in favor of PDEU-KILUSAN with rival federations to get the most number of members.
(Records, page 1). It can be seen that Kilusan was moving very fast.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution and orders
of respondent Med-Arbiter and Secretary of Labor and Employment,
On June 19, 1990, or just three days after the organizational meeting,
Kilusan filed a petition for certification election (Records, pages 2 and 3) respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated
February 25, 1991 is made permanent.
accompanied by a copy each of the charter certificate, constitution and by-
laws and minutes of the organizational meeting. Had the local union filed an
application for registration, the petition for certification election could not have
been immediately filed. The applicant union must firstly comply with the "20%
signature" requirement and all the other requisites enumerated in Article 234.
Moreover, since under Article 235 the BLR shall act on any application for
registration within thirty (30) days from its filing, the likelihood is remote that,
assuming the union complied with all the requirements, the application would
be approved on the same day it was filed.

We are not saying that the scheme used by the respondents is per se illegal
for precisely, the law allows such strategy. It is not this Court's function to
augment the requirements prescribed by law in order to make them wiser or
to allow greater protection to the workers and even their employer. Our only
recourse is, as earlier discussed, to exact strict compliance with what the law
provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.

It may likewise be argued that it was Kilusan (the mother union) and not the
local union which filed the petition for certification election and, being a
legitimate labor organization, Kilusan has the personality to file such petition.
PAGPALAIN HAULERS, INC., petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, in his official capacity as Secretary of
Labor and Employment, the HONORABLE RENATO D. PARUNGO,
in his official capacity as the Med-Arbiter in DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-
M-9705-006, and the INTEGRATED LABOR ORGANIZATION
(ILO-PHILS) PAGPALAIN WORKERS UNION-ILO-
PHILS. respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
On May 14, 1997, respondent Integrated Labor Organization-Pagpalain Haulers
Workers Union (hereafter referred to as ILO-PHILS), in a bid to represent the rank-
and-file drivers and helpers of petitioner Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. (hereafter referred
to as Pagpalain), filed a petition for certification election with the Department of
Labor and Employment. ILO-PHILS attached to the petition copies of its charter
certificate, its constitution and by-laws, its books of account, and a list of its officers
and their addresses.
On July 10, 1997, Pagpalain filed a motion to dismiss the petition, alleging that
ILO-PHILS was not a legitimate labor organization due to its failure to comply with
the requirements for registration under the Labor Code. Specifically, it claimed that
the books of account submitted by ILO-PHILS were not verified under oath by its
treasurer and attested to by its president, a required by Rule II, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
In a reply dated August 4, 1997, ILO-PHILS dismissed Pagpalains claims,
saying that Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997 had dispensed with the
requirement that a local or chapter of a national union submit books of account in
order to be registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.
Finding in favor of ILO-PHILS, the Med-Arbiter, on August 27, 1997, ordered
the holding of certification elections among the rank-and-file of Pagpalain
Haulers. Pagpalain promptly appealed the decision to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. It claimed that the Med-Arbiter had gravely abused his discretion in
allowing Department Order No. 9 to take precedence over a ruling of the Supreme
Court. Pagpalain cited Protection Technology v. Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment[1] and Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary of Labor[2] in
support of its contention.
Declaring Protection and Progressive to be inapplicable to the case before him,
the Secretary, on February 27, 1998, issued a resolution dismissing Pagpalains
appeal. In his own words, [I]n these aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court
premised its ruling on the previous rules implementing the Labor Code, particularly
Book V, that provides the requirements for the registration of a local or chapter of a
federation or national union. With the issuance of Department Order No. 09
amending the rules implementing Book V of the Code, the requirement on books of
account no longer exists.[3]
Aggrieved by said resolution, Pagpalain now comes to this Court for relief
claiming that the Secretary of Labor acted without jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned resolution. In support of its proposition, it claims that:
1. DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 9, SERIES OF 1997, ISSUED BY
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF LABOR IS NULL AND
VOID FOR BEING CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY LAID
DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN PROTECTION
TECHNOLOGY, INC. V. SECRETARY OF LABOR (G.R. NO.
