[G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.
] violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San
Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Hector B. Almeyda for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION; 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD DOES NOT APPLY TO OFFENSES SUBJECT TO SUMMARY
PROCEDURE. — Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does
not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all
cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the
Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in
relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true
legislative intent.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION (B) REFERS TO SECTION 32(2) OF BP NO. 129. —
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the
obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory
or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof;
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine
does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. These offenses are not covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
3. ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; APPLIES TO VIOLATIONS OF
MUNICIPAL OR CITY ORDINANCES. — As it is clearly provided in the Rule on
Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or
city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for
Section 1 of Rule 110.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTS ONLY WHEN THE CASE IS
ACTUALLY FILED IN COURT. — Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
"the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this
provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only
when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a
preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period
shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date
before that.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION IN CONSONANCE WITH ACT NO. 3326. —
This interpretation is in consonance with Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings,"
contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not
distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION IN
CRIMINAL CASES IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. — The Court feels that if there be a
conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if
there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right.
7. ID.; ID.; CRIME PRESCRIBES IF THE PROSECUTOR DELAYS INTENTIONALLY
OR NOT THE INSTITUTION OF NECESSARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. — The Court
realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he
delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late.
However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules
beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The
remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to
prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
1
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive
period for violations of municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a
mayor’s permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality
of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of
the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May
30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court
of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal, the denial was sustained by the responded judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the
charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary
Procedure:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in the
following cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
B. Criminal Cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the
offense charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other impossible penalties,
accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied.)
x x x
SECTION 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the
scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation:
Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases
shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense
cannot be prosecuted de officio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and
sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and
to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized
by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
SECTION 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and
penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month
statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge
against her should have been dismissed on the ground prescription.
2
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended
upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes
Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as
follows:cralawnad
SECTION 1. How Instituted. — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by
filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or
a complaint with the fiscal’s office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense
charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of
the complaint with the Officer of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase
"such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without
distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following
dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench
and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration,
has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one
established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal
Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on
its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing
whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or
investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the
offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of
the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two
months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1,
1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated
therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985,
except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the
rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section
does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in
all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by
the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should
be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the
true legislative intent.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses
it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the
charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the
obvious reference is to Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such
courts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more
than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
3
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information
shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or
preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent
the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However,
the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not
the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actual filed
in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says
that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are
"judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they
include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish
as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The
judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the
information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on
October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2,
1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so
ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326
and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield
because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of
the Constitution Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the
decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense
involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.
By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal
ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered
by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even
if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or
not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late.
However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules
beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The
remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to
prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.cralawnad

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the
petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended
two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No.

4
[G.R. No. 69863-65 : December 10, 1990.]
192 SCRA 183
LINO BROCKA, BENJAMIN CERVANTES, COSME GARCIA, RODOLFO SANTOS,
VALENTINO SALIPSIP, RICARDO VEGA, ERIC MARIANO, JOSE EMMANUEL OYALES,
RONNIE MATTA, ALFREDO VIAJE, RUBEN EUGENIO, REYNALDO ORTIZ, ORLANDO
ORTIZ, NOEL REYES, EDUARDO IMPERIAL, NESTOR SARMIENTO, FRANCO PALISOC,
VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, ALBERTO REYES, JESSIE PINILI, ROMULO AUGUIS,
DOMINADOR RESURRECION III, RONNIE LAYGO, ROSAURO ROQUE, CLARENCE
SORIANO, OCTAVO DEPAWA, CARLITO LA TORRE, SEVERNO ILANO, JR., DOMINGO
CAJIPE, ALAN ALEGRE, RAMON MARTINEZ, MA. GILDA HERNANDEZ, EDNA P.
VILLANUEVA, DOLLY S. CANU, MELQUIADES C. ATIENZA, ELIGIO P. VERA CRUZ,
ROGER C. BAGAN, ABUNDIO M. CALISTE, Petitioners, vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MAJ.
GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, BRIG. GENERAL PEDRO BALBANERO, COL. ABAD, COL.
DAWIS, SERGIO APOSTOL, P/LT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and JUDGE RICARDO
TENSUAN, Respondents.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the release of
petitioners on habeas corpus and to permanently enjoin the City Fiscal of Quezon
City from investigating charges of "Inciting to Sedition" against petitioners Lino
Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos, (hereafter Brocka,
et al.). On learning that the corresponding informations for this offense has been
filed by the City Fiscal against them on February 11, 1985, a supplemental petition
was filed on February 19, 1985 (p. 51, Rollo) to implead the Presiding Judge, 1 and
to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p.
349, Rollo) and the issuance of warrants for their arrests, including their
arraignment. Since then President Ferdinand E. Marcos had ordered the provisional
release of Brocka, et al., the issue on habeas corpus has become moot and
academic (p. 396, Rollo). We shall thus focus on the question of whether or not the
prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to Sedition may lawfully be enjoined.:-
cralaw
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police
District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in
sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport
Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly in
Criminal Cases Nos. 37783, 37787 and 37788 with Branch 108, Regional Trial Court,
NCJR, Quezon City. 2
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal
Assembly and for whom no bail was recommended, the other petitioners were
released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered
only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7,
1985 were held.
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al.
remained in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Action
(PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985 (p. 6, Rollo). Neither the
original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to
them (p. 367, Rollo).
Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to
Sedition, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349,
Rollo), without prior notice to their counsel (p. 7, Rollo). The original informations
filed recommended no bail (p. 349, Rollo). The circumstances surrounding the hasty
filing of this second offense are cited by Brocka, et al. (quoting from a separate
petition filed on their behalf in G.R. Nos. 69848-50 entitled "Sedfrey A. Ordoñez vs.
Col. Julian Arzaga, et al."), as follows:
"x x x
"6. The sham' character of the inquest examination concocted by all respondents is
starkly bizarre when we consider that as early as 10:30 A.M. today, February 11,
1985, Benjamin Cervantes was able to contact undersigned petitioner by phone
informing counsel that said Benjamin Cervantes and the 4 other persons who are
the subjects of this petition will be brought before the Quezon City Fiscal at 2:30 for
undisclosed reasons: subsequently, another phone call was received by petitioning
counsel informing him that the appearance of Benjamin Cervantes et al. was to be
at 2:00 P.M. When petitioning counsel arrived in the office of Assistant City Fiscal
Arturo Tugonon, the complainants' affidavits had not yet been received by any of
the panel of three assistant city fiscals, although the five persons under detention
were already in the office of said assistant fiscal as early as 2:00 P.M. It was only at
3:00 when a representative of the military arrived bringing with him alleged
statements of complainants against Lino Broka (sic) et al. for alleged inciting to
sedition, whereupon undersigned counsel asked respondent Colonel Agapito Abad
5
'who ordered the detained persons to be brought to the office of Assistant Fiscal
Arturo Tugonon since there were no charges on file;' and said Colonel Agapito Abad
said aloud: 'I only received a telephone call from Colonel Arzaga about 11:00 A.M.
to bring the detained persons today — I am only the custodian.' At 3:15, petitioning
counsel inquired from the Records Custodian when the charges against Lino Broka
(sic) had been officially received and he was informed that the said charges were
never coursed through the Records Office.
"7. Under the facts narrated above, respondents have conspired to use the strong
arm of the law and hatched the nefarious scheme to deprive Lino Broka (sic) et al.
the right to bail because the utterances allegedly constituting inciting to sedition
under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are, except for varying nuances, almost
verbatim the same utterances which are the subject of Criminal Cases No. 37783,
37787 and 37788 and for which said detained persons are entitled to be released
on bail as a matter of constitutional right. Among the utterances allegedly made by
the accused and which the respondents claimed to be violative of Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code are: 'Makiisa sa mga drivers, "Makiisa sa aming layunin,
"Digmaang bayan ang sagot sa kahirapan,' Itigil ang pakikialam ng imperyalismo sa
Pilipinas,' 'Rollback ng presyo ng langis sa 95 Centavos.' (See Annex B)
"8. That when petitioning counsel and other members of the defense panel
requested that they be given 7 days within which said counsel may confer with their
clients — the detained persons named above, the panel of assistant fiscals
demanded that said detained persons should sign a 'waiver' of their rights under
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for the grant of said request,
which is a harassing requirement considering that Lino Broka (sic) et al. were
already under the detention, albeit illegally, and they could not have waived the
right under Rule 125 which they did not enjoy at the time the ruling was made by
the panel of assistant city fiscals." (pp. 4-6, Rollo in G.R. 69848-50).
They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then President
F. E. Marcos. The circumstances of their release are narrated in Our resolution
dated January 26, 1985, as quoted in the Solicitor General's Manifestation as
follows:
"G.R. Nos. 69848-50 (Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, Petitioner, vs. Col. Julian Arzaga, et al.,
Respondents). — Petitioner Sedfrey A. Ordoñez filed this petition for habeas corpus
in behalf of Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia, Alexander Luzano, and
Rodolfo Santos, who were all detained under a Preventive Detention Action (PDA)
issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on January 28, 1985. They were
charged in three separate informations of the crime of illegal assembly under Art.
146, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1834. On February
7, 1985, the Honorable Miriam Defensor Santiago, Regional Trial Judge of Quezon
City, issued a resolution in the above criminal cases, directing the release of the five
accused on bail of P6,000.00 for each of them, and from which resolution the
respondent fiscals took no appeal. Immediately thereafter, the accused filed their
respective bail bonds. This notwithstanding, they continued to be held in detention
by order of the respondent colonels; and on February 11, 1985, these same accused
were 'reinvestigated,' this time on charges of 'inciting to sedition' ** under Art. 142
of the Revised Penal Code, following which corresponding cases were filed. The
respondents complied with Our resolution requiring them, inter alia, to make a
RETURN of the writ of habeas corpus. In their RETURN, it appeared that all the
accused had already been released, four of them on February 15, 1985 and one
February 8, 1985. The petitioner, nevertheless, argued that the petition has not
become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of
the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition." (p. 395, Rollo).
Hence, this petition.
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are
sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the
second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the
same act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain
that while there may be a complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law
does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing two
informations therefor, further, that they will be placed in double jeopardy.
The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case,
since the two other issues raised by Brocka, et al. are matters of defense against the
sedition charge.
We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the
second offense of inciting to sedition.
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or
stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are however exceptions, among
which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
(Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez
vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
6
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag,
70 Phil. 202);
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil,
67 Phil. 62);
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young
vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia,
109 Phil. 1140);
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-
25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo,
CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance
(Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R,
October 8, 1962; Cf, Guingona, et al vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA
577); and
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February
18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
"7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1,
1958)." (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that
the criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been
undertaken by state officials in bad faith.: nad
Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s
release from detention (before their release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This
PDA was, however, issued on January 28, 1985, but was invoked only on February 9,
1985 (upon receipt of the trial court's order of release). Under the guidelines
issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours
(outside Metro Manila). (Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 28, 1985, 139
SCRA 349). Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its
production, the prosecution merely presented a purported xerox copy of the
invoked PDA (par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder, p. 367, Rollo).
The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor General's office. In
fact they found petitioner's plight "deplorable" (par. 51, Manifestation, p. 396,
Rollo).
The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and inoperational
PDA, certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue
criminal charges against Brocka, et al.
We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that "individuals against whom PDAs
have been issued should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original,
and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at
the time of the apprehension" (supra, p. 369).
We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public official's prosecution of
criminal offenders. We, however, believe that this should not be a license to run
roughshod over a citizen's basic constitutional lights, such as due process, or
manipulate the law to suit dictatorial tendencies.
We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness against the awesome powers
of a dictatorship. Thus, while We agree with the Solicitor General's observation
and/or manifestation that Brocka, et al. should have filed a motion to quash the
information, We, however, believe that such a course of action would have been a
futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing. Thus, the tenacious
invocation of a spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty preliminary
investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al.
in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could be facilitated
and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew. As a matter of fact
the corresponding informations for this second offense were hastily filed on
February 11, 1985, or two days after Brocka, et al.'s release from detention was
ordered by the trial judge on February 9, 1985.
Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this gesture is the true sign of
democracy. These may not be set aside to satisfy perceived illusory visions of
national grandeur.: nad
In the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Paño, We point out:
"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal
procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest
7
and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution . . ." (G.R.
No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438-at p. 448).

We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the
filing of criminal charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred
from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed, and where
a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a
result should lawfully be enjoined.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY

ENJOINED from proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

8
G.R. No. L-32849 July 31, 1984
QUIRICO A. ABELA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE CESARIO C. GOLEZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Capiz, Branch I,
and AGUSTIN ALMALBIS respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
Direct appeal by City Fiscal Quirico A. Abela, of Roxas City, from a decision dated
August 27, 1970 of then Court of First Instance Judge Cesario C. Golez, compelling
him to "file the proper action for estafa arising from the bouncing check Exhibit B.
Without pronouncement as to costs." (p. 41, Rollo)
On December 28, 1968, private respondent Agustin Almalbis filed with the Office of
the City Fiscal of Roxas City a complaint for estafa against one Virginia Anisco. After
conducting a preliminary investigation, herein petitioner Quirico A. Abela dismissed
the complaint "for lack of merit." Thereafter, private respondent Almalbis
commenced the action for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Roxas City
against herein petitioner Quirico A. Abela. In due course said court rendered the
above-mentioned decision. Hence, this appeal.
The findings of the petitioner are contained in his Order, from which we quote:
It appeared from the testimony of the complainant, that sometime in 1967, the
complainant entered into a business arrangement with the respondent, Virginia P.
Anisco. The former, who is both owner and operator of several fishing boats and
fishponds, sends fish by the tons to the respondent to be sold at the Manila
Divisoria Market. From the proceeds of such sales, which were entirely supervised
and controlled by the respondent, respondent got four per cent (4%) commission
from the gross proceeds plus whatever expenses she has advanced as expenses in
the process. Respondent in turn has the obligation to remit the balance of the
proceeds to the complainant.
This business arrangement had continued for sometime at a more or less irregular
interval of two weeks to the satisfaction of both parties, until the respondent later
became late and irregular in her remittances of the balance of the proceeds due the
complainant.
Remittances of the net proceeds were mostly done by respondent by sending her
personal checks and later, when respondent had been late in her remittances,
complainant proposed that respondent give him a check book, each and every
check of which is presigned in blank. The blanks corresponding to the amount and
the payee to be filled in later by the complainant as the value of the shipment is
determined after each sale. This was done and the business again continued under
the above arrangement. Then Checks Nos. 378389 dated September 16, 1968,
392377 dated October 20, 1968, 392379 dated October 29, 1968, 392380 dated
October 30, 1968, and 392381 dated October 30, 1968 drawn on the Prudential
Bank and Trust Company of Manila as prepared and filled in by the complainant
were all dishonored for lack of funds, when presented for payments by the
complainant through the Roxas City Branch of the Philippine National Bank.
The foregoing is the summary of the testimony of complainant, Agustin Almalbis.
and with the submission of his aforementioned exhibits, rested his case.
Respondent failed to appear on the dates scheduled for her turn and was
considered to have waived her rights to present evidence in her defense.
THE ISSUE
The question is, has the respondent committed Estafa by giving, presigned blank
checks to the complainant which were later dishonored by the bank for lack of
funds, as defined under Art. 315 paragraph 2-d of the Revised Penal Code.
xxx xxx xxx
There is a deceit when one is misled, either by guile or trickery or by other means,
to believe to be true what is really false.
When, therefore, the parties agreed to the arrangement, that the respondent give a
check book, all the individual checks contained therein already signed by the
respondent as drawer in blank, leaving the complainant to fill in the payee and the
amount to be drawn later after the amount is determined after the sale of each
shipment of fish consigned to the respondents such arrangement can only be
considered as an agreement for business convenience between those concerned
and no more.
Certainly, deceit can not be attributed to the respondent if the checks from the
aforesaid check book under the control of the complainant, prepared and filled in
by him as to the date, the payee and amount, turned out to be dishonored as it did
due to lack of funds for the simple reason, that except for presigning the checks the
respondent had no hand in the preparation of the same thereby giving her no
chance to determine the sufficiency of her original bank deposit or the necessary
amount for replenishment of such deposit.
9
xxx xxx xxx
Considering, further, the element mentioned herein before, that the check
dishonored must have been issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the
same time without which the transaction would not have been consummated as
held in the case of People vs. Obieta et al. (CA-52 O.G. 065224), the inapplicability
of the penal provision relied upon by the complainant becomes glaringly clear.
That act of the respondent in signing the checks in blank, delivering the same to the
complainant to be filled in later by the latter as to the date indicating the date of
the issuance, the name of the payee and the amount to be drawn, in payment for
the costs of future shipments of fish to be sold at the Manila Market, can never be
interpreted or considered as checks issued in the payment of an obligation
contracted at, the same time even by the wildest stretch of imagination. The law
contemplates, as ruled in the case of People vs. Obieta aforecited, of one
uninterrupted transaction. The consummation of the transaction and the issuance
must be concurrent. (pp. 17, 20, 21, 22, Rollo)
The Honorable Judge Golez overruled petitioner, saying:
The first check so issued is PBTC (Prudential Bank and Trust Company) Check AD No.
378389, dated September 16, 1968, payable to the order of Mr. Agustin Almalbis in
the amount of P6,000.00 and signed by Virginia P. Anisco (Exhibit B).
The second check issued was PBTC Check AD No. 392377, dated October 20, 1968,
payable to the order of Cash in the amount of P3,637.05 and signed by Virginia P.
Anisco. (Exhibit C).
The third check issued was PBTC Check No. 392379, dated October 29, 1968,
payable to the order of Agustin Almalbis in the amount of P3,426.85 and signed by
Virginia P. Anisco. (Exhibit D).
The fourth and fifth checks issued were PBTC Check AD No. 392381, and PBTC
Check AD No. 392380, both dated October 30, 1968, in the amount of P1,360.50
and P3,000.00, respectively, both payable to Cash both signed by Virginia P. Anisco.
(Exhibits E and F).
It also appears that Virginia P. Anisco, the respondent mentioned in the
aforementioned letter-complaint Exhibit A, was handling the sales of the fish which
the petitioner in Roxas City was shipping from time to time to Manila where the
said fish was sold by Virginia P. Anisco in the Divisoria Market for which service
Anisco was paid by Almalbis a commission of 4% on the gross proceeds of the sales.
According to Almalbis it was their agreement that Anisco would remit to him here in
Roxas City the net proceeds of the sales of fish made by Anisco in Manila after
deducting her commission and other incidental expenses therefrom.
The five checks Exhibits B, C, D, E and F adverted to elsewhere above represented
the net proceeds realized from the sales made by Virginia P. Anisco of the fish of
Agustin Almalbis.
The petitioner Agustin Almalbis further narrated that the PBTC Check AD No.
378389, dated September 16, 1968 (Exhibit B), was hand-carried by Amador Anisco,
from Manila to Roxas City where Amador delivered the said check Exhibit B to the
said petitioner. Then Almalbis indorsed the check Exhibit B to the Philippine
National Bank, Roxas City Branch, where it was accepted for deposit only. Later on
the check Exhibit E was returned to Almalbis, dishonored by the Prudential Bank
and Trust Company against which it had been drawn, for lack of funds. When the
check Exhibit B had found its way back to Almalbis, the latter left for Manila to
inquire from Virginia why the said check bounced back. Virginia begged of him to
give her a little more time to get sufficient funds for The said check Exhibit B. But
the funds never came.
Meanwhile, and upon the plea of Virginia, the petitioner continued to make
shipments of fish to her, and as part of this new understanding, Virginia agreed to
sign, as she signed, checks in blank which she delivered to petitioner who was to fill
the blanks therein with the amount and date corresponding to the sales of fish
made by Virginia and reported by her by telegram to said petitioner. By virtue of
this arrangement the checks Exhibits C, D, E and F were made out by Almalbis
himself by filling up the pre-signed blank checks provided him by Virginia. But the
said checks Exhibits C, D, E and F also bounced back for lack of funds or for the
reason of "Exceeds Arrangements" (Exhibit D-5 and E-5).
Almalbis declared that he placed all of the foregoing facts at the disposal of the
respondent City Fiscal Quirico Abela who conducted the preliminary investigation
on his within mentioned letter-complaint of 26th December 1968.
xxx xxx xxx
The instant petition is also a two-fold action, firstly, for certiorari upon the ground
that the respondent Fiscal gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the within
mentioned complaint with the result that the petitioner herein has been deprived
of his right as the aggrieved party in a criminal transaction-and, secondly, for
mandamus to compel the said respondent to bring the corresponding criminal
action. The second phase of the action, i.e., mandamus, depends entirely upon the
success or failure of the first phase of the action, i.e., certiorari, in the sense that
10
should it be found that the respondent herein did gravely abuse his discretion in
dismissing petitioner's complaint mandamus would lie to rectify his error. (Bonilla,
et al., vs. Sec. of Agriculture & Natural Resources, L-20083, April 27, 1967).
In the given state of facts such as spelled out elsewhere above the right of the
petitioner, with specific reference to the check Exhibit B, cannot be said to be
dubious, uncertain or nebulous, but in fact well- defined, clear and certain, not at all
found within the sphere of speculation or probability, but is firmly secured within
the realm of certainty, and this condition should entitle the petitioner herein to a
relief for official inaction obtainable through the extraordinary remedy of
mandamus. (See the following cases: Aquino v. General Manager, GSIS, L-24859,
Jan. 31, 1968; Aprueba et al. v. Ganzon, et al., L-20867, Sept. 3, 1966; Kwok Kam
Lien v. Vivo, L-22354, Mar. 31, 1965; Alzate v. Aldana L-18085, May 1963; Villamor,
et al. v. Lacson, et al., L-15945, Nov. 28, 1964; People v. Orais, 65 Phil. 744, 747.)
While as already shown the discretion of the court will not ordinarily be controlled
by mandamus, it is not universally true that the writ will not issue to control such
discretion or to require a judicial tribunal to act in a particular way. Where the
discretion of the court can be legally exercised in only one way, mandamus will lie
to compel the court to exercise it; and in some cases has been employed to correct
the errors of inferior tribunals and to prevent a failure of justice or irreparable
injury where there is a clear right, and there is an absence of any adequate remedy,
as for instance where no appeal lies, or where the remedy by appeal is inadequate.
It may also be employed to prevent an abuse of discretion or to correct an arbitrary
action which does not amount to the exercise of discretion. (Corpus Juris, sec. 85,
pp. 608-609, as quoted in People v. Orais, supra)
So that where the fiscal filed an information for homicide over the insistence of the
aggrieved party that the crime committed was murder as shown by the declaration
of witnesses disclosing the presence of qualifying circumstances the Supreme Court
ruled that his failure to file the proper information rendered the Fiscal subject to
the writ of mandamus. (Bernabe v. Bolinas, et al., L-22000, Nov. 29, 1966.) " (pp. 33,
35, 39, 4 1, Rollo)
There is merit in the appeal. The public prosecutor is entitled to use his judgment
and discretion in the appreciation of evidence presented to him and, in the exercise
thereof, he may not be controlled by mandamus. Whether an information should
be filed in court is a matter address to the sound discretion of the fiscal according
to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the fiscal can not be compelled to act in a distinct manner
whether to prosecute or not to prosecute and, instead, is allowed to stand on his
opinion and conviction, "reserving only to the Secretary, in any appropriate case
when the latter believes public interest impels that a different course of action
should be taken, to temporarily relieve the fiscal of the duty to act by designating
somebody else to take his place solely and only for the purpose of such particular
case. ... Under Sections 1679 and 1689 of the Revised Administrative Code, in any
instance where a provincial or city fiscal fails, refuses or is unable, for any reason, to
investigate or prosecute a case and, in the opinion of the Secretary of Justice it is
advisable in the public interest to take a different course of action, the Secretary
may either appoint as acting provincial or city fiscal, to handle the investigation or
prosecution exclusively and only for such case, any practicing attorney or some
competent officer of the Department of Justice or office of any city or provincial
fiscal, with complete authority to act therein in all respects as if he were the
provincial or city fiscal himself, or appoint any lawyer in the government service or
not in the government service, temporarily to assist such city or provincial fiscal in
the discharge of his duties, with the same complete authority to act independently
of and for such city or provincial fiscal, provided that no such appointment may be
made without first hearing the fiscal concerned and never after the corresponding
information has already been filed with the court by the corresponding city or
provincial fiscal without the conformity of the latter, except when it can be patently
shown to the court having cognizance of the case that said fiscal is intent on
prejudicing the interest of justice. The same sphere of authority is true with the
prosecutor directed and authorized under Section 3 of Republic Act 3783, as
amended and/or inserted by Republic Act 5184." (Estrella vs. Orendain Jr., 37 SCRA
640)
However, the matter of instituting an information should be distinguished from a
motion by the fiscal for the dismissal of a case already filed in court. The judge may
properly deny the motion where, judging from the record of the preliminary
investigation, there appears to be sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution.
This is, as it should be, because the case is already in court and, therefore, within its
discretion and control.
But then, the question may be asked: What are the remedies of the offended party
or complainant when the prosecuting officer refuses or fails to file an information
or to prosecute the criminal action? As stated above, "[i]n case the provincial fiscal
should fail or refuse to act even when there is sufficient evidence on which action
may be taken, the offended party may take up the matter with the Secretary of
Justice who may then take such measures as may be necessary in the interest of
justice under Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Pañgan vs.
Pasicolan, 103 Phil. 1143). " He may also file with the proper authorities or courts
criminal and administrative charges against the prosecuting officer. As held in
Bagatua vs. Revilla, 104 Phil. 393, "[w]hile it is the duty of the fiscal or the City
Attorney, as prosecuting officer, to prosecute persons who, according to the
11
evidence received from the complainant; are shown to be guilty of a crime, said
officer is likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from
groundless, false or malicious prosecution. The prosecuting officer would be
committing a serious dereliction of duty if he files the information based upon a
complaint, where he is not convinced that the sufficiency and strength of the
evidence would warrant the filing of the action in court against the accused. This
duty of the prosecuting officer involves discretion, hence, it cannot be controlled by
mandamus unless there has been a grave abuse thereof which is not shown in the
case at bar." Or, he may file a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the New
Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated August 27, 1970, of respondent judge is hereby
SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

12
G.R. No. L-27204 August 29, 1975
CASIMIRO V. ARKONCEL petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BASILAN CITY, presided by HON. REGINO
HERMOSISIMA; CITY FISCAL ANDRION and GERARDO ESPERAT, respondents.
Beltran, Beltran & Beltran for petitioner.
AQUINO, J.:
Casimiro V. Arkoncel, a lawyer serving as officer-in-charge of the Basilan Branch of
the Board of Liquidators, was charged with qualified theft by the City Fiscal of
Basilan City in the Court of First Instance of Basilan, together with his laborers
named Rogelio Lachica, Moro Hasi, Anastacio Inid and Geronimo Inid (Criminal Case
No. 1763).
It was alleged in the information that the accused stole 5,000 coconuts from the
land of Gerardo Esperat. The Fiscal, after certifying that he had conducted the
proper preliminary investigation, added "that the accused were duly subpoenaed
but failed to appear".
According to the Fiscal, when Arkoncel appeared in court and was about to be
arrested, the arrest was not effected because of his supplication that the case be
settled and, if it could not be settled, that he be allowed to go home so that he
could prepare the requisite bail bond.
Instead of posting bail, Arkoncel filed on December 14, 1966 the instant special civil
action of prohibition in order to enjoin his prosecution for qualified theft.
He alleged that he was denied due process because he was not subpoenaed to
appear at the preliminary investigation. That assertion is not correct. The truth is
that in two subpoenas dated September 13 and 21, 1966 (containing the usual
warning: "Fail not under penalty of law") he was required to appear at the
preliminary investigation. He did not appear at the scheduled hearings. The hearing
set for September 29, 1966 was postponed at the instance of Atty. Engracio S.
Bautista, a land investigator of the Zamboanga City office of the Board of
Liquidators, who presumably appeared for Arkoncel.
Atty. Bautista informed the Fiscal that he had requested the Manila office of the
Board of Liquidators to furnish him certain data relevant to the case. The hearing
was postponed for three weeks. After the expiration of that period Arkoncel and
Bautista did not get in touch with the Fiscal. He filed the information in October,
1966.
The issue is whether Arkoncel's prosecution can be enjoined. We hold that this case
falls within the general rule that injunction or prohibition does not lie to restrain a
criminal prosecution. It does not fall within the exceptions where the prosecution
may be enjoined (a) for the orderly administration of justice, (b) to prevent the use
of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, (c) to avoid
multiplicity of actions, (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights,
and (e) where the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was declared void
(Hernandez vs. Albano, L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95, 98-99; Ramos vs.
Torres, L-23454, October 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 557).
The reason for the general rule is that the accused has an adequate remedy at law
by establishing as a defense to the prosecution that he did not commit the act
charged, or that the statute, on which the prosecution is based, is void, and, in case
of conviction, be taking an appeal (Gorospe vs. Peñaflorida, 101 Phil. 886). Public
interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for
the protection of society (Nicomedes vs. Chief of Constabulary, 110 Phil. 52; Griñen
vs. Consolacion, 115 Phil. 697).
There is another reason which justifies the dismissal of the petition. Arkoncel did
not exhaust his remedies. He did not raise in the lower court the alleged lack of due
process. He came to this Court without first filing in the lower court a motion to
quash or asking for a reinvestigation. His contention in this Court that his
prosecution was merely an act of harassment, while he was in the lawful
performance of his duties as a government officer, is a factual allegation that has no
basis in the record. It is controverted by the respondents. He should have raised
that issue in the lower court.
The rule is that in a preliminary investigation conducted by the provincial or city
fiscal, or state attorney, it is sufficient if the accused was given a chance to be heard
(Sec. 14, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court). In this case, Arkoncel was afforded an
opportunity to appear at the preliminary investigation. He waived his appearance. A
"preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial"
(Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
WHEREFORE, the petition, which is patently frivolous and dilatory, is dismissed with
treble costs against the petitioner.
13
G.R. No. L-39962 April 7, 1976
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO BERIALES, BENEDICTO CUSTODIO and PABLITO CUSTODIO, accused-
appellants.
Francisco D. Abas for appellants.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia V. Sempio-
Diy and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for appellee.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V, Ormoc
City, in Criminal Case No. 562-0, convicting the accused Ricardo Beriales Benedicto
Custodio and Pablito Custodio of the crime of murder, sentencing each one of them
to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to jointly and severally pay the heirs of
Saturnina Gonzales Porcadilla the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. 1
It appears that in Criminal Case No. 562-0 the herein appellants were charged with
the crime of murder in an information filed by the City Fiscal of Ormoc City on
November 22, 1974, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th of September, 1974, at around 9:00 o'clock in the
morning at Barrio Mahayahay, this city, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, RICARDO BERIALES BENEDICTO CUSTODIO and
PABLITO CUSTODIO, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
and aiding one another, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, strike
and stab the person of SATURNINA PORCADILLA, without giving the latter sufficient
time to defend herself, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which
caused her death. ... 2
At the hearing of November 26, 1974, appellants' counsel moved for a
reinvestigation of said ease, along with two other related cases 3 which the court a
quo granted, in its Order reading as follows:
On motion of Atty. Abas counsel for the accused and without objection on the part
of Fiscal Ramon So Jr., let the reinvestigation of this case immediately take place at
the Office of the City Fiscal and let the arraignment and trial be postponed until
December 5 and 6, 1974 at 7:30 a.m. of each day, if and when the Fiscal shall
recommend that the case shall proceed after it shall have been reinvestigated, with
notice to Attys. Abas and Cornejos as well as Fiscal Solis in open court. 4
On December 3, 1974, the trial court postponed the hearing of the case to
December 17 and 18, 1974. 5 in view of the City Fiscal's motion "for a deferment of
the hearing or trial set for December 5 and 6, 1974 until such time the
REINVESTIGATION shall have been terminated for which the result of said
reinvestigation will be submitted to this Honorable Court for its resolution in the
premises." 6
On December 6, 1974, however, the trial court, motu proprio cancelled the
aforesaid hearings on December 17, and 18, 1974, and, instead, reset the
arraignment and trial of the case to December 10 and 11, 1974. 7
At the hearing of December 10, 1974, appellants counsel manifested to the court
that pursuant to its approval of his motion for reinvestigation, the City Fiscal had set
the reinvestigation for December 12, 1974 and had already issued the
corresponding subpoena to secure the attendance of the witnesses. 8 Nevertheless,
the court a quo, issued an order setting the hearing of the case to the next day,
December 11, 1974, 9 at which hearing, appellants' counsel reiterated his
manifestation that since the City Fiscal had already ordered the reinvestigation on
December 12, 1974, the said reinvestigation should first be finished and the
corresponding resolution rendered thereon and submitted to the court before any
trial of the case should take place. 10
The trial court, however, relying on the mandate of the New Constitution that "All
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies" 11 re-scheduled the hearing to December
13, 1974. 12 Immediately thereafter, Special Counsel Rosario R. Polines, in
representation of the City Fiscal, manifested that the private prosecutor, Atty.
Procadilla, be authorized to conduct the case for the prosecution.
When the case was called for hearing on December 13, 1974, counsel for the
appellant asked the court to wait for the City Fiscal to appear, since the
reinvestigation of the case had already been terminated and the Fiscal, if given a
chance, might be able to report on said reinvestigation. 14 The trial court, however,
insisted in arraigning the appellants. 15 When arraigned, the three appellants
declined to plead, saying: "I am not going to answer the question because the Fiscal
is not yet around." 16 Thereupon, the trial court entered a plea of "Not Guilty" for
each of them. 17
Thereafter, appellants' counsel again manifested that the City Fiscal was absent and
that they could not go to trial without the fiscal and his report on the
14
reinvestigation conducted by him. 18 Nonetheless, the trial court, ordered the
presentation of evidence by the private prosecutor since he had been previously
authorized by the City Fiscal to handle the case. 19
After the direct examination of the witnesses presented by the private prosecutor,
the trial court asked the counsel for the defense if he desired to cross-examine the
witnesses. Appellants' counsel, however, reiterated his manifestation that they
would not go to trial until the City Fiscal shall have submitted the result of the
reinvestigation to the court, and the court each time ruled that it considered such
manifestation as a waiver on the part of the appellants to cross-examine the
witnesses. 20
Thereafter, the private prosecutor rested the case for the prosecution and the court
called for the evidence of the defense. Again, appellants' counsel manifested that
the appellants were not agreeing to the trial of the case unless they first received
the result of the reinvestigation conducted by the City Fiscal. 21 Whereupon, the
court considered the case submitted for decision and announced the promulgation
of the decision on December 17, 1974. 22
When the case was called on December 17, 1974, appellants' counsel manifested
that the accused were not in conformity with the promulgation of the decision on
the ground that they did not agree to the trial of the case. 23 Nonetheless, the trial
court promulgated its judgment on the same day. 24
Hence, the appellants interpose this appeal, upon the principal ground that they
were denied due process of law. 25 The Solicitor General agrees with such
contention and recommends that the judgment under review be set aside and the
case remanded to the lower court for another arraignment and trial. 26
We sustain the appellants. After the trial court granted the appellants' motion for
reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the
arraignment and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have conducted and
made his report on the result of such reinvestigation. That was a matter of duty on
its part, not only to be consistent with its own order but also to do justice aid at the
same time to avoid a possible miscarriage of justice. It should be borne in mind,
that the appellants herein were charged with the serious crime of murder, and
considering that their motion for reinvestigation is based upon the ground that it
was Felipe Porcadilla (husband and father, respectively, of the two deceased,
Saturnina Porcadilla and Quirino Porcadilla) who was the aggressor for having
attacked and seriously wounded appellant Pablito Custodio 27 it was entirely
possible for the City Fiscal to modify or change his conclusion after conducting the
reinvestigation. When the trial court, therefore, ignored the appellants'
manifestations objecting to the arraignment and the trial of the case, until after the
City Fiscal shall have rendered a resolution on his reinvestigation, but instead
considered such manifestations on their part as a plea of riot guilty and proceeded
to try the case, received the evidence for the prosecution, and then rendered
judgment against them on the basis thereof, it committed a serious irregularity
which nullifies the proceedings below because such a procedure is repugnant to the
due process clause of the Constitution. 28
Besides, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "what is more deplorable
and which renders patently irregular all the proceedings taken in this case, was the
total absence of the City Fiscal and/or any of his assistants or special counsel on
December 13, 1974, when the appellants were arraigned and when the private
prosecutor presented evidence and rested the case supposedly for the People.
Under the Rules of Court, "All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal." 29
In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appeal for the
government. 30 As stated by this Court, "once a public prosecutor has been
entrusted with the investigation of a case and has acted thereon by filing the
necessary information in court he is b law in duty bound to take charge thereof
until its finally termination, for under the law he assumes full responsibility for his
failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its
termination." 31 While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in
criminal cases which denies the right of the fiscal, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, to turn over the active conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor,32
nevertheless, his duty to direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases
requires that he must be present during the proceedings. Thus, in the case of
People vs. Munar 33 this Court upheld the right of the private prosecutor therein to
conduct the examination of the witnesses because the government prosecutors
were present at the hearing; hence, the prosecution of the case remained under
their direct supervision and control.
In the present case, although the private prosecutor had previously been
authorized by the special counsel Rosario R. Polines to present the evidence for the
prosecution, nevertheless, in view of the absence of the City Fiscal at the hearing on
December 13, 1974, it cannot be said that the prosecution of the case was under
the control of the City Fiscal. It follows that the evidence presented by the private
prosecutor at said hearing could not be considered as evidence for the plaintiff, the
People of the Philippines. There was, therefore, no evidence at all to speak of which
could have been the basis of the decision of the trial court.
Moreover, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, "to permit such prosecution
of a criminal case by the private prosecutor with the fiscal in absentia can set an
obnoxious precedent that can be taken advantage of by some indolent members of
15
the prosecuting arm of the government as well as those who are oblivious of their
bounden duty to see to it not only that the guilty should be convicted, but that the
innocent should be acquitted — a duty that can only be effectively and sincerely
performed if they actively participate in the conduct of the case, especially in the
examination of the witnesses and the presentation of documentary evidence for
both parties." 34

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the trial court for another arraignment and trial. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

