1
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him
or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May
15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23
and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant
to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are
also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration
of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as
when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of
the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it
now provides:
2
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the
parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections
to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be
able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a
foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they
got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained
a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where
the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
3
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering
that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record,
we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
 4

had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such

declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
RESOLUTION
peralta, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12,
2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43,
in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition
for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a
judgment of divorce Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April
25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week
for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial
hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the
trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the
Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
5
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed
questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the
allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted.
The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national
named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and
after die proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by
the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce
Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her
daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry
of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former
Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not
appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is
no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered
and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of
entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already
dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the
said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden
surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan
for her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to
be sufficient in form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 -
March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of
Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling
that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined
that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over
issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination
of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo
who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling
that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer
married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the
divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v.
Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was
dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
6
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the
marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which
terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules
exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital
bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute
divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is
allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines,
which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued
on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a
second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted
by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and
approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. 19 As
modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
her to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts
to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity,
our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the
children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our
courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his
or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because
he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national
law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who,
under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even
after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands')
national laws and perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case
where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen
and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining
7
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the
recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court
and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order
that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the
event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed
by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its
legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint
custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued
his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who
exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding
following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to
reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but
it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not
to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law,
but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are
not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled
the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit
for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his
submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in
this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint
was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to
render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and
to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On
his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada
court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if
the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
8
tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in
the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his
own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from
Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese
national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared
the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national,
void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife
of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the

spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of
law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage
included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a
spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under
Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.
x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly
filed for divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition
before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the
petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,
et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA
for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve
the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When
this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody
and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one
of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to
remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe
fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and
the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from
the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal
status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the
divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as
she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that
that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law,
but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is,
therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the
same.
9
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the
one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in
the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there
should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted
to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart
from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. 39 Law have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which
the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an
absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is
free to marry under the laws of his or her countr. 42 Whether the Filipino spouse
initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed

by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's
national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found
under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact,
the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may
provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression
to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature
only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification
and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice,
such classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops
where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties,
and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If
a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and
the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press,
assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote. 49 On the other hand,
what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 50 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way,
such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare. 51 It
essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides
individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter. 52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle
applies with respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of
law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites 53 of the equal protection
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary,
and whimsical classification.
10
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino
who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial
differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic
cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien
spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained
abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree
obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree
upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and
foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and
obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it
not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality
in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a
Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if
based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In
filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of
invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be
governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that
Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the
severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism
now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance
of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in
detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's
case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of
our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26
encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the
indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce
proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn
to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of
good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable
presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that
a person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in
was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute
any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or
she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that
interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that
Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they
are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not
for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national.
In one case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not
and cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt
to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live
together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not,
and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise,
such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. 63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 64 Nevertheless,
it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner
Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G.
Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
11
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be
understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make
this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My
intention was primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not
necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce,
my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of
prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11,
1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery
on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act
No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the
authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese
Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the
Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce
Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute
divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one
year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse
against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable,
and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the
Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and
Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. 70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the
Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet
17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in
the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303
entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House
Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on
Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill,
the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified
or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in
such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than
six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of
respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person
other than one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the
mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a
similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of
rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common
child or a child of a petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for
more than one (1) year.
12
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2)
years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce
based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated
as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled
was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the
marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or
personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage
with the other and such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable;
and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to
be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the
marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the
time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly
improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the
Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the
celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or
transition from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for
absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total
breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at
reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary
to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as
an institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government
can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can
neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus
establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for country. 77 While
marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are
governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in
total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside
from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend,
among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation
s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children
are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence.
In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate,
the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No
9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
13
10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in
protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social
institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the
dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If
We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the
existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that
he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of
the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to
suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few
of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are
to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the
principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution
is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by
marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon.
Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that
imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. 83 Living in a flawed
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full
human potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a
marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages
and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v.
San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent

of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a
way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its
cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words
of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate
this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for
decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that
it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered
by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
14
foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. 89 The fact
of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act
or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of
the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued
by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of
Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the
Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject
Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese
Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the
existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit
an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
 15

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power
of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. 96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent
Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall
squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18,
2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court
of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 119602 October 6, 2000
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the lower court in CA-G.R. CV No.
36821, entitled "Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd., plaintiff-appellant, versus Philippine
President Lines, Inc., defendant-appellant."
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine
President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz,
Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the
vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official
pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to
navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. 1 He was asked to pilot
the said vessel on February 11, 19882 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.3
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the
bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel's third mate (then the officer on
watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port4 at 1:40 a.m. on February
12, 1988.5 Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way.6
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque
Channel at mile 172.7 The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the
watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. 8
Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some vibrations. 9 These
occurred at 4:12 a.m.10 It was then that the watch officer called the master to the
bridge.11
The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel12 and verified that it was in
the centre of the channel.13 He then went to confirm, or set down, the position of
the vessel on the chart.14 He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the
President Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks.15
16
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River,16 thus
obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner
Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that
day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and
Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for
damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US
$400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation. The complaint
against Pioneer Insurance Company was dismissed in an Order dated November
7, 1988.17
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the following facts:
"1. The jurisdictional facts, as specified in their respective pleadings;
"2. That defendant PPL was the owner of the vessel Philippine Roxas at
the time of the incident;
"3. That defendant Pioneer Insurance was the insurance underwriter for
defendant PPL;
"4. That plaintiff Wildvalley Shipping Co., Inc. is the owner of the vessel
Malandrinon, whose passage was obstructed by the vessel Philippine
Roxas at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, as specified in par. 4, page 2 of the
complaint;
"5. That on February 12, 1988, while the Philippine Roxas was navigating
the channel at Puerto Ordaz, the said vessel grounded and as a result,
obstructed navigation at the channel;
"6. That the Orinoco River in Puerto Ordaz is a compulsory pilotage
channel;
"7. That at the time of the incident, the vessel, Philippine Roxas, was
under the command of the pilot Ezzar Solarzano, assigned by the
government thereat, but plaintiff claims that it is under the command of the
master;

"8. The plaintiff filed a case in Middleburg, Holland which is related to the
present case;
"9. The plaintiff caused the arrest of the Philippine Collier, a vessel owned
by the defendant PPL;
"10. The Orinoco River is 150 miles long and it takes approximately 12
hours to navigate out of the said river;
"11. That no security for the plaintiff's claim was given until after the
Philippine Collier was arrested; and
"12. That a letter of guarantee, dated 12-May-88 was issued by the
Steamship Mutual Underwriters Ltd."18
The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of the petitioner,
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, ordering defendant
Philippine President Lines, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of U.S. $259,243.43,
as actual and compensatory damages, and U.S. $162,031.53, as expenses
incurred abroad for its foreign lawyers, plus additional sum of U.S. $22,000.00, as
and for attorney's fees of plaintiff's local lawyer, and to pay the cost of this suit.
"Defendant's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."19
Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-award of interest with the
private respondent questioning the decision on the merits of the case.
After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals came out with its
questioned decision dated June 14, 1994,20 the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding defendant-appellant's appeal to be meritorious, judgment
is hereby rendered reversing the Decision of the lower court. Plaintiff-appellant's
Complaint is dismissed and it is ordered to pay defendant-appellant the amount of
Three Hundred Twenty-three Thousand, Forty-two Pesos and Fifty-three Centavos
(₱323,042.53) as and for attorney's fees plus cost of suit. Plaintiff-appellant's
appeal is DISMISSED.
17
"SO ORDERED."21
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 22 but the same was denied for lack of
merit in the resolution dated March 29, 1995.23
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner assigns the following errors to the court a quo:
1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW NO FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE
CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE MASTER NOR THE OWNER OF THE
"PHILIPPINE ROXAS" FOR THE GROUNDING OF SAID VESSEL
RESULTING IN THE BLOCKAGE OF THE RIO ORINOCO;
2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT
CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE;
3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" IS SEAWORTHY;
4. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING VENEZUELAN LAW DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
SAME HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY PROVED IN THE TRIAL COURT
WITHOUT ANY OBJECTION FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND
WHOSE OBJECTION WAS INTERPOSED BELATEDLY ON APPEAL;
5. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WITHOUT ANY FAIR OR REASONABLE BASIS
WHATSOEVER;
6. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S CAUSE IS MERITORIOUS HENCE,
PETITIONER SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS
AND INTEREST.
The petition is without merit.
The primary issue to be determined is whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable
to the case at bar.