117211, 1 MARCH 1995) AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT
CORP. V. SECRETARY OF LABOR (G.R. NO. 96425, 4 FEBRUARY
1992);
2. DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 9, SERIES OF 1997, OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF LABOR CANNOT ALTER THE
REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLES 241(H) AND (J) OF THE
LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOR CAN IT PREVAIL
OVER THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT, WHICH
FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.
Pagpalains contentions are without merit.
Under Article 234 of the Labor Code, the requirements for registration of a
labor organization is as follows:
Art. 234. Requirements of registration. Any applicant labor
organization, association or group of unions or workers shall
acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights
and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration
based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal
address of the labor organization, the minutes of the
organizational meetings and the list of the workers who
participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty
percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit
where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or
more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the
applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and
the list of the members who participated in it.
As can be gleaned from the above, the Labor Code does not require the
submission of books of account in order for a labor organization to be registered as a
legitimate labor organization. The requirement that books of account be submitted as
a requisite for a registration can be found only in Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, prior to its amendment by Department Order No. 9,
Series of 1997. Specifically, the old Section 3(e), Rule II, of Book V provided that
[t]he local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain
a constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts. For reporting
purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions,
federations or national unions shall be observed.
In Progressive Development Corporation, cited by Pagpalain, this Court held
that the above-mentioned procedure governing the reporting of independently
registered unions refers to the certification and attestation requirements contained in
Article 235, paragraph 2. Article 235, paragraph 2 provides that [a]ll requisite
documents and papers shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer
of the organization, as the case may be, and attested to by its president; hence, in the
above-mentioned case, we ruled that in applications for registration by a local or
chapter of a federation or national union, the constitution and by-laws, set of officers
and books of account submitted by said local or chapter must be certified under oath
by the secretary or treasurer and attested to by its president.
Three years later, in Protection Technology v. Secretary of Labor, we amplified
our ruling in Progressive, saying that the non-submission of books of account
certified by and attested to by the appropriate officer is a ground for an employer to
legitimately oppose a petition for certification election filed by a local or chapter of a
national union.
By virtue of Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997, however, the documents
needed to be submitted by a local or chapter have been reduced to the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union
indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapters officers, their addresses, and the
principal office of the local/chapter;
(c) The local/chapters constitution and by-laws; provided that where the
local/chapters constitution and by-laws is the same as that of the
federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified
under oath by the Secretary or Treasurer of the local/chapter
and attested by its President.[4]
Since the Department Order No. 9 has done away with the submission of books
of account as a requisite for registration, Pagpalains only recourse now is to have
said order declared null and void. It premises its case on the principles laid down
in Progressive and Protection Technology. First, Pagpalain maintains that
Department Order No. 9 is illegal, allegedly because it contravenes the above-
mentioned rulings of this Court. Citing Article 8 of the Civil Code, which provides
that [j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines, Pagpalain declares the two cases
part of the law of the land which, under the third paragraph of Article 7 of the Civil
Code,[5] may not be supplanted by mere regulation.
Second, it claims that dispensing with books of account contravenes public
policy, citing Protection Technology, as follows:
It is immaterial that the Union, having been organized for less
than a year before the application for registration with the
BLR, would have had no real opportunity to levy and collect
dues and fees from its members which need to be recorded in
the books of account. Such accounting books can and must
be submitted to the BLR, even if they contain no detailed or
extensive entries as yet. The point to be stressed is that the
applicant local or chapter must demonstrate to the BLR that
it is entitled to registered status because it has in place a
system for accounting for members contributions to its fund
even before it actually receives dues and fees from its
members. The controlling intention is to minimize the risk of
fraud and diversion in the course of the subsequent formation
and growth of the Union fund. [Underscoring petitioners]
To buttress its argument, Pagpalain also cites Progressive, thus:
The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it is
dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not
submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the
Bureau. The inclusion of the certification and attestation
requirements will in a marked degree allay these
apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of
any false statement and misrepresentation a ground for
cancellation of registration (See Article 239(a), (c) and (d)); it
is also a ground for a criminal charge of perjury.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive
measures against the commission of fraud. They likewise
afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees
who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night
unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or to use
the union for dubious ends. [Underscoring petitioners]
Finally, Pagpalain cites as indicative of public policy, the following sections of
Article 241 of the Labor Code:
The following are the rights and conditions of membership in
a labor organization:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Every payment of fees, dues, or other contributions by a
member shall be evidenced by a receipt signed by the officer
or agent making the collection and entered into the record of
the organization to be kept and maintained for that purpose;
xxx xxx xxx
(j) Every income or revenue of the organization shall be
evidenced by a record showing its source, and every
expenditure of its funds shall be evidenced by a receipt from
the person to whom the payment is made, which shall state
the date, place and purpose of such payment. Such record or
receipt shall form part of the financial records of the
organization. [Underscoring petitioners]
Under Article 8 of the Civil Code, [j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines. This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts
exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be
violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of
our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist
or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of
legislating.