16
G.R. No. 116237 May 15, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FE ARCILLA y CORNEJO, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:p
In an Information, dated August 5, 1992,1 accused FE ARCILLA y CORNEJO was
charged with Parricide before the Regional Trial Court of Daraga, Albay, viz:
That on or about 9:00 A.M. of May 1, 1992, at Brgy. Namantao, Daraga, Albay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill and while armed with a fan knife, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab her husband, ANTONIO F.
ARCILLA, hitting and inflicting upon the latter fatal wound on his left chest, which
injury directly caused and resulted to the death of said Antonio F. Arcilla, all to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused pleaded not guilty 2 and underwent trial.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that accused Fe Arcilla y Cornejo and the
victim, Antonio Arcilla, were married in Goa, Camarines Sur, on April 19, 1975.3
They had five (5) children.
Accused was a teacher while Antonio was an employee of National Power
Corporation in Daraga, Albay. In 1983, she left her family to work in Singapore. Her
children remained in their conjugal home in Camarines Sur. Antonio, on the other
hand, stayed most of the time in Albay.
Unknown to the accused, Antonio developed an illicit affair with Lilia Lipio. The
house of Lilia's parents in barangay Namantao, Daraga, Albay, served as their
lovenest. Antonio sired two (2) children during his amorous union with Lilia.
Eventually, the accused learned of her husband's infidelity. She returned to the
country in 1988 but her return did not stop the illicit relationship between Lilia and
Antonio.
The illicit relationship came to a tragic end on May 1, 1992. At about 9:00 A.M. of
said date, accused went to Lilia's residence in Namantao, Daraga, Albay looking for
Antonio. It was the barangay's feast day and Lilia's family had a lot of guests. The
accused found Antonio having a drinking spree with his friends in a kiosk, just a few
meters away from Lilia's house.
The meeting immediately started to be violent. Accused approached Antonio and
slapped him. She then went inside Lilia's house and instructed Antonio to tell Lilia to
join them. The three proceeded to the bedroom where the three (3) year-old son of
Lilia and Antonio was sleeping. A heated altercation between accused and Antonio
followed. Lilia left the bedroom and sat on a sofa in the receiving room. The sofa
was about two (2) meters away and she could see the bickering couple through the
bedroom's door which was then half-closed.
At the height of their arguments, the accused took a fan knife from her shoulder
bag and stabbed Antonio on the chest, causing him to embrace her tightly. Lilia
barged back to the room, held Antonio's belt at the back and pulled him away from
accused. Accused was able to pull out the knife from Antonio's chest and she
delivered a second thrust to Antonio. She hit him on the left thigh. Accused then
fled with the fan knife. Blood stained her clothes.
Antonio was rushed to the hospital where he died due to "hypovolemic shock due
to massive hemorrhage secondary, to stab wound."
Accused gave a different version.
She testified that she received an urgent letter from her eldest daughter asking for
money to pay her tuition fees. Thus, in the early morning of May 1, 1992, she went
to see her husband in his office in Daraga, Albay. The security guard told her that
Antonio was in Namantao. She proceeded to Lilia's residence and found Antonio
drinking with some friends. Antonio advised her up go home and not to make a
scene. Irked, she slapped him and then went inside Lilia's house. Antonio followed
her up the bedroom where the three-year old son of Lilia was sleeping. Lilia joined
the couple in the bedroom. Accused then asked them if the child was theirs. Lilia
denied the accusation but Antonio boldly admitted that the boy was theirs. The
admission provoked a heated verbal exchange between the accused and Antonio
while Lilia brought the child outside the bedroom. The altercation became violent
when Antonio pushed the accused and she hit the concrete wall and felt dizzy.
Seeing a fan knife in a cabinet, she held it with her right hand and warned Antonio
not to go near her or she would stab him. Antonio did not heed her warning. They
grappled for the knife until Antonio was able to twist her left arm at her back. She
managed to free her left arm and held the knife with both hands. However, Antonio
moved behind her, wrapped his arms around her, held her hands and tried to force
17
the knife towards her. She twisted her body and the knife struck Antonio's left
thigh. Undaunted, Antonio tried to direct the knife towards her a second time. She
bit his arm but his grip even tightened. Again, she twisted her body and, in the
process, the knife struck Antonio. When his embrace loosened, she ran away.
She chanced upon a barangay tanod who helped her surrender to the barangay
captain of Namantao. She was then taken to the police headquarters in Daraga,
Albay.
The trial court gave more credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Lilia
Lipio and convicted the accused. The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision,
dated May 27, 1994,4 states:
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING RATIOCINATION, the court hereby finds the accused
FE ARCILLA Y CORNEJO to have committed beyond reasonable doubt the act of
stabbing her lawfully wedded husband ANTONIO ARCILLA, resulting to the latter's
untimely death. Accused is therefore declared GUILTY of the crime of parricide as
defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. She is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and the accessory
penalties provided by law.
Having been found (guilty) of the capital offense, the bail bond filed for her
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and accused is ordered committed to the
provincial jail.
Accused is likewise hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim
ANTONIO ARCILLA, the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for the fact of
death; TWENTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED (P20,100.00) PESOS, as actual or
compensatory damages; and another TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, as
moral damages.
Costs against the accused.
Subsequently, the trial court amended the dispositive portion of its Decision.
Treating reclusion perpetua as a divisible penalty under Republic Act No. 7659, the
trial court sentenced the accused as follows:
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING RATIOCINATION, the Court finds the accused FE
ARCILLA Y CORNEJO to have committed beyond reasonable doubt the act of
stabbing her lawfully wedded husband ANTONIO ARCILLA, resulting to the latter's
untimely death. Accused is therefore truly and truthfully guilty of the crime of
parricide. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance and after applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL as minimum, to TWENTY-EIGHT (28) YEARS, (8) MONTHS AND ONE (1)
DAY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum, and all the accessory penalties
provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx5
Hence, this appeal where appellant contends:
FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF LILIA LIPIO DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN THE TAKING THEREOF.
SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF LILIA LIPIO
RELATIVE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE DEATH OF ANTONIO
ARCILLA.
THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT RELATIVE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE
DEATH OF HER HUSBAND ANTONIO ARCILLA.
The appeal lacks merit.
We reject the first contention of the appellant. The records do not show that the
entire testimony of the prosecution star witness, Lilia Lipio, was given in the
absence of the prosecuting fiscal. As explicitly stated by the trial judge in his
Decision, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
From the records of Branch I of the Regional Trial Court, Prosecutor de Joya only
attended the pre-trial of the case. The pre-trial was, however, waived by the
defense. It appears that Prosecutor de Joya, after the pre-trial went back to Branch
2, as in fact he cross-examined a witness for the defense in People vs. Rogelio
Andez. This case was heard after the hearing in instant case. So Prosecutor de Joya
was absent for only a few minutes. He was not absent for all the time that Lilia Lipio
took the witness stand.
18
The Presiding Judge had a chance to talk to Prosecutor de Joya. According to him, A Antonio Arcilla said: "yes, is it not that you knew it already."
he stayed at Branch I for not more than five (5) minutes, then, returned to Branch 2.
When he returned to Branch 2, the private prosecutor was still conducting his direct xxx xxx xxx
examination on Lilia. (Emphasis supplied)
Q How far were you from Antonio and Fe when you seated yourself in the
The fleeting absence of Fiscal de Joya is not a sufficient ground to invalidate the receiving room?
testimony of Lilia Lipio as urged by appellant. To begin with, appellant herself did
not object to the continuation of the testimony of Lipio despite the momentary A More or less two meters.
absence of the prosecutor. Appellant has not also shown any prejudice caused to
her by the incident. Through counsel, she was able to fully cross-examine Lipio and Q What happened while you were already seated in the receiving room.
test her credibility. To be sure, appellant misappreciates the reason requiring the
public prosecutor to be present in the trial of criminal cases. A crime is an offense A Fe Arcilla asked Antonio Arcilla: "what do you like me to do, do I have to
against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the kill you."
Philippines.6 For this reason, section 5 of Rule 110 provides that "all criminal
actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted Q What was the answer of Antonio Arcilla?
under the direction and control of the fiscal. . . ." Only private crimes like adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness can be prosecuted A Antonio Arcilla answered, "just do it."
at the instance of the offended party.7 The presence of a public prosecutor in the
trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests at stake in the Q What else happened after that?
prosecution of crimes, fore most of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law,
the bedrock of peace of the people. As the representative of the State, the public A Antonio Arcilla was standing fronting Fe Arcilla.
prosecutor has the right and the duty to take all steps to protect the rights of the
People in the trial of an accused. It ought to be self evident that the right belongs to Q Where was he facing, was he looking at Fe Arcilla when he said that?
the public prosecutor and not to the accused. The absence of a prosecutor cannot
therefore be raised by an accused to invalidate the testimony of a state witness if A Yes, sir, but his face was a little bit lower.
he cannot prove personal prejudice as in the case at bar.
Q With that position of Antonio Arcilla so, what did Fe Arcilla do?
In her second assignment of error, appellant assails the credibility of Lilia Lipio. The
records will show that Lilia Lipio was clear and categorical when she testified on A I saw Fe Arcilla opened her shoulder bag.
how Antonio was stabbed by accused. She declared:8
Q What did he get from that bag?
ATTY. NINOFRANCO:
A That fan knife.
What happened when you entered the room?
Q What did she do with the fan knife?
(LILIA LIPIO)
A She immediately stabbed Antonio Arcilla.
After I entered the room Fe Arcilla asked Antonio Arcilla whether the child who was
sleeping is the child of Antonio Arcilla with me? Q Was Antonio Arcilla hit by that stabbing?

Q What did Antonio Arcilla answer or what was the answer of Antonio A Yes, sir.
Arcilla?
Q Where, on what part of his body?

19
 Only that altercation and Fe Arcilla even asked Antonio Arcilla: "What do you want
A At this juncture witness pointing to her left breast. me to do, do I have to kill you now?"

xxx xxx xxx Q That child who was sleeping inside the room was he awakened?

Q Now, after Fe Arcilla stabbed Antonio Arcilla on the left breast what else A No, sir, my, child was not awakened but I told somebody to get my son and
happened? brought (sic) him to me.

A Antonio Arcilla was able to embrace Fe Arcilla. Q You mean after the stabbing incident, your son was still sleeping?

Q What did you do? A Yes, sir.

A Inasmuch as the hands of Fe Arcilla could not extricate from the body of xxx xxx xxx
Antonio Arcilla what I did was to grab Antonio Arcilla by his belt on his back as there
was blood oozing from his body. Q You did not witness any commotion before the stabbing incident?

Q What happened when you grabbed Antonio Arcilla at his belt? A No, sir, only the door was moved by them. Why, were they grappling for
something?
A Fe Arcilla was able to pull the knife and stabbed Antonio Arcilla again for
the second time. A No, sir, but Antonio Arcilla was able to embrace Fe Arcilla when Antonio
Arcilla was stabbed by Fe Arcilla.
Q Where was Antonio Arcilla hit with the second stab?
Q And you witnessed all these?
A On the left thigh.
A Yes, sir and even my other child was able to witness it. My other child
(Witness pointing to his left thigh). fainted.

Q After the second stab what did Fe Arcilla do? Q The one who was not asleep?

A She hurriedly went out of the house. A Yes, sir, my daughter.

xxx xxx xxx Q And you said that Fe Arcilla again stabbed Antonio Arcilla for the second
time hitting him on the left thigh?
During her cross-examination, Lipio remained firm and certain on what transpired
that fateful day. She testified:9 A When Fe Arcilla pulled the knife from Antonio Arcilla's breast and then she
thrust (sic) it again on the left thigh.
ATTY. JACOB:
Q How, will you demonstrate?
Before Fe Arcilla stabbed Antonio Arcilla, nothing happened as to any conversation
which took place between the two? A At this juncture witness demonstrated how Antonio Arcilla was stabbed for
the second time on the left thigh. Probably the intention of Fe Arcilla was to stab
(LILIA LIPIO) the genitals of Antonio Arcilla.

20
Q But she failed?
A Antonio Arcilla was hit on the left thigh.
Q And he was facing Fe Arcilla?
A Yes, sir, that is why he was able to embrace Fe Arcilla and even had a hard
time in pulling the knife that is why I grabbed Antonio Arcilla on his back by pulling
his belt.
Q And so, you were at the back of Antonio Arcilla when he was stabbed for
the second time?
A Yes, sir, going out of the sala because Fe Arcilla passed by the sala as she
was going out of the room Fe Arcilla passed by the right side.
Q And so, let us get this clear Fe Arcilla stabbed Antonio Arcilla for the
second time using the same hand?
A Yes, sir, the same hand, the right hand.
Q And it was done in the same manner by which she made the first thrust?
A When she pulled the knife and made a thrust and he was hit on the left
thigh.
Q But by then Fe Arcilla was closer to Antonio Arcilla than when she made
the first thrust?
A Yes, sir, because I was able to grab him and she was able to pull the knife
and made the second thrust.
Q Romeo Lipio your brother was inside the compound of your parent's house
at that time of the incident?
A Yes, sir, because he was in-charge of the cooking of the food.
The records show that the demeanor of Lipio while on the witness stand impressed
the trial judge . In his Decision, the trial judge declared:
xxx xxx xxx
The court is then called upon (to) choose between these two . . . opposing actions
of incompatibles. The court is wary and conscious of this state of things, so that it
was quite critical and keen in the observation of the witnesses when they took the
witness stand. The court was then particularly watchful and paid strict attention
when prosecution witness Fe Arcilla, the accused herself, testified. Lilia may be
considered a biased witness considering that she was the other woman in the life of
Antonio. They have lived together for quite a number of years and in fact begotten
two children out of their relation. Fe Arcilla, however, could not be far behind. She
may likewise be considered as a biased witness on the footing and level as Lilia, as
she is the accused in this case. . . .
As seen and sensed by the court through a careful analytic attention, Lilia was quite
honest and sincere when she took the witness stand. She was emphatic in her
testimony and straightforward. The court could not detect any evasiveness in her
testimony. She was composed and cool.
The court, on the other hand, could feel any (sic) perceived that the accused was
not disturbed by the incident which is quite unnatural. At times, she seemed to he
amused and would smile, although there was nothing funny about the matter.
For the nth time, we reiterate that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses deserves great respect since it has the important opportunity to observe
first-hand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses at the trial. 10 We find no
cogent reason to depart from this well settled rule.
Anent the third assignment of error, we have examined the testimony of appellant
and we are not convinced that the stabbing at bar was merely accidental and
through the own doing of the victim. The location of the victim's wounds, the
position of the accused and the victim, and their relative strength negate the
credence of appellant's story. Indeed, her claim that she twisted her body at an
angle that allowed the knife to pass just below her armpit and pierce the victim's
chest and left thigh, is incredulous. Evidence to be believed must not only come
from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself. 11
We also reject the contention of the accused that she was forced to use the knife to
resist the victim's assault. While the estranged couple had a heated argument
before the stabbing incident, the evidence shows that it was the accused who
provoked the victim. By her own admission, the victim initially dissuaded her from
making a scene. Nonetheless, she could not control her emotion and she slapped
the victim in front of his friends. Even assuming arguendo, that the victim harmed
her prior to the stabbing, there was no reasonable necessity for her to use the knife
as there were many people outside the house who could readily render assistance
to her.
21
We now come to the penalty imposed by the trial court in its amended decision. In
an on bane resolution, 12 dated January 9, 1995, this Court clarified its earlier 13
held that "although ruling in People v. Lucas and section 17 of R.A. 7659 has fixed
the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty years (20) and one (1) day to forty
(40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as
an indivisible penalty." In accord with this clarification, the proper penalty to be
imposed on the appellant is reclusion perpetua without any divisible period. It is
then needless to address appellant's plea that the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender be considered in her favor. appellant's voluntary surrender will
not alter her penalty of reclusion perpetua, the same being a single and indivisible
penalty.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed amended decision is AFFIRMED,

with modification that accused FE ARCILLA y CORNEJO is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

22
G.R. Nos. 74989-90 November 6, 1989
JOEL B. CAES, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Special Cases Division), Hon.
ALFREDO M. GORGONIO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXXV, National Capital Region and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
We deal with a simple matter that should not detain us too long. Fittingly, we shall
decide it in favor of individual liberty rather than upon rebuttable presumptions and
dubious implications.
The facts are simple and mostly undisputed.
On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate
informations with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1 The cases were consolidated on
December 10, 1981. 2
Arraignment was originally scheduled on January 11, 1982, but was for some reason
postponed. 3
On August 31, 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Trial was
scheduled for October 13, 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties. 5
On November 15, 1982, the trial was again postponed for reasons that do not
appear in the record. 6
On December 20, 1982, the trial was again postponed because the prosecution
witnesses were absent. 7
On January 19, 1983, the third resetting of the case was also canceled, no reason
appearing in the record. 8
On February 21, 1983, no trial could be held again, the because witnesses being
absent. 9
On March 21, 1983, the trial was reset once more, again because the prosecution
witnesses were absent. 10
On April 19, 1983, the trial of the case had not yet started. It was reset because the
prosecution witnesses were again absent. 11
On June 3, 1983, a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution
witnesses, namely, Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado had been
personally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing scheduled on
June 6, 1983. 12
On June 6, 1983, the trial was again postponed, this time because there was no trial
fiscal. 13
On July 12, 1983, trial was reset for lack of material time. 14
On September 6, 1983, The trial was once more reset by agree-judgment of the
parties. 15
On October 19, 1983, the trial was reset to November 14, 1983. 16
On November 14, 1983, the prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the
case because its witnesses had not appeared. On the same date, Judge Alfredo M.
Gorgonio issued the following order:
In view of the failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear on several scheduled
hearing and also for the hearing today which is an indication of lack of interest,
upon motion of the trial fiscal for the provisional dismissal of these cases and with
the conformity of the accused, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered
Provisionally Dismissed, with costs de oficio. 17
On January 9, 1984, a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay (he had
been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt. Lustado who alleged that they could not
attend the hearing scheduled on November 14, 1983, for lack of notice. 18 Copy of
the motion was furnished the City Fiscal of Caloocan City but not the petitioner.
On May 18, 1984, the respondent judge issued the following order:
Acting on the "Motion for the Revival of the Case" dated December 5, 1983 filed by
the complaining witnesses to which no opposition has been filed either by the Fiscal
or the defense, and considering that the dismissal of these cases was only
provisional, for reasons stated in the motion, the same is granted.
WHEREFORE, let these cases be set anew for hearing on June 13, 1984 at 8:30 in the
morning. 19
23

A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner dated June 7, 1984, was denied
on October 9, 1984, and the revived cases were set from hearing on November 19,
1984. 20
The petitioner questioned the judge's order on certiorari with this Court, which
reffered his petition to the respondent court. The petition there was dismissed for
lack of merit on May 20, 1986, and reconsideration was denied on June 17, 1986.
21 Caes then came to us again.
The present petition is based on two arguments, to wit: (a) that the motion to
revive the cases was invalid because it was riot filed by the proper party nor was a
copy served on the petitioner; and (b) the revival of the cases would place the
petitioner double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights.
We sustain the petitioner on both counts.
It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the
government prosecutor and must always be under his control. 22 This is true even if
a private prosecutor is allowed to assist him and actually handles the examination
of the witnesses and the introduction of other evidence. 23 The witnesses, even if
they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the prosecutor in the handling of
the case. Although they may ask for the filing of the case, they have no personality
to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not even parties thereto nor do they
represent the parties to the action. Their only function is to testify. In a criminal
prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government prosecutor, or one
acting under his authority, and by no one else.
It follows that the motion for the revival of the cases filed by prosecution witnesses
(who never even testified) should have been summarily dismissed by the trial judge.
The mere fact that the government prosecutor was furnished a copy of the motion
and he did not interpose any objection was not enough to justify the action of these
witnesses. The prosecutor should have initiated the motion himself if he thought it
proper. The presumption that he approved of the motion is not enough, especially
since we are dealing here with the liberty of a person who had a right at least to be
notified of the move to prosecute him again. The fact that he was not so informed
made the irregularity even more serious. It is curious that the motion was granted
just the same, and ex parte at that and without hearing, and the petitioner's
subsequent objection was brushed aside.
On the second issue, the position of the public respondent is that double jeopardy
has not attached because the case was only provisionally dismissed and it was with
the conformity of the accused. The petitioner denies that he consented to the
dismissal and submits that the dismissal was final notwithstanding its description.
Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey," the right against double jeopardy
prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previously
acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first prosecution
forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the
danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense.
It has been held in a long line of cases 24 that to constitute double jeopardy, there
must be: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent court; (c)
to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been previously
acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the case at bar.
What we must resolve is the effect of the dismissal, which the petitioner contends
finally and irrevocably terminated the two cases against him. His submission is that
the dismissal was not provisional simply because it was so designated, more so
since he had not expressly consented thereto.
It is settled that a case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the
accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the
accused. 25 Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. But a dismissal is
not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was made without the
express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be presumed nor may it be
merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object. As we have held
in a number of cases, such consent must be express, so as to leave no doubt as to
the defendant's conformity. 26 Otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final,
i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the case.
There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final and to dispose
of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the
accused himself. The first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the
evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested. Such dismissal has
the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. In People v.
City of Silay, 27 for example, the trial court dismissed the case on motion of the
accused on the ground of insufficiency of the prosecution evidence. The
government came to this Court on certiorari, and the accused pleaded double
jeopardy. Our finding was that the case should not have been dismissed because
the evidence submitted by the prosecution was not insufficient. Even so, the
petitioner had to be denied relief because the dismissal amounted to an acquittal
on the merits which was therefore not appealable. Justice Muñoz-Palma said:
24
"However erroneous the order of the respondent Court is, and although a
miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, such error cannot now be lighted
because of the timely plea of double jeopardy."
The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused,
because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to
prosecute. Concerning this right, the ruling in the old case of Conde v. Rivera 28 is
still valid doctrine. Here the prosecution was dismissed because the accused was
made to "dance attendance on courts" and subjected to no less than eight
unjustified postponements extending over a year that unduly delayed her trial. In
dismissing the charges against her, Justice Malcolm declared for a unanimous
Supreme Court:
On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but
fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the
Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the last to set an example of
delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a
moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that
the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good
cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond
a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief ...
The case at bar is not much different from Conde. As the record shows, the
petitioner was arraigned on August 31, 1982, but was never actually tried until the
cases were dismissed on November 14, 1983, following eleven postponements of
the scheduled hearings, mostly because the prosecution was not prepared. The
accused was never absent at these aborted hearings. He was prepared to be tried,
but either the witnesses against him were not present, or the prosecutor himself
was absent, or the court lacked material time. Meantime, the charges against him
continued to hang over his head even as he was not given an opportunity to deny
them because his trial could not be held.
Under these circumstances, Caes could have himself moved for the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This would have been
in keeping with People v. Cloribel, 29 where the case dragged for almost four years
due to numerous postponements, mostly at the instance of the prosecution, and
was finally dismissed on motion of the defendants when the prosecution failed to
appear at the trial. This Court held "that the dismissal here complained of was not
truly a dismissal but an acquittal. For it was entered upon the defendants'
insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the
prosecution's failure to appear on the date of trial."
The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against the petitioner was
described by the trial judge as "provisional" did not change the nature of that
dismissal. As it was based on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the
consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal
of the accused on the merits. No less importantly, there is no proof that Caes
expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent, as we have
repeatedly held, is not enough; neither may it be lightly inferred from the
presumption of regularity, for we are dealing here with the alleged waiver of a
constitutional right. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the
accused.
We conclude that the trial judge erred in ordering the revival of the cases against
the petitioner and that the respondent court also erred in affirming that order. Caes
having been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and not having
expressly consented to the "provisional" dismissal of the cases against him, he was
entitled to their final dismissal under the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy. 30
The Court expresses its stern disapproval of the conduct in these cases of the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City which reveals at the very least a lack of
conscientiousness in the discharge of its duties. The informations appear to have
been filed in haste, without first insuring the necessary evidence to support them.
The prosecution witnesses repeatedly failed to appear at the scheduled hearings
and all the prosecution did was to perfunctorily move for a resetting, without
exerting earnest efforts to secure their attendance. In the end, it moved for the
"provisional" dismissal of the cases without realizing, because it had not studied the
matter more carefully, that such dismissal would have the effect of barring their
reinstatement. Characteristically, it was also non-committal on the motion to revive
the cases filed by the prosecution witnesses only, thereby surrendering, by its own
silence, its authority in conducting the prosecution.
It is possible that as a result of its in attention, the petitioner has been needlessly
molested if not permanently stigmatized by the unproved charges. The other
possibility, and it is certainly worse, is that a guilty person has been allowed to
escape the penalties of the law simply because he may now validly claim the
protection of double jeopardy. In either event, the responsibility clearly lies with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City for its negligence and ineptitude.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the respondent
court dated May 20, 1986, and the orders of the trial court dated May 18, 1984, and
25
October 9, 1984, are SET ASIDE. The dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. C-16411(81)
and C-16412(81) is hereby declared as final.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Secretary of Justice.

26
G.R. No. L-53373
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF
LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss
a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion
and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the
Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the
Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a
motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the
presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the
arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to
elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of
injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals
restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until
further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General
he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually
restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the
accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the
petition for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9
attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of
August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition
thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the
arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised
on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident
from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to
move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for
the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can only be civil
and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the
accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary
of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but
also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as
without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at
9:00 o'clock in the moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary
restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-
08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further
orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A
motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a
resolution of February 19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby
petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be
perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and
trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and
of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and
declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
27
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due
course to the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to
file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by
the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it being
meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and
a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the
resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to
transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the
Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to
dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal.
He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not fonow that
presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion,
is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18
The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of
the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It
cannot be controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power
vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting
persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown
to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They
have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they
become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima
facie case. 22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines
the existence of a puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case.
The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal
prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to
prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that
the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the
Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a
certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and
control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the
case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the
same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently
move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is
innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a
clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's
should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or
final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do
so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm
of the law in an op pressive and vindictive manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or
control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the
chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the
Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or
opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion
to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in
Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The
Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and
determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused
either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the
accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn,
as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused.
36 or the right of the People to due process of law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a
motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
28
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as
proceed for the proper determination of the case. to costs.

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed SO ORDERED.
by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a
vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly
be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis
for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case
thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.

The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is
to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person
accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty
of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the
Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether
the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the
responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such
circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it
to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and
void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the
prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the
private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to
grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court,
the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for
the determination of the Court.

29
G.R. No. 88442 February 15, 1990
FELIX A. VELASQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO and EDGARDO
AVILA, respondents.
Joanes G. Caacbay for petitioner.
Tomas R. Leonidas for respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Petition for certiorari to annul and/or set aside the resolution/ letter dated January
4, 1989 of the public respondent, Undersecretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero
ordering a reinvestigation of I.S. No. 86-28751.
Respondent Edgardo Avila was a Cash and Business Development Consultant of the
Techtrade Management International Corporation, authorized to follow-up
business transactions, including loan applications submitted to the company.
On September 29, 1986, Avila informed the company that he had a borrower
(whom he did not identify) for P200,000 with interest of 3%/month for a 30-day
term from September 29 to October 29, 1988. This was approved by the company
which issued to him a pay-to-cash check for P194,000 after deducting the 3%
interest of 6,000. Instead of returning the borrowed amount on due date or giving a
satisfactory explanation for the supposed borrower's failure to pay the loan despite
written demands, Avila resigned from the company on December 17, 1986
promising that: "... I shall set aside the P200,000 upon its subsequent collection
(subject of Atty. Caacbay's letter of 12/10/86) to answer for the P100,000 portion of
Tony's P700,000 loan to you; please treat the P100,000 — balance, less my unpaid
professional fee and gas expenses from November 16 to December 15, 1986, as my
separation and compulsory benefit" (p. 6, Rollo).
On December 23, 1986, petitioner Felix A. Velasquez, as Executive Vice-
President/Managing Director of Techtrade, filed a complaint for estafa against Avila
in the Manila City Fiscal's Office, where it was docketed as I.S. No. 86-28751.
Assistant Fiscal Romulo Lopez dismissed the complaint. However, upon review by
the Chief, Investigation Division of the City Fiscal's Office, the latter set aside Fiscal
Lopez' resolution and ordered the filing of an information for estafa against Avila in
the Regional Trial Court.
Avila twice sought a reconsideration of that resolution, but both motions were
denied by the City Fiscal (Annexes F & H).
Before arraignment, Avila filed on June 29, 1987 in the Department of Justice a
petition for review (Annex I) which the petitioner opposed (Annex J). On February
15, 1988, Justice Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III denied the petition for review
(Annex L). A motion for reconsideration (Annex M) of the denial did not prosper
(Annex O).
On October 14, 1988, Avila filed a second motion for reconsideration which the
Undersecretary of Justice, Honorable Artemio Tuquero granted on January 4, 1989
(Annex A, Petition). He directed the City Fiscal:
... to conduct a reinvestigation of this case to afford respondent to properly present
evidence that he was duly authorized to pay the subject creditors and for
complainant to rebut the same with controverting evidence, and thereafter to
resolve the case anew on the basis of all the evidence adduced. (p. 15, Rollo.)
The complainant filed a motion for reconsideration (Annex C) of that resolution but
it was denied on May 15, 1989 (Annex B, Petition). Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
The petition is meritorious. This case is governed by our decision in Crespo vs.
Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, where we ruled that once the information is filed in court,
the court acquires complete jurisdiction over it. A motion for reinvestigation should,
after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial
judge and to him alone. Neither the Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor
the Fiscal may interfere with the judge's disposition of the case, much less impose
upon the court their opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused, for the
court is the sole judge of that.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to
grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
30
In order therefor[e] to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial
court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining
a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for
the determination of the Court. (Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, 471 & 472.)

Crespo vs. Mogul was reiterated in Marquez vs. Alejo, 154 SCRA 302; Sta. Rosa
Mining Co. vs. Asst. Provincial Fiscal Augusta Zabala, 153 SCRA 367; Republic vs.
Judge Sunga, G.R. No. 38634, June 20, 1988; Peralta vs. CFI of La Union, 157 SCRA
476 and Almazar vs. Judge Cenzon, 161 SCRA 454.

The Undersecretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in ordering the re-
investigation of the criminal case against Avila after it had been filed in court. The
avowed purpose of the reinvestigation "to give an opportunity to the private
respondent to present an authentic copy of the board resolution of the offended
party (Techtrade Management International Corporation) which [allegedly] had
authorized him to deal and otherwise dispose of the funds of the corporation" (p.
72, Rollo), can also be achieved at the trial in the lower court where that piece of
evidence may be presented by the accused as part of his defense.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The order dated January 4, 1989
of the public respondent (Annex A, Petition) is hereby annulled and set aside, with
costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

31
G.R. No. L-38634 June 20, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I, Camarines Sur, ARISTON
ANADILLA, RAFAEL ANADILLA and JOSE ANADILLA, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order * of the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur, 10th Judicial District, Branch I, dated 20 March 1974, dismissing
motu proprio Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled "People of the Philippines,
Complainant versus Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, Accused," as
well as of the order dated 22 April 1974 of the same court denying the motion for
reconsideration of said earlier order.
The facts are not disputed.
On 10 August 1964, an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents Rafael
Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on 11 and 12
March 1974. The hearing set on 11 March 1974 was, however, postponed in view of
the absence of one of the accused, respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet
been arrested by the police authorities. On the same date, the court a quo issued
an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set the trial of the case
for 29 and 30 July 1974.
On 20 March 1974, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads:
Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the
further prosecution of this case and there being no objection on the part of the
accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, this case is hereby
DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael
Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect.
The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered
cancelled.
In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby
ordered to release said accused from their detention immediately upon receipt of
this order.
SO ORDERED. 1
The affidavit of desistance, relied upon by the aforequoted order, was executed by
the offended party on 20 March 1974 and subscribed and sworn to before the
branch Clerk of Court Atty. R.B. Torrecampo. It alleged, among others, that:
That he was the complainant in Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled, People vs. Ariston
Anadilla, et al., for Attempted Homicide, which case is pending before the first
branch of this Court; that he is no longer interested in the further prosecution of
this case and that he has already forgiven the accused for their acts; that his
material witnesses could no longer be contacted and that without their testimonies,
the guilt of the accused cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that in
view of these circumstances, he requests the Prosecuting Fiscal for the dismissal of
the said case. 2
The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied by
the court a quo in an order dated 22 April 1974. 3 This petition was thereupon filed
before this Court.
The issue in this petition is whether the courta a quo may dismiss a criminal case on
the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without a
motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal.
The issue presented is not novel. In Crespo v. Mogul, 4 promulgated on 30 June
1987, the Court had occasion to state the rule in regard to the respective powers of
the prosecuting fiscal and the court, after the complaint or information has been
filed in court. In said case, the issue raised was whether the trial court, acting on a
motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to
grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial of the case on the merits.
In the Crespo case, an information for Estafa had already been filed by the Assistant
Fiscal before the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. Arraignment of the accused
and trial of the case were, however, deferred because of a pending appeal by the
accused/respondent to the Secretary of Justice. Reversing the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal, the Undersecretary of Justice directed the fiscal to
move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. Upon
such instructions, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence. The Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. On a certiorari
32
recourse to the Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed. Review of the Court of
Appeals decision was then sought by the accused with this Court, raising the issue
previously stated herein, Resolving, the Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The
Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and
determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant
for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either
voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the
accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn,
as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court or not [sic], once the case had already been brought to
Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case
thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only
qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of
the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
In the case at bar, the Court has taken note that before the case was set for trial,
almost ten (10) years had elapsed from the date of filing of the information. It was
not, therefore, unusual that the complainant-offended party, in his affidavit of
desistance manifested that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted,
but, without their testimony, the guilt of the accused could not be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
The prosecuting fiscal in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the
case, obviously believed that despite such manifestation of the complainant, he
(fiscal) could prove the prosecution's case.
To avoid similar situations, the Court takes the view that, while the Crespo doctrine
has settled that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should
be dismissed (after the complaint or information has been filed in court), still, any
move on the part of the complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case,
even if without objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting
fiscal for his own view on the matter. He is, after all, in control of the prosecution of
the case and he may have his own reasons why the case should not be dismissed. It
is only after hearing the prosecuting fiscal's view that the Court should exercise its
exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to
grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation." (Emphasis supplied). 5

33
G.R. No. L-12260 October 20, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOROTEA ORTEGA and RAMON CHUA YAP, defendants-appellants.
Thomas Lislie McGirr for appellants.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
Tirso de Irureta Goyena for private prosecutor.
CARSON, J.:
The defendants and appellants in this case were convicted on the 12th day of June,
1916, in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal, of the crime of adultery,
committed, as charged in the complaint, in the municipality of Antipolo in that
province, between the 9th and 12th days of May, 1914. The complaint was filed by
Antonio Seng Queng, the husband of Dorotea Ortega, on the 26th day of October,
1915.
It appears that on November 15, 1914, a judgment was entered in a criminal action
in the Court of First Instance of Manila, acquitting these accused of another charge
of the crime of adultery set forth in a complaint filed in that court on the 12th day
of October, 1914, alleging the commission of the crime of adultery in the city of
Manila, between the 1st and 10th days of October, 1914.
It further appears that on or about October 15, 1914, a civil action for divorce was
instituted against the wife by the husband in the Court of First Instance in the city of
Manila, and that prior to the date of the institution of the criminal proceedings in
the Province of Rizal, judgment on the merits had been rendered in the civil action
against the plaintiff husband and in favor of the defendant wife, absolving her from
the charges of adulterous relations set forth in the complaint.
At the time when the criminal action was instituted and decided in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, an appeal was pending in this court from the judgment rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Manila in favor of the wife in the civil for divorce;
and when the appeal from the judgment in the criminal action in the Province of
Rizal was first submitted to this court, our attention was invited and directed to the
fact that the appeal in the civil action was still pending. Some time thereafter the
appeal in the civil action was dismissed on the motion of the appellant; and the
judgment in favor of the wife in the civil action for divorce in the Court of First
Instance of Manila became final and unappealable, prior to the date of the
resubmission of the appeal in the case at bar at the opening of the present term.
1awphil.net
On the appeal in the case at bar, counsel for the defendants and appellants
renewed their contentions in the court below that the judgments in the criminal
and the civil actions, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, sustained their pleas of
"autrefois acquit," and res adjudicata under the provisions of article 436 of the
Penal Code, which were submitted in due form upon their arraignment, and
supported by the introduction into the record of copies of the proceedings had in
the former cases, including the judgments entered therein.
The Attorney-General contends with much force that the plea of "autrefois acquit."
based on the judgment in the former criminal actions, should not be sustained,
because the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila had no jurisdiction in a
criminal action over the adulterous acts with which the accused were charged, and
of which they were convicted in the case at bar. This because the complaint in the
case at bar and the evidence submitted at the trial disclose that these alleged
adulterous acts, if committed at all, were committed in the Province of Rizal and
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of the First Instance of Manila; and it
is contended that an acquittal in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, on
a charge of the commission of the crime of adultery within the jurisdictional limits
of that court, should not be held to be a bar to a prosecution and conviction upon
another charge of adultery committed beyond the jurisdictional limits of that court,
when the second charge is submitted in the Court of First Instance of the province
wherein it is alleged and proven that the crime was committed.
We do not deem it necessary, however, to discuss or decide this question, because
we are of the opinion that a judgment in favor of the wife in a civil action for
divorce is a bar to her subsequent prosecution and conviction in a criminal action
for adultery, based upon the commission of alleged adulterous acts prior to the
institution of the civil action — and this without regard to the place where it is
alleged that such adulterous acts are committed.
Article 436 of the Penal Code is as follows:
A final judgment in favor of a defendant in an action for divorce upon the ground of
adultery shall be conclusive in a criminal prosecution for the same offense.
If the decision in the civil case is to the effect that adultery has been committed, a
prosecution shall, nevertheless, be necessary for the imposition of a penalty.
The first paragraph of the article is manifestly conclusive as to the rights of the
defendants and appellants in the case at bar. It may be well be observe, however,
34
that in a civil action for divorce on the ground of adultery the inquiry as to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant spouse is not limited to the commission of
adulterous acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court wherein the action is
pending: so that in such an action a judgment on the merits, declaring that there
are no sufficient grounds for a divorce, is in substance and effect a judicial finding
that there is no merit in the allegations set forth in the complaint of the plaintiff
spouse praying for divorce on the ground of the alleged unfaithfulness of the
defendant spouse. In other words, the judgment is a solemn declaration that the
defendant spouse has not been guilty of adultery prior to the date of the institution
of the civil action for divorce.