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.24
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten
law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, the entire provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law
sought to be proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is
admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts
of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.25
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office." (Underscoring supplied)
The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent
evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign
law.26
In the noted case of Willamette Iron & Steel Works vs. Muzzal,27 it was held that:
"… Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, since the
year 1918 under oath, quoted verbatim section 322 of the California Civil Code and
stated that said section was in force at the time the obligations of defendant to the
plaintiff were incurred, i.e. on November 5, 1928 and December 22, 1928. This
evidence sufficiently established the fact that the section in question was the law of
the State of California on the above dates. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of
our Code of Civil Procedure will convince one that these sections do not exclude
the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign
law.
"`The foreign law is a matter of fact …You ask the witness what the law is; he may,
from his recollection, or on producing and referring to books, say what it is.' (Lord
Campbell concurring in an opinion of Lord Chief Justice Denman in a well-known
18
English case where a witness was called upon to prove the Roman laws of
marriage and was permitted to testify, though he referred to a book containing the
decrees of the Council of Trent as controlling, Jones on Evidence, Second Edition,
Volume 4, pages 3148-3152.) x x x."
We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the Assistant
Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, 28 to testify on the
existence of the Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of
Venezuela)29 and the Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules
governing the navigation of the Orinoco River). Captain Monzon has held the
aforementioned posts for eight years.30 As such he is in charge of designating the
pilots for maneuvering and navigating the Orinoco River. He is also in charge of
the documents that come into the office of the harbour masters.31
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner
provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta
Oficial32 of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was
presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a book
issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela.33 Only a photocopy of
the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public
documents for they are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of
Venezuela.34
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites
are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the
records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or
consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.35 The latter
requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full
faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country.36
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de
Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon
attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a
certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who
had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or

legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by
the seal of his office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such
certificate could be found in the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written
law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign
statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly
authenticated copy of the statute.37
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded
before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading
about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the
event or transaction in issue.38
A review of the Complaint39 revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite
the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the
territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the
laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own
local or domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.40
Having cleared this point, we now proceed to a thorough study of the errors
assigned by the petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that there was negligence on the part of the private respondent
that would warrant the award of damages.
There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to give
only the diligence required of a good father of a family in accordance with the
provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil Code, thus:
"Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence
shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
19
"If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required."
The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which an
ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his own property. This we
have found private respondent to have exercised when the vessel sailed only after
the "main engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries" were checked and found to
be in good running condition;41 when the master left a competent officer, the officer
on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco
River; when the master ordered the inspection of the vessel's double bottom tanks
when the vibrations occurred anew.42
The Philippine rules on pilotage, embodied in Philippine Ports Authority
Administrative Order No. 03-85, otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations
Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine
Ports enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a master of a vessel and its pilot,
among other things.
The pertinent provisions of the said administrative order governing these persons
are quoted hereunder:
"Sec. 11. Control of Vessels and Liability for Damage. -- On compulsory pilotage
grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for
the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his
negligence or fault. He can be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by
force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra
diligence to prevent or minimize the damage.
"The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds
whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot
on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at
ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility
and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to
recourse against said Master.
"Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined
by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.
"x x x
"Sec. 32. Duties and Responsibilities of the Pilots or Pilots’ Association. -- The
duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:

"x x x
"f) A pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he
assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely;
Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master
neglects or refuses to carry out his order."
The Code of Commerce likewise provides for the obligations expected of a captain
of a vessel, to wit:
"Art. 612. The following obligations shall be inherent in the office of captain:
"x x x
"7. To be on deck on reaching land and to take command on entering and leaving
ports, canals, roadsteads, and rivers, unless there is a pilot on board discharging
his duties. x x x."
The law is very explicit. The master remains the overall commander of the vessel
even when there is a pilot on board. He remains in control of the ship as he can
still perform the duties conferred upon him by law43 despite the presence of a pilot
who is temporarily in charge of the vessel. It is not required of him to be on the
bridge while the vessel is being navigated by a pilot.
However, Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, provides:
"Sec. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service - For entering a harbor and anchoring
thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as
docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another,
every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory
pilotage.
"xxx."
The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the engaging
of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal, bank, deep and
shallow ends of the river. In his deposition, pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez testified
that he is an official pilot in the Harbour at Port Ordaz, Venezuela, 44 and that he
had been a pilot for twelve (12) years.45 He also had experience in navigating the
waters of the Orinoco River.46
20
The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the order or
command of the harbor pilot on board. The master of the Philippine Roxas deemed
it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop the vessel, 47 mayhap, because the latter
had assured him that they were navigating normally before the grounding of the
vessel.48 Moreover, the pilot had admitted that on account of his experience he
was very familiar with the configuration of the river as well as the course headings,
and that he does not even refer to river charts when navigating the Orinoco
River.49
Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the master chose
not to regain control of the ship. Admitting his limited knowledge of the Orinoco
River, Captain Colon relied on the knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to
guide the vessel safely.
"Licensed pilots, enjoying the emoluments of compulsory pilotage, are in a different
class from ordinary employees, for they assume to have a skill and a knowledge of
navigation in the particular waters over which their licenses extend superior to that
of the master; pilots are bound to use due diligence and reasonable care and skill.
A pilot's ordinary skill is in proportion to the pilot's responsibilities, and implies a
knowledge and observance of the usual rules of navigation, acquaintance with the
waters piloted in their ordinary condition, and nautical skill in avoiding all known
obstructions. The character of the skill and knowledge required of a pilot in charge
of a vessel on the rivers of a country is very different from that which enables a
navigator to carry a vessel safely in the ocean. On the ocean, a knowledge of the
rules of navigation, with charts that disclose the places of hidden rocks, dangerous
shores, or other dangers of the way, are the main elements of a pilot's knowledge
and skill. But the pilot of a river vessel, like the harbor pilot, is selected for the
individual's personal knowledge of the topography through which the vessel is
steered."50
We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. When the
vibrations were first felt the watch officer asked him what was going on, and pilot
Vasquez replied that "(they) were in the middle of the channel and that the
vibration was as (sic) a result of the shallowness of the channel."51
Pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez was assigned to pilot the vessel Philippine Roxas
as well as other vessels on the Orinoco River due to his knowledge of the same. In
his experience as a pilot, he should have been aware of the portions which are
shallow and which are not. His failure to determine the depth of the said river and
his decision to plod on his set course, in all probability, caused damage to the
vessel. Thus, we hold him as negligent and liable for its grounding.

In the case of Homer Ramsdell Transportation Company vs. La Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406, it was held that:
"x x x The master of a ship, and the owner also, is liable for any injury done by the
negligence of the crew employed in the ship. The same doctrine will apply to the
case of a pilot employed by the master or owner, by whose negligence any injury
happens to a third person or his property: as, for example, by a collision with
another ship, occasioned by his negligence. And it will make no difference in the
case that the pilot, if any is employed, is required to be a licensed pilot; provided
the master is at liberty to take a pilot, or not, at his pleasure, for in such a case the
master acts voluntarily, although he is necessarily required to select from a
particular class. On the other hand, if it is compulsive upon the master to take a
pilot, and, a fortiori, if he is bound to do so under penalty, then, and in such
case, neither he nor the owner will be liable for injuries occasioned by the
negligence of the pilot; for in such a case the pilot cannot be deemed properly
the servant of the master or the owner, but is forced upon them, and the
maxim Qui facit per alium facit per se does not apply." (Underscoring supplied)
Anent the river passage plan, we find that, while there was none, 52 the voyage has
been sufficiently planned and monitored as shown by the following actions
undertaken by the pilot, Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez, to wit: contacting the radio
marina via VHF for information regarding the channel, river traffic, 53 soundings of
the river, depth of the river, bulletin on the buoys. 54 The officer on watch also
monitored the voyage.55
We, therefore, do not find the absence of a river passage plan to be the cause for
the grounding of the vessel.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the case at bar because the
circumstances surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate negligence on the part
of the private respondent. For the said doctrine to apply, the following conditions
must be met: (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference
that it would not have happened except for defendant's negligence; (2) the
accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured. 56
As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of control over the
ship from the master of the vessel to the pilot on a compulsory pilotage channel.
Thus, two of the requisites necessary for the doctrine to apply, i.e., negligence and
control, to render the respondent liable, are absent.
21
As to the claim that the ship was unseaworthy, we hold that it is not.
The Lloyd’s Register of Shipping confirmed the vessel’s seaworthiness in a
Confirmation of Class issued on February 16, 1988 by finding that "the above
named ship (Philippine Roxas) maintained the class "+100A1 Strengthened for
Ore Cargoes, Nos. 2 and 8 Holds may be empty (CC) and +LMC" from 31/12/87
up until the time of casualty on or about 12/2/88."57 The same would not have been
issued had not the vessel been built according to the standards set by Lloyd's.
Samuel Lim, a marine surveyor, at Lloyd's Register of Shipping testified thus:
"Q Now, in your opinion, as a surveyor, did top side tank have any bearing at all to
the seaworthiness of the vessel?
"A Well, judging on this particular vessel, and also basing on the class record of
the vessel, wherein recommendations were made on the top side tank, and it was
given sufficient time to be repaired, it means that the vessel is fit to travel even with
those defects on the ship.
"COURT
What do you mean by that? You explain. The vessel is fit to travel even with
defects? Is that what you mean? Explain.
"WITNESS
"A Yes, your Honor. Because the class society which register (sic) is the third party
looking into the condition of the vessel and as far as their record states, the vessel
was class or maintained, and she is fit to travel during that voyage."
"x x x
"ATTY. MISA
Before we proceed to other matter, will you kindly tell us what is (sic) the 'class
+100A1 Strengthened for Ore Cargoes', mean?
"WITNESS
"A Plus 100A1 means that the vessel was built according to Lloyd's rules and she
is capable of carrying ore bulk cargoes, but she is particularly capable of carrying
Ore Cargoes with No. 2 and No. 8 holds empty.
 22