Consequently, Progressive and Protection Technology are not to be deemed as
laws on the registration of unions. They merely interpret and apply the implementing
rules of the Labor Code as to registration of unions. It is this interpretation that forms
part of the legal system of the Philippines, for the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the force of law.[6] Progressiveand Protection
Technology, however, applied and interpreted the then existing Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Since Book V of the Omnibus Rules,
as amended by Department Order No. 9, no longer requires a local or chapter to
submit books of accounts as a prerequisite for registration, the doctrines enunciated
in the above-mentioned cases, with respect to books of account, are already passe
and therefore, no longer applicable. Hence, Pagpalain cannot insist that ILO-PHILS
comply with the requirements prescribed in said rulings, for the current
implementing rules have deleted the same.
Neither can Pagpalain contend that Department Order No. 9 is an invalid
exercise of rule-making power by the Secretary of Labor. For an administrative order
to be valid, it must (i) be issued on the authority of law and (ii) it must not be
contrary to the law and Constitution.[7]
Department Order No. 9 has been issued on authority of law. Under the law, the
Secretary is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to implement the Labor
Code. Specifically, Article 5 of the Labor Code provides that [t]he Department of
Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and
enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations. Consonant with this article, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment promulgated the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code. By virtue of this self-same authority, the Secretary amended the above-
mentioned omnibus rules by issuing Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997.
Moreover, Pagpalain has failed to show that Department Order No. 9 is
contrary to the law or the Constitution. At the risk of being repetitious, the Labor
Code does not require a local or chapter to submit books of account in order for it to
be registered as a legitimate labor organization. There is, thus, no inconsistency
between the Labor Code and Department Order No. 9. Neither has Pagpalain shown
that said order contravenes any provision of the Constitution.
Pagpalain cannot also allege that Department Order No. 9 is violative of public
policy. As adverted to earlier, the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret
the laws.[8] It does not formulate public policy, which is the province of the
legislative and executive branches of government. It cannot, thus, be said that the
principles laid down by the court in Progressive and Protection
Technology constitute public policy on the matter. They do, however, constitute the
Courts interpretation of public policy, as formulated by the executive department
through its promulgation of rules implementing the Labor Code.However, this public
policy has itself been changed by the executive department, through the amendments
introduced in Book V of the Omnibus Rules by Department Order No. 9. It is not for
us to question this change in policy, it being a well-established principle beyond
question that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the
policy of legislative or executive action.[9] Notwithstanding the expanded judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, an inquiry on the above-
stated policy would delve into matters of wisdom not within the powers of this
Court.