In this jurisdiction, criminal actions for adultery cannot be instituted except on the
complaint of the offended spouse, and the provisions of article 436 of the Penal
Code as to the conclusiveness in such an action of a judgment in favor of the
defendant in a civil action for divorce is, therefore, no more than a formal
declaration of the logical effect of such a judgment to deny to the complaining party
the right to harass and prosecute his spouse with the prosecution of criminal
proceedings based upon charges which have been judicially determined to be
without foundation in a solemn judgment rendered in a civil action in which he was
a complaining party, and in the course of which he was afforded an opportunity to
establish the truth of such charges if they were well founded. No such contentions
can be advanced, therefore, against the conclusiveness of a judgment in a civil
action for divorce in a subsequent criminal action charging that offense, as was
submitted by the Attorney-General against the claim of the alleged conclusiveness
of an acquittal in a criminal action for adultery with relation to a subsequent
criminal action for that crime, charging the commission of the adulterous acts
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court wherein the first criminal action was
tried.

We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below convicting and
sentencing these defendants and appellants of the crime of adultery should be
reversed, and that, it appearing that final judgment has been entered in favor of the
defendant wife in an action for divorce upon the ground of adultery, that judgment
is conclusive in this action, so that the defendants and appellants should be
acquitted of the crime of adultery with which they were charged in the complaint
filed in the court below and their bail bonds exonerated, with costs of both
instances de officio. So ordered.

35
G.R. No. L-55082 April 19, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICANOR DE LOS SANTOS, defendant-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Does a court have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint for rape not subscribed or
initiated by the victim who was already of legal age at the time the crime was
committed? This is the main issue presented to this Court by appellant who was
convicted of the crime of rape by the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XV in
Criminal Case No. AR-288.
As gathered from the records of this case, the essential facts are as follows:
In April, 1973, Luzviminda Tan, a beautiful lass at the age of 23, went to stay with
her aunt Calixta de los Santos in Alcoy, Cebu for a vacation. At about eight o'clock in
the evening of April 28, 1973, Luzviminda told her aunt that she had to go to the
comfort room which was located approximately 20 meters away from the house.
Inasmuch as Luzviminda failed to return after 20 minutes, her aunt began to worry.
Unable to find her anywhere near the house, Calixta went to a nearby store to ask a
certain Jaime Carulasan to help her look for her niece. Carrying a torch light, Jaime
and Calixta proceeded towards the town poblacion. On the way, they met three
men who informed them that Luzviminda was in the house of a certain Gildo Egon.
Immediately thereafter, they went to the said house.
Upon arriving therein, Calixta went up and met Nicandro Anore, the co-accused of
appellant in the lower court, who said, "I have nothing to do with that." Upon
hearing this statement, Calixta and Jaime barged into a room and saw the
seemingly unconscious Luzviminda lying on the floor with her dress raised up to her
waist. She was not wearing panties. They also saw appellant Nicanor de los Santos,
the son of the then incumbent mayor of Alcoy, near Luzviminda. He was fixing his
pants to cover his still exposed private organ. Upon seeing the two, appellant put
off the light and ran away. Calixta, on the other hand, went to assist the trembling
girl and with the help of Nicanor, brought her home.
The next day, Calixta filed a report of the incident in the PC Headquarters of
Sibonga, Cebu. On April 30, 1973, a physical examination of Minda was conducted
at the PC Crime Laboratory.
The findings of the medico-legal were contained in a medical report which reads:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRA-GENITAL:
Fairly developed, nourished and slightly coherent nervous female subject. Breasts
are hemispherical with dark-brown areola and nipples from which no secretion
could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and tight.
The following injuries are noted:
Trunk and upper extremity;
(1) Hematoma, scapular region, measuring 3 x 3 cm., 10 cm. right of the posterior
midline, 110 cm. above the heel.
(2) Graze abrasion, proximal 3rd of right forearm, measuring 0.3 x 0.2 cm., 3 cm.
lateral to its posterior midline.
(3) Hematoma, middle 3rd of right arm, measuring 3 x 2.5 cm., 5 cm. lateral to its
anterior midline.
Lower extremities;
(4) Hematoma, proximal 3rd of the right thigh, measuring 9 x 3 cm., just lateral to
its anterior midline.
(5) Linear abrasion, middle 3rd of right leg, measuring 4.5 x 0.1 cm., 3.5 cm. lateral
to its anterior midline.
(6) Linear abrasion, distal 3rd of right thigh, measuring 1.5 x 0.2 cm., 3 cm. medial to
its anterior midline.
(7) Linear abrasion, proximal 3rd of right leg, measuring 2.5 x 0.1 cm., 2.5 cm lateral
to its posterior midline.
GENITALS:
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated
with the dark-brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same
are disclosed an elastic fleshy type hymen, with indentations at 5 and 7 o'clock
positions and an abraided vulvar mucosa. External vaginal orifice offers moderate
resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger and virgin size vaginal
36
speculum. Vaginal canal is tight with slightly shallowed rugosities. Cervix is normal
in size, color and consistency.
Vaginal and peri-urethal smears are positive for spermatozoa.
REMARKS:
Findings are compatible with that of a recent sexual intercourse.
Barring unforeseen complications, it is estimated that the above injuries will resolve
in 7-9 days. 1
Later, a complaint for rape was filed by the father of Luzviminda against appellant
Nicanor de los Santos and Nicandro Anore .
On June 13, 1980, after due trial, the lower court rendered a decision finding
appellant Nicandro de los Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and required him to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of P40,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The trial court, however, acquitted Nicandro
Anore for want of sufficient evidence.
Hence, this appeal by Nicanor de los Santos.
Regarding the main issue, appellant argues that jurisdiction was never conferred
upon the trial court since the complaint was not signed by the victim herself who
was already of age, but by her father Paulino Tan . 2 The lower court, on the other
hand, ruled that the father of the victim had the perfect right to file the complaint
in view of the incapacity of the latter who was not in complete possession of her
mental and physical faculties. 3 Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court is
the applicable provision of the Rules in this regard, to wit:
Sec. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions:.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The offense of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the above provision of law, the right to institute a criminal action for the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviouness is reposed exclusively
and successively in the persons enumerated in the provision, in the order in which
they are mentioned. This means that no one has the authority to proceed if there is
some other person previously mentioned therein with legal capacity to appear and
institute the action. 5 Therefore, a father cannot file a complaint for any of the
abovementioned crimes committed against his daughter if the latter has the legal
capacity to appear and institute the action.
After a careful scrutiny of the voluminous records of this case, We hold that the
complaint filed by the father of Luzviminda is valid and sufficient and is not in
violation of the jurisdictional requirement of the law since the rape victim was
incapacitated to file it herself. Although the purpose of the law in placing the
offended party in the first rank is to give her the preferential right in the filing of the
complaint, this does not apply where she is otherwise physically or legally
incapacitated to do so.
The finding of the lower court that "the victim was not in complete possession of
her mental and physical faculties and was incapacitated by reason of insanity" is
well-supported. Witnesses declared under oath that after the incident, the victim
would not talk, refused to eat and just spent her time as a timid and immobile
person. This was corroborated by Dr. Ortega, who, after an examination of the
victim, concluded that she was not capable of testifying in any court proceeding.
The trial court judge personally examined the girl in court and saw for himself the
pitiable state she was in. She could not even do such simple acts like standing up
and sitting down so much so that somebody else had to assist her. Questions
propounded to her were answered with blank stares. Hence, the lower court made
the pronouncement that she is insane and that she cannot testify in court.
We cannot help but agree with the above finding after taking a look at the
photographs of Luzviminda which were offered as exhibits in the lower court. One
cannot deny that the picture taken of her after the incident is that of a skinny,
untidy, and frightened girl so different from that taken of her previous thereto
where she appears to be very healthy and strikingly beautiful. Accordingly, it is
unreasonable to expect her to file the necessary complaint with the proper
authorities. In view of the foregoing, We hold that the father of a rape victim has
the perfect right to initiate the prosecution of a rape case in behalf of his daughter,
even if she is of legal age, if she is mentally incapacitated to do so.
37

Appellant, however, insists that he cannot be convicted of the crime of rape on the
basis of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution which allegedly
does not clearly establish his guilt. He also maintains that the lower court should
not have considered the testimonies of Calixta de los Santos and Jaime Carulasan
because they are incredible and are contradictory to each other. Appellant also
claims that the injuries of Luzviminda were caused by her aunt who continously
whipped her with coconut leaves after finding her half naked in the house of Egon
He further explains that when Calixta saw Luzviminda, without her panties, in the
kitchen of the house, the latter was only urinating. Lastly, appellant insists that he
could not have raped Luzviminda as he considered her a relative.
We cannot agree with appellant that there is no sufficient basis for the judgment of
conviction. Although the victim was not able to testify in court due to her mental
illness, the facts and circumstances surrounding this case clearly prove the
commission by the appellant of the crime of rape against her person.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed if the offender had
common knowledge of a woman and such act is accomplished under the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances lances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraph shall be
present.
The findings of the medico-legal officer who examined Luzviminda the day after the
incident showed that the victim had sexual intercourse very recently and that force
was applied on her as evidenced by the presence of numerous abrasions,
lacerations and other injuries. As to the Identity of the offender, the aunt of the
victim and witness Jaime Carulasan were positive that it was appellant whom they
saw inside the room with the girl, his private organ still exposed although he
belatedly tried to avoid being Identified by putting off the light and scampering
away.
As to the testimonies of Calixta de los Santos and Jaime Carulasan. We reiterate the
oft-repeated rule that inconsistencies and contradictions on minor matters do not
affect the credibility of such testimonies.
On the contrary, it is the testimony of the appellant which appears unconvincing. It
is hardly believable that Calixta de los Santos would mercilessly whip her already
physically weak and very frightened niece on the sensitive parts of her body causing
all those injuries found on her by the medico-legal officer. Furthermore, the
explanation of appellant that the victim was just urinating in the kitchen when
Calixta de los Santos and Jaime Carulasan arrived is incredible. In the first place, it is
not probable that a young, unmarried lady like Luzviminda would venture to go
alone to a very dark room in a stranger's house without bringing any lamp or any
other form of illumination with her. Besides, it does not seem to be a practice of
women to remove their panties in order to urinate. Pulling them down is sufficient
for the purpose.
We also reject the contention of appellant that since he considers Luzviminda as his
relative, his claim of innocence is fortified. Apparently, appellant got strongly
attracted to Luzviminda because, as described by his own witness, she was very
beautiful that night. 6 If there were cases of men raping their own daughters, with
more likelihood there could be cases of men raping their distant relatives.
Moreover, the family of Luzviminda does not consider appellant as their relative.
We also take into consideration the fact that appellant failed to show any motive on
the part of the parents of Luzviminda to fabricate a rape charge against him. There
was also no reason given by him for Calixta testifying against him when his own
mother declared that Calixta had good relations with them before the incident.7
This observation holds true as well for the other prosecution witness Jaime
Carulasan whom appellant considered as a closed friend. 8
]The guilt of appellant is all the more made evident by the fact that his father
interceded to settle the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court is hereby
AFFIRMED with costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED,
38
G.R. No. L-39881 February 20, 1934 held for trial upon an information charging a crime under article 343 aforesaid;
provided that such information be filed within ten days from and after a copy of this
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, decision is served upon the Solicitor-General, failing which it is ordered that the
vs. accused be discharged from further custody.
ARSENIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Laurel, Del Rosario and Lualhati and Francisco G. Perez for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

BUTTE, J.:

The appellant was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga of the
crime of rape upon the following information:

"Que en o hacia el 2 de febrero de 1933, en el Municipio de Arayat, Provincia de

Pampanga, Islas Filipinas, el referido acusado, Arsenio de la Cruz, por medio de
engaño, fuerza, amenaza e intimidacion, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente, yacio
con Emiliana Balatbat contra su voluntad. Hecho cometido contra la ley y con las
circunstancias agravantes de nocturnidad, despoblado y premeditacion." Upon
conviction he was sentenced to seventeen years, four months and one day of
reclusion temporal.

We have carefully examined all the evidence in this case but we do not deem it
necessary to restate it at length. We cannot find that the accused exercised over
the offended party, a girl sixteen years of age, such continuous intimidation, even
during many hours of separation and absence, and with many opportunities of
escape and calls for assistance, as the prosecution has tried to prove in this case.
The offended girl may be ignorant, as argued by the Solicitor-General, but she is not
an idiot. No rational person, who can testify so intelligently as Emiliana Balatbat,
even under cross-examination, would long remain under the fear that the accused
could strike her dead by raising his hand. Nor can we believe that a virtuous girl
who valued her honor would not have challenged him to try his alleged miraculous
power. The defendant denied that he ever made any claim to supernatural power
and there is no evidence in the record that anybody ever heard him make such a
claim except Emiliana Balatbat and Filomena Maño, who both charge him with the
crime of rape. We are not convinced beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence in
this case that the consent of the offended party was entirely lacking.

While we have arrived at the conclusion that the judgment of guilt this information
must be reversed, we are inclined to believe that a prosecution under article 343 of
the Revised Penal Code for rapto con anuencia might have prospered. Without,
however, prejudging in the slightest degree that question, we direct the defendant
be not discharged (see section 37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) but that he be

39
G.R. No. L-3181 October 10, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, defendant-appellant.
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos, for appellant.
Rafael Palma and P. Salas, for private prosecutors.
CARSON, J.:
The complaint charges the defendant with the crime of seduction (estupro) of a
woman over 12 and under 23 years of age, as defined and penalized in article 443
of the Penal Code, which is as follows:
The seduction of a virgin over 12 and under 23 years of age, committed by any
public authority, priest, servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or by any person in
charge of her education or guardianship, under any name whatsoever, shall be
punished with the penalty of prision correccional, in its minimum and medium
degrees.
Whosoever shall commit incest with his sister or descendant, even though she were
older than 23 years of age, shall incur the same penalty.
Seduction, when committed with fraud by any other person on a woman over 12
years of age, but under 23, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor.
Any other unchaste abuse committed by the same persons and under similar
circumstances shall be punished with the same penalty.
It is alleged that the defendant seduced Teofila Sevilla under promise of marriage
early in the year 1902, at which time she was less than 21 years of age. The
complaint was not filed until February, 1906, when she was more than 24 though
less than 25 years of age, and was signed, sworn, and submitted by one Esteban
Sevilla, at whose "instance" these proceedings were had, he appearing as the
private prosecutor and alleging that he is the father of the said Teofila Sevilla.
The facts as to the age of the woman were developed at the trial of the case and
are not controverted.
We think that since the complaint was not filed until after the offended party had
attained her majority, criminal proceedings based on the alleged seduction could
only be instituted and maintained at her "instance", and she, and she alone, could
file a complaint which would give the trial court jurisdiction over the offense
charged. The complaint having been filed by her father, at whose instance the
proceedings in the case were had, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged, and its judgment of conviction should be reversed and the
complaint upon which it was based dismissed. Article 448 of the Penal Code is as
follows:
Criminal proceedings for seduction can only be instituted on the complaint of the
offended person or her parents, grandparents, or guardian.
In order to proceed in cases of rape and in those of abduction committed with
unchaste design, the denunciation of the interested party, her parents,
grandparents, or guardians, shall suffice even though they do not present a formal
petition to the judge.
If the person injured should, by reason of her age or mental condition, lack the
requisite personality to appear in court, and should, besides, be wholly
unprotected, not having parents, grandparents, brothers, or guardian of person or
property to denounce the crime, the procurador sindico or the or the public
prosecutor may do so, acting on the strength of public rumor.
In all the cases of this article the express or implied pardon of the offended party
shall extinguish penal action or the penalty, if it should have been already imposed
on the culprit.
The pardon shall never be presumed, except by the marriage of the offended party
with the offender.
It is contended that these provisions authorize the institution of criminal
proceedings by the father in all cases of seduction because the offense can only be
committed upon a woman under age and legally incapacitated to institute criminal
proceedings on her own behalf. But if the father does not institute such
proceedings until after his daughter has attained full age, we are of opinion that he
loses the right so to do, and that this right vests exclusively in the offended party,
unless, of course, there is some legal impediment, not arising out of nonage, which
prevents her from maintaining such criminal action.
The right to institute criminal proceedings in cases of seduction could not be
reposed in the offended person, her parents, grandparents, and guardian, at one
and the same time, without occasioning grave difficulties in the administration of
justice, resulting from the attempts of some of these persons to institute criminal
40
proceedings contrary to the wish and desire of the others; and that this was not the
intention of the lawmaker becomes manifest in the light of the peculiar provisions
of the above-cited article of the Penal Code, whereby the offended party is given
the right to pardon the offender and thus extinguish and destroy the cause of the
criminal action, or remit the penalty prescribed by law, where judgment of
conviction has been actually pronounced and sentence imposed.
Hence, although these persons are mentioned disjunctively, the above provision of
the Penal Code must be construed as meaning that the right to institute criminal
proceedings in cases of seduction is exclusively and successively reposed in these
persons in the order in which they are named, so that no one of them has authority
to proceed if there is any other person previously mentioned therein with legal
capacity to appear and institute the action.
This construction of the law imposes upon the woman the obligation and the right
to determine whether criminal proceedings shall be instituted for seduction, if it
appears that she is of age, and is not otherwise legally incapacitated from appearing
in court to maintain the action at the time when it is imposed to institute such
proceedings.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a woman 23 years old is of age. From that
period she is in the full possession of her civil rights, save only in certain exceptional
cases expressly prescribed in the code. The right to appear and prosecute or defend
an action in the courts is not one of these exceptions, and indeed, it is inherent to
the full exercise of civil rights. (For the purpose of this decision it is not necessary to
consider the effect of American legislation as modifying this provision by reducing
the number of years at which woman becomes of age.)
Since the offended party in this case was over 23 but less than 25 years of age at
the time when the complaint was filed, it may be well to add that article 321 of the
Civil Code, which is as follows —
. . . Daughters of the family who are of full age but less than 25 years old can not
abandon the paternal roof without permission of the father or of the mother in
whose company they live, unless it be to marry, or when the father or mother have
contracted another marriage" — does not imply a limitation to the right of a
woman of full age to appear and defend an action, nor confer authority upon the
father to appear for and instead of his daughter in legal proceedings, for this article,
since it confers exceptional authority on the father, must be construed strictly and
should not be extended beyond its own proper terms and the object and purposes
indicated therein. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, October 13, 1890.)
lawphil.net
Counsel for the prosecution insists that since no objection was made to the
complaint in the court below, the appellant is not entitled to raise an objection
thereto for the first time in this court, and should be held to have waived such
objection by his failure to urge it in the trial court. In support of this contention, he
cites the case of the United States vs. Sarabia (4 Phil. Rep., 566), wherein this court,
adopting the general rule in the United States, that an objection to the complaint to
be available in the appellate court must have been raised below, held "that no
objection to a complaint based upon a defective statement, either in the matter of
form or substance of "the acts or omissions complained of" as required by section
6, paragraph 3, of General Orders, No. 58, not made in the court below" will be
available in the Supreme Court.
It is to be observed, however, that under the provisions of the above-cited article
448 of the Penal Code, jurisdiction over the crime of seduction is expressly denied
the trial court unless such jurisdiction be conferred by one of certain persons
specified in the law; in this case, as we have seen, by the offended person herself.
The objection in this case is not, strictly speaking, to the sufficiency of the
complaint, but goes directly to the jurisdiction of the court over the crime with
which the accused was charged. It has been frequently held that a lack of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of
the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p.
189, and large array of cases there cited), and, indeed, where the subject matter is
not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4
Ill., 133; 1 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the
manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction
can not be waived by the parties. Hence, the accused in a criminal case can not, by
express waiver or otherwise, confer jurisdiction on a court over an offense as to
which such jurisdiction has not been conferred upon such court by law. (Harkness
vs. Hyde, 98 U.S., 476; Nazos vs. Cragin, 3 Dill (U.S.), 474; 3 Tex., 157; 2 5 Mich., 331;
3 Ohio St., 223; 4 82 Wis., 664; 91 Ill., 311. 5 ) Counsel further contends that since
the offended party appeared in court and testified, she may be said to have
instituted the proceedings, as provided in article 448, although the complaint is
signed and sworn to by her father. It may be sufficient answer to this contention to
point out that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the proceedings were,
in fact, had at the instance of the daughter rather than the father, the fact that she
appeared and gave testimony not justifying such conclusion because, being duly
subpoenaed, she would have been compelled so to do whether she appeared
voluntarily or otherwise; but, as has been shown before, the provisions of article
448 are so explicit and so positive that even though it appears that she had, in fact,
taken an active part in all the proceedings, this would not be sufficient unless the
41
complaint was submitted and the action formally maintained by her. That this is the
meaning of the provisions of the said article becomes clear upon a comparison of
the language used as to proceedings for seduction and proceedings in a case of
rape. In proceedings for seduction the language used expressly provides that they
can only be instituted and maintained on the complaint (a instancia) of the persons
therein mentioned; while in cases of rape and those of abduction committed with
dishonest designs, the denunciation (la denuncia) of the interested party, or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, shall suffice, "though they do not present a
formal complaint to the judge" (aunque no formalicen instancias). (U.S. vs. Santos, 4
Phil. Rep., 527.)

The judgment of conviction of the trial court should be, and is hereby, reversed and
the complaint instituted in these proceedings should be, and is hereby, dismissed,
with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

42
G.R. No. L-20687 April 30, 1966
MAXIMINO VALDEPEÑAS, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Jose F. Aquirre for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General A. A.
Narra and Solicitor O. R. Ramirez for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by petitioner Maximino Valdepeñas from a decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, convicting him of the crime
of abduction with consent, and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from three (3) months and twenty-five (25) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify Ester Ulsano in the sum of
P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The only question raised by petitioner is whether "the Court of Appeals erred in not
reversing the decision of the trial court, dated June 30, 1960, for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the action for the offense
of abduction with consent".
The pertinent facts are: On January 25, 1956, Ester Ulsano, assisted by her mother,
Consuelo Ulsano, filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Piat, Cagayan, a
criminal complaint,1 duly subscribed and sworn to by both, charging petitioner
Maximino Valdepeñas with forcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano. After due
preliminary investigation, the second stage of which was waived by Valdepeñas, the
justice of the peace of Piat found that there was probable cause and forwarded the
complaint to the court of first instance of Cagayan2 in which the corresponding
information for forcible abduction with rape3 was filed.4 In due course, said court
of first instance rendered judgment5 finding petitioner guilty as charged and
sentencing him accordingly.6
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals7 modified the decision of the
court of first instance, convicted him of abduction with consent and meted out to
him the penalty set forth in the opening paragraph of this decision.1äwphï1.ñët
A motion for reconsideration and new trial having been filed by petitioner
contesting the finding, made by the Court of Appeals, to the effect that complainant
was below 18 years of age at the time of the occurrence, said Court 8 granted the
motion, set aside its aforementioned decision and remanded the case to the court a
quo for the reception of additional evidence on said issue. After a retrial, the court
of first instance rendered another decision,9 reiterating said finding of the Court of
Appeals, as well as its judgment 10 of conviction for abduction with consent and the
penalty imposed therein. Petitioner appealed again to the Court of Appeals 11
which 12 affirmed that of the court of first instance 13 with costs against the
petitioner. Again petitioner filed 14 a motion for reconsideration based, for the first
time, upon the ground that "the lower court had no jurisdiction over the person of
appellant and over the subject matter of the action, with respect to the offense of
abduction with consent." Upon denial of the motion, 15 petitioner interposed the
present appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner's theory is that no complaint for abduction with consent has been filed
by either Ester Ulsano or her mother, Consuelo Ulsano, and that, accordingly, the
lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction
with consent and had, therefore, no authority to convict him of said crime. We find
no merit in this pretense.
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension,
with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 16 In the
case at bar, it is not claimed that petitioner had not been apprehended or had not
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Indeed, although brought before
the bar of justice as early as January 25, 1956, first, before the then justice of the
peace court of Piat, then before the court of first instance of Cagayan, later before
the Court of Appeals, thereafter back before said court of first instance, and then,
again, before the Court of Appeals, never, within the period of six (6) years that had
transpired until the Court of Appeals, rendered its last decision, 17 had he
questioned the judicial authority of any of these three (3) courts over his person. He
is deemed, therefore, to have waived whatever objection he might have had to the
jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Court's
jurisdiction. What is more, his behaviour and every single one of the steps taken by
him before said courts — particularly the motions therein filed by him — implied,
not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the
courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person.
Upon the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
action — in this lease the crime of abduction with consent — is and may be
conferred only by law; 18 that jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law
upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involve in the
offense; and that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be
convicted of abduction with consent. 19 It is true that, pursuant to the third
paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
43
. . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
The provision does not determine, however, the jurisdiction of our courts over the
offenses therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same
is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals
primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment
of the culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition
precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the
guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed "out of consideration for the
offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial." 20
"by force and violence ... against her will and taking advantage of the absence of
her mother" from their dwelling and carried "her to a secluded spot to gain carnal
intercourse with the offended party against her will, using force, intimidation and
violence, with lewd designs." This allegation implies that Ester is a minor living
under patria protestas, and, hence, single, thus leading to the presumption that she
is a virgin, 26 apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation, 27 for, as
Chief Justice Moran has aptly put it, the presumption of innocence includes, also,
that of morality and decency, and, as a consequence, of chastity. 28
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner Maximino Valdepeñas. It is so ordered.

In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have negated such
preference by filing the complaint adverted to above and going through the trials
and tribulations concomitant with the proceedings in this case, before several
courts, for the last ten (10) years. Petitioner says that the complaint was for forcible
abduction, not abduction with consent; but, as already adverted to, the latter is
included in the former. Referring particularly to the spirit of said provision of Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code, we believe that the assent of Ester Ulsano and her
mother to undergo the scandal of a public trial for forcible abduction necessarily
connotes, also, their willingness to face the scandal attendant to a public trial for
abduction with consent.

The gist of petitioner's pretense is that there are some elements of the latter which
are not included in the former, and, not alleged, according to him, in the complaint
filed herein, 21 namely: 1) that the offended party is a virgin; and 2) that she is over
12 and under 18 years of age. The second element is clearly set forth in said
complaint, which states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor ... 17 years of age ...", and,
hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age.

As regards the first element, it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Article 343
of the Revised Penal Code, 22 as an essential ingredient of the crime of abduction
with consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does not exclude
the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation, 23 because the
essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the
family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members."
24

The complaint in the case at bar 25 alleges, not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17
years of age, but also that petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously" took her

44
G.R. No. L-58595 October 10, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, CFI of Iloilo, Br. V,
CECILE SANTIBANEZ and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Panfilo B. Enojas for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo, Branch V, presided by the respondent Judge
Ricardo M. Ilarde, granting the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case
No. 13086, entitled, "People of the Philippines, plaintiff versus Cecile Santibañez
and Avelino T. Javellana accused."
The information in Criminal Case No. 13086 was filed on March 4, 1981 by City
Fiscal Ricardo P. Galvez. It reads:
The undersigned City Fiscal upon sworn complaint originally filed by the offended
party Efraim Santibañez, copies of which are thereto attached as Annexes "A" and
"B" hereby accused CECILE SANTIBAÑEZ and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA of the crime of
adultery, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1980, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused Cecile Santibañez being
lawfully married to Efraim Santibañez, which marriage at that time has not been
legally dissolved, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, maliciously and
criminally have sexual intercourse with her coaccused Avelino T. Javellana, a man
not his husband and who in turn knowing fully well that his co-accused was then
lawfully married to Efraim Santibañez, did then and there wilfully, maliciously and
criminally have sexual intercourse with her.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Annex "A" referred to in the information is the sworn complaint for adultery filed by
Efraim Santibañez against herein private respondents, Cecile Santibanez and
Avelino T. Javellana, with the Integrated National Police, Iloilo Metro Police District,
Iloilo City, on November 4, 1980, which complaint was immediately forwarded to
the Office of the City Fiscal for preliminary investigation. Said complaint reads:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned accuses ATTY. AVELINO JAVELLANA, a resident of CPU Compound,
Jaro, Iloilo City, and Cecile Santibañez. a resident of Candido Subdivision, Iloilo City,
for the crime of adultery ...
xxx xxx xxx
(Sgd.) EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ
(Signature of complainant)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of November, 1980 in the City
of Iloilo:
(Sgd.) RICARDO P. GALVEZ
City Fiscal
Annex "B" of the information is the affidavit-complaint dated November 6, 1980
executed by Efraim Santibañez, sworn to and filed before City Fiscal Galvez on
November 7, 1980, wherein Santibañez recounted in detail the antecedents which
brought about the apprehension in flagrante of private respondents. The same is
quoted as follows:
I, EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ, of age, married, and a resident of Fundidor Molo, Iloilo City,
after having been duly sworn to according to law depose and say:
That I am legally married to Cecile Soriano in a Civil Marriage solemnized by Judge
Vicente Santos, City Court of Pasay City on March 22, 1974 but subsequently
remarried in a religious ceremony before Rev. Panfilo T. Brasil at the Parish Church
of La Paz, iloilo City on July 18, 1974, xerox copies of the aforesaid marriage
contracts are hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B", forming integral parts of this
affidavit;
After our marriage, I built a house for our permanent residence and as our conjugal
home in Fundidor, Molo, Iloilo City and furnished it with all the comforts well within
my means;
At the start of our marriage, I was led to believe by my wife of her total concern,
love and devotion to me valid in turn I lavished her with all the material comfort at
my command and even tried to build up her social status by sending her as a
45
delegate to the Zonta World Conference at Washington, D.C. last July, 1980 without
any company. As a token of my love and unfailing trust we went sightseeing and on
second honeymoon to Hongkong only last month.
Sometime during the last week of October, 1980, while I went on my normal work
routine to Passi Sugar Millsite in Passi Iloilo, my son Edmund took me aside in
confidence and told me that he has some very delicate matters to take up with
which may be misinterpreted by me or may be taken by her in a wrong light;
however, he said hat the his valid dignity of the family is at mistake and I have to
know it whatever be the consequence. After I gave him the go signal, he narrated to
her that my wife Cecile Sorianosos has been unfaithful to me and has been. having
illicit relationship with another man. Of curse, I was taken aback and stunned so I
asked him for the source of his information. He informed me that our maid Elsa
Barios and our driver Loreto Reales had beeen aware of the relationship and the
man usually went to my house and even slept there whenever I was in Manila. I got
angry and blamed our maid and the driver for not telling me but Edmund told me
that they were afraid to tell because they were threatened. After I have calmed
down, I commended that if I confront my wife about her illicit relationship, she will
surely deny it. So I thought that the best way was to catch her red-handed in the act
of infidelity so that she could not deny it. anymore. I suggested to Edmund to think
of a plan so we can catch his wife red-handed.
After several days of planning we agreed to put our plan of action in operation on
November 3, 1980 since I will be leaving for Manila in the morning of that day. Our
problem was how to catch my wife in the very act of having sexual intercourse with
her lover considering the fact that our master's room was air-conditioned with all
windows framed by glass jalousies closed and covered by curtains. At first we
thought of breaking down the main door with a sledge hammer so we could take
them by surprise, later we abandoned the Idea because of legal complications,
Finally, I thought of removing a glass of the jalousy so the inside of the bedroom can
be seen from the outside once the curtain can be brushed aside by means of a thin
wire and the persons on bed could be seen clearly since the bed is on the same
level as the opening of the window. After several experiments whenever my wife
was out, I found out that my wife cannot notice the removal of the glass jalousy
since our windows are screened from the inside of our room.
As pre-arranged, I removed one jalousy glass of the window of our master room so
that the people inside our room could be seen actually from the outside and the
moment my wife and her lover is seen in the act of sexual intercourse.
Having completed all the plans to effect our plan of operation, I told my wife that I
Qfor Manila on that day. I instructed my son Edmund to inform me immediately of
the result of the plan of action as soon as possible.
Almost midnight of November 3, 1980, I was informed by my daughter-in-law
Rebecca that the operation was successful and resulted in the arrest of my wife and
Atty. Bob Javellana inside our bedroom.
I know Atty. Bob Javellana for quite a time and we have been close friends. As a
friend he has come to our house at Molo Iloilo City oftentimes to discuss matters
about the court case between the Iloilo City Government and St. Therese Memorial
Chapel which is a business which I have given to my wife Cecile. Atty. Javellana
knew that Cecile Sorianosos is my legally married wife.
When I returned to Iloilo City from Manila on November 4, 1980, I was shown the
photographs taken inside our master bedroom and I am attaching hereto the
photographs which are marked as Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I" and "J".
That I am formally charging my wife, Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of
Qcomplaint against them (pp. 4-5, Original Records).
Sometime in January 1981, i.e., before the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation then being conducted by the Fiscal's Office, Efraim Santibañez learned
that he was sick of cancer and decided to leave for the United States for medical
treatment. Before his departure, he executed a holographic Will, dated January 10,
1981, a portion of which provided:
I do hereby disinherit my second wife Cecilia Sorianosos of any and all inheritance
she is entitled under the law as my wife on the ground that she had given cause for
legal separation by committing acts of adultery with Atty. Bob Javellana in the
evening of November 3, 1980 in my conjugal abode at Candido Subdivision and as a
result of which I charged her and Atty. Bob Javellana for adultery with the Fiscal's
Office and I filed a case of legal separation against her in Civil Case No. SP- 11-309 of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Iloilo City for which act of infidelity, I
can never forgive her.2
On January 15, 1981, after several requests for postponement, private respondents
submitted their memorandum to the Fiscal's Office; and on February 19, 1981,
Fiscal Galvez issued a resolution finding the existence of a prima facie case for
adultery against private respondents.
On February 26, 1981, Fiscal Galvez was informed by relatives of Efraim Santibañez
that the latter had died in the United States on February 16, 1981. This
46
notwithstanding, he prepared the information in question on March 3, 1981, and
on the following and filed the same with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
Private respondents filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the offense charged, as the offended party
had not filed the required complaint pursuant to the provisions of Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court to the effect that
"the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed and the offended spouse,"
Finding merit in the position taken by private respondents, respondent judge
granted the motion and dismissed the case. The city fiscal moved for a
reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the present recourse.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not there has been compliance with the
requirement of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, reiterated in Section 4, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court, that "the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party "
We rule in the affirmative,
We are aware that in a long line of decisions,3 this Court has maintained strict
adherence to the requirement imposed by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
It must be borne in mind, however, that this legal requirement was imposed "out of
consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial." 4 Thus, the law leaves it
to the option of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the affront
committed by the erring spouse. And this, to Our mind, should be the overriding
consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition precedent
prescribed by said Article 344 has been complied with. For needless to state, this
Court should be guided by the spirit, rather than the letter, of the law.
In the case at bar, the desire of the offended party, Efraim Santibañez, to bring his
wife and her alleged paramour to justice is only too evident. Such determination of
purpose on his part is amply demonstrated in the dispatch by which he filed his
complaint with the police [annex "A", supra]; the strong and unequivocal statement
contained in the affidavit filed with the Fiscal's Office that "I am formally charging
my wife Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of the crime of adultery and
would request that this affidavit be considered as a formal complaint against them"
[Annex "B", supra]; his filing of a complaint for legal separation against Cecile
Santibañez with the local Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court; and finally, in
disinheriting his wife in his Last Will and Testament dated January 10, 1981.
In quashing the information, respondent judge relied upon Our decision in People
vs. Santos 5 to the effect that a "salaysay" or sworn statement of the offended
party, which prompted the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation and then to
file an information in court, was not the complaint required by Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The ruling in Santos is not applicable to the case at bar. In that case, the "salaysay"
executed by complainant Bansuelo was not considered the complaint contemplated
by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code because it was a mere narration of how
the crime of rape was committed against her. However, in the affidavit-complainant
submitted by Efraim Santibañez, the latter not only narrated the facts and
circumstances constituting the crime of adultery, but he also explicitly and
categorically charged private respondents with the said offense. Thus—
That I am formally charging my wife Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of the
crime of adultery and would request that this affidavit be considered as a formal
complaint against them.
Moreover, in Santos, this Court noted that the information filed by Rizal Provincial
Fiscal Nicanor P. Nicolas "commenced with the statement "the undersigned fiscal
accuses Engracio Santos with the crime of rape," the offended party not having
been mentioned at all as one of the accusers." In the instant case, however, the
information filed by the city fiscal of Iloilo reads as follows:
The undersigned city fiscal upon sworn statement originally filed by the offended
party Efraim Santibañez, xerox copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "A"
and "B" ...
Undoubtedly, the complaint-affidavit filed by Santibañez contains all the elements
of a valid complaint, as "it states the names of the defendants, the designation of
the offense by the statute, the acts or omission complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party, the approximate time of the commission
of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. 6
What is more, said complaint-affidavit was attached to the information as an
integral part thereof, and duly filed with the court. As held in Fernandez vs. Lantin,
7 the filing in court of which affidavit or sworn statement of the offended party, if it
contains all the allegations required of a criminal complaint under Section 5, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance of the law. Thus:
... in a case where the Fiscal filed an Information charging the accused with "telling
some people ill the neighborhood that said Fausta Bravo (a married woman) was a
47
paramour of one Sangalang, a man not her husband", and Fausta Bravo did not
subscribe to the complaint this Court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case. It ruled that since the accused imputed to Fausta Bravo the
commission of adultery, a crime which cannot be prosecuted cle oficio, the
Information filed by the Fiscal cannot confer jurisdiction upon the court of origin.

lt must be noted, however, that this error could be corrected without sustaining the
motion to quash and dismissing the case. Pursuant to section I of paragraph (a) of
Presidential Decree No. 77, under which the Assistant City Fiscal conducted the
preliminary investigation the statement of the complainant was sworn to before
the aforesaid Investigating Fiscal. Assuming that the recitals in said worn statement
contain all those required of a complaint under the rules i copy of said verified -
statement of the complainant should be filed With respondent Court in order to
comply with the requirements of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code; otherwise,
the respondent Fiscal should file with said court a verified complaint of the
offended party

Upon these premises, We cannot but conclude that the adultery charge against
private respondents is being prosecuted "upon complaint filed by the offended
party."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The orders of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch V, in Criminal Case No. 13086, dated May 21 and
September 14, 1981, are hereby set aside, and respondent judge is directed to
proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