"x x x "(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
"COURT
"x x x"
The vessel is classed, meaning?
Due to the unfounded filing of this case, the private respondent was unjustifiably
"A Meaning she is fit to travel, your Honor, or seaworthy." 58 forced to litigate, thus the award of attorney’s fees was proper.

It is not required that the vessel must be perfect. To be seaworthy, a ship must be WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the
reasonably fit to perform the services, and to encounter the ordinary perils of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 36821 is AFFIRMED.
voyage, contemplated by the parties to the policy.59
SO ORDERED.
As further evidence that the vessel was seaworthy, we quote the deposition of pilot
Vasquez:

"Q Was there any instance when your orders or directions were not complied with
because of the inability of the vessel to do so?

"A No.

"Q. Was the vessel able to respond to all your commands and orders?

"A. The vessel was navigating normally."60

Eduardo P. Mata, Second Engineer of the Philippine Roxas submitted an accident

report wherein he stated that on February 11, 1988, he checked and prepared the
main engine, machineries and all other auxiliaries and found them all to be in good
running condition and ready for maneuvering. That same day the main engine,
bridge and engine telegraph and steering gear motor were also tested. 61 Engineer
Mata also prepared the fuel for consumption for maneuvering and checked the
engine generators.62

Finally, we find the award of attorney’s fee justified.1âwphi1

Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides that:

"Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

"x x x

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31
January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2
March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed
the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May
2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court
in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
23
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The
RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section
5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of
the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in
this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right
or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of
Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and

Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to
void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not,
of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing
marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a
bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to Article 413
of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of
the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to
cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to
annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court
"gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper
venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the
concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to
dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative
to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have
"immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
24
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the proceeding
because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the other
hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this
case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x
which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza
v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in
Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has
no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack
such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional
ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section
529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal"
of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated
through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in
such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the
one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as
the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of
the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the
civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure
to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons"
in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words,
"[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x." 38 The
Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino
citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43 Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. 44 On the other hand,
Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
25
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in
a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its
provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will
litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original
cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent
with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law.
Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition
by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of
such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or
final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited
review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
26
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution
of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3
of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant
to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence
such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As
noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in

the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of
law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage
include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under
Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the
substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any
case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by
limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by
law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife
under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one
who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
27
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution
for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention
of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of
nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue
on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the
suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as
the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a
court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this
Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition
for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the

investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act
of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of
the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of
Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the
anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in
the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in
the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in
28
the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which
declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage
on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare
the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the
Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between
the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to
undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine
courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
 29

clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already
"presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition
of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is

without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he
term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to
address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under
Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon
City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December
11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather
silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing
of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
30
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare
null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons
who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for
review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state
the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and
correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal
effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of
petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence
of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to
Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds
from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable
social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by
the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract
of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping
and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their
privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma
was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now
desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to
what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses
from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period
or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being
lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should
be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should
not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later
use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless
the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to
be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
31
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage,
the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining
persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars
thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . .
.
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited
the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period.
Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or
where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the
having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that
they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time
of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even
assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both
Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted
for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that
is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered
by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab
initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be
applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of
either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and
persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be
the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to
such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as
well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous
and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it
is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a
judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage
void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for
the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by
the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances,
32
the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon
the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either
or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is
not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a
final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the
action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause
of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement
of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This
is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both
bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant
complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court,
Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta
Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that marriage.2 On 22
March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized
said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living
together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known
that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to
harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
33
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed.
Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the
dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein
invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits 5 of the late Manzano
and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his
instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by
constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or
communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the
basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be
present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry
each other]; and
 34

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon
impediment to their marriage.6 respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note SO ORDERED.
that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it
was indicated that both were "separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a

diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. 7 In
fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was
married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And
respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting
previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits
which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code
allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately
from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise
stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de
facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano
and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife
for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another
person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals
who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption
from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he

solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law
excuses no one" has special application to judges, 8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and
basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary,
the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its
journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much
reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all
things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring
husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the
annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner
appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced
by the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the
Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South
Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's
mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first
night of their married life.
35
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened
on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can
enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his
mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join
them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this
period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together
in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March
15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to
Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on
January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal
and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was
asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as
he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant
using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his
mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and
to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage
shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with
his wife.
 36

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the
(3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988
between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science. Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between SO ORDERED.
them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have
sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking Hence, the instant petition.
and she did not like it. So he stopped.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff
filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will I
be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage. in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they
are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their II
differences.
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether totally absent.
he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of III
impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original incapacity of both.
size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
IV
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman. in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by
the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion
between them.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private
respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since
there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the
parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the
admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion
drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a
product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said
provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted
that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the
petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and
101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1,
Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage
to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties.
When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had
sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice
Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
37
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not
based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence
on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged
refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure
of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological
incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not
be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been
other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other
discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse
from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a
finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual
contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be
filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of
who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any
of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that
he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private
respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated
above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with
private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids
him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At
least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover
what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is
capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not

psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it
became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his
or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In
the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that
the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief.
Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989)
that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right
seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I
Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and
seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted
by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by
her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino
woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved
is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is
not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that
the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
38
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within
the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction
therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife
and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil.
1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared
less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery
of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private
respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in
each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in
addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a
marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity,
our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages
void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning
of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel
provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the
herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has
labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."
Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to
lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the
January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858
affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent
Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre
O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest
with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between
them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila,
39
and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel
some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be
to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order
to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel
could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage;
(2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals;
and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at
the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her
friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas,
a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as
Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only
during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void.
The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in
toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an
erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as
provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to
establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is
anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on
the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because
of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that
"the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee)
intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights.
. . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on
the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their
individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of
Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such
ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
40
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders
them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose
C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband
could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of
the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the
psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better
for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with
another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the
parties are psychologically unfit for each other but
they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their
professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.
While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it
merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts
of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art.
36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely,
the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and
Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee.
The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3,
1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
41
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor

a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
42
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the
petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing
guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists
and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only
because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel
Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4
January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was
psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in
a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not
support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must,
as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that

"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did
not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if
it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a
resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under
Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision
Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of
marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way
the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that
these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is
43
not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a
defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for
the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . .
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do
with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological
incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental
impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session
that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the
phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would
give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa
agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured
after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not
ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa
suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites
of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special
cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the
Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification
or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more
permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal
provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however,
recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the
Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null
and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection
and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing
the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another
marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those
laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married
couples have found themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds in the
eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under
44
state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages
or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that
the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of
psychological incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the
beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not
provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same
indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons
to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in
marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal
and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of
interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack
of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that
the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological
grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases
that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not
present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage.
The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself
had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was
paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of
serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the
ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological
expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's
entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not
amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting
link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a
legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer
be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand
the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability
to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders
that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or
the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing.
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of
psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development
of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves
to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must
be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love;
and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a
true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc.
45
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any
other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was
on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their
responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered
into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's
failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the
marriage was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were
not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of
Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return
home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years
is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and
subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court
upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the
presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner

husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a
fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his
wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn
refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the
lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on
Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse
to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and
subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on
the part of either or both of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the
bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No.
209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity"
was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
46
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law
Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision
was taken from Canon Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting
marriage; (those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given
and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to
the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several
provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining
the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the
Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons,
render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are
not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.