Furthermore, the controlling intention in requiring the submission of books of
account is the protection of labor through the minimization of the risk of fraud and
diversion in the handling of union funds.As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, this intention can still be realized through other provisions of the Labor
Code. Article 241 of the Labor Code, for instance:
Art. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization The following are the rights and conditions of
membership in a labor organization:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The members shall be entitled to full and detailed reports
from their officers and representatives of all financial
transactions as provided for in the constitution and by-laws of
the organization;
xxx xxx xxx
(g) No officer, agent or member of a labor organization shall
collect any fees, dues, or other contributions in its behalf or
make any disbursement of its funds unless he is duly
authorized pursuant to its constitution and by-laws;
(h) Every payment of fees, dues, or other contributions by a
member shall be evidenced by a receipt signed by the officer
or agent making the collection and entered into the record of
the organization to be kept and maintained for the that
purpose;
(i) The funds of the organization shall not be applied for any
purpose or object other than those expressly provided by its
constitution or by-laws or those expressly authorized by
written resolution adopted by the majority of the members at
a general meeting duly called for the purpose;
(j) Every income or revenue of the organization shall be
evidenced by a record showing its source, and every
expenditure of its funds shall be evidenced by a receipt from
the person to whom the payment is made, which shall state
the date, place and purpose of such payment. Such record or
receipt shall form part of the financial records of the
organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(l) The treasurer of any labor organization and every officer
thereof who is responsible for the account of such
organization or for the collection, management, disbursement,
custody or control of the fund, moneys and other properties of
the organization, shall render to the organization and to its
members a true and correct account of all the moneys
received and paid by him since he assumed office or since the
last day on which he rendered such account, and of all bonds,
securities and other properties of the organization entrusted
to his custody or under his control. The rendering of such
account shall be made:
(1) At least once a year within 30 days after the close of its fiscal year;
(2) At such other times as may be required by a resolution of the majority
of the members of the organization;
(3) Upon vacating his office.
The account shall be duly audited and verified by affidavit and
a copy thereof shall be furnished the Secretary of Labor.
(m) The books of account and other records of the financial
activities of any labor organization shall be open to inspection
by any officer or member thereof during office hours;

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, Article 274 of the Labor Code empowers the Secretary of Labor
or his duly authorized representative to inquire into the financial activities of
legitimate labor organizations upon the filing of a complaint under oath duly
supported by the written consent of 20% of the total membership of the labor
organization concerned, as well as to examine their books of accounts and other
records to determine compliance or non-compliance with the law. All of these
provisions are designed to safeguard the funds of a labor organization that they may
not be squandered or frittered away by its officers or by third persons to the
detriment of its members.
Lastly, Department Order No. 9 only dispenses with books of account as a
requirement for registration of a local or chapter of a national union or
federation. As provided by Article 241 (h) and (j), a labor organization must still
maintain books of account, but it need not submit the same as a requirement for
registration. Given the foregoing disquisition, we find no cogent reason to declare
Department Order No. 9 null and void, as well as to reverse the assailed resolution of
the Secretary of Labor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the resolution of the Secretary of Labor dated
February 27, 1998 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INTERNATIONAL GOLF CLUB
INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS
EMPLOYEES UNION-PGTWO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Before this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 is the petition of the
Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club Incorporated (THIGCI) assailing
the February 15, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals denying its petition to
annul the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Resolutions of
November 12, 1998 and December 29, 1998.
On October 16, 1997, the Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union
(THEU)Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO),
Local Chapter No. 776, a legitimate labor organization said to represent
majority of the rank-and-file employees of THIGCI, filed a petition for
certification election before the DOLE Mediation-Arbitration Unit, Regional
Branch No. IV.
THIGCI, in its Comment[1] filed on November 27, 1997, opposed THEUs
petition for certification election on the ground that the list of union members
submitted by it was defective and fatally flawed as it included the names and
signatures of supervisors, resigned, terminated and absent without leave
(AWOL) employees, as well as employees of The Country Club, Inc., a
corporation distinct and separate from THIGCI; and that out of the 192
signatories to the petition, only 71 were actual rank-and-file employees of
THIGCI.
THIGCI thus submitted a list of the names of its 71 actual rank-and-file
employees which it annexed[2] to its Comment to the petition for certification
election. And it therein incorporated the following tabulation[3] showing the
number of signatories to said petition whose membership in the union was
being questioned as disqualified and the reasons for disqualification:
# of Signatures Reasons for Disqualification
13 Supervisors of THIGCI
6 Resigned employees of THIGCI
2 AWOL employees of THIGCI
53 Rank-and-file employees of The Country Club at
Tagaytay Highlands, Inc.
14 Supervisors of The Country Club at Tagaytay
Highlands, Inc.
6 Resigned employees of The Country Club at
Tagaytay Highlands, Inc.
3 Terminated employees of The Country Club at
Tagaytay Highlands, Inc.
1 AWOL employees of The Country Club at Tagaytay
Highlands, Inc.