48
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City
Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign
absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against
the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what
hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before
the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal
Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella
Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner
in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April,
1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on
January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show
that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on
and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal
of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an
affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the
corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city
fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two
complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly
filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William
Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI
presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines
vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to
the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking
that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against
her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State
Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city
fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been
arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to
elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment
and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo
Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand,
respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the
cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then
pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also
directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William
Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be
arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as
direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered
detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent
entered a plea of not guilty. 14
49
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment
of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and
decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted
de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and
from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March
23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions
for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing
the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as
four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and
not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of
the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a
sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint
which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended
spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts
of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery
and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party.
The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four
offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is
significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian,
such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the
action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does
not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply.
Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are
generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action,
or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might
prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public
trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of
the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence
since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be
determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time
when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the
specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended
spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one
who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and
with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in
the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
50
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of
the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in
pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the
innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings
have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant
when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when
the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to
entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for
this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in
our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We
are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis
the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the
person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is
meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was
granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her
American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her
business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render
an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such
stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer
the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case
before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor
marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither
would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said
to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26
since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses
from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on
the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by
private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the
same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although
the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the
lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her
marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have
her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a
formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity
because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating
that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint
51
for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to
stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview
of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery
was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its
nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the
termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore

cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case
reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint
for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation
akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET

ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on
October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

52
G.R. No. L-32215 October 17, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANTIAGO 0. TAÑADA Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
(Branch V), respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
We set aside the dismissal decreed in the Order dated May 4, 1970 of respondent
Judge Santiago O. Tañada in Criminal Case No. V-13048 entitled "People v.
Postrero" of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cebu,
Branch V.
The information in Criminal Case No. V-13048 charging Romulo Postrero of rape
was filed on September 17, 1968, by Assistant Cebu City Fiscal Jose Batiquin. It
reads:
The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of the City of Cebu, upon sworn complaint
originally filed by the offended party, Victoria Capillan, attached hereto and made
part hereof and marked as Annex "A" accused Romulo Postrero of the crime of
RAPE, committed as follows:
That in the evening of August 15, 1968, (sometime past 6:40 p.m. thereof) at the
Queen Hotel of this city, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of, or sexual intercourse with the complainant Victoria Capillan, through
the expediency and by means of depriving the latter of her reason and otherwise
facilitating the carnal knowledge by rendering said complainant tired, weakened
and semi-conscious the accused having previous thereto offered and given Victoria
Capillan a beverage to drink (seven-up) and from the partaking of which said
complainant felt physical weakness and still much later deprived of reason, thus the
accused brought about this condition on the complainant to ravish the complainant
with impunity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Annex "A" referred to in the information is the sworn letter-complaint for rape filed
by Victoria Capillan with the Office of the City Fiscal, Cebu City, on September 16,
1968. Said letter-complaint reads:
Sir:
I am filing a criminal charge of RAPE against Romulo Postrero of 183-D B. Rodriguez
Street, Cebu City committed as follows:
That on or about 6:40 p.m. or so, on August 15, 1968, in the City of Cebu, one
Romulo Postrero invited me for a snack at Quiapo Restaurant of this City and he
ordered me to consume my soft drink (seven-up) at once and, thereafter, I felt
sleepy, drowsy, dizzy and very weak. Then he brought me to Queen Hotel, and then
and there raped me and have carnal knowledge with me and while I was still half
conscious as if I was drugged, to my own damage and prejudice.
I hope that a preliminary investigation be conducted immediately preparatory to
the filing of a criminal complaint.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) VICTORIA A. CAPILLAN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 16th day of September, 1968, at the
City of Cebu, Philippines.
(Sgd.) JOSE BATIQUIN
Asst. Fiscal, City of Cebu 2
On April 21, 1970, the accused filed a motion to dismiss the information on the
ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the offense charged, as the
information filed by the fiscal is not a complaint signed by the offended party as
required by the provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 4,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court to the effect that 'the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party."
Over the opposition of the prosecution, respondent judge issued the Order dated
May 4, 1970, 3 granting the motion and dismissing the case for lack of a valid
complaint. The prosecution moved for a reconsideration, but the same was denied
in an Order dated June 13, 1970. Hence, the present recourse.
As above intimated, we find the petition meritorious.
In granting the motion of the accused, respondent judge relied upon our decision in
People v. Santos 4 to the effect that unless the same is filed in court, a "salaysay" or
sworn statement of the offended party, which prompted the fiscal to conduct a
53
preliminary investigation and then to file an information in court, is not the
complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
This ruling is not controlling in the case at bar. In the first place, the rule of
"complaint filed in court" enunciated therein has already been modified. In the
1966 case of Valdepeñas v. People 5 this Court, through then Associate, later Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, clarified:
... It is true that pursuant to the third paragraph of Art. 344 of the Revised Penal
Code,
.... the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents ...
The provision does not determine, however, the jurisdiction of our courts over the
offenses therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same
is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals
primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment
of the culprit. The complaint required in said Article is merely a condition precedent
to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty
parties. And such condition has been imposed out of the consideration for the
offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. (Samilin v. CFI of
Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298, 304)
In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have negated such
preference by filing the complaint adverted to above ... 6
This ruling was followed in the subsequent case of People v. Babasa 7 where the
Court, citing the Valdepeñas case, ruled that "Art. 344 was not enacted for the
specific purpose of benefiting the accused. When it is said that the requirement in
Article 344 that there should be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives is
jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory
proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the Court to try the
case. The court's jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law ..." 8
In People v. Ilarde 9 we again cited the Valdepenas case in setting aside the orders
which dismissed an information for adultery under Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code filed by the City Fiscal of Iloilo upon a sworn complaint originally lodged
before the fiscal's office, charging the private respondents therein with the crime of
adultery, which sworn complaint was attached to the information. In overruling the
lower court's reliance on People v. Santos, supra, in dismissing the case, the Court,
through Justice Venicio Escolin, correctly emphasized that the overriding
consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition precedent
prescribed in Article 344 has been complied with is the intent of the aggrieved party
to seek judicial redress for the affront committed.
Secondly, as we pointed out in the Ilarde case, the "salaysay" executed by the
complainant in Santos was not considered the complaint contemplated by Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code because it was a mere narration of how the crime of
rape was committed against her. However, in the letter-complaint submitted by
Victoria Capillan, the latter not only narrated the facts and circumstances
constituting the crime of rape, but she also explicitly and categorically charged
accused Romulo Postrero with the said offense. Thus-
I am filing a criminal charge of RAPE against Romulo Postrero ...
Moreover, in Santos, the fiscal did not mention the offended party in the opening
statement of the information. In the case at bar, the fiscal expressly stated that the
information was instituted upon the sworn complaint of the offended party, and
even attached and incorporated the complaint as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of the City of Cebu, upon sworn complaint
originally filed by the offended party, Victoria Capillan—attached hereto and made
part hereof and marked as Annex "A"—accuses Romulo Postrero of the crime of
RAPE, committed as follows: ...
Clearly, the letter-complaint filed by the offended party Capillan contains all the
elements of a valid complaint as it "states the names of the defendants, the
designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party, the approximate time of
the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
10
Upon these premises alone, it is evident that the respondent judge erred in finding
that there was no valid complaint filed by the offended party in the charge of rape.
There is another cogent reason why the import of the appealed orders cannot be
sustained.
As correctly pointed out by counsel for the People, to rule that the complaint for
rape in the instant case, and in all other crimes covered by the third paragraph of
Article 344 of the Penal Code should be filed in court, is violative of the Charter of
Cebu City and contravenes our decision in Balite v. People 11 to the effect that all
complaints must first be filed before the City Fiscal since he has the exclusive power
54
to investigate all charges of crimes pursuant to the provisions of the first paragraph,
Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 58 (Cebu City Charter).

Accordingly, the procedure taken by the offended party in the instant case of filing
first a complaint before the Office of the City Fiscal, which complaint was adopted
by the fiscal and attached to and made part of the corresponding information filed
after investigation, sufficiently complies with the requirement of Article 344 of the
Penal Code and Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in accordance with our
pronouncement in the Valdepeñas case. Further, it was the proper procedure, and
it remains so, pursuant to the Charter of Cebu City.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch V, in Criminal Case No. V-13048, dated May 4 and June 13, 1970, are
hereby set aside, and respondent judge or the incumbent presiding judge is
directed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits without delay.

Considering the number of years that this case has been pending, and in the
interest of justice, this decision is immediately executory. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

55
G.R. No. L-12724 January 31, 1958
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARIDAD CAPISTRANO, defendant-appellant.
C.A.S. Sipin, Jr. for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for
appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Caridad Capistrano was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal with the
violation of Circular No. 37, as implemented by Circular No. 60, Section 1 (b) of the
Central Bank, in relation to Section 34 of Republic ActNo. 265, committed as
follows:
The undersigned City Attorney accuses Caridad Capistrano of Violation of Circular
No. 37, as implemented by Circular No. 60, Section 1 (b) of the Central Bank, in
relation to section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of March, 1955, in the Manila International Airport,
Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Caridad Capistrano, and outgoingPhilippine resident who
had booked passage and ready to leave the Philippinesfor Hongkong through
Philippine Air Lines plane, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in her possession and control, concealed in her person, in a sanitary pad
(Kotex brand) the following, to wit.
100 pcs at P50.00 each —— P5,000.00
Contrary to Law.
A motion to quash having been denied, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
When the case was called for trial, however, she admitted the act alleged in the
information but averred that said act did not constitute a public offense.
Thereafter, without either the prosecution or the defense adducing any evidence,
the lower court rendered judgment finding the accusedguilty and sentencing her to
suffer one month imprisonment and pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. She appealed from this
decision directly to this Court on purely questions of law.
In this appeal the accused reiterated her plea that the act alleged in the information
does not constitute a public offense because Circular No. 60 of the Central Bank,
the violation of which she is charged, is null and void, predicating her contention on
the following grounds: (a) that it was not approved by the President of the
Philippines as required by the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265); (b) that the
exercise of the powers by theMonetary Board of the Central Bank under Section 74
of said Act is authorized only during exchange crisis; (c) that the delegation by
Congress to the Monetary Board of the power to declare the existence of an
exchange crisis is unconstitutional; (d) that Circular No.60 is ultra vires in that it
treats of the licensee of the importation and exportation of Philippine currency
which is alien to foreign exchange, the only subject of the authority of theMonetary
Board to license under Section 74; and (e) that Circular No. 37 (now Circular No. 60)
amends and enlarges the scope of Sections 2710 and 2711of the Revised
Administrative Code.
While there are good reasons for upholding the validity of Circular No. 60of the
Central Bank under the authority given to the Monetary Board by Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 265 as interpreted by this Court in Peoplevs. Exconde, 101 Phil.,
1125 we don't deem it necessary however to go into ameticulous discussion of the
issues raised by appellant, it being sufficientto state that, on the hypothesis that
such circular is valid, the informationsuffers from a fatal defect in that it does not
allege an important elementwhich is considered indispensable to constitute a
violation of the circularin question.
As expressly recited in the information, appellant is accused of violatingSection 1 (b)
of Circular No. 60 of the Central Bank the pertinent portions of which we quote:
Section 1. The import and export of Philippine coins and notes including but not
limited to drafts checks, money orders and/or other bills of exchange inPhilippine
pesos drawn on banks operating in the Philippines, or any order for payment in
Philippine pesos, is prohibited without the necessary license issued by the Central
Bank, except in the following cases;
xxx xxx xxx.
(b) Outgoing Philippine residents and transient visitors leaving the Philippines may
take with them Philippine coins and notes in an amount not exceeding P100,
provided the coins do not exceed P5. (Emphasis supplied).
From the above it is manifest that in order that the pertinent portion of the circular
may be infringed, it is necessary to allege that the outgoing Philippine resident or
transient visitor has taken or is about to take out ofthe Philippines Philippine coins
and notes in excess of the exempted amounts without the necessary license issued
56
by the Central Bank. An examination of the information does not show any
averment of this element. This omission makes the charge alleged in the
information insufficient to constitute an offense for which apppelant may be
convicted and rendered amenable to the penalty prescribed by law.

. . . The complaint, in a criminal case, must state every fact necessary tomake out an
offense, (U. S. vs. Cook, 17 Wall. (U.S.), 168.) The complaint must show, on its face
that, if the facts alleged are true, an offense hasbeen committed. It must state
explicitly and directly every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute an
offense. (U.S., vs. Pompeya, 31 Phil., 245, 256-257).

Where the information is not merely defective but it does not charge any offense at
all, technically speaking that information does not exist in contemplation of law.
(People vs. Austria, 50 Off. Gaz., No. 5, p. 1967; 94 Phil., 897.).

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The appellant is

acquitted and the sum of P5,000 confiscated from her ordered returned to her,with
costs de oficio.

57
G.R. Nos. 116259-60 February 20, 1996
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
G.R. Nos. 118896-97 February 20, 1996
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated original actions for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioner Salvador P. Socrates assailing the orders and resolution issued by
respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028, both entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Salvador P. Socrates." In G.R. Nos. 116259-60,
petitioner assails the legality of (a) the order dated February 9, 1994 denying
petitioner's Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the Informations; 1 (b)
the order dated May 24, 1994 denying the Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation; 2 and (c) the order dated July 20, 1994 denying the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the Order of May 24, 1994. 3 On the other hand, in G.R.
Nos. 118896-97, petitioner seeks the annulment of the Resolution dated December
23, 1994 4 ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner as Provincial Governor
of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days, and to enjoin respondent court from
enforcing the same.
The antecedent facts, as may be culled from the Comment filed by the Solicitor
General in G.R. Nos. 116259-60, are as follows:
Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected governor of
the said province in 1968 and was again reelected in both the 1971 and 1980
elections, until he was replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez as
Officer-In-Charge Governor after the EDSA Revolution in February 1986.
Subsequently, both petitioner and Rodriguez ran for governor in the 1988 elections
where the latter emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national and local
elections, the two again contested the gubernatorial post; and this time, it was
petitioner who won.
Meanwhile, at the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the
Provincial Government of Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial
Board Members of Palawan, filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan two (2)
complaints both dated December 5, 1986 and docketed as TBP No. 86-01119. The
first complaint charged petitioner with violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the second
charged petitioner, together with several other provincial officers, with violation of
Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law (Annexes "A" & "A-1", respectively, Petition).
Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as directed, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend
Preliminary Investigation dated September 3, 1987 on the ground that upon the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the present Tanodbayan has been
transformed into the Office of the Special Prosecutor and has, therefore, lost his
power to conduct preliminary investigation (Annex "C", ibid.).
In a letter to the Honorable Tanodbayan dated June 23, 1988, however, Nelia Yap-
Fernandez, the Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor from the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City, requested that she be allowed to inhibit herself
from handling the preliminary investigation of the present case considering that
petitioner appears to be her co-principal sponsor in a wedding ceremony held last
May 28, 1988 (Annex "C-3", ibid.).
On January 16, 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman received a letter from
Rodriguez, who was then the incumbent governor of the province, inquiring about
the present status of TBP No. 86-01119 (Annex "D", ibid.). In its 4th Indorsement
dated February 7, 1989, the Ombudsman referred the matter of continuing and
terminating the investigation of the present case to the newly deputized
Tanodbayan Prosecutor, Sesinio Belen from the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
(Annex "D-1", ibid.). However, the latter, in his 5th Indorsement dated February 27,
1989 to the Ombudsman, requested that the present case be reassigned to another
Prosecutor considering that he is a long time close friend and "compadre" of
petitioner and that one of the complainants therein Eustaquio Gacott, Jr., who was
formerly a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is now the Provincial
Prosecutor of Palawan, his present superior (Annex "D-2", ibid.).
On April 25, 1989, petitioner was directed by the Ombudsman to comment on the
letter-manifestation dated April 4, 1989 filed by Rodriguez requesting that an
amendment be effected on certain portions of the present complaint (Annexes "E"
& "E-2", ibid.). No comment having been received by the Ombudsman as of May 24,
1989, petitioner, on an even date, was again directed to comment thereon (Annex
"E-1", ibid.). Finally, petitioner filed his required comment dated June 2, 1989
(Annex "E-3", ibid.).
58

Based on the Resolution dated August 27, 1992 of Special Prosecution Officer I
Wendell Barreras-Sulit (Annex "F-2", ibid.), which affirmed the Resolution dated
February 21, 1992 rendered by Ombudsman Investigator Ernesto Nocos
recommending the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor filed on September 16, 1992 with the respondent Court two (2)
Informations against petitioner, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028.
The first was for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the second
for violation of Section 3(e) of the same law (Annexes "F" & "F-1", ibid.).
Before his arraignment could be set, petitioner initially filed an "Urgent Motion for
Quashal of Information and/or Reinvestigation in the Light of Supervening Facts."
However, when the said motion was subsequently called for hearing, petitioner's
counsel was made to choose which of the aforesaid two (2) conflicting motions he
preferred to take up with respondent Court. Thus, on January 18, 1993, petitioner
filed an "Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information in the
Above-entitled Cases." After an Opposition and a Reply were filed by the
prosecution and petitioner, respectively, respondent court issued its first assailed
Resolution on February 9, 1994, denying the same (Annex "G", ibid.).
On March 15, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation, which was subsequently denied by respondent court in its second
assailed Resolution issued on May 24, 1992 (Annex "H-1", ibid.). 5
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. Nos.
116259-60, challenging the aforementioned orders of the Sandiganbayan for
allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It was likewise prayed that respondent court be enjoined
from taking cognizance of and from proceeding with the arraignment of petitioner
and the trial and hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 18027-28 pending before it.
Respondents thereafter filed their Comment to which a Reply was submitted by
petitioner.
In the meantime, no temporary restraining order having been issued by this Court
in G.R. Nos. 116259-60, respondent court proceeded with the arraignment of
herein petitioner on October 5, 1994 wherein a plea of not guilty was entered for
him by the court after he refused to do so. Thereafter, with the denial of
petitioner's motion to quash the informations, the prosecution filed on October 11,
1994 before respondent court a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite 6
pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioner opposed said motion on
the ground that the validity of the informations filed against him is still pending
review before the Supreme Court. He further contended therein that Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, on which the motion to suspend is based, is unconstitutional
in that it constitutes an undue delegation of executive power and is arbitrary and
discriminatory.
In view of the filing of the motion for his suspension, petitioner filed on October 14,
1994 in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 a Supplemental Petition 7 questioning the veracity of
and seeking to restrain respondent court from acting on said motion to suspend
pendente lite, the hearing of which was scheduled on October 17, 1994. However,
before respondents could file their comment thereto as required by this Court,
petitioner, who initially sought the holding in abeyance of further action on his
supplemental petition until after respondent court shall have resolved the motion
to suspend pendente lite, eventually decided to withdraw the same purportedly in
order not to delay the disposition of the main petition. Hence, on January 16, 1995,
this Court issued a resolution 8 granting the motion to withdraw the supplemental
petition and considering the petition in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 as submitted for
resolution.
In the interim, petitioner filed before respondent court on November 28, 1994 an
amended motion to include as co-principals: (a) in Criminal Case No. 18028, the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who authorized the purchase and repair
of the vessel in question; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 18027, the Board of Directors
of ERA Technology and Resources Corporation which entered into a contract with
the Province of Palawan. 9 Petitioner argued that the non-inclusion of these co-
principals violates his right to due process and equal protection of the laws which
thus rendered the informations null and void. It appears that the prosecution did
not oppose nor object to this amended motion.
On December 23, 1994, respondent court, without ruling on petitioner's motion to
include co-principals, issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to
suspend pendente lite and ordering the suspension of petitioner as Provincial
Governor of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days from notice.
His motion for the reconsideration thereof having been denied, another petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a restraining order was filed by petitioner
on February 20, 1995 against the same respondents, docketed as G.R. Nos. 118896-
97, and which seeks to annul as well as to enjoin respondent court from enforcing
its resolution dated December 23, 1994 ordering his suspension pendente lite. On
March 8, 1995, the Court resolved to consolidate this second petition with G.R. Nos.
116259-60.
From the mosaic of the foregoing events and the incidents interjected therein, the
following pattern of contentious issues has emerged:
59
In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, the validity of the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos.
18027-28 is being contested on three grounds, viz.: (1) the respondent court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case on the ground that an inordinate delay of six (6)
years between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent
filing of the informations against petitioner constitutes a violation of his
constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the case and due process of law
pursuant to the Tatad doctrine; (2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
and (3) since the acts charged in the complaints filed before the Tanodbayan are
different from the charges contained in the informations, another preliminary
investigation should have been conducted, in the absence of which there is a denial
of due process.
In G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner questions the validity of the suspension order in
that: (1) he may not be suspended while the issue on the validity of the
informations filed against him is still pending review before the Supreme Court; and
(2) Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, which forms the basis of the order of
suspension, is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes an undue
delegation of the authority to suspend which is essentially an executive power.
Petitioner contends that the jurisprudential doctrines relied upon by respondent
court in upholding the constitutionality of Section 13 are not applicable to the cases
at bar which involve an issue not yet passed upon by this Court. In addition,
petitioner again attacks the legality of the subject informations for having been filed
in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses by reason of the non-
inclusion therein, as co-principals, of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
who approved the purchase of the vessel, as well as the board of directors of ERA
Technology and Resource Corporation which entered into a contract with the
Province of Palawan.
I. G.R. Nos. 116259-60
1. In asserting that there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial by
reason of the unreasonable delay of six (6) years between the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and the filing of the informations, petitioner invokes the
doctrine laid down in the leading case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. 10 In said
case, all the affidavits and counter-affidavits had already been filed with the
Tanodbayan for final disposition as of October 25, 1982 but it was only on June 12,
1985, or three (3) years thereafter, that the informations accusing Tatad of a
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Court
held there that an inordinate delay of three (3) years in the conduct and
termination of the preliminary investigation is violative of the constitutional rights
of the accused to due process and speedy disposition of his case, by reason of
which the informations filed against the accused therein were ordered dismissed. It
must be emphasized, however, that in the Tatad case, no explanation or
ratiocination was advanced by the prosecution therein as to the cause of the delay.
In the present case, as distinguished from the factual milieu obtaining in Tatad,
respondent court found that the six-year delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation was caused by petitioner's own acts. Thus:
In the cases at bar, the record shows that delay in the filing of the Informations in
these cases was caused, not by inaction of the prosecution, but by the following
actuations of the accused:
(1) Sometime after the complaint of private complainant was filed with the
Office of the City Fiscal of the City of Puerto Princesa, preliminary investigation was
held in abeyance on account of the motion of accused Salvador P. Socrates, entitled
"Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation" Suspension was prayed for until an
Ombudsman, as provided in Executive Order No. 243, shall have been appointed;
(2) Preliminary investigation was interrupted when private complainant, then
Governor Victoriano J. Rodriguez, filed on April 24, 1989, a letter-manifestation
correcting the complaint;
(3) Only on September 22, 1989 did the accused in these cases file with the
Office of the Ombudsman a reply to complainant's manifestation;
(4) In view of the foregoing actuations of the parties, preliminary investigation
of these cases was started in earnest only on June 25, 1990. Respondents then,
including the accused herein, were required to submit counter-affidavits;
(5) Interrupting preliminary proceedings again, accused Governor Salvador P.
Socrates, on August 13, 1990, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the
following grounds:
(a) That the Honorable Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the person of
respondent; and
(b) That the complaint does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.
The private complainant was, as a matter of right, granted a period of time within
which to oppose the motion. The prosecution necessarily had to ponder on the
motion after protracted deliberations;
(6) On April 1, 1991, counsel for the accused filed an "Appearance and Motion
for Extension of Time to File Appropriate Pleading." Counsel prayed that
60
"respondents be granted an extension of twenty (20) days within which to comply
with the order of March 11, 1991";
(7) The accused Governor Salvador P. Socrates, through counsel, filed a
motion to quash/dismiss on December 17, 1991. This pleading was received by the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman only on January 13, 1992. It took some time for
the prosecution to resolve the motion and there never was any intimation on the
part of the accused that the accused was invoking his right to a speedy disposition
of the complaint against him. The motion to quash/dismiss was in fact denied by
the prosecution in an order dated January 20, 1990;
(8) A motion for reconsideration having been filed thereafter, the
Informations in these cases were after all filed on September 16, 1992, but only
after the ruling of the prosecution on the motion to quash/dismiss. 11
Petitioner, in a futile attempt to refute the foregoing factual findings of respondent
court, could only raise the defense that the motion to suspend the preliminary
investigation did not affect the proceedings therein; that the preliminary
investigation really started on February 18, 1987 when the Tanodbayan issued
subpoenas to the respondents; that the motion to dismiss/ quash the complaints
was purposely for the early termination of the preliminary investigation; that the
filing of the complaint was politically motivated, as may be gleaned from the
affidavit of complainant Rodriguez; and that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, the case should have been resolved within ten (10) days from the
time the investigation was concluded.
Clearly, the facts of the case at bar are diametrically opposed to the factual
situation in Tatad because the obviously delaying tactics resorted to by herein
petitioner were not present in the latter case. Furthermore, the allegation that the
filing of the complaint was politically motivated does not serve to justify the
nullification of the informations where the existence of such motive has not been
sufficiently established nor substantial evidence presented in support thereof. The
situation in Tatad was quite to the contrary since the accused therein successfully
proved that the charges were filed against him only after it became widely known
that he actually had a falling out with the late President Marcos.
That scenario impelled the Court to make the admonition therein that "prosecutors
should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is
being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other
purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving
the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants
alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty." Such an exigency
apparently does not obtain in the case at bar. There is nothing in the records from
which it can be conclusively inferred, expressly or impliedly, that the investigating
prosecutors were politically motivated or even coerced into filing these criminal
charges against petitioner.
We likewise do not adhere to petitioner's asseveration that the orders issued by
Branches 51 and 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City quashing the
informations for technical malversation filed against herein petitioner, on the
ground that the inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation
constitutes a violation of petitioner's right to due process and speedy disposition of
his case which thereby ousted said courts of jurisdiction thereover, have become
final and conclusive by reason of the prosecution's' failure to file an appeal
therefrom. We have carefully scrutinized the orders adverted to and we find and so
hold that the same cannot effectively deter the prosecution herein from proceeding
with the trial before the Sandiganbayan.
First, the criminal cases for technical malversation filed before said Regional Trial
Court are different from the charges for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 filed
with the Sandiganbayan. The former is covered by a general law while the latter
involves a special law, with variant elements of the offenses being required, hence
double jeopardy cannot set in. Second, and more importantly, it will be noted that
the trial court in the malversation case hastily concluded that there was an
inordinate delay of six (6) years in the termination of the preliminary investigation
through the mere expedient of counting the number of years that had elapsed from
the institution of the complaint with the Ombudsman until the filing of the
informations in court, without bothering to inquire into the pertinent factual
considerations and procedural technicalities involved.
In arriving at such a self-serving conclusion, the trial court confined itself strictly to a
mathematical reckoning of the time involved, instead of undertaking a more
substantive appreciation of the circumstances and particulars which could have
possibly caused the delay. On the contrary, herein respondent court has
convincingly shown that the preliminary investigation dragged on for several years
owing, ironically, to petitioner's evident propensity to resort to dilatory tactics. In
the cases now before us, it cannot be successfully and validly contended that
petitioner's right to speedy trial has been violated.
We have only to reiterate the declaration made in Tatad to the effect that in the
application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case. It is palpably clear that the application of the Tatad doctrine should not be
made to rely solely on the length of time that has passed but equal concern should
likewise be accorded to the factual ambiance and considerations. It can easily be
deduced from a complete reading of the adjudicatory discourse in Tatad that the
61
three-year delay was specifically considered vis-a-vis all the facts and circumstances
which obtained therein. Perforce, even on this ground alone, the instant petition
for certiorari should be dismissed.
A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the
rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The
primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an
accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. 12 In the
cases at bar, while there may have been some delay, it was petitioner himself who
brought about the situation of which he now complains.
2. Petitioner then questions the sufficiency of the allegations in the
informations in that the same do not constitute an offense supposedly because (a)
in Criminal Case No. 18027, there is no statement that herein petitioner actually
intervened and participated, as a board member of ERA Technology and Resources
Corporation, in the latter's contract with the Province of Palawan, which is allegedly
an element necessary to constitute a violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No.
3019; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 18028, the information failed to show a causal
relation between the act done by the accused and the undue injury caused to the
provincial government of Palawan.
With respect to the alleged defects in the information filed in Criminal Case No.
18027 for violation of Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law, petitioner invokes the ruling
in the case of Trieste, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan 13 where it was held that "what is
contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the
transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability
may attach." In the cited case, however, the Court found that the petitioner therein
did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and payment of the purchases
in question since he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already
been made, delivered and paid for by the municipal treasurer.
The purchases involved therein were previously ordered by the municipal treasurer
without the knowledge and consent of the accused municipal mayor, were
subsequently delivered by the supplier, and were thereafter paid by the treasurer
again without the knowledge and consent of the mayor. The only participation of
the accused mayor in the transaction involved the mechanical act of signing the
disbursement vouchers for record purposes only. Thus, the Court did not consider
the act therein of the accused mayor to be covered by the prohibition under
Section 3(h) of the law.
Contrariwise, in the present cases, petitioner Socrates stands charged with a
violation of Section 3(h) for intervening in his official capacity as Governor of
Palawan in reviewing and approving the disbursement voucher dated August 2,
1982 for payment in favor of ERA Technology Resources Corporation where he was
one of the incorporators and members of the board of directors. Such allegation
clearly indicates the nature and extent of petitioner's participation in the
questioned transaction. Without petitioner's approval, payment could not possibly
have been effected.
We likewise do not find any flaw in the information filed in Criminal Case No.
18028, for violation of Section 3(e), which would warrant the dismissal thereof.
Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these are matters
of defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor
could be proved during the trial. 14 Hence, there is no need to state facts in the
information which would prove the causal relation between the act done by the
accused and the undue injury caused to the Province of Palawan. Antipodal to
petitioner's contention, a reading of the information in Criminal Case No. 18028 will
readily disclose that the essential elements of the offense charged have been
sufficiently alleged therein. It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges right
at the outset without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller
ventilation and examination. Given all the circumstances of this case, we feel it
would be unwarranted to cut off the prosecutory process at this stage of the
proceedings and to dismiss the information. 15
3. It is likewise asserted by petitioner that the elements of the offenses
charged in the complaints are different from those stated in the informations which
were filed before the Sandiganbayan, and that since there was no preliminary
investigation conducted with respect to the latter, such informations should be
declared null and void for lack of due process.
The first complaint for violation of Section 3(b) became the basis for the filing of an
information in Criminal Case No. 18027 for a violation of Section 3(h). In both,
petitioner is accused of intervening in his official capacity as Provincial Governor in
the contracts for the installation and construction of waterwork projects, with the
ERA Technology and Resources Corporation, where he was an incorporator and a
member of the board of directors, thereby directly or indirectly benefiting from said
transactions. In Criminal Case No. 18028, petitioner was charged with a violation of
Section 3(e) as a result of the complaint filed against him and several others for a
violation of Section 3(a) and (g). In both instances, petitioner is charged with the
disbursement of public funds for the purchase of a motor launch which was grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the provincial government of Palawan because
the same broke down only after its maiden voyage.
It is thus clearly apparent that the complaints and the informations are based on
substantially the same factual settings, except that the respective designations are
different. Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the
62
offense but its description in the complaint or information. 16 The real nature of
the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. It is not the technical name given by the fiscal appearing
in the title of the information that determines the character of the crime but the
facts alleged in the body of the information. 17
This Court has repeatedly held that when the facts, acts and circumstances are set
forth in the body of an information with sufficient certainty to constitute an offense
and to apprise the defendant of the nature of the charge against him, a misnomer
or innocuous designation of a crime in the caption or other parts of the information
will not vitiate it. In such a case, the facts set forth in the charge controls the
erroneous designation of the offense and the accused stands indicted for the
offense charged in the statement of facts. The erroneous designation may be
disregarded as surplusage. 18
Furthermore, it will be observed that it is the same section of the law which is
involved in the present case, that is, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, albeit it
defines several modes of committing the same offense. It is an old and well-settled
rule in the appreciation of indictments that where an offense may be committed in
any of several different modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is
alleged to have been committed in two or more of the modes specified, it is
sufficient to prove the offense committed through any one of them, provided that it
be such as to constitute the substantive offense. Thereafter, a judgment of
conviction must be sustained if it appears from the evidence in the record that the
accused was guilty as charged of any one of these modes of the offense. 19
Neither will the absence of a preliminary investigation, assuming that it is necessary
to conduct a new one, affect the validity of the informations filed against petitioner.
It has been consistently held that the absence of a preliminary investigation does
not impair the validity of the criminal information or render it defective. Dismissal
of the case is not the remedy. 20 It is not a ground for the quashal of a complaint or
information. The proper course of action that should be taken is for the
Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon such information and to
remand the case to the office of the Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor
to conduct a preliminary investigation 21 if the accused actually makes out a case
justifying such relief.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, therefore, we rule and so hold that the
informations filed against petitioner are valid and legal.
II. G.R. Nos. 118896-97
The main issue submitted herein for resolution is the legality of the petitioner's
preventive suspension, which is premised on several grounds.
1. Initially, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
abuse of discretion in ordering his suspension despite the fact that the validity of
the informations filed against him is still pending review before the Supreme Court.
In support thereof, he invokes the rule laid down in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation vs. Court of appeals, et al. 22 that even if no temporary restraining
order was issued by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals could have refrained
from taking any action while the petition for certiorari was pending with the
Supreme Court. Petitioner insists that this is what respondent court should have
done. Under this particular issue, petitioner is in effect seeking a review of the
order issued by the Sandiganbayan, dated February 9, 1994, denying his amended
and consolidated motion to quash the information.
We have but to reiterate the fundamental rule that an order denying a motion to
quash is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a
petition for certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of
law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. 23 In other words, it cannot be the
subject of appeal until the judgment or a final order is rendered. The ordinary
procedure to be followed in that event is to enter a plea, go to trial and if the
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. 24
Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is a
grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, that vitiating error is not attendant
in the present case.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that:
Sec. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him. 25
63
This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a
public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a
pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is
conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the
court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on
the merits of the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its
validity. The hearing may be treated in the same -manner as a challenge to the
validity of the information by way of a motion to quash. 26
In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al. 27 we have set out the
guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of
suspension under Section 13 of the law, to wit:
(c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the
power of suspension from office of public officers charged under a valid information
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to Section 13 of said Act, it may be briefly
stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order
with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of
hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited
mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a
motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the
information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial
court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court
duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the
information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order
or suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withhold such
suspension in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing.
Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity
to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has
not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which
he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant
his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or he may
present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule
117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by the Act upon
determination of the pendency in court of a criminal prosecution for violation of
the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information requires at the same time
that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the
prompt suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the
ground alleged in the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be called
upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the validity of the
information and setting the same for trial on the merits.
With the aforequoted jurisprudential authority as the basis, it is evident that upon a
proper determination of the validity of the information, it becomes mandatory for
the court to immediately issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is
specific and categorical. It leaves no room for interpretation. It is not within the
court's discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on the
pretext that the order denying the motion to quash is pending review before the
appellate courts. Its discretion lies only during the pre-suspension hearing where it
is required to ascertain whether or not (1) the accused had been afforded due
preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the information against him, (2) the
acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3019 or of the provisions of Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or (3)
the informations against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in
Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 28
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court
must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts
about it. This is because a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed
as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension. In view of this latter provision, the accused elective
public officer does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the
suspension order in the event that the information is subsequently declared null
and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against him. Taking into consideration
the public policy involved in preventively suspending a public officer charged under
a valid information, the protection of public interest will definitely have to prevail
over the private interest of the accused. 29
To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 3019, it is said that the court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to
determine whether or not a preventive suspension is required to prevent the
accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or
continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the
accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is
likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court. 30
64
Applying now the procedure outlined in Luciano, the records of the instant case do
not show that the proceedings leading to the filing of the informations against
petitioner were tainted with any irregularity so as to invalidate the same. Likewise,
the informations show that the allegations contained therein meet the essential
elements of the offense as defined by the substantive law. The record is also bereft
of undisputed facts to warrant the quashal of the informations under any of the
grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 31 Finally, a cursory
reading of the order dated February 9, 1994 issued by respondent court will show
that petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard on his motion to quash.
Veritably, the Sandiganbayan did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying
the motion to quash and ordering the preventive suspension of herein petitioner.
2. Additionally, petitioner avers that the informations filed against him on
which the order of suspension was based, are null and void in view of the non-
inclusion of his co-principals which thus constitutes a violation of petitioner's right
to due process and equal protection of the law and, therefore, ousted respondent
court of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner alleges that in Criminal Case No.
18027, the board of directors of ERA Technology Corporation should have been
included as principals by indispensable cooperation because without them he could
not possibly have committed the offense.
Also, he claims that in Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan who issued the resolutions authorizing the purchase and repair of the
motor launch should likewise have been included as principals by inducement or
indispensable cooperation, considering that petitioner was allegedly merely
implementing their resolutions. Hence, according to him, since the informations are
null and void, the suspension order which is based thereon should necessarily also
be declared null and void. We find no merit in petitioner's arguments.
First, the rule under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as reformulated in
Section 2, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is that all criminal
actions must be commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the
People of the Philippines "against all persons who appear to be responsible for the
offense involved." The law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the
charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for an
offense. This does not mean, however, that they shall have no discretion at all; their
discretion lies in determining whether the evidence submitted justify a reasonable
belief that a person has committed an offense. What the rule demands is that all
persons who appear responsible shall be charged in the information, which
conversely implies that those against whom no sufficient evidence of guilt exists are
not required to be included.32
This notwithstanding, it has equally been ruled that the failure of the fiscal to
include the other public officials who appear to be responsible for the offense
charged as co-accused in the information filed against the accused does not in any
way vitiate the validity of the information under the Rules.33
Second, a failure to include other persons who appear to be responsible for the
crime charged is not one of the grounds provided under Section 3, Rule 117 for
which a motion to quash the information against the accused may be filed, most
especially in the case at bar where there is prima facie proof that petitioner is
probably guilty of the offense charged, aside from the fact that there is no
allegation of conspiracy in the informations. Besides, such an infirmity would
neither have the effect of extinguishing or mitigating petitioner's liability if he is
subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. No one would contend that if for
lack of knowledge of the facts, by mistake or for any other reason the prosecuting
officer fails to include the names of one or more persons in an information filed by
him, who were in fact guilty participants in the commission of the crime charged
therein, such persons will be relieved of criminal liability; or that those accused who
have been charged with the offense, brought to trial, and found guilty will be
permitted to escape punishment merely because it develops in the course of the
trial, or after the trial, that there were other guilty participants in the crime.34
Granting arguendo that this plaint of petitioner may be invoked as a ground for the
quashal of the informations, the motion to quash must still be denied for having
been filed only after petitioner had been arraigned. Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "(t)he failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the
grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged,
extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy." The failure to include a co-
accused is not covered by the exception; hence, the same is deemed waived.
Third, where the government prosecutor unreasonably refuses to file an
information or to include a person as an accused therein despite the fact that the
evidence clearly warrants such action, the offended party has the following
remedies: (1) in case of grave abuse of discretion, he may file an action for
mandamus to compel the prosecutor to file such information; (2) he may lodge a
new complaint against the offenders before the Ombudsman and have a new
examination conducted as required by law; (3) he may institute administrative
charges against the erring prosecutor, or a criminal complaint under Article 208 of
the Revised Penal Code, or a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the Civil
Code; (4) he may secure the appointment of another prosecutor; or (5) he may
institute another criminal action if no double jeopardy is involved.
65