I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken
and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following
tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
47
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal,
to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and
support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36,
as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as
still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still
remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such
intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were otherwise,
there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The
fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal
command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so
much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court
there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory
unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have
them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is
quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has

not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or
convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only
because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel
Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4
January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was
psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in
a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not
support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must,
as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did
not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if
it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a
resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under
Art. 45 of the Family Code.
48
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision
Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of
marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way
the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that
these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is
not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a
defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for
the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . .
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do
with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological
incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental
impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session
that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to

discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the
phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would
give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa
agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured
after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not
ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa
suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites
of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special
cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the
Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification
or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more
49
permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal
provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however,
recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the
Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null
and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection
and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing
the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another
marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those
laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married
couples have found themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds in the
eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under
state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages
or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that
the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of
psychological incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the
beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not
provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same
indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons
to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in
marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal
and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of

interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack
of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that
the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological
grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases
that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not
present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage.
The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself
had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was
paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of
serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the
ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological
expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's
entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not
amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting
link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a
legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer
be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand
the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability
to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders
that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
50
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or
the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing.
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of
psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development
of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves
to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must
be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love;
and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a
true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any

other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was
on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their
responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered
into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's
failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the
marriage was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were
not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of
Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return
home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years
is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and
subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court
upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the
presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner
husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a
fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his
wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn
refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the
lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on
Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
51
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse
to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and
subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on
the part of either or both of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the
bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No.
209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity"
was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law
Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision
was taken from Canon Law.1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting
marriage; (those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given
and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to
the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several
provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining
the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the
Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons,
render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are
not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken
and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
52
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following
tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal,
to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and
support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36,
as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as
still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still
remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such
intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were otherwise,
there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The
 53

fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal
command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation

of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development. (The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so
much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court
there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory
unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have
them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is
quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has
not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or
convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge
Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel
were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11
August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the
couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together,
respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their
marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him
which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she
incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him
like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the
physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other
trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high
position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and
scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their
neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she
did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological
incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her
own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable
and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond
the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and
suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22)
years.
54
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with
her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories
against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife
and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and
family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors
despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a
happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness
stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents
never approved of his marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to
the seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were difficult years as they had a
hard time being accepted as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this
period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and temperamental5 to
him and his parents.6 She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became the
common source of their quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union as happy
during that period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were
engrossed in furnishing their new house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with law
school and with various community organizations, it was then that he felt that he
and his wife started to drift apart.9 He then narrated incidents during their marriage
that were greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife
quarreled with an elderly neighbor;10 when she would visit him in his office and
remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she kicked a trash can across
the room or when she threw a ballpen from his table;11 when she caused his office
drawer to be forcibly opened while he was away; 12 when she confronted a female
tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair with him; 13 and other
incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters
continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.14 Respondent Manuel could not forget
that he was not able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did
not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very generous when it
came to celebrations of their parish priest. 15 Respondent Manuel then denied that
he was a womanizer16 or that he had a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel
testified as to their conjugal properties and obligations. 18
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel’s Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner
Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuel’s office. 19 But when she was there, she
would call witness to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the

office.20 One time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through
respondent Manuel’s drawer looking for his address book while the latter was in
Subic attending a conference.21 When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked
drawer she called witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone
number of respondent’s hotel room in Subic. A process server was requested by
petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper. When the locksmith
arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked drawer. On another
occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner
Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka
anak mo yan sa labas?"22
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA
whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner
Juanita.23 From her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-
Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational
problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love,
support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is
secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita
had engaged themselves in a defective communication pattern which is
characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence
to maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who
are expected to use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and
differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical, argumentative,
depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance
and suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine
ego to cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused
to the detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize
the marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological
repertoire (along with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately
empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each other’s needs and
feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a
progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their
psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the
fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of
maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not
otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will
bring about more emotional mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid
55
sets of traits which were in existence before the marriage will tend to be
pervasive and impervious to recovery.25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel’s allegations. She
insisted that they were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they
were happily married until respondent Manuel started having extra-marital
affairs26 which he had admitted to her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she
would wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her husband.28 She
stated further that she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up
for him while he was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he
already filed the present case, she would still attend to his needs.29 She
remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent
Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new family. 30
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by
respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on
petitioner Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report. Said report
stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests,
respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature,
conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman who possess [sic]
more than enough psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long
term heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful of
traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was
also found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is
capable of enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu.
Finally, she is reality-oriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and
sound decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be
psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential
obligations of marriage.32
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the
Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other.33 The couple would religiously
attend prayer meetings in the community.34 Both were likewise leaders in their
community.35 Witness then stated that she would often go to the house of the
couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel there. 36
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuel’s petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part that:

The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not
preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily married
and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life
together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and
obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties’ relationship sometime in the
early 90’s when the defendant-wife started receiving letters that the
plaintiff is playing footsy.
xxx xxx xxx
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk
responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A
wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to
the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as
our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in
such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital
partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes
may sound like a firetruck.37
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May
2001.38
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly
on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita
psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals.39 Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there
is empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is – a shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other’s
feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening
the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love "amore gignit
amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise
conscious of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs.
Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
56
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set
aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not
only of defendant but also of himself.40
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred –
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL
LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE
FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The Court’s Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that
whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case.
Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as
there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court of Appeals
did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a
clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the
couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of their
wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had
coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained
the wife for the reason that an essential marital obligation under the Family Code is
procreation such that "the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity."

On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather,
we have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wife’s
outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wife’s obsession with cleanliness
and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of
support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book,
however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to
file a case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of Appeals44 we
expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or
clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by
experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
57
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.45
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of
whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL

We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted
in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. 46 With this cardinal
state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals 47 that the burden of
proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel
herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that
respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of
Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuel’s own evidence, contains candid
admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge whether
or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool,
intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he
has done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He is having extra
marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest
problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl
now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them
together in the car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file
the petition." She feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-
ulit," but, that she still is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really
psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy
should give me a chance to have a new family." She answered and said,
"Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage
natin."48
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital
obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation
of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be shown that
respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality
which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state51 and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own
flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had
[extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular point."52
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
58
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed
to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with
cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his
salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological
maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba,
whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported
that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and
essential obligations of marriage.54
The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other
hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctor’s
conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary,
the report clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is
traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as required by law – but from
her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as they
wanted their son to enter the priesthood,55 her husband’s philandering, admitted no
less by him,56 and her inability to conceive.57 Dr. Garcia’s report paints a story of a
husband and wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who pursued their
individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing
intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel
himself during his direct examination.58
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been
allowed a window into the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived therefrom a simple
case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the
husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere
showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel
might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is
 59

no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where
neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual
problem.61

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01
July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted
between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio
Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16,
1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of
the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but
he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer
residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed
an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial
court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons,
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general
circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a
responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a
60
motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that
no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence
submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted
respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to
support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner
Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL
and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are
ordered to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties
pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s psychological
incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to
fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his
daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the
needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the
Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his
wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such
behavior could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability
of entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a
decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law
and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment

is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court
a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month
after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to
support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for
two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the
letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to
see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to
no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to
Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically
asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party
to the cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution?
Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other
spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope
up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required
under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic
vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those
cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the
husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove
the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital
obligations, despite respondent’s failure to comply with the guidelines laid
down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his
insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His
behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling
61
short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and
incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the
guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of
the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides
that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita

vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
62
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshio’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and
support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent.
Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the
Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to
be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was
no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This
respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance
of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume
 63

psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not
apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband
being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we
find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be
lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of
studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social
institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with
respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated
August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004
DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE
IBRAHIM, Respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was
working in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship
and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City
Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.1 The civil marriage was ratified in a church
wedding on May 20, 1967.2
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18,
1968;3 Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David born on April
24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.6 The conjugal partnership,
nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible
and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a
dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential
Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr.
Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment,
Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named
Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children.
However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner
bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even
considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9,
1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two
children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1,
1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by
publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the
64
country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the
Philippines.7
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a
psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious,
hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed
up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she
committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing
with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity
and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.8
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages
between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September
28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential
obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is
dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property between
the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property
registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed
alleging that –
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A
CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and
ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.10
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January
8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and
manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological
incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner
falls short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent
adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological incapacity?"
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
65
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state
of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.13
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a
very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition.
In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
thereof.14 It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful
marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced
four children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be
equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.
 66

At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal
separation under Article 5517 of the Family Code. However, we pointed out
in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void.