4 Signatures that cannot be deciphered
16 Names in list that were erased
2 Names with first names only
THIGCI also alleged that some of the signatures in the list of union
members were secured through fraudulent and deceitful means, and
submitted copies of the handwritten denial and withdrawal of some of its
employees from participating in the petition.[4]
Replying to THIGCIs Comment, THEU asserted that it had complied
with all the requirements for valid affiliation and inclusion in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations pursuant to DOLE Department Order No. 9,
series of 1997,[5] on account of which it was duly granted a Certification of
Affiliation by DOLE on October 10, 1997;[6] and that Section 5, Rule V of said
Department Order provides that the legitimacy of its registration cannot be
subject to collateral attack, and for as long as there is no final order of
cancellation, it continues to enjoy the rights accorded to a legitimate
organization.
THEU thus concluded in its Reply[7] that under the circumstances, the
Med-Arbiter should, pursuant to Article 257 of the Labor Code and Section
11, Rule XI of DOLE Department Order No. 09, automatically order the
conduct of a certification election.
 By Order of January 28, 1998, [8] DOLE Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin
ordered the holding of a certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of THIGCI in this wise, quoted verbatim:
We evaluated carefully this instant petition and we are of the
opinion that it is complete in form and substance. In addition
thereto, the accompanying documents show that indeed
petitioner union is a legitimate labor federation and its
local/chapter was duly reported to this Office as one of its
affiliate local/chapter. Its due reporting through the
submission of all the requirements for registration of a
local/chapter is a clear showing that it was already included
in the roster of legitimate labor organizations in this Office
pursuant to Department Order No. 9 Series of 1997 with all
the legal right and personality to institute this instant
petition. Pursuant therefore to the provisions of Article 257 of
the Labor Code, as amended, and its Implementing Rules as
amended by Department Order No. 9, since the respondents
establishment is unorganized, the holding of a certification
election is mandatory for it was clearly established that
petitioner is a legitimate labor organization. Giving due
course to this petition is therefore proper and
appropriate.[9] (Emphasis supplied)
Passing on THIGCIs allegation that some of the union members are
supervisory, resigned and AWOL employees or employees of a separate and
distinct corporation, the Med-Arbiter held that the same should be properly
raised in the exclusion-inclusion proceedings at the pre-election
conference. As for the allegation that some of the signatures were secured
through fraudulent and deceitful means, he held that it should be coursed
through an independent petition for cancellation of union registration which is
within the jurisdiction of the DOLE Regional Director. In any event, the Med-
Arbiter held that THIGCI failed to submit the job descriptions of the
questioned employees and other supporting documents to bolster its
claim that they are disqualified from joining THEU.
THIGCI appealed to the Office of the DOLE Secretary which, by
Resolution of June 4, 1998, set aside the said Med-Arbiters Order and
accordingly dismissed the petition for certification election on the ground that
there is a clear absence of community or mutuality of interests, it finding that
THEU sought to represent two separate bargaining units (supervisory
employees and rank-and-file employees) as well as employees of two
separate and distinct corporate entities.
Upon Motion for Reconsideration by THEU, DOLE Undersecretary
Rosalinda Dimalipis-Baldoz, by authority of the DOLE Secretary, issued
DOLE Resolution of November 12, 1998[10]setting aside the June 4, 1998
Resolution dismissing the petition for certification election. In the November
12, 1998 Resolution, Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz held that since THEU
is a local chapter, the twenty percent (20%) membership requirement is not
necessary for it to acquire legitimate status, hence, the alleged retraction and
withdrawal of support by 45 of the 70 remaining rank-and-file members . . .
cannot negate the legitimacy it has already acquired before the petition; that
rather than disregard the legitimate status already conferred on THEU by the
Bureau of Labor Relations, the names of alleged disqualified supervisory
employees and employees of the Country Club, Inc., a separate and distinct
corporation, should simply be removed from the THEUs roster of
membership; and that regarding the participation of alleged resigned and
AWOL employees and those whose signatures are illegible, the issue can be
resolved during the inclusion-exclusion proceedings at the pre-election stage.
The records of the case were thus ordered remanded to the Office of
the Med-Arbiter for the conduct of certification election.