Fourth, it is significant and demonstrative of petitioner's strategy that from the
inception of the criminal complaint before the Ombudsman and during the conduct
of the preliminary investigation, until the filing of the informations before the
Sandiganbayan and up to the denial of his amended and consolidated motion to
quash, herein petitioner has not been heard to complain about the alleged non-
inclusion of the other supposed offenders. Indeed, it is now much too late for
petitioner to invoke and exploit this particular unfounded issue.
Prescinding from the averments raised in the complaint and information, from the
facts and evidence of record, we do not deem it necessary to include the members
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan and the board members of the ERA
Technology and Resources Corporation as co-accused in the informations filed
against herein petitioner. Insofar as the board members of said corporation are
concerned, they may be prosecuted only under Section 4(b) of Republic Act No.
3019 which provides that "(i)t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce
or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3
thereof." In the information filed in Criminal Case No. 18027, petitioner stands
charged with a violation of Section 3(h). It does not contain any allegation to the
effect that the board members knowingly induced or caused herein petitioner to
commit the offense defined therein, which is an essential element of the crime in
Section 4(b). Indubitably, therefore, the board members cannot be included as co-
principals in Criminal Case No. 18027.
On the other hand, the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot likewise
be included in the information for violation of Section 3(e) filed in Criminal Case No.
18028, for the simple reason that it is not the validity of their resolution which is in
issue here. While it is true that said sanggunian passed a resolution authorizing the
allocation of funds for the purchase of a motor launch, and that petitioner merely
acted on the strength thereof, it is not the fact of such authorization which is the
subject of the charges against petitioner but rather the manner by which that
resolution was implemented by the latter. There is nothing in the averments in the
information from which it could be inferentially deduced that the members of the
sanggunian participated, directly or indirectly, in the purchase of the vessel, and
which fact could be the basis for their indictment.
3. Lastly, petitioner questions the legality of his suspension on the ground
that Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, which is the basis thereof, is
unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of executive power to the
Sandiganbayan. He postulates that the power of suspension, which is an incident of
the power of removal, is basically administrative and executive in nature. He further
submits that the power of removal vested in the court under Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 3019 is an incident of conviction, that is, it can only be exercised after a
conviction has been handed down. Hence, according to petitioner, since the power
to suspend is merely incidental to the power of removal, the former can only be
exercised as an incident to conviction. Also, considering that Section 13 authorizes
the court to exercise the power of suspension even prior to conviction of the
accused, it cannot be considered as an exercise of judicial power because it is not
within the ambit of the court's power of removal. In addition, petitioner avers that
Section 13 is arbitrary and discriminatory because it serves no purpose at all, in that
it does not require a proceeding to determine if there is sufficient ground to
suspend, except for the fact that it is required by law.
Although presented differently, the issue on the court's power of suspension under
Section 13 has been squarely and directly raised and adjudicated in the case of
Luciano vs. Provincial Governor, et al.,35 the pronouncements wherein we quote in
extenso:
3. Proceeding from our holding that suspension is not automatic, who should
exercise the mandatory act of suspension under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act?
Three theories have been advanced. One is that the power of suspension where a
criminal case has already been filed in court still is with the Provincial Governor,
relying on Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. Another is that,
following the ruling in Sarcos vs. Castillo . . ., because the main respondents are
elective municipal officials, that power of suspension must be held to repose in the
Provincial Board, under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 (Republic Act
5185). The third is that, by Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
solely the court in which the criminal case has been filed shall wield the power of
suspension.
We opt for the third. Common sense and the scheme of the law so dictate.
It is true that nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
grants with specificity upon the Court of First Instance the power to suspend an
official charged with a violation thereof. It would seem to us though that
suspensions by virtue of criminal proceedings are separate and distinct from
suspensions in administrative cases. An accurate reading of Section 13 yields two
methods of investigation, one separate from the other: one criminal before the
courts of justice, and the other administrative. This is the plain import of the last
sentence of Section 13, which says that if acquitted, defendant in an Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices case "shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him." Our interpretation but
66
preserves, as it should, the substantial symmetry between the first part of Section
13 and the last part thereof just quoted.
And so, there is in this legal provision a recognition that once a case is filed in court,
all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions which here include
suspension should be left to the Court of First Instance.
Not that this view finds no statutory support. By Section 9 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the court is empowered to punish any public official
committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5
and 6 of the law, amongst others, to "perpetual disqualification from public office."
Here, the Makati elective officials heretofore named have been charged with and
found guilty of a violation of Section 3(8) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and were sentenced by the court below, amongst others, to be "perpetually
disqualified to hold office." Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification entails "(t)he deprivation of the public
offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by
popular election." No stretch of the imagination is necessary to show that perpetual
absolute disqualification which, in effect, is encompassed in the punishment set
forth in Section 9 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act covers that. of removal
from the office which each of the respondent municipal official holds.
Since removal from office then is within the power of the court, no amount of
judicial legerdemain would deprive the court of the power to suspend. Reason for
this is that suspension necessarily is included in the greater power of removal. It is
without doubt that Congress has power to authorize courts to suspend public
officers pending court proceedings for removal and that the congressional grant is
not violative of the separation of powers. For, our Constitution being silent, we are
not to say that from Congress is withheld the power to decide the mode or
procedure of suspension and removal of public officers.
A look into the legislative intent, along with the legislative scheme, convinces us the
more that the power of suspension should be lodged with the court. While the law
may not be a model of precise verbal structure, the intent is there. Section 13
requires as a pre-condition of the power to suspend that there be a valid
information. Validity of information, of course, is determined by the Court of First
Instance where the criminal case is pending. That is essentially a judicial function.
Suspension is a sequel to that finding, an incident to the criminal proceedings
before the court. Indeed, who can suspend except one who knows the facts upon
which suspension is based? We draw support from Lacson vs. Roque, supra, at page
469: "We are certain that no authority or good reason can be found in support of a
proposition that the Chief Executive can suspend an officer facing criminal charges
for the sole purpose of aiding the court in the administration of justice.
Independent of the other branches of the Government, the courts can well take
care of their own administration of the law.
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, an important legislation, should not be
artificially construed so as to exclude the courts from the power to suspend a prime
tool designed by Congress to prevent the power which an official wields from
frustrating the purity and certainty of the administration of justice. Surely, we
should not be pedantically exacting in reading its provisions. We should rather say
that if the court's power of suspension incident to the court proceedings is to be
withheld of narrowed by construction, Congress should have spelled it out in no
uncertain terms. . . .
The Court then hastened to clarify that such a view may not be taken as an
encroachment upon the power of suspension given other officials, reiterating in the
process that a line should be drawn between administrative proceedings and
criminal actions in court, that one is apart from the other. Elucidating further on the
possible danger which may arise if the power of suspension, in consequence of a
criminal action under Republic Act No. 3019 is vested in any authority other than
the court, it declared that:
There is reasonable ground to believe that Congress did really apprehend danger
should the power of suspension in consequence of a criminal case under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act be lodged in any authority other than the court.
Quite apart from the fact that the court has a better grasp of the situation, there is
one other factor, and that is, the rights of the person accused. The court could very
well serve as a lever to balance in one equation the public interests involved and
the interests of the defendant. And then, there is the danger that partisan politics
may creep in. The hand of political oppression cannot just be ignored especially if
the majority members of the Provincial Board and the defendant public local
elective officer are on opposite sides of the political fence. Power may be abused.
Conversely, if both are of the same political persuasion, the suspending authority
will display reluctance in exercising the power of suspension. It is thus that the
statute should catch up with the realities of political life. There is indeed the
dispiriting lesson that in a clash between political considerations and conscience it
is the latter that quite often gets dented. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Therefore, since suspension is incident to removal and should proceed from one
who should logically do so, and considering that in the operation of a given statute
fairness must have been in the mind of the legislators, we brush aside needless
refinements, and rule that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, once a valid information upon the provisions thereof is lodged with the Court
67
of First Instance, that court has the inescapable duty to suspend the public official
indicted thereunder.

These cases have long been on the line, unduly stretched beyond their logical
parameters and the permissible time frame. Indeed, it is high time, ironically in
fairness to petitioner himself, that the same be now calcined in the judicial crucible
into their ultimate configuration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 and

118896-97 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

68
G.R. No. 119601 December 17, 1996
DANILO BUHAT, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
Delicate and sensitive is the issue in this case, which is, whether or not the
upgrading of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of
murder is such a substantial amendment that it is proscribed if made after the
accused had pleaded "not guilty" to the crime of homicide, displaying as alleged by
the defense, inordinate prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
On March 25, 1993, an information for HOMICIDE 1 was filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) 2 against petitioner Danny Buhat, "John Doe" and "Richard Doe". The
information alleged that on October 16, 1992, petitioner Danilo Buhat, armed with
a knife, unlawfully attacked and killed one Ramon George Yu while the said two
unknown assailants held his arms, "using superior strength, inflicting . . . mortal
wounds which were . . . the direct . . . cause of his death" 3 .
Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the prosecution moved for the
deferment of the arraignment on the ground that the private complainant in the
case, one Betty Yu, moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of the City
Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the aforementioned information for
homicide. Petitioner however, invoking his right to a speedy trial, opposed the
motion. Thus, petitioner was arraigned on June 9, 1993 and, since petitioner
pleaded "not guilty", trial ensued.
On February 3, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, finding Betty Yu's
appeal meritorious, ordered the City Prosecutor of Roxas City "to amend the
information by upgrading the offense charged to MURDER and implead therein
additional accused Herminia Altavas, Osmeña Altavas and Renato Buhat". 4
On March 10, 1994, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to amend
information. The amendment as proposed was opposed by the petitioner.
The amended information read:
The undersigned assistant City Prosecutor accuses DANNY BUHAT, of Capricho II,
Barangay V, Roxas City, Philippines, HERMIÑIA ALTAVAS AND OSMEÑA ALTAVAS
both resident of Punta Tabuc, Roxas City, Philippines, of the crime of Murder,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of October, 1992, in the City of Roxas, Philippines,
the above-named accused, Danny Buhat armed with a knife, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did and then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously [sic] without justifiable motive and with intent to kill, attack, stab
and injure one RAMON GEORGE YU, while the two other accused held the arms of
the latter, thus using superior strength, inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said Ramon George Yu in such amount as maybe [sic]
awarded to them by the court under the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
The prosecution had by then already presented at least two witnesses.
In an order, 6 dated June 2, 1994, the RTC denied the motion for leave to amend
information. The denial was premised on (1) an invocation of the trial court's
discretion in disregarding the opinion of the Secretary of Justice as allegedly held in
Crespo vs. Mogul 7 and (2) a conclusion reached by the trial court that the
resolution of the inquest prosecutor is more persuasive than that of the Secretary
of Justice, the former having actually conducted the preliminary investigation
"where he was able to observe the demeanor of those he investigated" 8 .
The Solicitor General promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. He filed
a petition for certiorari 9 assailing the aforecited order denying the motion for leave
to amend information. Finding the proposed amendment as non-prejudicial to
petitioner's rights, respondent court granted the petition for certiorari in a decision,
dated March 28, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, herein petition is hereby granted: the Order dated
June 2, 1994 is set aside and annulled; amendment of the Information from
homicide to murder, and including as additional accused Herminia Altavas and
Osmeña Altavas is allowed; and finally, the writ of preliminary injunction we issued
on January 30, 1995 is made permanent by prohibiting the public respondent from
hearing aforementioned criminal case under the original information. 10
Hence this petition raising the sole issue of whether or not the questioned
amendment to the information is procedurally infirm.
The petition lacks merit.
69

The additional allegation of conspiracy is only a formal amendment, petitioner's
participation as principal not having been affected by such amendment.
Petitioner asseverates that the inclusion of additional defendants in the information
on the ground of conspiracy "is a substantial amendment which is prohibited by
Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, because the allegation of
conspiracy . . . is a substantial amendment saddling the [p]etitioner with the need
of a new defense in order to met [sic] a different situation at the trial [c]ourt" 11
Petitioner cites the case of People v. Montenegro12 as jurisprudential support.
Indeed, we stated in the Montenegro case that "the allegation of conspiracy among
all the private respondents-accused, which was not previously included in the
original information, is . . . a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with
the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court"
13. And to explain the new defense theory as a bar to a substantial amendment
after plea, we cited the case of People v. Zulueta 14 where we elucidated, thus:
Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original charges will
have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly the
allegation of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the
accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even omissions of his co-
conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendment thereby
widens the battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered
weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would seem
inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this stage of the controversy,
bearing in mind that the accused is only guaranteed two-days' preparation for trial.
Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases the liberty, even the life, of the accused
is at stake, it is always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to
avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too
many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared adversaries.
This jurisprudential rule, however, is not without an exception. And it is in the same
case of Zulueta that we highlighted the case of Regala v. Court of First Instance of
Bataan 15 as proffering a situation where an amendment after plea resulting in the
inclusion of an allegation of conspiracy and in the indictment of some other persons
in addition to the original accused, constitutes a mere formal amendment
permissible even after arraignment. In Zulueta, we distinguished the Regala case in
this wise:
Some passages from "Regala contra El Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Bataan" are quoted by petitioners. Therein the accused pleaded not guilty to an
information for murder, and later the fiscal amended the indictment by including
two other persons charged with the same offense and alleging conspiracy between
the three. Five justices held that the amendment was not substantial. But that
situation differs from the one at bar. The amendment there did not modify theory
of the prosecution that the accused had killed the deceased by a voluntary act and
deed. Here there is an innovation, or the introduction of another alternative
imputation, which, to make matters worse, is inconsistent with the original
allegations. 16
Applying our aforegoing disquisition in the 1946 case of Regala, we likewise ruled in
the 1983 case of People v. Court of Appeals 17 that a post-arraignment amendment
to further allege conspiracy, is only a formal amendment not prejudicial to the
rights of the accused and proper even after the accused has pleaded "not guilty" to
the charge under the original information. We held in said case of People v. Court of
Appeals:
. . . The trial Judge should have allowed the amendment . . . considering that the
amendments sought were only formal. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his
memorandum, "there was no change in the prosecution's theory that respondent
Ruiz willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and shot with a gun
Ernesto and Rogelio Bello . . . . The amendments would not have been prejudicial to
him because his participation as principal in the crime charged with respondent
Ruiz in the original informations, could not be prejudiced by the proposed
amendments."
In a case (Regala vs. CFI, 77 Phil. 684), the defendant was charged with murder.
After plea, the fiscal presented an amended information wherein two other persons
were included as co-accused. There was further allegation that the accused and his
co-defendants had conspired and confederated together and mutually aided one
another to commit the offense charged. The amended information was admitted . .
..
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise stated, the amendments . . . would not have prejudiced Ruiz whose
participation as principal in the crimes charged did not change. When the incident
was investigated by the fiscal's office, the respondents were Ruiz, Padilla and
Ongchenco. The fiscal did not include Padilla and Ongchenco in the two
informations because of "insufficiency of evidence." It was only later when
Francisco Pagcalinawan testified at the reinvestigation that the participation of
Padilla and Ongchenco surfaced and, as a consequence, there was the need for the
information of the informations . . . .
70
The aforegoing principle, by way of exception to the general rule, also appositely
applies in the present controversy.
Petitioner undoubtedly is charged as a principal in the killing of Ramon George Yu
whom petitioner is alleged to have stabbed while two unknown persons held the
victim's arms. The addition of the phrase, "conspiring, confederating and helping
one another" does not change the nature of petitioner's participation as principal in
the killing.
Whether under the original or the amended information, petitioner would have to
defend himself as the People makes a case against him and secures for public
protection the punishment of petitioner for stabbing to death, using superior
strength, a fellow citizen in whose health and safety society as a whole is
interested. Petitioner, thus, has no tenable basis to decry the amendment in
question.
Furthermore, neither may the amendment in question be struck down on the
ground that Herminia Altavas, Osmeña Altavas and Renato Buhat would be placed
in double jeopardy by virtue of said amendment. In the first place, no first jeopardy
can be spoken of insofar as the Altavases are concerned since the first information
did not precisely include them as accused therein. In the second place, the
amendment to replace the name, "John Doe" with the name of Renato Buhat who
was found by the Secretary of Justice to be one of the two persons who held the
arms of the victim while petitioner was stabbing him, 18 is only a formal
amendment and one that does not prejudice any of the accused's rights. Such
amendment to insert in the information the real name of the accused involves
merely a matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the accused of a
fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the nature of the offense charged
affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name does not change the
theory of the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and material fact. 19 In
fact, it is to be expected that the information has to be amended as the unknown
participants in the crime became known to the public prosecutor. 20
"Abuse of superior strength" having already been alleged in the original information
charging homicide, the amendment of the name of the crime to murder, constitutes
a mere formal amendment permissible even after arraignment
In the case of Dimalibot v. Salcedo, 21 we ruled that the amendment of the
information so as to change the crime charged from homicide to murder, may be
made "even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the accused." In that case, several accused
were originally charged with homicide, but before they were arraigned, an
amended information for murder was filed. Understandably raised before us was
the issue of the propriety and legality of the afore-described amendment, and we
ruled, thus:
. . . it is undisputed that the herein accused were not yet arraigned before the
competent court when the complaint for homicide was amended so as to charge
the crime of murder. . . . the amendment could therefore be made even as to
substance in order that the proper charge may be made. . . . The change may also
be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. 22
Thus, at the outset, the main consideration should be whether or not the accused
had already made his plea under the original information, for this is the index of
prejudice to, and the violation of, the rights of the accused. The question as to
whether the changing of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious
offense of murder is a substantial amendment proscribed after the accused had
pleaded "not guilty" to the crime of homicide was, it should be noted, categorically
answered in the affirmative by us in the case of Dionaldo v. Dacuycuy, 23 for then
we ruled:
. . . the provision which is relevant to the problem is Rule 110, Sec. 13 [now Sec. 14
under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure] of the Rules of Court which stipulates:
. . . The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without
leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during
the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when
the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
To amend the information so as to change the crime charged for homicide to the
more serious offense of murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the
former is indubitably proscribed by the first paragraph of the above-clouted
provision. For certainly a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of form;
it is one of substance with very serious consequences. 24
Indeed, petitioner forcefully and strongly submits that, in the light of this ruling, we
are allegedly obliged to grant his prayer for the reversal of the assailed decision of
respondent Court of Appeals and the affirmance of the trial court's ruling that the
post-arraignment amendment sought by the People is prohibited under Section 14,
Rule 110, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same being a substantial
amendment prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
71
The cited ruling, however, differs from the case at bench because the facts herein
sustain a contrary holding. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
. . . the original Information, while only mentioning homicide, alleged:
Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe as the accused; [sic] of Danny Buhat
stabbing the deceased Ramon while his two other companions were holding the
arms of Ramon, thus, "the Information already alleged superior strength"; and
inflicting mortal wounds which led to the death of Ramon.
Superior strength qualifies the offense to murder (Article 248).
xxx xxx xxx
Before us, the Information already alleged superior strength, and the additional
allegation that the deceased was stabbed by Buhat while the arms of the former
were being held by the two other accused, referring to John Doe and Richard Doe. .
. charged as determined by the public prosecutor, does not exactly correspond to the
xxx xxx xxx
If the killing is characterized as having been committed by superior strength, then
to repeat, there is murder . . .
Also the case of Dacuycuy was mentioned, as a justification for not allowing change
of designation from homicide to murder, but then the body of the Information in
the Dacuycuy ruling did not allege averments which qualifies [sic] the offense of
murder. The case before us instead is different in that the Information already
alleges that Buhat attacked the deceased while his two other companions held him
by the arms, "using superior strength." . . . We would even express the possibility
that if supported by evidence, Buhat and the Altavases could still be penalized for
murder even without changing the designation from homicide to murder, precisely
because of aforementioned allegations. The proposed change of the word from
homicide to murder, to us, is not a substantial change that should be prohibited. 25
In the matter of amending a criminal information, what is primarily guarded against
is the impairment of the accused's right to intelligently know the nature of the
charge against him. This right has been guaranteed the accused under all Philippine
Constitutions 26 and incorporated in Section 1 (b), Rule 115, of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure 27.
In a criminal case, due process requires that, among others, the accusation be indue
form, and that notice thereof and an opportunity to answer the charge be given the
accused; 28 hence, the constitutional and reglementary guarantees as to accused's
right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." An
accused should be given the necessary data as to why he is being proceeded against
and not be left in the unenviable state of speculating why he is made the object of a
prosecution, 29 it being the fact that, in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of
the accused is at stake. It is always wise and proper that the accused be fully
apprised of the charge against him in order to avoid any possible surprise that may
lead to injustice. 30
In order to sufficiently inform the accused of the charge against him, a written
accusation, in the form of a criminal information indicting the accused and
subscribed by the fiscal, must first be filed in court. 31 Such information must state,
among others, the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the
statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. 32
Evidently, the important end to be accomplished is to describe the act with
sufficient certainty in order that the accused may be apprised of the nature of the
charge against him. 33 In the event, however, that the appellation of the crime
actual crime constituted by the criminal acts described in the information to have
been committed by the accused, what controls is the description of the said
criminal acts and not the technical name of the crime supplied by the public
prosecutor. As this court, through Justice Moreland's authoritative disquisition, has
held:
. . . Notwithstanding apparent contradiction between caption and body, . . . the
characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is
immaterial and purposeless . . . the facts stated in the body of the pleading must
determine the crime of which the defendant
stands charged and for which he must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine .
. . is thoroughly in accord with common sense and with the requirements of plain
justice. . . . Procedure in criminal actions should always be so framed as to insure to
each criminal that retributive punishment which ought swiftly and surely to visit
him who willfully and maliciously violates the penal laws of society. We believe that
a doctrine which does not produce such a result is illogical and unsound and works
irreparable injury to the community in which it prevails.
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in
no way aids him in a defense on the merits. . . . That to which his attention should
be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are
the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law
some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body
of the information in the matter therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence
72
to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law
denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by
name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that
pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal . . . For his full and complete
defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence
whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real and important
question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not,
"Did you commit a crime named murder?" If he performed the acts alleged, in the
manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the
penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or
what it is named. If accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then
he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of
the crime which those acts constitute.
The plea of not guilty ought always to raise a question of fact and not of law. The
characterization of the crime is a conclusion of law on the part of the fiscal. The
denial by the accused that he committed that specific crime so characterized raises
no real question. No issue can be raised by the assertion of a conclusion of law by
one party and a denial of such conclusion by the other. The issues raised by the
pleadings in criminal actions . . . are primarily and really issues of fact and not of
law. . . . .
. . . Issues are not made by asserting and denying names. They are framed by the
allegation and denial of facts. . . . To quibble about names is to lose sight of realities.
To permit an accused to stand by and watch the fiscal while he guesses as to the
name which ought to be applied to the crime of which he charges the accused, and
then take advantage [sic] of the guess if it happens to be wrong, while the acts or
omissions upon which that guess was made and which are the real and only
foundation of the charge against him are clearly and fully stated in the information,
is to change the battle ground in criminal cases from issues to guesses and from fact
to fancy. It changes lawyers into dialecticians and law into metaphysics — that
fertile field of delusion propagated by language. 34 [Emphasis ours]
In other words, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision
of the law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law which in no
way affect the legal aspects of the information, but from the actual recital of facts
as alleged in the body of the information. 35
Petitioner in the case at bench maintains that, having already pleaded "not guilty"
to the crime of homicide, the amendment of the crime charged in the information
from homicide to murder is a substantial amendment prejudicial to his right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against him. He utterly fails to dispute,
however, that the original information did allege that petitioner stabbed his victim
"using superior strength". And this particular allegation qualifies a killing to murder,
regardless of how such a killing is technically designated in the information filed by
the public prosecutor.
Our ruling in the case of People v. Resayaga36 is clearly apropos:
The appellant maintains that the Information filed in this case is only for Homicide. .
..
The contention is without merit. Reliance is placed mainly upon the designation of
the offense given to it by the fiscal. . . . In the instant case, the information
specifically alleges that "the said accused conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with ice picks one Paulo Balane . . ." Since the killing is characterized as having
been committed by "taking advantage of superior strength," a circumstance which
qualifies a killing to murder, the information sufficiently charged the commission of
murder. 3 7
On another aspect, we find merit in the manifestation of the Solicitor General to the
effect that the respondent Court of Appeals erroneously supposed that petitioner
and Renato Buhat are one and the same person, hence the non-inclusion of Renato
Buhat as additional accused in its order allowing the amendment of the
information. 38 We also agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the
amended information filed in this case still fails to embody the correct identity of all
of the persons found to be indictable in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
Explained the Solicitor General:
In its Decision under review, the Court of Appeals erroneously supposed that Danny
Buhat and Renato Buhat are one and the same person (CA Decision, 1st par.). This,
however, is not correct because Danny Buhat and Renato Buhat are, in fact,
brothers. Moreover, it was not Osmeña Altavas and his wife Herminia Altavas who
held the arms of the victim while Danny Buhat stabbed him. According to the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, which is requoted hereunder:
The evidence on hand clearly shows that while Osmeña Altavas was continuously
hitting Ramon Yu with his fists, his wife Herminia aided him by hitting the victim
with a chair. It was also during this time that Danny Buhat and two (2) unidentified
persons appeared and joined spouses Osmeña and Herminia. One of the
unidentified persons was later identified as Renato Buhat. Renato Buhat and the
other unidentified person held the arms of Ramon Yu while Danny Buhat stabbed
Ramon Yu twice on the chest which resulted in his death. The restraint on the
73
person of Ramon Yu before he was stabbed was described by eyewitness Susan WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The City Prosecutor of
Labrador during the continuation of the preliminary investigation of the instant case Roxas City is HEREBY ORDERED to file the correct Amended Information fully in
on December 2, 1992. accordance with the findings of fact set forth in the Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice, dated February 3, 1994, and in disregard of the finding of the Court of
The Amended Information to be filed in this case must, therefore, reflect the above Appeals in its Decision, dated March 28, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 35554 to the effect
facts set forth in the aforesaid Resolution of the Secretary of Justice — which was that "Danny Buhat and Renato Buhat are one and the same person."
the result of the preliminary investigation (as reviewed by the Secretary of Justice)
conducted in this case. Strangely enough, however, the Amended Information SO ORDERED.
(Annex "C") that was subsequently filed before the Roxas City RTC in this case by
Assistant City Prosecutor Alvin D. Calvez of Roxas City does not reflect the above
facts set forth in the aforesaid Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Said Amended
Information in effect alleges that Osmeña and Herminia Altavas were the ones who
held the arms of the victim while Danny Buhat stabbed him, whereas, according to
the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice abovecited, it was Renato Buhat and
another unidentified person who held the arms of the victim while Danny Buhat
stabbed him. According to the said Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the
participation of Osmeña Altavas in the crime was that of hitting the victim with his
fists, while . . . the participation of Herminia Altavas in the crime was that of hitting
the victim with a chair.

Verily, the statement of facts in the Information or Amended Information must

conform with the findings of fact in the preliminary investigation (in this case, as
reviewed by the Secretary of Justice) so as to make it jibe with the evidence . . . to
be presented at the trial. . . . .

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in this case (which merely resolved
affirmatively the legal issues of whether or not the offense charged in the
Information could be upgraded to Murder and additional accused could be included
in said Information) should not be made the basis of the Amended Information
herein as the said Decision does not constitute the preliminary investigation
conducted in this case. Such Amended Information should be based on the findings
of fact set forth in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, as above quoted and
requoted. 39 [Emphasis theirs]

The Solicitor General prays for at least the remanding of this case to respondent
Court of Appeals for the correction of the error abovecited and for the ordering of
the filing of the correct Amended Information by the City Prosecutor of Roxas City.
Considering, however, that further delay of the trial of this case is repugnant to our
inveterate desire for speedy justice and that the full and complete disposition of
this case virtually serves this end, we see it to be within our jurisdiction and
authority to order the correct amended information to be filed in this case without
the need to remand the same to respondent appellate court.

74
G.R. No. L-29129 May 8, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO MABUYO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio
G. Ibarra and Solicitor Hector C. Fule for plaintiff-appellee.
Domingo M. Angeles for defendant-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in its
Criminal Case No. 2486 finding the accused Domingo Mabuyo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with treachery as the qualifying
circumstance, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties provided by law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Norberto Anillo in
the sum of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
On June 18, 1966, at about midnight, Norberto Anillo was shot dead at the doorstep
of his house in Bo. Ambulong, Tanauan, Batangas. Immediately thereafter a police
team headed by Lt. Roque Garcia, Deputy Chief of Police of Tanauan, went to the
scene of the incident and conducted an investigation. Fifteen empty carbine shells
were recovered from the premises. Agaton Anillo, the father of the deceased, and
Adelaida Mirania, the widow, when interviewed by Lt. Garcia, declined to name the
assailants but promised to go to his office after the interment to disclose to him
their identities.
Dr. Francisco M. Garcia, the Municipal Health Officer of Tanauan who performed
the post mortem examination of the deceased in the early morning of June 19,
1966, found eleven (11) gunshot wounds on his body.
As promised, Agaton Anillo and Adelaida Mirania went to the Office of the Chief of
Police of Tanauan on June 20 and submitted themselves to a formal investigation.
In their respective statements they named Domingo Mabuyo as the triggerman and
alluded to a certain Juan Mendoza as the instigator of the crime. The following day,
June 21, a complaint for murder was filed in the Municipal Court of Tanauan against
both Mendoza and Mabuyo. Upon a finding of a probable cause, the municipal
judge ordered the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest, but Domingo
Mabuyo was nowhere to be found.
Juan Mendoza waived his right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation
and the municipal court forwarded the record of the case to the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, where an information for murder was filed against him alone
as principal by inducement. Upon a plea of "not guilty" the accused went to trial,
after which he was acquitted "on ground of reasonable doubt" in a decision
promulgated on January 7, 1967..
On March 27, 1967, Domingo Mabuyo presented himself at the Office of the Chief
of Police of Tanauan, but only to be fingerprinted since he had with him an order of
release issued by the Municipal Court. It appears that Mabuyo had previously
prepared a bail bond in the sum of P30,000.00, which was approved by the
Municipal Judge. Through counsel Mabuyo waived his right to the second stage of
the preliminary investigation. Accordingly the municipal court in its order dated
March 27, 1967 elevated the case to the Court of First Instance of Batangas for
further proceedings. On April 5, 1967 the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding
information for murder against Mabuyo, alleging the circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation. The case went to trial upon a "not guilty" plea. The
widow of the deceased, who appeared to be the lone eyewitness to the commission
of crime, testified that at about midnight Of June 18, 1966, while she was reading in
bed, she heard her husband asking her to open the door. She stood up, and taking
with her a lighted kerosene lamp, went downstairs. Suddenly there were two
successive gun shots. She heard her husband cry out "aray," followed by a sound of
a falling object. As she came near the door there were other successive shots.
Undaunted, she opened the door to see what was happening outside. With the aid
of the light of the kerosene lamp, which she was holding over her head, she saw
Domingo Mabuyo firing at her prostrate husband with what appeared to her to be a
carbine. Mabuyo aimed it at her, so she immediately closed the door and shouted
for help. Shortly thereafter her father-in-law, whose house was nearby, arrived. She
told him that it was Domingo Mabuyo whom she saw shooting her husband.
Another witness for the prosecution, Aniceto Sumarraga of Bo. Ambulong, narrated
that on June 16, 1966, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, while he was at home
reading, Domingo Mabuyo arrived with a carbine. They talked briefly inside the
house. Domingo Mabuyo inquired if he (the witness) would go with him to kill
Norberto Anillo. Aniceto refused, saying that he did not want to be involved in any
such undertaking. Domingo Mabuyo then told him that if that was his decision, then
he alone would go. After his visitor had left, Aniceto went to the store of a certain
Alejandro Perez, also in Bo. Ambulong, and played mahjong. He noticed that
Norberto Anillo was also there watching the game. As he was engrossed in the
game Aniceto did not warn Norberto about Mabuyo's criminal design against him.
At about midnight Anillo left the store. A few minutes later the mahjong players
heard gun reports coming from the direction of Norberto Anillo's place. They
75
stopped the game and went to Anillo's house and there saw the lifeless body of
Norberto Anillo lying on its face on the ground.
Testifying also for the prosecution, Agaton Anillo said that in the evening of June 18,
1966 he was at his home. At about midnight he heard gun reports coming from the
house of his son Norberto. At first there were two shots, followed shortly by several
more in rapid succession. When he was about to go downstairs he heard the shouts
of his daughter-in-law that her husband had been fired upon. He ran to her house,
where he saw his son already dead. His daughter-in-law met him and told him that
she had seen Domingo Mabuyo do the shooting.
Agaton Anillo further testified that on June 16, or two days before the fatal
incident, his son told him that there was a plot for his liquidation and that it was
Domingo Mabuyo who would carry it out; that on June 18 he (Agaton) saw
Domingo passing in front of his house; and that after Norberto was killed Domingo
disappeared and went into hiding.
Domingo Mabuyo's defense was alibi. He claimed that early in the morning of June
3, 1966 he left Bo. Ambulong, Tanauan, Batangas for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija,
arriving there at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, and did not return to Tanauan
until March 27, 1967, when he surrendered to the authorities. While away from
home he worked in the logging concession of Gabaldon Vice-Mayor Isabelo Aquino
in Ibuna Estate, Dingalan, Quezon. In the evening of June 18, 1966, the date when
Norberto Anillo was killed, he was detained in the municipal jail of Gabaldon for
drunkenness and was released at about 8:00 o'clock the next morning. On March
23, 1967 he went to Dolores, Quezon, with some members of the family of Vice-
Mayor Aquino, and attended the annual Holy Week rites of his religious sect known
as "Iglesia dela Ciudad Mistica." While there somebody informed him that he was
being charged in court. At first he did not mind the information, but when he
happened to meet Atty. Juan Mendoza, who told him the same thing, he decided to
surrender to the authorities, On March 27, 1967 he and Atty. Mendoza went to
Calamba, Laguna, and asked a certain Patrolman Dionisio Samiano to accompany
them to the Tanauan Police Department. While he was at the Tanauan Police
Department somebody fetched him and took him to the office of the municipal
judge, where he was asked to sign certain papers which turned out to be his bail
bond. After said bond was approved by the municipal judge he was ordered
released temporarily from the custody of the police authorities. He further claimed
that he had no motive to kill the deceased because the latter was not only his friend
but also a nephew of his wife. He added that he was Norberto's confidant even in
connection with the latter's extra-marital affairs.
Corroborating the alibi of the accused, Vice-Mayor Isabelo Aquino of Gabaldon,
Nueva Ecija, testified that on June 2, 1966 he sent Antonio Berganos to Ambulong,
Tanauan, Batangas to fetch Domingo Mabuyo; that the following day, June 3, 1966,
both Antonio Berganos and Domingo Mabuyo arrived in Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;
that from June 6, 1966 to March 22, 1967, Domingo Mabuyo worked under him as a
laborer — first as a log cutter in his concession in Dingalan, Quezon and then as a
rattan gatherer; that Domingo Mabuyo stopped working on March 22, 1967
because he went to Dolores, Quezon, to attend a religious ceremony of his sect;
and that the distance from Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija to Tanauan, Batangas could be
negotiated by means of a bus in about ten (10) hours. In the course of his testimony
Aquino identified a time book he was keeping, wherein it was shown that Domingo
Mabuyo rendered services as one of his laborers from June 1966 to November l966.
Also identified by him were the payrolls from April 1966 to November 1966,
showing the amounts paid to Domingo Mabuyo from June 1966 to November 1966,
and his signatures as payee.
Gabaldon Police Chief Francisco Gamit testified on the entries in the police blotter
of his department, showing that Domingo Mabuyo was detained for drunkenness in
the municipal jail on June 18, 1966 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening and released at
8:00 o'clock the next morning.
Another corroborating witness, Atty. Juan Mendoza, testified that in the first week
of June 1966 Domingo Mabuyo was fetched from barrio Ambulong by Antonio
Berganos, one of the laborers of Vice-Mayor Aquino, to work in the logging
concession of the latter in Dingalan, Quezon; that from the time of Domingo
Mabuyo's departure, it was only on March 23, 1967, in Dolores, Quezon, that they
met again; that upon meeting Domingo Mabuyo, he informed the latter that he was
facing a court charge for having allegedly killed Norberto Anillo and advised him to
surrender immediately after the festivities of their sect; that early in the morning of
March 27, 1967 he and Mabuyo went to Calamba, Laguna and asked Patrolman
Samio of the Calamba Police to accompany them to the Tanauan Police
Department; and that from the time, they met each other in Dolores, he had
Domingo Mabuyo under his surveillance until he surrendered on March 27, 1967..
Upon the evidence presented the trial court rendered its judgment of conviction as
aforestated; hence, this appeal.
The appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him of a crime not
properly charged in the information since he was charged with murder allegedly
committed in Bo. Bagumbayan, Tanauan, Batangas, but was found guilty of said
crime committed in Bo. Ambulong, some 12 kilometers away in the same
municipality and province. The alleged irregularity does not constitute a reversible
error. It is a settled rule that unless the particular place of commission is an
essential element of the offense charged, conviction may be had even if it appears
that the crime was committed not at the place alleged in the information, provided
76
the place of actual commission was within the jurisdiction of the court.1 In the
instant case the place of commission does not constitute an essential element of
the offense charged and the evidence discloses that said offense was in fact
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. Moreover, there is no
reason to believe that the appellant was misled or surprised by the variance
between the proof and the allegation in the information as to the place where the
offense was committed.
With respect to the appellant's claim that he was denied the right to preliminary
investigation, We find the same to be without factual basis, it appearing from the
order dated March 27, 1967 of the Municipal Court of Tanauan that he "had
renounced his right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation."
Furthermore, the record does not show that he raised the question of lack of
preliminary investigation at any stage of the trial in the court of first instance. It is
well-settled that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right
and may be waived expressly or by silence.2
We now take up the merits of the case. In asking for his acquittal the appellant
vigorously assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the
widow who identified him as the murderer of her husband. He urges that since the
testimonies of said witnesses as regards the guilt of Juan Mendoza were not given
credence, the same should likewise be rejected in his case in order to be consistent.
We cannot sustain the appellant. It is to be noted that in Criminal Case No. 2388
Juan Mendoza was prosecuted on the theory that he directly induced the herein
appellant, who was then at large during the pendency of said case, to kill Norberto
Anillo. In the case under review, the appellant himself was charged as the sole
author of the crime after the acquittal of his supposed inducer. Under the foregoing
factual setting, the trial, court aptly observed that the incredibility of the witnesses
for the prosecution against Juan Mendoza as principal by inducement did not
necessarily mean that said witnesses were also incredible when they testified
against the very person who allegedly shot to death the victim. In fact, it found that
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Adelaida Mirania, Agaton Anillo and
Aniceto Sumarraga against the appellant "were in accord to what they disclosed in
their written statements executed less than two days after the commission of the
imputed crime," but such was not the case when they testified against Juan
Mendoza. In People vs. Malillos,3 this Court had occasion to state that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some
facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. And it has been aptly said that
even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in sonic material
particulars, it is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated testimony be
rejected, but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited.
Suffice it to say, in this connection, that a trial court by reason of its proximate
contact with witnesses, are in a more competent position to discriminate between
the true and the false, and We really find no cogent reason to disturb the above-
quoted conclusion of the court below in the decision appealed from.
Adelaida Mirania could not possibly have been mistaken as to the identity of the
appellant. She knew him very well, he being from the same barrio where his house
was not far away from hers. At the time of the incident she was carrying a lighted
kerosene lamp. Although the lamp was not presented in evidence it was adequately
described as a bottle of beer with the wick held in place at its mouth by means of a
tin plate. It is a common enough source of illumination in our barrios. Undoubtedly
it was sufficient to light an area within a radius of five meters.
While it is true that Adelaida Mirania did not report immediately to the Deputy
Chief of Police the identity of the assailant, it is to be noted that she promised to
identify him after her husband was interred, which she readily did by going to the
police department where she executed a sworn statement.
In a further attempt to discredit the identification made by Adelaida Mirania, the
appellant insists that she could not have possibly seen the assailant because, as
testified to by Mateo Simbahan, she was not at home at the time of the incident
but in the house of her father-in-law, watching a game of "bingo." However, the
testimony of said witness contains flaws which render it unworthy of belief. He
went to Agaton Anillo's house, he said, in order to ask the latter to help him find a
job. Yet he did not talk to Agaton Anillo immediately upon his arrival but waited
until midnight on the lame excuse that he got interested watching the bingo game.
Furthermore, considering that Adelaida Mirania had nine (9) children and was then
again pregnant, it is hardly believable that she would leave her house just to watch
the bingo game, remaining on her feet until midnight.
The appellant also insists that the widow pointed to him as the assailant because
she was angry with him because he refused to stop helping her late husband in his
extra-marital affairs. We find this motive insufficient for her to accuse him falsely of
so grave a crime as murder. Besides, it is unthinkable that she would fabricate
evidence to send an innocent man to jail and let the real murderer of her husband
go free.
The appellant having been clearly and positively identified by the widow, his alibi
cannot be sustained. Moreover, after examining the evidence in support of his
defense We find that his alibi has the aspect of fabrication. Firstly, the police blotter
of Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, was not properly accomplished. While the Chief of Police
testified that the appellant was brought to the municipal jail by his two policemen
at about two o'clock in the afternoon of June 18, 1966, it appears in the blotter that
the appellant was detained at 9:00 o'clock in the evening. Also, while the appellant
77
was supposedly released on June 19, 1966 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning, the
release was entered on the page for June 18, 1966. It is a fair conclusion that the
fact of release was entered on said page because it could no longer be
accommodated on the page for June 19, 1966, there being already legitimate
entries thereon and the blank spaces having been crossed out. The Chief of Police
was even surprised why the questioned entry appeared as it did. Secondly, as
correctly observed by the trial court, from all appearances the payrolls from April
1966 to November 1966 were all prepared at the same time. Thirdly, the
protestation of the appellant that he never knew that he was being implicated in
the killing of Norberto Anillo or that he was being charged in court therefor until he
was so informed by Juan Mendoza on March 23, 1967 is belied by the fact that even
before that date he had already taken steps to prepare his bail bond. It appears
from the record that his bondsmen secured the necessary papers in connection
with their respective properties to be offered as security on February 28, 1967 and
that the bail bond itself was prepared on March 4, 1967. Lastly, if it were true that
he was working from June 1966 to March 1967 under Gabaldon Vice-Mayor Aquino
and not hiding from the authorities as alleged by the prosecution, he would at least
have returned home to visit his family during that long period. He never did, not
even on Christmas day, which is traditionally a day for family reunion. If anything,
his long absence from his barrio supports the theory of the prosecution that his
flight immediately after the commission of the crime was not for any innocent
reason.

The trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery

against the appellant. The attack was sudden: the victim was knocking at the door
and asking his wife to open it when he was shot. Although he was apparently aware
of the plot to liquidate him, the circumstances, including the use by the appellant of
a high power firearm, rendered the victim defenseless. The mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender cannot be considered in favor of the appellant. The fact that
it took him almost nine months after the issuance of the warrant of arrest against
him before he presented himself to the police authorities negates the spontaneity
of his surrender.

The crime committed was murder, and there being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, the appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.

WHEREFORE, with the only modification that the indemnity payable to the heirs of
the deceased Norberto Anillo is increased from P6,000.00 to P12,000,00, the
decision appealed from is affirmed with costs.

78
G.R. No. L-2733 March 27, 1906
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOLAS ARCEO, defendant-appellant.
Alfredo Chicote, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
In a written complaint dated October 15, 1903, Nicolas Arceo Tanuco was charged
by the assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila with the crime of illegal
marriage. The complaint as filed sets forth the following facts : That on or about
May 1, 1901, the defendant, being the legal husband of one Tranquilina Arcilia,
willfully and illegally did enter into a second matrimonial bond with one Teodora de
Guia in the Province of Rizal within the police and court jurisdiction of Manila, the
former matrimonial bond not having been legally dissolved at the time.
The case having been tried upon the said complaint, it was shown, especially by the
documentary evidence introduced and which forms a part of the record, that
according to a certificate of marriage (fol. 20) signed by the pastor of the church at
Bacolor, Pampanga, the defendant, Nicolas Arceo, did marry Tranquilina Arcilia on
February 3, 1897, in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church. The
ceremony was performed by Gregorio Dizon, a priest, in the presence of witnesses,
in the parochial church of said pueblo of Bacolor.
It was further shown that, according to a certificate signed by the secretary to the
archbishop of Manila, attached to the record (fol. 37), by a decree dated April 29,
1901, signed by the archbishop, the last two banns were ordered suppressed at the
request of the defendant in order to expedite his marriage with Teodora de Guia,
and in view also of the report from the pastor of Tambobong, which stated that the
first bann proclaimed in his church met with no opposition. The certificate further
sets forth that the defendant appeared before the pastor at Tambobong and
declared that he was unmarried.
By virtue of said decree from the archbishop of Manila, the defendant was married
on the 1st of May, 1901, to Teodora de Guia, in accordance with a the rites of the
Roman Catholic Church and in the presence of witnesses in the church of
Tambobong. The defendant signed the marriage papers as an unmarried man (fol.
21), as testified by the Rev. Mateo Evangelista.
It was thus proved that the defendant did enter into a second marriage with
Teodora de Guia while his first wife, Tranquilina Arcilla, still lived (for. 98 of the
record); that the marriage ceremony took place in the pueblo of Tambobong, which
is now included in the Province of Rizal, but formerly was part of the city of Manila.
Assuming that article 471 of the Penal Code has been violated, and considering that
the crime was committed in the pueblo of Tambobong, which is now included in the
territory of Rizal Province, the first point to be determined is whether or not the
judge who presided at the trial had jurisdiction to try the case. The defense raised
this point and questioned the right of the Court of First Instance of Manila to hear
and determine this case.
The decision of this court in the case of the United States vs. C. M. Jenkins1 (4 Off.
Gaz., 523), wherein it was held that the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
had no jurisdiction over crimes committed in the Province of Rizal and within the 5-
mile limit, as fixed by section 3 of Act No. 183, for police purposes, has definitely
settled the question of jurisdiction. The proceedings had in the lower court
therefore void.
It is a general principle of law that the place where a crime is committed should be
first ascertained in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court of judge.
Act No. 140 fixes the territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of the Islands,
including the Court of First Instance of Manila. Although Act No. 183, section 3,
extended the jurisdiction of the city government to a radius of 5 miles for police
purposes, it was never intended to confer upon the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila jurisdiction over it. No other view can be taken, since Act No. 183,
section 3, does not amend or modify the jurisdiction of the courts prescribed in Act
No. 140.
Any change in the territorial jurisdiction of a court enlarging or restricting the same
can never be established by mere deduction or inference. Judicial divisions and
boundaries of provinces and districts are always fixed by law. So that alterations of
such boundaries can only be made in express terms by the legislative body. Nothing
to this effect is contained in Act No. 183, section 3, amending Act No. 140;
therefore it is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the court below should
be, and it is hereby, set aside and the case dismissed with costs de oficio.
It is also ordered that, in the event of the filing of a new complaint, the judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal shall proceed in accordance with law.
79
The court below and the Solicitor-General shall be notified of this decision and the
record returned to the interior court with a certified copy of this opinion and of the
judgment to be entered in accordance herewith for its execution. So ordered.

80
[G.R. No. L-7987. March 26, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. PLACIDO OPEMIA, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
DECISION
REYES, A., J.:
This is an appeal by the prosecution from an order of dismissal.
It appears that on February 26, 1953, an information was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, charging four persons with theft of large cattle alleged
to have been committed on or about June 18, 1952. After the Defendants had
pleaded not guilty and in the course of the trial, the caretaker of the stolen carabao,
testifying as fourth witness for the prosecution, declared that the theft occurred
sometime in July, 1947, whereupon the fiscal asked for permission to amend the
information to make it conform to the evidence as regards the date of the
commission of the crime. Instant objection to the proposed amendment was raised
on behalf of the Defendants on the ground that it would violate their substantial
rights for the reason that the case had already been pending for a long time and the
trial had progressed to such an extent that their defense had already been revealed
to the prosecution. Believing that the amendment would really prejudice the
substantial rights of the accused the trial court sustained the objection. And the
defense having also asked that the information be quashed on the ground of
variance between its allegations and the evidence, the court verbally ruled that it
was dismissing the said information and implemented the ruling by declaring the
case dismissed in the judgment rendered at the conclusion of the trial.
Appealing from the order of dismissal, the Solicitor General contends that instead
of dismissing the case the lower court should have allowed the information to be
amended.
Section 13 of Rule 106 provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“SEC. 13. Amendment. — The information of complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the Defendant pleads;
chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of
form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the Defendant.
“If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or
information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided
the Defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.”
The amendment proposed in the present case consists in changing the date of the
commission of the crime charged from June 18, 1952 to July, 1947. In not
permitting the amendment the learned trial Judge said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“It is a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that the precise time at which an offense
was committed need not be alleged in the complaint or information, but it is
required that the act be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the
actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint
would permit (Rule 106, section 10). The reason for this rule is obvious. It is to
apprise the accused of the approximate date when the offense charged was
committed in order to enable him to prepare his defense and thus avoid a surprise.
In the case at bar, the proof shows that the carabao was lost on July 25, 1947 and
not on June 18, 1952 as alleged in the information. The period of almost five years
between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that one cannot help but
be led to believe that another theft different from that committed by the
Defendants in 1952 was also perpetrated by them in 1947. Under this impression
the accused, who came to court prepared to face a charge of theft of large cattle
allegedly committed by them in 1952, were certainly caught by sudden surprise
upon being confronted by evidence tending to prove a similar offense committed in
1947. The variance is certainly unfair to them, for it violates their constitutional
right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and
deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover, they cannot be
convicted of an offense with which they are not charged.
“It is also a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that after the Defendant has entered
his plea, the information or complaint may be amended only as to all matters of
form when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the Defendant
(Rule 196, section 13). An amendment that would change the date of the
commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form. The
difference in date could not be attributed to a clerical error, because the possibility
of such an error is ruled out by the fact that the difference is not only in the year,
but also in the month and in the last two digits of the year. It is apparent that the
proposed amendment concerns with material facts constituting the offense, and
consequently it would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the Defendants.”
His Honor has we think adduced good reasons for considering the amendment as
referring to substance and not merely to form. But even supposing it to be the
81
contrary, its allowance, after the Defendants had pleaded, was discretionary with
the court and would be proper only if it would not prejudice their rights. We are not
prepare to say that the court did not make good use of that discretion in disallowing
the amendment, considering that the variance sought to be introduced thereby
would appear to be really unfair to the Defendants, for as clearly explained by the
court “it violates their constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the
specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend
themselves.”

In any event, it appears from the judgment below that, with the proposed
amendment disallowed and seeing that the prosecution could not contradict the
testimony that created the necessity for the amendment, the trial court dismissed
the case on the ground of variance between allegation and proof, so that the
dismissal really amounted to an acquittal. In line, therefore, with our ruling in
Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil., 299; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Diaz, 94
Phil., 714; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Bangalao, et al., 94 Phil., 354; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand Catilo vs. Abaya, 94 Phil., 1014 the Defendants in the
present case should be deemed to have already been acquitted and may not be
tried again without being put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

Wherefore, the appeal is dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

82
G.R. No. 72994 January 23, 1991 The accused, thru counsel de officio, Atty. Lilio L. Amora, moved to quash the
information,3 alleging that the statement of the time of commission of the felony
FELICISIMO ROCABERTE, petitioner, charged, "from 1977 to December 1983, . . . a period of seven years," or "about
vs. 2,551 days," was fatally defective: there was "so great a gap as to defy
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. ANDRES S. SANTOS, Judge, RTC, Tagbilaran, approximation in the commission of one and the same offense" (citing Peo. v.
Bohol, respondents. Reyes, 108 SCRA 203); "the variance is certainly unfair to the accused for it violates
their constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge
Lilio L. Amora for petitioner. against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves . . ."
(invoking Peo. v. Openia, 98 Phil. 698).

NARVASA, J.:
The case at bar treats of the sufficiency of the averment in the information of the
time of the commission of the felony of theft ascribed to petitioner Felicisimo
Rocaberte and two (2) others. The information, filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, City of Tagbilaran,1 Judge Andres S. Santos, presiding, reads as follows:2
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal hereby accused Felicisimo Rocaberte,
Florencio Ranario and Flaviana Ranario of the crime of Theft, committed as follows:
That on or about the Period from 1977 to December 28, 1983 at the off offshore of
West Canayaon, municipal of Garcia-Hernandez, province of Bohol, Philippines . . .,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with
intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following properties, to
wit:
The motion was denied4 as was, too, the defendants' motion for reconsideration.5
In the motion for reconsideration, the accused drew attention to Section 4, Rule
117 "of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure," as a remedy that could be
alternatively granted, viz.:
Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. — If the motion to quash is based
on an alleged defect in the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be made. (2a)
Felicisimo Rocaberte then instituted in this Court, thru his aforenamed counsel de
oficio, the special civil action of certiorari at bar, impugning the denial by
respondent Judge Santos of his motion to quash, or his refusal, at the very least, to
direct the amendment of the information pursuant to Section 4, Rule 117 of the
1985 Rules of Court, supra. He is correct, and will be granted appropriate relief.
The rules of criminal procedure declare6 that —

One (1) pc. sledge hammer, valued at P136.00 . . . A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the defendant;
One (1) pc. H beam, valued at 400.00 the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
Two (2) cut abrasive steel plates for cargo as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time
berth cover protector 158.00 of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
Ninety-nine (99) blocks of aluminum, alloy committed.
anodes at P3,750.00 each block P371,250.00
TOTAL P371,944.00 and — as regards the time of the commission of the offense, particularly — that:7
in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
FORTY-FOUR PESOS (P371,944.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to and owned by . . . It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
the Philippine Sinter Corporation, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the
aforestated amount. offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to
the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Articles 308, 309 of the Revised Penal complaint will permit.
Code.
In line with this last mentioned rule, a variance of a few months between the time
set out in the indictment and that established by the evidence during the trial has

83
been held not to constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a
conviction solely on that score. Hence, where the information sets the date of
commission of a robbery at March 25, 1900, evidence was allowed to show that the
offense was actually perpetrated on the 5th or 6th of March; and an amendment of
an information so as to change the year therein stated to that following it, was
allowed it appearing that the alteration impaired none of the defendant's rights.8
Where, however, there was a variance of several years between the time stated in
the information, 1947, and the proof of its actual commission adduced at the trial,
1952, the dismissal of the case by the Trial Court was sustained by this Court, since
to allow amendment of the indictment to conform to the evidence would be
violative of defendant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.9
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the writ of certiorari prayed for is
ISSUED, ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the challenged Orders of respondent
Judge dated August 12, 1985 and September 10, 1985 in Criminal Case No. 3851,
and DIRECTING the amendment of the information in said case by the prosecution
within such time as the respondent Judge may deem proper, failing which the
criminal prosecution against the petitioner and his co-defendants shall be
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

Again, the statement of the time of the commission of the offense which is so
general as to span a number of years, i.e., "between October, 1910 to August,
1912," has been held to be fatally defective because it deprives the accused an
opportunity to prepare his defense.10

A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is
not, however, a ground for a motion to quash under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
Even if it were, a motion for quashal on that account will be denied since the defect
is one that can be cured by amendment; instead, the court shall order the
amendment to be made by stating the time with particularity.11

The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of
the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of particulars, provided
for in Section 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court of 1964.12

Bill of particulars. — Defendant may, at the time of or before arraignment, move for
or demand a more definite statement or a bill of particulars of any matter which is
not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to
plead or prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and
the details desired.

From all that has been said, the conclusion should be clear. The information against
petitioner Rocaberte is indeed seriously defective. It places on him and his co-
accused the unfair and unreasonable burden of having to recall their activities over
a span of more than 2,500 days. It is a burden nobody should be made to bear. The
public prosecutor must make more definite and particular the time of the
commission of the crime of theft attributed to Rocaberte and his co-defendants. If
he cannot, the prosecution cannot be maintained, the case must be dismissed.

84
G. R. No. L-41903 June 10, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, Br. V, Mauban, Quezon; RAMON S. REYES
alias "CAPING", GUILLERMO UNTALAN, NATALIO ALVAREZ and WILFREDO
SALIENDRA, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the order of the
respondent court dated October 24, 1975 dismissing the information for qualified.
theft against the private respondents in Criminal Case No. 380 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, Branch V, 1 on the ground that it does not charge an offense
for failure to allege the proper offended party therein.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondents Ramon Reyes alias "Caping," Guillermo Untalan, Natalio
Alvarez and Wilfredo Saliendra were charged in Criminal Case No. 380 at the Court
of First Instance of Quezon, Branch V, with qualified theft, as defined and punished
under Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 330 2 in an information filed by Special
Counsel Hjalmar Quintana of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon, on
August 5, 1975, in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 16th day of April 1974, at Barrio San Jose, in the Municipality
of Mauban, Province of, Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ramon Reyes alias "Caping",
Guillermo Untalan, Natalio Alvarez and Wilfredo Saliendra, with intent to gain,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter a public forest zone under lease
to the ALUK LOGGING CORPORATION and once inside, illegally cut, take, steal and
carry away two (2) Lauan trees consisting of 1,200 board feet, without the consent
of the latter, valued at ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY (P1,920.00)
PESOS, Philippine currency, to the. damage and prejudice of said Aluk Logging
Corporation in the aforesaid sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
On September 17, 1975, the private respondents were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty to the charge 4 After the arraignment, the private respondents moved to
quash the aforestated information based on the following grounds:
1. That the facts charged do not constitute the crime of qualified theft, there
being no offended party, Aluk Logging Corporation being neither a timber lessee or
licensee;
2. That the pretended owner, Arsenio Lukang, has no timber license to
operate in Mauban, Quezon;
3. That the information is defective is it does not describe the "situs" of the
offense with particularity, defendant Ramon S. Reyes being a timber licensee in
Mauban, Quezon. 5
On September 29, 1975, the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon filed an opposition to
private respondent's quashal arguing that:
1) the information is sufficient in form and substance and that there is a
specific offended party;
2) the place of the commission of the offense is sufficiently described;
3) the allegation that Ramon S. Reyes is a timber licensee over the forest zone
in question is a matter of defense and evidentiary in nature that should be proven
during the trial;
4) the motion to quash was filed after the arraignment of the accused and,
therefore, said accused should be considered as having waived all objections which
are grounds for a motion to quash. 6
The provincial fiscal of Quezon prayed that the prosecution be allowed to amend
the information by replacing the word "Corporation" with the word "Operation,"
being a typographical error committed by oversight. 7
On October 9, 1975, the private respondents filed their reply reiterating the
grounds stated in their motion to quash. 8
The respondent court, in its assailed order dated October 24, 1975, quashed the
information for failure to conform substantially to the prescribed form 9 under Sec.
3(d) Rule 117, specifically the failure to state the name of the offended patty an
embodied in See. 11, Rule 110 of the Old Rules of Criminal Procedure.
85
In quashing the information, respondent judge reasoned that the prosecuting
fiscal's categorical admission that the State and not Aluk Logging Corp. was the
offended party was fatal to the information. Such admission by the fiscal deviated
from the allegations of the information which affected not only its form but also its
substance. The court held that such a defect in the designation of the name of the
offended party could not be cured by mere amendment in view of another claim by
one of the accused, Ramon S. Reyes, as the duly registered timber licensee. 10
As an additional reason for the quashal, the trial court also observed that Aluk
Logging Corp. was not a duly registered partnership or corporation and proceeded
to conclude that, necessarily, it had no capacity to become a lessee nor be a
registered holder of any timber license. 11
Hence, this petition.
Before us, petitioner assigns the following errors, to wit:
I This reasoning cannot be sustained.
The respondent court erred in ruling that the information filed against the private
respondents in Criminal Case No. 380 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch V, does not charge an offense for failure to cite the State as offended party
and complainant.
II
The respondent Court erred in quashing the information on the basis of the said
alleged defect.
The resolution of this case hinges on the determination of whether or not the
information for qualified theft properly charges an offense due to its failure to
allege the proper offended party therein.
As early as 1916, this Court in the case of U.S. v. Pablo, 12 said:
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one or the attributes that by
a natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common
will of the members or society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the
community, the individual and social rights and the liberties or every citizen and the
guaranty or the exercise of his rights.
From this decision, we deduce that all criminal actions must be commenced either
by a "complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against
all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved" 13 Thus, while
the offended party is authorized to initiate proceedings, the prosecution is required
to be in the name of the People of the Philippines whose peace, in legal theory, has
been breached.
In the present case, the above rule was complied with when the criminal action for
qualified theft under Presidential Decree No. 330 was instituted by the provincial
fiscal in the name of the People of the Philippines. 14
Despite such compliance with the rules, the lower court found the information to
be defective in form and substance because "nowhere in the information is cited
any damage or prejudice caused to the State." The lower court reasoned out that
since the fiscal admitted that it is the State which is the actual offended party and
not Aluk Logging Corporation (or Operation) as alleged in the information, the
evidence of the prosecution would be at variance with the allegations in the
information. 15
Again what is important, as required by the Rules, is that in criminal action the
complaint or information shall be in writing in the name of the People of the
Philippines...16 The rules do not require that the State be specifically mentioned in
the body of the information as an offended party. It is sufficient that the People of
the Philippines appear in the caption of the information to emphasize that penal
laws of the State have been violated. For indeed, a crime is an offense against the
State.
Proceeding now to the main issue, we rule that it was error for the lower court to
dismiss the information. The information was already sufficient in form and
substance. The argument that it was fatal for the prosecution not to have alleged
the State as the offended party is without merit for in the case of Sayson v. People,
17 in construing Sec. 11 of Rule 110 (now See. 12, Rules of Court of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure), we have clearly held that in offenses against property, the
designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable as
long as the original act charged in the complaint or information can be properly
Identified. 18
Indeed, the crime of qualified theft under Presidential Decree No. 330 was
described with particularity in the information as to properly identify the offense
charged. Hence, the erroneous allegation as to the person injured is deemed
immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which does not tend to prejudice
any substantial right of the defendant. 19
86
On the other hand, the amendment sought by heroin petitioner changing the word
"Corporation" to "Operation" such that "Aluk Logging Corporation" would read
"Aluk Logging Operation" is merely formal. Even private respondents alternately
used the words "corporation" and "operation" in their pleadings. 20 Thus, it was
not surprising that this formal defect was glossed over by the lower court.

WHEREFORE, the Order dated October 24, 1975 in hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the case is REMANDED to the lower court for immediate disposition on the
merits.

87
G.R. No. L-51745 October 28, 1988
RAMON F. SAYSON, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Federico P. Roy for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision finding him guilty of
attempted estafa.
On March 25, 1972, an information for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of a
Commercial Document was filed against the herein petitioner, Ramon F. Sayson
before the Court of First Instance of Manila, the pertinent portion of which reads:
... the said accused having come in possession of a blank US dollar check
#605908142, with intent to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously forge and falsify or cause to be
forged and falsified the said check, by then and there writing or filling or causing to
be written or filled up the following words and figures: "March 10, 1972," "Atty.
Norberto S. Perez," "2,250.00" and forging the signature of the Asst. Cashier,
Manager of the Bank of America, Dania Branch, making it appear, as it did appear,
that the said check was duly issued by the Bank of America, when in truth and in
fact, as the accused well knew, the said check was never issued nor authorized by
the said bank; that thereafter, said accused wrote or affixed the signature
"Norberto Perez" on the back of said check as indorser; that once the said cheek
had been forged and falsified in the manner above described, the said accused by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which he made to
Ernesto Rufino, Sr. that he is "Atty. Norberto Perez" who is the payee of the said
Check, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing
the said Ernesto Rufino, Sr. to change said dollar cheek, as in fact, said Ernesto
Rufino, Sr. issued Manufacturer's Bank Check No. 87586 dated March 22, 1972
payable to "Norberto Perez" in the amount of "Pl 4,850.00" in exchange for said
dollar check; ... [Rollo, pp. 23-24.]
Arraigned on December 8, 1972, petitioner pleaded not guilty. On October 9, 1974,
after several postponements, the prosecution rested its case. At the hearing of
December 9, 1974, when the defense was scheduled to present its evidence, only
the petitioner appeared. He said that his counsel had another case in a different
court. In the morning of the said day, his lawyer also sent a telegram to the court
requesting cancellation of the hearing because he was sick. The court denied the
motion for postponement and the case was considered submitted for decision
without petitioner's evidence.
The trial court rendered judgment on January 30, 1975, finding the accused guilty of
the crime charged and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 6 years of prison correccional to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed but
modified the penalty by imposing six months of arresto mayor and eliminating the
fine. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The background facts as found by the appellate court as well as its conclusions
thereon follow:
On March 22, 1972, appellant Ramon Sayson y Fernandez was introduced by
Vicente Jaucian a former employee of the Luzon Theatres, Inc. to Anselmo Aquiling,
private secretary to Ernesto Rufino, Sr., General Manager of the corporation.
Vicente Jaucian had known appellant as "Fiscal Perez" who wanted to exchange
dollars for pesos, having been introduced to him in that capacity by his (Jaucian's)
cousin. Thinking that Rufino might be interested in dollars, Jaucian accompanied
appellant to the offices of the Luzon Theatres, Inc. and Mever Films, Inc. at the
Avenue Hotel on Rizal Avenue, Manila. Upon being introduced to Anselmo Aquiling,
appellant showed the latter an Identification card indicating that he was Norberto
S. Perez, a Prosecuting Attorney from Angeles City. After making the introduction,
Jaucian left. Mr. Rufino said that he was not personally interested in dollars but
suggested to his secretary to inquire if Mever Films, Inc. needed dollars.
Mr. Rufino was also Chairman of the Board of the aforesaid corporation; and when
told that Mever Films needed dollars, he authorized the transaction. Appellant then
presented to Edgar Mangona, the assistant accountant of Mever Films, a Bank of
America check in the amount of $2,250,00 payable to the order of Atty. Norberto S.
Perez, a xerox copy of which was introduced in evidence as Exhibit E. Actually,
Exhibit E appears to be a bill of exchange or draft drawn by the Dania, Florida
Branch of the Bank of America on its San Francisco Branch in favor of said payee
and bears serial number 605908142. Edgar Mangona prepared a check of the
Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Company in the amount of P14,850.00 at the
exchange rate of P6.60 to a dollar (Exh. B). He then walked over to the office of Mrs.
Teresita Rufino Litton whom he asked to sign the check and thereafter Mangona
asked Mr. Rufino to countersign it. Finally, the check was exchanged with
appellant's Bank of America draft and the latter signed the voucher for the peso
check.
88

On the same day, March 22, 1972, appellant repaired to the Tayuman Branch of the
Banco Filipino and informed its Branch Manager, Mrs. Maria Fe Relova that he
wanted to open a savings account. He was given an application form which he filled
up with the name Norberto S. Perez as the applicant, among other things. Appellant
then presented the Manufacturer 's Bank check Exhibit B, payable to the order of
Norberto S. Perez, and after endorsing the same, it was posted in the passbook
issued to him. Unknown to appellant, however, Mrs. Relova, an astute woman had
been auspicious of the former's actuations. So that after he left, she called up the
office of the PLDT and inquired if the telephone number which appellant had
unsolicitedly given her was listed in Perez' name. She was told that the number
referred to had not yet been issued by PLDT. She then telephoned the office of
Mever Films, Inc., the drawer of the check, and inquired if the check was in fact
issued by it and she was answered in the affirmative. Despite this assurance, she
tested her suspicions further by sending out a bank employee to deliver a brochure
to the address given by appellant and the messenger returned without locating the
place.
Within a short time, the officials of the Mever Films, Inc. became doubtful of the
genuineness of the Bank of America draft. And on March 24, 1972, two days after
the issuance of the Manufacturer's Bank check and one day after the check was
cleared with the Central Bank, Mever Films which was convinced that the draft was
spurious ordered its payment stopped (Exhibit D). On the same day, Vicente Jaucian
who had introduced appellant to Anselmo Aquiling and the latter himself went to
the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and there gave written
statements on what they knew about appellant (Exhibits F and G). Also on the same
day, the Assistant Manager of the Bank of America, Manila Branch, who must have
been informed of the transaction involving the draft, addressed a letter to the NBI
authorities (Exh. B) which reads:
Gentlemen:
This is to certify that U.S. Dollar draft No. 605908142 drawn on the Bank of America
NT & SA, San Francisco, in favor of Atty. Norberto S. Perez for $2,250.00 and dated
March 10, 1972, is one of the blank drafts surreptitiously taken from a shipment
sent to us by our San Francisco Headquarters sometime in the latter part of 1970.
Issuance of the above-mentioned draft was not authorized by this bank.
Jose R. Lopez, the abovementioned assistant manager who issued the aforestated
certification, testified that the draft in question was one of the 900 blank drafts
which were missing from a shipment received from their head office in the United
States sometime in 1971. He declared that the words "Dania Branch" and "Dania,
Florida" appearing on the face of the draft were superimposed so as to make it
appear that the draft was drawn by the Dania, Florida Branch of the Bank of
America on the San Francisco Branch, when in fact the blank draft was for the
exclusive use of the Manila Branch, as revealed by the first four code figures of the
draft's serial number.
We are satisfied with Lopez' testimony that the draft in question was a forgery.
Since the same was a blank draft appertaining to the Manila Branch of the Bank of
America, of which he was the Assistant Manager, Lopez was competent to state
whether or not the draft was a forgery. And the fact that appellant had openly and
falsely represented himself to be Atty. Norberto S. Perez indicated in the forged
draft as the payee, is a strong circumstantial evidence that he was instrumental in
its forgery. [Rollo, p. 25-30.]
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant has raised the issue of due process, alleging denial of his right to be
heard and to present evidence. This requires inquiry into the extent of the rights
accorded an accused in a criminal case and whether the accused-appellant has been
denied the rights to which he is entitled.
The right to be heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights of
the accused. But while the accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel
and to present evidence for his defense by direct constitutional grant, such right is
not exempt from the rule on waiver as long as the waiver is not controverted to
law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law [Article 6, Civil Code.] There is nothing in the
Constitution nor in any law prohibiting such waiver. Accordingly, denial of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been
made, as in this case.
Petitioner claims though that he was not waiving such right; on the contrary, he was
vigorously asserting his right to be heard by counsel and to present evidence in his
verbal motion for postponment due to absence of his counsel de parte. He thus
assails the denial of his motion as it in effect deprived him of his day in court.
It is too well established to require citation of authorities that the grant or refusal of
an application for continuance or postponement of the trial lies within the sound
discretion of the court. Justice Malcolm, in a 1919 decision, expounded on such
judicial discretion as follows:
Applications for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In
this respect, it may be said that the discretion which the trial court exercises must
89
be judicial and not arbitrary. It is the guardian of the rights of the accused as well as
those of the people at large, and should not unduly force him to trial nor for fight
causes jeopardize the rights and interests of the public. Where he consideration--
that it to be necessary for the more perfect attainment of justice, it has the power
upon the motion of either party to continue the case. But a party charged with a
crime has no natural or inalienable right to a continuance.
The ruling of the court will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear
abuse of discretion. When the discretion of the court is exercised with a reasonable
degree of judicial acumen and fairness, it is one which the higher co is loathe to
review or disturb. The trial judge must be to a certain extent free to secure speedy
and expeditious trials when such speed and expedition are not inconsistent with
fairness. Since the court trying the case is, from personal observation, familiar with
all the attendant circumstances, and has the best opportunity of forming a correct
opinion upon the case presented, the presumption will be in favor of its action. It
would take an extreme case of abuse of discretion to make the action of the trial
court a denial of due process. (Emphasis supplied; U.S. v. Ramirez, 39 Phil. 738
(1919).]
The factual background of the case penned by Justice Malcolm, which was quoted
with approval in the case of People v. Mendez [G.R. No. L-27348, July 29, 1969, 28
SCRA 880], is very similar to that of the case at bar. In the instant case, the
information was filed on March 25,1972 and arraignment was held on December
8,1973. The prosecution started presenting its evidence on March 12,1973 and
after 1 year, 10 months and 1 day from the day of arraignment, it rested its case.
During this time, petitioner had already secured seven postponements, which it
admitted in its brief filed with the Court of Appeals [Rollo, p. 20] thus prompting the
trial judge to remark that "this is a notoriously postponed case' and that "the
defense had abused the rules" [TSN, December 12,1973, pp. 2-3.]. Since the judge's
comments were home out by the record regarding the postponements which were
admitted by petitioner himself in his brief filed before the Court of Appeals,
petitioner cannot rightfully cast aspersion on the integrity of said judge by
attributing to him a non-existent attitude of bias and hatred toward the petitioner-
accused.
No grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for postponement
can be imputed to the trial court. First, the petitioner's motion was not seasonably
filed as the three-day notice required by the rules (Rule 15, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court) was not complied with. Moreover, it was not accompanied by an
affidavit nor a medical certificate to support the alleged illness of counsel,
controverted to what Rule 22, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 5. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for illness of party or counsel.—A
motion to postpone trial on the ground of illness of a party or counsel may be
granted if it appears upon affidavit that the presence of such party or counsel at the
trial is indispensable and that the character of his illness is such as to render his
non-attendance excusable.
Besides, when petitioner himself sought postponement of the case during the
December 9 hearing, he claimed that his counsel had another case in a different
court. Certainly, the conflicting stories advanced by petitioner and his counsel only
indicate the lack of a good cause for the postponement.
Petitioner's lament that 'at least, in the name of justice and fair play, the trial court
should have warned accused that no further postponements shall be entertained by
the court' [Rollo p. 97] is baseless. As he was aware that the case had already been
postponed seven times at his initiative, he had no right to assume that his motion
would be granted; rather, he should have foreseen that any further motions for
postponement might not be met with approval by the trial court. Besides, the
record of the case clearly shows that the accused had repeatedly appeared in court
without his counsel, seeking postponements which were liberally granted by the
court with an order directing his counsel to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt for repeated failure to appear at the trial of the case. In fact, the court,
in its Order dated August 1 2, 1974, categorically declared: "In the meantime, let
the trial of this case be DEFINITELY POSTPONED FOR THE LAST TIME to August 14,
1974 at 8:30 a.m. as previously scheduled, with the warning to the accused to be
ready with his present counsel or another counsel on said date as the court will not
entertain any further delays in the proceedings in this case and shall proceed with
the trial of this case with or without his counsel." [Original Records, p. 430]. This,
certainly, was enough warning.
Finally, the motion for postponement was properly denied inasmuch as the
defendant failed to present any meritorious defense. This Court's
pronouncement—that in incidents of this nature before the trial court, two
circumstances should be taken into account, namely, 1) the reasonableness of the
postponement and 2) the merits of the case of the movant should not be lightly
ignored [Udan v. Amon G.R. No. L-24288, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 837.] There may
be an accident, surprise or excusable neglect justifying postponement or
reconsideration but if the movant does not present a meritorious claim or defense,
denial of his motion for postponement may not be considered as an abuse of the
discretion of the court.[De Cases v. Peyer G.R. No. L-18564, August 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
11 65.]
Absent any meritorious case in defendant's favor, his motion for postponement was
properly denied. His invocation of his right to counsel and to present evidence was
90
an empty gesture revealing his dilatory scheme. Under the circumstances, the
petitioner must be deemed to have waived his rights and to have been extended
the protection of due process.
Moreover, the petitioner in negotiating the check presented himself as a lawyer; he
was addressed in the Notice of the Order dated September 11, 1972 as "Atty.
Ramon Sayson y Fernandez" [Original Records, p. 381 and he himself filed the
Motion to Quash [Original Records, p. 22] and a pleading captioned "Compliance"
dated December 2, 1972 [Original Records, p. 41.] These facts indicate that he was
capable of defending himself That he himself was allowed to file pleadings clearly
negatives the alleged deprivation of his right to due process of law. Consequently,
there being no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, its order will not be
disturbed.
The Court finds the petitioner's plea that it was incumbent upon the trial judge to
appoint a counsel de oficio who for him when he appeared without his counsel
utterly without legal basis. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio
when the accused has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of
one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment (Rule 116, Section 6, Revised
Rules of Court This is no longer so where the accused has proceeded with the
arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his choice but when the time for the
presentation of the evidence for the defense has arrived, he appears by himself
alone and the absence of his counsel was inexcusable. This Court's holding in a
previous case that there is no deprivation of the light to counsel in such a case is
squarely applicable:
As the appellant was represented by counsel of his choice at the arraignment, trial
and in the incidental motions to dismiss and to postpone the resumption of the trial
of the case, the trial court was not in duty bound to appoint a counsel de oficio to
assist him in his defense. His failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the
hearing of the case, notwithstanding repeated postponements and warnings that
failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver on the part of the appellant to
present his evidence and the case would be deemed submitted for decision upon
the evidence presented by the prosecution, was sufficient legal justification for the
trial court to proceed and render judgment upon the evidence before it. Taking into
consideration all the steps taken by the trial court to safeguard the rights of the
appellant, the latter cannot pretend that he was deprived of his right to be assisted
by counsel and to present evidence in his behalf. Moreover, the repeated failure of
the appellant to appear with counsel at the resumptions of the trial of the case may
be taken as a deliberate attempt on his part to delay the proceedings. [People vs.
Angco, 103 Phil. 33, 39 (1958).]
At the most, the appointment of a counsel de oficio in situations like the present
case is discretionary with the trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with
in the absence of abuse. Here, the trial court had been liberal in granting the
postponements secured by the petitioner himself, at the same time admonishing
the latter to be ready with his present counsel or another counsel [Original Records,
p. 430]. Notwithstanding this admonition, the petitioner kept on attending the
hearings without securing another lawyer to substitute his present counsel who
was constantly absent during the hearings. Still, as admitted by petitioner in his
memorandum, the trial court, at the December 9, 1974 hearing, allowed him to
look for a lawyer but no one was available at the time (Rollo, p. 94). These steps
undertaken by the trial court removes any doubt that its order was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
The last issue to be resolved dwells on the effect of the alleged variance between
the prosecution's allegation and proof.
The petitioner vigorously maintains that he cannot be justifiably convicted under
the information charging him of attempting to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or
Bank of America because the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution
show very clearly that the accused allegedly attempted to defraud Mever Films,
Inc., a corporate entity entirely separate and distinct from Ernesto Rufino, Sr. He
firmly asserts that his conviction was in gross violation of his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Petitioner's claim is unavailing. The rule in this jurisdiction is that "variance between
the allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution in
support thereof does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal." [People v.
Catli G.R. No. L-11641, November 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 642.]
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the
name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed or any appellation or nickname by which such person has
been or is known and if there is no better way of Identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court;
now Rule 110, Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of
offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not
absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly Identified. Thus, Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of
Court provides that:
Section 11. Name of the offended party-
xxx xxx xxx
91
(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is
unknown, the property, subject matter of the offense, must be described with such
particularity as to properly Identify the particular offense charged.