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction
to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do
so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic
Church.

All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate
court.1âwphi1 We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of
petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this
case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.19 While we sympathize with petitioner’s marital predicament,
our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be. 20

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17
July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel
Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now
invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the
Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the
Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for
Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before
Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at
the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a
baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not
last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally,
the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when
and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with
his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a
nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
67
departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United
States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried
to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional
trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage
Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons
was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the
complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner
who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their
marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to
the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating
that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial
court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular
28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly
show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own
words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which
has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice
(Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient
use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in
the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed
that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in
judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He
added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable.
Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more
serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would
make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable.
Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to
read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in
sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but
lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
68
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a
psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground
for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of
consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable
marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to
the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the
word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred.
Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to
psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact
that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the
Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added
that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon
Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is
precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage
cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a
ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if
such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read
"even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the
marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the
phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one,

there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological
incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will
encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of
providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of
incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is
less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because
there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized
that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and
has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero
inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of
consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not
principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but
in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it
should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable
of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
69
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been
cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the
defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action
for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted,
the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have
been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is
brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation
be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the
bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity
of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a
psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in
the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of
marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid
interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there
is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice
Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to
copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes
commented that in some instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to
a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is
incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has
a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is
enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he

can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is
still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce,
the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage.
He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is
possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity
become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and
Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him
to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated, to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from
the beginning even if such incapacity becomes
manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with
"although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the
clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create
the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the
basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is
not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the
minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
70
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that
the phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is
an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge .
. ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental"
precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that
"psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they
have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological
incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity,
Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in
Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in
the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be
retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is
their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages,
which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice
Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of
cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and
Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period
of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately
deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so
designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia
V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice
Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994);
thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given
and accepted mutually;
71
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for
having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing
at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of
the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the
third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt
that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict
and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential
obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the
pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae
psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological
anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it
would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause
of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder;
after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the
ordinary obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise
definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius
Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual
disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render
what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the
crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute
incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John
Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological
defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the
moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being
bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese
of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that
the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has
not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
72
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law
on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state
of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be
reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even
now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between
a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
(Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our
laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to
the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and
understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
73
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice
Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I
cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On
the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and
cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity"
defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a
ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the
Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as
well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion
in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to
abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there
are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the
intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows
that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations,
to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States
to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in
July 1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that
she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts
in the U.S.A.

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the
Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there
were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar
efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had
elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or
her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her
answer, claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible
and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit
evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such
as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty
of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for
economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the
marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for
each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have
regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and
whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining
contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her
husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living
and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable
indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital
obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of
the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be
married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
74
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court
makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation
of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with
another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply
because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and
conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for
absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its
evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new
leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between
petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID
on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP
Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of
then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code
Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought
of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new
Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by
the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members
of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based
on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between
the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree
of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is
one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even

the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee
and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as —
"a special contract of permanent partnership
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional
concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent,
inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom
the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and
instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the
civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again
prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code
and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two
Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation
of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes.
The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage
in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to
wit:
75
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be
invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our
country today may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds
proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well
as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald
Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack
of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be
clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous
choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or
who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug

dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision
Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already
listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or
liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological
incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based
on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition
and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the
Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the
same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision
of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a
case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provisions was taken from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the lodestar
which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article
36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all,
it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of
one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are
constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-
accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since
its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is
addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some
members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not
interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
76
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice
Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I
cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On
the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and
cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity"
defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a
ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the
Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as
well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion
in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to
abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there
are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the
intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows
that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations,
to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States
to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in
July 1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that
she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts
in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the
Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there
were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar
efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.

d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had
elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or
her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her
answer, claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible
and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit
evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such
as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty
of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for
economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the
marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for
each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have
regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and
whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining
contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her
husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living
and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable
indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital
obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of
the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be
married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court
makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation
of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with
another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply
because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and
conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
77
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for
absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its
evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new
leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between
petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID
on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP
Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of
then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code
Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought
of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new
Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by
the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members
of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based
on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between
the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree
of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is
one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even
the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee
and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as —

"a special contract of permanent partnership
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional
concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent,
inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom
the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and
instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the
civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again
prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code
and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two
Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation
of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes.
The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage
in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to
wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
78
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be
invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our
country today may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds
proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well
as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald
Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack
of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be
clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous
choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or
who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision
Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already
listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or
liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological
incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based
on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition
and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the
 79

Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the
same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.

Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision
of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a
case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provisions was taken from Canon Law."3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the lodestar
which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article
36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all,
it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of
one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are
constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-
accepted means.

Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since
its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is
addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some
members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not
interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.

[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000.]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, Petitioner, v. WILSON G. MARCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may
be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist
as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the
parties is hereby declared valid." 2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her
Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and
respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is
declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The
conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and
129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of
the legitime of [the] parties’ children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor
children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of
respondent" .
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and
Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their
appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
80
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on
September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the
Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized
by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security
Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage,
five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973.
Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang
during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined
the Women’s Auxiliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the
Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential
Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they
became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street,
Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss
Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and
then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a
wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him,
instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to
engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with
him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for
a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several
times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were
already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and
chicken. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in
the morning before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the
military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development
Corporation.

"The ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’ took place on October 16, 1994, when
they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want
him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house,
she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting
physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following
day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in
her sister’s house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions
(Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to
him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon
seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence,
he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children
described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records,
pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., for
psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on
the other hand did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his
family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, . . .
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the
spouse’s psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must
81
also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the
essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to
225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly
be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by
psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the
appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is
essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was
assuming, or as would make him or her . . . unable to assume them. In fact, he
offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the
petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or
sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would
show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological
or mental — not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the
marriage and [was] incurable."
Hence, this Petition.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner presents for this Court’s consideration the following
issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by
the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject
himself to psychological evaluation .
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.

Preliminary Issue:
Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the
obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of
Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner
adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no
choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the
psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such
tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina, 8 the guidelines governing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family
Code 9 were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
‘as the foundation of the nation.’ It decrees marriage as legally ‘inviolable,’ thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be ‘protected’ by the state.
x x x complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the celebration’ of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their ‘I do’s.’ The manifestation of the illness need not be
82
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, ‘mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts’ cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095."
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
 83

Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 11 "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like. 12 At best, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however,
has not faithfully observed them.

Main Issue:
Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case — including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children,
petitioner’s sister and the social worker — was enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines in outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except
that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a
finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that SO ORDERED.
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted
to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing
that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was
during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and
moral support, and even left the family home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to
the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that
his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver.

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,

G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011
JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, Petitioner,
vs.
BONA J. ALANO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated October 11, 2004 as well as the
Resolution2 dated March 10, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
65120, which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated January 11, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 in Civil Case No. 97-2903. In the
said January 11, 1999 Decision, the trial court granted petitioner Jose Reynaldo
Ochosa’s (Jose) petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and
private respondent Bona J. Alano (Bona).
The relevant facts of this case, as outlined by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in
the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college drop-out. They
had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual
marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in
Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts.
Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned
and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter,
naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine
archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts,
preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his
areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for
four (4) days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the
Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living
quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed
coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
84
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage
when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had illicit relations
with other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways when they lived together
at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was
out of their living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y
Lita, a security aide, having sex with Jose’s driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of
Bona’s sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no
longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and
confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin
who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their
living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently
supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case
No. 97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his
marriage to Bona on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage.
Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly served upon Bona
who failed to file any responsive pleading during the reglementary period.
Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public Prosecutor conducted an
investigation to determine whether there was collusion between the parties. Said
prosecutor submitted a report that she issued a subpoena to both parties but only
Jose appeared; hence, it can not be reasonably determined whether or not there
was collusion between them.
Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two military aides,
Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Demetrio Bajet y Lita, testified about
respondent’s marital infidelity during the marriage.
The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who testified
that after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent
was suffering from histrionic personality disorder which she described as follows:
"Her personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention seeking
behavior.1âwphi1 So therefore they don’t develop sympathy in feelings and they
have difficulty in maintaining emotional intimacy. In the case of Mr. Ochosa he has
been a military man. It is his duty to be transferred in different areas in the