THIGCIs Motion for Reconsideration of the November 12, 1998
Resolution having been denied by the DOLE Undersecretary by Resolution
of December 29, 1998,[11] it filed a petition for certiorari before this Court
which, by Resolution of April 14, 1999,[12] referred it to the Court of Appeals
in line with its pronouncement in National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Hon.
Bienvenido E. Laguesma, et al.,[13] and in strict observance of the hierarchy
of courts, as emphasized in the case of St. Martin Funeral Home v. National
Labor Relations Commission.[14]
By Decision of February 15, 2000,[15] the Court of Appeals denied
THIGCIs Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the DOLE Resolution dated
November 12, 1998. It held that while a petition for certification election is an
exception to the innocent bystander rule, hence, the employer may pray for
the dismissal of such petition on the basis of lack of mutuality of interests of
the members of the union as well as lack of employer-employee relationship
following this Courts ruling in Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota
Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union et al[16] and Dunlop Slazenger
[Phils.] v. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment et al,[17] petitioner failed
to adduce substantial evidence to support its allegations.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, raising the following
ISSUES/ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE RESOLUTION DATED 12 NOVEMER 1998 HOLDING THAT
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES AND NON-EMPLOYEES
COULD SIMPLY BE REMOVED FROM APPELLEES ROSTER OF
RANK-AND-FILE MEMBERSHIP INSTEAD OF RESOLVING THE
LEGITIMACY OF RESPONDENT UNIONS STATUS
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE RESOLUTION DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1998 HOLDING
THAT THE DISQUALIFIED EMPLOYEES STATUS COULD
READILY BE RESOLVED DURING THE INCLUSION AND
EXCLUSION PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONER HAD
BEEN DULY PROVEN BY FAILURE OF RESPONDENT UNION
TO DENY THE SAME AND BY THE SHEER WEIGHT OF
EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY PETITIONER AND CONTAINED IN
THE RECORDS OF THE CASE[18]
The statutory authority for the exclusion of supervisory employees in a
rank-and-file union, and vice-versa, is Article 245 of the Labor Code, to wit:
Article 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any
labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
While above-quoted Article 245 expressly prohibits supervisory
employees from joining a rank-and-file union, it does not provide what would
be the effect if a rank-and-file union counts supervisory employees among its
members, or vice-versa.
Citing Toyota[19] which held that a labor organization composed of both
rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all, and
the subsequent case of Progressive Development Corp. Pizza Hut v.
Ledesma[20] which held that:
The Labor Code requires that in organized and unorganized
establishments, a petition for certification election must be
filed by a legitimate labor organization.The acquisition of
rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right
to file a petition for certification election, first and foremost,
depends on whether or not the labor organization has attained
the status of a legitimate labor organization.
In the case before us, the Med-Arbiter summarily disregarded
the petitioners prayer that the former look into the legitimacy
of the respondent Union by a sweeping declaration that the
union was in the possession of a charter certificate so that
for all intents and purposes, Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa sa
Pizza Hut (was) a legitimate organization,[21] (Underscoring
and emphasis supplied),
petitioner contends that, quoting Toyota, [i]t becomes necessary . . .,
anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to inquire
into the composition of any labor organization whenever the status of the
labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor
Code.[22]
Continuing, petitioner argues that without resolving the status of THEU,
the DOLE Undersecretary conveniently deferred the resolution on the serious
infirmity in the membership of [THEU] and ordered the holding of the
certification election which is frowned upon as the following ruling of this
Court shows:
We also do not agree with the ruling of the respondent
Secretary of Labor that the infirmity in the membership of the
respondent union can be remedied in the pre-election
conference thru the exclusion-inclusion proceedings wherein
those employees who are occupying rank-and-file positions
will be excluded from the list of eligible voters. Public
respondent gravely misappreciated the basic antipathy
between the interest of supervisors and the interest of rank-
and-file employees. Due to the irreconcilability of their
interest we held in Toyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motors
Philippines Corporation Labor Union, viz:
xxx
Clearly, based on this provision [Article 245], a labor
organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory
employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any
guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not being
one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file
and supervisory employees cannot posses any of the rights of
a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a
petition for certification election for the purpose of collective
bargaining. It becomes necessary, therefore, anterior to the
granting of an order allowing a certification election, to
inquire into the composition of any labor organization
whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged
on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor Code. (Emphasis by
petitioner) (Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.), v. Secretary of Labor,
300 SCRA 120 [1998]; Underscoring and emphasis supplied by
petitioner.)