(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person against whom or
against whose property the offense was committed is disclosed or ascertained, the
court must cause the true name to be inserted in the complaint or information or
record.

xxx xxx xxx

In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down the rule that when an
offense shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to
Identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed
immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any
substantial right of the defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which
had a factual backdrop similar to the instant case, where the defendant was
charged with estafa for the misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant which he
had cashed without authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the
effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the cheque, when
in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held to be
immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the warrant, was
described in the complaint with such particularity as to properly Identify the
particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against
property under the Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-
matter of the offense, was described with such particularity as to properly identify
the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the accused,
that it was established during the trial that the offended party was actually Mever
Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is hereby DENIED and

the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto with costs against the
appellant.

SO ORDERED.

92
G.R. No. L-12453 July 15, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO LAHOYLAHOY and MARCOS MADANLOG, defendants-appellants.
W. A. Kincaid for appellants.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This case is submitted to the Supreme Court for review of a decision of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, sentencing the defendants Pedro Lahoylahoy
and Marcos Madanlog to death upon a complaint charging the crime of robbery
with multiple homicide under the circumstances stated below.
It appears that in the year 1912 some ten or a dozen people were living on the
small island of Sicogon, in the jurisdiction of the municipality of Balasan, Province of
Iloilo. Two of these were an aged couple named Francisco Seran and his wife Juana.
Two others were Roman Estriba and his wife Rosa. The latter couple had two
children Miguela and Bartolome, aged at that time respectively about 14 and 9
years. Upon the night of the commission of the crime charged in the complaint the
two children were staying with Juana, their grandmother, in a house some distance
removed from that occupied by Roman and Rosa and located farther back from the
shore. The grandfather, Francisco, had gone to the beach as was his custom to
watch for turtles. After the grandmother and the children had gone to rest on a mat
where they slept together, and probably only a short while after it had become
dark, the two accused appeared and demanded money of Juana. She gave them
P100 in money in response to this demand, and the accused then required the
three to leave the house and go in the direction of the sea. When the party had
arrived at or near the beach, a further demand was made upon the old woman for
money, which demand she was unable to comply with. Lahoylahoy then struck her
with a bolo just below her breast, killing her instantly. The two children were at the
time close to their grandmother, and being greatly frightened, they ran away
separately for some distance and remained hidden during the night in the bushes.
The next morning the children made their way to the house where the old couple
had lived, which was vacant; but they there found each other and proceeded
together to the house of their parents. Going in that direction they stopped at the
house of their sister, the wife of the defendant Madanlog. When they went a little
later to the house where their parents had lived, the fact was revealed that
Francisco, Roman, and Rosa had also been killed. All the bodies were collected and
buried early in the morning by the two accused, assisted by Eugenio Tenedero, son-
in-law of Lahoylahoy. The two children Miguela and Bartolome say that they were
threatened with death if they should make complaint. Nevertheless their lives were
spared, and for sometime they stayed with their sister in the home of Madanlog;
and after staying for a long time on the island, they were afterwards taken to the
home of another sister, named Dionisia Estriba, at Escalante, on the Island of Panay.
They here revealed the facts above narrated. This sister, Dionisia, afterwards filed
the complaint in this case. Pedro Lahoylahoy was arrested first; and when he was
examined before the justice of the peace, he made a confession in which he stated
that the four deceased persons had been killed by Madanlog, with is assistance.
At the trial the two children gave a very consistent account of the robbery and of
the murder of their grandmother; but the boy said that he did not remember that
Madanlog was present when Lahoylahoy struck the fatal blow. Another important
witness for the prosecution was Eugenio Tenedero, the son-in-law of Lahoylahoy.
This witness testified that the defendants killed the four deceased persons, and that
early in the morning they came to his house and required him to help them bury
the dead, which he did. The accused gave no explanation to Tenedero of their
motive or of the reason for the commission of the deed, and told him not to tell
anybody. During the next day or two after the tragedy above narrated, the
defendant Madanlog went to the house where Francisco and Juana had lived and
carried away some palay, some dawa, three pigs, and a trunk containing wearing
apparel. We believe that the asportation of these things should not be considered
as a continuation of the acts of robbery and murder previously committed, but
rather as a spoliation of the state of a deceased person. It results that the only
property taken in the act of robbery was the P100 obtained from Juana.
As against Madanlog, the case rests chiefly upon the testimony of Miguela, who
says he was present at the robbery and at the murder of Juana. His guilt is also
indicated by his own conduct subsequent to the murder. We are satisfied with the
conclusion reached by the lower court with respect to the sufficiency of the
evidence, and we have no doubt of the guilt of both the accused.
An important question arises upon the matter of the complaint in connection with
the proof as to the ownership of the property which was taken by the accused. The
part of the complaint here material to be considered reads as follows:
The aforesaid accused taking advantage of the darkness of the night, voluntarily,
illegally, and criminally and by means of force on the things, took and appropriated
to themselves with intent of gain and against the will of the owner thereof, the sum
of P100, 5 bayones of palay, 4 bayones of dawa, and 1 trunk which contained
various wearing apparel, of the total value of P150, the property of Roman Estriba;
in consequence thereof and on the occasion of the said robbery, the aforesaid
93
accused criminally and with known premeditation and treachery, killed Roman
Estriba, Rosa Galoso, Francisco Seran, and Juana.
According to the proof the person robbed was Juana; while the complaint charges
that the property taken belong to Roman Estriba. What is the effect of this variance
between the language of the complaint and the proof? Subsection 5 of section 6 of
General Orders No. 58 declares that a complaint or information shall show, among
others things, the names of the persons against whom, or against whose property,
the offense was committed, if known. The complaint in this case therefore properly
contained an averment as to the ownership of the property; and upon principle, in
charging the crime of robbery committed upon the person, the allegation of the
owner's name is essential. But of course if his name cannot be ascertained, it may
be alleged that it is unknown.
From the fact that the name of the injured person may, in case of necessity, be
alleged as unknown it should not be inferred that the naming of such person, when
known, is of no importance. Where the name of the injured party is necessary as
matter of essential description of the crime charged, the complaint must invest
such person with individuality by either naming him or alleging that his name is
unknown. (Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice, 9th ed., secs. 111, 112.) It is
elementary that in crimes against property, ownership must be alleged as matter
essential to the proper description of the offense.
To constitute larceny, robbery, embezzlement, obtaining money by false pretenses,
malicious mischief, etc., the property obtained must be that of another, and
indictments for such offenses must name the owner; and a variance in this respect
between the indictment and the proof will be fatal. It is also necessary in order to
identify the offense. (Clark's Criminal Procedure, p. 227. See also page 338.)
Now a complaint charging the commission of the complex offense of robbery with
homicide must necessarily charge each of the component offenses with the same
precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate
complaints. It is well recognized in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is
charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component
offenses the defendant can be convicted of the other. The mere circumstance that
the two crimes are so related as to constitute one transaction in no way affects the
principles of pleading involved in the case. To permit a defendant to be convicted
upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof shows that he robbed an
entirely different person, when the first was not present, is violative of the
rudimentary principles of pleading; and in addition, is subject to the criticism that
the defendant is thereby placed in a position where he could not be protected from
a future prosecution by a plea of former conviction or acquittal. If we should convict
or acquit these defendants today of the robbery which is alleged to have been
committed upon the property of Roman Estriba, it is perfectly clear that they could
be prosecuted tomorrow for robbery committed upon the property of Juana; and
the plea of former jeopardy would be of no avail.
Reference to a few accredited decisions from American courts will make this clear.
In Comm. vs. Hoffman (121 Mass., 369), it was held that an acquittal on an
indictment for breaking and entering the dwelling house and stealing therein, the
property of A, is no bar to a complaint for stealing in the same dwelling house at the
same time the property of B, without proof that A and B are the same persons.
In Comm. vs. Andrews (2 Mass., 409), the defendant in an indictment for receiving
stolen goods which were the property of A, alleged that he had been convicted of
receiving stolen goods the property of B. The plea was adjudged insufficient,
although it was alleged that the two parcels of stolen goods were received by the
defendant of the same person, at the same time, and in the same package, and that
the act of receiving them was one and the same.
In Alexander vs. State (21 Tex. Cr. App., 406; 57 Am. Rep., 617), it was held that
where the goods of two different owners were stolen at the same time, an acquittal
on an indictment for stealing the goods of one would not constitute a bar to an
indictment for stealing the goods of the other; though it was observed that if the
defendant had been convicted upon the first trial, he would have been protected
from the second prosecution. (See Wright vs. State, 17 Tex. Cr. App., 152.)
In Comm. vs. Wade (17 Pick. [Mass.], 395), the offense of burning a building was
charged, and the indictment stated that the owner was a certain individual (naming
him). It was held that, although the name might possibly have been omitted
altogether, yet as the indictment did allege the name, the allegation of ownership
was material, being descriptive of the offense, and must be proved.
It should be borne in mind that the plea of former conviction or acquittal, or former
jeopardy, is supposed to be proved by the pleadings and judgment in the former
case, supplemented only by proofs showing the identity of the party, or parties.
Courts are not accustomed to determine the plea of former jeopardy by examining
the proof to discover just what facts may have been developed in the former case.
(Henry vs. State, 33 Ala., 389; Grisham vs. State, 19 Tex. Cr. App., 504.) In fact it is
not always practicable or even possible to produce for inspection upon the trial of
this issue the evidence which was adduced in court at the trial of the former case.
The second sentence of section 7 of General Orders No. 58 declares that when an
offense shall have been described with sufficient certainty to identify the act, an
erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial. We are
94
of the opinion that this provision can have no application to a case where the name
of the person injured is matter of essential description as in the case at bar; and at
any rate, supposing the allegation of ownership to be eliminated, the robbery
charged in this case would not be sufficiently identified. A complaint stating, as
does the one now before us, that the defendants "took and appropriated to
themselves with intent of gain and against the will of the owner thereof the sum of
P100" could scarcely be sustained in any jurisdiction as a sufficient description
either of the act of robbery or of the subject of the robbery. There is a saying to the
effect that money has no earmarks; and generally speaking the only way money,
which has been the subject of a robbery, can be described or identified in a
complaint is by connecting it with the individual who was robbed as its owner or
possessor. And clearly, when the offense has been so identified in the complaint,
the proof must correspond upon this point with the allegation, or there can be no
conviction.
In United States vs. Kepner (1 Phil. Rep., 519), this court had before it a case where
the defendant was charged with estafa in the misappropriation of the proceeds of a
warrant which he had cashed without authority. It was said that the erroneous
allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice
of the owner of the check, when in reality the bank, which cashed the warrant was
the sufferer, was immaterial. This observation was, we think, correct as applied to
that case, for the act constituting the offense of estafa was described in the
complaint with sufficient fullness and precision to identify the act, regardless of the
identity of the offended person. Section 7, General Orders No. 58, was therefore
properly applicable. It should be added, however, that the observation to which
reference has been made was, strictly speaking, unnecessary to the decision, for it
is further stated in the opinion that there was in fact an injury to the owner of the
check, which consisted of the "delay, annoyance, and damage caused by the
unlawful misappropriation of the warrant." (U.S. vs. Kepner, 1 Phil. Rep., 519, 526.)
There is evidently nothing in the case cited which can afford support for the idea
that an erroneous allegation in a complaint as to ownership of the property robbed
is immaterial. If we should hold that a man may be convicted of robbing one person
when he is charged with robbing another, the complaint instead of being a means
of informing him of the particular offense with which he is charged would rather
serve as a means of concealing it.
It is important to note that the complaint in this case is not defective in form, for
the charge is clear, direct, and unambiguous. No formal objection could possibly be
made by the defendants to this complaint; and their only course, if desirous of
making any defense, was to plead not guilty, as was done in this case. The difficulty
of the case arises from the facts adduced in evidence. Section 10, General Orders
No. 58, declares that no complaint is insufficient by reason of a detect in matter of
form which does not tend to prejudice a substantial right of the defendant upon the
merits. This provision has no application to such a case as that now before us; and
all arguments based upon the circumstance that the defendants made no objection
to the complaint in the Court of First Instance are irrelevant to the matter in hand.
The case of United States vs. Manalang (2 Phil., Rep., 64) has been called to our
attention as an authority upon the point that insufficiency of a complaint is waived
by failure of the defendant to object thereto in the Court of First Instance. It there
appeared that the statutory offense with which the defendant was charged could
only be committed by a Constabulary officer. There was no allegation in the
complaint that the defendant was such; but he appeared at the trial, testified in his
own behalf, without questioning his character as such officer. It was held upon
appeal that the objection to the complaint on the ground stated was unavailing, "as
no exception was taken to this defect by counsel for the defendant in the court
below, in which it might have been successfully raised by demurrer."
The following cases are also found in our Reports, showing that a complaint may be
held sufficient although the commission of the offense is charged by inference only,
provided no objection is made in the court below. (U.S. vs. Cajayon, 2 Phil. Rep.,
570; U.S. vs. Vecina, 4 Phil. Rep., 529; U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 566.) In all of
these cases the complaint was demurrable for defect of substance, but the
language used was so far sufficient that the commission of the crime could be
inferred. These cases are not relevant to the case at bar, as the complaint is not
demurrable for defect of any sort.
In the light of what has been said it is evident that, by reason of the lack of
conformity between the allegation and the proof respecting the ownership of the
property, it is impossible to convict the two accused of the offense of robbery
committed by them in this case; and therefore they cannot be convicted of the
complex offense of robbery with homicide, penalized in subsection (1) of article 503
of the Penal Code. No such difficulty exists, however, with respect to the quadruple
homicide committed upon the persons named in the complaint; and in conformity
with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code, the penalties corresponding to
all these crimes must be severely imposed. This court has already held in United
States vs. Balaba (37 Phil. Rep., 260), that where more than one offense (not
complex offenses) are charged in the complaint, and the accused fails to demur or
ask for a severance, the penalties corresponding to all of the offenses which are
charged and proved may be imposed. The doctrine announced in that case applies
with even greater propriety offenses in one complaint. (See sec. 11, General Orders
No. 58.)
The acts causing the violent death of the four deceased must be qualified as
homicide, as the record does not satisfactorily show how and in what manner they
were executed.
95
Even conceding the benefits or article 11 of the Penal Code, this circumstance, as
regards both defendants is counterbalanced by the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place, and, as
respects Marcos Madanlog, by that of relationship by affinity. The accused Pedro
Lahoylahoy has accordingly become liable to four penalties, each of seventeen
years four months and one day, reclusion temporal, and his co-accused Marcos
Madanlog also, to the same number of penalties of twenty years each, reclusion
temporal, for the homicide of the four deceased, each also being liable to one-half
of the costs.

In view of rule 2 of article 88 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the maximum duration
of three times the length of the most severe of the penalties to be imposed upon
the accused exceeds forty years, the judgment reviewed is reversed, and we find
that each of the accused Lahoylahoy and Madanlog should be, as they are hereby,
sentenced to suffer of aforesaid penalties of reclusion temporal, not to exceed forty
years, to the accessories prescribed by article 59, to indemnify, severally and jointly,
the heirs of each of the deceased in the amount of P1,000 and each to pay one-half
of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

96
[G.R. No. L-8596. May 18, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. JULIANA UBA and CALIXTA
UBA, Defendants-Appellees.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal by the People against a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, absolving Juliana Uba and Calixta Uba of the offense of oral defamation
of which they are charged in an information filed by the provincial fiscal.
On August 1, 1952, Demetria Somod-ong filed a complaint in the justice of the
peace court of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, charging above-named Juliana and
Calixta Uba with having uttered in public against complainant certain defamatory
words and expressions. The complaint was supported by the affidavits of Pastora
Somod-ong, Marciano Calibog and Anacoreta Rocaldo. The court found the
existence of probable cause and forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance,
where the provincial fiscal filed the information charging the accused Juliana and
Calixta Uba of serious oral defamation. However, instead of mentioning the
complainant Demetria Somod-ong as the offended party, the information named
Pastora Somod-ong as the person offended.
When the case came for trial both Demetria and Pastora testified for the
prosecution. Demetria is the daughter of Pastora and when the latter testified she
declared that it was her daughter Demetria who was insulted by the accused. When
Demetria testified she declared the accused insulted her corroborating her
mother’s testimony. Two other witnesses testified that the accused insulted
Demetria Somod-ong calling her lascivious and a prostitute. When the prosecution
had rested, counsel for the accused promptly moved for the dismissal of the case
on the ground that all the defamatory statements supposed to have been uttered
by the accused were against Demetria, not against the offended party, Pastora. The
judge then ordered counsel for the parties to present the motion and the answer
thereto in writing which they did. The judge sustained the motion to dismiss and
entered decision acquitting the accused of the charge. Hence, this appeal.
The Solicitor General contends in this appeal that the trial court should have
ordered the fiscal to amend the information by changing the name of the offended
party so as to make it conform with the evidence. It is claimed that the change
would merely be one of form, permitted by Section 13 of Rule 106, which
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“SEC. 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the Defendant pleads;
chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of
form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the Defendant.
If it appears at any time before judgment that mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and
order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the Defendant
would not be place thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses
to give bail for their appearance at the trial.”
While it is probably true that the fiscal or his clerk made a clerical error in putting in
the information the name of Pastora Somod-ong instead of that of Demetria
Somod-ong, as the offended party, the mistake thus committed was on a very
material matter in the case, such that it necessarily affected the identification of the
act charged. The act of insulting X is distinct from a similar act of insult against Y,
even if the insult is preferred by the same person, in the same language and at
about the same time. Note that the pleading that give the court jurisdiction to try
the offense is not the complaint of the offended party, but the information by the
fiscal, because the charge is the utterance of insulting or defamatory language, not
the imputation of an offense which can be prosecuted only at the instance of the
offended party. (People vs. Marquez, 68 Phil., 521; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryBlanco vs. People, 70 Phil., 735.)
The case of Lahoylahoy, 38 Phil., 330, appears to us to be in point and decisive of
the case. The reasons for the decision in that case were, first, because, to convict a
person of robbing X when the person robbed is Y is violative of the principles of
pleading and, second, because then the plea of double jeopardy would be of no
avail to an accused. To this same effect is our decision in People vs. Balboa, 90 Phil.,
We, therefore, find that the court a quo did not err in dismissing the case for
variance between the allegations of the information and the proof. But the
evidence showed that the accused were guilty of another act, that of insulting
Demetria Somod-ong. The Court should have, therefore, ordered the fiscal to file
another information with Demetria Somod-ong as the offended party and hold the
accused in custody to answer the new charge.
The order of dismissal is hereby affirmed, but the provincial fiscal of Misamis
Occidental is hereby ordered to file a new information charging the same accused
97
with the offense of serious oral defamation against Demetria Somod-ong. Judgment
modified.

98
G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State
Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst.
City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as
having committed rebellion complexed with murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
The second information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully,
feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the
apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or
concealing him in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance
the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of
probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the
record.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of
respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis
of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile
liable for violation of PD No. 1829."
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to
Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal
basis; and
(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder
against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of
their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator
for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to
May 30, 1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in
refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:
I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed
meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the
"complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-
conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;
III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution
for all the component acts of rebellion;
IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1829;
V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred
by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until
otherwise directed by this Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately
charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed
against him.
99
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that
the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal
Code or a general law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez
(99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for
habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164,
June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long
standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and
subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the
Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the
Court, which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the
complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be
charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or
component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly
Section 1 (c) which states:
SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine
ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any
of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows,
or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under
existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and
accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989
in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile
allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And
because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and
conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the
affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who
stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers
attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the
evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads
that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully
armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby
concluded that:
In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were
fully armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December
coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge
constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation
under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution
(Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder
and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent
prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels
under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col.
Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged
act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the
crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the
single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v.
Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well
as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of
men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932).
Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though
crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion.
100
(People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958];
People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this
case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component
or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot
therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80
Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by
some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity
may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes
Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article
48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for
possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for
robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a
fugitive is punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the
Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution
under the other. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The
rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or
general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in
furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be
isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form
part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be
punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the
crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as
murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The
attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the
theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes
but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with
Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and
concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two separate crimes of
rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on
his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in
furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and
Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly
favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses, and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v.
Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded
guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for
illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:
An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the
accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the
crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a
separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in
the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further
now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30,
1990) where the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this
case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of
subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the
101
petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the
doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT
BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the
Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or
rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must make up its mind whether to
charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and
charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D.
1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder.
Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in
Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion
already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the
independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator

Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel
Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for
the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social
motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part
of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in
addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no
need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777
is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and
their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from
holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further
proceedings therein is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

102
G.R. No. L-8476 February 28, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABUNDIO ROMAGOSA alias DAVID, defendant-appellant.
Benedicto P. Bonifacio for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor General Jose
G. Bautista for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This appeal is related to the case of People vs. Federico Geronimo alias Comdr.
Oscar, et al., G.R. No. L-8936, decided by this Court on October 23, 1956 (100 Phil.,
90; 53 Off. Gaz. No. 1, 68).
Herein appellant Abundio Romagosa alias David was, in all information filed by the
Provincial Fiscal, accused in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur of the
complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, under three
counts that are the last three of the five counts charged against Federico Geronimo,
et al., in said case No. G.R. L-8936, supra:
That on or about May 28, 1946 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto and
continuously up to the present time in the province of Camarines Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and in other municipalities, cities
and provinces and other parts of the country where they have chosen to carry out
their rebellious activities, the above-named accused being then ranking officers
and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise
known as the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed force of said
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) having come to an agreement and decide
to commit the crime of Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together and
confederating among themselves with all of the thirty-one accused in criminal case
Nos. 14071, 14282, 14315, 14270, 15344 and with all the accused in criminal case
number 19166 of the Court of First Instance of Manila with the other members,
officers and/or affiliates of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan and with many others whose identities and whereabouts
are still unknown, acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance
thereof, and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, help support, promote, maintain, direct and/or command the
Hukbalahaps (HUKS) or the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB), to rise publicly
and take arms against the government of the Republic of the Philippines, or
otherwise participate in such public armed uprisings for the purpose of removing
the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws
thereof, as in fact the said Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or the
Hukbalahaps (HUKS) pursuant to such conspiracy, have risen publicly and taken
arms against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to attain said
purpose, by then and there making armed raids, sorties, and ambuscades, attacks
against the Philippine Constabulary, the civilian guards, the Police and the Army
Patrols and other detachments as well as upon innocent civilians, and as a
necessary means to commit the crime of Rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof, have then and there committed wanton acts of murder,
pillage, looting, plunder, kidnappings and planned destructions of private and public
property and plotted the liquidation of government officials, to create and spread
disorder, terror, confusion, chaos and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of
the aforesaid purpose, among which are follows to wit:
1. That on or about the years 1951 to 1952 in the municipality of, Pasacao,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, a group of Armed Huks under Commander Rustum
raided the house of one Nemesio Palo, a Police sergeant of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur and as a result, said HUKS were able to capture said Nemesio Palo and once
captured with evident premeditation, treachery and intent to kill, stab, shot and cut
the neck of said Nemesio Palo thereby causing the instantaneous death of Nemesio
Palo.
2. That on or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of Santa Rita, Del Gallego, Camarines
Sur a group of HMBS with Federico Geronimo alias Commander Oscar ambushed
and fired upon an Army Patrol headed by CPL Bayrante, resulting in seriously
wounding of PFC Pancracio Torrado and Eusebio Gruta, a civilian.
3. That on or about February 1954 at barrio Cotmo, San Fernando, Camarines Sur,
Abundio Romagosa, one of a group of four HMBS led by accused Commander Oscar
with evident premiditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed one Policarpio
Tipay, a barrio lieutenant.
As in the case of Federico Geronimo, appellant Romagosa, upon arraignment,
entered a plea of guilty to the information. In view of the voluntary plea of guilty,
the prosecution recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be imposed on
the accused, on the ground that the charge being a complex crime of rebellion with
murders, robberies, and kidnappings, the penalty provided for by law is the
maximum of the most serious crime which is murder. Counsel for the accused, on
the other hand, argued that the proper penalty imposable upon the accused was
only prision mayor, since there is no such complex crime as rebellion with murders,
robberies, and kidnappings, because the latter being the natural consequences of
the crime of rebellion, the crime charged against the accused should be considered
only as simple rebellion.
103
On October 13, 1954, the lower court rendered judgment finding accused
Romagosa guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappings; and giving him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay a
fine of P10,000; to indemnify the heirs of the two persons killed named in the
information, in the sum of P6,000 each; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.
From the judgment accused Romagosa appealed to this Court, insisting that there is
no crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, and that he should
have been convicted only of simple rebellion and imposed the penalty of prison
mayor in its minimum period, in view of his voluntary plea of guilty.
The question of whether there is a complex crime of rebellion with murder,
robbery, and kidnapping under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, is exactly the
same question raised and decided in the cases of People vs. Hernandez, et al., * 52
Off. Gaz., No. 11, 5506, and People vs. Geronimo, supra. None of the members of
this Court has found reason to change his respective stand on the matter as
expressed in the Geronimo case, wherein the majority of this Court held that where
the crimes of murders, robberies, and kidnappings are committed as a means to or
in furtherance of the rebellion charged, they are absorbed by, and form part and
parcel of, the rebellion, and that therefore, the accused can be convicted only of
the simple crime of rebellion. Consistently with that precedent, we hold that the
lower court erred in holding appellant Romagosa guilty of the complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, and in imposing upon him the
penalty for such crime.
The same majority of six justices of this Court maintain their view express in the
Geronimo case that by his plea of guilty, appellant has admitted the commission of
the independent crime of murder alleged in count 3 of the information, the
averment that said crime was perpetrated "in furtherance" of the rebellion being a
mere conclusion and not a bar to appellant's conviction and punishment for said
offense, appellant having failed, at the arraignment, to object to the information on
the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged. Therefore, appellant must be held
guilty, and sentenced for the commission, of two separate offenses, simple
rebellion and murder.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that appellant
Abundio Romagosa alias David is convicted of the crimes of simple rebellion and
murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, appellant is
sentenced for the rebellion: to suffer 8 years of prison mayor and to pay a fine of
P10,000 (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to Article 38 of the Revised
Penal Code), and for the murder: to an indeterminate sentence of not less than 10
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum and not more than 18 years of
reclusion temporal as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tipay in the
sum of P6,000 solidarily with Federico Geronimo, alias Commander Oscar, (G.R. No.
L-8936), and other adjudged guilty of having participated in the slaying of said
deceased; and to pay the costs. So ordered.

As in the Geronimo case, there is the further question of whether, in view of

appellant's plea of guilty to the information, he should be deemed to have admitted
the commission of the simple crime of rebellion alone, or of rebellion and other
separate crimes, if any of the counts of the information charges crimes independent
of and not constituting essential acts or ingredients of the rebellion charged. As
already stated, the three counts of the information against herein appellant
Romagosa are exactly the same as the last three of the five counts charged against
Federico Geronimo (G.R. No. L-8936). As ruled the majority in the preceding case,
the first count under the present information (the third count against Geronimo)
does not charge appellant's participation and can not, therefore, be taken into
consideration in this case; the second (the fourth count against Geronimo) alleges
essential act of rebellion and is absorbed by that crime; while the third (the fifth
count against Geronimo) charges the murder of one Policarpio Tipay, a barrio
lieutenant, which killing, though committed within the jurisdiction of the lower
court, does not appear to be related to the rebellion and hence constitutes an
independent offense in itself.