Philippines. And while he is being transferred from one place to another because
of his assignments as a military man, Mrs. Bona Alano refused to follow him in all
his assignments. There were only few occasions in which she followed him. And
during those times that they were not living together, because of the assignments
of Mr. Ochosa she developed extra marital affair with other man of which she
denied in the beginning but in the latter part of their relationship she admitted it to
Mr. Ochosa that she had relationship with respondent’s driver. I believe with this
extra marital affair that is her way of seeking attention and seeking emotions from
other person and not from the husband. And of course, this is not fulfilling the basic
responsibility in a marriage."
According to Rondain, respondent’s psychological disorder was traceable to her
family history, having for a father a gambler and a womanizer and a mother who
was a battered wife. There was no possibility of a cure since respondent does not
have an insight of what is happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality.
With the conclusion of the witnesses’ testimonies, petitioner formally offered his
evidence and rested his case.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the petition on
the ground that "the factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can
come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA,
240 SCRA 20 [1995])."
In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and
nullified the parties’ marriage on the following findings, viz:
xxxx
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides as follows:
‘A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.’
Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage, the degree of incapacity must
exhibit GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that the psychological incapacity of
the respondent exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
85
It is grave because the respondent did not carry out the normal and ordinary duties
of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under everyday
circumstances of life and work. The gravity was manifested in respondent’s
infidelity as testified to by the petitioner and his witnesses.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent could be traced back to
respondent’s history as testified to by the expert witness when she said that
respondent’s bad experience during her childhood resulted in her difficulty in
achieving emotional intimacy, hence, her continuous illicit relations with several
men before and during the marriage.
Considering that persons suffering from this kind of personality disorder have no
insight of their condition, they will not submit to treatment at all. As in the case at
bar, respondent’s psychological incapacity clinically identified as Histrionic
Personality Disorder will remain incurable.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision dated January 11, 1999
read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING
the marriage of JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA J. ALANO on October
27, 1973 at Basilan City VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological incapacity of
the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code as amended with all the effects
and consequences provided for by all applicable provisions of existing pertinent
laws.
After this Decision becomes final, let copies thereof be sent to the Local Civil
Registrar of Basilan City who is directed to cancel the said marriage from its Civil
Registry, and the Local Civil Registrar of Makati City for its information and
guidance.5
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the Court of
Appeals which sided with the OSG’s contention that the trial court erred in granting
the petition despite Jose’s abject failure to discharge the burden of proving the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court Decision in its
assailed Decision dated October 11, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed Decision dated 11 January
1999 in Civil Case No. 97-2903 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,

Branch 140, is accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is entered
DISMISSING the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.6
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of
Appeals for lack of merit in its assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should be deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The petition is without merit.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial court
hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 we observed that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity
as mandated in Santos, we laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina8 the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
86
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outburst" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown

as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed
as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church – while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other – shall walk together in synodal cadence towards
the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
87
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.9 (Citations omitted.)
In Marcos v. Marcos,10 we previously held that the foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. For, indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the
concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it
simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the
affliction – already then existing – was so grave and permanent as to deprive the
afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.11
A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina guidelines, we made a
critical assessment of the same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,12 to wit:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live
with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which,
like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic
social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly,
the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase
and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals. 13
However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an abandonment of
the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply declared and, thus, clarified in the
same Te case that there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Furthermore, we reiterated in the same case the principle that each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.14
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondain’s testimony15 and her psychiatric
evaluation report16 as well as the individual testimonies of Jose17 and his military
aides - Mrs. Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal18 and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.19
We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence presented in
this case, that Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men,
sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had
indeed abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same conviction to Jose’s
thesis that the totality of Bona’s acts constituted psychological incapacity as
determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate credible
evidence that her "defects" were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the
marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the
jurisprudential requisite of "juridical antecedence."
With regard to Bona’s sexual promiscuity prior to her marriage to Jose, we have
only the uncorroborated testimony of Jose made in open court to support this
allegation. To quote the pertinent portion of the transcript:
Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken with your wife after several
years -
A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer bear the torture
because of the gossips that she had an affair with other men, and finally, when I
have a chance to confront her she admitted that she had an affair with other men.
Q: With other men. And, of course this – her life with other men of course before
the marriage you have already known –
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: So, that this gossips – because you said that you thought that this affair would
go to end after your marriage?
A: Yes, I was thinking about that.
88
Q: So, that after several years she will not change so that’s why you can’t bear it
anymore?
A: Yes, ma’am.20
Dr. Rondain’s testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not provide
evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Jose’s one-sided assertion.
Even if we take into account the psychiatrist’s conclusion that Bona harbors a
Histrionic Personality Disorder that existed prior to her marriage with Jose and this
mental condition purportedly made her helplessly prone to promiscuity and sexual
infidelity, the same cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the
method by which such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in
terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological
incapacity.
The psychiatrist’s findings on Bona’s personality profile did not emanate from a
personal interview with the subject herself as admitted by Dr. Rondain in court, as
follows:
Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for psychological test, how
about the respondent, did she come for interview and test?
A: No, ma’am.
Q: Did you try to take her for such?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview?
A: There was no response, ma’am.21
As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on her interview with Jose
and his witness, Mrs. Padernal, as well as the court record of the testimonies of
other witnesses, to wit:
Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the interview?
A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, ma’am.
Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal who
testified in this court?
 89

A: Yes, ma’am. We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent level of evidentiary
scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the
xxxx party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds
that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such
examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances
Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate members of
given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a determination
the parties?
though of a party’s complete personality profile, information coming from persons
with personal knowledge of the juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an
A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that
other witnesses, ma’am. it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert
opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.23
xxxx
However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make conclusions and
Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on the respondent? generalizations on a spouse’s psychological condition based on the information fed
by only one side, similar to what we have pointed out in the case at bar, is, to the
A: Yes, your honor. Court’s mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.24
Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based your evaluation
report? Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their marriage, Bona did not
wish to be with Jose as a further manifestation of her psychological incapacity, we
A: It was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical interview with the need only to look at the testimonial records of Jose and his witnesses to be
other witnesses, your Honor.22 convinced otherwise, to wit:

Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition indirectly from the JOSE OCHOSA’S TESTIMONY:
information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance
evokes the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias Q: How long did you stay with your wife?
for Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration.
A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all those years there
Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the testimonies at issue since the trial were only few occasions that we were staying together because most of the time
court judge had found them to be credible enough after personally witnessing Jose I’m in the field.
and the witnesses testify in court, we cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with
regard to information on Bona’s pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of Q: Now, you said most of the time you were in the field, did you not – your wife
antecedence in this case because we have only the word of Jose to rely on. In come with you in any of your assignments?
fact, Bona’s dysfunctional family portrait which brought about her Histrionic
Personality Disorder as painted by Dr. Rondain was based solely on the assumed A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one (1) day and then
truthful knowledge of Jose, the spouse who has the most to gain if his wife is found –
to be indeed psychologically incapacitated. No other witness testified to Bona’s
family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of the marriage. Both Mrs.
Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves you?
Padernal and Corporal Bajet came to know Bona only during their employment in
petitioner’s household during the marriage. It is undisputed that Jose and Bona
were married in 1973 while Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet started to live with A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan.
petitioner’s family only in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
Q: Where were you assigned most of the time?
 90

A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan. A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house.

Q: And, of course she would come to your place every now and then because it is xxxx
not very far –
Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together with your
A: No, ma’am, once in a while only. husband?

Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home? A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort Bonifacio.

A: I have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to at least three (3) Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent lived
days every other month. together?

Q: So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years you were A: Yes. Ma’am.
supposed to have been living together?
Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the respondent
A: No, actually in 19 – middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x x x.25 stay?

GERTRUDES PADERNAL’S TESTIMONY: A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.

Q: Now, do you know when they lived together as husband and wife? Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?

A: 1979. A: He is a soldier, a Colonel.

Q: And you said that you have known the petitioner and the respondent in this Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time?
case because in fact, you lived with them together in the same quarters. Does the
quarters have different rooms? A: Yes, ma’am, G-3.

A: Yes, ma’am. Q: May we know where this G-3 is?

Q: But very near each other? A: Fort Bonifacio, ma’am.

A: Yes, ma’am. Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?