The petition fails. After a certificate of registration is issued to a union,
its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may be
questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance
with Section 5 of Rule V, Book IV of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code
(Implementing Rules) which section reads:
Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or
workers association shall be deemed registered and vested
with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate
of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be
subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an
independent petition for cancellation in accordance with
these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
The grounds for cancellation of union registration are provided for under
Article 239 of the Labor Code, as follows:
Art. 239. Grounds for cancellation of union registration. The
following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union
registration:
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection
with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-
laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and
the list of members who took part in the ratification;
(b) Failure to submit the documents mentioned in the
preceding paragraph within thirty (30) days from adoption or
ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto;
(c) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection
with the election of officers, minutes of the election of
officers, the list of voters, or failure to subject these
documents together with the list of the newly
elected/appointed officers and their postal addresses within
thirty (30) days from election;
(d) Failure to submit the annual financial report to the Bureau
within thirty (30) days after the losing of every fiscal year and
misrepresentation, false entries or fraud in the preparation of
the financial report itself;
(e) Acting as a labor contractor or engaging in the cabo
system, or otherwise engaging in any activity prohibited by
law;
(f) Entering into collective bargaining agreements which
provide terms and conditions of employment below minimum
standards established by law;
(g) Asking for or accepting attorneys fees or negotiation fees
from employers;
(h) Other than for mandatory activities under this Code,
checking off special assessments or any other fees without
duly signed individual written authorizations of the members;
(i) Failure to submit list of individual members to the Bureau
once a year or whenever required by the Bureau; and
(j) Failure to comply with the requirements under Articles 237
and 238, (Emphasis supplied),
while the procedure for cancellation of registration is provided for in Rule VIII,
Book V of the Implementing Rules.
The inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the
grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections
(a) and (c) of Article 239 of above-quoted Article 239 of the Labor Code.
THEU, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be
considered to have already acquired juridical personality which may not be
assailed collaterally.
As for petitioners allegation that some of the signatures in the petition
for certification election were obtained through fraud, false statement and
misrepresentation, the proper procedure is, as reflected above, for it to file a
petition for cancellation of the certificate of registration, and not to intervene
in a petition for certification election.
Regarding the alleged withdrawal of union members from participating
in the certification election, this Courts following ruling is instructive:
[T]he best forum for determining whether there were indeed
retractions from some of the laborers is in the certification
election itself wherein the workers can freely express their
choice in a secret ballot. Suffice it to say that the will of the
rank-and-file employees should in every possible instance be
determined by secret ballot rather than by administrative or
quasi-judicial inquiry. Such representation and certification
election cases are not to be taken as contentious litigations
for suits but as mere investigations of a non-adversary, fact-
finding character as to which of the competing unions
represents the genuine choice of the workers to be their sole
and exclusive collective bargaining representative with their
employer.[23]
As for the lack of mutuality of interest argument of petitioner, it, at all
events, does not lie given, as found by the court a quo, its failure to present
substantial evidence that the assailed employees are actually occupying
supervisory positions.
While petitioner submitted a list of its employees with their
corresponding job titles and ranks,[24] there is nothing mentioned about the
supervisors respective duties, powers and prerogatives that would show that
they can effectively recommend managerial actions which require the use of
independent judgment.[25]
As this Court put it in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary
of Labor:[26]
Designation should be reconciled with the actual job
description of subject employees x x x The mere fact that an
employee is designated manager does not necessarily make
him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd situation where
one can be given the title just to be deprived of the right to be
a member of a union. In the case of National Steel
Corporation vs. Laguesma (G. R. No. 103743, January 29,
1996), it was stressed that:
What is essential is the nature of the employees function and
not the nomenclature or title given to the job which
determines whether the employee has rank-and-file or
managerial status or whether he is a supervisory
employee. (Emphasis supplied).[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Let the records of the
case be remanded to the office of origin, the Mediation-Arbitration Unit,
Regional Branch No. IV, for the immediate conduct of a certification election
subject to the usual pre-election conference.