104
G.R. No. L-45772 March 25, 1988 One (1) white gold ring mounting 18 karats
One (1) white gold ring mounting 18 karats
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, One (1) yellow gold stud
vs. One (1) lady's white gold ring setting
Hon. EDUARDO MONTENEGRO, Presiding Judge, Branch IV-B, CFI Rizal, Quezon City; One (1) white gold ring mounting
ANTONIO CIMARRA, ULPIANO VILLAR, BAYANI CATINDIG, and AVELINO DE LEON, ne (1) pc. white gold earring mounting
respondents. Twelve (12) pcs. of semi-precious stone bands with one broken
Two (2) Ivory bracelets
One (1) Silver bracelets
PADILLA, J.: One (1) yellow ring gold with blue stone
Two (2) wedding gold rings yellow
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, One (1) Minolta pocket size camera
to set aside the order of the respondent court, dated 10 February 1977, denying One (1) pink handbag
petitioner's Motion to Admit Amended Information and the order, dated 22 One (1) bunch keys
February 1977, of the same court, denying the Motion for Reconsideration of said
earlier order. Upon arraignment on 25 October 1976, all of the accused (now private
respondents) entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge filed against them.
On 21 March 1977, the court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Accordingly, trial on the merits was scheduled by the respondent court. However,
respondent court from proceeding to hear and decide the case until further orders before the trial could proceed, the prosecuting fiscal filed a Motion to Admit
from the Court. Amended Information, dated 28 December 1976, seeking to amend the original
information by: (1) changing the offense charged from "Robbery" to "Robbery in an
The facts of the case are as follows: Uninhabited Place," (2) alleging conspiracy among all the accused, and (3) deleting
all items, articles and jewelries alleged to have been stolen in the original
On 20 September 1976, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, thru Assistant Fiscal Virginia Information and substituting them with a different set of items valued at
G, Valdez, filed an Information for "Roberry" before the Court of First Instance of P71,336.80 2 to wit:
Rizal, Branch IV-B, Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-6821, against
Antonio Cimarra, Ulpiano Villar, Bayani Catindig and Avelino de Leon. Said accused Four (4) pcs. of I.D. Plates
(now private respondents) were all members of the police force of Quezon City and 14 Karat yellow gold
were charged as accessories-after-the-fact in the robbery committed by the minor P 24.00 each
Ricardo Cabaloza, who had already pleaded guilty and had been convicted in Thirteen (13) pcs. of I.D.
Criminal Case No. QF-76-051 before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Plates KYG
Quezon City. Ricardo Cabaloza was convicted for the robbery of the same items, P 26.40 each
articles and jewelries belonging to Ding Velayo, Inc. valued at P 75,591.40 and Five (5) pcs. of anniversary
enumerated in the original information 1 against herein private respondents as: Pendant 14 KYG
P 17.00 each
One (1) Arminius revolver, cal. 22 with six ammo SN-165928 Three (3) pcs. of pendant w/
One (1) gold men's ring 'signet' birthstones 14 KYG
Five (5) ID plates yellow gold P 16.00 each
Four (4) ID plates yellow gold Two (2) pcs. of Signet plain
Six (6) bracelets lock yellow gold 14 Karat yello gold rings
One (1) anniversary pendant yellow gold P 204.00 each
Three (3) heart shape with assorted birthstones Four (4) pcs. of lady's bracelet,
One (1) lady's (ring) white gold setting 14 KYG oval shape
P 30.00 each
105
Four (4) pcs. of necklace 14 KYG One (1) pc. yellow gold ring w/ blue
P 140.00 each sapphire for children
One (1) set of ring & earrings P 150.00
mounting w/ 23 brills 14 KYG One (1) brown envelope, containing 2
Two (2) pcs. of ladies I.D. pairs of 1/g loop earrings,
bracelet 14 KYG 14 karat
120.00 each P 780.00
Nine (9) pcs. of diamond design Cash money (inside the said envelope)
earrings 14 KYG P 555.00
P 32.00 each One (1) pc. silver bracelet
Five (5) pcs. of Sput-nik cross P 50.00
4 KYG One (1) pc. bronze bracelet
P 99.00 each P 30.00
One (1) pc. of ladies ring One (1) pc. ring blue stone YG
mounting 14 KYG P 250.00
P 290.00 One (1) pc. Lapiz Lazuli band
One (1) pc. of lady's sole diamond ring, P 100.00
about .40ct w/ yellow gold One (1) pc. Coral band
ring mounting, and one pair P 30.00
of earrings white gold solo One (1) pc. ring w/ diamond stone,
diamond about .25ct w/ black 14 KWG mounting
onyx P 250.00
P 2,000.00 Two (2) pcs. of 14 YG part bracelet
One (1) pc. lady's bracelet 14 KYG
P 1,500.00
One (1) pc. chain 24KYG necklace P 200.00
w/ small diamond Three (3) pcs. of men's ring 14 KYG
P 1,500.00 P 1,500.00
One (1) pc. Lapiz Lazuli ring 14 KYG One (1) pc. pendant 14 KYG
P 1,000.00 P 2,000.00
One (1) pc. Lapiz Lazuli 18 KYG One (1) pc. loose diamond about
P 1,000.00 4.50 karats antigo
One (1) pc. Lady's ring w/ 2 Jade stone, P 27,000.00
white gold w/ small One (1) pc. loose diamond about
diamonds and one pc. 2.05 carats each antigo cut
lady's ring white gold, P 20,000.00
14 K w/ 2 small diamonds One (1) pc. Cannon camera w/
w/ one Jade black case
P 2,000.00 P 1,200.00
Six (6) pcs. of fancy chains and bracelets One (1) pc. Yashika camera w/
P 40.00 each lens cover
One (1) pair of yellow gold earrings w/ P 1,300.00
pearl for children One (1) pc. Cannon camera w/
P 70.00 black case
106
P 1,100.00
Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended Information. The
respondent court resolved to deny the proposed amendments contained in the
Amended Information in the previously referred to order dated 10 February 1977.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the respondent
court, on 22 February 1977, denied said motion; hence, this petition.
Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal
Procedure) may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the
charge. Thereafter and during the trial, amendments to the information may also
be allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights
of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint
or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. 3
On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original information, and which,
therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an
amendment to form that can be made at anytime. 4
The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, are
clearly substantial and have the effect of changing the crime charged from
"Robbery" punishable under Article 209 to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place"
punishable under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private
respondents-accused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty imposable for
the offense charged in the original information to which the accused had already
entered a plea of "not guilty" during their arraignment.
Moreover, the change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen into
entirely different articles from those originally complained of, affects the essense of
the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all
the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to
the charge filed against them. It will be observed that private respondents were
accused as accessories-after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had
already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the original information. To
charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from that
committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by
the Court.
The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was
not previously included in the original information, is likewise a substantial
amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to
meet a different situation in the trial court. In People v. Zulueta, 5 it was held that:
Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original charges will
have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly the
allegation of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the
accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even omissions of his co-
conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendment thereby
widens the battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered
weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would seem
inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this stage of the controversy,
bearing in mind that the accused is only guaranteed two-days' preparation for trial.
Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused
is at stake, it is always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to
avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too
many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared adversaries.
To allow at this stage the proposed amendment alleging conspiracy among all the
accused, will make all of the latter liable not only for their own individual
transgressions or acts but also for the acts of their co-conspirators.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The orders of the respondent court, dated
10 February 1977 and 22 February 1977 are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining
order issued on 21 March 1977 is LIFTED.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
107
G.R. No. L-28701 March 25, 1983
PEDRITO L. CATINGUB, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. RICARDO C. PUNO and THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, respondents.
GUERRERO, J:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 38698-R entitled "PEDRITO L. CATINGUB, Petitioner, versus HON. RICARDO C.
PUNO, Judge of the CFI Manila, Branch 24, and the PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, Respondents."
Herein petitioner, Pedrito L. Catingub, was charged with the crime of malversation
in Criminal Case No. 75696 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIV,
under the following Information:
That on or about and during the period covered from January 20 to February 24,
1963, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a Sales
Supervisor of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, Cagayan de Oro Branch, an
instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, duly qualified,
appointed and acting as such, and as such is responsible and/or accountable for
public funds received by him by reason of his said office and position for the proper
discharge of his duties and functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and fraudulently, with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate,
embezzle, and take away from the said funds the total amount of P12,314.50 which
he thereupon appropriated and converted to his own personal use and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of public interests and the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines in the aforesaid amount of P12,314.50, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law. 1
Assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Ramon Academia during arraignment, petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 2 Trial commenced on August 30, 1965
during which petitioner appears to have submitted to the court a paper purporting
to be a Motion to Quash. 3 This motion, however, was withdrawn by petitioner,
through counsel, on the ground that the facts to support lack of jurisdiction "are not
yet apparent or they do not yet appear on record ..." 4 At the continuation of trial
on October 4, 1965, petitioner again filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that the
trial court "is without jurisdiction to try the present case," the correct situs of the
crime being Cagayan de Oro City. 5 The court held in abeyance the resolution of
said Motion "until after the prosecution shall have rested its case." 6 In the
meantime, trial proceeded and on February 21, 1966, the prosecution closed its
evidence.
The prosecution evidence established that petitioner was appointed in Manila on
April 13, 1960 as Salesman I, Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, with
compensation at the rate of Pl,800.00 per annum, effective upon assumption of
office (Exhibit "A") which he assumed on May 9, 1960 after taking his oath of office
in Manila on May 5, 1960. Thereafter, he was designated Temporary Sales
Supervisor of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) assigned at the
Cagayan de Oro Branch. As such, he received sweepstakes tickets on consignment,
with the express obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sales of these tickets to
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office as shown in Exhibits "D", "D-1", "D-2",
and "D-3". On March 12, 1963, petitioner was informed by the Auditing Examiner of
the PCSO Cagayan de Oro Branch that he has been found short of P12,307.45
(Exhibit "F-2"). Petitioner was ordered to explain the shortage in writing and to
produce the missing amount. He failed to do so. On April 23, 1963, in view of his
failure to settle his ticket accounts, and pursuant to Resolution No. 137 of the Board
of Directors dated April 2, 1963, the services of the petitioner were terminated
effective as of March 1, 1963, without prejudice to whatever court action the PCSO
will take for the recovery of the amount involved. (Exhibit "B-1"). In a letter dated
May 20, 1963, petitioner proposed to the General Manager of the PCSO Manila, to
settle his shortages by making monthly payments in the amount of at least P200.00,
which proposal was, however, denied by the General Manager.
On April 25, 1966, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground that "the
prosecution made a wrong choice of jurisdiction." He contended that "on the basis
of the prosecution's evidence, the offense charged, together with all its essential
ingredients occurred and the consummation thereof (was) completed, in Cagayan
de Oro." 7
The trial court on May 18, 1966, denied the aforesaid Motion to Dismiss in the
following Order, to wit:
Acting upon the defendant's "Motion to Dismiss", dated April 22, 1966, the
plaintiff's opposition thereto, dated April 28, 1966, and the reply dated May 10,
1966, filed in behalf of the accused, and considering the evidence on record, the
Court believes and so rules that for the proper determination of the issues involved
in this case, the accused should be heard in his defense.
Wherefore, the aforesaid motion to dismiss is hereby denied and the continuation
of the trial of this case is hereby set for July 6, 1966, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.8
108
Reconsideration of the foregoing Order sought by petitioner was denied in another
Order dated November 3, 1966. 9 Petitioner assailed these two Orders of the Court
of First Instance in his petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
respondent Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate
Court) dismissed the petition in a decision promulgated December 19, 1967, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, we are of the considered
opinion that the accused's motion to dismiss upon improper venue is without merit
and accordingly the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction should be, as it is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement
as to costs. 10
Petitioner now comes to this Court by way of appeal by certiorari, raising the
following errors:
A. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of
Manila is vested with jurisdiction to try an offense under an Information charging
Manila as the place of commission when the evidence adduced by the prosecution
clearly establishes another place of commission.
B. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the consignment invoices of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, objected to as incompetent, control in every
instance the ultimate situs of prosecution in a crime involving malversation even
when the elements thereof have been shown to have taken place in another
territorial jurisdiction.
C. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting an equitable relief to petitioner
by having him tried in the place of actual commission of the offense to afford him
all the opportunity in an adversary proceeding to present his evidence and
witnesses.
D. The Court of Appeals erred in not resolving at least the doubt where the
crime was committed in favor of the accused.
The main issue for resolution is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila
has jurisdiction to continue with the trial of the offense as charged in view of the
evidence presented by the prosecution.
The Information filed in the trial court specifically alleges that the crime imputed
against petitioner, was committed "in the City of Manila, Philippines." Such an
averment would be sufficient if "the offense was committed or some of the
essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction" of the Court of
First Instance of Manila pursuant to Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Sec. 14(a) also provides:
Sec. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. - (a) In all criminal prosecutions, the
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province
wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof
took place.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of malversation of public
funds or property as follows:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property.— Presumption of malversation.
— Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for
public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or appropriate or
shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise
be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
hundred pesos.
xxx xxx xxx
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
uses. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 1060.)
The above presumption of malversation "takes the place of affirmative proofs
showing the actual conversion (and) obviates the necessity of proving acts of
conversion on the part of the accused, a thing almost always extremely difficult to
do (U.S. vs. Acebedo, 18 Phil. 428, 431).
Respondent Court of Appeals, in upholding the trial court's dismissal of herein
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction, adverted to the
written condition on the consignment invoices covering the sweepstakes tickets
delivered to and received by said accused, Exhibits "D", "D-1", "D-2" and "D-3" that
"I (petitioner) bind myself to comply strictly with existing rules and regulations and
to turn over to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office the proceeds of these
109
tickets." As the following heading: "Republic of the Philippines, Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office, Manila," was printed on the consignment invoices, the
appellate court concluded that the PCSO mentioned or referred to therein was no
other than the central or Manila office, and that petitioner's obligation was to turn
over the proceeds of the sale to the PCSO in Manila. Accordingly, since petitioner
had the obligation to turn over the proceeds of his ticket sales to the PCSO Manila
and he failed to do so, the appellate court held that the courts of Manila had the
jurisdiction to try the malversation charge against him.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals for We find on record the
testimony of prosecution witness Adriano M. Ruiz, Branch Manager of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office at Cagayan de Oro showing that "we require
the fieldmen who receive the tickets to turn over the proceeds of their sales either
to the branch office or to the home office, and to return unsold booklets, if any, one
week before the draw direct to the central office" (t.s.n., p. 11, Vol. II).
It may be true that as testified to by the Auditing Examiner, Amando Dominguez,
assigned by the GAO to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office that fieldmen
"are bound to turn over the proceeds of the tickets at the branch where they are
assigned or in Manila" (t.s.n., p. 2, Vol. IV) and that as declared by Lope V.
Salvatoria, Assistant Department Manager of PCSO at Manila that "when the
proceeds are turned over to the branch cashier, the responsibility ends there and
the branch cashier in turn transmits the amount to the treasurer in Manila" (t.s.n.,
p. 25, Vol. V), the option to deliver the proceeds to the local branch office appear to
be tor convenience and for security reasons. But the final accounting, the
settlement of accounts and the final clearances would have to be taken up in the
central or Manila office. Petitioner himself recognizes this fact for as the evidence
disclosed, he proposed to settle his shortages by paying P 200.00 monthly in his
letter addressed to the General Manager of PCSO in Manila (Exhibit "K").
We also agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that the case of People vs.
Angco, 103 Phil. 33, is substantially on all fours with the case at bar. In the said
Angco case, the Supreme Court laid down this ruling:
The appellant presses the question of jurisdiction raised in a motion to quash which
was denied by the trial court. He insists that as the malversation was committed
while he was a travelling sales agent in Cagayan, as charged in the information, and
that as it is not charged that the fund or part thereof was malversed in Manila, the
Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the case. True it is alleged
in the information that he had his "headquarters at Tuguegarao, Cagayan" but it is
also alleged that he was a "Travelling Sales Agent of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office, in said City," (Manila) ... "charged with selling sweepstakes
tickets entrusted to him for sale in his district, with the obligation of turning over
the proceeds of the sale of said tickets to the Treasurer of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office in Manila," ... , and that he "wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
fraudulently, with grave abuse of confidence," misappropriated, embezzled.
misapplied and converted the amount of P3,960.95, the unaccounted and unpaid
balance of the proceeds of the sale of the tickets to his own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
These allegations are sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of First
Instance of Manila to the exclusion of the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Cagayan. The findings of the trial court to the effect that the
appellant "was bonded and was authorized to sell sweepstakes tickets, with the
obligation of turning over the proceeds of the sale to the treasurer of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, Manila," and that the appellant failed to account for
and pay part of the proceeds of the sale of tickets made by him, bear out the charge
proferred against him in the information.
The crimes of estafa and malversation are similar in nature in that both involve
misappropriation of funds or property, the difference being that in estafa, the
property or funds misappropriated is private in character whereas in malversation,
the property constitutes public funds or property for which the accused as a public
officer is accountable by reason of the duties of his office. In the case of U.S. vs.
Cardel, 23 Phil. 207, and U S. vs. Mesina, 42 Phil. 66, it was held that estafa was
consummated in the place where the accused is required to render an accounting
and failed to do so. Applying the same ruling in the instant malversation case and
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court hereinbefore quoted, We hold
and rule that the present case of malversation may be tried in Manila since the
offense charged was consummated in Manila.
Indeed, petitioner could have been charged and tried in Cagayan de Oro City for it is
not disputed that he received the sweepstakes tickets from the PCSO, Cagayan de
Oro branch. The essential ingredient of receiving the sweepstakes tickets took place
in Cagayan de Oro City. He could also be charged in the City of Manila since the final
accounting must be rendered in the Central Office, Manila. This is therefore, a case
of concurrent jurisdiction by the proper court of the place wherein "anyone of the
essential ingredients thereof took place." But the choice of venue lies with the
prosecuting officer and not with the accused.
Petitioner pleads for equitable relief by having him tried in Cagayan de Oro City to
afford him all the opportunity in all adversary proceeding to present his evidence
and witnesses. We cannot accept petitioner's plea for equity because having
admitted in writing his shortages in his letter to the General Manager of PCSO in
Manila Exhibit "K", he comes to court with unclean hands. He who seeks equity
must come to court with clean hands.
110
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED. The records of this case are hereby ordered remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings in the ordinary course of law. No costs.

111

[G.R. No. 136994. September 17, 2002.]
BRAULIO ABALOS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the consolidated decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
dated August 10, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP No. 42482 and CA-G.R. SP No. 43237. The CA
had dismissed for lack of merit petitioner’s separate appeals from the order of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Branch 40, in Civil Case No. 95-
00752-D, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Branch 69, in Civil Case No. 17576.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The antecedents of this petition, based on the findings summarized by the Court of
Appeals, duly supported by the records, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
On November 11, 1994, an Information for Falsification of Private Documents was
filed against the accused-appellant Braulio Abalos (hereinafter referred to as the
accused-appellant) before the Municipal Trial Court of Dagupan City, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 22707. The information alleged —
That on or about the 12th day of July, 1994, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ENGR.
BRAULIO ABALOS, with intent to cause damage to the heirs of Roman Soriano of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, among them is EVELYN C. SORIANO, complainant herein, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause(d) the production of and
the filling in of entries on Cash Receipts Nos. 39185, 39414 and 41775 of the
Pangasinan Photostat, and thereafter offered the same to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 37 of Lingayen, Pangasinan, as supporting documents to his Bill of Cost in
Civil Case No. 15958, giving the impression to the court that the receipts were
authentic when in fact, to his own knowledge, they were not, thereby making
untruthful statements in a narration of fact; that as a consequence thereof, the
adverse party in Civil Case No. 15958, represented by EVELYN C. SORIANO,
sustained damages.
Thereafter, or on December 12, 1994, another Information for Falsification of
Private Document was filed against the accused-appellant before the Municipal
Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, docketed as Criminal Case No.
10024.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Meanwhile, on June 5, 1995, during his arraignment before the Dagupan Municipal
Trial Court, the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. On August 7, 1995,
he filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Municipal Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged. . . .
On October 20, 1995, the Municipal Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 2, ordered
the quashal of Criminal Case No. 22707 for lack of jurisdiction. Private
complainant’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied on November 20, 1995.
On January 3, 1996, private complainant filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City. On May 14, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City, Branch 40 issued the Order now on appeal, reversing and setting
aside the October 20, 1995 and November 20, 1995 Orders of the Municipal Trial
Court of Dagupan City, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 22707. . . .
x x x
On the other hand, after the filing of the Information before the Lingayen court, the
accused-appellant filed a Motion to Quash . . . The court a quo denied the Motion
to Quash in its Order of September 8, 1996. Undaunted, the accused-appellant
went on Certiorari to the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69
which rendered a Decision on October 28, 1996, dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari of the accused-appellant for lack of merit. 2
Twice rebuffed by two different trial courts, petitioner appealed the said cases to
the Court of Appeals. The appeal in Criminal Case No. 22707 was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 42482, while that in Criminal Case No. 10024 was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 43237. On February 22, 1997, petitioner moved to consolidate the two
appeals, which the Court of Appeals granted on April 4, 1997.
On August 10, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, both Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42482 and
43237 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 3
112
On December 14, 1998, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Hence, the present petition, where petitioner ascribes the following errors to the
Court of Appeals:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING AND RULING
THAT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE AT BENCH (sic), BOTH MTC LINGAYEN AND
MTCC DAGUPAN "HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPECTIVE INFORMATION FILED
FOR FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS" ;
(b) THAT THE FACTS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION IN THE MTC LINGAYEN
AND IN THE INFORMATION IN THE MTCC DAGUPAN DO NOT CONSTITUTE ONLY
ONE CRIME OF FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS; AND
(c) THAT IN THE CASE AT BENCH (sic), "EACH FALSIFICATION COMMITTED ON
EACH OF THE INDIVIDUAL RECEIPTS AND VOUCHERS CONSTITUTES A SEPARATE
CRIME EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A
CONTINUOUS TRANSACTION ON THE SAME DATE OR EVEN ON THE SAME PIECE OF
PAPER" .
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING AND RULING THAT THE
COMPLAINANT EVELYN C. SORIANO AND THE PEOPLE ARE NOT GUILTY OF FORUM
SHOPPING IN THE FILING OF TWO INFORMATIONS FOR ONE AND SAME OFFENSE IN
TWO DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
III. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE
DECISION APPEALED FROM, THAT THE FALSIFICATION OF EACH RECEIPT AND EACH
INVOICE CONSTITUTES A SEPARATE OFFENSE, THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 10024, MTC LINGAYEN IS DISMISSIBLE FOR CHARGING MORE THAN ONE
OFFENSE, AND THE DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 22707 MTCC DAGUPAN
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED. 4
The main issue to be resolved is whether MTCC-Dagupan and MTC-Lingayen have
jurisdiction over the crimes allegedly committed by petitioner. In this connection,
we must also resolve whether the filing of separate complaints supported by the
identical affidavits and annexes to the informations filed in two courts constitutes
forum shopping. Lastly, we must also determine whether the respective
informations in Lingayen as well as in Dagupan, MTCC, were dismissible for
multiplicity of offenses merged in one information.
Primarily, petitioner assails the assumption of jurisdiction over the criminal cases
for falsification by the MTCC-Dagupan and the MTC-Lingayen. He argues that both
courts could not have simultaneous jurisdiction over his case. He avers that only
one crime was committed pursuant to the unified and indivisible nature of the
criminal intent proved.
Petitioner also contends that the filing of two separate complaints using the same
complaint-affidavit and supported by the same annexes constitutes forum
shopping. He points out that if indeed the acts committed by him constitute several
offenses, then the informations filed against him in Criminal Cases Nos. 10024 and
22707 should be dismissed on the ground of "multiplicity of felonies charged in a
single information." 5
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that both MTCC-
Dagupan and MTC-Lingayen have properly assumed jurisdiction over petitioner’s
criminal cases since these involved different acts of falsification, where some were
committed in Dagupan and others in Lingayen. The OSG adds that each falsified
document constitutes one separate act of falsification, such that "there could be as
many acts of falsification as there are . . . falsified documents." 6 Citing People v.
Madrigal-Gonzales, 7 SCRA 942 (1963), the OSG contends that in this case, the use
of several falsified documents during one occasion does not diminish the number of
acts of falsification that petitioner had committed. 7
On the issue of jurisdiction, we find enlightening the findings of the Court of
Appeals:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Stripped to the core, the issue in these consolidated cases is whether or not the
Dagupan and Lingayen trial courts have jurisdiction over the respective information
for Falsification of Private Documents.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
This question finds its answer in the case of Alfelor, Sr. v. Intia, 70 SCRA 480, citing
the case of Lopez v. City Judge, 18 SCRA 616, where the Supreme Court
stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was
committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element
of jurisdiction (U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the provisions of
Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have original jurisdiction
only over criminal offenses committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction.
113
x x x Likewise, considering that five separate offenses of falsification were involved,
Coming now to the cases at bench (sic), it is clear that both the Dagupan and
Lingayen courts may exercise jurisdiction over the respective criminal cases filed
before it.
In the Dagupan case involving the cash receipts issued by the Pangasinan Photostat
of Dagupan City, the Information alleges that the offense was committed in
Dagupan City. This suffices to give said court jurisdiction over the crime of
falsification as charged. Petitioner’s argument that "the crime of falsification . . .
arose ONLY when the intent to cause damage became evident, that is, when the
receipts and invoices were ‘submitted in court as proof of the Bill of Costs’" proves
futile in light of the pronouncement in Lopez (supra), that the act of falsification is
committed by the signing of the document and the coetaneous intent to cause
damage and whether the falsified private document was thereafter put or not put
to the illegal use for which it was intended is in no wise a material or essential
element of the crime of falsification of a private document.
As for the Lingayen case, it appears that the subject invoices were issued by the
Xerox Copying Machine of Lingayen, Pangasinan. Again, it suffices for jurisdiction to
vest that the Information alleges that the crime of falsification, as charged, was
committed within the municipality of Lingayen. 8
A detailed disquisition could throw but little additional light on the issue of
jurisdiction. Petitioner was charged with five counts of falsification. The first three,
concerning Cash Receipts Nos. 39185, 39414, and 41775, were allegedly committed
in Dagupan. The other two counts, involving Invoices Nos. 1070 and 1071, were
allegedly committed in Lingayen. It is obvious the cases had to be filed where the
offenses had been committed, either in Dagupan or in Lingayen,
respectively.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
there can be no forum-shopping. It was erroneous for petitioner to argue that only
one offense was committed. There are as many acts of falsification as there are
documents falsified. 9
The real problem, however, is why the first three offenses were lumped in a single
information filed in Dagupan. Likewise, why were two offenses joined in a single
information filed in Lingayen? Thus, petitioner now claims, with ostensible merit,
that Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court was violated. 10
The Rules of Court, particularly Rule 110, Section 13, indeed frowns upon multiple
offenses being charged in a single information. However, petitioner failed to raise
this issue during arraignment, in Lingayen as well as in Dagupan. His failure to do so
amounts to a waiver, and his objection on this point can no longer be raised on
appeal. 11 In his Motion to Quash filed in Dagupan City, petitioner alleged lack of
jurisdiction. On the other hand, in his Motion to Quash filed in Lingayen, petitioner
alleged forum-shopping, double jeopardy, lack of jurisdiction, and that the facts do
not constitute an offense. He only raised the issue of "multifariousness of offenses
alleged" in his petition before this Court. By this time, his objection is belated, and
obviously to no avail.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The consolidated decision of
the Court of Appeals dated August 10, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP No. 42484 and CA-G.R. SP
No. 43237, is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

For jurisdiction to be acquired by a court in a criminal case, the offense should have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Dagupan court could not validly
take cognizance of offenses committed in Lingayen. Nor could the Lingayen court
legally entertain charges for acts done in Dagupan. The fact that the falsified
receipts and invoices were allegedly used at the same time in one court
proceedings (at the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Branch 7, in connection with
Civil Case No. 15958) is of no moment. The offenses of falsification took place much
earlier, separately, when the cash receipts were produced repetitively in Dagupan
and Lingayen.

114
G.R. No. 117488 September 5, 1996
SANTIAGO IBASCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
His motion to reconsider the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals of 11 August 1994 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 13300 affirming in toto the decision 2 of 20 November 1991 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62, in Criminal Cases Nos.
2755-G, 2756-G, and 2757-G having been denied, 3 the petitioner filed this petition
for review. The trial court found him guilty of the offense punished in B.P. Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law).
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 2755-G dated 31
March 1987 reads as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of April 1984, at Barangay Camohaguin, Municipality
of Gumaca, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously issue and make out Check No. DAT 41911, in the amount of EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND NINETY PESOS and TEN CENTAVOS (P18,090.10), Philippine currency,
drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank, Daet Branch, and payable to
Manuel Trivinio in payment for feeds purchased from the latter; that the accused
knew fully well at the time of the issuance of said check that he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in
full upon presentment; that upon presentation of said check to the bank for
payment, the same was dishonored and refused payment for the reason that there
was no sufficient funds to cover said check; and that despite notice to the accused
by said Manuel Trivinio that said check was dishonored for lack of funds, said
accused failed to deposit the necessary amount to cover said check, to the damage
and prejudice of Manuel Trivinio, now represented by his heirs, in the aforesaid
sum.
Contrary to law. 4
The informations in Criminal Case No. 2756-G and Criminal Case No. 2757-G are
similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. 2755-G except as to the date of the
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the number of the checks, and the amounts thereof. In
Criminal Case No. 2756-G, the violation was committed on 23 March 1984 and
involved Check No. DAT 41910 in the amount of P17,900.00 5 In Criminal Case No.
2757-G, the violation was committed on 24 February 1984 and involved Check No.
41909 in the amount of P15,576.30. 6
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Upon arraignment, the petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the charges.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals as follows:
The facts are as follows [sic]: The complaining witness Maria Negro Trivinio and her
late husband Manuel Trivinio operate an animal feed mill in Gumaca, Quezon while
accused-appellant Santiago Ibasco and his wife operate a piggery in Daet,
Camarines Norte. On or about October 26, 1983, accused-appellant Santiago Ibasco
and his wife, came to the residence of the Trivinios at Sitio Seawall, Bgy.
Camohaguin, Gumaca, Quezon and requested credit accommodation for the supply
of ingredients in the manufacture of animal feeds (TSN March 15, 1988, p. 7). In
accordance with the agreed credit arrangement, the Trivinios made three delivered
of darak with a total value of P51,566.49 (Id., p. 9) and in payment, accused-
appellant issued three (3) postdated checks, to wit: (1) Check No. 41909, postdated
February 24, 1984, for P15,576.30 (Exh. A — Criminal Case No. 2757-G; Id., p. 9); (2)
Check No. 41910, postdated March 23, 1984 for P17,900.00 (Exh. A — 2756-G; Id.,
p. 5) and (3) Check No. 41911, postdated April 18, 1984 for P18,090.10 (Exh. A —
Criminal Case No. 2755-G; Id., p. 10). All checks were drawn against United Coconut
Planters Bank, Daet Branch. Upon presentment to the Bank for payment of their
due dates, the checks bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds (Exh. B-
2755-G, B-2756-G and B-2757-G). The Trivinio spouses notified accused-appellant of
the dishonor (TSN, March 13, 1988, p. 11). Accused-appellant replied by telegram
offering his real property in Daet as security. Accused-appellant invited the Trivinios
to come to Daet and inspect the property (Exh. C; Folder of Minutes and Exhibits, p.
13). When the Trivinios arrived in Daet, the accused told them that the property is
across the sea, and, not wanting to cross the sea, the couple did not anymore
inspect the property (TSN, March 15, 1988, p. 14). For failure of the accused to
settle his account with the Trivinios, the instant case was filed. 7
The original records of the aforementioned criminal cases show that after the
presentation of the evidence for both parties had been concluded, the trial court
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, before
submitting his memorandum, the petitioner's new counsel filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since, it is claimed, the checks were "prepared,
issued and delivered to the payee . . . at the office of the accused in Daet,
Camarines Norte." 8
115
In its order 9 of 14 November 1991, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss
considering that the informations alleged that the violations were committed in
Barangay Camohaguin, Gumaca, Quezon, and that pieces of evidence, viz., the
affidavits 10 of Maria Negro, the surviving spouse of Manuel Trivinio who was
presented by the defense as a hostile witness, established that the checks were
issued in the said place.
On 17 December 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision 11 dated 20
November 1991 convicting the petitioner. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court firmly believes and so holds that the prosecution had
equitably proved its case by the evidences [sic] presented, finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G, 2756-G and 2757-G, and
imposes the penalty in each criminal cases [sic]:
In Criminal Case No. 2755-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of P36,180.20.
In Criminal Case No. 2756-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of P35,800.00.
In Criminal Case No. 2757-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of P31,152.60.
12
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the evidence offered by the prosecution
and, disregarding the theory of the defense, it opined and ruled as follows:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was purposely enacted to prevent the proliferation of
worthless checks in the mainstream of daily business and to avert not only the
undermining the Banking System of the country, but also the infliction of damage
and injury upon trade and commerce occasioned by the indiscriminate issuance of
such checks. By its very nature, the offenses defined BP 22 are against public
interest while the crime of Estafa is against property.
Since the act and commission specified in BP Blg. 22 are not necessarily evil or
wrongful from their nature and neither are they inherently illicit and immoral and
considering that the law which penalize [sic] such act or commission is a special
statutory law, the offenses are considered mala prohibita and considering the rule
in cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law has been
violated (People vs. KIBLER, 106, NY, 321, cited in U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132) —
criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public
policy (People vs. Conosa, C.A. 45, O.G. 3953). The defense of good faith and
absence of criminal intent would not prosper in prosecution for violation (Res. No.
447, S. 1980, Tomayo vs. Desederio, Dec. 8, 1980 & Res. No. 624, S. 1981. ESCOBAR
vs. SY, Sept. 1, 1981).
xxx xxx xxx
It is of no moment that by the evidence presented by the accused that a pre-
existing obligation took place and that the products delivered by the deceased
husband of complaining witness was [sic] below par; and that his piggery suffered
losses. This situation can be a basis for a civil action which accused actually filed
against complaining witness, but it cannot divest of the glaring fact that the checks
he issued bounced and was [sic] dishonored. 13
As to the issue of jurisdiction, the trial court held:
. . . The sworn statement of Maria Negro Trivinio which repudiated the allegation of
the accused in questioning the jurisdiction of this Court; between the protestation
of the accused that the place of issuance to be at [sic] Daet, Camarines Norte and
the positive allegation of witness Maria Negro Trivinio that the checks were
delivered at their residence in Gumaca. Quezon by the accused, this Court gives
weight and credence to the testimony of said witness and accused is bound by his
own evidence. 14
The petitioner seasonably appealed 15 the decision to the Court of Appeals which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 13300.
In his Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 13300, the petitioner contended that the trial court
erred: (a) in not dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction; (b) in not dismissing the
cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt; (c) in not taking into consideration that the liability of the
accused should have been civil in nature and not criminal; and (d) in not
disregarding the testimony of Maria Negro vda. de Trivinio since it is not clear and
convincing and is incredible. 16
In its challenged decision 17 of 11 August 1994, the Court of Appeals rejected these
claims of the petitioner and affirmed in toto the trial court's decision. As to the
issue of lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals ruled:
We agree with the lower court. The sworn statement, Exhibit 10, of Maria Trivinio
who was presented by accused-appellant as his last witness, in the words of the
lower court, "repudiated the allegation of the accused in questioning the
jurisdiction of this Court; between the protestation of the accused that the place of
issuance to be at [sic] Daet, Camarines Norte and the positive allegation of witness
Maria Negro Trivinio that the checks were delivered at their residence in Gumaca,
116
Quezon by the accused, this Court gives weight and credence to the testimony of
said witness and accused is bound by his own evidence" (Decision, pp. 16-17; Rollo,
pp. 96-98).
At any rate, as held in the case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154, a violation of BP
22 is an offense that appears to be continuing in nature. The knowledge on the part
of maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an
essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the
accused be within one territory or another. Said the Supreme Court:
In respect of the Bouncing checks case, the offense also appears to be continuing in
nature. It is true that offense is committed by the very fact of its performance
(Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the
Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the
act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon.
Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been
filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-
18, September 11, 1987 "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the
place of the issuance of the check". However, it is likewise true that knowledge on
the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which
is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether
the accused be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R.
Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined by
the allegations in the Information, which are controlling (Arches vs. Bellosillo, 81
Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235).
The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in
San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below.
(at page 164)
This ruling was reiterated in the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487, where it was
held:
Besides, it was held in People v. Hon. Manzanilla, supra, that as "violation of the
bad checks act is committed when one "makes or draws and issues any checks [sic]
to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds" or having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . .
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of
the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank," "knowledge" is an
essential ingredient of the offense charged. As defined by the statute, knowledge,
is, by itself, a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or
another. This being the case, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City has jurisdiction
to try Criminal Case No. 2089-R (688).
Moreover, we ruled in the same case of People v. Hon. Manzanilla, reiterated in
People vs. Grospe, supra, that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations
in the information. The allegation in the information under consideration that the
offense was committed in Baguio City is therefore controlling and sufficient to vest
jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. (at pages 492-493)
In the case at bench it appears that the three (3) checks were deposited in Lucena
City. 18
As to the second error wherein the petitioner asserted that the checks were issued
"as a guarantee only for the feeds delivered to him" and that there is no estafa if a
check is issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation, the Court of Appeals pointed
out that the petitioner obviously failed to distinguish a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 from
estafa under Article 315(2)[d] of the Revised Penal Code. 19 It further stressed that
B.P. Blg. 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks were issued as a
guarantee or for deposit only, for it makes no distinction as to whether the checks
within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to
guarantee the said obligation and the history of its enactment evinces the definite
legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing. 20
As to the contention that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the
drawing and issuance of the checks the petitioner had insufficient funds at the
drawee bank to cover the face value of the checks, the Court of Appeals held that
the mere issuance of a dishonored check gives rise to the presumption of
knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the check without sufficient
funds. 21
The Court of Appeals also saw no reason to disregard the testimony of Maria Negro.
Still unsatisfied with the decision, the petitioner filed this petition for review. In
addition to reiterating the arguments he raised before the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine that the
mere issuance of a bad check is a crime in itself.
The petitioner admits that the checks he issued were dishonored. His main defense
as to the dishonored checks is that they were issued not for value but for
accommodation or guarantee and invokes our ruling in Magno vs. Court of Appeals,
22 where we held that there was no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 where the bounced
check was issued to cover a required warranty deposit. He also cites Ministry
117
Circular No. 4 issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 15 December 1981, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
2.3.4 Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P.
Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the
payment of the obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally
liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
It was subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 issued on 8 August 1984,
which admitted its misinterpretation of B.P. Blg. 22. The pertinent portion of the
latter reads:
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having
interpreting authority may reverse its administrative interpretation of a statute, but
that its new interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs.
Danaher, 128 Conn. 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim
that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an
obligation or to facilitate collection will no longer be considered as a valid defense.
The petitioner also argues us to apply our ruling in Co vs. Court of Appeals, 23
where we held that dishonored checks issued prior to 8 August 1984 to guarantee
or secure payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, are governed by
Circular No. 4 of 15 December 1981 of the DOJ and the drawer thereof cannot be
liable for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
In the resolution of 31 May 1995, 24 we denied the petition for failure of the
petitioner to show any reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. The
petitioner sought a reconsideration primarily on the basis of Co vs. Court of
Appeals. 25 In our resolution of 7 August 1995, 26 we granted the motion for
reconsideration, reinstated the petition and required the respondents to comment
on the petition.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General countered that the trial court had
jurisdiction over the cases inasmuch as the questioned checks were delivered to
Manuel Trivinio in Gumaca, Quezon, and cited in support thereof People vs. Yabut.
27 It further argued that all the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are present in these cases.
The petitioner's knowledge of insufficient funds is legally presumed from the fact of
dishonor; and the defense that the dishonored checks were issued as guarantee to
secure a pre-existing obligation is without merit pursuant to the rule laid down in
Que vs. People. 28
We sustain the petitioner's conviction.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is in the nature of a continuing crime. Venue is determined
by the place where the elements of making, issuing, or drawing of the check and
delivery thereof are committed. Thus, as explained in People vs. Yabut, 29 "[t]he
theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any
jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. . . . The place where the bills
were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place
where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof.
The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an
obligation."
In her testimony, Maria Negro categorically stated that the three checks were
delivered by the petitioner to their residence in Gumaca, Quezon.
It is well-settled in criminal jurisprudence that where the issue is one of credibility
of witnesses, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial
court, considering it was in a better position to settle such issue. Indeed, the trial
court has the advantage of hearing the witness and observing his conduct during
trial, circumstances which carry a great weight in appreciating his credibility. 30 We
see no oversight on the part of the trial court in giving credence to the testimony of
Maria Negro. Besides, we have repeatedly ruled that the testimony of a lone
witness, when credible and trustworthy, is sufficient to convict. 31
Besides, it is not without convincing reason to believe that delivery of the checks
was in fact made at Gumaca, Quezon, it being the place of business of the late
Manuel Trivinio and from where the animal feeds were delivered. Consequently,
payment should be considered effected at Gumaca, Quezon. 32
The petitioner's defense of accommodation cannot exculpate him from his
wrongdoing. The case of Magno is inapplicable to him. The material operative facts
therein obtaining are different from those established in the instant petition. In
Magno, the bounced checks were issued to cover a "warranty deposit" in a lease
contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It was as
modus operandi whereby the supplier of the goods is also able to sell or lease the
same goods at the same time privately financing those in desperate need so they
may be accommodated. The maker of the check thus becomes an unwilling victim
of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker did
not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an
accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for
value. Also, in Magno, the payee in the former was made aware of the insufficiency
of the funds prior to the issuance of the checks.
118
Equally untenable is the petitioner's argument that since he issued the checks prior
to 8 August 1984 as accommodation or security, he is similarly situated with Co in
the Co case. In Co, we held that the rubber checks issued prior to 8 August 1984 as
a guarantee or as part of an arrangement to secure an obligation or to facilitate
collection was a valid defense in view of Ministry Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of
Justice. In the case of the petitioner, although he issued the checks prior to such
date, they were issued in payment of his indebtedness, and not for the
accommodation of the Trivinios nor security of their indebtedness.

Accommodation pertains to an arrangement made as a favor to another, not upon

a consideration received. On the other hand, guarantee refers to a promise to
answer the debt of another, in case the latter should fail to do so. 33 Neither
occurred in this case.

The petitioner's theory of accommodation is debunked by the following

circumstances: (1) The checks were issued after all deliveries were made at such
time when the petitioner's obligation was already in existence; (2) The sum of the
checks equalled the petitioner's total obligation in the amount of P51,566.40; (3)
The petitioner prepared a statement of account, 34 where the checks issued were
applied to his accounts due to Manuel Trivinio; (4) The act of the petitioner in
issuing three checks of different dates is inconsistent to his claim 35 that Manuel
Trivinio requested a post-dated check to show to his creditors; and (5) After the
checks bounced, the petitioner offered a property for its replacement. 36 All these
incidents verily indicate that the checks were issued as payment and for value and
not for accommodation. Needless to state, the checks failed to bear any statement
"for accommodation" or "for guarantee" to show the petitioner's intent.

The fact that the object of the contract, the animal feeds, was not of good quality is
irrelevant in the prosecution of a case involving B.P. Blg. 22, for the said law was
enacted to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which
the law punishes, but the act of making and issuing a check that is dishonored upon
presentment for payment. 37

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G,
2756-G, and 2757-G is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

119
G.R. No. 116688 August 30, 1996
WENEFREDO CALME, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, former 10th Division with HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ as
chairman and HON. CANCIO C. GARCIA and HON. RAMON MABUTAS as members,
respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:p
Petitioner Wenefredo Calme appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 28883 dated 10 December 1993 and its resolution dated 14 July
1994 upholding the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Oroquieta
City over the information for murder filed against him (Calme).
Petitioner and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by
allegedly throwing him overboard the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland passenger
ship owned and operated by William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was sailing from
Ozamis City to Cebu City on the night of 12 May 1991. Petitioner impugned the
Oroquieta RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged through a motion to quash
which, however, was denied by Judge Celso Conol of RTC, Branch 12, Oroquieta
City. Petitioner Calme's petition for certiorari and prohibition was denied due
course and dismissed by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated 10 December
1993. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied in the
Court of Appeals's resolution 14 July 1994. Hence, the present appeal wherein the
only issue for resolution is whether or not the Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over
the offense charged against petitioner.
Petitioner asserts that, although the alleged crime took place while the vessel was
in transit, the general rule laid down in par. (a) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Court is the applicable provision in determining the proper
venue and jurisdiction and not Sec. 15(c) (now Section 14) thereof since the exact
location where the alleged crime occurred was known.1
Petitioner thus claims that the proper venue is Siquijor because, according to the
Marine Protest filed by the vessel's captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0
miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when he (Capt. Magallanes) received the
report that "a passenger jumped overboard."2
Petitioner's contention is unmeritorious. The exact location where the alleged
offense was committed was not duly established. The Marine protest simply
adverted that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the captain
was informed3 of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the alleged
murder took place in the same area. In any case, where the crime was actually
committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was
in transit. "In transit" simply means "on the way or passage; while passing from one
person or place to another. In the course of transportation."4 Hence, undoubtedly,
the applicable provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 which
provides that "(w)here an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of
its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the
first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel
passed during such voyage subject to the generally accepted principles of
international law."
Petitioner further contends that even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 governs, Oroquieta City
would still be excluded as a proper venue because the reckoning point for
determining the venue under the aforementioned paragraph is the first port of
entry or the municipalities/territories through which the ship passed after the
discovery of the crime, relying on Act No. 400.5
We disagree. Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court in that under the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to
the CFI of any province into which the ship or water craft upon which the crime or
offense was committed shall come after the commission thereof, while the present
rule provides that jurisdiction is vested "in the proper court of the first port of entry
or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such
voyage . . . ." This is the applicable provision and since it does not contain any
qualification, we do not qualify the same. We fully concur with the findings of the
Court of Appeals, thus:
To support his arguments, petitioner relies on Act 400, which according to him is
the spirit behind the present Sec. 15(c), Rule 110. The said Act specifically provides,
among other things, that for crimes committed within the navigable waters of the
Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of Philippine registry,
jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province in which
the vessel shall come after the commission of the crime.
Petitioner's reliance on Act 400 is erroneous. The provision of said Act vesting
jurisdiction in the province where the vessel shall come after the commission of the
crime is not carried in the present Rule.
xxx xxx xxx
120
It is a basic rule in statutory construction that where the provisions of the law or
rule is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined from the language
employed. It must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA [7]01;
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561).

The words of Sec. 15(c) being clear, there is no reason to rely on Act 400 in
determining its true meaning, regardless of whether said Act was indeed the
moving spirit behind it. In fact, it does not seem that
the provision of Act 400 was carried into the present rule, as it is now worded.6

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

121