Q: You know them because of the proximity of the quarters? A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.26

A: Yes, ma’am. DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAIN’S TESTIMONY:

Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you lived together that Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct?
you have a chance to be with the spouses?
A: Yes, ma’am.
xxxx

Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he was assigned in
different Provinces or Barangays in the Philippines?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go with the husband
in different places of his assignment did you ask her why what was the reason why
she did not like to go those places?
A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because… by transferring
from one place to another, she just don’t want to go, she just wanted to stay in
Basilan where her hometown is, ma’am.
Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent don’t want to go with him?
A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did not want to go with
him because she did not want him to be appointed to far away places.
Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband in some far
away different assignments she also assumed that the assignments were in this
war regions they were always fighting considering the place in Basilan they were in
fighting atmosphere?
A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also refused to stay in
Manila, ma’am.
Q: When was that that she refused to come to Manila?
A: I think, sometime in 1983, ma’am. She did not follow immediately. She stayed
with him only for four (4) months, ma’am.
Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were living together as
husband and wife for this period of time during the relationship?
A: Yes, ma’am. After their marriage I believe their relationship was good for a few
months until he was transferred to Julu. I believe during that time when they were
together the husband was giving an attention to her. The husband was always
there and when the husband transferred to Basilan, the attention was not there
anymore, ma’am.27
It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Jose’s
assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their
91
marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their relationship from
1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988.
On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from
Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable
explanation for Bona’s refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments in
other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict
areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bona’s desire to live with Jose would later
be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort
Bonifacio during the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity,
i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the
period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said
marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those
provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.28
While we are not insensitive to petitioner’s suffering in view of the truly appalling
and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by judicial precedents
regarding the evidentiary requirements in psychological incapacity cases that must
be applied to the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 92

G.R. No. 218630 Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's decisions-
from the manner by which she took care of Lanz, to the way she treated the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner household help. Most fights ended up in full blown arguments, often in front of
vs. Lanz. One time, when Katrina remembered and missed her youngest brother who
KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent was then committed in a substance rehabilitation center, Lawrence told her to stop
crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center if she will not stop. 11
DECISION
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his
TIJAM, J.: parents' home and never to come back. They have been separated in fact since
then.12
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated May 27, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who
confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based
Decision2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus Cavite, Branch 20,
on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic Personality
granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36
Disorder, that is characterized by a heightened sense of self-importance and
of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and
Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio. grandiose feelings that he is unique in some way.13

Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for declaration of Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent, incurable, and
deeply integrated within his psyche;14 and that it was present but repressed at the
nullity of her marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence) on the ground of
time of the celebration of the marriage and the onset was in early adulthood. His
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
maladaptive and irresponsible behaviors interfered in his capacity to provide
mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual help, and support to his wife.15
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual friends.
After a brief courtship, they entered into a relationship. When she got pregnant, the
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and Lawrence
two panicked as both their parents were very strict and conservative. Lawrence did
as void ab initio. It disposed, thus:
not receive the news well as he was worried how it would affect his image and how
his parents would take the situation.3 Nevertheless, they got married on July 22,
2000.4 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Katrina S.
Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab initio. As a
necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the
Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering and
surname of her husband having lost the right over the same and so as to avoid the
quarrels. As early as their honeymoon, they were fighting so much that they went
their separate ways most of the time and Katrina found herself wandering the misconception that she is still the legal wifo of respondent. Custody over the
couple's· minor child is awarded to petitioner, with reasonable visitation rights
streets of Hong Kong alone.5
accorded to respondent, preferably Saturday and Sunday, or as the parties may
agree among themselves.
Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the birth of
their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30,
2000.6 Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their child, saying he knew Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-General, the National
Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite who, in turn, shall
nothing about children and how to run a family.7 Lawrence spent almost every
endorse a copy of the same to the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City,
night out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees.8 Katrina noticed that
·Metro Manila, so that the appropriate amendment and/or cancellation of the
Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high
parties' marriage can be effected in its registry. Furnish, likewise, the parties and
degree of immaturity.9 Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with him
and they lost all intimacy between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their counsel.
bedroom every night to see to the needs of Lanz.10
SO ORDERED.16

The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. 4903-11dated8 May 2012
is hereby AFFIRMED.17
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a myriad
of cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the information
coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case, the psychiatrist
obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated,
exclusively from Katrina.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a myriad
of cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the information
coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case, the psychiatrist
obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated,
exclusively from Katrina.
Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding circumstances of each and
every case for the nullity is different from the other and must be appreciated for its
distinctiveness. She points out that the psychological report of Dr. Arellano clearly
outlined well-accepted scientific and reliable tests18 to come up with his findings. In
any case, the decision must be based not solely on the expert opinions but on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings, which the RTC and
the CA have found to have been sufficient in proving Lawrence's psychological
incapacity.
The issue before Us is plainly whether the totality of evidence presented by Katrina
supports the findings of both the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, meriting the dissolution
of his marriage with Katrina.
Contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA, We rule in the negative.
Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended
by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
93
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage,
and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.19
The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 20has set out the
guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically all declaration of
nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity cases that We have
decided:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. xxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. xxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. xxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. xxx
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. xxx 21

Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that
Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of a
husband.
Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other cases
they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions
presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
their proceedings.22 Here, We find the totality of evidence clearly wanting.
First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated were
based solely on Katrina's statements.1âwphi1 It bears to stress that Lawrence,
despite notice, did not participate in the proceedings below, nor was he
interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited to do so.
The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B.
Matudan23is instructive on the matter:
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of the
clinical psychologist cannot [be] relied upon to substantiate the petitioner-
appellant's theory of the psychological incapacity of his wife.
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below. The
clinical psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition was based
mainly on the information supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to some
extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was
only around two (2) years of age at the time the respondent left and therefore
cannot be expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel would not have been
very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because she could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know
what was happening between her parents until long after her birth. On the other
hand, as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature would
certainly be biased, and a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided
description can hardly be considered as credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v.
Angelita Suazo, el al., is illuminating on this score:
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion
evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the psychological evaluation report -
that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist
evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in an indirect manner - she
derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for
her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon
which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary
worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and
94
stringent set of standards outlined above i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-
depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
xxxx
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager
information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a
complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While the report or
evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's psychological condition,
this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a
party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the
psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that
psychological incapacity exists.
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was
similarly declared that '[t]o make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side
is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.'
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the
psychological condition of the respondent-appellee to be insufficient to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag
merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from. Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives as manifestations of the same.
The report neither explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor
showed that the respondent-appellee was really incapable of fulfilling her duties
due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. (Emphasis Ours)
The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted by Dr.
Arellano can most certainly be conclusive of the psychological disposition of
Katrina, but cannot be said to be indicative of the psychological condition of
Lawrence. There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude that
Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital
obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving statements. To make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed
by only one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.24
 95

Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly

depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated husband. Their frequent
fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be
a psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the
"psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be distinguished from
the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations that characterize some marriages.25 It is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.26

Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are hardpressed to

affirm the RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to support
the factual and legal conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab
initio. No other evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove
Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are
not evidence.27 Here, we reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not
present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's
psychological incapacity. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and
had no serious evidentiary value.28

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985,
which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of
Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 4903-11 is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 210518
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARTIN NIKOLAI Z. JAVIER and MICHELLE K. MERCADO- JAVIER,
Respondents
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision 2 dated July 10,
2013, and Resolution3 dated November 28, 2013, rendered in relation to CA-G.R.
CV No. 98015. In these assailed issuances, the CA reversed the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Pasig City, which dismissed the petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent Martin Nikolai Z. Javier
(Martin) against respondent Michelle K. Mercado-Javier (Michelle) under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Factual Antecedents
Martin and Michelle were married on February 8, 2002. 4
On November 20, 2008, Martin filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
and Joint Custody of Common Minor Child under Article 36 of the Family
Code.5 Martin alleged that both he and Michelle were psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.6 He thus prayed for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage, and for the joint custody of their minor child,
Amanda M. Javier.7
In order to support the allegations in his petition, Martin testified on his own
behalf,8 and presented the psychological findings of Dr. Elias D. Adamos (Dr.
Adamos) (i.e., Psychological Evaluation Report on Martin and Psychological
Impression Report on Michelle). 9
In the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, Dr. Adamos diagnosed her
with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. 10 Likewise, Dr. Adamos concluded in the
Psychological Evaluation Report that Martin suffered from the same
disorder. 11 Their disorder was considered grave and incurable, and rendered
Martin and Michelle incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Dr. Adamos further testified before the RTC to provide his expert opinion, and
stated that with respect to the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, the
96
informants were Martin and the respondents' common friend, Jose Vicente Luis
Serra (Jose Vicente ). 12 He was unable to evaluate Michelle because she did not
respond to Dr. Adamos' earlier request to come in for psychological evaluation. 13
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision14 dated March 10, 2011, the RTC dismissed the petition for failure to
establish a sufficient basis for the declaration of nullity of the respondents'
marriage. The relevant portions of the RTC's decision reads:
Upon the other hand, though Dr. Adamos diagnosed [Martin] to be afflicted with a
narcissistic personality disorder, which rendered him incapacitated to comply with
his essential marital obligations of observing love, trust and respect. [Martin's]
testimony is found by the Court to be not supportive of such finding and vice-
versa. In fact, on the basis of [Martin's] declarations, the Court came up with an
impression that [Martin] is a man gifted with a lot of patience; that he was
righteous, that he laudably performed his role as husband and father, and that in
spite of [Michelle's] alleged wrongdoings, he still exerted his best efforts to save
their marriage.
Thus, as to [Michelle's] alleged psychological incapacity, the Court finds [Martin's]
testimony to be self-serving and Dr. Adamos' findings to be without sufficient basis.
Taking all the foregoing into consideration, the Court finds no sufficient basis for
granting the relief prayed for in the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 15
Martin moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's decision on May 18,
2011. 16 Finding the arguments in the motion unmeritorious, the RTC denied the
motion in its Order17 dated September 7, 2011:
In the case at bar, the Court found no sufficient basis for making a finding that
either petitioner or respondent or both were afflicted with a psychological disorder
within the contemplation of existing law and jurisprudence. Such being the case,
there was no need to resort to Dr. Adamos' findings.
Having said this, the Court finds no compelling reason to set aside its March 10,
2011 Decision.

Wherefore, premises considered, the pending Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.18
Unsatisfied with the RTC's ruling, Martin appealed the denial of his petition to the
CA. 19 In his Appellant's Brief, Martin submitted that it is not necessary for the
psychologist to personally examine the incapacitated spouse, or Michelle in this
case, before the court may rule on the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.20 He also argued that, at the very least, there was sufficient evidence to
support his own diagnosis of psychological incapacity.21 Martin thus claimed that
the RTC committed a reversible error in dismissing his petition.
The Republic filed its own brief opposing the appeal of Martin. Arguing that there
was no basis for Dr. Adamos' findings as to Michelle's psychological incapacity,
the Republic asserts that there was no independent proof to establish this claim.
Furthermore, the Republic argued that Martin supported his petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage with self-serving testimonies and hearsay evidence.22
Ruling of the CA
On review, Martin's appeal was granted. In its Decision23 dated July 10, 2013, the
CA held that:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 10, 2011 and the Resolution dated September 07, 2011, respectively,
issued by the [RTC] of Pasig City, Branch 261, are hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between [Martin] and [Michelle] is hereby
declared NULL and VOID ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.24
The CA found that there was sufficient evidence to support Martin's claim that he is
psychologically incapacitated. The CA also negated the RTC's ruling by referring to
Martin's own testimony, in which he narrated his tendency to impose his own
unrealistic standards on Michelle.25 In its challenged decision, the CA likewise
ruled that Michelle's diagnosis was adequately supported by the narrations of
Martin and Jose Vicente.26
Aggrieved, the Republic filed its motion for reconsideration from the CA's Decision
dated July 10, 2013.27 The CA denied the motion in its Resolution28 dated
November 28, 2013 for being a mere rehash of its earlier arguments.
97
The Republic is now before this Court, arguing that there was no basis for the CA's
ruling granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It argues that the
testimony of Martin was self-serving, especially in relation to Dr. Adamos'
diagnosis that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code. According to the Republic,
there were no other witnesses that were presented in court, who could have
testified on Michelle's behavior.29
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the present petition partially unmeritorious. The totality of evidence
supports the finding that Martin is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage.
The psychological incapacity of a spouse must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability, which the Court discussed in Santos v.
CA, et al. 30 as follows:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 31
The Court later clarified in Marcos v. Marcos32that for purposes of establishing the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, it is not required that a physician conduct an
actual medical examination of the person concerned. It is enough that the totality
of evidence is strong enough to sustain the finding of psychological incapacity. In
such case, however, the petitioner bears a greater burden in proving the gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability of the other spouse's psychological
incapacity.33
While the Court has consistently followed the parameters in Republic v.
Molina,34 these guidelines are not meant to straightjacket all petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The merits of each case are determined on a
case-to-case basis, as no case is on all fours with another.35
Martin, as the petitioner in this case, submitted several pieces of evidence to
support his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. He testified as to his own
psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, Michelle. In particular, he stated
that Michelle was confrontational even before their marriage. 36 He alleged that
Michelle always challenged his opinions on what he thinks is proper, which he
insisted on because he witnessed the abuse that his mother went through with his

biological father. 37 He also thought that Michelle was highly impressionable and
easily influenced by friends, as a result of which, Martin alleged that Michelle acted
recklessly and without consideration of his feelings. 38
The psychological findings of Dr. Adamos were also presented in the trial court to
corroborate his claim. According to Dr. Adamos, Michelle suffered from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder as a result of childhood trauma and defective child-rearing
practices.39 This disorder was supposedly aggravated by her marriage with Martin,
who she constantly lied to. It was also alleged in the Psychological Impression
Report that Michelle openly had extra-marital affairs.40
The basis of Dr. Adamos' findings on the psychological incapacity of Michelle was
the information provided by Martin and Jose Vicente.1âwphi1 Jose Vicente was a
close friend of the respondents, having introduced them to each other before their
marriage.41 Jose Vicente was also allegedly a regular confidant of Michelle.42
While it is true that Michelle was not personally examined or evaluated for
purposes of the psychological report, the trial court was incorrect in ruling that Dr.
Adamos' findings were based solely on the interview with Martin. 43 Even if that
were the case, the findings of the psychologist are not immediately invalidated for
this reason alone. Because a marriage necessarily involves only two persons, the
spouse who witnessed the other spouse's behavior may "validly relay" the pattern
of behavior to the psychologist. 44
This notwithstanding, the Court disagrees with the CA's findings that
Michelle was psychologically incapacitated. We cannot absolutely rely on the
Psychological Impression Report on Michelle. There were no other independent
evidence establishing the root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's alleged
psychological incapacity. While this Court cannot discount their first-hand
observations, it is highly unlikely that they were able to paint Dr. Adamos a
complete picture of Michelle's family and childhood history. The records do not
show that Michelle and Jose Vicente were childhood friends, while Martin, on the
other hand, was introduced to Michelle during their adulthood. Either Martin or
Jose Vicente, as third persons outside the family of Michelle, could not have
known about her childhood, how she was raised, and the dysfunctional nature of
her family.45 Without a credible source of her supposed childhood trauma, Dr.
Adamos was not equipped with enough information from which he may reasonably
conclude that Michelle is suffering from a chronic and persistent disorder that is
grave and incurable.
The Court's explanation in Rumbaua v. Rumbaua46judiciously discussed the
dangers of relying on the narrations of a petitioner-spouse to the psychologist, viz.:
98
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side
- the petitioner - whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her
report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid
and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For,
effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a
third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the
respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor's
probes.
xxxx
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed
that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show
that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some
incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but
conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report - i.e., that the respondent
suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder declared to be grave and incurable" - is an unfounded statement, not a
necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have
been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this
same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition.
To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological
condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not
different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence.47 (Citations omitted and emphasis Ours)
It does not escape our attention, however, that Martin was also subjected to
several psychological tests, as a result of which, Dr. Adamos diagnosed him with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder.48 Additionally, the diagnosis was based on Dr.
Adamos' personal interviews of Martin, who underwent several-or to be accurate,
more than 10-counselling sessions with Dr. Adamos from 2008 to 2009.49 These
facts were uncontroverted by the Republic.
In his testimony, Dr. Adamos explained that Martin had a "grandiose self[-
]existence," which proceeded from his "ideas of preference towards ideal love and
ideal marriage."50 Dr. Adamos also found that Martin lacked empathy, leading him
to disregard and ignore the feelings of Michelle.51
 99

As a result, Martin was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, with

tendencies toward sadism. 52 Dr. Adamos concluded from the tests administered
on Martin that this disorder was rooted in the traumatic experiences he
experienced during his childhood, having grown up around a violent father who
was abusive of his mother.53 This adversely affected Martin in such a manner that
he formed unrealistic values and standards on his own marriage, and proposed
unconventional sexual practices. When Michelle would disagree with his ideals,
Martin would not only quarrel with Michelle, but would also inflict harm on
her. 54 Other manifestations include excessive love for himself, self-entitlement,
immaturity, and self-centeredness.55

These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential characteristics of

psychological incapacity on the part of Martin. As such, insofar as the
psychological incapacity of Martin is concerned, the CA did not commit a
reversible error in declaring the marriage of the respondents null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

As a final note, the Court emphasizes that the factual circumstances obtaining in
this specific case warrant the declaration that Martin is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his
marriage to Michelle. This is neither a relaxation nor abandonment of previous
doctrines relating to Article 36 of the Family Code. The guidelines in Molina still
apply to all petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage inasmuch as this Court
does not lose sight of the constitutional protection to the institution of marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as the psychological incapacity of
respondent Michelle K. Mercado-Javier is concerned. The Decision dated July 10,
2013 and Resolution dated November 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 98015 are MODIFIED to the extent that the marriage of the respondents
on February 8, 2002 is declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO due to the
psychological incapacity of respondent Martin Nikolai Z. Javier, pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.